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Galileo Military Benefits

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An Evaluation of the Military Benefits of the Galileo System (September 2002)

An Evaluation of the Military Benefits of the Galileo System (September 2002)

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  • 1. An Evaluation of the Military Benefits of the Galileo SystemION GPS 2002 • 25 September • Portland, Oregon USAJames Hasik, ConsultantMichael Rip, Michigan State UniversityABSTRACTThe US government has publicly and privately expressed concern that the planned Galileo navigation satellite system will adversely effect theintegrity of its own Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS), and has also questioned the need for a system that appears superficially toduplicate its functions. Despite this concern, Galileo will resolve unfulfilled military needs in four areas: greater availability in northern latitudes,logistical automation through greater integrity, greater accuracy for all navigation satellite services through somewhat friendly competition, andgreater availability in urban areas. This last advantage is perhaps the most important in light of the campaigns and operations in which NATOforces [1] may find themselves embroiled in the future. Discounting Galileos potential for generating revenues, forgoing the system could freemoney for significant investments in other military hardware. Determining which would be more valuable is a difficult exercise in policyanalysis, but the advantages of other systems are not overwhelming for European defense. Thus, apart from some lingering questions aboutthe security arrangements for Galileos Public Regulated Service (PRS), the US governments hitherto disdain for Galileo may be misplaced.
  • 2. DUPLICATION OR ENHANCEMENT? The 30-satellite Galileo system will, if brought to fruition, be the most technically sophisticated and costly European space initiative to date. The systems technical features may (as advertised) exceed those of the vaunted Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS). Indeed, interest within the EU ostensibly comes from many features of Galileo: its enhanced accuracy, its increased signal strength, and its contribution to the worldwide COSPAS-SARSAT seach-and-rescue (SAR) program. For example, SAR monitoring payloads on Galileo satellites and ancillary data streams in its message structure will provide integrity messages, distress acknowledgements, SAR co-ordination messages, weather alerts, and accident warnings. [2] This represents a considerable advance on current capabilities. However, while valuable and life-saving, features as these do not often translate into Combined Anglo-Franco-US naval task force in the Indian multi-billion euro projects on their own. Rather, the most frequently cited explanation for Ocean supporting the campaign in Afghanistan, spring 2002. Photograph courtesy of the US Navy Galileo is to foster competition in the market for satellite navigation services by breaking the effective monopoly that Navstar currently holds. This is an odd argument, as there is All military procurement choices taken within the context of an not much market for satellite navigation services—the dominant product is already free. alliance combine aspects of duplication and enhancement of one’s allies’ capabilities. Too much duplication is wasteful; too [After all, while there are still a few businesses selling unique Internet browser software, much enhancement leaves one vulnerable to the cooperative few are entering the industry intent on making large sums of money.] From the behavior of those allies. NATO aircraft carrier fleet provides an useful analogy. Even if the Charles de Gaule and HMS perspective of the US government, intent on encouraging greater and more effective arms Invincible have fraction of the fire power of the US carriers spending in Europe, Galileo is a frustrating priority. In the words of Frank Kramer, a pictured above, the US carriers are not always available all former US assistant secretary of defense, it is difficult to understand how European British and French national purposes. members of NATO could spend "money duplicating a system when so many other needs exist". This and concern over possible interference between Galileo signals and those of the new GPS M-code have caused consternation in Washington, and prompted concerned Artwork on the cover by J. Huart provided courtesy of the European Space Agency letters from sources as high as Paul Wolfowitz, the US Deputy Secretary of Defense. [3] Many of the more cynical North Americans expect that enthusiasm is strongest forpage 2 The Military Benefits of the Galileo System • Hasik & Rip • ION GPS 2002 • 25 September • Portland, Oregon
