Total: 1 hour 15 minLesson 1: Industry Landscape Learning Outcomes:Students will be able to explain how the scope and diversity of the current industry landscape influences companies’ methods of competing for defense contracts. Compare differences in business/market strategies, priorities, and processes between large, medium, small companies.Compare differences in business operations and strategies between companies focused on weapons systems, commercial products, and/or services.Describe defense companies’ core offerings.Differentiate between public and private companies.Describe the core businesses and focus of the current largest defense companies. Explain potential company strategic options in reaction to mission and budget changes, such as consolidation, restructures, diversification, mergers, acquisitions, divestitures, leave the market, etc.Describe macro issues that drive DoD industry today.Explain how industry can be vulnerable to economic trends, such as technology breakthroughs, workforce skill availability, energy issues, raw material supplies, etc.Explain how global competition impacts US industry market opportunities.Describe recent revenue and profit trends in the US defense industry.Describe how DoD funding profiles impact competitive outlook for defense industry.Describe tools and regulations that enable the Government to preserve a competitive base.3 minutesFilm ClipClip from to highlight an example of how an arsenal product was developed and used in early WWII – military-industrial complex transition.Need to acquire film clip from DAU video servicesContent is new.Reference:* Operation Pacific (John Wayne)70 minutesLectureBrief overview of the history of defense industry growth, arsenal to military-industrial complexBrief review of course read-ahead (consider the industrial base changes and trends to evaluate the industry playing field).Frame this review with discussion promptsTransitioning from a Pre-WWII government run arsenal system to nationalization of industrial capacity to mobilize for WWII, to military-industrial complex growth, the 1990s consolidation of industry capacity in the 90s to where we are today facing another drawdown. During this discussion a simple picture card recognition game will be used to assess students’ pre-reading assignments. This will be followed by a discussion (10 minutes) of macro issues currently driving industry with impacts to overall revenue and profits over time and summary of expected CBO and DoD budget profiles to illustrate ongoing downsizing.Company differences will be compared with a focus on the largest companies, their core offerings, and vulnerabilities to economic trends. A comparison of company product focus and strategic options in light of government budget changes will be explored.Finally a look at what government tools exist and under consideration to preserve the health of our defense industry. Need to identify pre-course reading (excerpt that talks about evolution of industrial base) Need 15-20 slides framing this lecture Need Instructor Support Package to document narrative for this lectureContent is new.Reference:*”Excess Profits” by Gary Heerkens* “Sustaining Critical Sectors of the US Defense Industrial Base”, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment *K:\\LCIC\\Business Acumen\\ACQ 315\\1 Industry Landscape
General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA-ASI) knows that some aircraft are better off without human pilots. The company is a designer and manufacturer of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) with names like Predator, Avenger, and Gray Eagle, as well as airborne intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR) sensor systems, including the Lynx multi-function radar and the Highlighter sensor for detecting improvised explosive devices. The company also manufactures solid-state digital ground control stations and provides UAS training and field operations support services. Additionally, it is developing lasers for rangefinding and marking targets. GA-ASI is an affiliate of privately-held General Atomics.General AtomicsAeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA-ASI) Related companiesName Exchange Symbol Last trade Change Mkt cap General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. Private AAI Corporation Private Dassault Falcon Jet Corp. Private CAE USA, Inc. Private Cessna Aircraft Company Private Lockheed Martin Commercial Space Systems Private Boeing Satellite Systems International, Inc. Private CIC International Ltd. Private Boeing Training & Flight Services, L.L.C. Private Space Exploration Technologies Corporation Private SpaceDev, Inc. Private
Lockheed Martin Corp. $16,700,588,328 1 2 Northrop Grumman Corp. $11,145,533,497 3 3 Boeing Co. $10,462,626,196 2 4 Raytheon Co. $6,727,232,555 5 5 Science Applications International Corp. $5,474,482,583 7 6 General Dynamics Corp. $5,431,882,984 4 7 KBR Inc. $4,545,440,824 6 8 L-3 Communications Corp. $4,176,624,682 8 9 Booz Allen Hamilton $3,352,844,339 10 10 Computer Sciences Corp. $3,293,278,386 9 11 Hewlett-Packard Co. $2,564,014,201 12 12 Dell Computer Corp. $2,270,000,000 15 13 Harris Corp. $2,165,268,040 13 14 ITT Corp. $2,074,983,916 11 15 BAE Systems Inc. $1,956,884,247 14 16 CACI International Inc. $1,911,928,093 20 17 IBM Corp. $1,774,623,164 18 18 Deloitte LLP $1,730,165,554 51 19 Verizon Communications Inc. $1,721,565,974 16 20 Jacobs Engineering Group Inc. $1,634,268,549 19 21 United Technologies Corp. $1,476,229,982 17 22 Battelle Memorial Institute $1,335,906,153 21 23 DynCorp International LLC $1,258,019,560 24 URS Corp. $1,225,071,020 22 25 DRS Technologies Inc. $1,006,436,334 23 26 Rockwell Collins Inc. $951,046,892 35 27 Accenture $924,092,794 25 28 Honeywell International Inc. $915,809,845 30 29 Serco Inc. $874,739,954 28 30 SRA International Inc. $869,734,080 26 31 ManTech International Corp. $855,567,586 48 32 Sprint Nextel Corp. $848,854,000 27 33 General Electric Co. $844,458,207 24 34 Aerospace Corp. $835,402,095 29 35 Apptis Inc. $826,790,863 50 36 Bechtel Corp. $756,597,943 37 VSE Corp. $686,912,905 31 38 Unisys Corp. $666,332,137 32 39 General Atomics $661,619,386 36 40 QinetiQ North America Inc. $660,647,787 34 41 Alion Science and Technology Corp. $625,817,000 39 42 SGT Inc. $602,586,194 62 43 Combat Support Associates $579,957,228 41 44 Stanley Inc. $572,197,243 45 45 Wyle Laboratories Inc. $571,152,677 43 46 AT&T Inc. $557,855,301 42 47 Fluor Corp. $533,950,701 48 Alliant Techsystems Inc. $520,341,034 37 49 Arinc Inc. $501,641,640 44 50 Comtech Telecommunications Corp. $495,744,635 81
Rank Top Defense Companies(follow links for complete company profiles) Defense Revenue (2010) 1 Lockheed Martin Corp. $10,888,633,000 2 Northrop Grumman Corp. $8,212,891,000 3 Boeing Co. $5,051,984,000 4 General Dynamics Corp. $4,576,415,00 5 Raytheon Co. $4,095,309 6 KBR Inc $3,546,554,000 7 L-3 Communications Corp. $3,332,433,000 8 Science Applications International Corp. $3,280,980,000 9 DynCorp International Inc. $2,398,874,000 10 Hewlett-Packard Co. $2,344,325,000 11 Booz Allen Hamilton $2,344,325,000 12 CACI International Inc. $2,059,613,000 13 Harris Corp. $1,993,623,000 14 Computer Sciences Corp. $1,828,670,000 15 ITT Corp. $1,808,674,000 16 Fluor Corp. $1,742,216,000 17 BAE Systems Inc. $1,381,184,000 18 Dell Inc. $1,263,236,000 18 ManTech International Corp. $1,167,928,000 20 United Technologies Corp. $1,121,492,000
The Defense Department has had, and will continue to have, a major role in cooperating with the antitrust agencies in their analysis of the competitive implications of defense industry mergers. The Defense Department has a vast and unique array of information that is relevant and important to the antitrust analysis. Over the past few years, the Defense Department has greatly improved its ability to assemble and convey this information to the antitrust agencies in a timely manner. As the major customer of defense industry firms, the Defense Department's views on the likely impact of a transaction are given great weight.Antitrust policy, including the policy of opposing consolidations that increase the potential for abuse of market power, is designed to apply to all industries. By promoting a competitive economy, the antitrust laws ensure that consumers will receive the best quality, highest performance goods and services at the lowest prices. As the major consumer of defense industry products, the Defense Department seeks the same goals. Vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws is thus entirely consistent with the goal of preserving a strong national defense.
CSIS CHART: SequestrationNeed Instructor Support Package to document narrative for this lectureContent is new.Reference:*”Excess Profits” by Gary Heerkens* “Sustaining Critical Sectors of the US Defense Industrial Base”, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment *K:\\LCIC\\Business Acumen\\ACQ 315\\1 Industry Landscape
History of Government Contracting pp 389.
The original European settlers in what became the United States brought firearms with them for hunting and self-defense. Weapons were also imported from Europe to equip the militias formed in the English colonies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to fight hostile Indian tribes and to resist incursions by the French and the Spanish. Later, many of these weapons were used by revolutionary forces to fight the British. There were never enough weapons to go around, however, and so the importation of arms from friendly European governments became a major priority for the Continental Congress and its overseas representatives, including Benjamin Franklin. Only when France agreed in 1778 to aid the American rebels with arms and troops was the success of the Revolution assured.After the Revolution the infant Republic continued to rely on imported weapons for many of its military requirements. To reduce this reliance, Congress voted in 1794 to establish government-owned facilities for the manufacture of firearms. These installations, most notably the army arsenals in Springfield, Massachusetts, and Harpers Ferry, Virginia (now West Virginia), gradually acquired expertise in the mass production of rifles and carbines.Although these facilities were largely able to satisfy government requirements during periods of relative calm, they could not produce sufficient weapons in times of war—as during the War of 1812 and the Mexican War of 1846–1848. To supplement production at Springfield and Harpers Ferry, the War Department contracted with private gunmakers such as Robbins and Lawrence of Windsor, Vermont, and Remington Arms of Ilion, New York—thus giving a significant boost to the development of a commercial arms industry in the United States. Many of these firms failed or were absorbed by others when government contracts disappeared, but others survived by embracing new technologies and finding foreign customers for their innovative products.Read more: http://www.answers.com/topic/arms-industry-1#ixzz1i3tgVVWM
Gale Encyclopedia of US Foreign Policy:Arms Transfers and Trade Read more: http://www.answers.com/topic/arms-industry-1#ixzz1i3xf8zJjAlthough these facilities were largely able to satisfy government requirements during periods of relative calm, they could not produce sufficient weapons in times of war—as during the War of 1812 and the Mexican War of 1846–1848. To supplement production at Springfield and Harpers Ferry, the War Department contracted with private gunmakers such as Robbins and Lawrence of Windsor, Vermont, and Remington Arms of Ilion, New York—thus giving a significant boost to the development of a commercial arms industry in the United States. Many of these firms failed or were absorbed by others when government contracts disappeared, but others survived by embracing new technologies and finding foreign customers for their innovative products.Read more: http://www.answers.com/topic/arms-industry-1#ixzz1i3wgUmKt
Gale Encyclopedia of US Foreign Policy:Arms Transfers and Trade When the Civil War broke out in 1861, the United States possessed a significant arms-making capacity. Together the various army arsenals and their civilian counterparts were capable of manufacturing hundreds of thousands of firearms per year. But even this impressive capacity was insufficient to satisfy the prodigious demands of war, and so both sides were forced to procure additional arms from abroad. Although both the Union and the Confederacy turned to foreign suppliers for a certain percentage of their military equipment, the need for imports was especially acute in the South. Because most of America's arms-making capacity was located in the North, the Union could satisfy a larger share of its military requirements from domestic factories than could the South. As a result, the Confederacy placed a greater emphasis on military imports than did the North, and both sides became engaged in an elaborate diplomatic struggle over arms transfers—with the South seeking to procure weapons from sympathetic powers in Europe and the North seeking to persuade these states to deny arms to the rebels. In the end the Northerners prevailed in this contest, as the major European powers—whatever their political sympathies—chose to eschew involvement in the conflict. This did not, however, deter the North from declaring a naval blockade of the South and deploying hundreds of ships in a determined effort to prevent the smuggling of arms to Confederate forces.Read more: http://www.answers.com/topic/arms-industry-1#ixzz1i3xycYVz
The Civil War, like the wars that preceded it, proved to be an enormous boon to the private arms industry. Once the war ended, however, the U.S. government sharply reduced its procurement of commercially manufactured weapons. To survive in this new environment, private arms companies such as Remington, Winchester, and Colt looked to the civilian market and to foreign customers for the orders needed to survive. This in turn spurred the introduction of new gun designs and manufacturing processes. As a result, American gun firms became adept at the mass production of cheap, reliable, and highly effective firearms.Read more: http://www.answers.com/topic/arms-industry-1#ixzz1i402s2iZIn 1816 Eliphalet Remington, a young American frontier lad, begged his father to buy him a rifle. All the other boys had them and he wanted one too. Hunting was good in the neighbouring woods and Eliphalet had ambitions. Remington senior refused his son’s request, and that refusal was to make history.Young Eliphalet went and made his own gun, took it to a neighbouring town to have it rifled, and discovered that he had an excellent hunting implement. The neighbours discovered this fact also, and before the lad realised it he had become one of the first arms manufacturers in the United States. In this simple and inauspicious manner one of America’s outstanding contributions to the armoury of Mars had its beginning.In 1828 young Remington’s business compelled him to move to larger quarters, and when the Mexican War came, he was able to take over a government order for rifles. The Civil War increased the demands for Remington rifles to such an extent that the company was obliged to work day and night. Overwork resulted in the death of the owner.5The company went right on. When the war orders stopped it was virtually ruined. The armament maker’s point of view is rather graphically presented by a paragraph heading in the Remington official history which reads: “ Peace and Disaster.” But if peace meant disaster to the company, it also taught it an important lesson. A company that manufactured more rifles than it could sell to hunters, or to its own government, must seek foreign business.The moral was so obvious that its implications were grasped at once. One brother was now sent abroad as sales agent and he stayed on the job constantly. Remington rifles were excellent, and orders began to pour in. In 1867 the United States Navy ordered 12,000 and Spain 85,000. In 1868 Sweden took 30,000 and Egypt 50,000. Business was certainly picking up. In the following years there was no letup. Among the rifles delivered were the following 145,000 to France; 21,000 to New York State; 10,000 to Porto Rico; 89,000 to Cuba; 130,000 to Spain; 55,000 to Egypt; 50,000 to Mexico; and 12,000 to Chile.Now and then misfortune dogged the company’s steps. Thus Prussia was ready to place an order for 20,000 rifles. The Prussian king himself came out to the rifle range to try out the rifle. He placed the stock against his shoulder, sighted, pressed the trigger—and nothing happened. He threw the rifle away in disgust and cancelled the order. Examination showed that the cartridge was defective.Another upset occurred in Turkey. Prospects were good for fitting out the entire Turkish army with Remingtons—a matter of 400,000 rifles. In Turkey, as in many other countries, army orders were placed only after the proper persons had been “ seen.” In crude vernacular this is called “ graft ”; the Turks called it “ royalties,” and the amount of “ royalties ” demanded by the officials was enormous. Remington refused the order.MERCHANTS OF DEATHBy H.C. Engelbrecht and F.C. Hanighen
Although the U.S. government did not always take advantage of this burgeoning capability, other governments were less inhibited. Samuel Remington, the president of Remington Arms Company, opened a sales office in Paris and secured lucrative contracts for the sale of rifles and ammunition to several European countries. Other U.S. firms, including Winchester, also obtained significant contracts from European governments. During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, for example, the French army ordered 100,000 rifles and 18 million rounds of ammunition from the Union Metallic Cartridge Company of Bridgeport, Connecticut (later a division of Remington Arms).Read more: http://www.answers.com/topic/arms-industry-1#ixzz1i42f6oKa
The capacity of American military firms to produce large quantities of weaponry in a relatively short amount of time was next tested in 1914, when World War I broke out in Europe. Although the U.S. government initially adopted a policy of neutrality in the conflict, President Woodrow Wilson allowed American firms to sell arms and ammunition to the Allied powers. Desperate to supplement their own manufacturing capabilities, Britain, France, and Russia then contracted with American companies to produce large numbers of guns and cartridges. The British, for example, ordered one million Enfield rifles from Remington. As one such order followed another, American military exports jumped from $40 million in 1914 to $1.3 billion in 1916 and $2.3 billion in the final nineteen months of war. This marked the first time that U.S. arms manufacturers played a truly significant role in the international weapons trade.Read more: http://www.answers.com/topic/arms-industry-1#ixzz1i42mAYVf
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harpers_Ferry_ArmoryThe national armoryIn 1794, the United States Congress passed a bill calling "for the erecting and repairing of Arsenals and Magazines". President George Washington, given wide latitude in carrying out this order, selected Harpers Ferry, then a part of Virginia, for the location of the Harpers Ferry National Armory. In 1796, the United States government purchased a 125-acre (0.51 km2) parcel of land from the heirs of Robert Harper. Subsequently in 1799, construction began on the national armory. Three years later, mass production of military arms commenced.The national armory at Harpers Ferry was actually the second national armory. The first was the Springfield Armory, constructed in Springfield, Massachusetts in 1794 after Congress approved the bill to create the nation's first national armory.Upon its grand opening, the armory's size seemed inadequate for a work force. It consisted of only one room, and the workers numbered a mere twenty-five. Nevertheless, the armory produced many muskets, rifles, and later pistols for the United States. The average annual production rate was estimated to have been ten thousand weapons per year. The building relied on river power to drive the armory's machinery.Expansion and upgradesIn 1844, the deficient state of the armory was taken into account and demand for military equipment increased, and so the renovation and expansion of the armory was undertaken. The upgrades of the arsenal began in 1845-1854 with the construction of seven brand new workshops and the installation of 121 new machines. The new workshops had a brick superstructure with iron framing and slanted sheet metal roofing. These reconstructed arsenal buildings became collectively known as the "U.S. Musket Factory". The armory canal was enlarged so that more water could get to the armory, which meant it would receive more power. Along with the enlargement of the canal, seven new water turbines were installed. Furthermore, heavier mill work was put into the building,[clarification needed] which meant stronger metal equipment used for making the equipment. All the expansions of the armory were done on a heavy stone foundation.In addition, more people were employed to work at the armory than before: the labor force increased from a minuscule twenty-five in 1802 to about four hundred workers in 1859. Furthermore, the working conditions improved, but only slightly.John Brown's RaidMain article: John Brown's RaidIn 1859, the armory became the site of the famous seizure by abolitionist John Brown, which, while unsuccessful in inciting a slave revolt, helped precipitate the American Civil War and the eventual emancipation of slaves in the United States.During the Civil WarWhile Virginia was still in the union, the armory regularly shipped manufactured weapons and material throughout the United States. However, once the Civil War began, the national armory became a vital control point for both the Confederates and the Union.Close to the beginning of the war on April 18, 1861, just a day after Virginia's conventional ratification of secession, Union soldiers, outnumbered and deprived of reinforcements, set fire to their own armory in an attempt to thwart the usage of it by an advancing Virginian Confederate militia numbering 360 men in all. Harpers Ferry residents (many of who made their living off the armory) were able to put out the fires swiftly enough to save most of the armory's weapon-making machinery. After rescuing the equipment, the Confederates shipped it south.[clarification needed] Two weeks later, the Confederates abandoned Harpers Ferry. The Southern forces confiscated what was left in the armory and burned the rest of the remaining armory buildings. They also blew up the railroad bridge of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.[verification needed]
The “Arsenal at Springfield” was established on a site chosen by General George Washington in 1777. It produced cartridges and gun carriages and stored weaponry during the American Revolution. Following the war it was the scene of violence during Shays’ Rebellion, when Massachusetts milita men fired upon anti-government Regulators attempting to commandeer the Arsenal building and its stores. The armory began making weapons in 1794. It continued to manufacture small firearms through the Civil War, including the famous Springfield Rifle. By World War II the Springfield Armory was the sole manufacturer of the semi-automatic M1 or “Garand Rifle” invented at the Armory by John Garand in 1934. The Defense Department closed the Springfield Armory in 1968. It is now a national historic site administered by the National Park Service. Prior to its closing, the Springfield Armory played a central role in the economic prosperity of its city, which since the late nineteenth century had been known as the “City of Homes”.
