Stiglitz Lesson's


Published on

Restoring Growth and Stability
in a World of Crisis and Contagion.

Published in: Economy & Finance, Technology
1 Like
  • Be the first to comment

No Downloads
Total views
On SlideShare
From Embeds
Number of Embeds
Embeds 0
No embeds

No notes for slide

Stiglitz Lesson's

  1. 1. Restoring Growth and Stability in a World of Crisis and Contagion: Lessons from Economic Theory and HistoryJoseph E. StiglitzParisFebruary 2012
  2. 2. OutlineO liI. DiagnosisII. PrescriptionsIII. Role and theory of contagionIV. Some general comments on the failure of modern macroeconomicsiV. Concluding remarks
  3. 3. I. Diagnosis•B f Before the crisis, th US ( d t a l th i i the (and to large extent th global) t t the l b l) economy was “sick,” supported by a real estate bubble, that led to a consumption bubble • Bottom 80% of Americans were consuming roughly 110% of their income • Not sustainable • Even after deleveraging, savings rate is likely to exceed 6% in US • E Even after banking system is f ll fi d real estate i ft b ki t i fully fixed, l t t investment t t won’t return to normal for a long time, given excess capacity
  4. 4. Financial and R l C i iFi i l d Real Crisis• Whil b bbl “hid” underlying problems, it l ft i it While bubble d l i bl left in its aftermath additional problems • Excess capacity in real estate • Excess leverage• Major mistake of Administration was to think that fixing the banking b ki system would “ ffi ” t ld “suffice” • But they didn’t succeed in restoring lending• But even deleveraging won’t suffice to restore economy won t • Won’t (and shouldn’t) return to world with consumption 110% of income • Though with deleveraging (and fixing other problems) growth might be restored to normal • To restore economy to full employment will require growth of more than 3% over an extended period of time
  5. 5. Underlying ProblemsU d l i P bl1. Structural transformation2. Inequality3. High oil prices4. Globalization5. Build up of global reserves
  6. 6. 1. STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION• Great Depression was structural transformation from agricultural to manufacturing—this is a structural transformation from manufacturing to services • Productivity growth well in excess of global growth in demand • Implying decrease in demand for labor in manufacturing globally • If labor gets “trapped” in declining sector then income will decline trapped sector,
  7. 7. • Technical change can always induce large distributive consequences • Standard models ignore these • With perfect markets, winners can compensate losers — but they seldom do • With free mobility all workers can be better off • With imperfect markets, those in rural sector worse off • decrease in welfare of those in “trapped sector” has spillover effects on trapped sector others • And especially if there are efficiency wage effects, there can be adverse macroeconomic consequences d i
  8. 8. Basic ModelB i M d l• T Two sectors (industry, agriculture) t (i d t i lt )(1) βα = βDAA (p, pα) + E DMA (p , w* )(2) H(E) = βDAM (p pα) + E DMM (p , w* ) +I (p, wβ is the labor force in agriculture, (1 - β) is the labor force in industry,α is productivity in agriculture, Dij is demand from those in sector i for goods from sector jww* is the (fixed) efficiency wage in the urban sector sector, I is the level of investment (assumed to be industrial goods),p is the pprice of agricultural g g goods in terms of manufactured goods, which is chosen as the numeraire, andE is the level of employment (E ≤ 1 - β); and where we h d h have normalized th l b f li d the labor force at unity. t it
  9. 9. ResultsR lNormally (under stability condition, other plausible conditions) with immobile laboran increase in agricultural productivity unambiguously yields a reduction in the relative price of agriculture and in employment in manufacturing.The result of mobility-constrained agricultural sector productivity growth is an extended economy-wide slump economy wide
