Jacob W. KijneWater Management Consultant 20 September 2012
In early August 2012, BBC World News and other news agenciesreported that half of the counties in the USA (in 35 states) hadbeen declared disaster areas because of drought. USDA hadsaid that yields, especially corn (maize) and soya were badlyaffected. Since then there have been headlines in the newspapers about the higher food prices to come. Droughts here andin many other countries, as well as floods in Burma andNiger, are the background for this discussion about water sharingand water conflicts. A motto for this discussion might be: “Thereis a sufficiency in the world for man‟s need but not for man‟sgreed” (as said by Mahatma Gandhi).Quoted on 2012 page 259 of Gustaf Olsson‟s new book „Waterand Energy: threats and opportunities‟. IWA Publishing.
Some twenty years ago, Ismail Serageldin, then Vice-Presidentof the World Bank, and Chairman of the CGIAR, said that „thewars of the next generation will be about water‟. At about thesame time, the then Secretary-General of the UN, BoutrosBoutros-Ghali made a similar statement. Perhaps it is nocoincidence that both gentlemen are from Egypt, a country thatdepends entirely on Nile river water, a source that could easilybe cut off by upstream countries such as Ethiopia, with itspopulation of more than 80 million people and still growing, orSudan.
This essay starts with a discussion of the water war argument,followed by some data on different types of water conflicts, andtheir number reported in the past. Then there follows a briefreview of incentives to cooperate rather than to enter into adispute. The process of water conflict management and its keyissues are discussed before concluding with an analysis ofwhether the history of conflicts can be seen as a predictor ofwhat the future will bring.
But first a word about terminology: the terms transboundary andinternational waters need clarification. Generally, the term„international waters‟ refers to those waters that cross boundaries oftwo or more countries, while „transboundary water‟ is a moreinclusive term that refers to waters crossing any jurisdictional orsectoral boundaries, including those within countries. The termsconflict and dispute also have distinct meanings in the literature. A„conflict‟ involves two or more parties with one of them disagreeingon a change in water use by one of the other parties, with thedisagreement leading to violence of some kind. A „dispute‟ is aconflict that results in non-violent tensions among parties, includingpolitical, legal, or economic actions.
The competition for water is becoming stronger every yearbecause of increased food and biofuel needs for a growingworld population, aggravated by changing eating patterns,greater demands for water from urban centers for drinking waterand sanitation and also from industrial and economicdevelopment, and finally as a result of changing rainfall andrunoff patterns due to climate change. The causes of conflictsinclude both hydrological factors and the social and economicneeds of riparian states, but also the need for changes in wateruse, e.g. arising from economic development. The critical issuesin conflict management to be discussed later are of courselinked to the causes of conflict.
Some scientific papers point to water not only as a cause of historicarmed conflict but also as the resource that will bring soldiers to thebattlefield in this 21st century. Invariably, water wars are mentionedin the context of the arid and hostile Middle East where the situationis rapidly getting worse with a diminished flow in the River Jordanand a much lower water level in the Dead Sea. The basic argumentsfor „water wars‟ therefore are: (1) water scarcity in arid and semi-arid regions that leads to immense political pressures; (2) water ignoring political boundaries; and (3) the fact that international water law is poorly developed and hard to enforce, complicating water conflict management.
On the legal aspects, the 1997 Convention on the Non-NavigationalUses of International Watercourses Commission, which took 27years to develop, reflects the difficulty of matching legal andhydrological realities. The Convention, based on the Helsinki Rules(1966), provides important principles for cooperation, such as„equitable use‟ and the „obligation not to cause appreciable harm‟.The Convention, however, provides little practical guidelines forwater allocation, the most common cause of conflict. Internationallaws are concerned with the rights and responsibilities of nations; asa result that some non-national political entities, such as thePalestinians along the Jordan River and the Kurds along theEuphrates, cannot claim water rights in international courts.
Globally, nearly half of the total land area is found in international basins;for Africa, the percentage is as high as 62%. There are about 270international river basins and more than half of the world‟s population livesin transboundary basins (Gleick, 2012).Water conflicts have been reported since people first started to leavewritten records. The Atlas of Water (Black and King, 2012) counts a total of816 conflicts between 1948 and 2008, half of which were about theallocation of water. Other sources present slightly different data (Gleick,2012; Delli Priscoli and Wolf, 2009). Additional causes of conflict cited bythese authors include water resources being used as weapons or targetsduring military action. In terrorism the action is caused by non-state actors;such actors may use water resources as targets or tools of violence andcoercion. In development disputes the harm can be done by state or non-state actors.
