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Local cultural responses to globalization Local cultural responses to globalization Document Transcript

  • Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology http://jcc.sagepub.com/Local Cultures Responses to Globalization : Exemplary Persons and Their Attendant Values Jeanne Ho-Ying Fu and Chi-Yue Chiu Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 2007 38: 636 DOI: 10.1177/0022022107305244 The online version of this article can be found at: http://jcc.sagepub.com/content/38/5/636 Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com On behalf of: International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology Additional services and information for Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology can be found at: Email Alerts: http://jcc.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Subscriptions: http://jcc.sagepub.com/subscriptions Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Citations: http://jcc.sagepub.com/content/38/5/636.refs.html Downloaded from jcc.sagepub.com at IACCP-International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology on March 16, 2011
  • LOCAL CULTURE’S RESPONSES TO GLOBALIZATION Exemplary Persons and Their Attendant Values JEANNE HO-YING FU Nanyang Technological University, Singapore CHI-YUE CHIU University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Taking a social identity perspective, the authors predict that when responding to the dominating influence of the global culture brought in by the Western economic powers, Hong Kong Chinese will recognize the global culture’s superiority in status attributes (e.g., competence, achievement), while at the same time maintaining positive evaluations of Chinese culture on solidarity attributes (traditional moral values). The authors test this hypothesis by examining the Chinese and Western exemplary persons listed spontaneously by Hong Kong Chinese undergraduates and the kind of values carried by these exemplary persons. In three studies, partici- pants associate traditional Chinese exemplary persons with both solidarity and status values and traditional Western exemplary persons with status values only. Additionally, participants also associate contemporary Western exemplary persons with Western rights-based moral values, suggesting that contemporary Western exemplary persons could be important drivers of changes in the moral values in Hong Kong. Keywords: culture; exemplary persons; values; globalizationThe possible effects of globalization on local cultures have generated heated debates in thesocial sciences. One critical issue in the debate is whether globalization ultimately leads tohomogenization of cultures via global hegemony. Researchers from many social science disci-plines have approached this question from their disciplinary perspective. However, despitesome recent calls for psychological analyses of globalization (Arnett, 2002), psychologists havenot been enthusiastic participants in this dialogue. Yet any answer to the prospect of culturalhomogenization will be incomplete without systematic analyses of the psychological responsesto globalization. In this article, we examine how Hong Kong Chinese respond to Western andglobal cultures by examining the cultural values carried by exemplary persons in Hong Kong.In the following section, we review different views of local culture’s responses to globalizationin the social science literature and discuss the psychological responses of Hong Kong Chineseto globalization from the perspective of the social identity theory. Next, we introduce a methodwe developed to examine psychological responses to globalization and present the results ofthree studies that looked at how Hong Kong Chinese maintain their Chinese cultural heritagein response to globalization. GLOBALIZATION AND HOMOGENIZATION OF CULTURES Globalization involves the spread of the global economy to regional economies aroundthe world. It requires integration of local economies into the global market. Culturally, theAUTHORS’ NOTE: We would like to thank Harry Triandis, Michael Morris, Yoshi Kashima, and Chung-Fang Yang for theirinsightful comments on the earlier drafts of this article. Correspondences concerning this article should be sent to JeanneHo-Ying Fu, Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 639798; e-mail: hyfu@pmail.ntu.edu.sg.JOURNAL OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY, Vol. 38 No. 5, September 2007 636-653DOI: 10.1177/0022022107305244© 2007 Sage Publications636 Downloaded from jcc.sagepub.com at IACCP-International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology on March 16, 2011
  • Fu, Chiu / GLOBALIZATION AND VALUES 637rapid growth of global linkages and global consciousness has led to reorganization of sociallife on a global scale. As Robertson (1992) noted, globalization involves “the compression ofthe world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole” (p. 8). Some con-straints that once bound different knowledge traditions have disintegrated. For example, inChina, it is common to find commercial messages promoting individualism and modern lifestyles in popular magazines targeting the younger generation (Zhang & Shavitt, 2003). There are two different views on how local culture responds to globalization. The firstview predicts that globalization would inevitably lead to the demise of local cultures andhomogenization of world cultures. According to this view, Western nations, representativesof the global culture, are not only perceived to be more economically advanced than non-Western nations, but they are often seen as reference nations in the realm of cultural restruc-turing. The global culture, which privileges consumerism, individualism, competition, andefficiency, has been characterized in some non-Western countries as new, modern, scientific,and results oriented (Lam, Lau, Chiu, Hong, & Peng, 1999; Pilkington & Johnson, 2003). In addition, the global market emphasizes the use of scientific knowledge and technol-ogy to achieve controllable and predictable results. To compete in the global market,instead of relying on traditional knowledge and experiences, local economies need scien-tific knowledge and professional training in business administration. It is not surprisingthat globalization in many developing countries is often accompanied by a vast demand forscience education and MBA programs (Chiu & Hong, 2006; Fischer, 1999; Tzeng &Henderson, 1999). Globalization has also transformed the consumption patterns in local economies, as evi-dent in the spread of global “brand-name” goods and restaurant chains (Daniels, 2003) andthe proliferation of global advertising that exploits similar basic material desires and cre-ates similar lifestyles (Parameswaran, 2002). Indeed, the global success of global brandssuch as McDonald’s and Starbucks has led some writers to predict an inevitable coloniza-tion of world cultures by international corporate brands (Falk, 1999). However, other writers hold a different view, believing that some aspects of