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# 10-24

## on Dec 04, 2006

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## 10-24Presentation Transcript

• 10-24
• objects persisting in time
• three dimensionalism coincidence
• four dimensionalism coincidence
• essentialist non-coincidence
• non-essential non-coincidence
• (mereological) nihilism
• leibniz’s law
• if (x)(y) [(x=y), then (P) (Px, iff Py)
• for any two objects, x and y, if x is equal to y, then, for any property P, P is a property of x if and only if P is a property of y
• 3Dism
• 3D states that (1) an ordinary object occupies multiple spacetime regions; (2) these spacetime regions are temporally unextended, or instantaneous, and non-simultaneous
• claims that objects endure in time
• an ordinary object x exists at time t iff it is wholly present at t
• 4Dism
• (1) an ordinary object occupies a unique spacetime region; (2) this spacetime region is temporally extended
• claims that objects perdure
• an object exists at time t iff it has a temporal part at t
• coincidence
• lump of clay/statue puzzle
• there exists at t 1 a lump of clay
• the lump of clay is molded into a statue, such that the statue exists at t 2
• the lump of clay is, according to leibniz’s law, distinct from the statue as it has a property that the statue does not have, namely it existed at t 1
• it looks like there are two objects coinciding in the same spacetime region, and this looks like a puzzle because it is generally understood that objects cannot do any such thing
• solution to coincidence
• 3Dism says that there is a total overlap, and objects completely overlap
• 4Dism says that the objects’ temporal parts overlap, that the statue is merely a subsegment of the “temporal worm”; this is no more surprising than two roads overlapping
• the essentialist move is to say that there is only one thing, and we make a mistake to suggest that there is any overlap at all. once we have a statue, the lump no longer exists
• the non-essentialist says the object in question has no essential properties, and we merely used different sortals to talk about the same thing
• the nihilist claims there is no object; there is only simples and relations between simples
• personal identity
• biological view
• psychological view
• memory
• nihilist (eliminativist)
• biological view
• identity is related to the organism; we just are our body
• brain is not necessarily any more important than any other body part
• as long as organism is biologically alive, identity survives
• allows us to say things like “i was once a fetus.”
• psychological continuity
• personal identity is in the psychology of the person
• allows us to make sense of “brownson” case
• this seems to be what most people rely on when pressed
• memory
• a particular version of the psychological view
• a person’s memory is responsible for continued identity as the same person
• this is the view espoused by locke
• nihilism
• there is no such thing as personal identity; it is merely a fiction
• we never experience the “i”
• we only have the experiences of particular impressions, and we have no reason to suppose there is some ultimate subject to whom those impressions all belong
• alternate ideas
• notion of identity is vague
• we simply never decided what was meant in these particular instances
• there are multiple candidates for identity
• this is a linguistic move
• mistaken use of word
• problems arise because we do not recognize that when we begin to talk about person having psychological identity we are applying a different concept than we normally use
• person normally simply refers to object
• various problems
• can i say that i was ever a fetus?
• do i have some responsibility to “brownson”?
• how does brain fission change things?
• can psychology be instantiated by a computer program?
• am i the same person if i am made up of different material put together in exactly the same way?