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Hsl Capstone Project J

  1. 1. Prevention and Protection: The Role of the United States Intelligence Community Justin R. Levy B.A., University of Hartford, 2004 A Capstone Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Professional Studies at the University of Connecticut 2007 1
  2. 2. APPROVAL PAGE Master of Professional Studies Capstone Project Prevention and Protection: The Role of the United States Intelligence Community Presented by: Justin R. Levy, B.A. Major Advisor: ________________________________________________ Associate Advisor: _____________________________________________ Associate Advisor: _____________________________________________ University of Connecticut 2007 2
  3. 3. Table of Contents Table of Contents.................................................................................................. 1 Abstract ................................................................................................................. 5 Capstone Proposal ............................................................................................... 6 Definition of Terrorism........................................................................................... 8 Lessons Learned from 9/11 .................................................................................. 8 Joint Inquiry Report into Intelligence Community Activities ............................... 9 9/11 Commission Report ................................................................................. 10 9/11 Commission Report Analysis ............................................................... 11 The Senate Intelligence Committee Report ..................................................... 12 The Butler Committee Report .......................................................................... 13 The WMD Commission Report ........................................................................ 14 Legislation ........................................................................................................... 14 National Security Act of 1947 .......................................................................... 15 Homeland Security Act of 2002 ....................................................................... 15 Executive Order 13354.................................................................................... 17 Executive Order 13356.................................................................................... 18 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 ............................. 18 Impact of Post-9/11 Investigations and Directives .............................................. 19 DCI and DNI Comparison ................................................................................... 20 Control of Intelligence Budget ............................................................................. 22 Coordination of Intelligence ................................................................................ 23 Role of Military Intelligence ................................................................................. 26 Human Capital Management .............................................................................. 29 Analysis of Progression ...................................................................................... 33 Implementation of a National Intelligence Agency .............................................. 36 National Intelligence Agency Legislation ......................................................... 36 National Intelligence Agency Foundation and Structure .................................. 38 Directorate for Customer Outcomes ............................................................ 38 3
  4. 4. Directorate for Analysis ................................................................................ 39 Directorate for Collection ............................................................................. 39 Directorate for Management ........................................................................ 40 Directorate for Information Sharing .............................................................. 40 National Intelligence Agency Budget ............................................................... 41 National Intelligence Agency Security Concerns ............................................. 41 Concept Analysis............................................................................................. 42 Concept Criticisms .......................................................................................... 44 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 46 Shortcomings .................................................................................................. 46 Project Analysis ............................................................................................... 47 Appendix A: Pre-DHS Reorganization Chart ...................................................... 49 Appendix B: DHS Organization Chart ................................................................. 50 Appendix C: Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) ................................ 51 Appendix D: Original ODNI Organizational Chart ............................................... 52 Appendix E: Current ODNI Organizational Chart ................................................ 53 References ......................................................................................................... 54 4
  5. 5. Abstract AUTHOR: Justin R. Levy TITLE: Prevention and Protection: The Role of the United States Intelligence Community FORMAT: Capstone Project WORD COUNT: 12,573 DATE: Spring/Summer 2007 PAGES: 58 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified DISCLOSURE: It must be maintained by the reader at all times that any analysis provided by the author is the result of an open source review. The reader should therefore expect that there are classified documents which exist that could either support or counter the views expressed hereinafter. 5
  6. 6. Capstone Proposal Prior to the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the United States Intelligence Community suffered from many shortcomings including but not limited to: a lack of information sharing; a lack of processing and evaluating of collected intelligence; legal barriers and many other failures. The Intelligence Community (IC) has undergone the largest reorganization in the history of the United States since the creation of the Department of Defense (DoD) as part of the National Security Act of 1947. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), among other agencies/positions, have attempted to better prepare the United States for attacks from terrorists and those who are sympathetic to their mission. Post-9/11 reorganization, legislation and other adjustments have attempted to produce a stronger and better prepared Intelligence Community with a renewed focus on prevention and protection of the United States and its assets domestically and internationally. Since 9/11, how have these efforts changed the face of the IC and have these changes made the IC better prepared in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)? Furthermore, would the consolidation of the IC into a single, unified intelligence agency provide a better model for the future of United States intelligence? Would this National Intelligence Agency (NIA) better prepare and protect the United States from future terror attacks both inside and outside of our borders? 6
  7. 7. To assist in answering these questions a review of the current state of the IC will be conducted as well as an analysis of pre- and post-9/11 directives relating to the prevention of terrorism within our borders. Following this will be a discussion of the single, unified agency concept with a suggested organizational layout introduced. 7
  8. 8. Definition of Terrorism Any discussion of terrorism or acts of terrorism should first begin with a working definition of the topic. For the purposes of this paper the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) definitions of terrorism will be adopted. They are as follows: Domestic terrorism is the unlawful use, or threatened use, of violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States (or its territories) without foreign direction committed against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives (Watson, 2002, p.3) . International terrorism involves violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any state. Acts are intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government, or affect the conduct of a government. These acts transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate, or the locale in which perpetrators operate(Watson,2002,p.3). Lessons Learned from 9/11 On September 11, 2001, a total of 19 hijackers took control of four domestic airplanes. These hijackers crashed two of these planes into the World Trade Center towers approximately eighteen minutes apart. The third plane was crashed into the Pentagon. The fourth, and last plane, was crashed into a rural field in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, after the hijackers were overtaken by a group of passengers. A total of 2,986 people died, including the 19 hijackers, as a result of the worse act of terrorism in modern-day history (Walker, 2004). 8