the localculture would survive the erosive effects of globalization. For example, Lal (2000) believesthat although the material beliefs (beliefs pertinent to making a living) in the global cul-ture will gain popularity as a country is integrated into the global market, beliefs pertinentto social relationship and morality in local cultures are relatively resistant to the influenceof globalization. Additionally, multinational survey data revealed that although economicdevelopment is accompanied by increased adherence to values that emphasize secular-ism, scientific rationality, and individualism, the broad knowledge tradition that definespersonhood and sociality in a society (e.g., Protestantism, Confucianism) is relativelyresistant to the erosive effects of globalization (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Likewise, ethno-graphic studies of mobile phone use in South Korea (Yoon, 2003) and MTV in East Asia(Santana, 2003) found that proliferation of global products and services in East Asia,instead of destroying local cultures, has played a crucial role in reinforcing and reinvent-ing traditional moral values in local communities. THE SOCIAL IDENTITY PERSPECTIVE The social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) offers a theoretical perspective tounderstand how a local culture may accept the values embedded in the global culture with-out giving up the core values in the local culture. In the face of globalization, a central Downloaded from jcc.sagepub.com at IACCP-International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology on March 16, 2011
  • 638 JOURNAL OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGYissue confronting the local culture is how it is possible to acknowledge the competitiveadvantages of the capitalist logic and its attendant values in the global market and at thesame time affirm the positive distinctiveness of the heritage culture. Based on the assump-tion that group memberships constitute an integral part of an individual’s self-definition,social identity theorists have expounded on the different cognitive and behavioral strate-gies a low-status group would adopt to protect its collective self-esteem when confrontingthe dominating influence of another group (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). One such strategyinvolves differential evaluations of the in-group and the dominating group on differentdimensions. Early empirical demonstrations of this strategy made use of the fact that language vari-ations within and between speech communities are important markers of the languageuser’s social group memberships. As such, perceivers can infer a speaker’s group mem-berships from his or her voice, and the characteristics attributed to the speaker may reflectthe perceivers’ attitudes toward the speaker’s inferred membership. In these studies, theparticipants listened to recordings of bilingual speakers reading a passage in one of the tar-get languages and to a translation of the same passage in the second target language.Unaware that they were listening to two readings of each of several bilinguals, the partic-ipants rated the speakers’ personalities (see Krauss & Chiu, 1998; Ryan & Giles, 1982, forreviews). Typically, ratings of speakers’ personalities can be organized into two evaluativedimensions: status and solidarity (Ryan, Giles, & Sebastian, 1982). The status dimension,including such competence-related attributes as successful, competent, and intelligent, ispositively correlated with sociopolitical power. Subordinate linguistic groups usually givemore favorable ratings to the dominant linguistic groups than to their own group on thisdimension (e.g., Callan, Gallois, & Forbes, 1983; Giles, Henwood, Coupland, Harriman,& Coupland, 1992; Lyczak, Fu, & Ho, 1976; Sebastian & Ryan, 1985). The solidarity dimension includes social, moral attributes such as trustworthy, friendly,kind, and benevolent. Minority group members typically rate speakers of their own lan-guage more favorably than speakers of the standard dominant group language on the soli-darity dimension (e.g., Bond, 1985; Giles et al., 1992; Hogg, Joyce, & Abrams, 1984;Lyczak et al., 1976; Tong, Hong, Lee, & Chiu, 1999). This pattern of evaluation mayreflect an attempt by the less powerful group to maintain positive evaluation of the groupwhile acknowledging the power difference between its group and the dominant group. Extending this finding to local cultures’ responses to the global culture, we mayexpect individuals in a local culture to acknowledge the dominating global culture’ssuperiority on the status dimension, while maintaining a positive perception of the localculture on the solidarity dimension. Individuals adopting this strategy would distinguishbetween modernization and Westernization, with modernization involving acquisition ofspecific skills and competencies that have fueled the economic development in the Westand Westernization involving adoption of the Western social–moral values. With this strat-egy, people in the local community can accept modernization and resist Westernization atthe same time. As a result, they may not see modernization as a threat to the fundamentalsocial and moral values in the local culture. Bond and King (1985) have applied the social identity perspective to understand HongKong Chinese’s responses to the global culture, which was brought in through coloniza-tion and then institutionalized through rapid industrialization. In a survey, Bond and Kingfound that most Hong Kong Chinese respondents (about 70%) believed that modernizationinvolved technology, behavior, or material progress, whereas Westernization involved val-ues, thinking, or Western cultural traditions. Almost two thirds of respondents (64%) also Downloaded from jcc.sagepub.com at IACCP-International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology on March 16, 2011
  • Fu, Chiu / GLOBALIZATION AND VALUES 639believed that modernization could proceed in Hong Kong without much cultural implica-tions. About half of them claimed that they managed to preserve their Chineseness byholding onto basic Chinese moral values, such as filial piety and respect for teachers. