Blood and Iron DomesStrategic signiﬁcance and American-Israeli cooperation inthe future of missile defenseJames HasíkWilliam Powers Doctoral FellowThe Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public AffairsThe University of Texas at Austin16 May 2013IntroductionAs John Reed wrote in the Financial Times after the Gaza War, “if one product has cometo define the high-tech military apparatus of Israel Inc., it is the Iron Dome.”1 This istimely, as the rocket bombardments of 2012 were just the latest episode of a historyballistic attacks dating back to 1969. The story of the Iron Dome has the hallmarks ofother projects of military-bureaucratic insurgents: a relatively modest technicaldevelopment, initially funded surreptitiously, and pushed to completion over theobjections of the senior leadership of (in this case) the Israeli Defense Force. Thesystem’s apparent success has cheered residents of southern and northern Israel alike, ifit has concomitantly alarmed Hamas, Hezbollah, and ideological opponents of missiledefense. But whatever the objections, defense against Islamist rocketry had become apolitical imperative for the Israeli government. The relative success of Iron Dome tellsus that within certain limits of expectation, and subject to a sensible accounting of thecosts, missile defense can accomplish strategic goals. And perhaps of great interest tothe United States, the particular path of the system’s development indicates thatbilateral industrial cooperation with Israel provide for excellent ongoing investment insystems born in the crucible on constant combat.A short history of the Arab-Israeli rocket warsRocket attacks on Israeli civilians are really a rather old problem: the first rocket strikeon Israeli, a salvo of Katyushas by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), hit the1 John Reed, “Israel: Shields Raised,” Financial Times, 31 March 2013.
northern town of Kiryat Shmona from Lebanon in 1969,2 and the PLO again fired largevolumes of Katyushas (as well as 130 mm artillery shells) at northern Israel during the1982 First Lebanon War.3 Of course, the Scud bombardment of the 1991 Gulf Warcannot be forgotten. It has even been some years since Israeli and its enemies firstentered a cycle of retaliation over smaller rocket attacks. A barrage by the LebaneseShi’ite militia Hezbollah against several towns in the north back in April 1996 promptedthe Israeli government to invade southern Lebanon once again, in a campaign it dubbedOperation Grapes of Wrath.Hamas, the Islamist organization now controlling the Gaza Strip, did not actually attackIsrael with rockets until April 2001, but the initially desultory fire increased to perhaps alaunch or mortar attack every other day from 2003 through 2004.4 From 18 to 23 Mayof 2004, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) undertook Operation Rainbow, a campaign toretaliate to find and destroy smuggling tunnels bringing in munitions-making materielfrom Egypt. On the second-to-last day of this effort, the IDF eliminated Hamas leaderAhmed Yassin in a targeted airstrike. While intendedly surgical, this sort of killingwould later prompt a more vicious recurrence of a cycle of violence.For the Israelis, direct defense has been difficult, as the actual launchers for short-ranged rockets are extraordinarily difficult to find. As they are basically expendable steeltubes, attacking them after launch has had little suppressive effect. Over time,retaliation was also proving only somewhat deterring. But later in 2004, BrigadierGeneral Dan Gold, an engineering officer with a doctorate in mathematics, became chiefof the research and development directorate (Mafat) of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF).That August, he put out a call to industry for help with defenses against rockets. InMarch 2005, he surreptitiously decided to fund the project without higher approval, andassigned it to Rafael without a competition. Israel’s auditor general would stronglycomplain about this in 2008, but for the time, the project was on.5Also in March 2005, the Israeli government evacuated all its troops and settlers fromGaza. “Almost immediately thereafter," as airpower theorist Benjamin Lambeth wrote,Hamas stepped up its rocket attacks, firing fully 1,200 rockets into Israel the next year.6The rocket problem got even uglier in 2006. After Hezbollah killed several Israelisoldiers patrolling the south side of the border, the Israeli cabinet launched the SecondHasík Blood and Iron Domepage 2 16 May 20132 Ian Spierco, “Shield of David: The Promise of Israeli National Missile Defense,” Middle East Policy, Vol.XVII, No. 2, Summer 2010, p. 128.3 Uzi Rubin, The Rocket Campaign against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War, Begin-Sadat Center forStrategic Studies, 2007, p. 1.4 Yoel Marcus, “Both Attacked and Condemned,” Haaretz, 21 November 2006.5 Charles Levinson and Adam Entous, “Israel’s Iron Dome Defense Battled to Get Oﬀ Ground,” WallStreet Journal, 26 November 2012.6 Lambeth, p. 94; Daniel Byman, A High Price: the Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism,Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 183.
Lebanon War, and Hezbollah responded by firing, over the course of 34 days, almost4,000 rockets into norther Israel.At the beginning of the campaign, IDF chief of staff Lieutenant General Dan Halutzproffered the opinion that “short-range rockets are not a decisive weapon.” But asEfraim Inbar of Bar-Ilan University later wrote, one-quarter of those weapons “hiturban areas and paralyzed the whole of northern Israel, its main port, refineries, andmany other strategic installations. Over one million Israelis lived in bomb shelters andabout 300,000 temporarily left their homes and sought refuge in the south.”7 Physically,the bombardment left 53 dead, and 2,000 homes destroyed or severely damaged.8 Bythis point, rockets had done more than kill; they had left Israelis with tangible dailyfears that caused widespread economic disruption.Thus, in February 2007, Defense Minister Amir Peretz approved the Iron Dome projectfor full development. Peretz lived in Sderot, the southern Israeli town most heavilybombarded by Hamas, and wanted something done. While relatively few rockets werefired that year, firing stepped up in 2008, as the Gazans built more tunnels, andsmuggled in more explosives and propellants from Egypt. A huge increase in rocket firein the first half of the year was followed for most of the latter half by only a few dozen,after a ceasefire brokered by the Egyptian government took effect. But by December2008, Gazan rockets were reaching as far as the south-central towns of Ashkelon andBeersheba. On 27 December 2008, the Israeli government launched Operation CastLead, a ground invasion of Gaza intended again to kill or capture the rocketeers anddestroy their smuggling tunnels. This punitive incursion, which lasted through 19January, was enough to stop two years of rocket fire in the south—but it was alsoexpensive.9A modest technical developmentMeanwhile, development of the anti-missile system was continuing furiously. Early on,prime contractor Rafael and the Mafat had together settled on missiles, rather thanlasers or guns, as the preferred mechanism. Lasers were generally consideredtechnologically immature, and chemical lasers, the most technologically mature type,would require constant recharge with hazardous chemicals. Quick-firing guns weremore seriously considered, but were judged too short-ranged for protecting any butHasík Blood and Iron Domepage 3 16 May 20137 Efraim Inbar, “How Israel Bungled the Second Lebanon War,” Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2007;quoting Ofer Shelah and Yoav Limor, Shvuyim Bilvanon, Tel Aviv: Miskal, 2007, p. 160. Of course,General Halutz also thought that taking territory had become irrelevant.8 Rubin, op. cit. p. 14.9 Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Israel’s War in Gaza: A Paradigm of Eﬀective Military Learning and Adaptation,"International Security, vol. 37, no. 2, Fall 2012, p. 93.