Data show an increase in water disputes over time. This increasemay partly be explained by better reporting and the globalization ofnews. Since the end of WWII, all regional wars and conflicts, suchas those in the Balkans and Central Africa, have resulted in water-related harm. The effects in these two areas reflects one of themost important changes in the nature of conflicts over the lastseveral decades – the growing severity and intensity of local andsub-national conflicts, and the relative decrease of conflicts at theinternational level (Gleick, ibid). A growing number of these disputesover water allocations across local boundaries, ethnic boundaries, orbetween economic groups have escalated into conflicts.
An early example of a terrorist-cum-development-related conflicthappened from 1907 till 1913 in the Owen‟s Valley of California. TheLos Angeles aqueduct/pipeline suffered repeated bombings in effortsby the affected people in the Valley to prevent diversions of waterfrom the Owen Valley to Los Angeles.Another well-known development conflict resulted from the 1947partition of India and Pakistan over the waters of the Indus River.This was not resolved until 1960 with the Indus Water Agreement,reached through World Bank intervention, involving the constructionof a number of large link canals to bring water from the Indian sideof the new border to Pakistan.
An example of a conflict in which water was used as a political tooloccurred in 1998 in Angola. Fierce fighting broke out at the Gove dam onthe Kunune River as UNITA and Angola government forces battled forcontrol of the installation.A recent example of a development conflict occurred in 2006 in Ethiopia. Atleast 12 people died and more than one hundred were wounded in clashesover competition for water and pasture in the Somali border area.The ongoing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is an example of apolitical conflict. In the West Bank, it is mainly caused by competition forwater supplies, with Israel getting more than three quarters of the supply,including water for the controversial settlements in the West Bank.
At the same time as this increasing number of disputes andconflicts, there are many examples of peaceful resolutions.The Atlas of Water (2012) reports a total of 1743 cooperativeevents between 1948 and 2008. Delli Priscoli and Wolf (2009)report the number of international water treaties from 1888 till2000 as 62. Most of the treaties specify boundaries andindicate some limits on the use of surface water. Only nine ofthe 62 treaties deal specifically with groundwater regulations,including allocation, quality and protection of the land. About25 include some conditions on groundwater management, butnot on water allocation, while an equal number mention waterquality only indirectly.
Although the exact number of disputes and treaties may not beknown, it is evident from the data that there are morecooperative events than conflicts. It should also be realizedthat treaties seldom clearly define water allocations and limitson water quality. Moreover enforcement mechanisms on waterquality are often absent, especially in international basinagreements. Thus, although helpful, the mere presence of atreaty does not automatically translate into behavior alteringcooperation (Warner and Zawahri, 2012)
Cooperation among riparian countries is becoming imperativeas pressure on the water resource increases. In March 2012in Marseilles, at the initiative of the International Network ofBasin Organizations, some 69 basin organizations in Africa,America, Asia, and Europe signed „The World Pact for BetterBasin Management‟. They expressed their intention – amongother things – to improve water governance in their basins,organize dialogues with stakeholders, facilitate agreements ona „shared vision of the future of the basin‟, develop action andinvestment plans that meet the economic, social andenvironmental priorities of the basins, and organize in eachbasin a harmonized data base as part of an integratedinformation system.
Although important, these agreements do not include amethodology for dealing with disputes or conflicts. A case inpoint is the Mekong River basin. There is a long history ofinternational cooperation under the Mekong River Committeeand the Mekong River Commission, established in 1957. ThisCommission is made up of representatives of Cambodia, Laos,Thailand and Vietnam. In December 2011, the Commissionurged for a second time that approval be withheld for theconstruction of a potentially devastating dam at Xayaburi innorthern Laos until more is known about its effect on the LowerMekong (Economist, May 5th 2012). Apart from high up in thegorges of south-western China, the Mekong remainsundammed.
But now a Thai construction company has been contracted tobuild the dam, and apparently 5000 workers have been hired.Two countries, Laos and Thailand, are expected to share thepower to be generated at the dam. The news that the dam willbe built has triggered an angry response from the other riparianneighbors. The December agreement, calling for furtherenvironmental studies, included Laos. Opponents of the damargue that the Xayabury dam will adversely affect the livelihoodof 65 million people in South-East Asia who depend on fisheryfor their sustenance. In fact, the Mekong Agreement of 1995requires the four nations to consult and respect their neighbors‟concerns but leaves the final decision to each sovereign state.