  • 3. Galileos potential as a job creation program for European electronics engineers and as a impetus for preserving the market positions of firms like Nokia, Thales, and Alenia. ALTERNATE MEANS OF GUIDANCE Concern in Washington may stem from Washingtons pending loss of control. Galileo will provide the governments of the EU member states with an extremely accurate satellite navigation system not subject to the operational control of the United States Air Force. This clearly has strategic advantages for the defense establishments of the EU member states. [We do not say the EUs defense establishment, as it is still unclear what military role that organization will eventually adopt.] As stated by the EU Directorate for Transport and Energy, "if the Galileo program is abandoned, (Europe) will, in the next 20 to 30 years, lose (its) autonomy in defense." [4] Since virtually every new weapon system and platform is incorporating satellite navigation technology, most new military products larger than small arms will depend on reliable overhead guidance in some way. Armaments manufacturers in EU member states will want to be able to sell precision guided weapons overseas without asking US permission for the PPS. Also, the overlay of the Galileo PRS signal atop the GPS L1 signal will greatly complicate US efforts to jam Galileo signals without affective GPS service, because the US would have great difficulty jamming any signal that sits atop one that they themselves want to use. [5] For these reasons, building the Galileo navigation system is a very effective way of raising the marketability of European-built weapons systems. A USAF Predator drone of the 11th Reconnaissance THE SUEZ SCENARIO Squadron comes in to land, and a French Army Piver drone of the 7th Artillery Regiment lifts off. Photographs courtesy of the USAF and the Armée de Terre. However, it should be noted that Galileo will not necessarily liberate European countries from reliance on a non-national authority for satellite navigation. The national Not all modern weapons systems carry satellite navigation governments of France, Spain, Italy, Germany, and the rest of the EU member states will receivers: the Piver drone above navigates with an inertial system, a Doppler radar, and an altimeter. It is rather not, of their own accords, control Galileo. While "the European Parliament recently voted inconceivable, however, that a similar system would be to ask the EU/ESA Joint Undertaking on Galileo not to exclude the possibility for built today without satellite navigation capability. European military forces to use Galileo in the context of peace-keeping operations," [6] itpage 3 The Military Benefits of the Galileo System • Hasik & Rip • ION GPS 2002 • 25 September • Portland, Oregon
  • 4. is unclear whether the European Commission, the European Parliament, or the national governments themselves would indefinitely look the other way at all questionable uses of Galileo. London and Paris might wonder what would happen if the Commission in Brussels disapproved of a British or French expedition overseas—one that used the encrypted signals of the PRS to restore order on their terms. Even countries like Belgium (in the Congo) or Spain (in Morocco) have reasons for military activities outside the bounds of the EU. Furthermore, the possibility of war between Greece (a NATO and EU member) and Turkey (a current NATO member, and possible future EU member) raises questions about how the ESA and the EU would react. Scenarios as these have not been adequately analyzed, largely because the EU has not had to contend to date with international but inter alia strife as this. ADVANTAGES OF GALILEO While these scenarios seem a bit far-fetched, a loss of GPS access probably is as well. As dependent as civil transportation has become today on the proper functioning of GPS, it is likely that only a drastic emergency could lead the US government to interfere with GPS C/A code signals. Furthermore, expanded opportunities for arms sales may or may not enhance Europes military security, but they do not, eo ipso, fulfill military requirements. For the purposes of this analysis, the relevant question is how Galileo will, on the margin, conquer practical military guidance problems that yet evade solutions. We see four main military advantages to the deployment of the Galileo constellation, which we describe below in increasing order of importance. USS Hawkbill breaking through the ice at the North Pole. Photograph courtesy of the US Navy Greater availability in northern latitudes. Improved access in polar regions will unquestionably benefit civil air