point targets.10 Guns do have greater responsiveness in terminal defense, and thus couldhave a useful supporting role. As one of Iron Dome’s developers later noted, “the moretime we have, the greater the precision… Gush Dan [the region of Tel Aviv] is easier forus than Sderot.”11 That is, missiles do not work quite so well against rockets with flighttimes under 30 seconds. Fortunately, anti-aircraft cannons like Raytheons Centuriondo: for immediate threats, the IDF could offset the most threatening flight paths fromGaza with a gatling gun every half-kilometer or so.12Lasers and guns were also limited to serial engagements of individual rockets, butmissiles could engage multiple inbound weapons in parallel.13 And for that matter,“contrary to common belief,” missiles had been calculated to be more cost-effectivedefenders of large areas than guns or lasers, as long as the enemy was firing less thanabout 4,000 missiles over the course of the war.14 That number was probably perilouslyshort of Hezbollah’s actual capability, but as I will discuss later, such a calculation wouldassume that the IDF could not suppress fire from the north at all.Building a team around veterans of the development of Rafael’s Python short-range air-to-air missile, the contractors and their customers began working what would becomeseveral years of six-day weeks.15 Rafael’s Advanced Defense Systems division broughtaboard subcontractors Elta Systems (a subsidiary of Israel Aerospace Industries) tobuild Iron Dome’s radar system, Comtec Communications for the command radio link,and mPrest Systems for the battle management control.16 The team was born of amilitary-entrepreneurial spirit. The firm mPrest had been founded only in 2003, andeven by 2012 had only 120 staff; its CEO, Natan Barak, was himself a naval captain(colonel) in the reserves and the former commander of the Israeli Navy’s software unit.17In 2010, Rafael bought a fifty percent stake.18Hasík Blood and Iron Domepage 4 16 May 201310 Lazar Berman, "Israel’s Iron Dome: Why America Is Investing Hundreds of Millions of Dollars," NationalSecurity Outlook no. 2, American Enterprise Institute, September 2012.11 Inbal Orpaz, “How does the Iron Dome work?” Haaretz, 19 November 2012.12 Ian Siperco, “Shield of David: The Promise of Israeli National Missile Defense,” Middle East Policy, Vol.XVII, No. 2, Summer 2010, p. 134.13 Avi Weinreb, “Defense of Populated Areas Against Ultra-Short-Range Ballistic Rockets: Guns?Lasers? Missiles?” Proceedings of the Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineers in Israel, 2008, p.374.14 Ibid., p. 377.15 Yaakov Katz, “Security and Defense: Iron Dome’s Chutzpah Factor,” Jerusalem Post, 26 April 2012.16 Orpaz, op. cit.17 Orpaz, op. cit. Barak’s LinkedIn proﬁle describes his entire naval career as a succession of positions inC4I. See http://www.linkedin.com/proﬁle/view?id=3736389.18 David Shamah, “Secrets of the Iron Dome, Revealed,” The Times of Israel, 28 December 2012.
Facing a potentially high volume of incoming rockets, the designers of the system settledon an economical architecture for the defenses. The missile batteries would be equippedwith a new Tamir interceptor missile, a derivative of the Python, which had been indevelopment and then production since 1978. The Tamir would carry a relativelyinexpensive active radar seeker, with a short detection range but a high degree ofdiscrimination. Economy was pursued at the component level: the electric motorsdriving the fins were supposedly sourced from a toy manufacturer.19Upon launch, the ground-based detection-and-tracking radar would feed the command-and-control system a missile trajectory designed to intercept the incoming rocket ashigh in altitude as possible. This would widely disperse fragments from the rocket andthe missile over a wide area, and slow them as they tumbled through the air, before theyhit the ground. Initially, two missiles would be fired at each incoming rocket, to increasethe likelihood of a successful interception. If the first were observed to detonate thetarget, the second would be directed by a ground-based command link to self-destruct.20Later, a single interceptor missile would generally prove sufficient. However, if anincoming rocket were observed on a trajectory carrying it outside a populated area, thecommand system would completely hold fire—and thus save the cost of a nearly$100,000 round. But when called upon grouped into batteries of three launchers with20 Tamirs each, the Dome could fire repeatedly without reloading.Born in battle, born in sinHamas resumed firing rockets in earnest in February 2009. Tests of the Iron Dome inthe Negev Desert in March 2009 showed a 95 percent kill rate.21 While few weaponswork as well in combat as they seem to work in testing, such a high rate wasencouraging. With further adjustments, the system was declared operational in June2010, 22 but the Air Force “stubbornly” refused to activate the system for months.23 IronDome’s first successful interception came on 7 April 2011, with the destruction of aHasík Blood and Iron Domepage 5 16 May 201319 Yossi Horowitz, head of business development and marketing for Rafael Advanced Defense Systems,in the Financial Times, 31 March 2013. The idea is not wildly novel. Boeing’s Joint Direct Attack Munition(JDAM) bombs similarly have contained parts made by a supplier of lawnmower parts. See James Hasik,Arms and Innovation: Entrepreneurship and Alliances in the Twenty-First-Century Defense Industry,University of Chicago Press, 2008, p. 64.20 Yaakov Lappin, “Defense Ministry Tests Upgraded Iron Dome,” Jerusalem Post, 21 January 2013.21 Lazar Berman, September 2012, p. 29; quoting Ur Heller, “Maarechet Habitachon: Arachnu NisuiMutzlach Bimaarechet Kippat Barzel” [Defense Establishment: We had successful tests for ‘Iron Dome’system], Nana 10, 27 March 2009.22 Yaakov Katz, “Israel declares Iron Dome operational,” Janes Defence Weekly, 6 July 2010.23 Yossi Melman, “Iron Dome Anti-Rocket System Was Never Meant to Protect Israeli Towns,” Haaretz,16 December 2010.