Interesting in this context is a 2011 decision of theInternational Court of Justice in a decision on a dispute aboutwater pollution from paper mills between Argentina andUruguay which states that Environmental Impact Assessmentis an essential requirement of customary international lawand diligence to prevent significant transboundary harm andits notification are required not just between states that haveconcluded international agreements (McIntyre, 2011). Theinternational Court of Justice has also stipulated that theprinciple of equitable utilization should be seen as a processrather than a normative determinative rule.
Under ideal circumstances striving for equity and preventing harmwould be strong incentives for collaboration between neighboringcountries. However, rarely are the potential partners in collaborationequal partners in power. A review of the treaties from the past halfcentury reveals an overall lack of robustness (Delli Priscoli and Wolf,ibid.). Nevertheless, on the positive side, in some of the more recenttreaties, there has been a broadening in the definition andmeasurement of basin benefits, with the intention to equitably allocatethe benefits derived from the use of water, not the amount of wateritself. One example is the 1961 Columbia River Treaty, in which theUS paid Canada for the benefits of flood control and Canada wasgranted rights to divert water between the Colombia and KootenaiRivers for hydropower generation.
Some scientists support the introduction of „efficiency‟ ratherthan „equity‟ into water conflict management, where „efficiency‟ isdefined as the allocation of water to its highest use. „Highestuse‟ may be illustrated by the following example. There is muchvariation in current water demands for producing 1 kg of corn: inthe USA it is 0.57 m3, in India 3.05 m3, and in Nigeria 5.34 m3.This is an example of inefficient water use in India and Nigeria.Water sharing should take into consideration the possibility ofincreasing the overall efficiency of water utilization byreallocating the water according to these values. But differentwater users, for example domestic water users versus users ofgolf courses, along a watercourse may value water differently.
The logical extension of this efficiency concept is the so-called „virtual‟ water,i.e. the water required to produce specific goods and services. Some arguethat the virtual water trade will become increasingly important as nations orregions experience water scarcity and then desire to mitigate the economicand political impacts of the internal water shortage by importing food. This canonly work if nations in water-scarce regions have the hard currency to buy thefood they need on the world market and are willing to forgo food self-sufficiency in their staple food crops. To complicate this issue: water-poorcountries often export fruits and other high value crops to water-rich countriesas these crops cannot be grown in the importing country for climatic reasonsor can be produced much more cheaply in the exporting country. Tradeshould be beneficial to both the exporter and importer. The assumption thatnations are willing to depend for their staple crops on import from elsewhere isdoubtful, especially when world market prices of agricultural products arevolatile as a result of drought in the main production areas.
Procedures for collaboration and dispute management range from initiativestaken by the conflicting parties themselves towards increased participationand interventions by third parties. The most far-reaching type of outsideintervention is third-party decision making. Unassisted conflict managementprocedures include conciliation, information exchange, collaborative problemsolving and negotiations. Assistance by others could consist of help inrelationship building, such as counseling, team building, and proceduralassistance (i.e. coaching, facilitation and mediation), as well as moresubstantive assistance through technical advisory boards, dispute panels,fact finding, and advisory mediation. Third- party intervention could benonbinding or binding arbitration and mediation, and judging. A critical tippingpoint is reached when the power to resolve the dispute moves from theparties in dispute into the hands of an outside party. With third party decision-making, the primary communication pattern is between parties and the arbiteror the panel charged with the decision making (Delli Priscoli and Wolf, ibid.).
The extensive literature on dispute management shows a trend towardprocedures of assisted dispute resolution but without the third-party makingthe decision. In the USA, the growing experience of litigation or threat oflitigation when a third party made the decision, acts as an incentive to moveaway from third-party involvement. Reviews of international mediationsdescribe similar experiences. Procedures with minimal assistance allow theparties in dispute more control over the outcome. Some reviewers suggestthat disputes with a third-party decision have limited capacity to deal with themultiple parties and issues that characterize water disputes. Yet expert panelsor commissions have been common in the water resources field. Forexample, there are technical committees on the Nile, the Euphrates, theIndus and other rivers. Technical committees have also been central to thework of a variety of river basin commissions in the USA and Canada.