  9. 9. As a result of this tragic day in history, there were extensive inquiries and investigations into the law enforcement and intelligence communities pre-9/11. The following is a brief overview of the various reports which have been issued in conjunction with the 9/11 attacks. The reader should note common themes which are present throughout each of the following inquiries as they will provide a foundation for legislative action which will be explored later. Joint Inquiry Report into Intelligence Community Activities In a December 2002 report, the United States Select Committee on Intelligence and the United States House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence issued the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (hereinafter referred to as the Joint Inquiry). This report was the first in-depth analysis into the shortcomings which were present within the IC pre-9/11. The Joint Inquiry identified several areas where the IC failed. Some of these findings were the following: • There was a lack of information sharing between agencies due, in part, to the culture and history of the IC (Tama, 2005). • There was an ineffective domestic intelligence capability and a failure to fuse information between law enforcement and intelligence agencies (Tama, 2005). • The United States Government (USG) failed to properly prioritize terrorist threats and counterterrorism efforts which resulted in insufficient analysis of threats posed by terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda (Tama, 2005). • The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was not given proper authority to direct and enforce policies within the IC (Tama, 2005). • The USG relied too heavily on foreign liaisons as a means of obtaining intelligence on al-Qaeda and failed to insert human assets to penetrate the terrorist organization (Tama, 2005). 9
  10. 10. As a result of these findings, the Joint Inquiry recommended that a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) be established and that the IC should increase “jointness” by having rotations through the various agencies (Tama, 2005). As will be a common theme throughout this document, the Joint Inquiry further recommended that there be increased focus on the timely sharing of information and stronger focus on recruitment efforts (Tama, 2005). 9/11 Commission Report In November 2002 the United States Congress and President George W. Bush established the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission). “This independent, bipartisan panel was directed to examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the September 11 attacks, identify lessons learned, and provide recommendations to safeguard against future acts of terrorism” (Kean et al., 2002, back cover). In a November 8, 2005, statement to the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment (Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives), former Vice-Chair of the 9/11 Commission, Lee H. Hamilton, provided the following analysis: Poor information sharing was the single greatest failure of our government in the lead-up to the 9/11 attacks. The failure to share information adequately, within and across federal agencies, and from federal agencies to state and local authorities, was a significant contributing factor to our government’s missteps in understanding and responding to the growing threat of al Qaeda in the years before the 9/11 attacks. There were several missed opportunities to disrupt the 9/11 plot. Most of them involved the failure to share information (Hamilton, 2005, p.5). 10
  11. 11. As a result of these findings, the 9/11 Commission issued several recommendations in an attempt to prevent another act of terrorism on the scale of the September 11th attacks. Furthermore, many of these recommendations focused on destroying the “wall” of information sharing which the Commission found was present between and among Federal, State and local agencies (Kean et al., 2002). 9/11 Commission Report Analysis While the 9/11 Commission provided a thorough overview of the problems among federal agencies’ in regards to priorities, coordination, and bureaucratic culture, it did not address the true problems affecting the IC (Cordesman, 2004). In an August 2004 report, the Center for Strategic and International Studies suggested that the 9/11 Commission failed to address problems regarding the intelligence cycle (collection, processing and analyzing), clandestine operations and information technology system capabilities. The study asserts the following problems concerning the 9/11 Commission Report (Cordesman, 2004): • The Commission used tunnel vision in its analysis of the overall weaknesses of the IC and did not fully address the problems which are present within the IC. • The analysis of problems related to counterterrorism capabilities were viewed as a separate issue from the analysis into the problems of the IC. • There was no analysis of the problems related to intelligence during military operations. • While there are several recommendations, few of them are coupled with thorough cost/time analysis. Also, the recommendations do not include the human capital and IT systems needed to pursue those implementations. • The Commission fails to understand and analyze how intelligence is received and used by the policy makers. “It does not examine the flow of documentation and advice provided by the policy level community or does enough to analyze how the policy level uses intelligence” (Cordesman, 2004, p.6). 11
  12. 12. • The Commission fails to understand the amount of data which is collected by the IC and therefore any failures by the IC are assumed by the policy level community to be fixable to a certain extent. The policy level community does not realize that the vast amount of information which is collected produces an infinite number of possible patterns which there is not sufficient staffing to follow-up on. • While it was recommended that a Director of National Intelligence (DNI), a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and a host of other reforms be implemented, the Commission focused “on lines of coordination and authority, not on the intelligence process and intelligence quality” (Cordesman, 2004, p.6). Furthermore these recommendations fail to take into the consideration the bureaucratic impact and additional layers of administration which would be formed as a result of these recommendations. • The Commission focuses on the increase of information sharing and the centralization of the IC but fails to address the fact that a majority of the intelligence budget is under the control of the Department of Defense (DoD). Therefore, adding additional layers of bureaucracy will not necessarily change some of the implementation problems present within the intelligence cycle. The Commission was directed to undertake an enormous task whose analysis would be the blueprint for governmental reform. The report conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies was a comprehensive analysis of many areas affecting the IC which the Commission never focused on. That being said, the 9/11 Commission accomplished something that several previous committees and reports had failed to do. The recommendations made by the Commission resulted in a major shake-up of the IC and led to the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). The Senate Intelligence Committee Report “As the 9/11 Commission report was released, public discussion of intelligence shortcomings began shifting from a focus on 9/11 to an examination of apparently inaccurate prewar government statements and assessments about 12
  13. 13. Iraq's WMD capability” (Tama, 2005, p.5). Therefore, on July 7, 2004, the Senate Intelligence Committee issued its’ report on the IC and its assessments of Iraq’s WMD capabilities regarding pre-war intelligence. The Senate Intelligence Committee (2004) found that the IC suffered from “groupthink” which led to the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq, issued in October 2002, to be either overstated or unsupported due to a heavy reliance on intelligence gleaned from United Nations (UN) inspectors and other foreign sources. The Senate Intelligence Committee’s report revealed that the IC had no human assets inserted in Iraq after 1998 (Tama, 2005). The main focus of the recommendations issued by the Senate Intelligence Committee (2004) focused on more in-depth analysis and use of human assets for intelligence gathering instead of foreign services and report. The Butler Committee Report One week after the Senate Intelligence Committee issued its report on Iraq’s pre-war WMD capabilities, Lord Butler (2004) and his committee, issued the Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction. While this report focused on British pre-war intelligence failures, it recognized that the problems regarding groupthink and reliance on foreign services for intelligence was not specific only to the United States IC (Butler, 2004). The Butler Report (2004) concluded that “acquiring intelligence on secret WMD programs is particularly difficult because they are usually subject to strong state control, very few people have complete knowledge of them, and many WMD materials and activities have dual uses” (Butler, 2004, p.25). That being said, “policymakers and intelligence 13
  14. 14. officials must recognize the limits and incompleteness of intelligence, rather than artificially constructing intellectually satisfying accounts” (Tama, 2005, p.5). The WMD Commission Report On March 31, 2005, the WMD Commission issued their report which mirrored the previously mentioned reports. Recommendations issued in previous reports focused almost solely on pre-war intelligence on Iraq’s WMD programs. The WMD Commission (2005) realized that the problems being experienced were not specific to Iraq but instead to the entire IC. Therefore, the WMD Commission’s recommendations included the granting of more authority to the DNI; establishing a National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC); creation of an Open Source Directorate, long-term and strategic analysis units within the National Intelligence Council (NIC), a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)- based National Security Service (NSS) and the establishment of a National Intelligence University (NIU) (Tama, 2005). There were several other recommendations issued however the above are examples to provide the reader with an overview of the WMD Commission and how they departed from focusing solely on Iraq’s capabilities. Legislation While the various committees discussed earlier were busy with their investigations and inquiries, the United States Congress and President George W. Bush began taking the recommendations being issued and translating them into legislation, executive orders and other directives. The following is a brief 14
