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JISC Greening ICT Keynote Presentation
 

JISC Greening ICT Keynote Presentation

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My slides for JISC's Greening ICT Programme Meeting. There are notes from slide 26 onwards....

My slides for JISC's Greening ICT Programme Meeting. There are notes from slide 26 onwards.

See: http://www.jisc.ac.uk/fundingopportunities/funding_calls/2009/09/0909greenict.aspx

And more at: http://joss.blogs.lincoln.ac.uk/tag/resilienteducation/

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    JISC Greening ICT Keynote Presentation JISC Greening ICT Keynote Presentation Presentation Transcript

    • Technology “an apparently politically neutral way through a tricky impasse.” 1
    • I=PxAxT The impact of human activities (I) is determined by the overall population (P), the level of affluence (A) and the level of technology (T). Even as the efficiency of technology improves, affluence and population scale up the impacts. 2
    • Population, people, us, you, me. Growth rate is slowing Population is still rising 3
    • Technology as an efficiency factor? Where did the efficiencies go? 4
    • We are energy efficient! “Energy efficiency improvement was an important phenomenon in the global energy balance over the past 30 years. Without energy efficiency improvements, the OECD nations would have used approximately 49% more energy than was actually consumed as of 1998.” Small print: Nevertheless, OECD energy use continues to rise. In 2000 it was 39% higher than in 1973. 5
    • Aren’t we? 6
    • We are, aren’t we?? 7
    • “From 2000 to 2006 UK energy efficiency increased by about 2% per year... Because the effects of technological change (including changes in the economy toward services and away from energy intensive industry) just about balanced the overall growth of the economy for the past decade, the UK has seen little growth in its overall carbon dioxide emissions.” 8
    • Kidding ourselves about consumption...? The UK reported a 15% decrease in emissions from 1990-2005. However, UK emissions increased by around 19% when emissions from aviation, overseas trade, shipping and tourism were accounted for. “The UK’s environmental impact is as significant from the resources exploited to produce its imports as from the domestic resources it consumes. It mandates counting emissions on a consumption basis.” 9
    • Economy wide rebound effect 10
    • ‘Rebound demands’ 1. by the same consumer for the same product or service; 2. by the same consumer for a different product or service; 3. by a different consumer for the same product or service; 4. by a different consumer for a different product or service. 5. No rebound. Increase leisure, work less, reduce purchasing power. 11
    • ‘Rebound’ is not new “If our parents doubled their income, or doubled the use of iron, or doubled the agricultural produce of the country, then so ought we, unless we are changed either in character or circumstances.” – Jevons 1865 12
    • Energy depletion: A change in circumstances… TPES = Total Primary Energy Supply; TFC = Total Final Energy Consumption “changes caused by the oil price shocks in the 1970s and the resulting energy policies did considerably more to control growth in energy demand and reduce CO2 emissions than the energy efficiency and climate policies implemented in the 1990s.” 13
    • “Addicted to oil” 14
    • Fascinating Oil Charts (I) 15
    • Fascinating Oil Charts (II) 16
    • 20 years 17
    • Scenario 1 In a business-as-usual scenario, global energy demand is forecast to rise by 40% by 2030. Fossil fuels account for over 75% of supply. 18
    • Scenario 2 19
    • What about renewables? Energy Returned on Energy Invested (EROIE) 20
    • Common features of the plans (per person) The five (national) plans David MacKay's Five Plans for providing renewable energy for the UK by 2050. They all assume significant energy efficiencies, as seen in the left image. 21
    • more efficiently unsustainable. 22
    • Our economic model of growth, the paradox of efficiencies, the reality of EROEI and the time we have to act, does not lead us to ‘sustainability’.