navigation, particularly on long-haul flights between While Galileo’s greater coverage in northern latitudes will be commercially valuable to Swedes and Finns, its military value Europe and the western Pacific Rim. Polar areas today are mostly for aerial transit from would have been considerably greater during the Cold War. North America to Russia and Central Asia and from Europe to the Far East. Enhanced availability would also enable military aircraft to travel with closer safe separations and with less aircrew attention to navigation. Still, while one should not completely discount the value of polar navigation to military forces, it would be far more interesting if NATOpage 4 The Military Benefits of the Galileo System • Hasik & Rip • ION GPS 2002 • 25 September • Portland, Oregon
  • 5. were still expecting to fight the Russians over the North Cape of Norway. Pushing GPS competitively for greater accuracy. As Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz claims, plans are already being laid to enhance the accuracy of GPS to match that planned for Galileo. Indeed, the history of GPS throughout the 1990s has been one of ever increasing accuracy as USAF engineers and their contractors worked continuously to improve the system. GPS modernization will replace all satellites with Block II-R versions, which should render the accuracy of the Standard Positioning Service (SPS) even more impressive than todays performance, which is already on the order of but a few meters. If this is so, one might then ask how Galileo would be useful on the margin. The answer is the competition that Galileo enthusiasts cite, albeit vaguely, in official justifications for the program. The Pentagon will not stand to have a significantly less accurate global navigation system than another available outside the United States. The Galileo PRS is advertised to be eventually just that, and the security arrangements have not added to the Pentagons level of comfort. While the PRS is to be limited to the military, police, firefighting, customs, and rescue forces of EU members and other participating states, opponents of the US could, it is feared, eventually hack into the PRS for better accuracy than that available to US forces. [7] Thus, whether from GPS or Galileo, significantly improved accuracy is on order for NATO military forces. This accuracy will be valuable in many ways. Some of the leading ones include: A tank of the Vojska Republika Srpska being struck by a NATO 450-kilogramme laser-guided bomb, • Increased lethality against hard targets. By decreasing the CEP in aerial September 1995. Video frames courtesy of NATO. bombardment, coordinate attack weapons will derive increased lethality against Ever increasing accuracy by global navigation satellite hardened point targets. The rather loose CEPs of GPS-guided weapons in the 1990s systems (GNSS) means that considerably smaller meant that targets like command and control bunkers and ammunition storage igloos weapons can be used to destroy the same targets. required the use of laser- or televisually-guided weapons, which exposed aircrews to Increasing integrity means greater safeguards against collateral damage. Both of these trends are reinforced increased danger as they loitered in the target area, their attention focused on the by a competitive environment in GNSS development business at hand. GPS and Galileo-guided weapons are, of course, launch-and-leave and refinement. (or, fire-and-forget) weapons whose use considerably increases survivability. Use of GPS and Galileo-guided weapons under this regime of increased accuracy will,page 5 The Military Benefits of the Galileo System • Hasik & Rip • ION GPS 2002 • 25 September • Portland, Oregon
  • 6. however, require increased attention to the selection of target coordinates down to the metre level. This may require additional effort at target reconnaissance activities, which could be costly. Finally, weapon accuracy, it is well-known, is a function of more than simply navigation system accuracy. As other factors in the equation—chiefly target location error—conspire to confound the excellence of the GPS/Galileo guidance, improved accuracy from the constellation may already be reaching the point of diminishing marginal returns—unless the considerable improvements are made in target intelligence. [We discuss this further below.] • Increased lethality per strike aircraft. Coordinate attack weapons also offer adverse weather capability that laser- and televisually-guided weapons do not, so a wider range of targets will be at risk during times of heavy cloud cover. Target obscuration was a significant problem in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, in the 