  15. 15. overview of these various documents beginning first with a review of the National Security Act of 1947 which provided the foundation for future legislation. National Security Act of 1947 The National Security Act of 1947 was a major reorganization of the foreign policy and military establishments of the United States Government. Among many other implementations, the National Security Act (1947) instituted the following: • Created the United States Department of Defense (DOD) headed by the Secretary of Defense. o Accomplished through the merger of the Department of War and Department of the Navy. • Separated the Air Force from the Army Air Forces. • Created National Security Council (NSC). o Meant as a central place of coordination for national security policy within the Executive Branch of the United States Government. • Created Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) headed by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). o Nation’s first peacetime intelligence agency. o DCI considered head of Intelligence Community acting under the direction of the President and NSC. The National Security Act of 1947 was what the United States Government functioned under for approximately 55 years until the implementation of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA). Homeland Security Act of 2002 The HSA (2002) was created as a sweeping anti-terrorism bill to better protect the United States. The most important aspect of this Act was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS became the largest reorganization of the United States Government since the National Security Act 15
  16. 16. of 1947. DHS consolidated more than 20 existing federal agencies, as well as creating new agencies, offices and task forces, in an attempt to quot;organize a government [which was] fractured, divided and under-prepared to handle the all- important task of defending our great nation from terrorist attackquot; (9-11 Research, 2006, p.1). One of the primary missions of this reorganization was to increase information sharing between Federal, State, local and private sector entities. To improve information sharing there were several initiatives implemented: • Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS): The HSAS was created on March 11, 2002 through the Homeland Security Presidential Directive-3 (HSPD-3). Though HSPD-3 was published prior to the passage of the HSA on November 25, 2002, responsibility of administering the system was transferred from the United States Attorney General to the Secretary of Homeland Security (Rolllins & Cunningham, 2005). The primary purpose of the HSAS was to be a “universally understandable, consistent and reliable national threat notification system” (Rollins & Cunningham, 2005, p.4). • Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC): HSOC was created to “serve as the nation’s nerve center for information sharing and domestic incident management—dramatically increasing the vertical coordination between federal, state, territorial, tribal, local, and private sector partners” (DHS, 2004, p.1). Through the use of the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), HSOC “fuses information from a variety of sources to help deter, detect, and prevent terrorist acts” by issuing advisories and bulletins based on real-time monitoring (DHS, 2004, p.1). While there have been other initiatives by DHS, the creation of the HSAS and HSOC were two of the more important implementations at an attempt to improve information sharing. 16
  17. 17. Executive Order 13354 On August 27, 2004, President George W. Bush authored Executive Order 13354 (EO-13354) which established the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The NCTC was developed on the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) model and created for the following reasons: • To serve as the primary organization for “analyzing all intelligence possessed or acquired…pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism” (EO-13354, 2004, p.1). • “Serve as the central and shared knowledge bank on known and suspected terrorists and international terror groups, as well as their goals, strategies, capabilities, and networks of contacts and supports” (EO-13354, 2004, p.1). • “Ensure that agencies…have access to and receive all-source intelligence support needed to execute their counterterrorism plans or perform independent, alternative analysis” EO-13354, 2004, p.1). The NCTC brings together members from various Federal, State and local agencies including (NCTC, 2006): • • Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Department of Homeland Security (DHS) • • Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Department of Justice (DOJ) • • Department of Agriculture (DOA) Department of State (DOS) • • Department of Defense (DOD) Department of Treasury (DOT) • • Department of Energy (DOE) National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency • (NGIA) Department of Health and Human • Services (DHHS) National Regulatory Commission (NRC) • • Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) United States Capitol Police (USCP) The NCTC has attempted to bridge the gaps of information sharing by including these agencies in a central location to fight terrorism. This follows a similar model to that of the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) which are located across the United States. 17
  18. 18. Executive Order 13356 On August 27, 2004, President George W. Bush authored Executive Order 13356 (EO-13356) with the intent of strengthening the sharing of information. The President ordered that a common set of standards be implemented to allow for the maximum distribution and sharing of information among the IC as well as other Federal, State, local and tribal entities. Furthermore, taking into consideration classification levels which prevents some information from being shared, the President ordered intelligence/terrorism reports to be produced at “multiple versions at an unclassified level and at varying levels of classification, for example on an electronic tearline basis, allowing varying degrees of access by other agencies and personnel commensurate with their particular security clearance levels and special access approvals” (EO-13356, 2004, p.1). Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 On December 17, 2004, President George W. Bush signed into law the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004. The IRTPA implemented the following in an attempt to fuse the information sharing gap which was revealed during the 9/11 investigation: • Director of National Intelligence (DNI): The DNI took over the primary responsibilities of the DCI however, by law, is no longer based out of the CIA. Among other responsibilities, the DNI is to promote information sharing among the Intelligence Community (IC) and coordinate the relationships between the IC and foreign services (IRTPA, 2004). • Information Sharing Environment (ISE): The ISE was created to “establish a secure [ISE] for the sharing of intelligence and related information in a manner consistent with national security and the 18
  19. 19. protection of privacy and civil liberties, incorporating specified attributes” (IRTPA, 2004, p.174). Impact of Post-9/11 Investigations and Directives There have been other implementations, orders, strategies and task forces created to further information sharing however those provided above are the most important and revolutionary. These various orders and legislation have attempted to dissolve the “wall” which the 9/11 Commission stated was present prior to September 11, 2001. Considerable progress has been made since our Nation was crippled on September 11th however have these changes better prepared and protected the United States from future terrorist attacks? The recommendations which were issued and the legislation which was enacted in response to September 11th were powerful documents which would lead the reader to believe that the United States would be better protected from future terrorist attacks. However, the USG has continued to receive criticism regarding whether the post-9/11 implementations simply added another layer of bureaucracy. Furthermore, it has been argued that the recommendations which have been issued have not completely been followed through with and still only remain words on paper. Lastly, several have suggested that the investigations into the IC were not properly focused on the real issues. As discussed earlier, the IRTPA (2004) formalized the NCTC, created the DNI as well as the Information Sharing Environment (ISE). The goal of the IRTPA was to fuse the information sharing gaps which existed prior to 9/11. Prior to the IRTPA, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director “also served as the titular head of the 14 other agencies in the intelligence community, most of which are in 19