Grad rocket near Ashkelon.24 Against occasional firings throughout the rest of that year,the IDF claimed an interception rate of about 75 percent.25Firing stepped up in October 2012, when Hamas put 183 rockets into Israel. Tiring ofthis potentially lethal harassment, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu decided totarget the opposing leadership. On 14 November 2012, the Israeli Air Force assassinatedthe commander of Hamas military wing, Ahmed Jabari, with a missile strike on hiscar.26 Expecting return fire, the Israeli Air Defense Command immediately beganpreparations to make Iron Dome ready for sustained firing.27 Within days, larger andmore powerful rockets were reaching as far as Gadera.28 By this point, though, themissileers and their supporting engineers had improved their accuracy, and were soonclaiming that their interception rate had increased to as much as 90 percent.29 Publicacclaim followed: Israeli civilians held barbecues for the missile crews besides theirbatteries, and the press gushed about the success.30While the IDF is justifiably proud of this accomplishment, its success would not havecome about but for the intervention of the Defense Ministry. Peretz felt strongly aboutthe system, but he was opposed by several Air Force and Army generals, includingMoshe Kaplinsky, the deputy chief of staff, who preferred to spend the money on moreoffensive systems.31 Indeed, in November 2010, as rockets fell but Iron Dome sat idle,Major General Gadi Eizenkot, commander of all Israeli forces in the north, asserted in aspeech at Haifa University that the Dome was not even intended to protect civilians—just military bases.32Hasík Blood and Iron Domepage 6 16 May 201324 Anshel Pfeﬀer and Yanir Yagna, “Iron Dome successfully intercepts Gaza rocket for ﬁrst time,”Haaretz, 7 April 2011.25 Yaakov Katz and Yaakov Lappin, “Iron Dome ups its interception rate to over 90%,” Jerusalem Post,10 March 2012.26 Video is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=7PpwMnXcAwI.Conveniently, this considerable coup came just two months before a planned election in Israel. SeeBarak Ravid, “Ahmed Jabari is Netanyahus Osama bin Laden,” Haaretz, 14 November 2012.27 Orpaz, op. cit.28 Yaakov Katz, “Islamic Jihad hits Gedera, schools remain closed,” Jerusalem Post, 13 March 201229 Katz and Lappin, op. cit.30 Mitch Ginsburg, “Iron Dome: A True Game-Changer or Just a Feel-Good Tactical System?” The Timesof Israel, 3 December 2012.31 Lazar Berman, “Capturing Contemporary Innovation: Studying IDF Innovation against Hamas andHizballah,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 35, no. 1, 2012, p. 143; and Eleazar Berman, op. cit., pp.28–29.32 “Eizenkot: Iron Dome Meant to Protect IDF Bases, Not Citizens,” Jerusalem Post, 30 November 2010.
This story fits a well-known theory of how military innovation occurs, often termed thecivil-military relations school of thought, which holds that change is mostly driven bysenior civilian policy-makers, who rationally consider the strategic situation, and thendirect the military how to respond.33 The military services and their institutionalarrangements, however, do not always provide a smooth process for projects theyconsider “born in sin”.34 To spur action, maverick managers—in this case, Daniel Gold—are sometimes needed for breaking inconvenient rules. As Yossi Drucker, Rafael’sproject manager for Iron Dome, put it “if you want to achieve something in a very shorttime... you have sometimes to bypass the bureaucracy.”35A sociological impact to successThat bypass appears to have worked quite well. We first must acknowledge, however,that success had theretofore been uneven, as the two most notable preceding rocket-versus-missile campaigns had offered diametrically contrasting tactical records. Theinitially apparent success of the Raytheon’s MIM-104C Patriot 2 missiles in the 1991Gulf War has been hotly contested, and remains at best in considerable doubt. ThePatriots provided an important morale boost for the Israeli public, and may havedissuaded the cabinet from unhelpfully entering the war. But perhaps none of the 40 orso Scuds fired towards Israel, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia were actually destroyed by thedefenses. In contrast, during the 2003 Gulf War, Raytheon’s MIM-104D Patriot 2 GEMand Lockheed’s MIM-104F Patriot 3 missiles proved much more accurate, destroying atleast eight (and possibly nine) of the nine Iraqi Al Samoud-2 and Ababil-100 rocketsfired south.36 These engagements might seem to confirm the potential of defense, butthe sample size was quite small. In 2012, though, Iron Dome appeared to achieve an 85percent success rate over 421 engagements. The experiment may indeed be repeatable.For political opponents of missile defense, this very success is calamitous. As Uzi Rubin,a retired brigadier general now with Bar Ilan University, put it almost ten years ago,opposition to missile defense amongst the “American intelligentsia” during the ColdWar approached a “kind of religious zeal”.37 Phillip E. Coyle III, who once served as thePentagon’s chief weapons tester, asserted that the Iron Dome could not possibly be asHasík Blood and Iron Domepage 7 16 May 201333 For the canonical exposition of this theory, see Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France,Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars, Cornell University Press, 1984.34 Melman, op. cit.35 Levinson and Entous, op. cit.36 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Patriot System Performance, Oﬃce of the UnderSecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, January 2005.37 Uzi Rubin, “Technological Possibilities,” in Missile Defence in a New Strategic Environment, WhitehallPaper 60, Jeremy Stocker and David Wiencek, eds., Royal United Services Institution, 2004.