1995 Bosnia Campaign, and in the 1999 Kosovo War. With renewed interest in using at least small parties of ground troops to spot for the aviators, and the recent demonstration in Afghanistan of the suitability of coordinate attack weapons for close air support, the ability to drop large numbers of precision weapons through the clouds is quite attractive. Also, while weapons in the 450-kilogram (kg) class and above already have considerable lethality against hard targets, a considerable increase A munitions technician readies 900-kilogramme GPS-guided in accuracy (coupled with improvements underway in the energy of explosive fills) bombs for loading onto a B-2 bomber at Whiteman Air Force may offer their capabilities to weapons in the 225-kg class or less. This will increase Base in Missouri. Photograph courtesy of the US Air Force. by a quantum factor (or more) the number of weapons that a bomber or fighter- The Pentagon’s original accuracy requirement for GPS- bomber can carry, which will increase considerably the number of targets that can be guided bombs was that any given round should have a 50% attacked per sortie. Lethality will thus dramatically improve without any other probability of landing with 13 metres of its target. Increasing accuracy means increasing lethality per strike aircraft. With modifications to airframes (assuming that the aircraft have a sufficient number of the sort of accuracy offered by the next generation of GNSS, connections in their avionics to communicate with all those weapons). However, it a B-2 bomber could theoretically carry up to 84 GPS-guided will pose the same target data collection challenges noted in the preceding paragraph, 225-kilogramme weapons, and expect to destroy targets all day. At that point, the limitation on operations could be the and the same problem of diminishing returns from satellite guidance accuracy. length of time that a stealth aircraft wishes to spend with its bomb bay doors open. • Mine and obstacle clearance. Whether under combat conditions or simply after the fighting is over, clearing the battlefield of ordnance and obstacles is dangerouspage 6 The Military Benefits of the Galileo System • Hasik & Rip • ION GPS 2002 • 25 September • Portland, Oregon
  • 7. and time-consuming. Metre-level accuracy will help mine clearing teams locate and mark their quarry with considerable confidence, speeding their work without increasing their risks. With millions of mines scattered and forgotten throughout the world, the value of the PRS to civilian clearance teams should not be underestimated. In the more martial realm, naval commandos marking assault lanes and clearing beaches for amphibious attacks will be able to provide boat crews with considerably greater confidence with meter-grade coordinates. As the US Marines and SEALs plan how to seize Al-Faw and Basra, the value of this increased accuracy is apparent. Logistical automation through greater integrity. GPS does not yet handle many aspects of civil air navigation in which safety is immediate and critical. This is because it was designed for a less stringent range of military navigational problems, and because it occasionally suffers unpredictable outages over considerable areas. [8] Problems with a single system could, in theory, be safely ignored on dual GPS-Galileo receivers. As Galileos proponents are quick to note, this will cut the cost of transportation in a wide variety of ways. In the maritime environment, Galileos enhanced integrity (combined with automated warning systems) may allow for one-man operation of cargo ships—even US Army Rangers in Mogadishu, 1993; and a automated moorings at piers. Galileo could make large-scale automation of military notional Galileo-enabled logistics operations through cooperative navigation by platoons of unmanned ground wireless communicator. vehicles (UGVs). This will lower the cost of logistics, which will be very important in Photographs courtesy of the Philadelphia Enquirer facilitating significant military operations outside the NATO areas. Of course, since and the ESA. systems like these represent a considerable rethinking of the way that operations are currently conducted, their advent may be some time in the future. Unfamiliar cities can be bewildering places on the first visit, particularly under Greater availability in urban areas. This last selling point of Galileo is probably its sniper fire. GNSS systems of Galileo’s planned greatest near term benefit to military forces. The combined GPS and Galileo accuracy may redress this constellations of 57 satellites will provide four-satellite availability of 95% in dense urban class of problem by areas. The current performance of GPS in the most built-up cities is 55%—not a figure on helping automate some of the more dangerous tasks which one would want to rely in combat. [9] While the potential for logistical automation in military logistics and is perhaps a ways off, greater signal availability in urban areas will still be valuable as communications soon as the Galileo constellation is fully functional.page 7 The Military Benefits of the Galileo System • Hasik & Rip • ION GPS 2002 • 25 September • Portland, Oregon