  20. 20. the Pentagon, even though he effectively lacked control over their budgets or personnel. This ‘dual hatting’ meant that no one was really in charge of the intelligence community” (Fessenden, 2005, p.114). The concept was that by removing this “dual hatting” from the CIA Director (DCI) and allowing a DNI to coordinate the activities of the IC, there would be an increase in budgetary controls as well as information sharing between the IC members as well as other Federal, State, local, and tribal entities. On April 21, 2005, Ambassador John D. Negroponte was confirmed by the Senate as the first DNI (ODNI, 2005). As the one year anniversary since the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has been functional approached there were questions regarding whether this was simply an added layer of bureaucracy or if the DNI is making an impact on reforming the IC. To begin our analysis of the progress being made by the DNI, we will first focus on the differences between the former DCI position and the newly created DNI. DCI and DNI Comparison As discussed earlier, the National Security Act of 1947 established the position of DCI within the IC. Over approximately 55 years before the DCI would be replaced with the DNI, the DCI was given increased responsibilities. While the list of DCI responsibilities is long, they can be summarized into three main areas: 1) The DCI was responsible for reporting all national intelligence activities to the President, various senior officials and, where appropriate, to Congress (Best et al., 2005). 2) “The DCI [had] served as head of the Intelligence Community with authorities to establish priorities for collection and analysis, to develop and present to the President the annual budget for national intelligence 20
  21. 21. programs, and, within tightly prescribed limits, to transfer funds and personnel from one part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), recently renamed the National Intelligence Program (NIP), to another” (Best et al., 2005, p.4). 3) The DCI directed day-to-day operations within the CIA including, but not limited to, human collection efforts, covert and counterterrorism operations, as well as various analytical efforts (Best et al., 2005). The IRTPA assigned the DNI the first two responsibilities formerly held by the DCI and created the position of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA) to handle the third task (IRTPA, 2004). One of the major aspects of this change was the decision to remove the responsibility of preparing the secretive and classified Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) and other daily intelligence briefings from the CIA and place it under the ODNI. Former DCI/DCIA Peter Goss admitted that preparing the presidential briefing took approximately six hours to complete each day which detracted from his capabilities to successfully run the CIA (Bennett, et al., 2005). This change allows the CIA to focus its daily efforts on human intelligence capabilities and become more of an operational entity rather than an analytical unit whose time is consumed preparing briefings for high-ranking senior officials. Also, while the PDB is a classified document, it can be assumed that under the DCI, the PDB contained mainly CIA-based information and intelligence as it was prepared by the DCI and CIA. However, under the DNI, the PDB should contain intelligence gathered from among the other member agencies and departments and not just solely from the CIA. Since the DNI has been preparing the PDB, it has received positive reviews from contributing agencies. The State Department has commented that the PDB now contains “divergent viewpoints” while the FBI has stated DNI Negroponte’s 21
  22. 22. request for information was the first time in approximately two years previous to 2005 that they were included in the daily briefing (Bennett, et al., 2005). Furthermore, several other agencies have been requested to regularly contribute information since the transfer of responsibility for the presidential briefing (Bennett, et al., 2005). The IRTPA also altered and increased the power of the DNI from that previously held by the DCI. Several of these issues are discussed throughout the next several sections. Control of Intelligence Budget Since DNI Negroponte’s confirmation he has introduced several reforms in the production of such products as the Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) and the National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) (Fessenden, 2005). While these are accomplishments, one consistent problem within the IC and for the DNI is control over and receiving more of the intelligence budget. Following the passage of the IRTPA, Congress failed to reorganize its committees and alter the way it conducts oversight in relation to the IC. The reasoning behind this is complicated and political but for this discussion it will suffice to state that such a change would possibly compromise the secrecy of the intelligence budget. At the end of the day, the DNI was not granted his own unified intelligence budget, however, it did give him authority on paper to develop and execute around 80 percent of intelligence spending, including the budgets of the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the intelligence shops of the FBI and the Departments of State, Homeland Security, Energy, and the 22
  23. 23. Treasury. That authority also extends to the biggest part of the intelligence budget, namely, the money for the Pentagon’s national collection agencies: the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGIA) (Fessenden, 2005, p.5- 6). This was a very significant accomplishment for the DNI and something that the DCI was never able to accomplish. It is significant because approximately 80% of the intelligence budget is allocated to the DoD (Treverton, 2005). While the DNI did not receive necessarily more of a budget or a uniformed budget which would have been ideal, he did receive the authority to use that money as effectively as possible among the many agencies which he now controls. However, the DNI is not being accepted by his colleagues. In an interview for the New York Times, Senator Susan Collins stated: “DoD is refusing to recognize that the Director of National Intelligence is in charge of the intelligence community” (Shane, 2006, p.1). This will continue to be a heated battle between the DoD and ODNI especially when it comes to control over the intelligence budget. Coordination of Intelligence During his stay as DNI, Negroponte made a strong effort to bring together the members of the IC in an attempt to further information sharing between the IC as well as other Federal, State, local and tribal communities. One of the methods which have been employed is the continued development and implementation of the NCTC. The NCTC “oversees three video teleconferences 23
  24. 24. a day linking main counterterrorism officials and posts intelligence on a classified website accessible to some 5,000 government analysis” (Shane, 2006, p.2-3). While this is a step in the right direction there still is no one single database which unites all IC information and intelligence. Currently NCTC analysts have access to “26 information networks across the intelligence agencies (housed in three computers on each analyst’s desk) however it is not possible to conduct a search across all 26 networks (Fessenden, 2005, p.8). Furthermore, “NCTC analysts can share information with each other person-to-person, but if they wish to share information with intelligence colleagues outside of the NCTC, they must get the permission of the originating agency” (Fessenden, 2005, p.9). As can be seen by this example, the NCTC is an improvement on information sharing but there is still a lot of work which needs to be done to enhance the capabilities of sharing. In October 2005, DNI Negroponte issued his first National Intelligence Strategy in which he set out to “integrate through intelligence policy, doctrine, and technology, the different enterprises of the Intelligence Community” (Negroponte, 2005, p.1). To accomplish this DNI Negroponte issued several mission and enterprise objectives which would be a blueprint from which the ODNI will function in the future. Following each objective the DNI issued orders to the IC in order to comply with the stated objectives. The end purpose of each objective is focused on integration through several ways. The National Intelligence Strategy (2005) is a focused document which orders a complete reform and improvement of the IC. The document is a bullet- point listing of changes, establishments, plans, and guiding principles which are 24
  25. 25. meant to improve the IC. DNI Negroponte issued orders to improve many areas of the IC including, but not limited to: collection, analysis, penetration of targets, human capital, establishment of democratic states, information sharing among Federal, State, local, and tribal governments as well as the private sector, and many other beneficial improvements. Contained within the document are several very important and revolutionary changes meant to enhance information sharing: • “Remove impediments to information sharing within the Community, and establish policies that reflect need-to-share (versus need-to-know) for all data, removing the “ownership” by agency of intelligence information” (Negroponte, 2005, p.21). • “Build a user-friendly system that allows customers to find needed intelligence and access it immediately” (Negroponte, 2005, p.21). • “Develop flexible and secure networks adaptable to a rapidly changing environment and capable of getting intelligence in an unclassified form to non-traditional customers such as state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector” (Negroponte, 2005, p.21). • “Create an intelligence ‘cyber community’ where analysts, collectors, and customers can interact swiftly and easily in considering classified information” (Negroponte, 2005, p.22). • “Redefine classification guidelines to allow for a large body of ‘sensitive’ information with flexible use and sharing arrangements, and a smaller body of ‘restricted’ information available to fewer personnel” (Negroponte, 2005, p.23). • “Establish uniform and reciprocal IC guidance on security issues of common concern, including access to facilities, and electronic access to systems and database” (Negroponte, 2005, p.23). • “Ensure the various IC elements conducting counterintelligence activities act as a cohesive whole to undertake aggressive, unified counterintelligence operations” (Negroponte, 2005, p.24). These few examples are representative of what the entire National Intelligence Strategy (2005) consists of. While the DNI presents several methods to enhance information sharing and produce a more cohesive IC, the reader only needs to reference the original ODNI organization chart (See Appendix D) to see that former DNI Negroponte had created several Deputy Director positions encompassing all intelligence 25