Noted for its expertise in the manufacture of weapons and weapon components, every phase of development and production is available from prototype to full-scale production of major items, spare parts, and repair items. Product items range from artillery gun mounts and recoil mechanisms to aircraft weapons sub-systems. Items manufactured at RIA include artillery, gun mounts, recoil mechanisms, small arms, aircraft weapons sub- system, grenade launchers, weapons simulators, and a host of associated components. These include: Gun Mount M178 for M109A1/M109A2 Self-Propelled Howitzer; Gun Mount M182 for M109A5/M109A6 Self-Propelled Howitzer (RCMAS); M119 Towed Howitzer, 105mm; Spare Parts for M198 Towed Howitzer, 155mm; M242 barrel for Bradley vehicles; and 120mm Gun Mount for M1A1 Abrams Tank.
By the time of U.S. entry into World War I, 843,239 of these rifles had been produced at Springfield Armory and Rock Island Arsenal. Pre-war production utilized questionable metallurgy. Some receivers were improperly subjected to excessive temperatures during the forging process. The carbon could be "burnt" out of the steel producing a brittle receiver. Despite documented evidence indicating some early rifles were improperly forged, actual cases of failure were very rare. Although several cases of serious injury from receiver failure were documented, the U.S. Army never reported any fatalities. Evidence also seems to suggest that improperly forged brass shell casings could have exacerbated receiver failure.Towards the end of the war, Springfield turned out the Model 1903 Mark I. The Mark I has a cut on the left hand side of the receiver meant to act as an ejection port for the Pedersen device, a modified sear and cutoff to operate the Pedersen device; a specialized insert that replaced the bolt and allowed the user to fire .30 caliber pistol cartridges semi-automatically from a detachable magazine. The stock was also slightly cut down on the left side to clear the ejection port. In all other respects, the Mark I is identical to the 1903. Temperature control during forging was improved prior to Mark I production. The receiver alloy was toughened by addition of nickel after Mark I production.In 1926, after experiencing the effect of long-range German 7.92x57mm Mauser and machine gun fire during the war, the U.S. Army adopted the heavy 174-grain boat-tail bullet for its .30-06 cartridge, standardized as 'Cartridge, Ball, caliber 30, M1'. M1 ammunition, intended primarily for long-range machine gun use, soon became known by Army rifle competition teams and expert riflemen for its considerably greater accuracy over that of the M1906 round; the new M1 ammunition was issued to infantrymen with the Springfield rifle as well as to machine gun teams. However, during the late 1930s, it became apparent that, with the development of mortars, high-angle artillery, and the .50 caliber M2 Browning machine gun, the need for extreme long-range, rifle-caliber machine-gun fire was decreasing. In 1938, the U.S. army reverted to a .30-06 cartridge with a 152-grain flat-base bullet, now termed M2 Ball, for all rifles and machine guns.In service, the Springfield was generally prized for its reliability and accuracy, though some problems remained. The precision rear aperture sight was located too far from the eye for efficient use, and the narrow, unprotected front sight was both difficult to see in poor light and easily damaged. The U.S. Marine Corps issued the Springfield with a sight hood to protect the front sight, along with a thicker front blade. The two-piece firing pin/striker also proved to be no improvement over the original one-piece Mauser design, and was a cause of numerous Ordnance repairs, along with occasional reports of jammed magazine followers.World War II saw new production of the Springfield at private manufacturers Remington Arms and Smith-Corona Typewriter. Remington began production of the M1903 in September 1941, at serial number 3,000,000, using old tooling from the Rock Island Arsenal which had been in storage since 1919. The very early rifles are almost indistinguishable from 1919-made Rock Island rifles. As the already worn tooling began to wear beyond use Remington began seeking Army approval for a continuously increasing number of changes and simplifications to both speed up manufacture and improve performance. The milled parts on the Remington M1903 were gradually replaced with stamped parts until, at about serial number 3,330,000, the Army and Remington recognized that a new model name was appropriate. Other features of the M1903, such as high-grade walnut stocks with finger grooves, were replaced with less expensive but serviceable substitutes. Most milled parts made by Remington were marked with an "R".
DevelopmentDevelopmentCanadian-born John Cantius Garand became an American firearms inventor. He went to work at the Army's Springfield Armory and began working on a .30 caliber primer-operated breech. In the summer of 1924, twenty-four rifles, identified as "M1922", were built at Springfield. At Fort Benning during the summer of 1925, they were tested against models by Berthier, Hatcher-Bang, Thompson, and Pedersen, the latter two being delayed blowback types. This led to a further trial of an improved "M1924" Garand against the Thompson, ultimately producing an inconclusive report. As a result, the Ordnance Board ordered a .30-'06 Garand variant. In March 1927, the Cavalry Board reported trials between the Thompson, Garand, and '03 Springfield had not led to a clear winner. This led to a gas-operated .276 model (patented by Garand on 12 April 1930).During the spring of 1928, both Infantry and Cavalry Boards ran trials with the .276 Pedersen T1 rifle, calling it "highly promising" (despite its use of waxed ammunition, shared by the Thompson). On 13 August 1928, a Semiautomatic Rifle Board carried out joint Army, Navy, and Marine Corps trials between the .30 Thompson, both cavalry and infantry versions of the T1 Pedersen, "M1924" Garand, and .256 Bang, and on 21 September, the Board reported no clear winner. The .30 Garand, however, was dropped in favor of the .276.Further tests by the SRB in July 1929, which included rifle designs by Browning, Colt-Browning, Garand, Holek, Pedersen, Rheinmetall, Thompson, and an incomplete one by White,[nb 1] led to a recommendation that work on the (dropped) .30 gas-operated Garand be resumed, and a T1E1 was ordered 14 November 1929.Twenty gas-operated .276 T3E2s Garands were made and competed with T1 Pedersen rifles in Spring 1931. The .276 Garand was the clear winner of these trials. The .30 caliber Garand was also tested, in the form of a single T1E1, but was withdrawn with a cracked bolt on 9 October 1931. A 4 January 1932 meeting recommended adoption of the .276 caliber and production of approximately 125 T3E2s. Meanwhile, Garand redesigned his bolt and his improved T1E2 rifle was retested. The day after the successful conclusion of this test, Army Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur personally disapproved any caliber change, in part because there were extensive existing stocks of .30 M1 ball ammunition. On 25 February 1932, Adjutant General John B. Shuman, speaking for the Secretary of War, ordered work on the rifles and ammunition in .276 caliber cease immediately and completely and all resources be directed toward identification and correction of deficiencies in the Garand .30 caliber.On 3 August 1933, the T1E2 became the Semi-Automatic Rifle, Caliber 30, M1. In May 1934, 75 M1s went to field trials; 50 were to infantry, 25 to cavalry units. Numerous problems were reported, forcing the rifle to be modified, yet again, before it could be recommended for service and cleared for procurement on 7 November 1935, then standardized 9 January 1936. The first production model was successfully proof-fired, function-fired, and fired for accuracy on July 21, 1937.Production difficulties delayed deliveries to the Army until September 1937. By September 1939, Springfield Armory had reached an output of 100 per day. Despite going into production status, design issues were not at an end. The barrel, gas cylinder, and front sight assembly were redesigned and entered production in early 1940. Existing "gas-trap" rifles were recalled and retrofitted, mirroring problems with the earlier M1903 Springfield rifle that also had to be recalled and reworked approximately three years into production and foreshadowing rework of the M16 rifle at a similar point in its development. Production of the Garand increased in 1940 despite these difficulties, reaching 600 a day by 10 January 1941, and the Army was fully equipped by the end of 1941.
Source: WikipediaM1 Garand with en bloc clips. Type Semi-automatic rifle Place of origin United States Service history In service 1936–1957 (as the standard US service rifle) Used by See Users Wars World War IIKorean WarArab-Israeli WarHukbalahap RebellionFirst Indochina WarSuez CrisisCuban RevolutionVietnam WarCambodian Civil WarNorthern Ireland TroublesOther conflicts around the world Production history Designer John C. Garand Designed 1932 Manufacturer Springfield ArmoryWinchesterHarrington & RichardsonInternational HarvesterBerettaBredaF.M.A.P.Springfield Armory, Inc. (civilian) Unit cost$85 (WW2) Produced 1936–1963 Number built Approx. 6.25 million Variants M1C, M1D Specifications Weight 9.5 lb (4.31 kg) to 11.6 lb (5.3 kg) Length 43.5 in (1,100 mm) Barrel length 24 in (609.6 mm) Cartridge .30-06 Springfield (7.62x63mm)7.62x51mm NATO (.308 Winchester) (Used by the U.S. Navy and some commercial companies to modernize the M1 and increase performance) Action Gas-operated, rotating bolt Muzzle velocity 2,800 ft/s (853 m/s) Effective range 440 yd (402 m) Feed system 8-round "en bloc" clip internal magazine Sights Aperture rear sight, barleycorn-type front sight
The Naval Aircraft Factory (NAF) Located at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard Established by the United States Navy in 1918 at Philadelphia in order to assist in solving the problem of aircraft supply which faced the Navy Department upon the entry of the U.S. into World War I. The Army’s requirements for an enormous quantity of planes created a decided lack of interest among aircraft manufacturers in the Navy’s requirements for a comparatively small quantity of aircraft. The Navy Department concluded that it was necessary to build a Navy-owned aircraft factory in order to assure a part of its aircraft supply, to obtain cost data for the Department’s guidance in its dealings with private manufacturers and to have under its own control a factory capable of producing experimental designs. During its lifetime the Naval Aircraft Factory provided the Navy with its own manufacturing and test organization, and also built aircraft designed by other manufacturers to evaluate the cost of aircraft submitted by industry. The NAF ended aircraft production in early 1945. The existence of the Naval Aircraft Factory was controversial at times as it put a federally-funded industrial activity in direct competition with civilian industry, and this was one of the reasons it was disestablished. Upon disestablishment, the aircraft test functions were passed to the newly formed Naval Air Test Center at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland.
The speech reflected the American approach to entry into World War II. It marked the decline of the isolationist and non-interventionist doctrine that had dominated interwar U.S. foreign policy since the United States' involvement in World War I. At the time, while the United States Navy appeared strong and was widely thought to guarantee the Western Hemisphere safe from invasion, there were only 458,365 non-Coast Guard military personnel on active duty—259,028 in the Army, 160,997 in the Navy, and 28,345 in the Marine Corps. By the next year, that number had nearly quadrupled, with 1,801,101 total military personnel—1,462,315 in the Army, 284,437 in the Navy, and 54,359 in the Marine Corps.^ Gould, Jack (May 12, 1940). The Broadway Stage Has Its First War Play. The New York Times. Quoting Robert Emmet Sherwood, "this country is already, in effect, an arsenal for the democratic Allies."^ Robinson, Charles K. (October 13, 1961) Time Magazine. Retrieved on June 6, 2008.^ Barnett, Richard. 1983. The Alliance: America, Europe, Japan, Makers of the Postwar World.^ Nolan, Jenny (January 28, 1997).Willow Run and the Arsenal of Democracy The Detroit News. Retrieved on October 26, 2007.^ "Series Y 904-916: Military Personnel on Active Duty: 1789 to 1970." Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Part 2 (Bicentennial Edition). September 1975. United States Census Bureau.Also See: How Detroit Won the War athttp://www.life.com/gallery/34852/wwii-how-detroit-won-the-war#index/0
Photo: http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-usn/usnsh-b/ss285.htmSource: http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/images/silentvictory.pdfBuilders: Electric Boat Co., CT; Portsmouth NSY, NH; Mare Island NSY, CA; Boston NSY, MA; Manitowoc Shipbuilding Co., WI; Cramp Shipbuilding Co., NJPower Plant: Four diesels, two shafts Length: 311.7 feet (95 meters)Beam: 27 feet (8.2 metersDisplacement: 1,525 tons surfaced, 2,415 tons submerged (1549/2454 metric tons) Speed: 20 knots (37 kph)Crew: 6 Officers, 60 Enlisted Armament: Ten 21-inch (533 millimeter) torpedo tubes (six bow, four stern) One 3-, 4-, or 5-inch deck gun One anti-aircraft gun on bridge4 February 1943 (USS Balao)
The United States Army TACOM Life Cycle Management Command (LCMC), formerly known as Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM), headquartered at the Detroit Arsenal in Warren, Michigan, is part of the United States Army Materiel Command (AMC). It generates, provides, and sustains mobility, lethality, and survivability for soldiers, other branches of the U.S. armed forces, and allies to ensure Army readiness. TACOM's military and civilian associates find and implement technology and logistics solutions for the soldier. From tank-automotive and armaments weapons systems research and development, through procurement and fielding, to sustainment and retirement, TACOM's associates provide "cradle-to-grave" support to America's armed forces.The entire complex that houses TACOM's headquarters is located on what is known as the Detroit Arsenal. TACOM has subordinate installations located at Anniston Army Depot in Alabama, Red River Army Depot in Texas, Sierra Army Depot in California, and Watervliet Arsenal in New York, and has significant numbers of personnel located at Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, and Natick Soldier Center, Massachusetts.
This tank arsenal was the first ever built for mass production of American tanks. When World War II erupted in Europe, and Germany began using tanks in its Blitzkrieg offensives, the United States did not have a tank production program. By mid-1940, the U.S. realized it needed an armored force separate from its infantry. In response to this need, the Detroit Tank Arsenal Plant sprang up seemingly overnight in the winter of 1940-'41, on 113 acres of farm land located north of downtown Detroit, in what is now the city of Warren. The mammoth structure measured five city blocks deep and two blocks wide, designed by master industrial architect, Albert Kahn, in the Moderne style.Owned by the government and run by Chrysler, the plant received its first contract to build 1,000 M3 tanks in 1940. The government accepted the first M3 on April 24, 1941, while the plant was still under construction. The delivery was marked by a festive occasion, broadcast over a nationwide radio hook-up. VIPs and plant workers cheered as the tank fired its guns, smashed telephone poles, and destroyed a mock-up house. The plant also built M4 Sherman tanks, which have a turret mounted 75-mm gun. The plant set an all-time monthly production record by delivering 896 M4s in December 1942. As the war ended, the government suspended tank production.During World War II, the Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant built a quarter of the 89,568 tanks produced in the U.S. overall. Its production closely matched tank production of either Great Britain or Germany. During the Korean War, the plant was modified to build the new battle tank, the M47 Patton. In all, Chrysler built 3,443 M47 Patton tanks between 1952 and 1954. During the '60s, the plant produced 500 of the superior M60A2 tanks, which had a novel turret mounted on an M60 chassis and featured a 152-mm gun launcher that fired both conventional rounds and a guided missile. In response to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the plant was producing a record five tanks per day.In 1979, the Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant built components for M1 tanks, which were built at the Lima Art Tank Plant, and continued to build M60 tanks. Because the Lima Plant could not keep up the M1 production, the Detroit Tank Arsenal plant also began producing M1s for the army. In 1982, Chrysler sold the plant to General Dynamics, which produced both M60s and M1s until 1987. The plant was closed in 1996, and the government transferred the property to city of Warren, where it is located, for reuse and development.Documentation includes the publication, Tanks and Industry, The Detroit Arsenal, 1940-1954, an eight-page overview and chronology, 13 black-and-white photographs, and a videotape.Originally submitted by: Carl Levin, Senator.
1869 the U.S. Naval Torpedo Station was founded on Goat Island, on the site of the former Army fort. The Station was greatly expanded over the next 100 years and produced many of the Navy's torpedoes through World War I and World War II at the island's Navy Torpedo Factory. The torpedo station was closed in 1951 and Naval Undersea Warfare Center was created with a facility nearby.