  • 8. Urban warfare has been unappealing in the West because it invariably accelerates casualties. In its 1994 assault on Grozny, the Russian Army suffered over 2,000 killed and 10,000 wounded before giving up. In its 1998 reprise of the attack, the Army decided to destroy much of the city with artillery fire and aerial bombs before rooting the Chechen rebels out of the rubble. In Bosnia in 1995, Serb commanders chose an extended siege of Sarajevo to an assault on the city for two reasons: the narrow streets of the old city were ideal for a house-to-house defense, and their own infantry lacked the morale and training required for close quarters fighting. Consequently, their artillery was required to do all the work, and with spectacular damage, but without any politically useful results. Indeed, urban fighting is ugly, and many potential opponents know this. Today, one of the greatest impediments to a quick and decisive conquest of Iraq is the possibility that Iraqi forces will hole up in Mesopotamian cities, avoiding an easy, open-desert roll-up, and hurl chemical weapons at US and UK forces from behind the shield of a large civilian population. Once in the cities, tasks that might be quite simple elsewhere suddenly become quite difficult. As one marketing brochure recently described the commercial analog to the problem, "just take an engineer on a fault-find: to-the-nearest-metre tasks such as locating manhole covers can be time-consuming when youve got to scour up to 30 square metres in a busy city." [10] Doing this under sniper fire is even less appealing. Somali technical vehicle, 1998. Photograph courtesy of the Philadelphia Enquirer. Troops very easily get lost in the confusion of unfamiliar streets and undistinguishable buildings, and recent exercises have only confirmed past experience in this regard. [11] Galileo’s greatest military benefit will arguably be in urban operations. With the increased accuracy and availability possible from a combined constellation of 57 or more GPS On the other hand, to cite another civilian analog, "any system precise enough to lead a and Galileo satellites, difficult targets as these (surrounded blind person to an unfamiliar doorway could just as accurately steer a Galileo-guided by non-combattants) could be held at risk with weapon through the door." [12] This sort of accuracy—guidance to the correct door—is the autonomous, indirect fire weaponry. issue in applying remote, precision technologies in cities—places with lots of doors and unfriendly things hiding behind them. The combined GPS and Galileo constellations could improve enhance military capabilities in urban areas in at least two ways: • Fire support. In 1993, US Rangers deployed infrared strobe beacons in the streetspage 8 The Military Benefits of the Galileo System • Hasik & Rip • ION GPS 2002 • 25 September • Portland, Oregon
  • 9. of Mogadishu to mark their own positions and those of their opponents in the Habr Gidr clan for attacks by AH-6 Little Bird helicopter gunships. [13] This was accomplished at considerable risk to the Rangers, as some beacons had to placed in the middle of streets or on enemy-occupied buildings. While precision was not quite the goal of the gunship pilots on their strafing runs, civilian casualties might be a more pressing consideration in the next urban engagement. While the sensor systems on aircraft like the AC-130 Spectre and Spooky fixed-wing gunships can target a single window, or the corner of a room, this requires direct visual observation and relatively unthreatening enemy air defenses. Further, gunship aircraft do run out of ammunition (as they did frequently over Mogadishu), and are not always available overhead. It also assumes that the aircrews know through which window to shoot. As we note below, this is entirely another matter. Assuming that those problems can be resolved, 95% availability from GPS and Galileo satellites could be used for guiding precision guided mortar rounds, howitzer shells, Formerly secret US military planning slide produced for the attack on the Yugoslav Federal Directorate of Supply and and rockets into exactly the right room of a building. Fire support could be Procurement. The building annotated in the satellite