C:\Documents And Settings\James Loerch\My Documents\Ew\Ew\20081216 Presentatie SchmidtPresentation Transcript
The Trajectory of Terrorism 1990-2030 Presentation by Alex P. Schmid, Director Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV), Netherlands Institute for International Relations ‘Clingendael’, Prinses Juliana Kazerne Conference ‘Challenging Uncertainties: The Future of the Netherlands’ Armed Forces’ 16 th - 17 th December 2008
The Economy of the Developed World is on Path to Grow for at least the next five years;
Militant Islam continues to spread and gain power
The World’s population is on course to reach 9.2 billion by 2050.
Technology increasingly dominates both the economy and society.
Privacy, once a defining right for Americans, is dying quickly
The global economy is growing more integrated
Urbanization, arguably the world’s oldest trend, continues rapidly
The internet continues to grow, but at a slower pace.
Advanced communication technologies are changing the way we work and live
The United States is ceding its scientific and technical leadership to other countries.
Table 1: Ten Most Important Trends for the Future of Terrorism according to Proteus Think Tank (February 2008) Source: Marvin J. Cetron and Owen Davies. 55. Trends Now Shaping the Future of Terrorism. The Proteus Trend Series, Vol. 1, Issue 2, February 2008
A. de Borchgrave :”it is just a matter of time. My assumption is it will be a weapon of mass destruction ”; M. Cetron : “If they want to do a bioweapons attack they would be in a perfect position to do that”; W. Phares : “…the next few months are crucial as they precede the presidential campaign year of 2008”; P.L. Williams : “…[bin Laden] is planning to conduct an attack on seven to ten cities simultaneously ”. Table 2: Sample of “Expert” Predictions from July 2007 for 2007/08 Source: Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report (TOSIR), No. 289, 26 July 2007
1. Terrorism refers on the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties; 2. Terrorism as a tactic is employed in three main contexts: (i) illegal state repression, (ii) propagandistic agitation by non-state actors in times of peace or outside zones of conflict and (iii) as a illicit tactic of irregular warfare employed by state- and non-state actors. Source: A.P. Schmid, Handbook of Terrorism Research, London, Routledge, forthcoming 2009. Table 3: Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism
Resistance to invasion/occupation by Partisan warfare
(Elite) coup d'etat/(mass) revolution
Civil war/armed intra-state conflict with, or without, state participation
Source: A.P. Schmid. Handbook of Terrorism Research. London, Routledge, forthcoming 2009. Table 4: Forms of Political Violence other than Terrorism
Table 5: Historical Evolution of Technology
Fire/Arson: Spanish Inquisition
Dagger/Blade: Sicarii, Assassins, French Revolution
Bombing: Gunpowder plot, Anarchists and many others
Handgun: Anarchists, Russian People’s Will
Hijacking: Cuban, Palestinians and many others(1960s)
Hostage Taking: Japanese Embassy in Peru 1996/1997
Vehicle Bombings: Hezbollah (1980s)
Suicide Bombing: LTTE, Hamas et al (1980s)
Chemical: Aum Shinrikyo (1995)
Biological: Anthrax Letters (2001)
% of all events % of all casualties Bombs 53.4 70.1 Guns 19.9 23.0 Arson 9.8 2.7 Remote control bombs 1.9 4.7 Knives & other blades 1.3 2.1 Chemical 0.2 0.59 Biological 0.08 0.02 Other 13.3 8.1 Total 100.0 100.0 Source: p.49.Kenneth T. Bogen and Edwin D. Jones. Risks of Mortality and Morbidity from Worldwide Terrorism: 1968-2004. Risk Analysis Vol. 26, No.1, 2006. – Data utilized are from RAND-MIPT. Incidents until 1997 include only international terrorism. Table 6: Terrorist Tactics, based on 25,303 terrorist events, 1968-2004
Table 7: Terrorist Incidents Worldwide Source: MIPT (domestic and international) – It should be noted that MIPT does not count civilians killed by governments. 99072 47596 27669 Total 18694 8763 3479 2007 20991 12071 6660 2006 15269 8192 4976 2005 10860 5066 2647 2004 6200 2346 1899 2003 7349 2763 2648 2002 6403 4571 1732 2001 2570 783 1151 2000 2534 847 1172 1999 8202 2172 1286 1998 Injured Fatalities Incidents Year