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH USING EXEMPLARY PERSONS As the preliminary findings from Bond and King (1985) indicated, in Hong Kong, theglobal culture is generally perceived to have originated in the West. Accordingly, in ourstudy of responses to the global culture in Hong Kong, we focus on the extent to whichstatus and solidarity values are exemplified by the individuals whom Hong Kong Chineseconsider to be exemplary persons in China and the West. We chose this analytic strategy for two reasons. First, exemplary persons are importantcarriers of culture. Exemplary persons are real or fictional figures who possess qualitiesthat are so positively evaluated in the culture that others would do well to copy.1 Exemplarypersons may be persons with outstanding achievements or persons who have endured mis-fortunes or met with failures in the pursuit of socially desirable goals. Both successful andunsuccessful exemplary persons can incite imitation among individuals in the culture(Lockwood, Marshall, & Sadler, 2005). Although successful exemplary persons inspireindividuals to pursue similar excellence, unsuccessful exemplary persons encourage indi-viduals to learn from the exemplary persons’ mistakes and from their persistence in pur-suing socially desirable goals. Widely recognized exemplary persons are usually idealized figures that embody certainhighly valued virtues in the culture (Chiu & Hong, 2006). As such, they are public repre-sentations of cultural ideals and important vehicles for transmitting cultural values. InChinese societies, young children often learn cultural values by reading or listening to sto-ries about exemplary persons whose behaviors exemplify these values. For example, thevalue of “filial piety” is introduced to children through the well-known Twenty-FourParables of Filial Piety, which describes and glorifies various filial behaviors displayed by24 famous sons or daughters in Chinese history. Similarly, in Hong Kong, young childrenoften learn Western values through stories of exemplary persons in Western cultures. Forexample, they learn the value of honesty through the story of the U.S. President GeorgeWashington and the value of creativity through the stories of Marie Curie, James Watt,Thomas Edison, and the Wright brothers. Western moral values such as equality, humanrights, and freedom are learned through the stories of Abraham Lincoln. Second, according to the social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), group memberscollectively construct prototypes of the group to represent the group’s defining, positivelydistinctive attributes. A prototype is often an exemplary person in the group. According toHogg (2004), “prototypes rarely describe average or typical ingroup members—ratherthey are polarized away from outgroup features and describe ideal, often hypothetical,ingroup members” (p. 229). Thus, according to the social identity theory, exemplary per-sons in a local culture and their attendant values represent the culture’s defining qualitiesfrom which its members derive a sense of positive distinctiveness and collective esteemvis-à-vis comparison with the global culture. As such, exemplary persons and their atten-dant values provide rich materials for understanding globalization and value negotiation. In this article, we reported three studies conducted in Hong Kong that used the methoddescribed earlier to examine the exemplification of status and solidarity values by individ-uals who are considered to be exemplary persons from local (Chinese) culture and global Downloaded from jcc.sagepub.com at IACCP-International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology on March 16, 2011
  • 640 JOURNAL OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY(Western) culture. In each study, a sample of Hong Kong Chinese undergraduates listed theexemplary persons who came to their mind readily and rated the extent to which theseexemplary persons represented competence values and social, moral values in Chinese andWestern cultures. We predicted that the spontaneously listed Chinese exemplary personsare likely to embody Chinese social, moral values or values that serve solidarity functions.Contrarily, spontaneously listed Western exemplary persons are likely to embody compe-tence values (versus Western moral values) or values that reflect socioeconomic status. STUDY 1METHOD Participants. Twenty Hong Kong undergraduate students (4 men and 16 women) froman introductory psychology class participated in this study in return for course requirementcredit. Their mean age was 19.40 (SD = 0.59). Measures and procedures. On arrival and signing the consent form, the participantscompleted a questionnaire that was written in Chinese. They listed six exemplary personsin Chinese culture and six exemplary persons in Western cultures. The order of listingChinese and Western exemplary persons was counterbalanced. Specifically, they wereinstructed to “list six persons in Chinese (Western) culture who deserve much respect andare worthy of imitating.” Next, the participants indicated on a 6-point Likert-type scale(from 1 = not at all to 6 = very much) the extent to which each of these exemplary personswas an embodiment of six solidarity values from Chinese culture (filial piety, patriotism,loyalty, righteousness, sacrifice, and bravery) and six status values (intelligence, persis-tence, wisdom, power, artistic talent, and creativity). The 12 values were presented to theparticipants in a random order, with the same order for all participants. These 12 values were selected based on the results of a pilot study. In the pilot study,we first identified 32 (23 men, 9 women) exemplary persons from Chinese culture and 22(18 male, 4 female) from Western cultures in Hong Kong’s grade school curriculum. Next,we had a separate sample of 121 Hong Kong Chinese undergraduates (22% male; meanage = 19.26, SD = 1.38) listed up to five values associated with these models. Half of theparticipants in the pilot study listed values associated with the Chinese exemplary persons,and the remaining half listed values associated with the Western ones. The six most fre-quently mentioned values associated with the Chinese exemplary persons were patriotism,bravery, righteousness, loyalty, self-sacrifice, and filial piety. These are all core Confucianmoral values. We used these six values to represent solidarity values in the main study. The six most frequently mentioned values associated with the Western exemplary per-sons were creativity, power, artistic talent, intelligence, persistence, and wisdom. Thesevalues are related to human competencies and are typical status values. Moral values in theWestern cultures (freedom, human rights) were seldom mentioned. These results are con-sistent with our hypothesis: In Hong Kong, Chinese exemplary persons tend to be associ-ated with solidarity values and Western exemplary persons with status values.RESULTS AND DISCUSSION We compiled a list of the exemplary persons listed by the participants in the main study.Of the 115 Chinese exemplary persons listed, 98.2% were men.2 The six most frequently Downloaded from jcc.sagepub.com at IACCP-International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology on March 16, 2011
