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10-24 10-24 Presentation Transcript

  • 10-24
  • objects persisting in time
    • three dimensionalism coincidence
    • four dimensionalism coincidence
    • essentialist non-coincidence
    • non-essential non-coincidence
    • (mereological) nihilism
  • leibniz’s law
    • if (x)(y) [(x=y), then (P) (Px, iff Py)
    • for any two objects, x and y, if x is equal to y, then, for any property P, P is a property of x if and only if P is a property of y
  • 3Dism
    • 3D states that (1) an ordinary object occupies multiple spacetime regions; (2) these spacetime regions are temporally unextended, or instantaneous, and non-simultaneous
    • claims that objects endure in time
      • an ordinary object x exists at time t iff it is wholly present at t
  • 4Dism
    • (1) an ordinary object occupies a unique spacetime region; (2) this spacetime region is temporally extended
    • claims that objects perdure
      • an object exists at time t iff it has a temporal part at t
  • coincidence
    • lump of clay/statue puzzle
      • there exists at t 1 a lump of clay
      • the lump of clay is molded into a statue, such that the statue exists at t 2
      • the lump of clay is, according to leibniz’s law, distinct from the statue as it has a property that the statue does not have, namely it existed at t 1
      • it looks like there are two objects coinciding in the same spacetime region, and this looks like a puzzle because it is generally understood that objects cannot do any such thing
  • solution to coincidence
    • 3Dism says that there is a total overlap, and objects completely overlap
    • 4Dism says that the objects’ temporal parts overlap, that the statue is merely a subsegment of the “temporal worm”; this is no more surprising than two roads overlapping
    • the essentialist move is to say that there is only one thing, and we make a mistake to suggest that there is any overlap at all. once we have a statue, the lump no longer exists
    • the non-essentialist says the object in question has no essential properties, and we merely used different sortals to talk about the same thing
    • the nihilist claims there is no object; there is only simples and relations between simples
  • personal identity
    • biological view
    • psychological view
    • memory
    • nihilist (eliminativist)
  • biological view
    • identity is related to the organism; we just are our body
    • brain is not necessarily any more important than any other body part
    • as long as organism is biologically alive, identity survives
    • allows us to say things like “i was once a fetus.”
  • psychological continuity
    • personal identity is in the psychology of the person
    • allows us to make sense of “brownson” case
    • this seems to be what most people rely on when pressed
  • memory
    • a particular version of the psychological view
    • a person’s memory is responsible for continued identity as the same person
    • this is the view espoused by locke
  • nihilism
    • there is no such thing as personal identity; it is merely a fiction
    • we never experience the “i”
    • we only have the experiences of particular impressions, and we have no reason to suppose there is some ultimate subject to whom those impressions all belong
  • alternate ideas
    • notion of identity is vague
      • we simply never decided what was meant in these particular instances
      • there are multiple candidates for identity
      • this is a linguistic move
    • mistaken use of word
      • problems arise because we do not recognize that when we begin to talk about person having psychological identity we are applying a different concept than we normally use
      • person normally simply refers to object
  • various problems
    • can i say that i was ever a fetus?
    • do i have some responsibility to “brownson”?
    • how does brain fission change things?
    • can psychology be instantiated by a computer program?
    • am i the same person if i am made up of different material put together in exactly the same way?