Democratic Republic of the Congo, since 1990 4,000,000 Sudan since 1983 2,000,000 Afghanistan since 1978 1,500,000 Uganda since 1987 500,000 Somalia since 1988 400,000 Sudan/Darfur since 2003 400,000 Burundi since 1993 300,000 Algeria since 1992 200,000 Colombia since 1964 200,000 Philippines since 1971 150,000 Israel/Palestine since 1948 120,000 Sri Lanka since 1948 100,000 Source: Mitchell Beazley. Where We Are Now. London, Octopus Publ. Group, 2008, p.103. Table 8: Death in Current Armed Conflicts
Table 9: Terrorist Incidents Worldwide in 2005 and 2006 according to US National Counter Terrorism Center Source: US National Counter Terrorism Centre as quoted in US Department of State. Country Reports on Terrorism and Patterns of Global Terrorism. Washington, DC, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 21 March 2007, p.3; available at www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82739.htm, consulted on 04/05/2007 6.959 7.194 Incidents worldwide, excl. Iraq and Afghanistan 749 491 Incidents of terrorism in Afghanistan 6.630 3.468 Incidents of terrorism in Iraq 14.338 11.153 Incidents of terrorism worldwide 2006 2005
Table 10: Terrorist Logistical Success: 1968-2007 Source: ITERATE, calculated by Peter Flemming 100.0 13,087 Total number of incidents 1.9 246 Unknown 79.6 10,411 Apparently completed as planned 5.6 734 Stopped by authorities at the scene after initiation 2.1 277 Unsuccessful owing to faults or error by terrorists 2.5 328 Aborted by terrorists during event 5.0 654 Incident stopped by authorities at scene/way to scene 3.2 421 Incident stopped by authorities at planning stage .1 16 Aborted by terrorists before initiation Percent Frequency Terrorist Logistical Success
Palestinian extremists sabotage and hijack airliners
Urban guerrillas in Latin America regularly kidnap foreign diplomats, demanding the release of their imprisoned comrades, first in Latin America, then in Europe and the Middle East;
First terrorist groups appeared in Europe and Japan
Terrorist bombings became increasingly common
Table 11: Non-State Terrorism in 1970: Types of Incidents Source: Brian Michael Jenkins. Unconquerable Nation. Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves. St. Monica, RAND, 2006, p. 6. 10
Attack on Olympic games 1972
Embassy party taken hostage in Lima
Bombs on trains and subways in Paris, Moscow, Madrid, Manila, London
Nerve gas attack in Tokyo’s subways
Truck bomb explosions in centre of London and Oklahoma
Suicide bombers walking into restaurants, shopping malls, buses, hotel lobbies
Trucks full of explosives driven into embassies, synagogues and mosques
Jumbo jets blown from the sky; surface-to-air missiles fired at civilian airliners
Hijacked planes flown into skyscrapers.
Table 12: Non-State Terrorism since 1970: Types of Incidents Source: Brian Michael Jenkins. Unconquerable Nation. Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves. St. Monica, RAND, 2006, p. 6. 10
Attempts to acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction
Diaspora Bridgeheads (Portable conflicts)
Kamikaze Suicide Terrorism
Expansion of Range of Targets (Tourists, ICRC, UN)
Links with Organized Crime
New Sources of Financing
Failed and weak states as de facto safe havens
New types of weapons (e.g. MANPADs)
Table 13: ‘New’ Elements in ‘ New Terrorism’
Before 9/11 After 9/11 Armed Attacks + 644 6185 Arson Events + 315 563 Assassinations + 492 1260 Barricades/Hostage Takings - 41 26 Bombings + 3236 11,409 Hijackings - 28 14 (inc. 9/11) Kidnappings + 373 1268 By other means + 99 561 Source: Source: Mitchell Beazley. Where We Are Now. London, Octopus Publ. Group, 2008, p.115 based mainly on MIPT : Terrorism Knowledge Base. Table 14: Terrorist Incidents before & after 9/11
1990 – 1994: 1,365 1995-1999: 4,328 2000- 2004: 15,532 2005 – 2008 (incomplete): 27,191 Total: 48,416 Source: Source: Mitchell Beazley. Where We Are Now. London, Octopus Publ. Group, 2008, p.115 based mainly on MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. Table 15: Civilian Deaths from Terrorist Attacks, 1990 – 2007