requested—at least in extremis—on positions that would now be considered photograph was heavily damaged on 7 May 1999 by five GBU- imprudently close to friendly troops, because those troops would be able to mark 32 GPS-guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) dropped by B-2 bombers (not the GBU-27 laser-guided bombs their own positions with extreme accuracy. This does, in many cases, assume that the described on the slide). Regardless, the building was actually GPS/Galileo receivers on the weapons can be sufficiently jam-proofed to preclude the mainland Chinese Embassy. A series of targeting errors easy interdiction. This may be difficult for a round sitting in the barrel of a artillery had led analysts to misinterpret the imagery. tube. It may be less difficult for a rocket whose nose cone or tail fins (where one The great but self-limiting advantage of coordinate attack would presumably place its receiver) could be exposed even part of the sky. With systems is their ability to seek out targets based solely on their locations. While this keeps friendly forces high above ground access to a single satellite and GPS or Galileo timation, additional satellites are much fire, it also creates an enormous intelligence collection and easier to acquire. This approach mimics the pre-launch tracking of satellites that was analysis burden associated with producing the extremely tested with AGM-154 Joint Stand-Off Weapons (JSOWs) under the wings of F-16 and accurate targeting intelligence that these weapons require. F-18 strike aircraft. • Close-quarters coordination of unmanned systems. The aforementioned advantages of Galileo for operation of UGV fleets and activities like mineclearing might be most useful in urban areas. Enhanced accuracy and availability in urbanpage 9 The Military Benefits of the Galileo System • Hasik & Rip • ION GPS 2002 • 25 September • Portland, Oregon
  • 10. areas could make possible the deployment of convoys of self-following autonomous trucks—of perhaps widely varying sizes—for maintaining physical communications with foot soldiers in difficult situations. Truck columns were sent to retrieve US Rangers in Mogadishu in 1993 and to resupply Russian infantry in Grozny in 1994; both were shot up rather badly in the narrow streets. One solution has been the suggestion of armed and armored supply vehicles. Another one—perhaps less costly in the long run—might be to remove the men from a task that does not require their direct presence. The problem with this theorizing about paper systems is that it assumes not just highly precise and reliable guidance, but highly accurate maps of the cities in question, three- dimensional computer models for predicting periods of GPS + Galileo shadowing by city block, and (of course) sensor-based navigation systems for detecting and avoiding obstacles (like chunks of buildings that have landed in the middle of the street). Making use of systems and products as these will require considerable ability in software Costs of Galileo vs. Costs of an A400M wing integration, data warehousing, and automated intelligence systems. These are not Initial Cost 30-year cost Total cost uncomplicated things, and to date, they have not been things on which European military 30 Galileo SVs ¤3200 MM ¤6600 MM ¤9800 MM forces have spent money at the same rate that the Pentagon has. The Pentagon, after all, 36 A400Ms ¤2800 MM ¤7200 MM ¤10800 MM probably spends at least as much each year on intelligence as most European countries spend on all their military procurement. Above: artist’s conception of Airbus A400M airlifters loading armored cars, courtesy of Airbus. SO WHAT ELSE WOULD THIS BUY? It is useful to consider the Galileo system’s military benefits in the context of the other large, pan-European aerospace development If we discount for the moment the intelligence support requirements, the military utility effort underway. Forgoing the Galileo project would enable European countries to purchase and operation a wing of 36 of Galileo is considerable. However, Galileos costs, while not exorbitant, are considerable A400M airlifters—a considerable, but not overwhelming number. as well. The development, deployment, and first 30 years of operation of Galileo are Cost data for the satellites and the airlifters were provided by the expected to cost some €9800 million. This figure includes €3200 million to build and ESA and Airbus, respectively. This comparison does not consider deploy the 30 satellite constellation and its control infrastructure, and an additional the potential economic benefits of the project. The two cost €6600 million to sustain the system over time (at €220 million annually). Supporters of streams are roughly equivalent in net present value terms at a discount rate of 4.65%, which is arguably reasonable for long- Galileo like to note that the construction costs will be less than those of the Brenner-Basis term governmental projects as these. Tunnel under the Alps or the Øresund Bridge between Denmark and Sweden.page 10 The Military Benefits of the Galileo System • Hasik & Rip • ION GPS 2002 • 25 September • Portland, Oregon