    • Consider this... In what way is our work intended to be a politically neutral way through the tricky impasse of exponential growth? Is your work more 'efficiently unsustainable'? An energy crisis is also an economic crisis. How resilient is your institution? What do we value? i.e Economic growth? Reproduction? Consumption? Well Being? Happiness? Progress? Social Justice? 24
    • Further information and references are included as notes with these slides. Joss Winn jwinn@lincoln.ac.uk http://joss.blogs.lincoln.ac.uk 25
    • Technology “an apparently politically neutral way through a tricky impasse.” 02/22/10 1 These slides were put together for a presentation to the JISC Greening ICT Programme meeting on 26th February 2010. I work for the Centre for Educational Research and Development, University of Lincoln and blog these ideas under the tag #resilienteducation http://joss.blogs.lincoln.ac.uk/tag/resilienteducation/ Many of the ideas in this presenation have been written up here: http://joss.blogs.lincoln.ac.uk/2010/02/12/revisiting-thinking-the-unthinkable/ The title quote comes from Tim Jackson, author of Prosperity Without Growth. The Transition to a Sustainable Economy, 2009. The actual quote comes from his ‘Rebound launch: keynote presentation’ (http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/Downloads/PDF/07/0710ReboundEffect/0710TJKeynote.p df) “The IPAT equation appears to offer us broadly three ways of achieving overall reductions in energy demand (for example). One, reduce the population – not a popular choice. Two, reduce the level of affluence (again not high on political priorities – although an interesting avenue to explore at various levels as I shall suggest in a minute). And three, improve technology: specifically to increase the energy efficiency of income generation, to reduce the energy intensity of the economy. Given the unpopularity and political intractability of routes one and two, it’s perhaps not surprising to find the mainstream response is to adopt route three as the preferred approach. Indeed an examination of the history of international policy from Brundtland onwards reveals quite clearly how route 3 allowed the world to steer an uneasy path between the demands of the North for population control in the South and the demands of the South for reduced affluence in the North. Option 3 emerges as an apparently politically neutral way through a tricky impasse.” 1
    • I=PxAxT The impact of human activities (I) is determined by the overall population (P), the level of affluence (A) and the level of technology (T). Even as the efficiency of technology improves, affluence and population scale up the impacts. 02/22/10 2 Source: Tim Jackson, Rebound launch: keynote presentation (http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/Downloads/PDF/07/0710ReboundEffect/0710TJKeynote.p df) “Technology is an efficiency factor in the equation. Population and affluence are scaling factors. Even as the efficiency of technology improves, affluence and population scale up the impacts. And the overall result depends on improving technological efficiency fast enough to outrun the scale effects of affluence and population.” So these factors are not independent and “appear to be in a self- reinforcing positive feedback between affluence and technology, potentially – and I emphasise potentially – geared in the direction of rising impact” For a quick overview of I=PAT, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_PAT 2
    • Population, people, us, you, me. Growth rate is slowing Population is still rising 02/22/10 3 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_growth 3
    • Technology as an efficiency factor? Where did the efficiencies go? 02/22/10 4 Source: World Bank Development Indicators (via Google Public Data: http://www.google.com/publicdata?ds=wb- wdi&met=eg_use_pcap_kg_oe&idim=country:GBR&dl=en&hl=en&q=energy+use+pe r+capita#met=eg_use_pcap_kg_oe&idim=country:GBR:CHN:IND:USA:JPN&tdim=true ) 4
    • We are energy efficient! “Energy efficiency improvement was an important phenomenon in the global energy balance over the past 30 years. Without energy efficiency improvements, the OECD nations would have used approximately 49% more energy than was actually consumed as of 1998.” Small print: Nevertheless, OECD energy use continues to rise. In 2000 it was 39% higher than in 02/22/10 1973. 5 Source: Geller H, Harrington P, Rosenfeld A H, Tanishima S and Unander F 2006 Policies for increasing energy efficiency: thirty years of experience in OECD countries Energy Policy 34 556–73 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2005.11.010 Note that despite these savings of 49%, OECD energy use continues to rise. In 2000 it was 39% higher than in 1973. http://josswinn.posterous.com/polices-for-increasing-energy-efficiency-thir 5