capable as advertised, simply because “no military system is 90 percent effective.”38 TedPostol, the MIT professor known for his trenchant criticism of the Patriot’s performancein 1991, and Mordechai Shefer, a former engineer at Rafael, claimed in an Israelinewspaper after the war that “in some cases, it seems as if the trajectories of Iron Domemissiles were preset.”39 And longtime Israeli missile defense opponent Reuven Pedazhurcalled the Dome a “scam” by the arms industry.40Claims of conspiracy can sound a bit pathological. The difference in fatality ratesbetween Hezbollah’s bombardment in 2006 and Hamas’ in 2012 arguably says morethan fancy statistics and interpretations of film footage. For as one defense industryofficial argued in the Financial Times earlier this year, “if the success rate was only fiveto ten per cent, where did the other missiles go?”41 Moreover, the validity of Postol andShefer’s study must be seriously questioned, merely because depends so strongly on theprincipals’ interpretation of YouTube videos filmed with handheld cameras. Coyle baseshis assertion on his experience as a weapons tester in laboratories and on ranges. Butwhat if the performance in combat actually is that impressive? To the contrary, thetechnical success of Iron Dome suggests that acceptance of missile defense is at a socio-political inflection point, having shown that such systems can indeed work.The political imperative of defenseGiven the ambitions of the program, this tactical effectiveness could be called strategiceffectiveness too. As Israeli newspaper editor Aluf Benn wrote, “by activating the IronDome system, Israel did to Hamas what Egypt did to the IDF in 1973: deployed adefensive weapon system in the defenders own territory neutralizing the enemys long-distance firepower.”42 While that war did not end well tactically for the Egyptians, itsufficiently bloodied the Israelis to bring them to exchange, only a few years later, thewhole of the Sinai for a simple peace treaty. The Egyptian air defenses were hardlyperfect, and were eventually penetrated by the Israeli Air Force. But as the 1973 missilebattle indicates about that of 2012, defenses need not be perfect to be useful, and victoryneed not be complete to be meaningful.Of course, perfection in the defense is probably not even possible. The problem ofallocating defensive missiles to offensive rockets is NP-complete, which means thatsufficiently large and complex tactical problems cannot be solved by huge computingHasík Blood and Iron Domepage 8 16 May 201338 Quoted in William J. Broad, “Weapons Experts Raise Doubts About Israel’s Antimissile System,” NewYork Times, 20 March 2013.39 Reuven Pedatzur, “How Many Rockets Has Iron Dome Really Intercepted?” Haaretz, 9 March 2013.40 Ben Hartman, “Iron Dome Doesn’t Answer Threats,” Jerusalem Post, 9 May 2010.41 Reed, op. cit.42 Aluf Benn, "Gaza Conﬂict Turns into Battle of Missile vs. Missile," Haaretz, 21 November 2012.
power in finite time.43 If Hamas were better at rocket bombardment, this could becalamitous. But Hamas is not. The best it could induce was a strong visceral reaction:enough to embroil the Israelis in a cycle of retaliation that may have served theIslamists’ purposes in allowing them to cast themselves as defenders of Gaza, helpingmaintain their grip on power in the Strip.It is also notable how the impact of that standoff firepower on Israel in 1973 was morepsychological than physical. Whether regarding Egyptian S-75 Dvinas, Iraqi Scuds, orGazan Qassams, Napoleon’s dictum relating the moral to the physical may be apt.44Even during the Scud attacks in 1991, the bulk of Israeli casualties were substantiallypsychological. These did include two fatalities, one severely injury, and 231 less graveinjuries from the blasts. But they also included 230 inappropriate auto-injections ofatropine (no nerve gas was ever detected), 544 admissions to emergency rooms for“acute anxiety,” 40 assorted traumas suffered while rushing to shelters, seveninadvertent suffocations from plugged gas mask filters, and four or five fatalities from“intercurrent” heart attacks.45Israelis have long since learned to be more sanguine about rocket attacks. But asDefense Minister Peretz knew, if General Eizenkot may have missed, their patience isbounded. Citizens of democracies tend to expect that someone is doing something toprotect them in wartime. When they are not so rewarded for their taxes and loyalty, theymay or may not show immediate anguish, but importantly for politicians, they willeventually likely vote. When Iron Dome finally arrived, it became “a hero and a comfortfor the residents of the south,” who would finally sense that their security mattered,after years of facing Gazan rocket fire without active protection.46Dissuading the electorate from rejecting the government of the day is one thing, butdissuading Hamas from trying to kill Israelis may be entirely another. After all, SaddamHussein also defied the “logic of deterrence” in launching his Scuds against Israel,“despite the near-certainty that Israel is nuclear-armed and is renowned for itsHasík Blood and Iron Domepage 9 16 May 201343 Fredrik Johansson and Göran Falkman, “Real-time Allocation of Defensive Resources To Rockets,Artillery, and Mortars,” Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineers’ 13th Conference on InformationFusion, 26–29 July 2010; quoting S.P. Lloyd and H.S. Witsenhausen, “Weapon Allocation is NP-Complete,” Proceedings of the 1986 Summer Conference on Simulation. In this context, NP stands fornondeterministic polynomial time.44 Mark Stout, “Assessing Iron Dome: What Makes a Weapon System Eﬀective?” Johns HopkinsUniversity Center for Advanced Governmental Studies, 29 April 2013. See also Irving Janis, Air War andPsychological Stress: Psychological Studies of Bombing and Civilian Defense, R-212 (Santa Monica:RAND, 1951); Irving Janis, The Psychological Impact of Air Attack: A Survey and Analysis of Observationon Civilian Reactions During World War II, RM-93 (Santa Monica: RAND, 15 January 1949); and MiltonGraham, “Psychological Eﬀects of Bombing,” Air University Quarterly Review, Spring 1952, pp. 122–125.45 Eric Karsenty et alia, “Medical Aspects of the Iraqi Missile Attacks on Israel,” Israel Journal of MedicalSciences, vol. 27 (1991), pp. 603–607.46 Ginsburg, op. cit.