  • Fu, Chiu / GLOBALIZATION AND VALUES 641mentioned exemplary persons in Chinese culture were Confucius (551 BC to 479 BC,philosopher; the percentage of participants who listed this exemplary person was 80.0%),Sun Yat-Sen (1866 to 1925, founder of the Republic of China; listed by 55.0%), Mencius(370 BC to 286 BC, philosopher; 55.0%), Li Bai (701 to 762, poet; 45.0%), Zhuangzi (369BC to 286 BC, philosopher; 40.0%), and Du Fu (712 to 770, poet; 40.0%). Of the 105 Western exemplary persons listed, 85.7% were men. The six most frequentlymentioned exemplary persons in Western cultures were James Watt (75.0%), MotherTeresa (30.0%), Sir Isaac Newton (25.0%), Napoleon Bonaparte (25.0%), Jesus Christ(25.0%), and Ludwig van Beethoven (20.0%). For each participant and for each value, we took the mean of the ratings assigned to thelisted Chinese exemplary persons and the mean of the ratings assigned to the listed Westernexemplary persons. Next, we took the mean of the six values in each of the two value cate-gories (Chinese solidarity values or status values). A 2 (Culture of Exemplary Person) X 2(Value Category) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significantmain effect of value category, F(1, 18) = 9.55, p < .01, η2p = .35, and a significant main effectof culture, F(1, 18) = 23.21, p < .001, η2p = .56. We interpreted these main effects in the con-text of the significant Culture X Value Category interaction, F(1, 18) = 8.97, p < .01, η2p =.33.3 As shown in Figure 1, Chinese exemplary persons were perceived to exemplify Chinesesolidarity values (M = 4.47, SD = 0.79) and status values (M = 4.77, SD = 0.41) to a similarextent, F(1, 19) = 3.49, ns. Western exemplary persons exemplified status values (M = 4.77,SD = 0.42) more than they did Chinese solidarity values (M = 3.96, SD = 0.60), F(1, 18) =49.26, p < .001, η2p = .73. In addition, Chinese and Western exemplary persons did not differin how much they exemplified status values, t(19) = 0.00, ns. However, compared to Westernexemplary persons, Chinese exemplary persons were perceived to exemplify solidarity val-ues more, t(19) = 2.55, p < .05, d = .73. We also used exemplary persons as our unit of analysis, treating each exemplary personlisted by the participant as a case in the analysis. First, we took the mean ratings of the six val-ues in each value category for each exemplary person. Next, we performed a 2 (Culture ofExemplary Person) X 2 (Value Category) ANOVA on the mean ratings. Gender of the exem-plary persons was not included in the analysis because the small number of female exemplarypersons (7.66%) yielded highly unstable estimates of the dependent measures for femaleexemplary persons. As in the analysis that used participants as the unit of analysis, there wasa significant main effect of value category, F(1, 220) = 67.59, p < .001, η2p = .24, a significantmain effect of culture, F(1, 220) = 8.57, p < .005, η2p = .04, and a significant Culture X ValueCategory interaction, F(1, 220) = 14.61, p < .001, η2p = .06. Chinese and Western exemplarypersons did not differ in how much they exemplify status values, t(221) = –0.07, ns. However,compared to Western exemplary persons, Chinese exemplary persons were perceived to exem-plify Chinese solidarity values more, t(221) = 2.11, p < .05, d = 0.50. In short, the pilot study and the main study yielded consistent results. In the pilot study,when presented with exemplary persons in Hong Kong’s grade school curriculum, HongKong Chinese college students spontaneously listed solidarity values when the exemplarypersons were from Chinese culture and status values when the exemplary persons werefrom Western cultures. In the main study, compared to Western exemplary persons,Chinese exemplary persons exemplified Chinese moral (solidarity) values more. Theseresults are consistent with the social identity theory prediction that Hong Kong Chinesecontinue to value Chinese moral values; the exemplary persons from Chinese culture thatthe participants aspired to imitate were perceived to exemplify these values more thanthose from Western culture. Downloaded from jcc.sagepub.com at IACCP-International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology on March 16, 2011
  • 642 JOURNAL OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 5 4.5 4 3.5 3 Chinese Exemplary Persons Western Exemplary Persons Solidarity Values Status ValuesFigure 1. Mean Ratings of How Much Chinese and Western Exemplary Persons Exemplified Different Categories of Values in Study 1NOTE: Error bars denote standard errors. It is interesting that in the main study, Chinese and Western exemplary persons exem-plified status values to a similar extent. We speculate that because of Hong Kong’s successin the global economy, many Hong Kong Chinese no longer perceive Western culture ashaving superior status than Chinese culture in terms of economic prosperity. Furthermore,they have started to use Chinese exemplary persons who embody both the perceived moralsuperiority of Chinese culture and the competence traits required for success in the globaleconomy as materials for constructing a positively distinctive identity. STUDY 2 Although Study 1 provided some initial support for our hypothesis, it could be arguedthat the findings are due to a priming effect—simply asking participants to think of anyChinese or Western person might be able to produce the pattern of results obtained inStudy 1. In other words, the effects may have nothing to do with the stimulus person beingan exemplary person. In the current study, to address this interpretive ambiguity, we repeated Study 1 with aslightly different procedure. In Study 1, the participants listed exemplary persons. In thepresent study, the participants listed historical figures from Chinese and Western culturesand rated these figures in terms of how much they exemplified Chinese moral (solidarity)values and competence (status) values. Next, we had a group of independent judges ratehow positive or negative each historical figure was. According to the social identity theory,prototypes of a group are idealized and positively evaluated in-group members (Hogg, Downloaded from jcc.sagepub.com at IACCP-International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology on March 16, 2011
  • Fu, Chiu / GLOBALIZATION AND VALUES 6432004). Thus, the pattern of results in Study 1 should emerge only when the historicalfigures are positive figures (when they are like exemplary persons). However, according tothe priming account, the pattern of results in Study 1 would emerge regardless of whetherthe historical figures are positive or negative figures. For instance, as long as the historicalfigures are Chinese persons, they should exemplify Chinese traditional moral values.METHOD Participants. Fifty Hong Kong Chinese undergraduates (15 men, 34 women, and 1 didnot report gender), with a mean age of 20.25 (SD = 2.26), participated in the current studyin return for course requirement credit. Procedures. The procedures were the same as those in Study 1, with the exception thatthe participants were instructed to list up to six historical figures in Chinese history and sixhistorical figures in Western history. Four Hong Kong Chinese undergraduates (2 men, 2women; mean age = 19.50, SD = 0.58) assigned a valence score to each historical figureaccording to the following scheme: 1 = negative figures, 2 = neutral figures, and 3 = pos-itive figures (a few figures were perceived as ambivalent or vague, and they were coded asmissing data). The correlations of the valence ratings between the four coders ranged from.57 to .88 (median = .81). An average valence score was obtained for each historical figureby taking the mean of the four coders’ ratings. The mean of the valence scores was 2.48(SD = 0.59).RESULTS AND DISCUSSION A list of historical figures generated by