  26. 26. activities with the exception of information sharing besides the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) Program Manager. DNI Negroponte had formed the positions of Deputy Director for Customer Outcomes (“Want It”), Deputy Director for Analysis (“Know It”), Deputy Director for Collection (“Get It”), and Deputy Director for Management (“Build It”) (ODNI, 2006). While the DNI has a Program Manager for the ISE, as ordered per the IRTPA, there is no Deputy Director for Information Sharing (“Share It”). This poses a potential problem as former DNI Negroponte had suggested several ways in which to improve information sharing however these tasks have been split among the other Deputy Directors instead of assigning it the sole responsibility of the Deputy Director for Sharing. On the ODNI’s website there is an updated organizational chart (See Appendix E) however these positions had simply been reworded to the following: DDNI of Policy, Plans & Requirements, DDNI of Collection, DDNI of Analysis, and DDNI of Acquisitions (ODNI, 2007). While this has altered the organizational chart slightly, it still does not add a Deputy Director position for information sharing. As the IC is in the process of refocusing its objectives in accordance with the National Intelligence Strategy (2005), DNI Negroponte had not included the role of military intelligence in this objective. Role of Military Intelligence Since the tragic events of September 11th the USG has undergone several major reorganization efforts which have led to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the NCTC, the ODNI, as well as the United States 26
  27. 27. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). “What has not occurred, as of yet, is a review of the role Military Intelligence should have in this new construct of intelligence law and counterterrorism organization” (McNeill, 2005, p.4). The Department of Defense defines Military Intelligence as “intelligence on any foreign military or military-related situation or activity which is significant to military policymaking or the planning and conduct of military operations” (McNeill, 2005, p.8). Currently, Military Intelligence is not integrated into the ISE or the NCTC which could be detrimental in the instance that the military is needed to execute a mission in conjunction with homeland defense as is the mission of NORTHCOM (NORTHCOM, 2006). As Colonel Joseph M. McNeill (2005) explains: The Intelligence staff of NORTHCOM should be integrated into the ‘Information Sharing Environment’ and should be a client of the NCTC from the outset. This capability, in keeping with any constraints and restraints determined to be necessary in order to protect the privacy of citizens, is essential in order to rapidly integrate any forces assigned to the command to execute a homeland defense…without it, the onset of any crisis will be characterized by an ill-informed and therefore ill-defined military capability which, presumably, must be able to execute any mission on extremely short notice (McNeill, 2005, p.13). While a lot of progress has been made by the DNI, it will take the resources of both departments to fully protect the United States. Without this the two departments will continue their separation and will undertake redundant investigations and waste resources. As the DNI continues reshaping and refocusing the IC, the SecDef has undertaken creating his own powerhouse counterterrorism and counterintelligence agency in addition to the various Special Forces operators 27
  28. 28. which are readily available to the DoD. Approximately four years ago the Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) agency was formed within DoD. The mission of CIFA is the quot;identification and tracking of terrorists and production of CI threat assessments and advisories and risk assessments in support of DoD force protection and critical infrastructure protection efforts, and tailored analytical and data-mining support to DoD CI field elements and agencies and the Service secretaries” (DOD, 2003, p.8). Initially the reader will only view CIFA as an assistance arm of DoD however there is a current push to authorize the organization to become an operational entity with jurisdiction within the borders of the United States (Pincus, 2005). CIFA is a highly classified agency which the reader could relate to operational entities on television such as the Counterterrorist Unit (CTU) on the FOX television show “24” or the Special Forces-Delta military group on the CBS show “The Unit.” It is extremely important that the DoD and ODNI integrate its resources especially with the introduction of CIFA as an operational entity with a charter to conduct investigations within the United States. That being said, it appears as though this cooperation is starting to make large strides under the watch of current SecDef Robert Gates and DNI McConnell. On May 24, 2007, SecDef Gates and DNI McConnell signed a memorandum of agreement establishing a dual-hatting role by the Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence as also the Director of Defense Intelligence within the organizational structure of the ODNI (ODNI, 2007). The current under-secretary is James R. Clapper who stated that the “creation of the Office of the Director of Defense Intelligence is in recognition of the importance of coordinated intelligence efforts to the national security of the 28
  29. 29. United States…this office will serve to strengthen the relationship between the DNI and the DoD” (ODNI, 2007, p.1). Then on July 19, 2007, the Chief Information Officers (CIOs) for the DoD and DNI announced a memorandum of agreement establishing a shared vision for a joint-services based information sharing environment to enhance homeland security, intelligence and information sharing (ODNI, 2007). These two recent steps by SecDef Gates and DNI McConnell are significant in that they set out to break down the wall which had existed prior between the SecDef and DCI/DNI. These memorandums of agreement will serve as the foundation to further produce joint systems which will secure the homeland. Most importantly is the creation of the Director of Defense Intelligence position because since it is a dual-hatting position that will allow information to be shared directly between the offices as the Director will be responsible for reporting to the command staff at the Pentagon as well as reporting to the DNI. Human Capital Management While much of the post-9/11 recommendations and focus have been on the problems associated with information sharing there has been little attention shown to the human infrastructure of the IC. “Personnel are the critical element in any major organizational transformation. A strategy for progressive intelligence reform, therefore, must focus on maximizing the effectiveness of the Intelligence Community’s most crucial resource-it’s people” (Center for American Progress, 2005, p.4). 29
  30. 30. To that extent, President George W. Bush instituted Chief Human Capital Officers within the USG structure including the IC. DNI Negroponte chose Dr. Ronald P. Sanders as the first Chief Human Capital Officer of the IC (ODNI, 2005). During the formulation of the National Intelligence Strategy (2005) DNI Negroponte understood the need and importance of proper human capital management. DNI Negroponte issued the following developmental plan: The Chief Human Capital Officer, in partnership with the Chief Training and Education Officer, will develop an Intelligence Community Strategic Human Capital Plan that will enable Community elements to: identify mission-critical human resource requirements; train, develop, and promote Community professionals according to rigorous, competency-based standards; select a senior leadership cadre that promotes high performance, employee engagement, information sharing, and collaboration; and develop evaluation and reward systems that reinforce excellence among professionals and those who lead them (Negroponte, 2005, p.21). To properly implement this plan and in accordance with the IRTPA (2004), the DNI had also instituted the National Intelligence University (NIU) System which is meant to integrate the training and education of the IC members into one single facility (ODNI, 2005). This is important because currently the IC agencies all have their own individual academies and training facilities. By having an integrated system it will allow all new agents to receive a basic training in the same fundamentals. It will also integrate the agents together which will only further information sharing as these new agents go back to their respective agencies. Once these new agents come back to their agencies they will have the opportunity to receive agency- specific training in accordance with each agency’s mission and charter. 30