propensity to retaliate.”47 The Israelis notably did not retaliate, but if this shows thatHussein’s behavior was not so risky, it also calls into question the clean game-theoreticmodels of Cold War. Nash and Kahn and Wohlstetter were brilliant mathematicians, butthey seemed to lack the historical sense needed to understand the idiosyncrasies ofactual war.48Consider that like Hussein, Hamas was horrifically irresponsible. As one of Iron Dome’sengineers told an American television broadcast, “the lives saved were not only those ofIsraeli citizens and soldiers, but of the Palestinians in Gaza who would have tended tosuffer the most had there been an incursion.”49 The inclination towards audaciousmilitary solutions may fit the “aggressive, brash” Israeli national personality,50 but theyhave not proven universally suitable. In this messy strategic interaction, some defensivebackup would be essential. Thus, as Lazar Berman of the American Enterprise Institutewrote, Iron Dome may represent “a conceptual shift in Israel’s security strategy, asIsraeli leaders move from their traditional offensive-minded posture and begin investingseriously in defensive technologies.”51The recurring question of costThis balance between offense and defense points to a separate and long-standing claimof cost-ineffectiveness. As Keith Payne wrote immediately after the 1991 campaign,“those who claim missile defense to be ‘technically infeasible’ may be correct under avery narrow and specific condition: if the exclusive goal of the defense is to protect thepopulation comprehensively, and the threat involves many thousands of nuclearwarheads. In those circumstances, if even a fraction of an opponent’s warheadspenetrate the defense and strike cities, the resulting level of casualties could be so highas to make the defense near meaningless.”52Qassams and Katyushas and the like are naturally not the nuclear-tipped missiles ofNATO and the old Warsaw Pact, but Hamas and Hezbollah’s avowed strategy againstIsrael actually seems less discriminate. As Notra Trulock once wrote, there is “noevidence to indicate Soviet interest in what Americans call countervalue targeting—Hasík Blood and Iron Domepage 10 16 May 201347 Payne, op. cit., p. 144.48 I thank Frank Gavin of the University of Texas for this observation.49 Ari, an Israeli engineer from the Iron Dome project, quoted in Paul Alster, “Behind the Iron Dome: KeyEngineer Tells How Israeli Defense System Saved Lives,” Fox News, 2 December 2012.50 Lazar Berman, September 2012, p. 2.51 Ibid., p. 1.52 Keith B. Payne, The Debate About Missile Defense, Including Lessons From The Gulf War, WestviewPress, 1991, p. 141.
attacking population centers.”53 In the Second World War, Allied firebombing ofGerman and Japanese cities destroyed production capacity, and killed factory workersas a collateral benefit, but did not aim specifically to reduce the population. While theirplanning appears inscrutable, the random nature of Hamas and Hezbollah’s rocketfirings seem geared towards simple murder and mayhem, in the hopes that sufficientpain will induce the Israeli government to offer concessions.If indiscriminate, the strategy is also fanciful, for much more intense bombardments donot clearly achieve much lesser political aims.54 Here it is worth repeating the finding ofthe official United States Strategic Bombing Survey after the Second World War: “areaattacks against German cities could not have been responsible for more than a verysmall part of the fall which actually had occurred in German production” by the end ofthe war—much less a surrender or domestic insurrection.55 It is thus highly questionablewhether the leadership of either Hezbollah or Hamas actually believes its rhetoric.Fortunately, this leaves Israel with a lesser problem. The Jewish State need not huntdown and kill every implacable anti-Semite in Gaza and Lebanon. Rather, it mustserially dissuade two violent political hierarchies lurking just beyond its borders fromspreading destruction as a distraction from their own serial failures of governance.Dissuasion, in this context, may be a matter of imposing unacceptable costs on theenemy. This question of cost is then not a clean calculation. To begin, as General Goldhimself put it, “a Kevlar vest costs hundreds of times the price of a bullet,” so the issuecannot simply be reduced to which missile or rocket costs more.56 The tactical context ofthe strategic exchange is very important. The Israelis and their enemies will continue toshoot at one another, and the defensive technologies—from body armor to armoredvehicles to interceptor missiles—are meant to resist the shots of those who are not shotfirst. Here, there is reason to believe that Israel can afford the exchange.The economics of the rocket-and-missile warOn the one hand, as Harry Trumans stereotyped economist would say, the numbersseem challenging. By press reports, the Defense Ministry spent (based on a wide rangeof reports) perhaps $800 million on development, production, and deployment overeight years. Each interceptor missile appears to cost somewhere between $50,000 andHasík Blood and Iron Domepage 11 16 May 201353 Payne, p. 143, quoting Notra Trulock, “Soviet Perspectives on Limited Nuclear Warfare,” in FredHoﬀman, Albert Wohlstetter and David Yost, eds., Swords and Shields, Lexington Books, 1987, p. 64(see also pp. 76–79).54 See, for example, Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, “Kosovo and the Great Air PowerDebate,” International Security, vol. 24, no. 4, Spring 2000.55 USSBS, Area Studies Division Report No. 31, p. 18; quoted in Alan S. Milward, War, Economy, andSociety, 1939–1945, University of California Press, 1977, p. 304.56 Daniel Gold, in Berman, 2012, op. cit., quoting Alon Ben-David, “Biladi: Hashigur Harishon shelMaarechet Kipat Barzel” [Biladi: The First Launch of Iron Dome], Nana 10, March 17, 2008.
$100,000; the Israelis shot about 500 of those in two weeks of fighting, for perhapsanother $75 million in consumables to replace. Like many things Israeli, a large chunkof that money ($275 million) will have come from the United States, but analytically, theinvestment was considerable.Much less is known about the Qassams and similar rockets, but Der Spiegel’s visit to anunderground rocket factory in 2008 elicited an estimate of $800 in raw materials perround.57 The Gazans alone shot through 2012 just under 10,000 rounds, so theireconomy invested something through less than $8 million in fertilizer and steel in itsrocket campaign. But if these numbers appear hugely in the Islamists’ favor, considerthree more issues.First, just roughly guessing at the raw materials cost is totally to exclude the assembly,transportation, tunnel digging, and everything else needed to set up and employ firingbatteries. All that is included in the estimate of the cost of the Israeli defenses, so thesuch a comparison would be lopsided. Second, in terms of technical performance, theQassams are are so inaccurate that only about one-third even get close to populatedareas. This means that the Israelis can hold their fire against the ones going wide.Indeed they do—the IDF only shot at 500 or so rounds, intercepting 421, for that successrate of nearly 85 percent. That implies that the Israelis did not bother with somethingaround 1000 of the incoming weapons.Third, even if the Israelis were paying for all of this from domestic resources, they couldafford it. Israel is a wealthy, and Gaza is dirt poor. The aforementioned $875 millionconstitutes less than 0.4 percent of a single years gross domestic product (GDP). Scaledto a country the size of the United States, a similar commitment would constitute a $54billion program. While that is a great deal of money, it will not sink the treasury. For theGazans, however, that seemingly paltry $8 million—and just in raw materials—isactually about 0.5 percent of a single years GDP. So the Gazans are making a biggercommitment of their resources to shooting the rockets than the Israelis are making oftheirs to shoot them down. Add the assembly, deployment, tunnel-digging, and otheractivities, and the relative commitment is much larger.A shifting balance of defensive and oﬀensive powerIn comparison, consider the threat from land mines and improvised explosive devices(IEDs). Perhaps the preceding accounting is too specific to the Arab-Israeli conflict, theeconomics of ballistic missile defense actually are as bad as those of countering IEDs,and no technological breakthrough looms in either case. The United States governmentHasík Blood and Iron Domepage 12 16 May 201357 Ulrike Putz, “Graveyard Shift for Islamic Jihad: A Visit to a Gaza Rocket Factory,” Der Spiegel, 29January 2008.