Many disputes, such as upstream-downstream conflicts, start as zero-sumconfrontations where one party‟s loss is another‟s gain. As the adversarial stageplays out, negotiations can shift from rights (what a party feels it is entitled to) toneeds (what is actually needed to fulfill its goals). At the same time, theattention shifts from past to future. The next stage – if all goes well – is usuallya move towards more cooperative solutions which entail the desire to increasethe benefits of the resource throughout the basin. This is often called„expanding the pie‟, meaning no longer conceiving the situation as a zero-sumargument. The most successful cases of building regional approaches to waterhave gone beyond seeing water as the end to recognizing it as a means toachieve other goals such as socio-economic development or reducing the risksof floods or drought. The last stage is agreeing on the sustainableimplementation of an action plan in which the benefits are distributed fairlyequitably among the parties. Needless to say, this is a very brief summary ofwhat is usually a complicated and time-consuming process which is oftencharacterized by one step forward and two steps back (Delli Priscoli and Wolf,ibid.).
The interesting studies by Professor Lynn of the Department of AgriculturalEconomics at University of Nebraska, Lincoln, (UNL) should be mentioned inthis context. He and his co-workers (Sheeder and Lynn, 2011) studiedfarmers‟ motivation to engage in conservation tillage in the upstream area ofthe Blue River/Turtle Creek watershed on the border between Nebraska andKansas. Runoff from irrigated fields of upstream farmers contributes to thepollution of the lake which is the source of drinking water for the downstreampeople. Traditionally, upstream farmers have not been concerned aboutdownstream water users‟ lack of access to clean water. To reduce waterpollution from agricultural runoff, conservation measures are stimulated bypayments. Three groups of people were identified in the study area:upstream farmers, downstream water users and people who were bothupstream farmers and downstream water users.
The researchers analyzed the sense of empathy (thinkingyourself in the shoes of others) of those in each group. The keyfinding from their research is that increasing conservationpayments is not likely to be cost-effective on their own foraddressing pollution problems. Individuals may ultimately makechoices based on empathy/sympathy. A strong feeling ofempathy leads to a sense of a shared interest in enhanced waterquality and diminishes the more primal tendency to maximizeprofits. They conclude that water policy and educationalprograms need to pay attention on how to induce, and otherwise‟nudge‟, empathy. A key question in conflict management isindeed how to stimulate this feeling of empathy for the otherparty in the conflict.
Power often plays an important role in water disputes. Unequalpower relationships, without a robust third-party involvement, cancreate strong disincentives for cooperation. A strong regionaleconomic entity can provide support when issues arise betweenbasin states, as was the case with the Central Asian EconomicCommunity in disputes around the Aral Sea. This was also therole of the World Bank (especially of its president Eugene Black)with the World Bank‟s positive, active and continuous involvementin the India-Pakistan water treaty after partition in 1947. Note thatthe World Bank was also the donor facilitating the solution in thisconflict. It has been recognized that in particularly hot conflicts,when political concerns override the water issues, a sub-optimalsolution may be the best that can be achieved.
Sometimes separating resource issues from political interestmay not be productive. Involvement of a non-riparian, regionalpower may then be important. A case in point was the role ofEgypt in conflicts about the water of the Jordan River.Elsewhere, solving political and resource use disputes wasaccomplished in two mutually reinforcing tracks (also in theMiddle East). A special type of unequal power occurs indisputes between Mexico and USA in the use of water from ashared aquifer when federal and state governments holddifferent opinions and thus impede cooperation (Delli Priscoliand Wolf, 2009).
Upstream-downstream power. Equitable agreements are hardto reach when one riparian country holds most geographic andmilitary power. Examples include disputes between Turkey andIraq and Syria over the water allocation from Tigris andEuphrates, and also with respect to the Salween River, withChina as the upstream power, and Burma and Thailanddownstream.
The water disputes between Turkey and Iraq and Syria have beenstudied in detail (Warner, 2012, and Warner and Zawahri, 2012). Turkeyis clearly the dominant power (hegemony) in this situation, while Syriaand Iraq complained but had little choice but to accept the fact thatTurkey was building dams and the remaining flow in the two riverswould be much reduced. Turkey needed the water for the developmentof the South East, the Greater Anatolia Project (GAP), includinghydropower and irrigation of 2 million ha. Gradually, Turkey started toframe the right to water as a security issue. Presenting policy issues asa security issue („securitization‟) has been done by many countries andis often a potent way of rallying a political constituency behind a policy.Securitization involves presenting a threat as a life and death concernlegitimizing extraordinary measures, such as top-down decision-makingand classifying information.