Pacific Undersea Warfare (USW) Test & Evaluation (T&E) Range and Test Facility Operations Independent USW Systems T&E and Experimentation USW Weapons and Vehicles Range and Environmental Test Systems Torpedo and Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) Maintenance and Repair Obsolescence Management/Custom Engineered Solutions for Undersea Warfare Systems Undersea Warfare Systems Material Depot Torpedo and UUV In-Service Engineering (ISE) and Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) Submarine USW Systems ISE and ILS Carrier USW Systems Fleet Training and Training Management Systems
These lessons, which argued powerfully against returning to an arsenal system,were further reinforced by episodes such as the dismal performance of theNewport Torpedo Station’s Mark-14 torpedo. The Newport facility developed theMark-14 during the 1930s, and the Mark-14 was the principal torpedo used byU.S. submarines during World War II. However, early in the war operational experiencein the Pacific began to reveal major deficiencies in the weapon. Testsconducted by operational submarines based in Australia in mid-1942 confirmedwhat many submarine skippers had begun to suspect: the Mark-14 ran an averageof 11 feet deeper than its set depth.21 By April 1943, further tests and combatexperience revealed that the Mark-14’s magnetic-influence exploder was defectiveand, by mid-1943, it became clear that the Mark-14’s contact exploder was alsoprone to failure when the impact angle approached 90 degrees, a perfect shot.22Due to an unfortunate confluence of personalities and bureaucratic inertia, it tooktwenty-one months to isolate and correct all of the Mark-14’s defects—less timethan it took the OSRD to develop and field the first acoustic homing torpedo, theMark-24, from scratch.23 Part of the reason it took so long to correct the Mark-14’sdefects was that each problem masked the remaining ones. Nevertheless, long
Source: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/highland.htmThe former Shumaker Naval Ammunition Depot (NAD), consisting of 68,417.82 acres, was located four miles northeast of Camden, Arkansas on the east side of U.S. Highway 79 and north of State Highway Number 4. The NAD covered land in two counties, Calhoun and Ouachita. The location is further described as being located at Latitude 33 degrees, 38 minutes North, and 92 degrees, 42 minutes West; 95 miles south of Little Rock, Arkansas and 87 miles east of Texarkana, Arkansas.The site was operated by the U.S. Navy from 1944 until 1957 for the manufacture, testing, storage, distribution, disassembly, reworking, and destruction of ammunition, bombs, and explosives, principally rockets. It was operated by the National Fireworks Ordnance Corporation as a government owned - contractor operated (GOCO) facility under the supervision of U.S. Navy personnel. Improvements to the site included an elaborate railroad track and spurline system, hundreds of reinforced concrete storage magazines, loading dock facilities, headquarters and administration buildings, and an eight mile long rocket test range in addition to production and handling facilities for all types of high explosive admixtures, to include TNT, Composition "B", Ammonium Nitrate, RDX Base and aluminum powder.International Paper in 1961 bought 40,000 acres of forest at the former naval depot. The Brown family of Texas, later famous for its partnership in the global Brown and Root construction company, bought the remaining 25,000 acres. The purchase included the headquarters buildings, the depot's extensive network of railways, hundreds of warehouses, production facilities and bunkers where the Navy stored explosives and ammunition. Highland Resources Inc., a subsidiary of Brown Engineering, then began operating the depot as an industrial park and defense contractors began taking over the old facilities. The Navy's housing area became the town of East Camden. The depot commander's house became a guest house for visiting consultants, executives and engineers.The Reagan-era defense buildup swelled production and employment at the park. By 1984, the LTV Aerospace and Defense Company produced one MLRS rocket every three minutes and several launch vehicles every week in its East Camden plant. General Dynamics produced Sparrow missiles, and Hitech Inc., made demolition charges for the Army and underwater demolition kits for the Navy. The end of the Cold War brought defense spending cutbacks. Tracor and General Dynamics layed off workers, causing a rise in local unemployment rates. Tracor, which had 440 employees at the end of 1989, had only 90 by April 1990. General Dynamics, which once employed 1,500 workers, was by now down to 550.Notable features located within the boundaries of the former installation are three cemeteries and the community of East Camden (formerly Billkitts Rental Housing). International Paper conducts forestry operations on approximately 40,000 acres. The majority of the remaining acreage is currently an industrial complex known as Highland Industrial Park. Occupants of the industrial park with ordnance related functions include: Lockheed-Martin, Loral Vaught Systems, Atlantic Research Corporation, BEI Defense Systems Company, Tracor Aerospace, Hughes Missile Systems, National Testing Service, Olin Industries, Camden Ordnance, Hitech Incorporated, and Austin Power.Since beginning production in the early 1980s Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control Camden Operations has produced more than 650,000 rockets and over 1,100 MLRS launchers. The current Camden facility performs final assembly, test and storage of missiles including the MLRS Extended-Range (ER) Rocket, the Reduced-Range Practice Rocket (RRPR) and the Guided MLRS Rocket. The plant produces MLRS launchers for the U.S. Army, Army National Guard and several allied armies, and produces HIMARS launchers for the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, which designates HIMARS as the Marine Expeditionary Rocket System (MERS). The new facility will include world-class automated production and assembly equipment and be located near the existing Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) production plant.The April 28, 2001, explosion that occurred at the Highland Industrial Park complex located in East Camden, Arkansas consisted of two explosions that caused the destruction of the bunkers at the Highland Industrial Park. The initial explosion was relatively small in size and occurred at approximately 7:39 pm on the night of April 28, 2001, followed by a larger explosion occurring approximately one minute later creating a crater the size of football field. The igloo was being utilized for munitions storage by New River Energetics of Radford, Va., and managed by its parent company, Alliant Tech Systems. Approximately 142,000 pounds of assorted high explosives and smokeless propellants were stored in the bunker. The explosion totally destroyed the bunker and damaged surrounding bunkers. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) was ultimately unable to determine the initial cause of the explosion. However, investigators found no evidence of illegal entry into or tampering with the bunker.
HistoryOriginal DuPont powder wagonEstablishment, 1802DuPont was founded in 1802 by Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, using capital raised in France and gunpowder machinery imported from France. The company was started at the Eleutherian Mills, on the Brandywine Creek, near Wilmington, Delaware two years after his family and he left France to escape the French Revolution. It began as a manufacturer of gunpowder, as du Pont noticed that the industry in North America was lagging behind Europe. The company grew quickly, and by the mid 19th century had become the largest supplier of gunpowder to the United States military, supplying half the powder used by the Union Army during the American Civil War. The Eleutherian Mills site was declared a National Historic Landmark in 1966 and is now a museum.Expansion, 1902 to 1912Working powder mills on Brandywine Creek, about 1905. Note the handwritten "These blow up occasionally, and then?"DuPont continued to expand, moving into the production of dynamite and smokeless powder. In 1902, DuPont's president, Eugene du Pont, died, and the surviving partners sold the company to three great-grandsons of the original founder. The company subsequently purchased several smaller chemical companies, and in 1912 these actions gave rise to government scrutiny under the Sherman Antitrust Act. The courts declared that the company's dominance of the explosives business constituted a monopoly and ordered divestment. The court ruling resulted in the creation of the Hercules Powder Company (now Hercules Inc.) and the Atlas Powder Company (purchased by Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) and now part of AstraZeneca). At the time of divestment, DuPont retained the single base nitrocellulose powders, while Hercules held the double base powders combining nitrocellulose and nitroglycerine. DuPont subsequently developed the Improved Military Rifle (IMR) line of smokeless powders.DuPont also established two of the first industrial laboratories in the United States, where they began the work on cellulose chemistry, lacquers and other non-explosive products. DuPont Central Research was established at the DuPont Experimental Station, across the Brandywine Creek from the original powder mills.Automotive investments, 1914Pierre S. du Pont invested in the fledgling automobile industry, buying stock of General Motors (GM). The following year he was invited to sit on GM's board of directors and would eventually be appointed the company's chairman. The DuPont company would assist the struggling automobile company further with a $25 million purchase of GM stock. In 1920, Pierre S. du Pont was elected president of General Motors. Under du Pont's guidance, GM became the number one automobile company in the world. However, in 1957, because of DuPont's influence within GM, further action under the Clayton Antitrust Act forced DuPont to divest itself of its shares of General Motors.Major breakthroughs, 1920In the 1920s DuPont continued its emphasis on materials science, hiring Wallace Carothers to work on polymers in 1928. Carothers discovered neoprene, the first synthetic rubber, the first polyester superpolymer and in 1935, nylon. The discovery of Teflon followed a few years later. DuPont introduced phenothiazine as an insecticide in 1935.Second World War, 1941 to 1945Throughout this period, the company continued to be a major producer of war supplies. As the inventor and manufacturer of nylon, DuPont helped produce the raw materials for parachutes, powder bags, and tires.DuPont also played a major role in the Manhattan Project in 1943, designing, building and operating the Hanford plutonium producing plant in Hanford, Washington and the Savannah River Plant in South Carolina.Space Age developments, 1950 to 1970After the war, DuPont continued its emphasis on new materials, developing Mylar, Dacron, Orlon and Lycra in the 1950s, and Tyvek, Nomex, Qiana, Corfam and Corian in the 1960s. DuPont materials were critical to the success of the Apollo Project of the United States space program.DuPont has been the key company behind the development of modern body armor. In the Second World War DuPont's ballistic nylon was used by Britain's Royal Air Force to make Flak jackets. With the development of Kevlar in the 1960s, DuPont began tests to see if it could resist a lead bullet. This research would ultimately lead to the bullet resistant vests that are the mainstay of police and military units in the industrialized world.Conoco holdings, 1981 to 1995In 1981, DuPont acquired Conoco Inc., a major American oil and gas producing company that gave it a secure source of petroleum feedstocks needed for the manufacturing of many of its fiber and plastics products. The acquisition, which made DuPont one of the top ten U.S.-based petroleum and natural gas producers and refiners, came about after a bidding war with the giant distillery Seagram Company Ltd., which would become DuPont's largest single shareholder with four seats on the board of directors. On April 6, 1995, after being approached by Seagram Chief Executive Officer Edgar Bronfman, Jr., DuPont announced a deal whereby the company would buy back all the shares owned by Seagram.Divestiture, 1999In 1999, DuPont sold all of its shares of Conoco, which merged with Phillips Petroleum Company.Current activitiesPre-tax U.S. Profit by Year, in US$Millions2010 949 2009 171 2008 992 2007 1,652 2006 1,947 2005 2,795 2004 −714 2003 −428 2002 1,227 6,131 DuPont describes itself as a global science company that employs more than 60,000 people worldwide and has a diverse array of product offerings. In 2005, the Company ranked 66th in the Fortune 500 on the strength of nearly $28 billion in revenues and $1.8 billion in profits.DuPont businesses are organized into the following five categories, known as marketing "platforms": Electronic and Communication Technologies, Performance Materials, Coatings and Color Technologies, Safety and Protection, and Agriculture and Nutrition.In 2004 the company sold its textiles business, which included some of its best-known brands such as Lycra (Spandex), Dacron polyester, Orlon acrylic, Antron nylon and Thermolite, to Koch Industries. DuPont also manufactures Surlyn, which is used for the covers of golf balls, and, more recently, the body panels of the Club Car Precedent golf cart.As of 2011, DuPont is the largest producer of titanium dioxide in the world, primarily provided as a white pigment used in the paper industry.DuPont has its R&D facilities located in China, Japan, Taiwan, India, Germany and Switzerland with an average investment of $1.3 billion annually in a diverse range of technologies for many markets including agriculture, genetic traits, biofuels, automotive, construction, electronics, chemicals and industrial materials. DuPont employs more than 5,000 scientists and engineers around the world.On January 9, 2011, DuPont announced that it had reached a definitive agreement to buy Danish company Danisco for US$6.3 billion. On May 16, 2011, DuPont announced that its tender offer for Danisco had been successful and that it would proceed to redeem the remaining shares and delist the company.LocationsThe company’s corporate headquarters are located in Wilmington, Delaware. The company’s manufacturing, processing, marketing and research and development facilities, as well as regional purchasing offices and distribution centers are located throughout the world. Major manufacturing sites include the Spruance plant near Richmond, Virginia (currently the company's largest plant), the Mobile Manufacturing Center(MMC) in Axis, Alabama, the Bayport plant near Houston, Texas, the Mechelen site in Belgium, and the Changshu site in China. Other locations include the Yerkes Plant on the Niagara River at Tonawanda, New York, the Sabine River Works Plant in Orange, Texas and the Parlin Site in Sayreville, New Jersey. Hyderabad in India - Du Pont Services center and Du Pont knowledge centre.During the World War, Du Pont supplied 40 per cent. of the powder used by the Allies, and after 1917 its orders from the United States government were enormous.6 To-day the Du Pont Company owns and operates more than sixty plants in twenty-two states of the Union. Five research laboratories and more than eight hundred and fifty chemists and engineers have taken the place of the individual inventor. Every year it grants twenty research fellowships. It manufactures a multitude of products, including chemicals, paints, varnishes, rubber goods, cellophane, rayon, and countless others, but it is still the largest and most important powder-maker in the United States.7 Yet it is rather significant that, according to its own figures, only 2 per cent. of its total manufactures are in military products.86 “ Du Pont de Nemours Powder Company, E.I.” Encyclopaedia Britannica (14th ed.).7 “ Research,” Encyclopaedia Britannica (14th ed.).8 Stockholders’ Bulletin, June 15, 1933.
Just before the outbreak of the Civil War, Meigs and Lt. Col. Erasmus D. Keyes were quietly charged by President Abraham Lincoln and Secretary of State William H. Seward with drawing up a plan for the relief of Fort Pickens, Florida, by means of a secret expedition. In April 1861, together with Lieutenant David D. Porter of the Navy, they carried out the expedition, embarking under orders from the President without the knowledge of either the Secretary of the Navy or the Secretary of War.On May 14, 1861, Meigs was appointed colonel, 11th U.S. Infantry, and on the following day, promoted to brigadier general and Quartermaster General of the Army. The previous Quartermaster General, Joseph Johnston, had resigned and become a general in the Confederate Army. Meigs established a reputation for being efficient, hard-driving, and scrupulously honest. He molded a large and somewhat diffuse department into a great tool of war. He was one of the first to fully appreciate the importance of logistical preparations in military planning, and under his leadership, supplies moved forward and troops were transported over long distances with ever-greater efficiency.Of his work in the quartermaster's office, James G. Blaine remarked, "Montgomery C. Meigs, one of the ablest graduates of the Military Academy, was kept from the command of troops by the inestimably important services he performed as Quartermaster General. Perhaps in the military history of the world there never was so large an amount of money disbursed upon the order of a single man ... The aggregate sum could not have been less during the war than fifteen hundred million dollars, accurately vouched and accounted for to the last cent." Secretary of State William H. Seward's estimate was "that without the services of this eminent soldier the national cause must have been lost or deeply imperiled."Montgomery C. MeigsMeigs' services during the Civil War included command of Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant's base of supplies at Fredericksburg and Belle Plain, Virginia (1864), command of a division of War Department employees in the defenses of Washington at the time of Jubal A. Early's raid (July 11–14, 1864), personally supervising the refitting and supplying of Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman's army at Savannah (January 5–29, 1865), and at Goldbrick and Raleigh, North Carolina, reopening Sherman's lines of supply (March–April 1865). He was brevetted to major general on July 5, 1864.A staunch Unionist despite his Southern roots, Meigs detested the Confederacy. He recommended that the historic Custis Mansion in Arlington, Virginia, owned by Mary Anna Custis Lee, the wife of Robert E. Lee, be used as a military burial ground. Based on this recommendation, Arlington National Cemetery was created in 1864. In October of that same year, his son, First Lieutenant John Rodgers Meigs, was killed at Swift Run Gap in Virginia and was buried at a Georgetown Cemetery. Lt. Meigs was part of a 3-man patrol which ran into a 3-man Confederate patrol; Lt. Meigs was killed; one was captured and one escaped. Meigs to the end of his life believed that his son had been murdered after being captured—despite evidence to the contrary. In 1882 the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in United States v. Lee that the recommendation made by Meigs and confirmed by Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton was illegal and returned the estate to George Washington Custis Lee, Gen. Lee's oldest son. He, in turn, sold the part of the estate that was used as a cemetery to the U.S. Government for $150,000, considered the fair market value of the property. This decision had a profound adverse impact on Meigs.
The design was completed by Christopher Spencer in 1860, and was for a magazine-fed, lever-operated rifle chambered for the 56-56 Spencer rimfire cartridge. Unlike later cartridge designations, the first number referred to the diameter of the case at the head, while the second number referred to the diameter at the mouth; the actual bullet diameter was .52 inches. Cartridges were loaded with 45 grains (2.9 g) of black powder.Diagram of the Spencer rifle showing the magazine in the buttTo use the Spencer, a lever had to be worked to extract the used shell and feed a new cartridge from the tube. Like the Springfield Model 1873 Trapdoor Rifle, the hammer had to be manually cocked in a separate action. The weapon used rimfire cartridges stored in a seven-round tube magazine, enabling the rounds to be fired one after another. When empty, the tube could be rapidly loaded either by dropping in fresh cartridges or from a device called the Blakeslee Cartridge Box, which contained up to thirteen (also six and ten) tubes with seven cartridges each, which could be emptied into the magazine tube in the buttstock.There were also 56–52, 56–50, and even a few 56–46 versions of the cartridge created, which were necked down versions of the original 56–56. Cartridge length was limited by the action size to about 1.75 inches, and the later calibers used a smaller diameter, lighter bullet and larger powder charge to increase the power and range over the original 56–56 cartridge, which, while about as powerful as the .58 caliber rifled musket of the time, was underpowered by the standards of other early cartridges such as the .50–70 and .45-70.At first, conservatism from the Department of War delayed its introduction to service. However, Christopher Spencer was eventually able to gain an audience with President Abraham Lincoln, who subsequently invited him to a shooting match and demonstration of the weapon. Lincoln was impressed with the weapon, and ordered that it be adopted for production.The Spencer repeating rifle was first adopted by the United States Navy, and subsequently adopted by the United States Army and used during the American Civil War where it was a popular weapon. The South occasionally captured some of these weapons and ammunition, but, as they were unable to manufacture the cartridges because of shortages of copper, their ability to take advantage of the weapons was limited. Notable early instances of use included the Battle of Hoover's Gap (where Col. John T. Wilder's "Lightning Brigade" effectively demonstrated the firepower of repeaters), and the Gettysburg Campaign, where two regiments of the Michigan Brigade (under Brig. Gen. George Armstrong Custer) carried them at the Battle of Hanover and at East Cavalry Field. As the war progressed, Spencers were carried by a number of Union cavalry and mounted infantry regiments and provided the Union army with additional firepower versus their Confederate counterparts. President Lincoln's assassin, John Wilkes Booth was armed with a Spencer carbine at the time he was captured and killed.Spencer 1865 Carbine .50 caliberThe Spencer showed itself to be very reliable under combat conditions, with a sustainable rate-of-fire in excess of 20 rounds per minute. Compared to standard muzzle-loaders, with a rate of fire of 2-3 rounds per minute, this represented a significant tactical advantage. However, effective tactics had yet to be developed to take advantage of the higher rate of fire. Similarly, the supply chain was not equipped to carry the extra ammunition. Detractors would also complain that the smoke and haze produced was such that it was hard to see the enemy.In the late 1860s, the Spencer company was sold to the Fogerty Rifle Company and ultimately to Winchester. With almost 200,000 rifles and carbines made, it marked the first adoption of a removable magazine-fed infantry rifle by any country. Many Spencer carbines were later sold as surplus to France where they were used during the Franco-Prussian War in 1870.Despite the fact that the Spencer company went out of business in 1869, ammunition was sold in the United States up to about the 1920s. Later, many rifles and carbines were converted to centerfire, which could fire cartridges made from the centerfire .50–70 brass. Production ammunition can still be obtained on the specialty market.
76 Quadrennial Defense Review ReportREFORMING HOW WE DO BUSINESSSome critiques say that the QDR is a rationalization of current force structure.
76 Quadrennial Defense Review ReportREFORMING HOW WE DO BUSINESS
76 Quadrennial Defense Review ReportREFORMING HOW WE DO BUSINESSDeveloping our people: To operate effectively, the acquisition system must be supported by an appropriately sized cadre of acquisition professionals with the right skills and training to successfully perform their jobs. To address personnel deficiencies, we will increase the number of acquisition personnel by 20,000 positions by 2015. We will continue to significantly enhance training and retention programs in order to bolster the capability and size of the acquisition workforce.