will still continue to spend money on both objectives for some time.58 The game is on, sothe time for abject complaining has ended. As the American congressman Daniel Floodchided Defense Secretary Robert McNamara some fifty years ago over his opposition tomissile defenses, one might think that finally “we had broken through this problem inthis country, of wanting things to be perfect before we sent them to the troops”—whether with MRAPs or the Iron Dome.59This repeatable, relative success with Iron Dome then portends badly for Third Worldopponents of industrial states. For over time, rockets have been the only way that arelatively disorganized country like Syria or Iran has been able to project airpowerreliably. That is the big attraction of these one-use ballistic weapons, which otherwiseare themselves not economical—a fact that was known as long ago as the V-2 campaignof 1945. A political movement like Hamas or Hezbollah, with much lesser resources,cannot achieve as much. Even if Gazan or Lebanese opponents could aim their rocketswith great accuracy, weapons leaking through that ten percent miss-rate might bemopped up with just a few more missiles, or bursts of cannon fire. The record of theDome actually opens the possibility of meaningful prevention.But as defensive action will not prove hermetic, offensive action must also be employedto stop, suppress, and ultimately deter future attacks. Showing a willingness to absorbeven missiles easily repelled, without response, might just induce Hamas to continueshooting. But if some active response is ultimately necessary, rocket defenses providebreathing room for a considered, rather than emotional, reaction.60 As two economistsobserved from their admittedly abstract models of missile defense ten years ago, simply“by reducing the damages caused by surprise attacks, defense weapons can decrease theneed to launch preemptive strikes, and improve the sustainability of peace.” So long asthe motivation to attack is preemption, and not predation, cooler heads can prevail.61On the other hand, offensive measures to suppress rocketry once it starts will likelycontinue to be problematic, but probably necessary. If the Coalition’s missiles probablydestroyed no Scuds in the air in the 1991 campaign, its aircraft and commandos almostHasík Blood and Iron Domepage 13 16 May 201358 Byron Callan, “Field Notes: Missile Defense & More,” Capital Alpha Partners, 12 March 2013; and anobservation by Paul von Hippel of the University of Texas.59 Flood was complaining to McNamara about the latter’s desire to cancel procurement of the Nike Zeusmissile system, at a congressional hearing in 1961. Quoted in Ernest J. Yanarella, The Missile DefenseControversy: Strategy, Technology, and Politics: 1955–1972, University Press of Kentucky, 1977, p. 70.60 Siperco, op. cit., p. 136.61 Sylvain Chassang and Gerard Padró i Miquel, “Defensive Weapons and Defensive Alliances,”American Economic Review, Vol. 99, No. 2, May 2009, pp. 282.
certainly destroyed no Scuds on the ground.62 The campaign was similar in its effort andrelative lack of success to Operation Crossbow, the Anglo-American aerial campaignagainst V-1 and V-2 missile launchers from 1943 through 1945.63 Whether in woodednorthern France or the open Iraqi desert, missile launchers have actually proven veryhard to find. With much smaller offensive weapons, the problem is considerably moreacute. In the 2008, some of Hezbollah’s rockets “had been dug in and camouflaged soeffectively that IDF soldiers literally walked across the top of the fake stone used toconceal them without detection of what lay beneath.”64 Yet it is important to rememberthat defensive measures have never induced Hamas, Hezbollah, or even the Baathists tostop firing. While the cycles of violence are regrettable, a threat of further offensiveaction has been necessary to break or suppress them, if just for a time.Israel as development and testing laboratory for the PentagonThus the military response must be balanced. This is why several countries which sensethreats from nearby rockets, including South Korea, India, Singapore and Poland, haveconsidered buying their own Iron Domes from Rafael.65 In the short-term, battle-testinghas provided the company real marketing muscle; in the longer-term, it may be leadingIsrael to become a military-industrial development laboratory for the Pentagon.To a certain extent, this has been true for some time. The terms of the militaryassistance funding provided each year by the United States government require thatAmerican dollars be spent on American-built weapons. That is understandable, but it isalso constraining in Israel, a state with disturbingly few friends around the world. Untilrecently, Israeli military-industrial strategy was observed to source large-scale systemsoverseas, but to produce munitions and electronic systems domestically. With theexception of the ill-fated Lavi fighter program in the 1980s, the largest integral systemsbuilt in Israel have been armored vehicles. Until recently, almost all Israeli armoredHasík Blood and Iron Domepage 14 16 May 201362 Thomas A. Keaney, “Surveying Gulf War Airpower,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 1993, pp. 29–30.Barry Watts notes that this ofﬁcial ﬁnding of the Gulf War Air Power Survey remains disputed. GeneralWayne Downing, who commanded US Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the war insisted in Newsweekover a decade later, “I know that SOF took out six to eight Scuds” (“The Tip of the Spear,” 25 November2002). See Barry D. Watts, Long-Range Strike: Imperatives, Urgency and Options, Center for Strategicand Budgetary Assessments, 2005, p. 52.63 See Mark E. Kipphut, Crossbow and Gulf War Counter-Scud Efforts: Lessons from History, thesis, USAir War College, 1996.64 Russell W. Glenn, All Glory Is Fleeting: Insights from the Second Lebanon War, MG-708-1, RAND,2012, p. 6. Glenn quotes the presentation “Northern Command Lessons Learned,” by Colonel BoazCohen, director of operations in July and August 2006 for IDF Northern Command, given during the IDF–U.S. Joint Forces Command seminar, Tel Aviv, 21 March 2007; and Andrew Exum’s Hizballah at War: AMilitary Assessment, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 63, December 2006, p.4.65 Reed, op. cit. For my thoughts on why the North Korean rocket problem is much more challenging,see Kevin Baron, “Why Doesnt Seoul Have Iron Dome?” Foreign Policy, 9 April 2013.