    • Aren’t we? 02/22/10 6 Source: IEA Key World Energy Statistics http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2009/key_stats_2009.pdf I’ve switched from OECD energy consumption to world energy consumption because part of the reduction in energy use in the OECD is due to de-industrialisation and the move to service economies. Energy intensive work has shifted to other places outside the OECD, so it’s misleading to say that our energy consumption has been reduced by x% if we don’t include that which we’ve out-sourced. 6
    • We are, aren’t we?? 02/22/10 7 Source: IEA Key World Energy Statistics http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2009/key_stats_2009.pdf 7
    • “From 2000 to 2006 UK energy efficiency increased by about 2% per year... Because the effects of technological change (including changes in the economy toward services and away from energy intensive industry) just about balanced the overall growth of the economy for the past decade, the UK has seen little growth in its overall carbon dioxide emissions.” 02/22/10 8 Source: Roger A Pielke Jr , The British Climate Change Act: a critical evaluation and proposed alternative approach. 2009 http://www.iop.org/EJ/abstract/1748- 9326/4/2/024010/ 8
    • Kidding ourselves about consumption...? The UK reported a 15% decrease in emissions from 1990-2005. However, UK emissions increased by around 19% when emissions from aviation, overseas trade, shipping and tourism were accounted for. “The UK’s environmental impact is as significant from the resources exploited to produce its imports as from the domestic resources it consumes. It mandates counting emissions on a consumption basis.” 02/22/10 9 Source of quote: Too Good to be True? The UK's Climate Change Record http://www.dieterhelm.co.uk/node/656 Half of our emissions occur abroad. For example, as our emissions from production have decreased, China's emissions from production have increased. De-industrialised, service-driven economies become more energy efficient because they import more finished goods rather than raw energy and materials. “50% of the emission growth from 2002 to 2005 was triggered by export production and 60% of these commodities are exported to the West [Weber et al., 2008]. In other words, consumers in developed countries are at least partially responsible for one-third of Chinese emission increase from 2002 to 2005.” Guan, D., Glen Peters, C.L. Weber and K. Hubacek, 2009. Journey to world top emitter – an analysis of the driving forces of China's recent CO2 emissions surge. Geophysical Research Letters, 36 (L04709) http://homepages.see.leeds.ac.uk/~leckh/Guan et al. China_02-05_SDA_Draft.pdf One third of China's emissions are from the production of exports. Guan, D., Hubacek, K., Weber, C.L., Peters, G.P. and Reiner, D.M. (2008) The drivers of Chinese CO2 emissions from 1980 to 2030. Global Environmental Change, 18 (4). pp. 626-634. ISSN 0959-3780 http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/5405/ For a study of economic growth and GHG emissions decoupling, see, Wei Ming Huang, Grace W.M. Lee, Chih Cheng Wu, GHG emissions, GDP growth and the Kyoto Protocol: A revisit of Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis, Energy Policy, Volume 36, Issue 1, January 2008, Pages 239-247, ISSN 0301-4215, DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2007.08.035. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V2W- 4PYR4NP-1/2/03c633d91324a9a96040ff02e9e34864 For an excellent discussion of 'The Myth of Decoupling', see Prosperity Without Growth – The Transition to a Sustainable Economy from the Sustainable Development Commission, ‘The Government’s independent watchdog on sustainable development' http://www.sd-commission.org.uk/publications.php?id=914 “It’s vital to distinguish between ‘relative’ and ‘absolute’ decoupling. Relative decoupling 9
    • Economy wide rebound effect 02/22/10 10 Source: Launch Presentation of An Assessment of the evidence for economy-wide energy savings from improved energy efficiency http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/support/tiki-index.php?page=ReboundEffect2 “In developed countries, energy use as conventionally measured has grown more slowly than the economy as a whole. From this, it is generally concluded that technical change has improved the efficiency with which energy is used and thereby helped to ‘decouple’ energy consumption from economic growth. However once different energy sources are weighted by their relative ‘quality’ or economic productivity, the coupling between energy consumption and economic growth appears far stronger. Taken together, the evidence reviewed in this report suggests that: a) the scope for substituting other inputs for energy is relatively limited; b) much technical change has historically increased energy intensity; c) energy may play a more important role in economic growth than is conventionally assumed; and d) economy-wide rebound effects may be larger than is conventionally assumed.” 10
