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Third Generation Terrorism And Crisis Management

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A Sample of in class Independent Research

A Sample of in class Independent Research

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  • 1. Third Generation Terrorism  and Crisis Analysis     Jeffrey A. Schneider 12/08/09
  • 2. Agenda (the Meta-Discourse Slide)
    • My argument today in this presentation is based on the following syllogism:
    •  
    • 1.  Third Generation Terrorism Exists
    • 2.  Terrorist plot trends illustrate that it is a growing threat.
    • 3.  The M-11 attack in Madrid illustrates the nature of this threat.
    • 4.  Third Generation Terrorism must be analyzed.
    • 5.  Third Generation Terrorism does not conform to traditional frameworks of Crisis Analysis (specifically: Snyder-Diesing)
    •  
    • conclusion:
    • To better analyze and prepare to deal with this growing threat, a new analytical framework is needed. 
  • 3. What is Third Generation Terrorism?
    • Mustafa Setmarian (aka Abu Musab al-Suri)
    • The International Islamic Resistance Call
    •  
    • "[The Grassroots Jihadi Networks is a] third generation of mujahideen, a generation currently in the process of being defined, born after the September happenings, the occupation in Iraq, and the Palestinian Intifada."
    •  
  • 4. What is Third Generation Terrorism? Mustafa Setmarian (aka Abu Musab al-Suri) The International Islamic Resistance Call   "[The Grassroots Jihadi Networks is a] third generation of mujahideen, a generation currently in the process of being defined, born after the September happenings, the occupation in Iraq, and the Palestinian Intifada."   Jordan, Manas, Horsburgh "Strengths and Weaknesses of Grassroot Jihadist Networks: The Madrid Bombings"   "Individuals that operate within the country they reside and share the strategic objectives of the Global Jihad Movement, but do not formally belong to the Al Qaeda Organization or other associated groups."  
  • 5. What is Third Generation Terrorism? Mustafa Setmarian (aka Abu Musab al-Suri) The International Islamic Resistance Call   "[The Grassroots Jihadi Networks is a] third generation of mujahideen, a generation currently in the process of being defined, born after the September happenings, the occupation in Iraq, and the Palestinian Intifada."   Jordan, Manas, Horsburgh "Strengths and Weaknesses of Grassroot Jihadist Networks: The Madrid Bombings"   "Individuals that operate within the country they reside and share the strategic objectives of the Global Jihad Movement, but do not formally belong to the Al Qaeda Organization or other associated groups."   Dr. Marc Sageman Leaderless Jihad   "the jihadi-wannabes"
  • 6. The 3 Generations of Salafi Terror
    • Generation 1
    • The "Statists" -- jihadists whose battle was against their Kemalist/Nasserist/Baathist home regimes
    •  
    • Generation 2
    • The "ABC" men -- inspired by Abdullah Azzam's Join the Caravan, fought International Jihads -- Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, would form the The Global Jihad Movement
  • 7. The 3 Generations of Salafi Terror
    • Generation 1
    • The "Statists" -- jihadists whose battle was against their Kemalist/Nasserist/Baathist home regimes
    •  
    • Generation 2
    • The "ABC" men -- inspired by Abdullah Azzam's Join the Caravan, fought International Jihads -- Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, would form the The Global Jihad Movement
    •  
    •  
    • Generation 3
    • The "Grassroots Jihad Movements"
    •  
    • The GJM is made up of individuals who:
      • are self-radicalized and consider themselves "fellow travelers" in the Global Jihad
      • do not formally belong to any Global Jihadist Organization and are not tethered to their hierarchical control
      • maintain only passive connections to groups like AQ by consuming their literature and propaganda disseminated online
  • 8. Characteristics of 3rd Gen. Jihadist Groups
    •  
      • Autonomous in Operational and Tactical Command and Control
        •   inspired by , but not controlled by AQ
    •  
      • Autonomous Logistically
        • self-reliant gathering material and human resources, without direct support from Global Jihadi Movements
    •  
      • Open to the Outside
        • 3rd Gen Networks use multiple ad-hoc networks for financing, recruiting, and accruing arms
          • networks of common delinquency
          • networks from prisons
          • networks of alternative Islamic Movements
          • Online Communities and Chat Rooms (the "Dijihad")
    •  
  • 9. Third Generation Terrorism -- Trends and a Growing Threat
    • In the past 20 years, the origins of
    • plots were from:
    •  
    • AQ Core Controlled Networks: 20%
    • AQ Affiliated Networks: 25%
    • AQ Inspired GJM: 54%
    •  
    • In the past 10 years, the trend
    • becomes clearer:
    •  
    • AQ Core Controlled Networks: 18%
    • AQ Affiliated Networks: 6%
    • AQ Inspired GJM: 76%
    •  
    •                                                                           
    •  
    •  
    • source: Dr. Marc Sageman
  • 10. Madrid, 2004
    • The 11-M Terror attack in Madrid, 2004, is an example of a 3rd Generation Terror Incident.