the participants was compiled. Of the 296Chinese historical figures generated, 91.9% were men. The six most frequently mentionedfigures in Chinese history were Qin Shi Huang (259 BC to 210 BC, Emperor of the QinDynasty; percentage of participants who mentioned this figure was 62.0%), Yue Fei (1103to 1141, a general in the Sung Dynasty; 48.0%), Sun Yat-Sen (44.0%), Li Bai (32.0%), LiuBei (161 to 223, ruler of the State of Shu; 30.0%), and Zhuge Liang (181-234, a chief mil-itary advisor; 26.0%). Of the 282 Western historical figures listed, 96.1% were men. The six most frequentlymentioned figures in Western history were Adolf Hitler (56.0%), Napoleon Bonaparte(48.0%), George Washington (32.0%), Alexander the Great (30.0%), Abraham Lincoln(28.0%), and Marco Polo (28.0%). We treated each historical figure as a case in our analysis. For each historical figure, wecomputed the mean exemplification rating on each of the two value categories. We meancentered the valence score to avoid potential problems caused by multicollinearity. Next,we fitted a 2 (Culture of Historical Figure) X 2 (Value Category) X Valence generalizedlinear model to the data, with valence as a mean-centered continuous variable. Again,gender of the historical figures was not included in the analysis because very few femalehistorical figures were listed (6.03%). The following effects were significant: the maineffects of culture, F(1, 558) = 9.84, p < .001, η2p = .02, valence, F(1, 558) = 78.74, p <.001, η2p = .12, value category, F(1, 558) = 91.42, p < .001, η2p = .14, the Culture X Valenceinteraction, F(1, 558) = 13.55, p < .001, η2p = .02, the Culture X Value Category interac-tion, F(1, 558) = 41.61, p < .001, η2p = .07, the Value Category X Valence interaction, Downloaded from jcc.sagepub.com at IACCP-International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology on March 16, 2011
  • 644 JOURNAL OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGYF(1, 558) = 21.99, p < .001, η2p = .04, and Culture X Value Category X Valence interaction,F(1, 558) = 42.73, p < .001, η2p = .07. Follow-up simple slope analyses showed that for positive historical figures (valence cen-tered at 1 SD above the mean), there was a significant main effects of culture, F(1, 558) =23.42, p < .001, η2p = .04, value category, F(1, 558) = 12.09, p < .001, η2p = .02, and CultureX Value Category interaction, F(1, 558) = 84.98, p < .001, η2p = .13. As shown in Figure 2,positive Chinese historical figures (valence > mean) exemplified Chinese solidarity values(M = 4.56, SD = 1.11) slightly more than status values (M = 4.37, SD = 0.82), F(1, 196) =5.91, p < .05, η2p = .03, whereas positive Western historical figures (valence > mean) exem-plified status values (M = 4.46, SD = 0.75) more than Chinese solidarity values (M = 3.71,SD = 1.10), F(1, 198) = 83.33, p < .001, η2p = .30. Furthermore, compared to positive Westernhistorical figures, positive Chinese historical figures exemplified Chinese solidarity valuesmore, t(396) = 3.29, p < .01, d = .77. As in Study 1, Chinese and Western historical figuresdid not differ in how much they exemplified status values, t(396) = –0.51, ns. For negative historical figures (valence centered at 1 SD below the mean), the only signif-icant effect was the main effect of value category, F(1, 558) = 100.89, p < .001, η2p = .15.Status values (M = 4.11, SD = 0.88) were exemplified more than solidarity values (M = 3.36,SD = 1.16), t(182) = 6.95, p < .01, d = .73, by these negative historical figures. The Culture XValue Category interaction was not significant, F(1, 558) = 0.00, ns. In short, the results from Study 1 were replicated when the valence of the historicalfigures was positive. However, when the valence of the historical figures was negative,Chinese and Western historical figures did not differ in the types of values they exempli-fied. These findings eliminated the alternative hypothesis that any Chinese or Westernstimulus person would produce the value association pattern in Study 1. STUDY 3 Results from Studies 1 and 2 showed that Chinese exemplary persons or positively eval-uated Chinese historical figures are associated with both solidarity (Chinese moral) andstatus values and Western exemplary persons or positively evaluated historical figures areassociated with status values only. The current study was designed to replicate these find-ings and address several concerns. First, it may be argued that the participants recalled thewidely recognized Chinese and Western exemplary persons in Hong Kong but did notadmire or aspire personally to possess the values these persons exemplify. To address thisissue, in Study 3, participants were asked to list the exemplary persons they themselvesadmired and aspired to become. In addition, they were not constrained to list exemplarypersons from any particular culture. Instead, we sorted the exemplary persons the partici-pants listed according to the culture to which the exemplary persons belonged. Second, although Hong Kong undergraduates do not associate Western exemplary per-sons with Chinese moral values, they may associate them with Western moral values. It ispossible that through their exposure to Western cultures, Hong Kong Chinese also aspireto become some Western exemplary persons who embody Western moral values. If that isthe case, Western moral values may find a way to enter the value system in Hong Kong.To explore this possibility, in the current study, we included moral values from Westernculture, such as human rights and individuality, and asked the participants to rate theexemplary persons on these values. Downloaded from jcc.sagepub.com at IACCP-International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology on March 16, 2011
  • Fu, Chiu / GLOBALIZATION AND VALUES 645 5 4.5 4 3.5 3 Positive Positive Negative Negative Chinese Western Chinese Western Historical Figures Solidarity Values Status ValuesFigure 2. Mean Ratings of How Much Positive and Negative Chinese and Western Historical Figures Exemplified Different Categories of Values in Study 2NOTE: Error bars denote standard errors. Finally, according to the social identity theory, a group may construct different proto-types when the specific out-group that forms the basis of social comparison changes(Hogg, 2004). Similarly, a new set of exemplary persons carrying different values mayemerge and become widely recognized in a society as the comparison group changes. Inthe context of Hong Kong, the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997 has given rise to newintercultural dynamics: A rapidly growing concern in the city during and immediately afterthe political transition was the positive distinctiveness of Hong Kong people vis-à-visChinese mainlanders. There is evidence that during this period, Hong Kong people polar-ized themselves away from Chinese mainlanders by emphasizing Hong Kong people’sadherence to Western moral values such as human rights and democracy (Lam et al., 1999;Tong et al., 1999). Indeed, soon after Hong Kong was returned to China in 1997, the citywas known to the world as the City of Protest. There were large-scale rallies, with tens ofthousands of protesters taking to the streets in Hong Kong to protest for freedom of speechand other political rights. Thus, it is possible that in response to this shift in the out-groupas the basis for social comparison, Hong Kong Chinese have constructed a new set ofexemplary persons who embody such Western moral values as democracy and humanrights. Aggregating scores across exemplary persons from different epochs in the previoustwo studies might have overlooked this subtle development. In the current study, weexplored this issue by examining the values exemplified by historical and contemporaryexemplary persons. We assumed that the values represented by historical exemplary Downloaded from jcc.sagepub.com at IACCP-International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology on March 16, 2011