  31. 31. To further the new concept of “jointness” among the IC, the IRTPA also authorizes the DNI to “establish positions specifically designed to involve service in two or more agencies within the IC during the course of a career, and to provide rewards for undertaking missions with planning or analysis involving two or more agencies of the IC” (Center for American Progress, 2005, p.14). It will be interesting to see how this concept is developed by the DNI and implemented within the IC. In conjunction with the new importance placed on human capital the DNI, on February 10, 2006, announced the first recipients of the “Director of National Intelligence Fellows Award.” The concept behind the award is that members of the IC involved in the fields of science and technology are nominated and then chosen based on technical contributions, track record of contributions and the future potential of the candidate. Those receiving the award also are awarded a $200,000 research grant to perform or continue government intelligence technology research (ODNI, 2006). This is a first step in rewarding the personnel of the IC who dedicate their time and energy to protect and prevent terrorist attacks against the United States and its’ assets. Other programs also are in place meant to encourage and attract new talent to the IC. One such program is the National Security Education Program (NESP) which was created as part of the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991. This program provides scholarships and fellowships to undergraduate and graduate students to study languages, area studies and other national security related fields (NSEP, 2006). While this program has been in place for over a decade, the program is funded on a yearly basis by the National 31
  32. 32. Security Education Trust Fund. During the Fiscal Year 2005 Congress made an $8,000,000 appropriation for the Trust Fund in the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY05 (Center for American Progress, 2005). Another program which was established by means of the IRTPA was the Intelligence Community Scholarship Program. The concept behind this program is that “as a return for each year of assistance, students would commit a two-year term of service as an employee of an agency in the IC” (Center for American Progress, 2005, p.15). This program is under the control of the DNI and will introduce new and talented agents into the IC. There are several other programs and concepts in development to further human capital resources within the IC however the above examples are provided to show the new focus on the importance of human capital management, recruitment and training. Prior to the issuance of the National Intelligence Strategy (2005) and the development of the NIU there was a lot of criticism that such attention hadn’t been paid to the personnel and that attention was only focused at the policy level. However, with these implementations it is clear that the DNI is working towards the goals of increased importance on the IC’s human capital. A further topic for debate in the human capital management realm is the creation of a National Intelligence Reserve Corps (NIRC). The IRTPA (2004) authorized such a reserve corps to be developed in order to “meet the demands of a crisis or imminent threat while maintaining [the IC’s] ability to examine the horizon for emerging challenges” (Center for American Progress, 2005, p.16). A model that the DNI could follow for the effective implementation of such a 32
  33. 33. program would be the military’s Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). “Reservists would be required to maintain security clearances and receive regular training to ensure that their skills are current. A reserve corps would also enable the IC to draw on the expertise of people outside of government service” (Center for American Progress, 2005, p.17). During the open source review done in preparation for this project there were no available and credible sources which would suggest that the DNI is forming such a reserve corps. The IRTPA (2004) places the responsibility and option of forming a reserve corps under the control of the DNI. Developing such a reserve corps would only prove beneficial to the IC especially during times of increased crisis such as the various recent worldwide terrorist attacks especially those in the United States and London. Analysis of Progression The reorganization of the IC is far from over. However, substantial strides have been taken in response to the generational bureaucratic problems associated with the IC. In order for these recommendations, legislation, executive orders and conceptual ideas to be truly effective they must be implemented to their fullest extent. It will be up to the DNI to properly “sell” these changes to the policy level community as well the IC personnel. Without a complete “buy in” by everyone involved the creation of the DNI position will be considered a failure. At the same time, the DNI and the IC community as a whole needs to be given time to accept and implement these changes. Critics are quick to point out the failures or shortcomings of the IC however fail to realize 33
  34. 34. how massive of a reorganization effort this is and the bureaucratic tape which must be cut through for these changes to be effective. In the same respect, this does not give the DNI an open-ended timetable as time is on the side of the terrorists. Another failure by the IC will not be tolerated by Americans who do not possess a complete understanding of the USG and specifically the IC. But, the IC needs to make every attempt possible to plan these implementations logistically as the USG does not need another rushed institution/reorganization as was/is the case with DHS. To this end, on April 11, 2007, the United States’ second and current Director of National Intelligence, J.M. McConnell, issued a 100 Day Plan for Integration and Collaboration. This 100 day plan “lays out specific, measurable short-term goals on important intelligence related issues [including a transformation] into a truly integrated community” (Marshall 2007). This plan has six focus areas along with several subsections under each area: • Create a Culture of Collaboration • Foster Collection and Analytic Transformation • Build Technology Leadership and Acquisition Excellence • Modernize Business Practices • Accelerate Information Sharing • Clarify and Align DNI’s Authorities Pertinent to this discussion is the DNI’s focus on accelerating information sharing. DNI Marshall is seeking to transform information sharing moving from “a ‘need to know’ model to a ‘responsibility to provide’ collaborative environment by developing an implementation plan for an IC-wide identity structure with attribute- based access, such as clearance level, project affiliation, or other such attributes” 34
  35. 35. (Marshall 2007). This is an encouraging step if followed through and implemented. Upon successful completion of this 100 day plan, DNI Marshall plans to issue a 500 day plan that will continue to improve upon these six focus areas. This 100 day plan is an aggressive goal but a short timetable is exactly what is needed in order to ensure that these items are not ignored as tends to be the case when directives, orders, initiatives, policies and legislations are announced. Furthermore, National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) Joel F. Brenner recently issued the National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of America (2007). This strategy was issued in compliance with the National Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 and the IRTPA (2004). Throughout the course of this project thus far it has been shown that the United States is still implementing recommendations from the various strategies and legislation which were mentioned earlier. A review of the similarities and differences between the DCI and DNI revealed both the positive changes since the creation of the DNI position as well as the many hindrances that still exist especially those between the ODNI and DoD, DNI and SecDef. Over the course of the past eight years the United States has reorganized homeland security efforts through the creation of DHS, NCTC and other government entities but what has not been addressed is the restructuring of the IC. The DEA has been, in recent years, added as a member of the IC yet no major reorganization has been implemented/discussed besides the creation of the DNI and the various changes associated with this office which has occurred. 35
  36. 36. It was shown that the ODNI has begun taking the steps necessary to improve information sharing with the issuance of the National Intelligence Strategy (2005) by DNI Negroponte and the 100 Day Plan (2007) by DNI Marshall however the challenge now is to take the words on the paper and transform them into action. There are many methods by which this could be achieved meaning the IC could be left in its current community-based state. However, it is the author’s belief that in order to properly prepare and prevent another major terrorist attack, the USG should consider consolidating the IC into one National Intelligence Agency (NIA). Implementation of a National Intelligence Agency All agencies with an intelligence capability would be stripped of their intelligence offices and have them placed under the NIA. Any agency seeking intelligence information will have a working relationship with the NIA however no agency would be allowed to set-up separate national intelligence shops. The development of individual intelligence offices in multiple agencies within the Federal Government is the exact reason why the wall of information sharing was formed. However, this wall has become so embedded within the culture of the IC that attempting to simply reorganize the IC will not be successful. The creation of the NIA will be the single most productive and beneficial method to improving information sharing and streamlining the intelligence cycle so that it is operating as effectively as possible. National Intelligence Agency Legislation 36
