(1) entity e within nature (or the cosmos, or nature itself) is like specified human artifact a (e.g., a machine) in relevant respects R . (2) a has R precisely because it is a product of deliberate design by intelligent human agency. (3) like effects typically have like causes (or like explanations, like existence requirements, etc.) therefore:
(4) it is (highly) probable that e has R precisely because it too is a product of deliberate design by intelligent, relevantly human- like agency.
relevant respects and properties R are referred to variously as teleological properties or as marks or signs of design, and objects having such properties are sometimes referred to as teleological objects
there is not enough similarity for the analogy to work
cannot argue from the parts to the whole
we learn about artifacts requiring a designer based upon multiple experiences which we are able to compare, but there is only one universe, and, hence, we are unable to compare one against our experience of several
most importantly, we all recognize human artifacts as different from other objects “in the wild,” and this is the very thing that demonstrates that they are, in fact, artifacts
our attempt at this reasoning results in a god who is very un-Godlike; the analogy is strongest when God is most like us
remove infinity (cause should be proportionate to the effects, and the effects are clearly finite)
remove perfection (our experience, the thing we use to get to the idea of design, see flaws and imperfection everywhere. if we assume our understanding of our experience to be flawed, then we have no reason for believing we can ever make the leap necessary for this argument to work)
remove unity (there is no reason there must be only one designer)
remove immortality (men are mortal and must, necessarily, reproduce to continue the species)
might as well make “god” completely human-like, and then we have no reason for worship at all
(1) some things in nature (or nature itself, the cosmos) are design-like (exhibit a cognition-resonating, intention-shaped character R ) (2) design-like properties ( R ) are not producible by (unguided) natural means—i.e., any phenomenon exhibiting such R s must be a product of intentional design. therefore:
(3) some things in nature (or nature itself, the cosmos) are products of intentional design. and of course, the capacity for intentional design requires agency of some type.
though paley’s argument appears inductive (and parts are), this is a better presentation of the form