    • ‘Rebound demands’ 1. by the same consumer for the same product or service; 2. by the same consumer for a different product or service; 3. by a different consumer for the same product or service; 4. by a different consumer for a different product or service. 5. No rebound. Increase leisure, work less, reduce purchasing power. 02/22/10 11 “A fifth category is the case of consumers’ choosing leisure instead of additional consumption, reducing their purchasing power (e.g. by working less) to a degree proportional to engineering energy savings. Here rebound would be zero (if macroeconomic effects of leisure can indeed be neglected), and the efficiency increases have enabled real resource savings with no loss of affluence.The literature separates this demand into ‘direct’ (roughly, categories 1 and 3) and ‘indirect’ rebound (categories 2 and 4), together constituting ‘economy-wide’ or simply ‘total’ rebound (e.g. [16, p. 196]). A special problem is presented by new products or services or whole new industries, e.g. railroads in the 19th century or lasers in the 20th century, that are partially enabled by efficiency increases in extant products and industries [8,18,19], but for simplicity we ignore these here. Note that category five is always possible, i.e. were all humans to ‘reap’ energy efficiency benefits in the form of less work and less purchasing power, rather than greater consumption, this would lead to a 100% realisation of the potential (or theoretical quantity) engineering savings. A zero price elasticity of demand would describe this situation. Human history, psychology and poverty indicate that this is very unlikely. Given any positive value of the elasticity, rebound must thus be greater than zero.” “Not only is there at present no viable methodology for measuring indirect or economy-wide rebound, but these two concepts are themselves poorly defined. Microeconomic tools can describe the elasticities to be discovered, but data at aggregate levels to estimate such elasticities are lacking. We know that technological efficiency increases expand the production possibi- lities frontier—we are enabled to consume both more end product and more inputs, whether of energy, materials or labour. We know that over the last 200 or more years energy consumption has risen and real energy prices have fallen; and it is safe to assume that technological efficiency has also risen. But whether this correla- tion reflects causality is undetermined. In deciding whether to prescribe or subsidise energy efficiency improvements beyond those that take place as business-as-usual, it is of crucial importance to know the size of the economy-wide (global) rebound. Otherwise, energy efficiency policies become ineffective, or even counterproductive, as rebound rises, with important implications for policy design and the achievability of, say, energy supply security or greenhouse gas mitigation targets.” Alcott and Madlener, Energy rebound and economic growth: A review of the main issues and research needs, Energy 34 (2009) 370–376 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2008.10.011 11
    • ‘Rebound’ is not new “If our parents doubled their income, or doubled the use of iron, or doubled the agricultural produce of the country, then so ought we, unless we are changed either in character or circumstances.” – Jevons 1865 02/22/10 12 Top, quoting Jevons (1865) in Blake Alcott, Jevons’ Paradox, Ecological Economics, 54 (2005) 9-21 http://www.blakealcott.org/publications.html My emphasis. 12
    • Energy depletion: A change in circumstances… TPES = Total Primary Energy Supply; TFC = Total Final Energy Consumption “changes caused by the oil price shocks in the 1970s and the resulting energy policies did considerably more to control growth in energy demand and reduce CO2 emissions than the energy efficiency and climate policies implemented in the 1990s.” 02/22/10 13 Source: Geller H, Harrington P, Rosenfeld A H, Tanishima S and Unander F 2006 Policies for increasing energy efficiency: thirty years of experience in OECD countries Energy Policy 34 556–73 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2005.11.010 “Total primary energy supply (TPES) per unit of GDP has fallen sharply since the first oil price shock. Today major OECD economies use a third less primary energy to generate a unit of GDP than in 1973 (Fig. 1). The TPES/GDP ratio fell most rapidly immedi- ately after the two oil price shocks. Between 1973 and 1983, the fall in primary energy intensity averaged 2.2%/year. After 1983 and until 1990, TPES/GDP declined at a more modest average rate of 1.3%/year. After 1990 the decline slowed considerably until 1996 when the decline in OECD primary energy intensity accelerated again, averaging a rate of 1.8%/year between 1997 and 2000.The decline in primary energy per unit of GDP has been driven by improved energy efficiency in key end-uses and changes in the structure of human and economic activities. Changes in the mix and efficiency of energy supply have also affected this ratio. This is illustrated by the line showing the development of TPES per unit of total final energy consumption (TFC) in Fig. 1. In 2000, this ratio was 9% higher than in 1973, i.e., losses and consumption in the energy