Table 16: Incidents by Region: 1998 - 03/03/2008 Source: MIPT, at http://www.tkb.org, as of 03/03/2008 47693 99214 27680 TOTAL 401 1787 3087 Western Europe 1748 5552 1738 Southeast Asia & Oceania 7744 17953 4881 South Asia 2996 2408 120 North America 28248 54707 13865 Middle East / Persian Gulf 1688 2648 1834 Latin America & the Caribbean 2010 5127 1455 Eastern Europe 164 393 128 East & Central Asia 2694 8639 572 Africa Fatalities Injuries Incidents Region
Symbolic targets: biblical sites; Pope; White House; Statue of Liberty. Major events: soccer stadium, apartment buildings. Common people: American school; soccer stadia; tourist places; “Westerners”. Government: United Nations; FBI & CIA headquarters; Capitol. Transport: New York Subway; airports; US navy ship. Business: banks. Infrastructure: NY tunnels ;UK Tower bridge; pipelines; oil refinery; nuclear power plant. Table 17: Targets of Planned, Foiled and Failed Terrorist Attacks outside Europe, 1993-2006
Symbolic targets: Eiffel Tower; church; synagogue. Major events: G-7 meeting; world soccer cup final. Common people: Christmas market, shopping centre; nightclub; funeral of Pope. Government: embassies, Ministry of Defense; house of parliament, supreme court. Transport: airport; aircraft; trains; passenger ships; subway. Business: Trade centre. Infrastructure: nuclear power plant; air force base; computer backup server centre. Table 18: European Targets of 44 Planned, failed and Foiled Jihadist Terrorist Attacks, 1994-2006
Killed Wounded 8/7 1998: Attacks on US embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salam 224 4,000 9/11 2001: Attacks on US targets, incl. WTC, with four airplanes 2.998 6.291 10/12: Bomb attacks in Bali on Western Tourists 202 209 11/15 2004 Two attacks in Istanbul on Jewish synagogues 25 300+ 11/20 2004: Attack on British consulate in Istanbul 27 450 3/11 2004: Ten bombs explode in four trains in Madrid 192 1.800 7/7/2005: Attack on London underground and bus 52 700 11/09 2005: Amman bombing 57 96 Source: Spiegel Jahrbuch 2003. Hamburg & Muenchen, Der Spiegel Verlag/ Deutscher TaschenbuchVerlag, 2003, pp. 538-543 ; Spiegel Spezial. Terror: der Krieg des 21. Jahrhunderts. Hamburg, Der Spiegel, 2/2004, pp. 55;Der Fischer Weltalmanach 2005. Frankfurt a. M., Fischer Verlag, 2004, p.434. Table 19: Casualty Rates of Major Al Qaeda related/inspired Terrorist Attacks
Year Incidents Killed Wounded Total Casualties 1995: 1 7 60 67 1996: 0 0 0 0 1997: 1 68 24 92 1998: 2 224 4077+ 4301+ 1999: 1 1 0 1 2000: 1 17 39 56 2001: 1 2998 6291 9289 2002: 6 31 112 143 2003: 4 97 429+ 526+ 2004: 5 62 206 268 2005: 5 46 89 135 2006: 7 6 37 43 2007: 1 24 50+ 74+ 2008: 0 0 0 0 Totals: 35 3581 11414+ 14995+ Source: Data calculated by B. McAllister, CSTPV Table 20: Number of Incidents and Casualties of Major Al Qaeda Central Attacks
Year Location 1998: Kenya, Tanzania 1999: India 2000: Yemen 2001: United States 2002: Pakistan, Tunisia, Yemen, Jordan, Kenya 2003: Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Indonesia 2004: Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, Spain, Iraq 2005: Egypt, Israel, Jordan, UK, Iraq 2006: Algeria, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, Iraq 2007: Pakistan, Iraq Source: Data calculated by B. McAllister, CSTPV Table 21: Locations of al-Qaeda ‘Central’ Attacks, 1998 - 2007
Table 22: Al Qaeda’s Strategic Goals as of mid-2005 (Ayman al-Zawahiri) Stage 1: Expel the Americans from Iraq Stage 2: Establish an Islamic authority or emirate, then develop it and support it until it achieves the level of caliphate Stage 3: Extend the jihad wave to the secular countries neighbouring Iraq Stage 4: (maybe coinciding with what came before): the clash with Israel