  10. 10. Great DepressionG D i• From 1929 to 1932, US agriculture income fell more than 50%• Whil th While there h d b had been considerable mobility out of id bl bilit t f agriculture in the 1920s (from 30% to 25% of population), in the 1930s almost no outmigration • Labor was trapped • Could not afford to move • High unemployment meant returns to moving low
  11. 11. Financial and Real Causes of Downturn• Banking crisis was a result of the economic downturn, not a cause• B t financial crisis can h l perpetuate d But fi i l i i help t t downturn t
  12. 12. Government ExpendituresG E di• Under the stability condition, an increase in government expenditure i dit increases urban employment and raises b l t d i agricultural prices and incomesEven though problem is structural Keynesian policies work structural,Even more effective if spending is directed at underlying structural problem
  13. 13. Emerging fE i from the G h Great Depression D i• New Deal was not big enough to offset negative effects of declining farm income • And New Deal was not sustained • Cutbacks in 1937 in response to worries about fiscal deficit led once again to a downturn• And much of Federal spending offset by cutbacks at state and local level• Analogous to current situation, where government employment is now lower by nearly 1 million from where it was b f before crisis i i • Local government alone has lost 824,000 since the peak of employment in September 2008 • 276,000 government jobs lost over last 12 months
  14. 14. War• WWII was a massive Keynesian stimulus• Moved people from rural to urban sector• Provided them with training• Especially in conjunction with GI bill• It was thus an “industrial policy” as well as a Keynesian policy•F Forced savings d i W provided stimulus to b d i during War id d i l buy goods after War • In contrast to the legacy of debt now
  15. 15. WagesIn model, under normal condition, lowering urban wages lowers agricultural prices and urban employment• Hi h ( i id) wages are not th problem High (rigid) t the bl• Lowering wages would lower aggregate demand—worsen the problem• In this crisis, the US—country with most flexible labor market—has had poor job performance, worse than many performance others
  16. 16. Monetary policy was not cause ofDepression• And it is unlikely that it could have, by itself, reversed downturn, contrary to claim of Friedman• Thi recession h This i has provided t t of monetary h id d test f t hypothesis th i• Massive monetary expansion•MMay have saved th b k b t did ’t resuscitate h d the banks, but didn’t it t economy
  17. 17. Monetary arrangements• But gold standard did inhibit adjustment• Countries that left gold standard (like Argentina) did better • Though some of gains were based on “beggar thy neighbor” competitive devaluations• Internal devaluation is no substitute for exchange rate flexibility• Obvious lessons of these experiences for current downturn
  18. 18. An Aside on Irrelevance of StandardMacro-models• Since such structural transformations occur very seldom, rational expectation models are not of much help• Since th central i Si the t l issue i structural, aggregate model with is t t l t d l ith single sector not of much help• Since among major effects are those arising from redistribution, a representative agent model is not of much ep help• Since central issue entails frictions in mobility, assuming p perfect markets is not of much help p• Problems exacerbated by efficiency wage effects
  19. 19. ReferenceR fDomenico Delli Gatti; Mauro Gallegati; Bruce C. Greenwald; Alberto Russo; Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Sectoral Imbalances and Long Run Crises ” presented to IEA Crises, meeting, Beijing, July, 2011.