vehicles have been designed, built, and serviced entirely domestically. The Namerarmored vehicle program has provided a recent exception to that practical rule, as someunits are now being assembled in Ohio by General Dynamics, simply so that militaryassistance funds can be used. But Israel craves autarky, for it worries reasonably aboutpolitical isolation. Missiles are wartime expendables, and with domestic production,embargoes are meaningless.66And so, the later stages of the development of the Iron Dome have been partly fundedwith American money. The marketing rights for the United States have been acquired byRaytheon, the leading American missiles firm. If the company can make the case, IronDome may now be produced in the US for fielding with the US Army. Until now, Israeliweapons in US inventories have been rare: the Popeye missile and the Pioneer dronehave been notable exceptions.For a future of declining budgets, the aforementioned Lazar Berman has enthusiasticallyendorsed an “Iron Dome model—financially supporting a new system developed by anallied country after it proves itself” as a means “to maintain American access to cutting-edge defense innovations.”67 But why turn specifically to Israel for cooperativedevelopment? It is well known that the Israeli software and arms industry produce novelproducts of remarkable quality. More pointedly, while the United States may havemoney enough for development, Israel fights enough that it is sometimes the “canary inthe mine” for new threats.68 If the United States does manage to avoid anotherprolonged war for some time, but Israel does not, the latter can become a skunk worksand proving ground for the First World’s weaponry.This would depart somewhat from historical pattern. Even considering the massivelyglobal Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, the United States’ most common sovereignpartners in armaments development are NATO allies. The history of these projects,however, has been checkered at best. Michael De Vore of the Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology has argued that the problems in international development programs havesubstantially followed a three-phase history (see the chart below) with overlappingphases of different styles of armaments cooperation.69In the early days of the alliance (1953–1962), NATO countries launched a series ofcommon aircraft programs meant to fill well-defined NATO Basic MilitaryHasík Blood and Iron Domepage 15 16 May 201366 For these insights, I thank Jeﬀery J. Roncka of Renaissance Strategic Advisors.67 Lazar Berman, September 2012, p. 1.68 Eleazar Berman, “Meeting the Hybrid Threat: the Israeli Defense Forces Innovations Against HybridEnemies, 2000–2009,” unpublished thesis, Georgetown University, April 2010. p. 4.69 Marc R. De Vore, “The Arms Collaboration Dilemma: Between Principal-Agent Dynamics andCollective Action Problems,” Security Studies, vol. 20, no. 4, 2011. De Vore’s study focused on “thegovernance of European collaborative ﬁxed-wing military aircraft projects conducted since the 1950s.”The validity of the ﬁndings may not be diﬃcult to extrapolate to guided missile projects today.
Requirements (NBMRs). Individual firms from around Western Europe would bid,winners would be selected by NATO’s Advisory Group for Aeronautical Development(AGARD), and individual participating states could then purchase the aircraft. The focusof the governance of these developmental programs was generally on the familiar issuesof principal-agent dynamics. These are present in any development-for-hire, whetherthe customer is a governmental or commercial entity. The acute problem, though, wasthe possibility of ex post defection. For example, after AGARD selected the G.91 jet asthe Lightweight Strike and Reconnaissance (LWSR) Aircraft (NBMR-1), the French,Britons, and Americans realized that an Italian firm had won. Francs, sterling, anddollars would be flowing to Italy to equip their air forces with Fiats. In the end, only theWest Germans and the Italians bought the planes.Governance of NATOs International Armaments Collaborations70Period of TimeFocus ofGovernanceStructuresInterstateCooperationSelection ofContractorsDuplication ofIndustrialProcessesFirst Generation(1953–1962)Principal-AgentDynamicsProblematic(massivedefections)Efﬁcient(competitive)NegligibleSecondGeneration(1958–1969)InterstateCollaborationProblemsModerate(bilateral dealswith fewdefections)Less efﬁcient(uncompetitiveselections)Moderate (inﬁnal assembly)Third Generation(1968–present)Collective ActionProblemsHigh (manypartners, andalmost nodefections)Inefﬁcient(sometimes leastcompetitiveﬁrms selected)HighIn a second phase of cooperation (1958–1969), the focus of governance logically shiftedto these problems of interstate collaboration. Tighter Anglo-French and Franco-Germanbinational arrangements produced long-serving aircraft such as the Transall transport,the Jaguar fighter-bomber, and the Alpha Jet trainer. The acute problem in theseprojects, however, was cost control: each of the three aircraft cost more than of any of itssize and capabilities should have, simply because each country insisted on buildingwhole aircraft in its own factories. Sourcing of components, however, remained arelatively efficient process, as international allocations of work shares only needed tocross a single border. Duplication of effort was thus was generally limited to finalassembly.Hasík Blood and Iron Domepage 16 16 May 201370 Table 5 in De Vore, op. cit., p. 659.
In yet a third phase (1968–present), the focus of governance has rested on the problemsof collective action. Escalating expectations of what aircraft should do has led to largeincreases in development costs, demanding multinational development for all but thelargest countries. The products developed notably included the Tornado and Typhoonhigh-performance fighter-bombers, from the Panavia and Eurofighter consortia. Thedegree of interstate cooperation has been quite high, and in the larger programs, therehas been very little defection—even to date in the profoundly troubled JSF program. Theselection of contractors, however, has left much to be desired. The juste retourdemanded by every participant meant that work shares were truly allocated. This is how,as De Vore puts it, “the Eurofighter became the first aircraft in history to have its twowings produced by different companies in different states.”71From this history, De Vore summarizes international armaments cooperation as “bothproblematic and inefficient,”72 repeating defense economist Keith Hartley’s notablefinding that cooperative aircraft development programs cost at least as much as nationalones, but take longer to bring about.73 But following his logic, I assert that the currentbilateral American-Israeli cooperation to develop further the Iron Dome may combinethe best of his first two approaches. The focus of the governance structure remains onclassic principal-agent dynamics, but these are confined mostly to Israel. The solidbilateral relationship between the US and Israel, however, further suppresses thelikelihood of defection. This is particularly true on the Israeli side, for the smaller stateclearly relies quite strongly on the larger for security assistance, and the United Statescan bank on that. If the informal alliance lacks formal structures of NATO’s secretariat,or the particular cultural closeness of the Anglo-American special relationship, it willalmost certainly be politically enduring.Business practices in the American and Israeli arms industries may also differ moresignificantly than those between American and European firms, but the experience oflong-standing cooperation within security assistance programs mitigates that tension.With a relatively large selection of qualified firms on both sides, contractors can moreoften be selected on the basis of actual capability, and not simply allocated by workshare requirements. The competitiveness is no less than the small Israeli industryallows, but that is better than in most European countries. Duplication may still be aconcern, as in the Namer program, but this should still be limited to final assembly andtesting.In this way, bilateral armaments deals may resemble bilateral trade deals: less efficientthan global regimes, but sometimes as good as politics will allow. For Israel as a whole,Hasík Blood and Iron Domepage 17 16 May 201371 De Vore cites Hugh Harkins, Euroﬁghter 2000: Europe’s Fighter for the New Millennium, Aerofax, 1997,pp. 29–40.72 Ibid., p. 626.73 Ibid., 629, quoting Keith Hartley, NATO Arms Co-operation: A Study in Economics and Politics, GeorgeAllen and Unwin, 1983.