Phase 1: (2001-2003): “The Awakening”: awake the Islamic nation from its state of hibernation by causing United States to "act chaotically”. Phase 2: (20032006): “Eye-Opening”: turn Iraq into a recruiting ground for young men eager to attack America; conduct “electronic jihad” Phase 3 (2007-2010): “Arising and Standing Up” Al Qaeda focus of struggle on Syria and Turkey, also begin of confrontation with Israel Phase 4 (2011-2013): Al Qaeda to bring about demise of Arab governments, continued attacks on oil industry, electronic attacks to undermine U.S. economy, bringing about the collapse of the dollar by promoting gold as exchange medium Phase 5 (2014-2016): “declaration of Islamic caliphate” leading to change of int. balance of power by seeking new economic allies such as China Phase 6 (2017-2020): “total confrontation”: the now established caliphate’s Islamic Army will achieve “definitive victory”. Source: Lawrence Wright. The Master Plan. For the new theorists of jihad, Al Qaeda is just the beginning. The New Yorker , September 11, 2006, pp.7-8; at: http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2007/09/11/060911fa_fact3?cur ..., as of 08/10/2008. Table 23: Al Qaeda’s Twenty-Years’ Grand Plan
Stay alive and active and show that jihad against Crusaders and Zionists is a feasible strategy
Transform Al Qaeda from a militant group into a political movement
Portray the GWOT as a war on Islam
Trap the United States in “bleeding wars”
Overthrow the government of Pakistan
Crusaders and Zionist armies to leave Muslim lands defeated after the collapse of their economies.
Attack with weapon of mass destruction to make USA isolationist.
Provoke war between USA and Iran and Israel and Saudi Arabia
Overthrow of all apostate rulers in Muslim countries
Recover “every stolen Islamic land from Palestine to al-Andalus and other Islamic lands that were lost”
Reunite the Ummah and establishment of a Caliphate
Introduction of Salafism and Sharia law everywhere.
Source: Various,;incl. Bruce Reidel. The Search for Al Qaeda. Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future. Washington, D.C. Brookings Institution Press, 2008, pp.34, 53,113, 121, 124. Table 24: Progress of Al Qaeda on the Path to a Caliphate
Terrorism is a tactic that can be employed by any adversary. Potential threats can come from unexpected as well as familiar directions.
Future of terrorism will depend, in large part, on use & accessibility of technology
Future of terrorism will be affected in part by the mobility of people.
Future of terrorism will be shaped by our actions in defending against terrorism
Understanding the future of terrorism requires our understanding trends and developments in a wide range of areas.
The most significant terrorist threat to the homeland today stems from a global movement, underpinned by a jihadist/Salafist ideology
Source: Homeland Security Advisory Council. Report of the Future of Terrorism Task Force. Washington , DC, DHS, January 2007, pp. 3-5. Table 25: Future of Terrorism according to US Homeland Security Advisory Council, January 2007 - Selected Findings
Core of al Qaeda is resilient and resurgent, remains a threat to USA.
A more pressing threat will be the wider movement inspired by al Qaeda .
While difficult to measure with precision, al Qaeda’s ideology is spreading
Threat of state-sponsored terrorism will not disappear.
Internet has become a major facilitator of terrorism, spreading jihadist ideology
Alienation of Muslim populations in the West major component in spread of
Source: Homeland Security Advisory Council. Report of the Future of Terrorism Task Force. Washington , DC, DHS, January 2007pp. 3-5. Table 25a: Future of Terrorism according to US Homeland Security Advisory Council, January 2007 - Selected Findings cont.
Al Qaeda will rely more on Western radicalized Muslims to assist in future attacks
Greatest threat to the United States in 2015 will be form groups operating out of Europe
Next decade may see an increase in technology –assisted terrorism
The United States should be prepared to see a surge of sleeper cells over the next ten years
Source: http://www.hklaw.com/content/maritime/mardocs/Workshop_2015.pdf Table 26: Terrorism 2015 – US Dept. of Homeland Security workshop – some views expressed
Radiological: trafficking in radio-isotopes but no incidents Nuclear: trafficking in plutonium and highly enriched uranium – but no incidents with improvised, stolen or sold nuclear device Chemical: Sarin attack in Tokyo’s subway system in April 1005: 12 killed, dozens wounded Biological: Anthrax attack in USA 2001: 5 killed, 22 infected Table 27: The CBRN Threat of Terrorism: Fact or Fiction?
