1. PrefabricatedShelters: Points to Consider Presentation at the Sustainable Disaster Relief Housing Conference, Oct. 28, 2011 Eddie ArgenalShelter and Settlements Advisor, USAID/OFDA
2. Session Agenda• NOT Housing, but Shelter• NOT just Shelter, but “S&S”• NOT just “S&S,” but Links to DRR and other Sectors• Lesson from Haiti
3. OFDA: Lead USG Agency for Int‟lDisaster Assistance Since 1964 1963, Irazu Volcano in Costa Rica1963, Skopje EQ, Former Yugoslavia
4. USAID/OFDA Mandate Save Lives Reduce Suffering Reduce the Economic and Social Impacts of Disasters (OFDA’s “Third Phrase”)
5. OFDA Criteria for Response Host country must ask for, or be willing to accept, USG assistance The disaster is of such magnitude that it is beyond the host country‟s ability to respond adequately, and It is in the interest of the USG to provide assistance.
6. Quick Review of OFDA Activities• In FY ‟10 spent $1.3B (5.8% of total USAID budget)• 73 “declared disasters” (1 every 5 days)• Worked in 56 countries• 250 employees in 25 offices• FY‟08 = $550M• FY‟12 = ???
7. Some of OFDA‟sOperational Partners
8. A Challenging Work Environment: The Fog of Relief EU/ ECHO USAID UN NGOs HOST OCHA NGOs NATIONNGOs SECURITY FORCES OTHER WFP NGOsICRC USAID DONORS OTHER UN AGENCIES IN COUNTRY UNHCR US Military Other Nation IOMUNDP Military UNJLC
9. Not an Atypical Pattern ofRecent OFDA Grant Funding to OFDA Grant Funding 2003 Implementing Partners… 10% 25% 65% UN Agencies NGOs/PVOs Intl Orgs
10. OFDA Does NOT Engage in Housing Reconstruction or Development, But RatherHumanitarian Shelter Assistance
11. “Full Reconstruction” Exceeds“HA” Mandates and Capacities
12. “Full Reconstruction” in ResponsePhase May Appear to Close Gap, ButFew “HA” Actors Know How to do it,so… MORE PROBLEMS
13. Transitional Shelter• More than a tent, less than a house• Jump-starts and re-engages affected populations in the incremental, longer- term process of housing development• Means of Promoting DRR and Livelihoods (platform for other sector interventions), and• Unlike other sectors, no easy handoff to development. With programmatic vacuum, all the more reason to emphasize CONTEXT and TRANSITION.
14. Transitional Shelter, Indonesia
15. Back to the Big Picture: SETTLEMENTS, the“Where?” of “Our” Mandate
16. Where Settlements are located,How they have developed,How rapidly they grow,How strong their economies are, andHow well they are managed, esp. intimes of crisis… Will largely determine whether they become the sites of future disasters -- and possible USG responses
17. The TRENDS Affecting Settlements Are Many, and Include…• The Future Is Urban. Global population will increase from 6.2 billion to 8.3 billion, ’03-’30; equiv. of nearly 100% located in the cities of developing countries, increasing pop. from 2 to 4 billion!• Persistent Poverty. Over 3.3 billion people -- 48% of humanity -- survived on per capita incomes of no more than $2.50/day in 2005. The poverty level was 2.5 billion in 1987.• Increasing Strains on Basic Social Services and Institutions• Growing Environmental Decline, Coupled with Limited Economic Growth• HIV/AIDS, Bird Flu, Swine Flu, Pandemic Influenza, etc. increasingly a feature of settlements
18. ANYONE SEEN…• Conditions depicted are experienced by nearly 1 of every 6 human beings• By 2030, nearly 1 of every 4!!!
19. Implications for OUR Work…• Context: 2X urban pop., 3X urban land; LOTS of issues with growth• Chronic and acute needs are merging more and more every day• Disasters/crises accelerate and exacerbate the urbanization process, and• How to address urban displacement?
20. Example: Kabul, „00-‟10:3X Pop., Maybe 6X Area
21. The Importance of Settlements• Settlements provide context for shelter interventions• Unit of Analysis changes with a settlements approach; no longer a near-exclusive focus on households and shelter, but neighborhoods and larger communities, and• Change in Unit of Analysis particularly useful in urban areas.