vis-à-vis its essential American ally, this may be a very sensible strategic move. Withinthe Israeli Kriegswirtschaft, this model may strike the proper balance between autarkyand efficiency. One should then ask what Israeli industry can do to capitalize on thispattern. Foremost, ask not for permission. Rafael did not need to leverage an Americanpresence or early American funding to develop a strategically important system.Bypassing the bureaucracy is much more possible in a bilateral deal where one partnerlives under the threat of hostile action. Flattening the hierarchy may lead to moredecision-making at lower levels, but also clearly direction from the top. Top managerscan get “closer to the businesses,” speeding communication and improving day-to-daygovernance.74ConclusionThe portfolio of air and missile defense projects for the US armed forces remains "veryexpensive," and potential enemies have clear options for developing relativelyinexpensive threats. But failing to proceed is not an option. For as accomplished ColdWarrior Henry Kissinger wrote, far back in the aftermath of the 1991 Scud War, “noresponsible leader can henceforth deliberately leave his civilian populationvulnerable.”75 As the imbalance in the costs of offensive and defensive technologiesremains manageable, constraints on funding are merely prompting a shift towardsrelatively affordable incremental improvements.76So what are those options? For the United States, the experience of the Iron Domeproject suggests a recurring opportunity to invest systematically in defenses calibratedto the latest evolving threats. Spending money and signing one-off agreements alone donot naturally create an industrial strategy. The structures and incentives of particularprograms and overall portfolios matter greatly.77 If Israel is indeed the “start-up nation,”the United States might consider treating its arms industry as a venture capitalist treatsa late-stage investment opportunity: worthy of more money when the particularcombination of management, technology, opportunities and threats are compelling.78For Israel, fifteen Iron Dome batteries, at $50 million each, are planned now to protectthe whole of the country.79 Five have been assembled already, but with further missileHasík Blood and Iron Domepage 18 16 May 201374 Julie Wulf, “The Flattened Firm: Not as Advertised,” Working Paper 12-087, Harvard Business School,9 April 2012, p. 2. The work, admittedly, was based largely on interviews with CEOs.75 Henry Kissinger, “A Sea-Change in U.S.-Soviet Relations,” Washington Post, 2 April 1991, p. A21.76 “Army To Focus On More Cost-Eﬀective Air And Missile Defense Solutions,” Inside Defense, 12 March201377 For this observation, I thank Steve Grundman of the Atlantic Council of the United States.78 Dan Senor and Saul Singer, Start-up Nation: The Story of Israels Economic Miracle, Twelve, 2011.79 Jenny M. Sharp, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, US Congressional Research Service, 12 March 2012, p. 11.
production and engineering support, the additional cost will be nearly $1 billion.80 Thethe Dome also has a useful secondary capacity against aircraft, and Hezbollah has beenexperimenting with armed drones for some time.81 Given the economic disruptioncaused by more than a decade of rocket attacks, this billion could be a soundinvestment.Yet it bears repeating that even such comprehensive coverage would not be hermetic. InJanuary 2013, the Israeli Air Force sent several Iron Dome batteries to the north ofIsrael, including one to cover Haifa, for fear that Hezbollah or the Syrian Army mightfire rockets south as a morale-raising diversion from their poor performance in theSyrian Civil War.82 Still, in May 2013, the Israeli Air Force struck a shipment of IranianFateh-110s to Hezbollah proceeding west of Damascus towards the Lebanese border.Much faster and longer-ranged than any rockets fired up to that point from Lebanon,the Fateh-110 would likely blow past the limited Iron Dome deployment in the north.Even as sophisticated a weapon as the Arrow 3 could not guarantee a leak-proofdefense.83 Defensive measures will continue to be a complement to offensive ones.Will this dynamic continue to be important to the Israeli security, and available toAmerican investment? Absolutely. Violence by irredentist Arabs has stretchedthroughout the 65 years of Israeli history, and progress towards a comprehensivesettlement has been grindingly slow, in the most optimistic characterization. Over theseyears, to paraphrase Bismarck, the Middle East has looked not to Israel’s “liberalism butto its power”—whatever either may have been at any time. As the proximity of Hamasand Hezbollah’s rockets have made clear, the borders established for Israel—whether bythe United Nations or its own military prowess—simply “are not favorable for thehealthy life of the state.” This leaves “blood and iron” to decide the issues of its security—either the blood of every Israeli, effectively on the front line every day, or an IronDome of superior military technology.84Hasík Blood and Iron Domepage 19 16 May 201380 Amos Harel, “Israel to Invest $1 Billion in Iron Dome Missile Defense System,” Haaretz, 9 May 2011.81 Arie Egozi, “Israels Iron Dome Gains Anti-Aircraft Role,” Flight Global, 28 September 2011.82 Yaakov Lappin, “IDF Deploys Iron Domes in North amid Syria Worries,” Jerusalem Post, 27 January2013.83 Noah Shachtman, “Why Israel’s Interceptors Can Stop Syrian Missiles—And Why It Attacked Anyway,”Wired, 7 May 2013.84 Quotes from Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s ‘Blood and Iron’ speech to the Prussian Reichstag’sFinance Committee in 1862; in Lothar Gall, ed., Bismarck: Die grossen Reden (Berlin: Ullstein, 1981), p.62, translated by Bill Patch, Grinnell College.