Detonation of a 10 kiloton nuclear device by terrorists;
a biological attack with aerosolized anthrax;
an outbreak of pneumonic plague;
a flu pandemic originating in South Asia;
the release of a chemical agent over a football stadium;
an attack on an oil refinery;
the explosion of a chlorine tank
three cesium-137 dirty bombs detonated in three different cities
the explosion of improvised explosive devices in sports arenas and emergency rooms;
the contamination of ground beef by liquid anthrax.
Cit. Philip Bobbitt.. Terror and Consent. The Wars for the Twenty-First Century. London, Allen Lane, 2008, p. 234 Table 28: Terroristic Catastrophe Scenarios of US Department of Homeland Security
Table 30: Seven Key Drivers of Global Change (from Global Trends 2015) Source: Robert L. Hutchings, Chairman of the [US] National Intelligence council in introduction to National Intelligence Council. Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council ‘s 2020 Project. Washington, D.C., NIC, 2005, .p 2
Natural resources and the environment
Science and technology
The global economy and globalization
National and international governance
The role the United States
Rise of New Powers
Decay of International Institutions
Geopolitics of Energy
Source: [US] National Intelligence Council. Global Trends 2025. A Transformed World Washington, D.C. , GPO, November 2008 (NIC 2008-003). Table 31: Key Drivers of ‘Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World’
Mass communication and propaganda
Western responses to radicalisation
Governance in target countries
Western dominance (both real and perceived)
Religion (and its relationship to politics)
Government responsiveness (civil society)
Immigration and demographics
“ Us- vs. -Them” identity politics
Resources (scarcities, conflicts over ~)
Violence (associated with extremism)
Global Futures Forum. Radical Worlds of 2020. Imagining the Futures of Radicalisation. The Hague, 12-14 December 2007, pp. 54. Table 32: Key Drivers of Radicalisation, according to Global Futures Forum
Resilience and longevity of the international jihadist networks
unipolar exclusionist and interventionist world order
weak transitional states
non-state actors in global politics
globalisation of organized crime
Middle East oil dependence
Migration and ethnic heterogenisation of Western societies
Growing information interconnectedness
Proliferation of deadly technologies
Out-of-area spill-over from ongoing armed conflicts
Source:Brynjar Lia. Globalisation and the Future of Terrorism. Patterns and Predictions. London, Routledge, 2005, pp. 187-188. Table 33: Factors Facilitating Future Terrorism, according to Brynar Lia (2005)
“ Terrorism is unlikely to disappear by 2025, but its appeal could diminish if economic growth continues and youth unemployment is mitigated in the Middle East. Economic opportunities for youth and greater political pluralism probably would dissuade some from joining terrorists’ ranks, but others – motivated by a variety of factors, such as a desire for revenge or to become ‘martyrs ’ – will continue to turn to violence to purpose their objectives”. “ Terrorist and insurgent groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long-established groups – that inherit organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks – and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized. (…)Future radicalism could be fuelled by global communications and mass media. Increasing interconnectedness will enable individuals to coalesce around common causes across national boundaries, creating new cohorts of the angry, downtrodden, and disenfranchised”. US] National Intelligence Council. Global Trends 2025. A Transformed World Washington, D.C. , GPO, November 2008 (NIC 2008-003), p. 68 [emphasis added, AS]. Table 34 : Terrorism in 2025 (US National Intelligence Estimate)
1 st Wave: 1879- World War I: Anarchist Wave 2 nd Wave: 1920s to 1960s: Anti-Colonial Wave 3 rd Wave: 1960s – early 1980s: New Left Wave 4 th Wave: 1979- today: Religious Wave 5 th Wave: Today – 2030s?: The New Tribalism? Source: David C. Rapoport. The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11. Anthropoetics 8, no. 1 (Spring / Summer 2002); Jeffrey Kaplan. The Fifth Wave: The New Tribalism? Terrorism and Political Violence , Vol. 19, No.4, 2007, pp.545-570. Table 35: Rapoport’s four Waves Theory
Radical quest for purity – racial, tribal, ecological, etc.
Belief in human perfectibility and chiliastic utopia in this lifetime
Children are the vanguard of the fifth wave as they are the least contaminated by the old society
Rape is the signature tactic of the fifth wave
Fifth wave groups are localistic and particularistic….
Authoritarian in nature with charismatic leadership patterns
Chiliastic in nature…millenarian dream to be realized through a campaign of apocalyptic violence.