  • 646 JOURNAL OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGYpersons are likely to be longstanding values in the culture and values represented by con-temporary exemplary persons are likely to be the values that were incorporated into theculture’s value system relatively recently. Thus, the values historical and contemporaryexemplary persons exemplify may reflect value change in a culture.METHOD Participants. Thirty-one Hong Kong Chinese undergraduates (6 men, 25 women; meanage = 20, SD = 1.79) received US$7.50 for their participation in the present study. Procedures. On arrival and signing the consent form, participants were instructed to“list 12 exemplary persons you respect and aspire to become” and to rate on a 6-pointLikert-type scale (from not at all to very much) how much each of these exemplary per-sons exemplified 18 values. Of these values, 12 were those used in Studies 1 and 2. Theremaining 6 were Western rights–based or individualist values: equality, human rights,democracy, individuality, freedom, and uniqueness. Next, half of the participants ratedhow well each exemplary person represented Chinese culture before they rated how wellthe exemplary person represented Western culture. The remaining participants performedthe same ratings in the reverse order.RESULTS AND DISCUSSION Two hundred and sixty-eight exemplary persons (69.3% males) were listed.4 The firstauthor categorized the exemplary persons into Chinese or Western exemplary persons.Exemplary persons who did not fall into these categories (4.5%) were excluded from fur-ther analyses. The exemplary persons were also categorized into historical or contempo-rary exemplary persons depending on whether they had passed away before the end ofWorld War II (1945). Cultural representativeness of exemplary persons. Treating each exemplary person as acase, we performed a 2 (Culture: Chinese or Western) X 2 (Epoch: Historical orContemporary) ANOVA on how well the exemplary persons represented Chinese culture.The results indicated that Chinese exemplary persons (M = 4.28, SD = 1.30) were seen asbetter representatives of Chinese culture than were Western ones (M = 2.28, SD = 1.04),F(1, 243) = 222.50, p < .001, η2p = .48, for the main effect of culture. Historical exemplarypersons (M = 3.80, SD = 1.80) were seen as better representatives of Chinese culture thanwere contemporary ones (M = 3.33, SD = 1.36), F(1, 243) = 18.43, p < .001, η2p = .07, forthe main effect of epoch. The Culture X Epoch interaction was also significant, F(1, 243) =18.66, p < .001, η2p = .07. Historical Chinese exemplary persons (M = 5.17, SD = 1.08) wereseen as better representatives of Chinese culture than were contemporary Chinese exemplarypersons (M = 3.87, SD = 1.19), F(1, 149) = 41.18, p < .001, η2p = .22, whereas historicaland contemporary Western exemplary persons did not differ in how well they representedChinese culture (M = 2.28, SD = 1.05 versus M = 2.28, SD = 1.04), F(1, 94) < 0.01, ns. Asthe means indicated, both historical and contemporary Western exemplary persons werenot seen to be representative of Chinese culture. A similar analysis performed on how well the exemplary persons represented Westernculture revealed that Western exemplary persons (M = 4.63, SD = 1.00) were seen as better Downloaded from jcc.sagepub.com at IACCP-International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology on March 16, 2011
  • Fu, Chiu / GLOBALIZATION AND VALUES 647 TABLE 1 Correlation Between How Well Exemplary Persons Represented Chinese and Western Cultures and How Much They Exemplified Different Categories of Values (Study 3) Value Category Solidarity Status Western (Chinese Moral) Value Value Moral ValueRepresentativeness of Chinese culture .15* –.08 –.08Representativeness of Western culture –.12* .17* .23***p < .05. **p < .01.representatives of Western culture than were Chinese exemplary persons (M = 2.88, SD =1.34), F(1, 242) = 159.65, p < .001, η2p = .40, for the main effect of culture. In addition, con-temporary exemplary persons (M = 3.71, SD = 1.29) were seen as better representatives ofWestern culture than were historical ones (M = 3.31, SD = 1.74; d = .26), F(1, 242) = 12.52,p < .001, η2p = .05, for the main effect of epoch. The significant Culture of Exemplary PersonX Epoch interaction, F(1, 242) = 14.78, p < .001, η2p = .06, indicated that historical and con-temporary Western exemplary persons did not differ in how well they represented Westernculture (M = 4.64, SD = 1.02 versus M = 4.60, SD = 0.99), F(1, 94) = 0.05, ns. It is interest-ing that contemporary Chinese exemplary persons (M = 3.25, SD = 1.18) were viewed asbetter representatives of Western culture than were historical Chinese exemplary persons(M = 2.10, SD = 1.32), F(1, 148) = 28.15, p < .001, η2p = .16. Attendant values of the exemplary persons. Table 1 shows the correlation between howwell the exemplary persons represented Chinese and Western cultures and how much theyexemplified the three categories of values. The better the exemplary persons representedChinese culture, the more they were perceived to exemplify Chinese moral values (r = .15,p < .05). The better the exemplary persons represented Western culture, the more they wereperceived to exemplify Western moral values (r = .23, p < .01) and status values (r = .17,p < .05). Finally, the better the exemplary persons represented Western culture, the lessthey were perceived to exemplify Chinese moral values (r = –.12, p < .05). To examine how exemplary persons from different cultures and epochs differed in thevalues they exemplified, we performed a 2 (Culture of Exemplary Person) X 2 (Epoch ofExemplary Person) X 3 (Value Category) ANOVA on the exemplification ratings. The fol-lowing effects were significant: the main effect of value category, F(2, 486) = 26.02, p <.001, η2p = .10, the Culture X Epoch interaction, F(2, 243) = 5.92, p < .05, η2p = .02, theCulture X Value Category interaction, F(2, 486) = 9.12, p < .001, η2p = .04, the Epoch XValue Category interaction, F(2, 486) = 4.20, p <.05, η2p = .02, and the Culture X EpochX Value Category interaction, F(2, 486) = 7.74, p < .001, η2p = .03. All the effects wereinterpreted in the context of the highest order three-way Culture X Epoch X ValueCategory interaction. Figure 3 shows that historical Chinese exemplary persons exemplified Chinese moralvalues (M = 4.38, SD = 1.14) and status values (M = 4.34, SD = 0.82) more than they didWestern moral values (M = 3.92, SD = 1.11), F(2, 94) = 4.42, p < .05, η2p = .09. In con-trast, historical Western exemplary persons exemplified status values (M = 4.54, SD =0.67) more than they did Western moral values (M = 3.86, SD = 1.22) and Chinese moralvalues (M = 3.60, SD = 1.35), F(2, 84) = 12.63, p < .001, η2p = .23. Downloaded from jcc.sagepub.com at IACCP-International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology on March 16, 2011