  37. 37. It is upon the President of the United States and the United States Congress to enact the “Centralization of Intelligence Act” formally creating the NIA. This act will remove the intelligence capabilities and offices from all agencies and place them under the newly developed structure of the NIA. Upon full implementation of the Act, the IC as we currently know it will not exist. All intelligence capabilities, powers of authority, personnel, budgets, databases and other resources will be transferred to the NIA. To avoid a problematic and delayed transfer similar to that being experienced by DHS, the Act will provide a time frame of only one year for such integration. DNI Negroponte has already published the National Intelligence Strategy therefore this document will be used as a guide to setting up the new agency. The Act will authorize the DNI to a cabinet-level position since the DNI currently is not even a ranking member (White House, 2006). In order for the DNI to be taken as a legitimate leader within Washington, such a move will need to occur since his colleagues currently are cabinet members including, but not limited to, the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DoJ) and Department of State (DoS). By thrusting the DNI to a cabinet-level position, the Act will also authorize that the DNI has direct reporting exclusively to the President. Other aspects of the “Centralization of Intelligence Act” will be discussed in further detail throughout future sections of this document. 37
  38. 38. National Intelligence Agency Foundation and Structure The foundation for such reorganization has already been put in place with the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the publishing of the National Intelligence Strategy. While there have been references made concerning a transformation similar to DHS, the NIA would not simply take all of the members of intelligence agencies and place them under a new departmental umbrella as the creation of the DHS did. The IC should be completely stripped and rebuilt utilizing the organizational chart already in place within the ODNI along with some additions to that structure. The ODNI currently has four Deputy Directors: Deputy Director for Customer Outcomes (“Want It”), Deputy Director for Analysis (“Know It”), Deputy Director for Collection (“Get It”), and Deputy Director for Management (“Build It”) (ODNI, 2006). It is proposed that a fifth position be added, as mentioned earlier, representing the need for information sharing: Deputy Director for Information Sharing (“Share It”). Using these five divisions as a foundation, all intelligence personnel would be assigned based on their training and expertise. Directorate for Customer Outcomes Potential intelligence customers would submit, via an online form located on a secured website, requests for information, operations, details, etc. to the Directorate for Customer Outcomes. Requests would only be considered if they were submitted via the secured website thereby creating a standardized method which could be tracked. Once a request has been approved it will be flagged 38
  39. 39. and forwarded to the appropriate Directorate, whether that is the Directorate of Analysis or the Directorate of Collection. Directorate for Analysis All raw intelligence information would be submitted to the Directorate for Analysis. The Directorate of Analysis would be where all analysts are housed and informational databases maintained. A “Library of Intelligence” would be utilized and housed within the Directorate for Analysis. This would allow analysts to reference previously completed material, research and analysis to prevent unnecessary duplicative efforts. This library would be located on several secure local and remote servers to prevent a complete collapse or infiltration of the information. Directorate for Collection The Directorate for Collection would be the largest of these five divisions as it would encompass all intelligence gathering operations and collection disciplines (IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, MASINT, and OSINT). All covert operations would be initialized, carried out and monitored by the Directorate for Collection. All information obtained during any operation would be forwarded to the Directorate for Analysis. All operations would be recorded and would require after-action reports to be inputted before the file could be closed. This will attempt to prevent information from being lost during the transfer to the Directorate for Analysis. 39
  40. 40. Directorate for Management The Directorate for Management would be a two-part directorate responsible for ensuring that compliance measures are being met by the other Directorates. Also, since this Directorate is termed “Build It” it will be responsible for all science and technology developments and inventions as required by the Directorates for Analysis and Collection. Directorate for Information Sharing The Directorate for Information Sharing would be responsible for the timely dissemination of reports to the appropriate agencies. This Directorate would also be in charge of redacting documents in a timely manner as dictated in the National Intelligence Strategy (2005). This Directorate would further comply with the National Intelligence Strategy (2005) by ensuring that information is being utilized based on a need-to- share basis and not the need-to-know foundation which was a factor in the impediments to information sharing which plagued the IC (Negroponte, 2005). Along similar lines, the Directorate of Information Sharing would “redefine classification guidelines to allow for a large body of ‘sensitive’ information with flexible use and sharing arrangements, and a smaller body of ‘restricted’ information available to fewer personnel” (Negroponte, 2005, p.23). The Directorate of Information Sharing will have its personnel detailed to the other Directorates to aid in the timely development and sharing of information. The problems which exist with the current-day IC in relation to multiple databases, as was discussed during the second research paper, would not be an 40
  41. 41. issue with the NIA. There would be a single database which would be setup by clearance level. Depending on user clearance level the database will dictate what information you are allowed to access. If the user attempts to access information outside of their clearance level, the system will alert the user to contact the appropriate department to have their clearance changed or the information redacted to their clearance level depending on the situation. National Intelligence Agency Budget Since the IC will no longer formally exist, the entire intelligence budget will be authorized and appropriated to the NIA. This will include removing the large portion of the intelligence budget which is currently controlled by the DoD. The NIA will not be able to properly function without having full control of the budget. Also, the DoD will have no rights to the budget any longer since it would also be stripped of its’ intelligence agencies. Earlier the failures by Congress to realign the intelligence budget thereby granting the DNI full control were discussed. Some of the reasoning provided was that it would possibly compromise the secrecy of the budget due to how it was spread among so many agencies (Fessenden, 2005). This would no longer be an issue since the intelligence budget would only be for the NIA therefore allowing for the secrecy of the budget to be maintained. National Intelligence Agency Security Concerns Along with the other criticisms which would surface with the announcement of the NIA would come concerns over security. The NIA would be a large organization, if not the largest Federal Government agency, which 41
  42. 42. would serve as the clearinghouse for all intelligence. This of course raises security concerns in regards to the physical structure and safety of the personnel. Currently if a terrorist developed a plot to strike at the IC it would have to be a multi-faceted attack since the IC agencies are spread among several buildings across the United States. However, though they are currently spread across the United States, many of their locations are well known and advertised. To avoid similar security concerns regarding terrorist attacks, the NIA would also be divided into separate office buildings located around the country in non-descript office buildings which would not possess any emblems or other identifying markers which would reveal the owner. Granted, on a regular basis high-ranking officials would visit many of these facilities and because of that standard counterterrorist and security procedures would be in place to allow for a safe working environment for all who work or visit the facilities. Concept Analysis “On September 11, 2001, the United States possessed superb military forces, unparalleled information-collection assets, and dedicated intelligence analysts. But it failed to use them effectively, suffering from an almost systemic and often self-imposed lack of coordination and information-sharing among governmental agencies. When 19 terrorists hijacked 4 planes, murdering at least 2,973 men, women, and children from 70 countries, it was clear the status quo could no longer be tolerated” (Bogdanos, 2005, p.3). The National intelligence Agency is a utopian concept however such implementation may be the only way the IC will be able to fully prevent and 42