  20. 20. 2.2 INEQUALITY• Redistribution from those who would spend all of their income to those that don’t lowers aggregate demand•LLarge i increases i i in inequality i most countries of th lit in t ti f the world• America said “spend as if your income was going up ” that spend up, is—borrow• Problem exacerbated—downturn leading to lower wages and incomes
  21. 21. There were alternative policiesTh l i li i• Combating inequality directly (e.g. through progressive taxation)•IIncreased government spending d t di• But “political economy” made such alternative unacceptable• Instead, tax cut for rich exacerbated problems, putting increased burden on bubble/debt for sustaining economy before crisis
  22. 22. 3.3 RISING OIL PRICES• Meant US and European consumers were spending more of their income abroad• I effect, a redistribution from oil consuming countries t In ff t di t ib ti f il i t i to oil rich countries• But a redistribution which lowered global aggregate demand
  23. 23. 4.4 GLOBALIZATION• Global competition for limited number of manufacturing jobs• Shifti Shifting comparative advantage compounded problems ti d t d d bl for US and Europe• One of factors contributing to growing inequality
  24. 24. 5. GLOBAL RESERVES• Build up of reserves weakened global aggregate demand• Some of it based on precautionary savings—response to crisis exacerbating thi problem t ( i i b ti this bl too (countries with l ti ith large reserves did better)• Some of it reflecting high oil prices• Some of it part of export-led growth—most successful growth strategy
  25. 25. ReferencesR f• UN Commission• J. E. Stiglitz, Freefall
  26. 26. II. RemediesIncrease aggregate demandAddressing underlying issues• Facilitate the structural transformation • Adapting to changing comparative advantage • Helping economy move into services• Red ce ineq alit Reduce inequality• Reduce dependence on oil•R d Reduce need f global reserves d for l b l• Finish the task of fixing the financial system and underlying real estate problem
  27. 27. Finishing the Task of Fixing the FinancialSystem• Redirecting financial system to its core mission lending mission—lending (carrots and sticks) • Restricting speculative activities, proprietary trading (“ringfencing”)• H l i Helping community and regional b k it d i l banks • Bailout was directed at helping the big banks • More than 300 small banks have gone bankrupt, more than 800 are on the “ t h li t” th “watch list” • While investment of large firms is largely back to normal, small and medium size enterprises• Reregulating the banks • Restricting excess leverage (Basel III doesn’t go far enough, failed to understand insights of Modigliani and Miller) • Doing something about the too big to fail financial institutions too-big-to-fail • Transparency (e.g. OTC derivatives) • Prohibiting predatory lending • Stopping anti competitive practices anti-competitive
  28. 28. Mortgages• Real estate markets continues to fall• Foreclosures continue apace • Administration efforts inadequate • More than 20% of mortgages underwater• What is needed: Homeowners Chapter 11 Homeowners’• Alternatively: carrots and sticks to get banks to restructure • Changing in accounting rules • Tax incentives
  29. 29. Increasing AI i Aggregate Demand D d• Government spending in a world with fiscal deficits • High return investments lower debt/GDP in medium term • Well designed tax and expenditure programs can yield balanced budget multiplier of 2-3. • Shifting composition of taxes and expenditures can increase GDP• Cutbacks in spending can impede transition • Especially since two of critical services (education and health) are typically government fi i ll financed d
  30. 30. Design f StimulusD i of S i l• Hi h multipliers High lti li• High job multipliers• Sensitive to sectoral/skill mix of unemployed• Money gets quickly into system • Assistance to states and localities, which otherwise would have to fire teachers t h• Addressing long term problems • Facilitating restructuring g g • Reducing inequality • Investments (infrastructure, technology, education) • Protecting the environment• Sensitive to long term nature of problem • Short term palliatives won’t work • Scope for longer term investment strategy
  31. 31. ObjectionsObj i• With interest rate fixed at low levels, deficits won’t crowd out private investment• Public investment crowds i private i P bli i t t d in i t investment t t• Ricardian equivalence doesn’t hold• Well-designed i W ll d i d investments i t t improve f tfuture fi fiscal position, l iti should lead to more consumption today• Savings today translates into spending tomorrow; if future periods demand constrained, increases income in future; expectation of that leads to more consumption today: with rational expectations, multipliers are larger
  32. 32. Promoting IP i Investment• In US biggest needs are in public sector• What is holding back private investment? • Excess capacity in many sectors • Lower interest rates and supply side policies won’t help • Macro-uncertainty Macro uncertainty • Government could issue “macro-Arrow-Debreu” securities • Speeches about confidence, green shoots, won’t work • I long run, counterproductive In l t d ti • NOT too high taxes, regulatory uncertainty • Lowering corporate tax rate will have no significant effect, except on g p g p cash constrained firms • To extent that investment is debt financed, cost of capital will increase
  33. 33. A Green Growth Strategy G G hS• Raising carbon prices will induce significant amounts of new investment•U Uncertainty about carbon price may b i t i t b t b i be impeding di investment • Government could provide carbon price guarantees paying off if guarantees, carbon price is lower than critical level in future years• Reducing dependence on oil will also have benefits for g global aggregate demand• A New Innovation model—focusing on saving the environment, rather than saving labor • Especially important in a world with high unemployment
  34. 34. Global StrategyGl b l S• I world of globalization, what matters i global aggregate In ld f l b li ti h t tt is l b l t demand• Reform of global reserve system key• Improving recycling of savings from reserve countries to where investment is badly needed y • Bernanke was wrong—the problem was not a savings glut • G-20 strategy of encouraging consumption is misguided • Planet will not survive if everyone aspires to US patterns of consumption • Enormous needs for investments in developing countries and to retrofit global economy for global warming • Mistake was that financial markets didn’t allocate capital well • Part of the problem is that there needs to be better risk mitigation facilities f iliti
  35. 35. Limited Scope f MLi i d S for Monetary P li Policy• Short-term interest rates can’t get any lower• QE II effect on LT interest rates limited• Hard to show any quantitatively significant effect of change in interest rates on investment or consumption, • especiall in periods of e cess capacit e cess le erage especially excess capacity, excess leverage • Especially when “credit channel” is blocked, because of failure to fix banks • QE I and II didn’t work—why expect QE III to do so?