[On May 9, 2012, Mario Otero, Under-secretary for Civilian Security,Democracy and Human Rights, in the State Department (USA)commented that “if left unaddressed, water challenges worldwidewill pose a threat to US security interests”.]The political situation in the area changed with the US occupation ofIraq, Syria‟s support for Kurdish fighters, privatization of Turkey‟swater sector and the outcome of the World Commission on Dams(FAO and World Bank, 2000). Turkey at the time wanted to constructthe Ilisu dam close to the border with Syria. The downstream waterusers objected as they feared for their own water supplies; the rivershows large variability in its flow. American Society of AgronomyCSA News September 2012, page 20.
The need to find international funding for the construction of the Ilisudam alerted national and international NGO‟s to the destruction ofheritage sites below the reservoir, the environmental impact of thedam and the inevitable resettlement issues. As a result ofinternational pressure, the donor countries and banks withdrew theirsupport which led to long delays. Yet, in 2005 Turkey revised theproject. More protests followed but the construction has now startedwith completion expected in 2015.This brief discussion of power and power distribution shows thecomplexity of the various roles played by domestic and internationalpolitical players, and the limited validity of the secularizationattempted by Turkey.
Data. Data collection and sharing is essential before anagreement can be reached or construction takes place. Butparties in developing countries often disagree about thevalidity of the collected data, especially on the ecologicalimpacts and development projections. Requestingincreasingly detailed data clarifications is often used as adelaying tactic. Agreement on the minimum data necessaryfor a solution can be a first step in establishing trust, and ifthat is not possible delegating data gathering to a third partymay speed up negotiations.
Benefits. All the water resources in the relevant domain of theparties in conflict need to be included in the watermanagement programs and strategy. Ignoring the link betweenquantity and quality, and between surface water andgroundwater ignores the hydrologic reality. What is needed isIntegrated Water Resource Management (IWRM; see Lentonand Muller, 2009), which is difficult to realize. In all disputes,but especially between nations with unequal power alleconomic benefits from a possible agreement between partiesshould be considered.
Several important trends of the recent past could raise the likelihoodof water disputes in the future. These are population growth and theassociated increased demand for food, biofuel and meat,urbanization, economic development, the associated energy andindustrial water demands, and climate change. These challenges areclosely interlinked. For example, Vaux (2004) argued with great claritythat water scarcity will constrain the extent to which we are able toprovide adequate water and sanitation services to most of the world‟spopulation. The notion that water for domestic purposes is of suchhigh value and clear priority that it takes precedence over other uses,cannot be maintained. There are no well-functioning markets whichrespond to relative values to ensure that water is allocated to useswith the highest values.
Communities in both dry and humid areas struggle to obtain the watersupplies needed to support existing and anticipated population andeconomic growth. The need to maintain sustainable ground waterresources, the maintenance and improvement of water quality and theneed to feed a more populous world will compete in part with the needfor water that should be allocated to sanitation and drinking watersupplies for poor people. Alleviating ground water overdraft byimporting additional surface water supplies is becoming less viable assurface water becomes fully appropriated (Vaux, ibid.). Increasingenergy supplies in countries with frequent power cuts require largeamounts of water; energy from biomass and oil need most. A case inpoint is South Africa, one of several countries that are both water- andenergy-scarce, and where much needed water is diverted to coal-firedpower plants with SO2 scrubbers. See also Olsson (2012).
To make matters worse, there are concerns about the implicationsfor transboundary waters arising from the rapid increase inacquisition and leasing of large areas of agricultural land by otherscountries and investors. Since 2000, more than 1000 of such dealshave been made, involving a land area of about half the size ofEurope, 40 percent of which is in Africa (230 Mha, according to arecent report from Kings College, London). In Mali 100,000 ha ofland previously cultivated by small family farmers was last yearallocated to investors for large-scale farming. The process haslargely bypassed the official procedures established by the Office duNiger at regional scale. Negotiations are done behind closed doorsand water is often presumed to be included without it explicitly beingmentioned in the land lease agreements.