  • 11. In military terms, this would also purchase a wing of 36 A400M airlifters. This assumes a procurement cost per aircraft of €80 million, an additional 30 year life cycle cost of €200 million, and a constant discount rate of approximately 4.65%. [14] This small fleet could fly a battalion group of infantry, armored cars, and even medium-lift helicopters and Patriot missile launchers about 2000 nautical miles from Europe, and then resupply and reinforce it over time. This is not an inconsiderable force to project, especially for multi- national peacekeeping operations, but it should be considered in the context of the rest of the force projection projects that European armed forces have in mind. Further, the marginal value of 36 A400Ms should be considered in light of the current pan-European intent to procure 196 of these aircraft. More than €3200 million might be required to purchase a new aircraft carrier for a European navy, but that sum would not buy many strike aircraft to occupy its decks. Further, we must reiterate that musings as these do presume that Galileo will earn little money from value-added services and possible chipset licensing. Any revenues that defray expenses will be more than those expected from wholly military procurements. A QUALIFIED ENDORSEMENT We should admit that Galileo, like GPS, will be available worldwide, and that keeping its signals beyond the use of unfriendly forces will be quite difficult. The Galileo PRS will not be as secure as the GPS PPS, at least not if one is handing cryptographic gear to ambulance drivers. Therefore, military forces may wish to consider employing receivers Artist’s conception of the proposed Net Fires solution—the that make use of GPS and Galileo signals, but that lend more weight to GPS solutions in “rockets in a box” solution for replacing US artillery—courtesy of the Lockheed Martin Corporation. sitiuations where each single-constellation solution diverges significantly from the other. [15] However, while the PRS might constitute the most valuable signal, any Galileo (or Washington has reason to get “transformationally” enthused more accurate GPS SPS) signal will offer considerable navigation capabilities to enemies about the military potential of the Galileo system. In addition to improving GNSS service for US forces, particularly in cities—the of US and the EU as well. Jamming of GPS and Galileo frequencies away from those most difficult places to fight today—Galileo could provide impetus carrying the P-code, the M-code, and the PRS will still be possible, and possibly advisable for European military transformation by spurring the development under some emergency conditions. The real advantage to NATO (and other EU) forces of precision weapons and advanced intelligence systems comes from their (hopefully) superior communications, organization, and training, thatpage 11 The Military Benefits of the Galileo System • Hasik & Rip • ION GPS 2002 • 25 September • Portland, Oregon
  • 12. About the Authors will permit them to make far better use of the extreme accuracy provided by Galileo and tomorrows enhanced GPS. That said, we would advise the US federal government to James Hasik holds an MBA from the University of stand down from its recent criticism of the Galileo undertaking for two broad reasons: Chicago in finance and business economics, and a BA from Duke University in history and physics. A former US • Improved positioning for US forces. Assuming that Galileos security issues can Navy officer, he toured the Persian Gulf about the be addressed, its accuracy and availability (in conjunction with the existing GPS helicopter carrier USS Saipan in the early 1990s. Since signal) will remedy deficiencies in critical requirements, especially in urban leaving the military he has been a mangement consultant operations, which are among the most challenging environments today. This will to a variety of commercial and governmental entities. His benefit US, Canadian, and other forces as much as it benefits European ones. government clients have included the US Air Force, the US Navy, and the Defense Science Board, which he has • Impetus for the European military transformation. Next, the technical and advised on the financial and technological aspects of systems integration