  36. 36. • Temporary measures likely to limit asset price effects, and even smaller consumption effects• I a globalized capital market, money fl In l b li d it l k t flows t where to h return is highest • In emerging markets, where it’s not needed markets it s • Not in US, where it’s needed• Most effective c a e may be through co pe os e ec e channel ay oug competitive e devaluation • But that only works if others don’t respond • They do respond, with exchange rate interventions, capital controls, etc • Leading to fragmentation of global capital market
  37. 37. • Low interest rates may even be ensuring that we have a jobless recovery • Evidence that this (and other recent recessions) are different • In vintage capital model (putty-clay), low long term interest rates induce firms to use capital intensive technology—making labor redundant
  38. 38. III.III Interconnectivity andContagion:How the Crisis Spread Aroundthe World• Theoretical question: Does Interconnectivity lead to more or less systemic stability?• Standard answer: spreading of risk, with concavity, leads to better outcomes
  39. 39. • B t economic systems are rife with non-convexities—e.g. But i t if ith iti bankruptcy• Interlinked systems are more prone to system wide failures, with huge costs • privately profitable transactions may not by socially desirable (Greenwald-Stiglitz, "E t (G ld Sti lit "Externalities i E liti in Economies with I i ith Imperfect f t Information and Incomplete Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101(2), pp. 229-64. 1986) • May lead to systemic risk• This crisis illustrates the risk
  40. 40. Incoherence in StandardMacro-frameworks• Argue for benefits of diversification (capital market liberalization) before crisis•WWorry about contagion (worsened b excessive b t t i ( d by i integration) after crisis• Optimal system design balances benefits and costs • “Contagion, Liberalization, and the Optimal Structure of Globalization,” Journal of Globalization and Development, 1(2), ( ) • “Risk and Global Economic Architecture: Why Full Financial Integration May be Undesirable,” American Economic Review, 100(2), 100(2) May 2010 pp 388-392 2010, pp.
  41. 41. An Analogous P blA A l Problem• With an i t integrated electric grid th excess t d l ti id the capacity required to prevent a blackout can be reduced • alternatively, for any given capacity, the probability of a blackout can be reduced.• B t a failure i one part of the system can lead t But f il in t f th t l d to system-wide failure • in the absence of integration the failure would have integration, been geographically constrained• Well-designed networks have circuit breakers, to g , prevent the “contagion” of the failure of one part of the system to others.
  42. 42. A Simple E Si l Example l•
  43. 43. Simple Example (Si l E l (cont.) )•
  44. 44. Simple Example (cont ) (cont.)