  • 648 JOURNAL OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 4.5 4 3.5 3 Historical Historical Contemporary Contemporary Chinese Western Chinese Western Exemplary Persons Solidarity Values Status Values Western Moral ValuesFigure 3. Mean Ratings of How Much Historical and Contemporary Exemplary Persons From Chinese and Western Cultures Exemplified Different Categories of Values in Study 3NOTE: Error bars denote standard errors. Furthermore, compared to historical Western exemplary persons, historical Chineseexemplary persons exemplified Chinese moral values more, t(182) = 2.41, p < .05, d = .62.As in Studies 1 and 2, Chinese and Western exemplary persons did not differ in how muchthey exemplified status values, t(182) = 1.17, ns. In short, the findings on Chinese moraland status values exemplified by historical exemplary persons were similar to those inStudies 1 and 2. Results also showed that the two groups of exemplary persons did not dif-fer in how much they exemplified Western moral values, t(182) = 0.2, ns. We next examined the values associated with contemporary exemplary persons. Thecontemporary Chinese exemplary persons were similar to the historical Western exem-plary persons in terms of pattern of values they exemplified. Contemporary Chineseexemplary persons exemplified status values (M = 4.18, SD = 0.85) more than they didWestern moral values (M = 3.65, SD = 1.08) and Chinese moral values (M = 3.58, SD =0.91), F(2, 204) = 22.81, p < .001, η2p = .18. Finally, contemporary Western exemplarypersons exemplified Western moral values (M = 4.29, SD = 0.86) and status values (M =4.23; SD = 0.74) more than they did Chinese moral values (M = 3.75, SD = 1.02), F(2, 104) =9.81, p < .001, η2p = .16. Similar to the historical exemplary persons, we explored whether contemporaryChinese and Western exemplary persons showed differences in exemplifying each type ofvalues. We found that contemporary Chinese and Western exemplary persons did not dif-fer in how much they exemplify Chinese moral values, t(312) = –0.72, ns, and status val-ues t(312) = –0.28, ns. However, compared to contemporary Chinese exemplary persons, Downloaded from jcc.sagepub.com at IACCP-International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology on March 16, 2011
  • Fu, Chiu / GLOBALIZATION AND VALUES 649contemporary Western exemplary persons exemplified Western moral values to a largerextent, t(312) = 3.10, p < .01, d = .66. Apparently, to the Hong Kong Chinese undergraduates in the current study, among thehistorical exemplary persons they respected and aspired to become, Chinese exemplarypersons exemplified Chinese moral values and status values, whereas Western exemplarypersons exemplified status values only. This is the pattern we found repeatedly in Studies1 and 2. It is interesting that Western moral values appear to have found a way to enter theparticipants’ value system, through the contemporary Western exemplary persons. At thesame time, contemporary Chinese exemplary persons ceased to be seen as good represen-tatives of moral values in Chinese culture. Indeed, they were seen to exemplify status val-ues more than they do moral values from both Chinese and Western cultures. GENERAL DISCUSSION Across three studies, we found that Hong Kong undergraduates associate traditionalChinese exemplary persons with both Chinese solidarity and status values and traditionalWestern exemplary persons primarily with status values. These findings are consistent withthe social identity theory: People in the local culture tend to maintain favorable perceptionsof their culture by affirming their culture’s social and moral values. These results suggest thatChinese moral values are more resistant to change; Chinese young people continue to lookup to the Chinese exemplary persons (particularly the historical ones) who carry these val-ues. Consistent with this idea, Stewart, Bond, Deeds, and Chung (1999) reported that amongHong Kong Chinese, although the younger generation values autonomy more than the oldergeneration does, Hong Kong Chinese teenagers give lower priority to early autonomy thando their Western counterparts. Similarly, Yue and Ng (1999) found in another intergenera-tional study that traditional moral values such as filial piety are still the top moral concernsamong young people in Beijing, China, another cosmopolitan Chinese society (see also Yeh,2002). In short, it seems that in Hong Kong and other modern Chinese societies, traditionalChinese moral values are still heavily emphasized. In all three studies, the participants linked Western exemplary persons to status values—they aspired to become the Western figures that embody Western competence traits that areassociated with success and achievement. These results suggest that during globalization,Western values that support development of arts, science, and technology (such as cre-ativity, intelligence, and artistic talents) are particularly likely to be incorporated in thelocal culture’s value system.SPECULATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS We also found that the Chinese exemplary persons whom the participants aspired tobecome also embody status values. We speculate that Hong Kong’s success in the globaleconomy might have motivated the participants to construct a distinctive identity thatembodies both Chinese moral values and Western competence traits. This identity distin-guishes Hong Kong Chinese from the global economic powers and at the same timeacknowledges the economic accomplishment of the Hong Kong Chinese. The findings in Study 3 revealed that some Western moral values have begun to takeroot in Hong Kong society; contemporary Western exemplary persons who representWestern moral values are also recognized by Hong Kong undergraduates. At the same Downloaded from jcc.sagepub.com at IACCP-International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology on March 16, 2011