76 Quadrennial Defense Review ReportREFORMING HOW WE DO BUSINESSBolstering cost analysis: The Department is undertaking several initiatives to strengthen our cost analysis capabilities in line with the goals of recent legislation. We are increasing our reliance on independent analyses in order to ensure that decisions on acquisition and logistics programs are based on the most realistic cost estimates possible. We are expanding the Department’s independent cost assessment capabilities and are modernizing the cost and price analysis training that DoD personnel receive. To strengthen our cost databases and make costs more visible, we are improving contractor data reporting of actual costs, early systems engineering and development planning, earned value management, and pricing information. The more robust data gleaned from contractor reports will enable more continuous monitoring of program execution and facilitate improvements in the requirements-establishment and contracting processes of the Department. Finally, we will improve the transparency of cost estimates, establish a more rigorous quality assurance program, and report annually to Congress on the Department’s cost- estimating activities.
76 Quadrennial Defense Review Report REFORMING HOW WE DO BUSINESS
Quadrennial Defense Review ReportREFORMING HOW WE DO BUSINESS 78IImproving program execution: Beyond ensuring that acquisition efforts begin on the right track, the Department must also continue to strengthen the execution phase of weapons development programs by pursuing several avenues: Begin to employ fixed-price development contracts more frequently when appropriate. Constrain the tendency to add requirements to programs by employing the ConfigurationSteering Boards previously endorsed by Congress. Demonstrate critical technologies and prove concepts by creating competitive prototypes prior to initiating engineering and manufacturing development. Certify technology maturity through independent reviews and technology readiness assessments. Develop more accurate technical baselines by applying disciplined systems engineering throughout the life cycle. Conduct realistic integrated testing to identify system problems as early as possible. When necessary, so as not to slow the fielding of urgently needed systems, the Department will conduct fielding in parallel with testing to assess safety and identify system capabilities and limitations. Better align profitability with performance by linking contract fee structures with contractor performance, rigorously examining service-based contracts to ensure that fees are properly earned, eliminating the use of no-bid contracts whenever possible, and ensuring that multiyear contracts are limited to instances in which real, substantial savings are accrued to the taxpayer. Achieve effective life cycle cost management by employing readiness-based sustainment strategies, facilitated by stable and robust government-industry partnerships.In short, we need to match requirements with mature technologies, maintain a disciplined systems engineering approach, integrated with comprehensive testing, and avoid sacrificing cost and schedule for promises of improved performance.
81 Quadrennial Defense Review ReportStrengthening the Industrial BaseIn order for the Department of Defense to develop, field, and maintain high-quality equipment, it must rely on a robust and capable defense industry. Indeed, America’s industrial capacity and capability made victory in World War II possible, maintained the technological edge against the Soviet Union, and today helps ensure that our military personnel in harm’s way have the world’s best equipment and are supported by modern logistics and information systems; thus our technological advantage must be closely monitored and nurtured.Unfortunately, the federal government as a whole and the Pentagon in particular have not adequately addressed the changes both within the industry and in the Department’s needs in the current strategic environment. The result has been that America’s defense industry has consolidated and contracted around 20th-century platforms rather than developing the broad and flexible portfolio of systems that today’s security environment demands.Remedying the outdated—for decades, largely hands-off—attitude toward the U.S. defense industrial base cannot be done quickly, and change will require a long-term approach undertaken in partnership with industry and Congress. The range of products and services on which our forces depend requires that the Department develop a more sophisticated relationship with the industrial base, one that takes into account the rapid evolution of commercial technology, as well as the unique requirements of the Department.Whenever possible and appropriate, the Department will rely on market forces to create, shape, and sustain industrial and technological capabilities, but we must be prepared to intervene when absolutely necessary to create and/or sustain competition, innovation, and essential industrial capabilities.For too long the defense industry has been viewed as a monolithic sector of the economy whose key players are made up of only the select few that are established military industrial providers.This simply is not true. The goods and services on which the Department relies reach far more deeply into the overall U.S. economy. Although some unique items are produced solely for the Department, these items themselves often rely on a complex and integrated supply chain of product providers that, if strained at the second, third, and even fourth tiers, would jeopardize the ability of even the seemingly pure military industrial providers to continue to support our forces.Many of the defense industries’ jobs that require the most irreplaceable skills reside within non- prime suppliers. Many of these small, highly specialized companies depend on the major suppliers and their unique requirements for their very survival. The cascading effects on them of decisions that the Department makes at the overall programmatic level must be better understood—to ensure that critical lower-tier providers have the capacity to respond to these decisions, to ensure the continued supply of critical subcomponents to our defense industrial base, to ensure that critical skills are not lost, and to protect our national security from the risk of using compromised supply chains.Moreover, the financial community has an important, and often overlooked, role to play in maintaining the health of our industrial base. From the small technology start-ups that seek venture funding to pursue new products and systems, to the debt markets that provide capital support as programs mature and evolve, the Department must ensure that we do not take this access to capital for granted and must work to form a more transparent view of our requirements and long-term investment plans.Likewise, although innovations unique to national security often occur within the “pure-play” defense industrial base, the vast majority of innovative and revolutionary components, systems, and approaches that enable and sustain our technological advantage reside in the commercial marketplace, in small defense companies, or in America’s universities.Therefore, the Department will work to establish requirements and pursue specific programs that take full advantage of the entire spectrum of the industrial base at our disposal: defense firms, purely commercial firms, and the increasingly important sector of those innovative and technologically advanced firms and institutions that fall somewhere in between.The Department will also work to adopt a more integrated approach that can improve our ability to identify potential single points of failure or concern earlier in the acquisition process, and will establish a more comprehensive and, when appropriate, interagency approach to industrial policy and industrial base issues.Our engagement with industry does not mean the Department of Defense will underwrite sunset industries or prop up poor business models. It does mean that the Department will create anenvironment in which our industries, a foundation of our nation’s strength, can thrive and compete in the global marketplace.As we take steps to revitalize our defense industrial base, we also recognize the value of our allies and their defense industrial capacities. We will continue to value our allies’ capabilities, ensure that when they bid on U.S. contracts that they are treated fairly, just as we expect our firms to be treated fairly in international competitions, and deepen our collaborative effort to innovate against 21st century threats.In order for the defense industry to remain a source of strategic advantage well into the future, the Department and our nation require a consistent, realistic, and long-term strategy for shaping the structure and capabilities of the defense industrial base. Toward this end, the Department is committed to being more forward leaning in its ongoing assessments of the industrial base— refocusing our efforts on our future needs, not just our past performance; working much more closely with the Services to foster an integrated approach to the overall industrial base; and placing transparency and dialogue with industry at the forefront of our agenda.
76 Center for Strategic and Budgetary AssessmentsThe figure shows consolidation from 1993 to 2007 in the U.S. defense industry.Ignoring entities later spun off (e.g., Rocketdyne to Pratt & Whitney), it depictssome thirty-seven “prime” contractors collapsing into five.Acquisitions of professional-services and information-technology (IT) firmshave been mostly excluded. Exceptions include Logicon, E Systems and Solipsys.For consolidation diagrams including professional services and IT, see PierreChao, et al., Structure and Dynamics of the U.S. Federal Professional ServicesIndustrial Base: 1995–2005 (Washington, DC: CSIS, May 2007), pp. 75–86.BAE, a British-Italian defense prime with a U.S. subsidiary, is not shown exceptfor units it acquired from Lockheed Martin in 2000. The heavier lines in thefigure indicate the acquisition of larger defense firms.
Rank Top 20 Contractors in 2000Obligations in2010 Millions Top 20 Contractors in 2010Obligations in2010 MillionsAn analysis of the top 20 contractors (by value of contract actions) in the federal servicesindustry further reveals how the industrial base has changed over the past ten years. In 2000,the top 20 companies held 32 percent of the market, but in 2010 this share dropped to 30percent. In parallel, the Top 5 companies lost some of their market share (from 19 percent in2000 to 15 percent in 2010). Furthermore, the threshold for a company to reach the top 20has changed. In 2000, contract awards of at least some $800 million placed an organizationin the top 20; in 2010, making the top 20 required annual awards of $2.2 billion.The composition of the top 20 contractors also differed between 2000 and 2010. The bigfive defense companies were prominent in both years, but in 2000, the University ofCalifornia held the number two spot and Northrop Grumman did not make the Top 5.Consolidation in the defense sector explains why the large defense primes now hold the topfour spots: Northrop Grumman merged with prior top 20 company TRW.Defense, security, and logistics firms comprised the majority of the top 20 federalcontractors in FY 2010, along with three major medical services providers. The entrance ofthe companies Health Net, TriWest Healthcare, and Humana into the top tier of federalcontracting in 2010 is notable, as their suddenly high ranking positions represent the growingcost of health-related entitlements paid by federal agencies and a trend in federal contractactions going to health service providers. In 2010, the Top 5 consisted of the large defense companies and totaled just over half of the contract dollars awarded to the overall top 20.Differences between the value of contract dollars awarded to each company in the Top 5were far larger than between most of the remainder of the top 20, with up to $14 billionseparating the top-ranking contractor and the fifth-highest ranking contractor compared to$2.4 billion between the sixth and twentieth highest ranking contractor. Overall, it appears that most of the federal services contracting industry lies beneath the top tier, as the top 20account for just under one-third of the total contract dollars awarded for services in 2010.
Two related but different trends shape the services industrial base today. The first trend is government promotion of small, disadvantaged, and disabled-veterans businesses. Since 1997, the Small Business Administration has had a goal of awarding 23 percent of government contracts to small businesses. In 2010, 22.7 percent of government contracts were awarded to small businesses, and in 2009 it was 21.9 percent.14 The effect of this over the last 10 years has been to direct 19-21 percent of government service contracts to these businesses (see Figure 2-10). (There is anecdotal evidence, however, of some negative side effects – such as companies that never graduate from their protected status, or those that do and then struggle to compete with larger, more established companies – that are worth further study.) The second trend is the significant growth of companies with annual revenue greater than $3 billion. While some of this growth is internal, a significant share is through mergers and acquisitions of smaller companies; in 2010, small companies represented 75 percent of government services acquisitions.15 This has resulted in large companies holding a growing share of the federal services market (see Figure 2-10).As a result of these two trends, a viable cadre of mid-tier companies is being squeezed out of the federal services market. This trend reached its nadir in 2007 but has receded in subsequent years. Though the 38 percent market share for mid-tier contractors in 2010 is the highest value since 2004, it has yet to return to the 40 percent plus share of the start of the decade.
Will revisions of organizational conflicts of interest (OCI) rules affect the structure of the services industrial base? As a result of substantial growth in the number of mergers and acquisitions in the services sector (since 2001, the transaction volume of M&A deals in the services sector has doubled), the government has grown increasingly concerned about the potential for OCI. Such conflicts arise when employees of the acquired firm assume oversight responsibilities over a sister firm as a result of a preexisting federal contract. As a by-product of this activity, several scientific engineering and technical assistance (SETA) contractors were absorbed by larger firms, sometimes supervising their parent or sister companies for the federal government. Efforts are currently underway to limit OCI in contracting.Source CSIS November 2011
An issue that has more recently captured the limelight is service contracts for operationsin Iraq and Afghanistan. Services account for well over sixty percent of the value of federalcontracts performed in those two countries and their theaters.40 GAO has scrutinizedinadequacies of some of the practices employed for service contracts in support of operationsin these theaters.41 Yet, at the same time, DoD is developing and refining guidance for thisemerging field of services contracting. For instance, it finalized in 2008 the Joint Publication4-10 Operational Contract Support or it has been revising DoD Instruction 3020.41 ProgramManagement for the Preparation and Execution of Acquisitions for ContingencyOperations.4240 Sanders, Gregory. ―Contracting for Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan‖, Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, November 05, 2009.41 Government Accountability Office (2010), Contingency Contracting: Improvements Needed in Managementof Contractors Supporting Contract and Grant Administration in Iraq and Afghanistan;Government Accountability Office (2008), Military Operations: DoD Needs to Address Contract Oversight andQuality Assurance Issues for Contracts Used to Support Contingency Operations;Government Accountability Office (2008), Defense Management: DoD Needs to Reexamine Its ExtensiveReliance on Contractors and Continue to Improve Management and Oversight;Government Accountability Office (2008), Contract Management: DoD Developed Draft Guidance forOperational Contract Support but Has Not Met All Legislative Requirements42 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (2008), Joint Publication 4-10 Operational Contract Support;Department of Defense (2009), DoD Instruction 3020.41 Program Management for the Preparation andExecution of Acquisitions for Contingency Operations43 GAO (2007) Federal Contracting: Use of Contractor Performance Information44 The database is located at http://www.ppirs.gov/ but only available to authorized users.
Edward G. Lengel, General George Washington: A Military Life (2007)United StatesThis media file is in the public domain in the United States. This applies to U.S. works where the copyright has expired, often because its first publication occurred prior to January 1, 1923. See this page for further explanation.Català | Česky | Deutsch | English | Español | Eesti | فارسی | Suomi | Français | Gaeilge | Galego | עברית | Magyar | Igbo | Italiano | 日本語 | Македонски | മലയാളം | Malti | Plattdüütsch | Nederlands | Polski | Português | Português do Brasil | Română | Русский | ไทย | Vèneto | 中文 | 中文(简体) | 中文(繁體) | +/− This image might not be in the public domain outside of the United States; this especially applies in the countries and areas that do not apply the rule of the shorter term for US works, such as Canada, Mainland China (not Hong Kong or Macao), Germany, Mexico, and Switzerland. The creator and year of publication are essential information and must be provided. See Wikipedia:Public domain and Wikipedia:Copyrights for more details.
The next four years were the darkest in American history as the nation tore at itself using the latest military technology and highly motivated soldiers. The urban, industrialized Northern states (the Union) eventually defeated the mainly rural, agricultural Southern states (the Confederacy), but between 600,000 and 700,000 soldiers Americans (on both sides combined) were killed, and much of the infrastructure of the South was devastated. About 8% of all white males aged 13 to 43 died in the war, including 6% in the North and an extraordinary 18% in the South. In the end, slavery was abolished, and the Union was restored, richer and more powerful than ever, while the South was embittered and impoverished.In 1864, General Grant assigned himself as direct commander of Meade and the Army of the Potomac, and placed General William Sherman in command of the Western Theatre. Grant began to wage a total war against the Confederacy. He knew that the Union's strength lay in its resources and manpower and thus began to wage a war of attrition against Lee while Sherman devastated the West. Grant's Wilderness Campaign forced Lee into Petersburg, Virginia. There he waged—and with Lee, pioneered—trench warfare at the Siege of Petersburg. In the meantime, General Sherman seized Atlanta, securing President Lincoln's reelection. He then began his famous March to the Sea which devastated Georgia and South Carolina. Lee attempted to escape from Petersburg in March–April 1865 but was trapped by Grant's superior number of forces. Lee surrendered at the Appomattox Court House. Four years of bloody warfare had come to a conclusion.The battle of Gettysburg, Pa. July 3d. 1863, depicting the Battle of Gettysburg, fought July 1—3, 1863. The battle was part of the American Civil War and was won by the North. Hand-colored lithograph by Currier and Ives.This image (or other media file) is in the public domain because its copyright has expired.This applies to Australia, the European Union and those countries with a copyright term of life of the author plus 70 years.
This image is in the public domain in the United States. In most cases, this means that it was first published prior to January 1, 1923 (see the template documentation for more cases). Other jurisdictions may have other rules, and this image might not be in the public domain outside the United States. See Wikipedia:Public domain and Wikipedia:Copyrights for more details. 12^ Edward C. Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age, Business, Labor, and Public Policy 1860-1897 (1961)13^ U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States (1976) series D726 and D736 pp 164-5. The data is in constant 1914 dollars, taking out the effects of deflation and inflation, and takes unemployment into account.
German efforts to use its submarines ("U-boats") to blockade Britain resulted in the deaths of American travelers and sailors, and attacks on passenger liners caused public outrage. Most notable was torpedoing without warning the passenger liner Lusitania in 1915. Germany promised not to repeat but decided in early 1917 that unrestricted U-boat warfare against all ships headed to Britain would win the war, albeit at the cost of American entry. When Americans read the text of the German offer to Mexico, known as the Zimmermann Telegram, they saw an offer for Mexico to go to war with Germany against the United States, with German funding, with the promise of the return of the lost territories of Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas.Congress voted on April 6, 1917 to declare war, but it was far from unanimous.1^ John M. Cooper, Woodrow Wilson: A Biography (2009)http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/42/U-14_%28WW1%29.jpg This image (or other media file) is in the public domain because its copyright has expired.This applies to Australia, the European Union and those countries with a copyright term of life of the author plus 70 years. This media file is in the public domain in the United States. This applies to U.S. works where the copyright has expired, often because its first publication occurred prior to January 1, 1923. See this page for further explanation.Lusitania. Other (Public Domain) http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Lusitania.aspxZimmermann Telegram as Received by the German Ambassador to Mexico, 01/19/1917Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of State, 1756 - 1979 National Archives and Records AdministrationARC Identifier302025
Pershing wanted an American force that could operate independently of the other Allies, but his vision could not be realized until adequately trained troops reached Europe. In order to rush as many troops as possible to France, the AEF left its heavy weapons behind and used French and British equipment. Particularly appreciated were the French canon de 75, the canon de 155 C modele 1917 Schneider and the canon de 155mm GPF. American aviation units received the SPAD XIII and Nieuport 28 fighters and the US tank corps used the French Renault FT17 light tanks. Pershing established facilities in France to train new arrivals with their new weapons. Wilson, Treat 'Em Rough: The Birth of American Armor, 1917-1920 (1989)The Renault FTPermission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.2 or any later version published by the Free Software Foundation; with no Invariant Sections, no Front-Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover Texts. A copy of the license is included in the section entitled GNU Free Documentation License. The Nieuport 28 (N.28C-1)Eddie Rickenbacker voreinerNieuport 28. Von "Rosebud's WWI Early Aviation Image Archive" ( http://members.shaw.ca/flyingaces/archive1.htm ) - gemeinfrei (public domain)Canon de 75 modèle 1897Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.2 or any later version published by the Free Software Foundation; with no Invariant Sections, no Front-Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover Texts. A copy of the license is included in the section entitled GNU Free Documentation License. Over against all these “successes” of the arms makers and the war contractors must be placed a certain number of dismal failures. They are summarized in a letter of President Harding, dated August 29, 1921. The President wrote in part:“ Our government... expended between five and six billion dollars for the manufacture of aircraft, artillery, and artillery ammunition. To show for this expenditure, it has been officially testified that less than 200 American-made airplanes or 200 American-made cannon ever went into action on the fighting front of the war, while not more than one per cent of the ammunition expended by American artillery was, according to the same testimony, of American manufacture. Approximately $3,500,000,000 has been poured out under the direction of the Shipping Board, yet I have from the War Department the curious bit of information that only one vessel built by the Shipping Board ever carried any American troops to fight in Europe. This was a cargo boat, the Liberty, which, according to War Department records, in October, 1917, carried approximately fifty soldiers to Europe.”24The great failures were particularly in artillery, in aircraft, and in shipping. This is readily understood. The American arms industry has always been outstanding for its small arms and ammunition. In these it excelled in the war. It was also efficient in producing small mobile artillery and it turned out successfully large orders for the French ’75’s. Heavy artillery had never been its forte and it could rely or the Allies for these materials, meanwhile using all available shipping for the transport of troops.MERCHANTS OF DEATHBy H.C. Engelbrecht and F.C. HanighenLithograph by Mabel DwightComplete and unabridged version as published by Dodd, Mead & Co., New York, 1934
On the battlefields of France in spring 1918, the fresh American troops were enthusiastically welcomed by the war-weary Allied armies in the summer of 1918. They arrived at the rate of 10,000 a day, at a time that the Germans were unable to replace their losses. After the Allies turned back the powerful final German offensive (Spring Offensive), the Americans played a central role in the Allied final offensive (Hundred Days Offensive). Victory over Germany achieved on November 11, 1918. Edward M. Coffman, The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I (1998),TITLE: [American Army field hospital inside ruins of church. France. 1918] (World War I).Library of Congress CALL NUMBER: LOT 7868 [item] [P&P]MEDIUM: 1 photographic print. CREATED/PUBLISHED: 1918. Photo by USASC 27410.