  45. 45. Liberalization is UnambiguouslyWelfare Decreasing•
  46. 46. • Basic insight: even with mean preserving reductions in risk associated with risk pooling, the probability of any particular country falling below the bankruptcy threshold may increase with economic integration
  47. 47. Some GS General R l Results l• Full integration never pays if there are enough countries• Optimal sized clubs• Restrictions on capital flows (circuit breakers) are desirable
  48. 48. • Formally, two effects: ff • Trend reinforcement—negative shocks move us down further (equity depletion) p ) • Modeling using stochastic differential equations, with probability that at any given time an agent goes bankrupt modeled as problem i fi t passage ti bl in first time • With trend reinforcement, there is an optimal degree of diversification • Battiston Stefano Domenico Delli Gatti Mauro Gallegati Bruce Battiston, Stefano, Gatti, Gallegati, Greenwald, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Liaisons Dangereuses: Increasing Connectivity, Risk Sharing, and Systemic Risk,” p p g y g y paper presented to the Eastern Economic Association Meetings, February 27, 2009, New York, NBER Paper No.
  49. 49. Financial iFi i l interlinkages li k• Bankruptcy cascades (Greenwald and Stiglitz 2003; Gale and Allen Stiglitz, Allen, 2001) – The bankruptcy of one firm affects the likelihood of the bankruptcy of those to whom it owes money, its suppliers and those who might depend upon it y, pp g p p for supplies; and so actions affecting its likelihood of bankruptcy have adverse effects on others.• The “architecture” of the credit market can affect the risk that one bankruptcy leads to a sequence of others. – If A lends to B, B lends to C and C lends to D, then a default in D can lead to a bankruptcy cascade. – On the other hand, if lending all goes through a sufficiently well capitalized clearing house (a bank), then a default by one borrower is not as likely to lead to a cascade – But a very large shock which leads to the bankruptcy of the “clearing house” can have clearing house severe systemic effects• Further externalities are generated as a result of information costs and imperfections. – If unit i d it doesn’t f ll k ’t fully know other units’ characteristics—including th th it ’ h t i ti i l di the relationships (contracts) of those with whom it engages in a relationship, including all the relationships with whom those are engaged, ad infinitum—it cannot know the risks of their honoring their contract. – Explains some of adverse effects of non-transparent over the counter credit default swaps
  50. 50. Asymmetric PA i Patterns• O canonical model also assumed symmetric relationships i Our i l d l l d ti l ti hi in which all ties/contracts were identical.• In the presence of convexities, such symmetric arrangements p , y g often characterize optimal designs.• But that is not so in the presence of non-convexities, and there are many alternative architectures architectures. • For instance, a set of countries can be tightly linked (a “common financial market”) to each other, but the links among financial markets may be looser. The former is designed to exploit the advantages of looser risk diversification, the latter to prevent the dangers of contagion. • Circuit breakers might be absent in the former but play a large role in the relations among the “common markets.” common markets.• Different architectures may lead to greater ability to absorb small shocks but less resilience to large shocks g
  51. 51. • Reducing the set of admissible relationships and behaviors can have benefits • Reducing the scope for these uncertainties, g p • Reducing the potential for information asymmetries, • Reducing the burden on information gathering.• I large non-linear systems with complex i t In l li t ith l interactions, ti even small perturbations can have large consequences • Understanding these interactions major research U de s a d g ese e ac o s ajo esea c agenda• Broader research agenda: Design of optimal networks, circuit breakers: optimal degree and form of financial integration• Beginning of large literature
  52. 52. references f• G Greenwald, B ld Bruce and J E Sti lit T d J. E. Stiglitz, Towards a N d New P di Paradigm of M f Monetary t Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003• Jeanne, Olivier and Anton Korinek, 2010, “Excessive Volatility in Capital Flows: A Pigouvian Taxation Approach,” Pigo ian Ta ation Approach ” American Economic Re ie 100(2) pp 403 407 Review, 100(2), pp. 403–407.• Haldane, Andrew G., 2009, “Rethinking the Financial Network,” address to the Financial Students Association, Amsterdam, April, available at http://www bankofengland co uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech386 pdf (accessed September 22, 2010).• Haldane, Andrew G. and Robert M. May, 2010, “Systemic risk in banking ecosystems, ecosystems ” University of Oxford mimeo mimeo.• Korinek, Anton, 2010a, “Regulating Capital Flows to Emerging Markets: An Externality View,” working paper, University of Maryland.• ——, 2010b “Hot Money and Serial Financial Crises ” working paper, University 2010b, Hot Crises, paper of Maryland, presented at the 11th Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference, November 4-5.• ——, 2011, Systemic —— 2011 “Systemic Risk-Taking: Amplification Effects Externalities and Effects, Externalities, Regulatory Responses,” working paper, University of Maryland.