  43. 43. protect the United States from future terrorist attacks. Each of the previously discussed recommendations and directives have partially succeeded depending on the specifics of each document however, embedded within each publication are other issuances which have not been followed. It is imperative that these directives be followed explicitly as the citizens of the United States will not tolerate another intelligence failure which results in death and destruction. To prevent this from happening, the President of the United States and the United States Congress need to take the appropriate steps to formalize the reorganization of the IC into a single National Intelligence Agency. The National Intelligence Community of Britain is already structured similar to this recommendation. Britain divides their intelligence and counterterrorism responsibilities across only a couple agencies. The British Security Service (most commonly known as MI5) is responsible for “gathering and assessing security intelligence, taking action to counter national security threats, and advising the government and various departments on the nature of national threats” (Henderson, 2003, p.208). The British Secret Intelligence Service (most commonly known as MI6) is mandated to produce “secret intelligence in support of the security, defense, foreign, and economic policies of the British government” (Henderson, 2003, p.208). MI5 and MI6 are the two main security and intelligence services however they are assisted by the Government Communications Headquarters which is responsible for SIGINT collection and assessment; the Defense Intelligence Staff whose primary responsibility is towards military intelligence; Special Air Service, Special Branch- Metropolitan Police, and the National Criminal Intelligence Service. These 43
  44. 44. additional agencies each have separate mandates however the two main agencies for security, counterterrorism and intelligence are MI5 and MI6. This organizational system would be similar to having DHS and the NIA within the United States. There would be other support agencies whose missions were similar such as the FBI and other Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies but the main agencies would be DHS and the NIA when it came to the protection of the United States and prevention of terrorist attacks within the homeland and abroad. Such a system would require a close working relationship with the DoD as it appears has been taking place in recent years. Concept Criticisms The creation of the NIA is certainly a viable concept which would, in theory, revolutionize the IC and fix many of the problems which have been identified throughout this document. However, it may not be the best option and could possibly hinder progress already being made by the IC. One of the first obvious concerns of such a creation would be the problems experienced by the formation of DHS. DHS currently employs approximately 180,000 people, spread across more than 20 agencies with a budget of approximately $36.5 billion per year and is currently the third largest cabinet-level department within the USG (Bogdanos, 2005). This has created an atmosphere plagued by “personality conflicts, bureaucratic bottlenecks and an atmosphere of demoralization, undermining its ability to protect the nation against terrorist attack, according to current and former administration officials and independent experts” (Mintz, 2005, p.1). Former DHS Inspector General Clark 44
  45. 45. Kent Irvin stated: quot;DHS is still a compilation of 22 agencies that aren't integrated into a cohesive whole…quot; (Mintz, 2005, p.3). Many of the comments currently being issued by former high-ranking officials within DHS such as Irvin sound eerily familiar to those made during the post-9/11 investigations and inquiries which were discussed earlier. Therefore, would the creation of the NIA only set the IC back in time to an earlier version of the community who was not making progress in information sharing and cohesion? There is no correct answer however DHS statistics rival those of the IC and would therefore propel the NIA past DHS on the rankings. It must be expected that the standing up of an NIA would not be as smooth as provided through the utopian concept outlined above. Inherent in such a consolidation would be similar ingrown problems as currently being experienced by DHS. Also, the concept of keeping specialties separated needs to be considered. The IC has “evolved over nearly 50 years and now amounts to a confederation of separate agencies and activities with distinctly different histories, missions and lines of command. Some were created to centralize the management of key intelligence disciplines. Others were set up to meet new requirements or take advantage of technological advances” (Brown et al., 1996, p.10). It can be expected that over time there has been a duplication of effort among agencies. However, the various agencies each have distinctive missions which are focused on specific areas of the intelligence cycle or intelligence disciplines. For example, the CIA is focused on HUMINT while the NSA is focused on SIGINT. This allows each agency to specifically recruit for those disciplines. The standing up of an NIA may cause problems with such 45
  46. 46. recruitment as the concept has suggested that the agencies would not simply be transferred under a new departmental heading but instead stripped of their titles and reorganized under new directorates. Therefore, since the CIA and NSA wouldn’t exist any longer, it would be the responsibilities of the Directorates of Management and Collection to recruit personnel. This presents some benefits such as the cross-training and jointness which has been suggested through previous recommendations however it may also cause the recruitment of specialties to be lost and instead a focus on those who can learn multiple disciplines. The ability to learn multiple disciplines is important and an attractive quality but there is still a need to have operators and analysts who are specifically trained in certain intelligence disciplines. Conclusion Shortcomings First and foremost, it is important to point out several shortcomings of this project: • There has already been a lot of reorganization within the Federal government. Another major reorganization could hamper progress which has been made in the post-9/11 environment. Could the United States Government sustain another major reorganization and would it be any more beneficial than the current structure? • This project is a public, open source document being presented to a group of colleagues with varying security level clearances. Furthermore, the author does not possess a security clearance. • Any information obtained during this project was obtained through an open source review and therefore it should be maintained that the possibility exists of classified information which supports or contradicts statements made. • A common theme during reviews of the pre-9/11 environment revealed that there was a lack of information sharing between Federal agencies and State and local agencies. This project does not address these issues and whether or not the legislation, strategies and reorganization has 46
  47. 47. positively impacted information sharing and integration of State and local agencies. Project Analysis The events which took place on September 11th showed the world that the United States Intelligence Community was plagued with several problems which prevented it from properly analyzing the intelligence being received to forecast that tragic day. No one ever thought that terrorists would take control of commercial airliners and use them as guided missiles to attack the United States on its own soil. Terrorist attacks on such a grand scale are now a reality and similar attempts by terrorist organizations should be expected. The IC has undergone many changes since September 11th which have attempted to make it a more cohesive unit. Steps such as the implementations of the National Counterterrorism Center and National Counterproliferation Center are steps in the right direction. Concepts such as the development of a single National Intelligence Agency should be considered only if it can be done without resistance from the member agencies and departments because the last thing the USG currently needs is another department experiencing growing pains such as DHS. Such problems could seriously hamper the IC’s ability to properly utilize its assets to prevent and protect the United States, its citizens and assets from future attacks. Regardless of whether the IC is kept in place or the USG reorganizes the agencies and departments into a single intelligence agency is not at the heart of the issue. Continued progress in information sharing, recruiting, human capital management, and cohesion should be the focus of the DNI. The DNI needs to 47
  48. 48. assure the American public that the ODNI will not become just another bureaucratic layer. The issuance of the National Intelligence Strategy (2005) and the 100 Day Plan (2007) were excellent steps and such progress should continue with the full implementation of all guidelines and objectives contained within these and other related documents. However, there are still many challenges to improving the IC. A 2006 report issued by the Government Accountability Office (2006) stated that: “No government-wide policies or processes have been established by the executive branch to date to define how to integrate and manage the sharing of terrorism-related information across all levels of government and the private sector despite legislation and executive orders dating back to September 11” (GAO, 2006, p.18). The newly released 100 Day Plan (2007) appears to be a step forward in this direction. Though this author’s analysis has focused specifically on the IC, information sharing must take place across all Federal, State, local, tribal and private sector entities to properly protect the United States. Overall, it is this author’s belief that the United States, its citizens and assets are better protected than we were pre-9/11. The IC is taking the necessary steps and continues to make progress though the mission will never be complete and therefore the IC should continue seeking ways to improve its capabilities such as the possibility of moving towards an NIA concept. 48
  49. 49. Appendix A: Pre-DHS Reorganization Chart 49
  50. 50. Appendix B: DHS Organization Chart 50
  51. 51. Appendix C: Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) 51
  52. 52. Appendix D: Original ODNI Organizational Chart 52
  53. 53. Appendix E: Current ODNI Organizational Chart 53
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