There was no great and important buying of war materials in the United States by the Allies until the second half of 1915. Then the traffic began in earnest. The Allies established a central purchasing bureau in the States which soon spent on the average of $10,000,000 a day. Between August, 1914 and February, 1917 more than $10,500,000,000 worth of goods were shipped out of America.2Munitions played a prominent part in this traffic. In 1914, exports amounted to $40,000,000, in 1915, they totaled $330,000,000, and in 1916 they pyramided to $1,290,000,000. From 1914 to 1918 the Allies bought $4,000,000,000 worth of munitions in the United States. But munitions were by no means the only item of commerce. In a long list of exports, the following are included: Iron and steel, explosives, cotton and cotton manufactures, wheat, copper, brass, leather, chemicals, firearms, automobiles, wheat flour, metal-working machinery, corn, horses, wire manufactures, shoes, railway cars, mules, barley, wool manufactures, tires, airplanes, motor cycles, etc.3The war year 1916 was by far the most prosperous in the entire history of American industry and finance. The enormous volume of foreign trade created something like a shortage at home, and as a result domestic prices began to skyrocket. The golden harvest reaped from American pocketbooks far outweighed the profits from the traffic with the Allies.42 C. Hartley Grattan, Why We Fought, chap. 3; John Kenneth Turner, Shall It Be Again ? pp. 274ss.3 Grattan, op. cit., p. 136.4 Turner, op. cit., pp. 275ss.Study of the International Armament IndustryMERCHANTS OF DEATHBy H.C. Engelbrecht and F.C. HanighenComplete and unabridged version as published by Dodd, Mead & Co., New York, 1934
All photos in the public domain
Chronology of World War I 1914 June Archduke Franz Ferdinand is shot. August Beginning of the war. 1915 May Sinking of the Lusitania. War talk begins in the United States. 1916 June National Defense Act expands the Army 1917 February Germany renews unrestricted submarine warfare.U.S.S. Housatonic sunk.U.S. breaks diplomatic relations with Germany April U.S. declares war. May Selective Service Act June First Liberty Loan July War Industries Board August Lever Food and Fuel Control Act October War Revenue Act November Second Liberty Loan December Railroads are nationalized. 1918 January Maximum prices for steel March Bernard Baruch heads the War Industries BoardGermans begin massive offensive on the western front May Third Liberty LoanFirst independent action by the American Expeditionary Force June Battle of Belleau Wood – the first sizable U.S. action July Second Battle of the Marne – German offensive stopped September 900,000 Americans in the Battle of Meuse-Argonne October Fourth Liberty Loan November Armistice The United States was in the war from April 7, 1917 to November 11, 1918. During this period it spent $22,625,52,843 and advanced another $9,455,014,125 to the Allies. Just as important for Wall Street was the absolute guarantee of Allied credit by the American government. All the reckless financing of the war years was now saved and, above all, the United States had now joined the Allies in placing war orders.It is really impossible to get an adequate picture of what 22,000,000,000 means. It required two heavy volumes for the Director of Munitions merely to outline the colossal buying of the American government in 1917 and 1918. Spending like this cannot be paid for by a single generation. Nor were these government orders the only factors in the situation. To this $22,000,000,000 must be added the rise in prices of all goods and commodities. Wheat reached $3.25, most of which went to others than the farmer, who was paid only 1.30 a bushel for that crop. Cotton touched the highest point in forty-five years. It was the same story with everything that was sold throughout the country.Exactly what the profits of the American arms merchants and their allies and financiers were in the war will never be accurately known. They realized very shortly that it would never do to let even the approximate amounts of their net gains be known. The Federal Trade Commission characterized the business methods of these groups as “inordinate greed and barefaced fraud.” It “exposed many tricks of bookkeeping by the great corporations... Costs were fictitiously enhanced by account juggling. Officers’ salaries were increased. The item of depreciation was padded. Interest on investment was included in cost. Fictitious valuations of raw materials were resorted to. Inventories were manipulated.”Despite all this, the profits reported were simply colossal. Du Pont paid a dividend of 100 per cent on its common stock in 1916. The earnings of the United States Steel Corporation for 1917 exceeded by many millions the face value of its common stock, which was largely water. In 1916 this same company reported earnings greater by $70,000,000 than the combined earnings of 1911, 1912, and 1913. Bethlehem Steel paid a stock dividend of 200 per cent in 1917. U.S. Treasury figures show that during the war period 69,000 men made more than $3,000,000,000 over and above their normal income.MERCHANTS OF DEATHBy H.C. Engelbrecht and F.C. HanighenLithograph by Mabel DwightComplete and unabridged version as published by Dodd, Mead & Co., New York, 1934
Photo:nationalmuseum.af.milAuthor U.S. Air Force In May 1917, one month after the US had declared war on Germany, a Federal task force known as the Aircraft Production Board summoned top engine designers Jesse Vincent (of the Packard Motor Car Company of Detroit) and E.J. Hall (of the Hall-Scott Motor Co. of Berkeley, California,) to Washington D.C. They were given the task of designing as rapidly as possible an aircraft engine that would rival if not surpass those of Great Britain, France, and Germany. The Board specified that the engine would have a high power-to-weight ratio and be adaptable to mass production. The Board brought Vincent and Hall together on 29 May 1917 at the Willard Hotel in Washington, where the two were asked to stay until they produced a set of basic drawings. After just five days, Vincent and Hall left the Willard with a completed design for the new engine.WIKIPEDIAIn July 1917, an eight-cylinder prototype assembled by Packard's Detroit plant arrived in Washington for testing, and in August, the 12-cylinder version was tested and approved. That fall, the War Department placed an order for 22,500 Liberty engines, dividing the contract between the automobile and engine manufacturers Buick, Ford, Cadillac, Lincoln, Marmon, Nordyke, and Packard. Hall-Scott in California was considered too small to receive a production order. Manufacturing by multiple different factories was facilitated by its modular design. Cadillac was asked to produce Liberty engines but William Durant was a pacifist who did not want General Motors facilities to be used for producing war material. This led to Henry Leland leaving Cadillac to form the Lincoln company to make Liberty engines. However, Durant later changed his mind and both Cadillac and Buick produced the engines.Ford was asked to supply cylinders for the new engine, and rapidly developed an improved technique for cutting and pressing steel which resulted in cylinder production rising from 151 per day to over 2,000, Ford eventually manufacturing all 433,826 cylinders produced, and 3,950 complete engines. Lincoln constructed a new plant in record time, devoted entirely to Liberty engine production, and assembled 2,000 engines in 12 months. By the time of the Armistice with Germany, the various companies had produced 13,574 Liberty engines, attaining a production rate of 150 engines per day. Production continued after the war, for a total of 20,478 engines built between July 4, 1917 and 1919.^ Trout, Steven (2006). Cather Studies Vol. 6: History, Memory, and War. University of Nebraska Press. pp. 275–276. ISBN 0803294646.^ Yenne, Bill (2006). The American Aircraft Factory in World War II. Zenith Imprint. pp. 15–17. ISBN 0760323003.^ Weiss, H. Eugene (2003). Chrysler, Ford, Durant, and Sloan. McFarland. p. 45. ISBN 0786416114.^ O'Callaghan, Timothy J. (2002). The Aviation Legacy of Henry & Edsel Ford. Wayne State University Press. pp. 163–164. ISBN 1928623018.^ Anderson, John David (2002). The Airplane: A History of Its Technology. AIAA. p. 157. ISBN 1563475251.
On 2 April 1917 President Woodrow Wilson cited Germany’s refusal to suspend unrestricted submarine warfare in the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean in his request for a declaration of war on Germany and Congress concurred on 2 April 1917. In that April 1,250,000 deadweight tons were sunk with 122 ocean going ships sunk in the first two weeks after that declaration of war. British losses in that period equaled an average round trip voyage loss of 25%. Allied losses had already been heavy before U.S. entry so that construction in yards outside the U.S. was unable to sustain current losses.^ abcdefghijkhttp://www.gwpda.org/wwi-www/Hurley/bridgeTC.htm | The Bridge To France by Edward N. Hurley, Wartime Chairman of the U. S. Shipping Board
Over against all these “successes” of the arms makers and the war contractors must be placed a certain number of dismal failures. They are summarized in a letter of President Harding, dated August 29, 1921. The President wrote in part:“ Our government... expended between five and six billion dollars for the manufacture of aircraft, artillery, and artillery ammunition. To show for this expenditure, it has been officially testified that less than 200 American-made airplanes or 200 American-made cannon ever went into action on the fighting front of the war, while not more than one per cent of the ammunition expended by American artillery was, according to the same testimony, of American manufacture. Approximately $3,500,000,000 has been poured out under the direction of the Shipping Board, yet I have from the War Department the curious bit of information that only one vessel built by the Shipping Board ever carried any American troops to fight in Europe. This was a cargo boat, the Liberty, which, according to War Department records, in October, 1917, carried approximately fifty soldiers to Europe.”2424 Turner, Shall It Be Again ? p. 3o8.MERCHANTS OF DEATHBy H.C. Engelbrecht and F.C. HanighenLithograph by Mabel DwightComplete and unabridged version as published by Dodd, Mead & Co., New York, 1934
Public debt levels in G-7 economiesfiscal consolidation is required. Reducing public debt to pre- crisis levels will constrain government expenditures for at least a decade.2Public spending cuts may have an adverse effect on competitiveness, especially if investments in growth-enhancing areas are affected. There is no doubt that reducing public investments for health, education, research and development (R&D), or the upkeep of infrastructure will erode competitive- ness over the medium to longer term. R&D and education espe- cially are among the areas that matter most for the competi- tiveness of advanced economies. Investments in these areas should therefore be preserved as much as possible.Although it is still too early to judge the effects of the pres- ent debt crisis on different categories of public expenditure, a recent survey in European countries shows that, over the next years, fiscal pressures may lead to a reduction of R&D investment in only four EU countries out of eighteen that were surveyed, while nine countries plan to increase public spend- ing in this category.3 In the United States, however, although overall government spending rose between 2007 and 2009, the share spent on education declined from 16.8 to 15.8 percent of the total.4Given the importance of public investment in the competitiveness-enhancing areas such as education or innovation for future competitiveness, policymakers must measure very carefully the effects of reducing such investments, as this may endanger future growth and prosperity. This would have the unfortunate effect of converting short-term financial difficulties into longer-term competitiveness weaknesses. Policymakers should therefore focus on measures to enhance competitive- ness that would strengthen their countries’ growth potential and thus improve the budgetary situation. In peripheral European economies that have accumulated debt over the past years while their competitiveness has not improved, competitiveness- enhancing reforms would support economic growth and thus create a virtuous cycle that could make high debt burdens more sustainable.Notes 1 OECD Economic Outlook, May 2011.For example, by one estimate public indebtedness in OECD countries can be reduced to its 2007 level by 2023 only provided that no new debt is created after 2014, and that growth rates of 4 percent annually are achieved. See Bofinger 2011.European Commission 2011.However, the absolute public spending on education increased. See OECD.stat, Dataset 11: Government spending by function. Available at http://stats.oecd.org/ Index.aspx (retrieved on August 12, 2011).CCountryPublic debt as percent of GDPJapan 220.3IItaly 119.0United States 91.6FFrance 84.3Canada 84.0GGermany 80.0United Kingdom 77.2AAverage 101.3
The Regulation of New WarfareDefense, Defense Strategy, U.S. Military, U.S. Department of DefensePeter W. Singer, Director, 21st Century Defense InitiativeThe Politic
by ELISABETH BUMILLERPublished: July 24, 2010 RECOMMEND TWITTER LINKEDINE-MAIL PRINT REPRINTS SHAREWASHINGTON — Like everything else, war is a lot more expensive than it used to be.MultimediaGraphicComparing the Costs of America’s WarsThe conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have cost Americans a staggering $1 trillion to date, second only in inflation-adjusted dollars to the $4 trillion price tag for World War II, when the United States put 16 million men and women into uniform and fought on three continents.Sticker shock is the inevitable first reaction to the latest statistics on the costs of all major United States wars since the American Revolution, compiled by the Congressional Research Service and released late last month, and the figures promise to play into intensifying political and economic pressures to restrain the Pentagon budget.Still, 21st-century technology is an obvious explanation for why two relatively small (although long) wars in developing societies like Iraq and Afghanistan are so expensive. As Stephen Daggett, a specialist in defense policy and budgets, writes in the Congressional Research Service report, in the Revolutionary War “the most sophisticated weaponry was a 36-gun frigate that is hardly comparable to a modern $3.5 billion destroyer.”A second look at the numbers shows another story underneath. In 2008, the peak year so far of war spending for Iraq and Afghanistan, the costs amounted to only 1.2 percent of America’s gross domestic product. During the peak year of spending on World War II, 1945, the costs came to nearly 36 percent of G.D.P.The reason is the immense growth, and seemingly limitless credit, of the United States economy over the last 65 years, as compared to the sacrifice and unity required to wring $4 trillion from a much smaller economy to wage the earlier war. To some historians, the difference is troubling.“The army is at war, but the country is not,” said David M. Kennedy, the Stanford University historian. “We have managed to create and field an armed force that can engage in very, very lethal warfare without the society in whose name it fights breaking a sweat.” The result, he said, is “a moral hazard for the political leadership to resort to force in the knowledge that civil society will not be deeply disturbed.”A corollary is that taxes have not been raised to pay for Iraq and Afghanistan — the first time that has happened in an American war since the Revolution, when there was not yet a country to impose them. Rightly or wrongly, that has further cut American civilians off from the two wars on the opposite side of the world.Before the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, “Americans were called upon by their leaders to pay higher taxes during a war, and grumbling or not grumbling, they did it,” said Robert D. Hormats, the under secretary of state for economic, energy and agricultural affairs and the author of “The Price of Liberty: Paying for America’s Wars.”In terms of costs per warrior, the current wars appear to be the most expensive ever, according to Todd Harrison, a senior fellow for defense budget studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Working independently of the Pentagon and of the Congressional study, and using computations based on the number of troops committed to the actual conduct of war at any one time, he estimates that the annual cost today is $1.1 million per man or woman in uniform in Afghanistan versus an adjusted $67,000 per year for troops in World War II and $132,000 in Vietnam.Although technology is the driving factor, along with the logistical expense of moving equipment over the treacherous and landlocked Afghan terrain, costs per soldier have also risen because of the price of maintaining a better-trained and higher-paid force. “We’re not just pulling random guys off the street and sending them off to war like we did in the past,” Mr. Harrison said.A last story in the numbers: A quick calculation shows that the United States has been at war for 47 of its 230 years, or 20 percent of its history. Put another way, Americans have been at war one year out of every five.“You know, it’s a surprise to me that it’s that high,” said Mr. Daggett, who has focused on the cost, not length, of wars. “You think of war as not being the usual state.”A version of this article appeared in print on July 25, 2010, on page WK3 of the New York edition.
History.comTruman took office as World War II in Europe drew to a close. The German leader Adolf Hitler committed suicide in Berlin only two weeks into Truman’s presidency and the allies declared victory in Europe on May 7, 1945. The war in the Pacific, however, was far from being over; most experts believed it might last another year and require an American invasion of Japan. The U.S. and British governments, though, had secretly begun to develop the world’s most deadly weapon -- an atomic bomb. Upon its completion and successful testing in the summer of 1945, Truman approved its use against Japan. On August 6 and 9, 1945, the U.S. Army Air Force dropped atomic bombs on two cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, immediately killing upwards of 100,000 people (with perhaps twice that number dying from the aftereffects of radiation poisoning). Japanese emperor Hirohito agreed to surrender days later, bringing World War II to a close.Truman faced unprecedented and defining challenges in international affairs during the first years of his presidency. American relations with the Soviet Union -- nominal allies in the battle against Germany and Japan -- began to deteriorate even before victory in World War II. Serious ideological differences -- the United States supported democratic institutions and market principles, while Soviet leaders were totalitarian and ran a command economy -- separated the two countries. But it was the diverging interests of the emerging superpowers in Europe and Asia which sharpened their differences.In response to what it viewed as Soviet threats, the Truman administration constructed foreign policies to contain the Soviet Union’s political power and counter its military strength. By 1949, Soviet and American policies had divided Europe into a Soviet-controlled bloc in the east and an American-supported grouping in the west. That same year, a communist government sympathetic to the Soviet Union came to power in China, the world’s most populous nation. The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, which would last for over forty years, had begun.At home, President Truman presided over the difficult transition from a war-time to a peace-time economy. During World War II, the American government had intervened in the nation’s economy to an unprecedented degree, controlling prices, wages, and production. Truman lobbied for a continuing government role in the immediate post-war economy and also for an expansive liberal agenda that built on the New Deal. Republicans and conservative Democrats attacked this strategy and the President mercilessly. An immediate postwar economy characterized by high inflation and consumer shortages further eroded Truman’s support and contributed to the Democrats losing control of Congress in the 1946 midterm elections. Newly empowered Republicans and conservative Democrats stymied Truman’s liberal proposals and began rolling back some New Deal gains, especially through the Taft-Hartley labor law moderately restricting union activity.
