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11-7
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11-7

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  • 1. 11-7
  • 2. free will vs. determinism <ul><li>determinism </li></ul><ul><li>libertarian free will </li></ul><ul><li>compatibilism </li></ul>
  • 3. determinism <ul><li>belief that, since each momentary state of the world entails all of its future states, it must be possible (in principle) to offer a causal explanation for everything that happens </li></ul><ul><li>human actions cannot be free as they are the products of causal processes </li></ul>
  • 4. why determinism makes sense <ul><li>we are made up of the same stuff as everything else </li></ul><ul><ul><li>assumes material monism </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>seems credible because everything that affects our body seems to affect us. thus, we have good reason for thinking we just are our body </li></ul></ul><ul><li>cannot be deductively proven, but there is considerable inductive evidence </li></ul><ul><li>all our sciences dealing with persons believe this either implicitly or explicitly </li></ul><ul><ul><li>how could one do psychology if people’s actions were truly indeterminate? </li></ul></ul>
  • 5. libertarian free will <ul><li>given the same antecedent conditions an agent can choose between multiple actions </li></ul><ul><li>there are three main arguments </li></ul><ul><ul><li>argument from deliberation </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>argument from moral responsibility </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>argument from quantum physics </li></ul></ul>
  • 6. argument from deliberation <ul><li>free actions are different from reflex actions in that they are purposively chosen </li></ul><ul><li>deliberating presupposes that choice is possible. otherwise there would be nothing over which to deliberate. as we are conscious of our deliberations between actions, we must be able to choose between them </li></ul>
  • 7. determinist response to deliberation <ul><li>the “feeling” of being free to choose is illusory. in reality there is no such thing. </li></ul><ul><li>feeling may simply be relief at the passing of some previous tension of competing desires (it is presumed that we do not choose our desires) </li></ul><ul><li>we are often wrong about our introspective findings, and other hidden motives are at play </li></ul>
  • 8. counter-arguments <ul><li>sometimes agents themselves are the cause of their own acts </li></ul><ul><li>reasons may influence but do not determine acts </li></ul><ul><li>human beings as persons create their agency out of nothing </li></ul><ul><li>the result of this is that actions are seen as miracles detached from laws of nature, or any laws at all, which makes them inexplicable </li></ul>
  • 9. argument from moral responsibility <ul><li>we believe that we are morally responsible for our actions </li></ul><ul><li>moral responsibility only makes sense if we are able to freely choose our actions </li></ul><ul><li>if determinism is true, we are not morally responsible </li></ul><ul><li>hence, we must reject determinism to salvage morality </li></ul>
  • 10. argument from quantum physics <ul><li>quantum mechanics opens up the door for indeterminacy. because the behavior of subatomic particles can only be probabilistically predicted, it looks like the world is not completely determined in the hard sense. </li></ul><ul><li>the counter is that it is unclear how such indeterminacy could help the libertarian. it still doesn’t look like there is any place for the will to work with randomness. how does such randomness allow room for purposeful behavior? </li></ul>
  • 11. compatibilism <ul><li>although we are determined, we still have moral responsibility </li></ul><ul><li>freedom is cashed out in the difference between voluntary and involuntary behavior </li></ul><ul><li>making the distinction clear </li></ul><ul><ul><li>consider someone who is a kleptomaniac as opposed to someone who simply chooses to steal </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>think of someone who does not eat because there is no food as opposed to someone who is merely fasting </li></ul></ul>
  • 12. counters <ul><li>incompatible determinist </li></ul><ul><ul><li>compatibilism merely “passes the buck.” both voluntary and involuntary actions are still determined (as admitted by the compatibilist), so where does free will find a foothold </li></ul></ul><ul><li>libertarian </li></ul><ul><ul><li>compatibilism still does not offer any place for genuine free will. all actions are still subject to causal antecedents. as such, there is still no place for moral responsibility. since moral responsibility must be preserved, any version of determinism must be denied. </li></ul></ul>

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