    •  
      • committed by individuals without direct connections to any organized transnational terrorist organization
    •  
      • an effort to further the strategic goals of the Global Jihad
    •  
  • 11. Data, Facts and Figures: The 3rd Generation Attack on Madrid
    • All 45 group members were living in Spain for prolonged periods of time, and most were legal residents of the country:
    •  
    •  
    •  
    •  
    •   
    • They were not connected to any Global Jihadist group, but instead organized based on family, national, and ideological ties.  
    •  
  • 12. Evidence the M-11 Bombers sought to support the 'global Jihad':
      • Group Communiqués threatening violence were signed  Ansar al Qaeda fi Europe (translation: Supporters of Al Qaeda in Europe)
    •  
      • Searches of apartments and safe-houses uncovered massive amounts of Jihadi propaganda and information.  The most relevant to our study here is:
    •  
    • Iraqi Jihad -- Hopes and Risks
    • (author/s unknown)
  • 13. Evidence the M-11 Bombers sought to support the 'global Jihad'
    • From:  Iraqi Jihad -- Hopes and Risks
    •  
    • " Therefore we say that in order to force the Spanish government to withdraw from Iraq the resistance should deal painful blows to its forces.  This should be accompanied by an information campaign clarifying the truth of the matter inside Iraq.  It is necessary to make the utmost use of the upcoming general election in Spain in March next year.
    •  
    • We think that the Spanish government should not tolerate more than two, maximum three blows, after which it will be forced to withdraw as a result of popular pressure.  If its troops still remain in Iraq after these blows, then the victory of the Socialist Party is almost guaranteed, and the withdrawal of the Spanish forces will be on its electoral programme ."
  • 14. Iraqi Jihad: Hopes and Risks    
  • 15. Crisis or Incident?
    • Crisis
    •  
    • Threat to highly valued interests or values
    •  
    • Turning point of Peace and War
    •  
    • Engages key Decision Makers who are party to crisis
    •  
    •  
    •  
    • Incident
    •  
    • Attack on valued interest or values
    •  
    • Interruption of Lengthy Peace or Lengthy War
    •  
    • Engages Consequence Managers in the immediate aftermath of the Incident
    •  
    •  
    Both   Characterized by Surprise   Situation where time is finite   International Politics in Microcosm
  • 16. Definition of a Crisis CRISIS Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Prevention Identifying Sources of Conflict Identifying Causes of Conflict Deterrence Provide strategy and capabilities to deter conflict Diplomacy Link diplomacy and military capabilities Escalation Use of force Threat of use Sanctioning Signaling Statements of Intent De-Escalation 3rd parties, including international organizations Threats of Renewed Escalation Signals for de-escalation Formation of coalitions Peace Keeping Peace Enforcement Forward Presence Nation Building Economic Development Democratic Political Systems *TIME LINE IS FINITE* WAR Perception of need to respond 1. When one side threatens mil action against another 2. Takes direct military action 1. Threat to highly valued interests or values 2. Turning point between Peace and War 3. Engages key decision makers who are party to crisis 4. Situation when time is finite 5. Characterized by Surprise 6. International politics in microcosm The Snyder-Diesing Model
  • 17. The Snyder-Diesing Problem
    • The proper application of the Snyder-Diesing Model in the analysis of crises requires certain prerequisite conditions, the most important of these being:
      • The crisis must occur between two hierarchically controlled actors
    •  
  • 18. The Snyder-Diesing Problem
    • The proper application of the Snyder-Diesing Model in the analysis of crises requires certain prerequisite conditions, the most important of these being:
      • The crisis must occur between two hierarchically controlled actors
    •  
    • The Problem:
    •  
    • In 3rd Gen. Terror Incidents:
    •  
      • There is no hierarchical control body at the state or transstate level for the attacker