History.comPresident Harry S. Truman receives National Security Council Paper Number 68 (NSC-68). The report was a group effort, created with input from the Defense Department, the State Department, the CIA, and other interested agencies; NSC-68 formed the basis for America's Cold War policy for the next two decades.In the face of U.S. foreign policy concerns, most notably the Soviet explosion of an atomic device in September 1949 and China's fall to communism the following October, President Truman requested a complete review and re-evaluation of America's Cold War diplomacy strategy. The result was NSC-68, a report that took four months to compile and was completed in April 1950.The report began by noting that the United States was facing a completely changed world. World War II had devastated Germany and Japan, and France and Great Britain had suffered terrific losses. This situation left the United States and the Soviet Union as the only two great world powers. The Soviet Union posed a new and frightening threat to U.S. power. Animated by "a new fanatic faith" in communism, the Soviet Union sought nothing less than the imposition of "its absolute authority over the rest of the world." Clashes with the United States were, therefore, inevitable. According to the report, the development of nuclear weapons meant, "Every individual faces the ever-present possibility of annihilation," and, as a result, "the integrity and vitality of our system is in greater jeopardy than ever before in our history."According to the report, the United States should vigorously pursue a policy of "containing" Soviet expansion. NSC-68 recommended that the United States embark on rapid military expansion of conventional forces and the nuclear arsenal, including the development of the new hydrogen bomb. In addition, massive increases in military aid to U.S. allies were necessary as well as more effective use of "covert" means to achieve U.S. goals. The price of these measures was estimated to be about $50 billion; at the time the report was issued, America was spending just $13 billion on defense.Truman was somewhat taken aback at the costs associated with the report's recommendations. As a politician, he hesitated to publicly support a program that would result in heavy tax increases for the American public, particularly since the increase would be spent on defending the United States during a time of peace. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, however, prompted action. Truman signed NSC-68 into policy in September 1950. As one State Department official noted, "Thank God Korea came along," since this act of communist aggression was believed to be crucial in convincing the public to support increased military spending. NSC-68 remained the foundation of U.S. Cold War policy until at least the 1970s. The document itself remained top secret until historians successfully lobbied for its declassification in 1975.WikipediaNational Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68) was a 58-page formerly-classified report issued by the United States National Security Council on April 14, 1950, during the presidency of Harry S. Truman. Written during the formative stage of the Cold War, it was top secret until the 1970s when it was made public. It was one of the most significant statements of American policy in the Cold War. NSC-68 largely shaped U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War for the next 20 years.Contents [hide] 1 Historical Background 2 Content and meaning 3 Internal debate 3.1 Truman's position 3.2 Public opinion 4 Historical debate 5 Conclusion 6 Notes 7 Bibliography 7.1 Primary Sources 8 External links Historical BackgroundBy 1949, events had reinforced the need for better coordination of national security policies: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed, military assistance for Europe was begun, the Soviet Union detonated an atomic bomb, and the Communists won control in China over the Nationalists. The United States Department of State seized the opportunity to review US strategic policy and military programs, overcoming opposition from Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and his allies in the Bureau of the Budget. Accounts of the deliberation on "NSC-68" indicate that the Defense Department representatives on the committee initially resisted proposals that would exceed the existing $12.5 billion ceiling on defense spending. The report, known as NSC-68, was requested by President Truman on 31 January 1950, following a feasibility study of both the US and the USSR acquiring thermonuclear weapons; he directed the secretaries of State and Defense "to undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans." The first report was submitted on 7 April, and then passed on to the NSC for further consideration.NSC Study Group (Known)Paul Nitze, ChairJohn P. DavisRobert TuftsRobert HookerDean AchesonChip BohlenMajor General Truman Landon, Joint Chiefs RepresentativeSamuel S. ButanoGeorge F. KennanOriginally, President Truman did not support NSC-68 when it was first brought to him in 1950. He believed that it was not specific about which programs would be affected or changed and it also didn't go well with his previous defense spending limits. Truman sent it back for further review until he finally approved it in 1951.The document outlined the de facto national security strategy of the United States for that time (though it was not an official NSS in the form we know today) and analyzed the capabilities of the Soviet Union and of the United States of America from military, economic, political, and psychological standpoints.The NSC-68 described the challenges facing the United States in cataclysmic terms. "The issues that face us are momentous," the document stated, "involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself." Content and meaningAlthough Kennan's theory of containment articulated a multifaceted approach for U.S. foreign policy in response to the perceived Soviet threat, NSC-68 recommended policies that emphasized military over diplomatic action. Kennan's influential telegram advocated a policy of containment towards the Soviet Union. In NSC-68, it can be defined as "a policy of calculated and gradual coercion." That said, the NSC-68 called for significant peacetime military spending, in which the U.S. possessed "superior overall power" and "in dependable combination with other like-minded nations." It calls for a military capable ofDefending the Western Hemisphere and essential allied areas in order that their war-making capabilities can be developed;Providing and protecting a mobilization base while the offensive forces required for victory were being built up;Conducting offensive operations to destroy vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity, and to keep the enemy off balance until the full offensive strength of the United States and its allies can be brought to bear;Defending and maintaining the lines of communication and base areas necessary to the execution of the above tasks; andProviding such aid to allies as is essential to the execution of their role in the above tasks.NSC-68 itself did not contain any specific cost estimates. The programs would cost, by estimates, a significant portion, perhaps more than the 20% of GDP the United States was already committing to defense. It was evident that the limits the President had previously set on defense spending would not be compatible with NSC-68. NSC-68 required that the United States must increase defense spending to as much as $50 billion per year from the original $13 billion set for 1950. However the specific costs were left to subsequent groups in the NSC to analyze and budget.Internal debateNSC-68 drew some criticism from senior government officials who believed the Cold War was being escalated unnecessarily. When the report was sent to top officials in the Truman administration for review before its official delivery to the President, many of them scoffed at its arguments. Willard Thorp questioned its contention that the "USSR is steadily reducing the discrepancy between its overall economic strength and that of the United States." Thorp argued: "I do not feel that this position is demonstrated, but rather the reverse... The actual gap is widening in our favor." He pointed out that in 1949 the US economy had increased twofold over that of the Soviet Union. Steel production in the US outpaced the Soviet Union by 2 million tons, and stockpiling of goods and oil production far exceeded Soviet amounts. As for Soviet military investment, Thorp was skeptical that the USSR was committing such large portion of its GDP: "I suspect a larger portion of Soviet investment went into housing." William Schaub of the Bureau of the Budget was particularly harsh, believing that "in every arena," the Air Force, the Army, the Navy, the stockpiling of atomic bombs, the economy, the US was far superior than the Soviet Union. Kennan, although "father" of the containment policy, also disagreed with the document, particularly its call for massive rearmament (FRUS, 1950, Vol. I).Truman's positionPresident Harry S. Truman, even after the Soviets became a nuclear power, sought to curb military spending. However, he did not reject the recommendations of NSC-68 out of hand, instead returning it to circulation and asking for an estimate of the costs involved. In the ensuing two months, little progress was made on the report. By June, Nitze had practically given up on it. But on June 25, 1950, North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel north. With the Korean War begun, NSC-68 took on new importance. As Acheson later remarked: "Korea... created the stimulus which made action."Public opinionThe Truman Administration began a nationwide public relations campaign to convince Congress and opinion setters of the need for strategic rearmament and containment of Soviet communism. It had to overcome isolationists, including Senator Robert A. Taft, who wanted less world involvement, as well as intense anti-Communists such as James Burnham who proposed an alternative strategy of rollback that would eliminate Communism or perhaps launch a preemptive war. The State Department and the White House used the North Korean attack of June 1950 and the see-saw battles during the first few months of the Korean War to steer congressional and public opinion toward a course of rearmament between the two poles of preventive war and isolationism.Historical debateNSC-68 is a source of much historical debate as is the escalation of the Cold War. NSC-68 was an important part of an overall shift in American foreign policy to a comprehensive containment strategy that was confirmed by successive administrations. Analyses ranges from Michael Hogan's belief that NSC-68 portrayed the threat "in the worst light possible" to providing an accurate picture of a genuine and growing threat.ConclusionThe strategy outlined in NSC-68 achieved ultimate victory, according to this view, with the collapse of the Soviet power and the emergence of a "new world order" centered on American liberal-capitalist values. Truman officially signed NSC-68 on September 30, 1950. It was declassified in 1975.Notes^ Block, Fred L. "The Origins of International..." Google Books. 28 Apr. 2010. Web. 29 Apr. 2010.^ Paul H Nitze, S Nelson Drew, Ed., NSC-68: forging the strategy of containment, Brief Chronology, pp. 17–9.^Paul H. Nitze, S. Nelson Drew, Ed., NCS-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment, p. 6, National Defense University, Washington DC: 1994. Google Books, 23 Apr. 2009^ Nash, Gary B., Julie Roy Jeffrey, John R. Howe, Peter J. Frederick, Allen F. Davis, Allan M. Winkler, Charlene Mires, and Carla GardinaPestana. The American People, Concise Edition Creating a Nation and a Society, Combined Volume (6th Edition). New York: Longman, 2007.^ational Security Council (U.S.), Paul H. Nitze, National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, and National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies. NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment. Ed. S. Nelson Drew. DIANE, 1994 p6.^ Nash, Gary B., Julie Roy Jeffrey, John R. Howe, Peter J. Frederick, Allen F. Davis, Allan M. Winkler, Charlene Mires, and Carla GardinaPestana. The American People, Concise Edition Creating a Nation and a Society, Combined Volume (6th Edition). New York: Longman, 2007 p829.^Matray, Truman Library.^ Princeton Seminars, October 10, 1950, reel 2, track 2, p. 15, Acheson Papers, Truman Library, Independence, Missouri^ Steven Casey, "Selling NSC-68: The Truman Administration, Public Opinion, and the Politics of Mobilization, 1950-51." Diplomatic History 2005 29(4): 655-690. Issn: 0145-2096 Fulltext: Ebsco^ Hixson, Walter L. "What Was the Cold War and How Did We Win It?" 28 Apr. 2010. Web. 29 Apr. 2010. ^NSC-68, 1950BibliographyAcheson, Dean (1969). Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. New York: Norton. pp. 798 pp. ASIN B0006D5KREBeisner, Robert L. Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War (Oxford University Press, 2006) online editionBernstein, Barton J. "The Truman Presidency and the Korean War," in Michael James Lacey, ed. The Truman Presidency (1989) pp 410-43 online editionCallahan, David. Dangerous Capabilities: Paul Nitze and the Cold War. (1990). 507 pp.Caridi, Ronald James. "The G.O.P. and the Korean War." Pacific Historical Review 1968 37(4): 423-443. Issn: 0030-8684 in JstorCasey, Steven. Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics, and Public Opinion in the United States, 1950-1953 (2008)Casey, Steven. "Selling NSC-68: The Truman Administration, Public Opinion, and the Politics of Mobilization, 1950-51." Diplomatic History 2005 29(4): 655-690. Issn: 0145-2096 Fulltext: EbscoCombs, Jerald A. "The Compromise That Never Was: George Kennan, Paul Nitze, and the Issue of Conventional Deterrence in Europe, 1949-1952," Diplomatic History, v. 15, No. 3 (Summer 1991), pp. 347-382:Cox, Michael. "Western Intelligence, the Soviet Threat and NSC-68: A Reply to Beatrice Heuser," Review of International Studies, 18, No. 1 (January 1992), pp. 75-83Dockrill, Saki. "Dealing with Soviet Power and Influence: Eisenhower's Management of U.S. National Security." Diplomatic History 2000 24(2): 345-352. Issn: 0145-2096 Fulltext: EbscoDonnelly, William M. "'The Best Army That Can Be Put in the Field in the Circumstances': the U.S. Army, July 1951-July 1953." Journal of Military History 2007 71(3): 809-847. Issn: 0899-3718 Fulltext: EbscoSpaulding, Elizabeth Edwards The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the Remaking of Liberal Internationalism. (2006) 314 ppFakiolas, Efstathios T. "Kennan's Long Telegram and NSC-68: A Comparative Theoretical Analysis." East European Quarterly, Vol. 31, 1998 online editionFautua, David T. "The 'Long Pull' Army: NSC 68, the Korean War, and the Creation of the Cold War U.s. Army." Journal of Military History 1997 61(1): 93-120. in JstorGaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment. A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (1982)Gaddis, John Lewis. "NSC-68 and the Problem of Ends and Means," International Security, v. 4, No. 4 (Spring 1980), pp. 164-170 in JSTORGuerrier, Steven Warren. "NSC-68 and the Truman Rearmament, 1950-1953." PhD dissertation U. of Michigan 1988. 441 pp. DAI 1988 49(5): 1253-A. DA8812899 Fulltext: ProQuest Dissertations & ThesesHamby, Alonzo. Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman (1998) excerpt and text searchHammond, Paul Y. "NSC-68: Prologue to Rearmament," in Walter Schilling et al. eds. Strategy, Politics and Defence Budgets (1962), pp. 274-326Heuser, Beatrice. "NSC-68 and the Soviet Threat: A New Perspective on Western Threat Perception and Policy Making," Review of International Studies, 17, No. 1 (January 1991), pp. 17-40; rejects notion that US misperceived and overreacted to Stalin's worldwide intentions; she instead says that events after World War II in the Balkans and Korea demonstrate a legitimate basis for NSC 68 and the resulting military buildup.Hogan, Michael J. A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. p12May, Ernest R., ed. American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68 (1993), with complete text of NSC-68Nitze, Paul. "The Development of NSC-68," International Security, v.4, No. 4 (Spring 1980), pp. 170-176 in JSTORNitze, Paul H. From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989.Ohanian, Lee E. "The Macroeconomic Effects of War Finance in the United States: World War II and the Korean War" American Economic Review. 87#1 (1997) pp 23-40 in JSTORPierpaoli, Paul G. Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the Early Cold War (1999) online editionRosenberg, David Alan. "The Origins of Overkill. Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," International Security, v. 7, No. 4 (Spring 1983), pp. 3-72;Talbott, Strobe. The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988.Wells, Jr., Samuel F. "Sounding the Tocsin: NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat" International Security, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Autumn, 1979), pp. 116-158 in JSTORPrimary Sources"A Report to the National Security Council - NSC 68", April 12, 1950. President's Secretary's File, Truman Library.External linksWikisource has original text related to this article:NSC-68Text of the report in multi-page formText of NSC-68 in single-page form"NSC 68 and the Patriot Act" a high school lesson plan comparing NSC-68 and the 2001Seminar Paper Selling NSC-68: Mobilization, Public Opinion, and the Korean War, by Steven Casey, London School of EconomicsNational Security Strategy 2006National Security Strategy 2002National Security Strategy 1996
Photo: Description English: The Last Supper (Mosaic in Basilica di San Marco) http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/production/researchissues/concentration_aprodConcentration of arms production in the USAIn the United States, there was an intensive period of concentration between 1993 and 1998, when a number of large-scale mergers and acquisitions took place. While this was made possible by changes in government policy, the financial sector also had a major role in this process. The catalyst of this development was a change in US defence industry policy in 1993 when the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry, addressed a dinner attended by defence industry executives and openly encouraged consolidation—this became known as the ‘last supper’. The presence of financiers at this meeting illustrates the increasing role of financial capital in the arms industry. To promote the consolidation, the DOD allowed companies to write off restructuring costs against military contracts, with the expectation of large costs savings which never materialized. The policy ended when the DOD decided it had gone far enough and blocked the merger of Lockheed Martin with Northrop Grumman in early 1997. This left four major US contractors in 1998: Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and Raytheon—which are now four of the top five companies in the SIPRI Top 100 for 2004. The list below tracks the evolution of these companies between 1990 and 1998.USA aerospace industry consolidation, 1990-1998.After 1998 the rate of concentration among large US companies has slowed down and the M&A deals have become smaller, but there is still a significant amount of acquisitions activity in the US arms industry.Major acquisitions in the North American arms industry 1998-2003.Concentration reduced the number of 'prime contractors' - the end producers of major weapons systems - dramatically throughout the 1990s. For example, the number of suppliers of tactical missiles dropped from 13 to 3 between 1990 and 2000. The reduction of other types of weapon systems are shown in the table below:Number of US DOD prime contractors in selected types of weapon systems, 1990 and 2000.Description English: The Last Supper (Mosaic in Basilica di San Marco) Date XIII c. Source Basilica di San Marco, turistic book Author anonimous master Permission(Reusing this file) See below. LicensingThis is a faithful photographic reproduction of an original two-dimensional work of art. The work of art itself is in the public domain for the following reason:This image (or other media file) is in the public domain because its copyright has expired.This applies to Australia, the European Union and those countries with a copyright term of life of the author plus 70 years.