  • 650 JOURNAL OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGYtime, contemporary Chinese exemplary persons seem to have taken the role of traditionalWestern exemplary persons. They represent what competent persons in the culture are like.However, unlike their traditional counterparts, their influence in the moral domain seems tohave subsided. We suspect that these changes are related to a shift in the comparison groupin intergroup comparison from Western or global culture to mainland Chinese culture. Forexample, there is considerable evidence (Ho, Chau, Chiu, & Peng, 2003; Lam et al., 1999)that during and after the handover of Hong Kong’s sovereignty to China in 1997, Hong Kongpeople seek to distinguish themselves from mainland Chinese by emphasizing Hong Kong’sdemocracy (as exemplified by contemporary Western exemplary persons) and economicaccomplishments (as exemplified by traditional Western and contemporary Chinese exem-plary persons). However, a direct test of this speculation is needed in future research. Furthermore, it is still unclear whether, in the process of culture change, the influenceof historical exemplary persons may gradually be diluted when new exemplary personsfrom the contemporary era become more important and broadly represented in differentpublic carriers of culture. If this happens, status and Western moral values will be morewidely represented in Hong Kong people’s value system. On one hand, the gradual incorporation of Western exemplary persons and their atten-dant cultural values into Hong Kong culture attests to culture’s malleability. On the otherhand, the fact that Confucian moral values are constantly being reproduced in Hong KongChinese culture indicates that some aspects of culture are relatively stable (Triandis, 2004).This analysis raises several interesting questions for future research. First, what are thedeterminants of the likelihood that a particular aspect of traditional culture would be repro-duced and maintained in the culture? Could it be how important this aspect is for the sur-vival of the human species, as evolutionary psychologists have proposed (Kenrick, Li, &Butner, 2003)? Could it be how widely this aspect is shared and implicated in interpersonalcommunication in the population (Latané, 1996; Lau, Chiu, & Lee, 2001; Lau, Lee, &Chiu, 2004; Lyons & Kashima, 2001)? Could it be how extensively this aspect has beeninstituted in the various public carriers of cultural meanings (Kitayama, 2002)? Exemplary persons are public carriers of culture as well as vehicles of intergenerationaltransmission of cultural values. However, it is unclear how exemplary persons contributeto internalization of cultural values. One possible mechanism is through culture priming(Hong, Chiu, & Kung, 1997; Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000). Many exem-plary persons (e.g., Abraham Lincoln) are embodiments of core values in a culture (e.g.,human rights in North America) as well as cultural icons. Every time an individual looksat these icons, the associated cultural values are activated. Children are often exposed tothese cultural icons in their socialization and educational experiences. Frequent exposureto these cultural icons, which are often displayed extensively in the environment, ensuresfrequent activation and chronic accessibility of the cultural values. Through their experiences with the public culture, the human mind is socialized.Meanwhile, changes in the form and structure of social practices may alter the distribution andsignificance of certain exemplary persons in the culture (Menon & Morris, 2001). A futureresearch challenge is to describe the reciprocal influence between public and private cultures.LIMITATIONS The present studies have several limitations. First, there was greater representation offemale (versus male) participants in the studies. A future study with relatively balancedgender distribution is needed to assure the generality of the results. Downloaded from jcc.sagepub.com at IACCP-International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology on March 16, 2011
  • Fu, Chiu / GLOBALIZATION AND VALUES 651 Second, the current studies focus on Hong Kong Chinese’s responses to globalization.Although the results of Inglehart and Baker’s (2000) cross-national survey reviewed in theintroduction suggest that there are similar value negotiation processes in other countries,replications of our findings in other societies would help to establish the generality of thevalue negotiation processes. Last, the measures in our studies were written in Chinese. Previous studies have shownthat language may activate its associated linguistic culture and affect responses to culture-relevant measures (Ross, Xun, & Wilson, 2002). The participants in our studies areChinese–English bilinguals. It is important and interesting to examine whether theirresponses would differ when the studies are conducted in an English-language context. CONCLUSION In conclusion, the rapid rate of globalization has made reproduction of culture and cul-tural change a timely topic in social psychological investigation. It also offers a window ofopportunity for researchers to uncover some dynamic cultural processes. The goal of thepresent article is to explore how local culture responds to globalization from the perspec-tive of the social identity theory and propose a new method that examines value exempli-fication of exemplary persons in Chinese and Western cultures. Our results offer someclues that may lead to the unveiling of some facets of the interactions between multiplecultures and the multicultural mind. NOTES 1. Although the word exemplary can mean serving as an example or serving as a warning, the research par-ticipants were instructed to list positive exemplary persons (see method sections in Studies 1 and 3). In this arti-cle, the referents of exemplary persons are restricted to positive exemplary persons only. 2. The ratio of exemplary persons generated only by men to those generated only by women was 1:5.64,which is similar to the ratio of men to women in the sample (1:4). 3. When participant gender was included as a factor in the analyses, no gender effects were significant. Thepattern of value exemplification was similar for men and women: Chinese solidarity: Mmen = 4.73, SD = 0.60; Mwomen = 4.41, SD = 0.84; t(18) = 0.85, ns Chinese status: Mmen = 4.74, SD = 0.45; Mwomen = 4.78, SD = 0.42; t(18) = –0.16, ns Western solidarity: Mmen = 3.58, SD = 0.79; Mwomen = 4.06, SD = 0.53; t(18) = –1.15, ns Western status: Mmen = 4.85, SD = 0.31; Mwomen = 4.74, SD = 0.45; t(18) = 0.57, ns 4. The ratio of exemplary persons generated only by men to those generated only by women was 1:4.43,which is similar to the ratio of men to women in the sample (1:4.2). REFERENCESArnett, J. J. (2002). The psychology of globalization. American Psychologist, 57, 774-783.Bond, M. H. (1985). Language as a carrier of ethnic stereotypes in Hong Kong. Journal of Social Psychology, 125, 53-62.Bond, M. H., & King, A. Y. C. (1985). Coping with the threat of Westernization in Hong Kong. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 9, 351-364.Callan, V. J., Gallois, C., & Forbes, P. A. (1983). Evaluative reactions to accented English: Ethnicity, sex role, and context. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 14, 407-426.Chiu, C., & Hong, Y. (2006). The social psychology of culture. New York: Psychology Press. Downloaded from jcc.sagepub.com at IACCP-International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology on March 16, 2011
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