          • coercive diplomacy and deterrence (excluding deterrence by active denial) are not options for the victim
          • the committal move in the crisis is often the only move made involving the attacker(s)
  • 19. The Snyder-Diesing Problem
    • The proper application of the Snyder-Diesing Model in the analysis of crises requires certain prerequisite conditions, the most important of these being:
      • The crisis must occur between two hierarchically controlled actors
    •  
    • The Problem:
    •  
    • In 3rd Gen. Terror Incidents:
    •  
      • There is no hierarchical control body at the state or transstate level for the attacker
          • coercive diplomacy and deterrence (excluding deterrence by active denial) are not options for the victim
          • the committal move in the crisis is often the only move made involving the attacker(s)
      • The Esc/De-esc moves do not involve CDM, but Consequence Managers
  • 20. The Snyder-Diesing Problem
    • The proper application of the Snyder-Diesing Model in the analysis of crises requires certain prerequisite conditions, the most important of these being:
      • The crisis must occur between two hierarchically controlled actors
    •  
    • The Problem:
    •  
    • In 3rd Gen. Terror Incidents:
    •  
      • There is no hierarchical control body at the state or transstate level for the attacker
          • coercive diplomacy and deterrence (excluding deterrence by active denial) are not options for the victim
          • the committal move in the crisis is often the only move made involving the attacker(s)
      • The Esc/De-esc moves do not involve CDM, but Consequence Managers
      • No threat of escalation to conventional or nuclear war ( Incident, not Crisis)
  • 21. A New Framework for Terrorist Incident Analysis
    • Phase 1 -- Pre-Incident
      • Prevention, Protection, Planning 
    •  
    • Phase 2 -- Incident
      • Immediate Escalation/De-Escalation
    •  
    • Phase 3 -- Incident Fallout Management
      • Consequence Management
    •  
    • Phase 4 -- Investigation and Apprehension
      •   Exposed Network Rollup, Intelligence
    •  
    • Phase 5 -- Post-Incident
      • Lessons Learned, New Status Quo
  • 22. My Suggested Framework:
    •  
  • 23. From Crisis Decision Makers to Consequence Management -- a US Proposal
    • In 3rd Gen. Terrorist Incidents:
      • CDMs main involvement occurs: Pre-Incident, Investigation and Apprehension, and Post-Incident (p1,4,5)
    •  
      • mitigation of damage requires coordination between CDMs and Consequence Managers in Incident Fallout Management. (p3)
        • coordination and planning must be done by CROSS-FUNCTIONAL TEAMS (CFT's)
    •  
      • Process must establish to ensure efficiency, effectiveness.  
      • A proposed outline of this process (and the groups involved) in the US is provided by Will Goodman (former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense & Americas' Security Affairs).  I have adapted it as follows:
    •  
    •   
  • 24. Threat Analysis --   identifies which missions demand imminent preparation                              (completed by a CFT  under the DNI)    
  • 25. Threat Analysis --   identifies which missions demand imminent preparation                              (completed by a CFT  under the DNI)   Strategic Guidance Statement --  establishes the goals for planning                                                    ( completed by NSC)  
  • 26.
    • Threat Analysis --   identifies which missions demand imminent preparation
    •                              (completed by a CFT  under the DNI)
    •  
    • Strategic Guidance Statement --  establishes the goals for planning
    •                                                    ( completed by NSC)
    •  
    • Deliberate Planning Process  
      • analysis of the mission -- strategic guidance, with IMPT team members obtaining feedback from their parent organizations
      • a concept of operations to be approved by CDMs in relevant depts.
      • a full deliberate plan for review and approval by the CDMs in relevant depts.
    •    (completed by the Incident Management Planning Team (IMPT), a CFT under DHS)
  • 27.