Large scale farming for the production of sugarcane or palm oil(perennial crops), and double cropping require more waterthan was used by the family farmers in the past. Local farmersoften have no legal ownership of their land or the water theyuse. In dry seasons of deficit years the water supply in theNiger River is not adequate to meet this increased demand.The Niger Basin Authority has put restrictions on the flow ofwater that Niger is allowed to divert upstream of the Markaladam, in order to maintain a significant downstream flow forfishing and ecological reasons. A recent special issue of WaterAlternatives (Mehta et al., 2012) reports several similar cases.
Unfortunately, as the SIWI report (Jägerkog et al, 2012) pointsout, the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investmentsagreed by FAO, International Fund for Agricultural Development(IFAD), the UN conference on Trade and Development, and theWorld Bank do not explicitly mention water. Is the acquisition ofland in a developing country land grabbing or a normal businesstransaction? It should be recognized that large-scale investmentis often desperately needed in rural areas to deliver social andenvironmental benefits, and help reduce rural poverty. The SIWIreport concludes that there is a clear trend for deals to occur inplaces with weak governance and legislation.
As mentioned climate change complicates the already existingcompetition for scarce water. The Fourth Assessment Report ofthe Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007)notes that climate change will lead to “changes in allcomponents of the freshwater system” and includes impacts onwater availability, timing, quality and demand. Mosttransboundary water agreements, however, are based on theassumption that future water supply and quality will not change(Gleick, 2012). As the Egyptian hydrologist Fekri Hassan hasobserved “In the long run, the only constant is change.” Quotedin Delli Priscoli (2012).
Currently, global circulation models are not of much help towater managers as they are not reliable predictors of rainfalland runoff at the scale required for catchment watermanagement. There are 23 of such models which generatehundreds of scenarios (Delli Priscoli, 2012). Policy changes willalso be needed. As Delli Priscoli (ibid) writes, “anticipatorypolicies and actions can improve the capacity of a watershed toadapt to transboundary impacts of changes in water use, landuse and climate on water resources and services. But thesepolicies are still in their infancy”.
Full-scale water wars are unlikely but the frequency of waterconflicts is likely to increase because of strong competition forthe scarce resource. Conflicts can be anticipated as the mostcommon causes are known. Such anticipation should includedata collection and measures to encourage cooperationbetween the opposing parties. Parties should not be allowed toget stuck in rigid positions or in securitization. Broad sets ofbenefits should be identified.
There is no one-size-fits-all solution for water disputes. Much dependson the local situation but international institutions might play a role asthird party mediators. Coping with water scarcity requires bothmitigation and adaptation. There are various ways to augment thesupply of water by constructing more storage in reservoirs, reuse ofdrainage water and treated waste water, and desalinating sea water;all of which are controversial, expensive and require energy. Equallyimportant, there are various ways to reduce the demand for water,including reducing water consumption in high-income countries,reducing the amount of animal products we consume, and reducingthe amount of non-revenue water (losses). There is a role forgovernments and water companies in achieving these demandreductions.
Demographics are important: the growing population of theSahel can expect their water supplies to diminish, while thedecreasing population of Southern Europe will have relativelymore water. Similar dichotomies exist elsewhere. In future,they might cause a flow of ecological refugees.Overall, then, with respect to water conflicts there is room foroptimism as well as pessimism, since water sharing has thepotential for win-win solutions.
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• Mehta, L, Veldwisch S.J. and Franco, J. (2012) Introduction to the Special Issue: Water Grabbing? Focus on the (Re)appropriation of Finite Water Resources. Water Alternatives 5(2):193-207• McIntyre, O. (2011) The World Court‟s ongoing contribution to International Water Law: the Pulp Mills case between Argentina and Uruguay. Water Alternatives 4(2):124-144• Olsson, G. (2012) Water and Energy: threats and opportunities. IWA Publishing, London, New York• Sheeder, R.J. and Lynne, G.D. (2011) Empathy-conditioned conservation: “Walking in the shoes of others”. Land Economics 87(3): 433-452
• Vaux jr, H. (2004) Perspective Paper 9.2 pp 535-540 In: Global Crises, Global Solutions (B. Lomborg, ed.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York• Warner, J. (2012) The struggle over Turkey‟s Ilisu dam: domestic and international security linkages. Int. Environ. Agreements 12:231-250• Warner, J. and N. Zawahri (2012) Hegemony and asymmetry: multiple-chessboard games on transboundary rivers. Int. Environ. Agreements 12: 215-229• World Commission on Dams Report (2000). UNDP, New York and World Bank, Washington DC