Norm Augustine: NASA PhotoThe Last Supper, Revisited Meeting Ignited Inevitable Consolidation By Norman R. Augustine Defense News June 26, 2006 The invitation received by about 15 defense industry chief executives in 1993 to drop by the Pentagon for dinner was signed by Defense Secretary Les Aspin. It was, as the saying goes, an invitation one simply couldn’t refuse. The events that took place that evening forever changed the character of the U.S. defense industry. Five years earlier, the defense budget had been projected by the Department of Defense to be well above $600 billion by the early 1990s. But in the interim, the Berlin Wall had collapsed, the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union each ceased to exist, and the defense budget passed through $300 billion, heading steeply downward. At the dinner, I was seated next to the defense secretary, and we discussed what appeared to be the industry’s evolving strategy for survival — a strategy which I referred to as Mutual Assured Starvation. “There may be only one new airplane,” the strategy went, “but everyone will share in it: Company A will build the vertical tail, Company B the left horizontal tail, Company C the right horizontal tail, and so forth.” After dinner, when we retired to the secretary’s briefing room, we were told that Secretary Aspin, Deputy Secretary Bill Perry and John Deutch, undersecretary of defense for acquisition, had other ideas. In fact, so sobering was their presentation that, when asked by a reporter a few days later for comments about the evening, I referred to it as “the Last Supper” — a sobriquet which had legs. After a brief introduction by Secretary Aspin, the presentation was largely made by Deputy Secretary Perry. He indicated the government had no intention of paying ballooning overhead costs as companies tried to preserve their headquarters and corporate aircraft fleets, even as their factories and labs disappeared. (Actually, one company did have a relatively imaginative approach. As reported by USA Today at the time, “CEO Kent Kresa also said Northrop will continue to sell nonproductive assets. Last year, it sold its headquarters in Los Angeles.” But that had to be counted as an exception.) In the briefing, it was pointed out the Defense Department was supported by five contractors providing surface combatants, but could afford to sustain only two; that it was provided rocket motors by five contractors, but needed only two; that it was provided bombers by three contractors, but needed only one; that it was provided submarines by two contractors, but needed only one; and so forth. Ironically, no one seemed particularly concerned at the time. CEOs, being CEOs, each logically assumed that they would be the “one.” Secretaries Perry and Deutch concluded the meeting by making it abundantly clear the Defense Department was not going to solve industry’s overcapacity problem — that would be up to those of us in the audience. But they did assure us the DoD would strongly support industry consolidation and approve financial arrangements that benefited companies as long as they also significantly benefited the government. The rest is history. General Electric Aerospace merged with Martin Marietta, which combined with Lockheed. McDonnell Douglas joined Boeing. Grumman joined Northrop. When the dust had cleared, there were only a few firms left standing. Was this good? To answer that question, one must consider the alternatives. Clearly, 10 healthy contractors is preferable to nine healthy contractors, which in turn is better than eight. Unfortunately, that was not among the options. The choice was to have a large number of relatively weak competitors or a small number of healthy competitors. Experience suggests the latter is preferable from every perspective. (As a contractor, I always preferred to compete against healthy, strong companies. Weak, desperate firms take unpredictable, desperate actions, complying with my law of the “cross-eyed discus thrower”: “He seldom wins any gold, but he sure does keep the crowd on its toes.”) The governing law is that the marginal gain in competitive benefits decreases with each additional competitor above two. Clearly, one would always prefer not to have a single provider; however, if that competitor is healthy and responsible, even that may be preferable to two very weak competitors. The particularly unfortunate aspect of the single provider is that it is simply a stroke of the pen away from de facto nationalization of the industry: the re-establishment of the arsenal system. And the free enterprise system does work, whether one is making missiles or whistles. The bottom line is that consolidation also worked: Lockheed Martin alone has saved the government over $3 billion per year by its consolidation actions, about equal to the savings from a single BRAC. Other firms in the industry have produced corresponding savings. Today, the industry is stronger than it would have been absent consolidation, albeit not without major challenges remaining. Not only has the government benefited greatly, so did the shareholders. Sadly, the burden was borne by that large number of very loyal, able employees who paid the price of the restructuring as the industry downsized and their jobs vanished. This was, by far, the greatest disappointment in my career, the second being the fact that the government reversed its policy of supporting consolidation suddenly and precipitously, without advising anyone in industry that it was going to do so. Perhaps the greatest irony is that it was inevitable that much of this restructuring would occur sooner or later, anyway. As the data presented in “Augustine’s Laws” as early as 1967 showed, the growth in the cost of individual items of military equipment was far exceeding the growth of the defense budget, such that within a few decades the quantity of individual items that could be purchased would diminish precipitously. That is, simple economics and arithmetic dictated that eventually only very small quantities — albeit of highly capable items — of military equipment would be affordable, unless markedly different procurement strategies were adopted. Many firms would have to be squeezed out of the industry eventually. The real benefit of the “Last Supper” may have stemmed from the fact that when change is inevitable, it is almost always best that it be implemented quickly. That is what happened. Les, Bill and John had it right. But next time I am invited to dinner at the Pentagon, I hope they provide Rolaids along with the dessert. Hoover InstitiutionWilliam J. Perry, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor at Stanford University, with a joint appointment in the School of Engineering and the Institute for International Studies, where he is codirector of the Preventive Defense Project, a research collaboration of Stanford and Harvard Universities. His previous academic experience includes professor (halftime) at Stanford from 1988 to 1993, when he was the codirector of the Center for International Security and Arms Control. He also served as a part-time lecturer in the Department of Mathematics at Santa Clara University from 1971 to 1977.Perry was the nineteenth United States secretary of defense, serving from February 1994 to January 1997. His previous government experience was as deputy secretary of defense (1993–94) and undersecretary of defense for research and engineering (1977–81).Perry's business experience includes serving as a laboratory director for General Telephone and Electronics (1954–64); founding and serving as the president of ESL (1964–77); executive vice-president of Hambrecht & Quist (1981–85); and founding and serving as the chairman of Technology Strategies and Alliances (1985–93). He serves on the board of directors of Anteon International Corporation and several emerging high-tech companies and is chairman of Global Technology Partners.Perry was born October 11, 1927, in Vandergrift, Pennsylvania. He attended grade school and high school in Butler, Pennsylvania. He received his B.S. and M.S. degrees from Stanford University and his Ph.D. from Pennsylvania State, all in mathematics. He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. From 1946 to 1947, Perry was an enlisted man in the Army Corps of Engineers and served in the Army of Occupation in Japan. He joined the Reserve Officer Training Corps in 1948 and was a second lieutenant in the army reserves from 1950 to 1955.Perry has received numerous awards, including the Presidential Medal of Freedom (1997), the Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal (1980 and again in 1981), and Outstanding Civilian Service Medals from the army (1962 and 1997), the air force (1997), the navy (1997), the Defense Intelligence Agency (1977 and 1997), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (1981), and the coast guard (1997). He received the American Electronic Association's Medal of Achievement (1980), the Eisenhower Award (1996), the Marshall Award (1997), the Forrestal Medal (1994), and the Henry Stimson Medal (1994). The National Academy of Engineering selected him for the Arthur Bueche Medal (1996). He has been honored with awards from the enlisted personnel of the army, navy, and air force. Perry has received decorations from the governments of Germany, England, France, Korea, Albania, Poland, Ukraine, Bahrain, Slovenia, Hungary, and Japan.
Mobilization in WWII This brochure was prepared in the U.S. Army Center of Military History by Frank N. Schubert.
World War II was the largest and most violent armed conflict in the history of mankind. However, the half century that now separates us from that conflict has exacted its toll on our collective knowledge. While World War II continues to absorb the interest of military scholars and historians, as well as its veterans, a generation of Americans has grown to maturity largely unaware of the political, social, and military implications of a war that, more than any other, united us as a people with a common purpose. Highly relevant today, World War II has much to teach us, not only about the profession of arms, but also about military preparedness, global strategy, and combined operations in the coalition war against fascism. During the next several years, the U.S. Army will participate in the nation's 50th anniversary commemoration of World War II. The commemoration will include the publication of various materials to help educate Americans about that war. The works produced will provide great opportunities to learn about and renew pride in an Army that fought so magnificently in what has been called "the mighty endeavor." World War II was waged on land on sea, and in the air over several diverse theaters of operation for approximately six years. The following essay on the wartime mobilization effort supplements a series of studies on the Army's campaigns of that war. This brochure was prepared in the U.S. Army Center of Military History by Frank N. Schubert. I hope this absorbing account of that period will enhance your appreciation of American achievements during World War II. GORDON R. SULLIVANGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff
Mobilization in WWII This brochure was prepared in the U.S. Army Center of Military History by Frank N. Schubert.
Mobilization in WWII This brochure was prepared in the U.S. Army Center of Military History by Frank N. Schubert.
James Francis Byrnes (May 2, 1882 – April 9, 1972) was an American statesman from the state of South Carolina. During his career, Byrnes served as a member of the House of Representatives (1911–1925), as a Senator (1931–1941), as Justice of the Supreme Court (1941–1942), as Secretary of State (1945–1947), and as the 104th Governor of South Carolina (1951–1955). He therefore became one of very few politicians to be active in all three branches of the federal government while also being active in state government. He was also a confidant of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and was one of the most powerful men in American domestic and foreign policy in the mid-1940s.
Financing the warThe total cost of the war to the federal government between 1941 and 1945 was about $321,000,000,000 (10 times as much as World War I). Taxes paid 41 percent of the cost, less than Roosevelt requested but more than the World War I figure of 33 percent. The remainder was financed by borrowing from financial institutions, an expensive method but one that Congress preferred over the alternatives of raising taxes even higher or making war bond purchases compulsory. In consequence the national debt increased fivefold, amounting to $259,000,000,000 in 1945. The Revenue Act of 1942 revolutionized the tax structure by increasing the number who paid income taxes from 13,000,000 to 50,000,000. At the same time, through taxes on excess profits and other sources of income, the rich were made tobear a larger part of the burden, making this the only period in modern history when wealth was significantly redistributedhttp://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/616563/United-States/77877/World-War-II?anchor=ref613132
This image is a work of a U.S. Air Force Airman or employee, taken or made as part of that person's official duties. As a work of the U.S. federal government, the image is in the public domain.
t involved four main-assembly factories: a pair of Boeing operated plants at Renton, Washington, and Wichita, Kansas, a Bell plant at Marietta, Georgia ("Bell-Atlanta"), and a Martin plant at Omaha, Nebraska ("Martin-Omaha").
Four key innovations facilitated this enormous wartime output. First, the commission itself allowed the federal government to direct the merchant shipbuilding industry. Second, the commission funded entrepreneurs, the industrialist Henry J. Kaiser chief among them, who had never before built ships and who were eager to use mass-production methods in the shipyards. These methods, including the substitution of welding for riveting and the addition of hundreds of thousands of women and minorities to the formerly all-white and all-male shipyard workforces, were a third crucial innovation. Last, the commission facilitated mass production by choosing to build many standardized vessels like the ugly, slow, and ubiquitous "Liberty" ship. By adapting well-known manufacturing techniques and emphasizing easily-made ships, merchant shipbuilding became a low-tech counterexample to the atomic-bomb project and the aerospace industry, yet also a sector which was spectacularly successful.http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/tassava.WWII
Kennedy, David M. Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employment status of the civilian noninstitutional population, 1940 to date." Available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat1.pdf.
Mobilization in WWII This brochure was prepared in the U.S. Army Center of Military History by Frank N. Schubert.
http://americanhistory.si.edu/collections/object.cfm?key=35&objkey=9842Physical DescriptionM1 rocket launcher, 60 mm, known as a “Bazooka.”General HistoryThe United States had a growing stockpile of excellent antitank warheads but lacked a suitable delivery system. Colonel Leslie Skinner, a U.S. Army officer at the Ordnance Proving Ground, was an enthusiastic proponent of rockets. He suggested carrying the hollow charge at the tip of a high-speed rocket. He built a rocket to carry a grenade body, then took a modified 60-mm mortar tube and demonstrated the destructive force of his new weapon in front of high-ranking generals. The officers gathered to see the official demonstrations of other weapons were suitably impressed and Skinner's weapon was ordered into production immediately. The new weapon was soon modified for production and a month later, in May 1942, General Electric had built 5,000 ready for combat. The first model was known as the Rocket Launcher M1. The caliber of 60 mm or 2.36 inches was determined by the grenades used as the warhead, which were already in production. The Bazooka got its nickname for its similar shape to the popular 1930s and 1940s radio comedian Bob Burns’s musical instrument, a homemade trombone he called a Bazooka.Measurements: overall: 11 in x 55 in x 3 1/2 in; 27.94 cm x 139.7 cm x 8.89 cmMaker(s):maker: General Electric CompanyDate Made: 1942Object ID: AF*67438MSubject(s):Military
The design was modified by the United States Maritime Commission to conform to American construction practices and to make it even quicker and cheaper to build. The US version was designated 'EC2-S-C1': 'EC' for Emergency Cargo, '2' for a ship between 400 and 450 feet (120 and 140 m) long (Load Waterline Length), 'S' for steam engines, and 'C1' for design C1. The new design replaced much riveting, which accounted for one-third of the labor costs, with welding, and featured oil-fired boilers. The order was given to a conglomerate of West Coast engineering and construction companies known as the Six Companies, headed by Henry J. Kaiser, and was also adopted as the Merchant Marine Act design.Suspicion fell on the shipyards which had often used inexperienced workers and new welding techniques to produce large numbers of ships in great haste. Suspicion fell on the shipyards which had often used inexperienced workers and new welding techniques to produce large numbers of ships in great haste. The Ministry of War Transport lent the British-built Empire Duke for testing purposes. Constance Tipper of Cambridge University demonstrated that the fractures were not initiated by welding, but instead by the grade of steel used which suffered from embrittlement. She discovered that the ships in the North Atlantic were exposed to temperatures that could fall below a critical point when the mechanism of failure changed from ductile to brittle, and thus the hull could fracture rather easily. The predominantly welded (as opposed to riveted) hull construction then allowed cracks to run for large distances unimpeded. One common type of crack nucleated at the square corner of a hatch which coincided with a welded seam, both the corner and the weld acting as stress concentrators.http://www.usmaritimecommission.de/Maritime Commission Task FourfoldThe task of the United States Maritime Commission since 1936 has therefore been fourfold:1. To build shipyards and develop management.2. To recruit, house and train shipyard workers.3. To build ships.4. To train officers and recruit personnel.How did the Maritime Commission-its commissioners and its staff meet this mighty challenge? Getting ReadyTo understand the conditions that faced the United States Maritime Commission at the beginning of World War II, consider and use the imagination on this one statement: "In the fifteen years between 1922 and 1937, only two ocean going dry cargo freighters were produced in American shipyards. A few tankers and passenger ships were built."It is true that late in 1937 the commission's proposal to build fifty ships a year over a ten-year period had been approved, but that was only the beginning. The nation that had built 2,500 ships in World War I had allowed its precious merchant marine to slip out of its hands and in fifteen years had built only two dry cargo freighters.This means much more than that the nation lacked shipyards. It lacked ships, shipyards and seamen; and the men who had once built ships had been forced out of their craft into other occupations. They had died or were too old, their skills were dulled from disuse and only a handful of men in the nation had kept abreast of modern technique and practice. Just as important-perhaps even more important-was the lack of man-agerial brains and experience in the country. There were many men who had accomplished great construction projects-bridges, skyscrapers, tunnels, and mighty dams - but literally-but few with experience in vast shipbuilding organization, in the training of armies of unskilled workers, in ability to "pour it on" and organize and produce ships swiftly and well. Even the shipbuilders of managerial experience were geared to a pace of taking a year to build a ship; and not one American shipbuilder of the peace-time era even dreamed of the management mir-acle of completing a 10,000-ton Liberty ship in an average time of only forty-three days from keel-laying to delivery.This was to come with increasing speed; achievement fed on achievement; the difficult was performed immediately; the impossible took a little longer. Ships constructed during the last war, slightly more than two-thirds as age as those of today, were delivered in from ten to twelve months. In January, 1942, the average de-livery time for a Liberty ship was 241.6 days; one year later, in December of 1942, eighty-two Libertys were' delivered in an average of fifty-five days.The first step in the emergency program was the recruiting of managerial experience and de-vising a fair method of contracting for the payment of the ships the nation had to have . . . and those steps taken by the Commission were explained with humor and vigor by its chairman, Rear Admiral Emory S. Land, before the Sub-committee on Shipyard Profits, Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the House of Representatives on March 22, 1944.Cost-Plus Method OutlawedThe old cost-plus method of building ships had been outlawed and the commission used an advanced type of contract never used before. Under this contract a shipbuilding contractor built and provided the facilities for building ships at cost without any provision of profit to him, and as Admiral Land explained it:"The key idea to the plan was that the contractor would have to produce ships before he would get anything beyond costs. We worked out the location of the yards, the arrangement with the contractors to build the facilities and the ships and a contracting plan for the building of the yards and facilities at cost with no profit to the contractor, and the building of the ships on the basis of an estimated cost with a base fee plus or minus bonuses and penalties dependent on meeting, exceeding, or falling short of required bogies in completion dates, man hours and costs."The Commission had to be both bold and realistic in inducing shipbuilding brains and production management to launch forth on this great program. To persuade private capital into such an undertaking, so transitory that in most cases its life was limited by the national emergency, was impossible. Most of the emergency shipyards were specially built plants adapted to production of a single type of ship, and no contractor could be expected to build a $20,000,000 yard with which he would be stuck at the end of the emergency. The commission therefore placed the emphasis on the shipbuilders' output and not on his capital invested.Admiral Land Solved Difficult ProblemParenthetically, Admiral Land made this humorous observation to the Subcommittee on Shipyard Profits: "If we were to attempt to use as a yardstick under these extraordinary circumstances a percentage return on the capital invested by the shipbuilder under some illogical theory that the relations between invested capital and profit are in any way similar to those commonly found in permanently organized businesses operating under private auspices and in ordinary commercial undertakings, I am frank to say that I have not the slightest idea as to what the proper return in percentage would be. If we reached up into the air and picked out 10 per cent return on the invested capital as suitable, it would lead in the case of some of the Liberty ships to a total profit for the shipbuilder of about $65 per vessel before taxes or about $18 per vessel after taxes, this on vessels costing, let us say, roughly, one million and three-quarters each. I do not want you to take this $18 too seriously. I point to it merely as showing the utter absurdity of attempting to relate the shipbuilder's profit to his invested capital under the conditions which had to be met to make our shipbuilding program possible."One result of incentive payments, however, was to stimulate rivalry between shipbuilders to reduce man-hours and cost and expedite deliveries so that an original estimate of 635,900 man-hours for a Liberty ship was brought down to 520,000 man-hours and in several yards to below 500,000; in one instance even to 350,000. Another result was better ships than those built at Hog Island in the first world war, at lower cost, completed during the war and not after it was over.And although the shipbuilders would be the first to agree that Admiral Land never spared the rod for fear of spoiling the child, he had this to say about them to the Congressmen:Shipbuilders Have Performed Splendidly"These shipbuilders have done one of the greatest managerial jobs of all history. They have provided the 'know-how' and brought to the task imagination, initiative and ability that astounded the world with their achievement. If there is to be a percentage basis for paying them, I think it should be a percentage on brains and not a per-centage on capital. I wish I knew some way to figure the proper percentage of return on brains."In other words the United States Maritime Commission spent the money and produced the goods.Mud-flats Into ShipyardsBy July of 1942 the Maritime Commission had eighteen shipyards operating on commission con-tracts along the Pacific Coast in Washington, Oregon and California. Ten of those yards had not delivered any ships-in fact, eleven of them had been created on mudflats or wastelands-but the other ten had already smashed all-time records for speed in building and number of ships launched. They had built two-thirds of the nation's ships delivered and on the seas.For ExampleThe California Shipbuilding Corporation on Terminal Island in Southern California finished its first ship four months after construction work had begun on a 100-acre mud flat and it was al-ready the second largest emergency shipbuilding yard in the land. . . . Marinship, at Sausalito, on the shores of Richardson Bay sprang partly from the mud on thousands of piles and partly on the site of a hill which had to be cut down to bay level. The site of the Pacific Bridge Company on the Oakland Estuary was not a shipbuilding plant at all in November, 1940, but it laid its first keel three months after the Pearl Harbor attack and had supplied four cargo ships to the British on lend-lease by August of 1942. . . . The Perman-ente Metals Yard No. 1 at Richmond was tidal mudflat at the beginning of 1941 but dredgers scooped out channels and dumped dirt into fills -and three months later a keel was laid and in four months plus two days, the Ocean Vanguard, sponsored by Mrs. Emory S. Land, was launched for delivery to the British Purchasing Commis-sion. Within eighteen months after the mud was so violently disturbed thirty ships had been de-livered to the British. . . . The stories of Yards Nos. 2 and 3 have the same plot of swift action and accomplishment.The Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation began construction in a river bottom in January of 1941, laid two keels four months later and soon made what was at that time a world shipbuilding record by delivering a ship thirty-one days after its keel was laid. . . . Same story at the Swan Island airport at Portland, swiftly transformed into a huge shipbuilding plant in 107 days; and at Kaiser's Vancouver yard which launched its first ship 165 days after it had been a dairy farm.These tell the story of the foresight with which the United States Maritime Commission acted in recruiting brains and managerial ability a year before the Japanese struck without warning and made it possible for the new and old shipyards to swing powerfully into production and reach their peak in time to win the war. Consider the terrific acceleration: twenty-eight ships delivered in 1939, and 1,896 in 1943; 341,219 deadweight tons produced in 1939 and 19,238,626 in 1943.