Source:Jeffrey Kaplan. The Fifth Wave: The New Tribalism? Terrorism and Political Violence , Vol. 19, No.4, 2007, p.548. Table 36: Fifth Wave of Terrorism - Tribal? Key Features, according to J. Kaplan.
Increasing Importance of Information
The Evolution of Irregular Warfare Capabilities
The Prominence of the Non-military Aspects of Warfare
The Expansion and Escalation of Conflict beyond the Traditional Battlefield
US] National Intelligence Council. Global Trends 2025. A Transformed World Washington, D.C. , GPO, November 2008 (NIC 2008-003), p. 71. Table 37: Key Drivers in Armed Conflict
1.Command and Control 2. Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Assessment 3. Intelligence Support 4. Education, Training and Exercise 5. NBC Defense 6. Special Operations 7. Electronic Warfare 8. Interdiction 9. Logistics 10. Power Projection 11. Combined Joint Operations 12. Land Operations 13. Air Operations 14. Maritime Operations. Source: Alex P. Schmid. Comparative Analysis of Six Dutch Scenarios and Twenty Nato ‘Planning Situations’. Leiden, PIOOM, March 1998, p.6. Table 38: Major Elements of overall military capability for NATO Armed Forces
‘ Unity of Effort’ – integrated employment of political, military, economic, social and psychological countermeasures
Win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the population
Gain greater credibility than the insurgent. Legitimacy is the main objective
Deny insurgents sanctuary
Focus on intelligence
Selective and discriminate use of force
Avoid overreaction to insurgent violence
Separate insurgents from support base
Use clear and hold, ‘oil spot’ tactics to gradually sanitise areas of insurgents
Secure (host-)nation borders
Protect key infrastructure
Table 41: How Terrorist Campaigns Came to an end (n=268) Source: Seth Jones. How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qa’ida. ST Monica, RAND, 2008, p.19
Tactical victory such as winning either a specific battle or, as a result of the cumulative effect of many such battlefield triumphs, a war;
Political-military victory (based on a sufficient number of tactical victories) , entailing a state’s achieving some of its political and military goals; and
Grand Strategy victory or the strategic successes that occur through the destruction of a society, its military, economy, and institutions of governance when the winning side imposes a strategic change in the international system by destroying the ideological and moral values of a society and then re-establishing the foundations of the enemy state, including its government, economy and military power.
Source : cit. William C. Martel. Victory in War. Foundations of Modern Military Policy. Cambridge, University Press, 2007, pp. 9-10, 96-98. Table 42: Definition of Levels of Victory in War (W.C. Martel, 2008)
Thank you for your attention. Questions?
Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence
School of International Relations,
University of St. Andrews
Instruments of International Legal Regime against Int. Terrorism % Ratification 138 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf 150 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 165 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation 135 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 165 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages 169 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents 186 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation 183 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 183 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft
Instruments of International Legal Regime against Int. Terrorism Cont. % Ratification 158 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 138 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection 4 2005 Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of fixed platforms located on the continental shelf 6 2005 Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation 17 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 40 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 163 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 158 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 138 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection
Table : Elements and Dimensions of Scenarios
What are the driving forces? (logic of the story based on predetermined forces)
What are the critical uncertainties?
What is inevitable?
Which chains of events will lead to this or that scenario?
Who are likely to be the winners and losers?
What will be the challenges and responses?
What is evolutionary, what is revolutionary (unbroken and broken lines into future)
What are the specific indicators for each scenario (current weak or strong signals pointing to one or another possible future)?
Source: Alex P. Schmid. Comparative Analysis of Six Dutch Scenarios and Twenty Nato ‘Planning Situations’. Leiden, PIOOM, March 1998, p.6.
Table 29: Possible Scale of Terrorist Attacks (1993 Estimates) Source: Office of Technology Assessment. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks. U.S. Congress, 1993; cit. Michael E. O’ Hanlon et al. Protecting the American Homeland. A Preliminary Analysis. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2002, p.6. Modest 50-100 Suicide attack with explosives or firearms in a mall or crowded street Low 250 Conventional attack on a single train or airplane Low 1,000 Simple, relatively inefficient biological or chemical attack in one skyscraper or stadium Very low 10,000 Successful attack on nuclear or toxic chemical plant Very low 100,000 Atomic bomb detonated in major US city Very low 1,000,000 Efficient biological attack Estimated Likelihood Possible Fatalities Type of Attack