22. One Solution Does NOT Fit All• Return to safe shelter• Return to safe, cleared sites• Stay with host family• Stay in proximity site with host community, and• Relocate to planned sites
23. The Basic of a Settlements Intervention• Shelter-led• Multi-sectoral, reflecting multi-faceted character of context (i.e., settlements)• Opportunistic with regard to livelihood promotion and “DRR” (e.g., rubble removal)• Cognizant of gender, environment, local organizations, and social relations• Transitional, by linking relief and developmental concerns, and• Accountable to local governing structures
24. CONTEXT, CONTEXT, CONTEXT Poorest country in the hemisphere, about 149th of 182 countries listed in the UNs Human Development Index, just below PNG 80% unemployed or underemployed 60% below the poverty line, making less than $2/day per capita In PAP, 70% of population doesn‟t officially exist (rent, lease, squat, but don’t own land) In PAP slums, 11 sq. m. for 6 people Limited institutional capacities, and High vulnerability to flooding, landslides, hurricanes, and, yes, earthquakes.
25. USAID/OFDA Shelter Outputs Emergency Phase: -- Plastic sheeting distributed to estimated 500,000-600,000 people Transitional Phase: -- Hosting Support to est. 17,500 HHs (HA community doesn‟t track totals, but OFDA share thought to be notable) -- House Repairs for 7,181 Families (Approx. 80% of HA community output, via 5,081 repairs) -- Transitional Shelter for 28,326 HHs (as of 10-1- 11. Also, approx 33% of HA community output) -- Completed approx. 112% of 47,500 identified “shelter solutions” (as of 10-1-11)
26. Habitability Assessment and Yellow-Tag House Repairs• USAID/OFDA supported UN Habitat and PADF/Miyamoto to conduct/manage assessment of 403,176 structures• USAID/OFDA supported PADF/M and WCDO to repair 3,908 houses as of 3-9- 11, approx. 80-90% of humanitarian community (HC) output; will repair approx. 2,000 more houses, and• 94,002 yellow-tag houses, but current HC plans only call for repairs to fewer than 10,000 structures.
27. “CCC”:UNDAMAGEDRural House, Mirebalais Area
28. UNDAMAGED Rural House,Leogane Area
29. CHF Transitional Shelterfor Leogane and West
30. ADRA “TS”Project,Carrefour
31. RE-Learned Lessons Become “New” Guidance… Context, Context, Context! Tents Typically Not Large Enough Good Tents Expensive Complex logistics could make deployed “Pre-fabs” More Expensive Schools = Poor Shelter Local Options are Familiar, Available, Often Inexpensive, thus Accepted.
32. RE-LEARNED LESSON: THINK BIG, ORYOU‟LL MISS THE “BIG PICTURE”
33. How MuchRubble in Haiti?
34. 1,000 Truckloads a Day for 1,000 Days – Minimum!
35. EMERGENT LESSON• Few want to deal with rubble, and it‟s expensive to address, so it could take years to remove/dispose• Yet rubble is ALSO the most effective land use management tool most countries will ever have: where you don‟t clear, you don‟t build, and• Surgical, neighborhood-based focus preferred over “clear cut” efforts; will require creative “S&S” work, like land sharing, land readjustment, and two- story T-shelters.
36. EMERGENT LESSON: THINK SMALL, OR YOUWON‟T FIT (SPHERE) INTO CITIES
37. 3.5 sq. m. per person is NOTbased on comfort, but isconsidered “minimallyadequate” topromote health,privacy, andhuman dignity A = ± 3.5 m2/p
38. A First: Two-Story TransitionalShelter, Haiti, 5-12-11• Response to site conditions and need• Platform for DRR (structure, evac routes, and WASH opps)
39. RE-Learned Lessons• Shelter is the Easy Part; the Much Tougher Issue is LAND• Shelter Delivery Made More Difficult with Rubble. Affected Communities Effectively Smaller in Area Because Rubble is on top of Land, and• In Haiti, PAP alone “lost” an estimated 30% of land area, making sheltering all the more difficult. (Ravine Pintade 18 AC/7.3 HA, covered with 120k cubic m to height of 5‟/1.64 m)
40. RE-Learned Lesson: Hosting (“STEALTH” Shelter) Really Does Work• Primarily socially defined, based on family, friends, neighbors, etc.• Commences before humanitarians arrive on the scene, i.e., self-selected• Cost-effective, flexible means of sheltering• Buys time for longer-term solutions to emerge, and• Often transitions to permanent shelter.
41. Host Family Support, Mirebalais(New self-built shelter in family compound is on right)
42. RE-Learned Lesson: Land Policies and InstitutionsAre Often Dysfunctional, at Best• In many countries, land management (e.g., planning, measuring, recording, documenting, regulating, taxing) is ineffective, and• Policy makers know steps “A and Z”, but not steps B, C, D, etc. Problems are so complex that they overwhelm existing capacities.
43. THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND PATIENCE EARGENAL@USAID.GOV