sector per unit of final energy delivered to end-use consumers had increased 9%. The main reason is the increased share of electricity in final demand. Electricity has a high end-use efficiency compared to direct fuel-fired applications, but often is associated with significant losses in generation. Consequently TFC per GDP fell more than TPES per GDP. By 2000, TFC per GDP was only 62% of the 1973 level.” “One of the most important findings from this study is that the rate of energy savings in IEA Member country economies has slowed since 1990, as has the decline in CO2 emissions relative to GDP. This shows that the changes caused by the oil price shocks in the 1970s and the resulting energy policies did considerably more to control growth in energy demand and reduce CO2 emissions than the energy 13
    • “Addicted to oil” 02/22/10 14 Source: Robert L. Hirsch. Mitigation of maximum world oil production: Shortage scenarios. Energy Policy 36 (2008) 881–889 14
    • Fascinating Oil Charts (I) 02/22/10 15 For sources, see http://joss.blogs.lincoln.ac.uk/2009/11/27/oil-and-the-story-of- energy 15
    • Fascinating Oil Charts (II) 02/22/10 16 For sources, see http://joss.blogs.lincoln.ac.uk/2009/11/27/oil-and-the-story-of- energy 16
    • 20 years 02/22/10 17 Waiting until world oil production peaks before taking crash program action leaves the world with a significant liquid fuel deficit for more than two decades. Initiating a mitigation crash program 10 years before world oil peaking helps considerably but still leaves a liquid fuels shortfall roughly a decade after the time that oil would have peaked. Initiating a mitigation crash program 20 years before peaking offers the possibility of avoiding a world liquid fuels shortfall for the forecast period. Source: Robert L Hirsch, The Inevitable Peaking of World Oil Production, The Atlantic Council of the United States, XVI, 3, 2005, 1-10 http://www.acus.org/docs/051007-Hirsch_World_Oil_Production.pdf 17
    • Scenario 1 In a business-as-usual scenario, global energy demand is forecast to rise by 40% by 2030. Fossil fuels account for over 75% of supply. 02/22/10 18 Source: IEA World Energy Outlook 2009 http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/ 18
    • Scenario 2 02/22/10 19 According to the IEA, this is what our use of fuels by 2030 should look like if we're to be on course to achieve the 450ppm emissions target. Source: IEA World Energy Outlook 2009 http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/ 19
    • What about renewables? Energy Returned on Energy Invested (EROIE) 02/22/10 20 Image source: Energy is Everything (http://www.energybulletin.net/node/48731) A ratio of less than 5:1 means that around 20% of the economy has to be used for 'energy gathering', compared to around 2.5% for the USA today. http://resourceinsights.blogspot.com/2008/09/net-energy-cliff.html Renewables (and nuclear) are less intensive forms of energy than oil, coal and gas. Efficiency gains, even if managed correctly, will not make up for the lower EROEI of renewables. 20
    • Common features of the plans (per person) The five (national) plans David MacKay's Five Plans for providing renewable energy for the UK by 2050. They all assume significant energy efficiencies, as seen in the left image. 02/22/10 21 Image source: Without Hot Air by David MacKay http://www.inference.phy.cam.ac.uk/withouthotair/c27/page_212.sht ml “All these plans are absurd!” 21
    • more efficiently unsustainable. 02/22/10 22 The phrase, 'more efficiently unsustainable', is borrowed from Bill Rees: http://joss.blogs.lincoln.ac.uk/2009/11/16/bill-rees-the-vulnerability-and- resilience-of-cities/ 22
    • Our economic model of growth, the paradox of efficiencies, the reality of EROEI and the time we have to act, does not lead us to ‘sustainability’. 02/22/10 23 23
    • Consider this... In what way is our work intended to be a politically neutral way through the tricky impasse of exponential growth? Is your work more 'efficiently unsustainable'? An energy crisis is also an economic crisis. How resilient is your institution? What do we value? i.e Economic growth? Reproduction? Consumption? Well Being? Happiness? Progress? Social Justice? 02/22/10 24 On being more efficiently unsustainable, see: http://joss.blogs.lincoln.ac.uk/2009/11/16/bill-rees-the-vulnerability-and- resilience-of-cities/ Resilience is often defined as 'Resilience is the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganise while undergoing change, so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity and feedbacks.' I've written about HEI's resilience: http://joss.blogs.lincoln.ac.uk/2009/12/11/energy-the-economy-and-resilience/ On values, see the work of the New Economics Foundation and Tim Jackson's 'Prosperity Without Growth' http://www.neweconomics.org http://www.sd-commission.org.uk/publications.php?id=914 24
    • 02/22/10 Further information and references are included as notes with these slides. Joss Winn jwinn@lincoln.ac.uk http://joss.blogs.lincoln.ac.uk 02/22/10 25