requirements for taking advantage of the capabilities Galileo weapons acquisition. He has also been a consultant for promises are considerable. These include substantial investments in reconnaissance, Global 2000 companies in procurement, logistics, strategic surveillance, secure communications, and intelligence processing. Someday a planning, experimental economics, and marketing. European strategic corporal fighting a three block war far from Europe may want to make use of Galileos ability to help him locate the right manhole cover on a dark Michael Rip holds a BS from the University of Cape Town and stormy night. If his headquarters were unable to provide him instantly the exact (UCT) in geography with a specialty in satellite remote location of that cover, and a briefing on its significance to his mission, Galileos sensing and digital image processing, an MS from the accuracy will either be for naught—or will be exploited only by US forces. The UCT Medical School in community health, and a PhD from construction of the Galileo system by the EU and ESA civil authorities is thus a Michigan State University (MSU) in medical geography challenge to which European military authorities need to respond. If Galileo provides and epidemiology. He currently holds a joint appointment the technical impetus that drags European forces into revolutionary military at James Madison College and the College of Human transformation, then the United States will found its way to transatlantic burden- Medicine at MSU. sharing paved through Brussels. Michael Rip and James Hasik are together the authors of While Washington may wish for greater European military spending in other areas, the The Precision Revolution: GPS and the Future of Aerial Galileo system is rapidly becoming a reality. Thus, with the advantages it offers, the US Warfare (Naval Institute Press, 2002), and the government needs to begin searching for ways to exploit Galileo rather than ways to forthcoming Just a Little Bombing: NATO’s Balkan Wars complain about it. and the Question of Military Transformation.page 12 The Military Benefits of the Galileo System • Hasik & Rip • ION GPS 2002 • 25 September • Portland, Oregon
  • 13. NOTES1. We say NATO forces, not EU forces, since it is yet unclear what sort of military structure the European Union might adopt. We also have doubts that those few member states of the EU that are not members of at least NATOs Partnership for Peace (PfP) might undertake significant military operations outside Europe. While the Irish Republic, for example, does occasionally send peacekeeping troops abroad as part of UN missions, these again do not constitute EU activities.2. J. Benedicto, S.E. Dinwiddy, G. Gatti, R. Lucas, & M. Lugert, ‘Galileo: Satellite System Design and Technology Developments,’ European Space Agency, November 2000.3. ‘US Warns EU About Galileos Possible Military Conflicts,’ Agence France-Presse, 18 Dec 2001. Quotes El País (Madrid), 18 December 2001.4. ‘Galileo: An Imperative for Europe,’ EU Directorate for Transport and Energy, position paper, 31 December 2001.5. Dee Ann Davis, ‘Military Role Emerges for Galileo,’ GPS World, 1 May 2002.6. Pascale Campagne, ‘Galileo and Security,’ Galileos World, 1 June 2002.7. Vidal Ashkenazi, ‘Galileo: Friend of Foe?,’ briefing to the Interagency GPS Executive Board, Washington DC, 28 February 2002.8. Instances include the faulty navigation message data on SVN35 in 1997, the 18 minutes of service disruption over Oklahoma, Kansas, and Nebraska in 2000, and the satellite clock error on SVN22 in 2001.9. Dr. Sally Howes, ‘Cost-Benefit Analysis for Galileo,’ US/UN Conference on the Use and Applications of Global Navigation Satellite Systems, Vienna, Austria, 28 November 2001.10. Comment by Steve Denison, Managing Director, APD Communications.11. Greg Jaffe, ‘Street Smarts: As Threats Evolve, Marines Learn Skill of Combat in Cities,’ The Wall Street Journal, 22 August 2002, p. A9.12. Rick Skinner, ‘Galileo and GPS–Competitors or Complements,’ speech to the Centre français sur les États-Unis, 5 April 2002, p. 413. Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down, Penguin Books, 1999.14. Cost data for Galileo and the A400M were supplied by the ESA and Airbus, respectively. The figure of 4.65% was a plug to match a whole figure of aircraft with a low rate of interest available for a government-financed project, and seems reasonable.15. Flt. Lt. David Riddel, RAAF, ‘The Implications of the Proposed Galileo Satellite Navigation System for the Ministry of Defence,’ unpublished paper, Royal Air Force College Cranwell, June 2002.page 13 The Military Benefits of the Galileo System • Hasik & Rip • ION GPS 2002 • 25 September • Portland, Oregon