    • Threat Analysis --   identifies which missions demand imminent preparation
    •                              (completed by a CFT  under the DNI)
    •  
    • Strategic Guidance Statement --  establishes the goals for planning
    •                                                    ( completed by NSC)
    •  
    • Deliberate Planning Process  
      • analysis of the mission -- strategic guidance, with IMPT team members obtaining feedback from their parent organizations
      • a concept of operations to be approved by CDMs in relevant depts.
      • a full deliberate plan for review and approval by the CDMs in relevant depts.
    •    (completed by the Incident Management Planning Team (IMPT), a CFT under DHS)
    • Incident Action Plan -- no more than 24 hours after an incident occurs
    • fills in holes of the IMPT's deliberate plan with the event details  
    • (completed by a CFT in the DHS National Operations Center)
  • 28.
    • Threat Analysis --   identifies which missions demand imminent preparation
    •                              (completed by a CFT  under the DNI)
    •  
    • Strategic Guidance Statement --  establishes the goals for planning
    •                                                    ( completed by NSC)
    •  
    • Deliberate Planning Process  
      • analysis of the mission -- strategic guidance, with IMPT team members obtaining feedback from their parent organizations
      • a concept of operations to be approved by CDMs in relevant depts.
      • a full deliberate plan for review and approval by the CDMs in relevant depts.
    •    (completed by the Incident Management Planning Team (IMPT), a CFT under DHS)
    • Incident Action Plan -- no more than 24 hours after an incident occurs
    • fills in holes of the IMPT's deliberate plan with the event details  
    • (completed by a CFT in the DHS National Operations Center)
    • Mission Assignments --   gives specific orders for every actor in the incident to conduct their missions according to the plan produced by the NOC
    • (completed by a CFT in the FEMA National Response Coordination Center)
  • 29. Challenges for Future Study/Discussions:
      • 3rd Generation Terrorism results in TERROR INCIDENTS, but incidents may trigger OTHER CRISES (see: political crisis post M-11 Attack)
    •  
      • GTN are unique and context specific, making a general analytic framework to analyze them essentialist at best.
    •  
      • We cannot dismiss Snyder-Diesing!
    •  
      • 3rd Generation Terrorist Incidents:  interruptions of peace, or battles in war?
    •  
      • What will 4th Generation Terrorism look like?
    •  
  • 30. QUESTIONS?
    •     
  • 31. Sources
    • Brannan, David W., Esler, Philip F. and Strindberg, N.T. Anders. "Talking to Terrorists: Towards an Independent Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism", Studies in Conflict and Terrorism , 24:1: 3-24.
    •  
    • Everly Jr., George S. "Crisis Management Briefings: Large Group Crisis Intervention in Response to Terrorism, Disasters, and Violence."  International Journal of Emergency Mental Health  2:1 (2000): 53-57.
    •  
    • IntelCenter. "al-Qaeda Targeting Guidance - v1.0." www.intelcenter.com, Ben Venzke. 1 April 2004, 16:51:43 EST.
    • [accessed 12/03/09]
    •  
    • IntelCenter. "London Tube Bus Attack (LBTA) v1.5." www.intelcenter.com, Ben Venzke. 28 July, 2005 14:50:22 EST.
    • [accessed 12/01/09]
    •  
    • Jordan, Javier, Manas, Fernando M. and Horsburgh, Nicola. "Strengths and Weaknesses of Grassroot Jihadist Networks: The Madrid Bombings", Studies in Conflict and Terrorism , 31:1, 17-39.
    •  
    • Lia, Brunjar; Hegghammer, Thomas. "Jihadi Strategic Studies: The Alleged Al Qaida Policy Study Preceding the Madrid Bombings."  Studies in Conflict and Terrorism  27:1: 335-375.
    •  
    • Ozkan, Murat. "The New Security Perception and the Policing of Crisis Management: 7/7 London Bombings."  The Journal of Turkish Weekly  (24 March, 2006) 
    •  
    • Pillar, Paul R. "Counterterrorism after Al Qaeda."  The Washington Quarterly  27:3 (Summer 2004): 101-113.
    •  
    • Sageman, Marc. Understanding Terror Networks . University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.
    •  
    • Sageman, Marc. Leaderless Jihad . University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.
    •  
    • Snyder, Glenn, and Paul Diesing. Conflict Among Nations . Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977.
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  • 32.  

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