  53. 53. IV.IV Failures of ModernMacroeconomics• Didn’t predict the financial crisis p • Standard models assert that bubbles can’t happen • Standard models assert that shocks are exogenous • Key “disturbance” to the economy was endogenous • Policy frameworks suggested that (a) keeping inflation low was necessary, and almost sufficient, for stability and growth; (b) government didn’t have instruments to prevent bubbles; (c) cheaper to clean up mess after bubble broke• EACH OF THESE BELIEFS WAS WRONG
  54. 54. • Even after bubble burst, standard macro-economists claimed effects “contained” •bbecause of di f diversification ifi ti • because markets have good “buffers”
  55. 55. • R Responses t crises (b to i (based on advice f d d i from standard t d d economists) have clearly been inadequate • High unemployment 4 years after beginning of recession • Standard models didn’t focus on credit—and therefore didn’t have much to say on repairing credit system • But theory of banking provided micro-foundations (including incentives of banks and bankers) • Policies ignored lessons of this literature (Greenwald-Stiglitz, 2003) • Even less to say on inherent deficiencies in securitization • Questionable improvements in risk diversification • Unambiguous attenuation of incentives (selection, monitoring, enforcement) • Some market participants took advantage of information asymmetries • Remarkable testimony to inefficiency, irrationality of markets that market participants did not recognize these (and other) problems • Including risk of increased leverage • Market didn’t seem to learn lesson of Modigliani-Miller Modigliani Miller
  56. 56. • Moreover, countries that have had highest persistent unemployment include those with allegedly most flexible labor markets (e.g. US), in contradiction to standard (e g US) macro-economic models • But consistent with earlier studies of volatility y • Easterly, W., R. Islam, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2001a, “Shaken and Stirred: Explaining Growth Volatility,” in Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics 2000, Washington: World Bank, pp. 191-212. • —— , ——, and —— , 2001b, “Shaken and Stirred: Volatility and Macroeconomic Paradigms for Rich and Poor Countries ”, in Advances Countries, in Macroeconomic Theory, Jacques Drèze (ed.), IEA Conference Volume, 133, Palgrave, 2001, pp. 353-372
  57. 57. • Th There were large losses associated with misallocation of capital l l i t d ith i ll ti f it l before the bubble broke. It is easy to construct models of bubbles. But most of the losses occur after the bubble breaks, in the persistent gap between actual and potential output – Standard theory predicts a relatively quick recovery, as the economy adjusts to new “reality” – New equilibrium associated with new state variables (treating expectations as a state variable) – And sometimes that is the case (V-shaped recovery) ( p y) – But sometimes the recovery is very slow – Persistence of effects of shocks – Explained by slow recovery of balance sheets (Greenwald (Greenwald- Stiglitz, 1993, 2003) – But current persistence is greater than can be explained by these models
  58. 58. V. Concluding RemarksV C l di R k• Current downturn likely to be long • And if something isn’t done soon about jobs situation, hysteresis effects will set in making return to full employment all the more in, difficult• Slump is more than a financial crisis • Though the financial crisis will make the return to full employment all the more difficult• W have t look at the underlying real problems and We h to l k t th d l i l bl d address them • Unless we do so we won’t succeed in recovering so, won t • And what we do may even be counterproductive
  59. 59. • Th crisis i not only a crisis i th economy, b t also The i i is t l i i in the but l should be a crisis in economics • Standard models contributed to policies that led to the crisis • Have provided us little guidance on how to respond • But the building blocks with which alternative theories can be constructed are already available • Research in economic theory over past three decades has been enormously rich and productive • The failure was to integrate adequately microeconomic insights into macro economic models • This is one of the main challenges going forward J.E. Stiglitz, 2011, “Rethinking Macroeconomics: What Failed and How to Repair It,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 9(4), 9(4) pp. 591 645 591-645.