May 2007, Dean Baker
As the big defense contractors continue to restructure themselves and their workforces for what is expected to be a period of decline in spending more layoffs were announced this week. The pressure too from the U.S. and other governments to be more price conscious is also affecting decisions related to the size of overhead and support employees.Many of the major U.S. corporations have already announced plans to reduce their overall number of employees including General Dynamics (GD), Boeing (BA) and Lockheed Martin (LMT). Despite all three having strong sales and many major programs they feel that it is best to begin creating a leaner overall structure.Read more: http://www.defenseprocurementnews.com/2011/09/28/more-defense-related-layoffs-announced/#ixzz1jHf0NRkz
In a bigger move British defense giant, BAE Systems (BAE:LSE), said that it would plan on reducing its workforce by about 3,000 positions. Most of these would be related to aircraft production where the Eurofighter Typhoon is near the end of its production run. Most of the original European customers have ordered all of that aircraft that they plan to buy leaving it needing Foreign Military Sales (FMS) customers to keep the line going beyond the next decade.Read more: http://www.defenseprocurementnews.com/2011/09/28/more-defense-related-layoffs-announced/#ixzz1jHfYw1z5
GAO-09-454 Defense Exports
DoD Foreign ContractorsTOTAL PURCHASES $5,254,092,000RankParent CompanyAmount ($000s)Market Share (%)1 BAE Systems 1,019,232 19.40 2 Canadian Commercial Corp. 661,701 12.59 3 Government of Germany 410,555 7.81 4 Rolls Royce PLC 215,741 4.11 5 Motor Oil Hellas 148,432 2.83 6 Okinawa Electric Power Co. 96,653 1.84 7 DuchossoisIndustries Inc. 92,427 1.76 8 European Utilities Companies 83,840 1.60 9 Daimler-Chrysler 80,548 1.53 10 KuwaitNationalPetroleumCo. 80,134 1.53 11 Tokyo Denryoku KK 74,207 1.41 12 FN FabriqueNationale De Herst 72,634 1.38 13 SKE Maintenance GMBH 59,864 1.14 14 Snecma 56,932 1.08 15 Texaco Inc. 54,186 1.03 16 Siemens AG 52,821 1.01 17 Hyundai Corp. 50,811 0.97 18 Government of theNetherlands 48,819 0.93 19 Bilfinger & Berger 42,353 0.81 20 Williams Holdings PLC 40,263 0.77 21 Warehouses Service Agency SARL 37,736 0.72 22 Greenland Contractors 36,422 0.69 23 Compania Espanola de Petroleos 33,370 0.64 24 Racal Electronics PLC 32,775 0.62 25 Ericsson 31,852 0.61 DoD Foreign Military SalesTOTAL PURCHASES $8,576,475,000RankParent CompanyAmount ($000s)Market Share (%)1 Lockheed Martin Corp. 3,431,950 40.02 2 Raytheon Co. 916,557 10.69 3 Boeing Co. 525,128 6.12 4 Canadian Commercial Corp. 455,658 5.31 5 Northrop Grumman Corp. 364,135 4.25 6 General Dynamics Corp. 330,531 3.85 7 TRW Inc. 297,288 3.47 8 Science Applications Intl. Corp. 256,031 2.99 9 United Technologies Corp. 159,830 1.86 10 General Electric Co. 96,106 1.12 11 Honeywell Inc. 91,697 1.07 12 Renco Group 71,842 0.84 13 Carlyle Group 59,540 0.69 14 Engineering Mgmt. Concepts 48,821 0.57 15 Government of the Netherlands 48,819 0.57
about the center for Strategic and budgetary assessmentsthe center for Strategic and budgetary Assessments (cSbA) is an independent, nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. cSbA’s goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters of strategy, security policy and resource allocation.cSbA provides timely, impartial and insightful analyses to senior decision makers in the executive and legislative branches, as well as to the media and the broader national security community. cSbA encourages thoughtful participation in the development of national security strategy and policy, and in the allocation of scarce human and capital resources. cSbA’s analysis and outreach focus on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to US national security. Meeting these challenges will require transforming the national security establishment, and we are devoted to helping achieve this end.
THURSDAY, MAY 01, 2008Understanding Defense Think-TanksTomDispatch.comreproduces Chalmers Johnson's review of Soldiers of Reason: The RAND Corporation and the Rise of the American Empire, by Alex Abella. Although Johnson is wrong about American "imperialism," the causes of the Cold War, and the role of RAND (the prototypical defense think-tank) in fostering and prolonging the Cold War. But Johnson is right in his characterization of defense think-tanks and their denizens. For example:[RAND's] ideological bent was disguised in statistics and equations, which allegedly made its analyses "rational" and "scientific." Abella writes:"If a subject could not be measured, ranged, or classified, it was of little consequence in systems analysis, for it was not rational. Numbers were all -- the human factor was a mere adjunct to the empirical."In my opinion, Abella here confuses numerical with empirical. Most RAND analyses were formal, deductive, and mathematical but rarely based on concrete research into actually functioning societies. RAND never devoted itself to the ethnographic and linguistic knowledge necessary to do truly empirical research on societies that its administrators and researchers, in any case, thought they already understood....It is also important to note that RAND's analytical errors were not just those of commission -- excessive mathematical reductionism -- but also of omission. As Abella notes, "In spite of the collective brilliance of RAND there would be one area of science that would forever elude it, one whose absence would time and again expose the organization to peril: the knowledge of the human psyche."Following the axioms of mathematical economics, RAND researchers tended to lump all human motives under what the Canadian political scientist C. B. Macpherson called "possessive individualism" and not to analyze them further. Therefore, they often misunderstood mass political movements, failing to appreciate the strength of organizations like the Vietcong and its resistance to the RAND-conceived Vietnam War strategy of "escalated" bombing of military and civilian targets.What Johnson says of RAND is typical of defense think-tanks. They tend to recruit academically minded Ph.D.s, whose understanding of the real world is off-center to begin with, and which remains almost completely innocent of the actual practice of statecraft and warfare. (See this post for a small sample.)In my experience (30 years' worth), the output of a defense think tank is seven parts theoretical, mathematical, and speculative (i.e., bull----) and one part empirical.POSTED BY THOMAS AT 12:15 PM CATEGORIES: POLITICS - POLITICIANS - GOVERNMENT IN ACTION
SUNDAY, AUGUST 06, 2006My Alma Mater in (Typical) ActionFrom WorldWideStandard.com:The Center for Naval Analyses has just released a report on "Managing Civil Strife and Avoiding Civil War in Iraq." A senior military analyst emailed me his take after reviewing the report:There are two interesting things about this report, in my view. First, although the panelists identified the power vacuum [see here for more on the roots of this vacuum) as the greatest factor contributing to the rise of militias on both sides, they assume, apparently without much discussion, that the US can do nothing to fill this vacuum. Second, they focus almost entirely on recommending solutions that rely on improvements in things we have the least control and leverage over. . . .The discussion about what to do in Iraq is spinning off into never-never land as people focus ever more on irrelevant theories and propose solutions that can't be implemented. . . .This piece by Dexter Filkins in today's New York Times seems to confirm much of the above.Typical. It's just what you'd expect from an institution which is headed by a self-described "Carter Democrat," and the staff of which comprises too many political non-scientists, whose idea of finding the truth is to convene "balanced" panels of bloviators. Yet one more bit wasteful exercise in self-aggrandizement, at the taxpayers' expense.P.S. The first link in the block quotation takes you to the home page of the Center's parent organization, The CNA Corporation. The conference report in question is here.POSTED BY THOMAS AT 8:24 PM
In 2010, the Cato Institute reported support by some 60 plus foundations including:Atlantic PhilanthropiesCharles G. Koch Charitable FoundationEarhart FoundationJM Foundation, founded by businessman Jeremiah MilbankJohn M. Olin Foundation, Inc.Claude R. Lambe Charitable FoundationLynde and Harry Bradley FoundationCastle Rock Foundation (formerly known as The Coors Foundation)Scaife Foundations (Sarah Mellon Scaife, Carthage)Ford FoundationPloughshares FundMarijuana Policy ProjectCorporate supportLike many think tanks, Cato receives support from a variety of corporations. In fiscal year 2008, corporate donations accounted for two percent of its budget.In 2004, the Institute published a paper arguing in favor of "drug re-importation." A 2006 study attacked the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Cato has published numerous studies criticizing what it calls "corporate welfare", the practice of public officials funneling taxpayer money, usually via targeted budgetary spending, to politically connected corporate interests.For example, in 2002, Cato president Ed Crane and Sierra Club executive director Carl Pope co-wrote an op-ed piece in the Washington Post calling for the abandonment of the Republican energy bill, arguing that it had become little more than a gravy train for Washington, D.C. lobbyists. Again in 2005, Cato scholar Jerry Taylor teamed up with Daniel Becker of the Sierra Club to attack the Republican Energy Bill as a give-away to corporate interests.Still, some critics have accused Cato of being too tied to corporate funders, especially during the 1990s. Such critics report that Cato received funding from Philip Morris and other tobacco companies during this period and that at one point Rupert Murdoch served on the boards of directors of both Cato and Philip Morris.Cato received support from multiple corporations in 2010 including:Altria Group, Inc.Amerisure CompaniesCME GroupConsumer Electronics AssociationFedEx CorporationGoogle Inc.PMI Global Services, Inc.Reynolds AmericanVerisign Inc.Volkswagen of AmericaWhole Foods Market
RAND Corporation (Research ANdDevelopment) is a nonprofit global policy think tank first formed to offer research and analysis to the United States armed forces by Douglas Aircraft Company. It is currently financed by the U.S. government and private endowment, corporations including the healthcare industry, universities and private individuals. The organization has long since expanded to working with other governments, private foundations, international organizations, and commercial organizations on a host of non-defense issues. RAND aims for interdisciplinary and quantitative problem solving via translating theoretical concepts from formal economics and the hard sciences into novel applications in other areas; that is, via applied science and operations research. Michael D. Rich is president and chief executive officer of the RAND Corporation.RAND has approximately 1,700 employees and three principal North American locations: Santa Monica, California (headquarters); Arlington, Virginia; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The RAND Gulf States Policy Institute has offices in New Orleans, Louisiana, and Jackson, Mississippi. RAND Europe is located in Cambridge, United Kingdom, and Brussels, Belgium. The RAND-Qatar Policy Institute is in Doha, Qatar. RAND's newest offices are in Boston, Massachusetts, Abu Dhabi, The United Arab Emirates, and Mexico City, Mexico, a representative office.RAND is also home to the Frederick S. Pardee RAND Graduate School, one of the original[clarification needed] graduate programs in public policy and the first to offer a Ph.D. The program aims to have practical value in that students work alongside RAND analysts on real-world problems. The campus is at RAND's Santa Monica research facility. The Pardee RAND School is the world's largest Ph.D.-granting program in policy analysis.RAND publishes The RAND Journal of Economics, a peer-reviewed journal of economics.To date, 32 recipients of the Nobel Prize, primarily in the fields of economics and physics, have been involved or associated with RAND at some point in their career.
all-weather fleet defense interceptorThe F-4's biggest weakness, as it was initially designed, was its lack of an internal cannon. For a brief period, doctrine held that turning combat would be impossible at supersonic speeds and little effort was made to teach pilots air combat maneuvering. In reality, engagements quickly became subsonic. Furthermore, the relatively new heat-seeking and radar-guided missiles at the time were frequently reported as unreliable and pilots had to use multiple shots (also known as ripple-firing), just to hit one enemy fighter. To compound the problem, rules of engagement in Vietnam precluded long-range missile attacks in most instances, as visual identification was normally required. Many pilots found themselves on the tail of an enemy aircraft but too close to fire short-range Falcons or Sidewinders. Although in 1967 USAF F-4Cs began carrying SUU-16 or SUU-23 external gunpods containing a 20 mm (.79 in) M61 Vulcan Gatling cannon, USAF cockpits were not equipped with lead-computing gunsights, virtually assuring a miss in a maneuvering fight. Some Marine Corps aircraft carried two pods for strafing. In addition to the loss of performance due to drag, combat showed the externally mounted cannon to be inaccurate unless frequently boresighted, yet far more cost-effective than missiles. The lack of a cannon was finally addressed by adding an internally mounted 20 mm (.79 in) M61 Vulcan on the F-4E.
Hx of contracting 3 16 feb 12
Total: 1 hour 15 min Lesson 1: Industry Landscape Learning Outcomes: Students will be able to explain how the scope and diversity of the current industry landscape influences companies’ methods of competing for defense contracts. Compare differences in business/market strategies, priorities, and processes between large, medium, small companies. Compare differences in business operations and strategies between companies focused on weapons systems, commercial products, and/or services. Describe defense companies’ core offerings. Differentiate between public and private companies. Describe the core businesses and focus of the current largest defense companies. Explain potential company strategic options in reaction to mission and budget changes, such as consolidation, restructures, diversification, mergers, acquisitions, divestitures, leave the market, etc. Describe macro issues that drive DoD industry today. Explain how industry can be vulnerable to economic trends, such as technology breakthroughs, workforce skill availability, energy issues, raw material supplies, etc. Explain how global competition impacts US industry market opportunities. Describe recent revenue and profit trends in the US defense industry. Describe how DoD funding profiles impact competitive outlook for defense industry. Describe tools and regulations that enable the Government to preserve a competitive base.
• 1.0 Students will be able to explain how the scope and diversity of the current industry landscape influences companies’ methods of competing for defense contracts.
• Compare differences in• business/market strategies,• priorities, and• processes between large, medium, small companies.
• Compare differences in business operations and strategies between companies focused on• weapons systems,• commercial products,• and/or services.
• Differentiate between public and private companies. Public: Lockheed Martin Private: General Atomics
The company is a designer and manufacturer of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) with names like Predator, Avenger, and Gray Eagle, as well as airborne intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR) sensor systems, including the Lynx multi-function radar and the Highlighter sensor for detecting improvised explosive devices. The company also manufactures solid-state digital ground control stations and provides UAS training and field operations support services. Additionally, it is developing lasers for rangefinding and marking targets. GA-ASI is an affiliate of privately-held General Atomics.
• Describe the core businesses and focus of the current largest defense companies.• http://washingtontechnology.com/toplists/top-100- lists/2010.aspx
1 Lockheed Martin Corp. $10,888,633,000 2 Northrop Grumman Corp. $8,212,891,000 3 Boeing Co. $5,051,984,000 4 General Dynamics Corp. $4,576,415,00 5 Raytheon Co. $4,095,309 6 KBR Inc $3,546,554,000 7 L-3 Communications Corp. $3,332,433,000 8 Science Applications International Corp. $3,280,980,000 9 DynCorp International Inc. $2,398,874,000 10 Hewlett-Packard Co. $2,344,325,000 11 Booz Allen Hamilton $2,344,325,000 12 CACI International Inc. $2,059,613,000 13 Harris Corp. $1,993,623,000 14 Computer Sciences Corp. $1,828,670,000 15 ITT Corp. $1,808,674,000 16 Fluor Corp. $1,742,216,000 17 BAE Systems Inc. $1,381,184,000 18 Dell Inc. $1,263,236,000 18 ManTech International Corp. $1,167,928,000 20 United Technologies Corp. $1,121,492,000
• Explain potential company strategic options in reaction to mission and budget changes, such as consolidation, restructures, diversification, mergers, acquisitions, divestitures, leave the market, etc.
• Describe macro issues that drive DoD industry today.
• Explain how industry can be vulnerable to economic trends, such as technology breakthroughs, workforce skill availability, energy issues, raw material supplies, etc. Energy see RAND on biofuels Rand on Titanium Lockheed Workforce Slide
• Explain how global competition impacts US industry market opportunities.
• Describe recent revenue and profit trends in the US defense industry.
• Describe how DoD funding profiles impact competitive outlook for defense industry.
• Describe tools and regulations that enable the Government to preserve a competitive base.• Full and Open Competition• Source Selection Criteria• Incentives• Small Business Set Asides• Anti-trust Laws
3 minutes Film Clip Clip from to highlight an example of how an arsenal product was developed and used in early WWII – military-industrial complex transition. Need to acquire film clip from DAU video services Content is new. Reference: * Operation Pacific (John Wayne)
70 minutes Lecture Brief overview of the history of defense industry growth, arsenal to military-industrial complex Brief review of course read-ahead (consider the industrial base changes and trends to evaluate the industry playing field). Frame this review with discussion prompts Transitioning from a Pre-WWII government run arsenal system to nationalization of industrial capacity to mobilize for WWII, to military-industrial complex growth, the 1990s consolidation of industry capacity in the 90s to where we are today facing another drawdown. During this discussion a simple picture card recognition game will be used to assess students’ pre-reading assignments. This will be followed by a discussion (10 minutes) of macro issues currently driving industry with impacts to overall revenue and profits over time and summary of expected CBO and DoD budget profiles to illustrate ongoing downsizing. Company differences will be compared with a focus on the largest companies, their core offerings, and vulnerabilities to economic trends. A comparison of company product focus and strategic options in light of government budget changes will be explored. Finally a look at what government tools exist and under consideration to preserve the health of our defense industry. Need to identify pre-course reading (excerpt that talks about evolution of industrial base) Need 15-20 slides framing this lecture
The activities of the Cannon Committee showed that Congress realized the need for a reliable source of armaments. In 1778 Congress authorized its first facility in Springfield, Massachusetts to provide and store gun powder for the Continental Army
The army’s Detroit Arsenal produced more than 22,000 of the 88,000 tanks made in WWII. At the beginning of the war, the Springfield Armory produced 1000 M-1 rifles per day, but by the end of the war, it was producing 3,000 per day.
After the Revolution the infant Republic continued to rely on imported weapons for many of its military requirements. To reduce this reliance, Congress voted in 1794 to establish government-owned facilities for the manufacture of firearms. These installations, most notably the army arsenals in Springfield, Massachusetts, and Harpers Ferry, Virginia (now West Virginia), gradually acquired expertise in the mass production of rifles and carbines.
Although these facilities were largely able to satisfy governmentrequirements during periods of relative calm, they could not producesufficient weapons in times of war—as during the War of 1812 and theMexican War of 1846–1848.To supplement production at Springfield and Harpers Ferry, the WarDepartment contracted with private gunmakers such as Robbins andLawrence of Windsor, Vermont, and Remington Arms, of Ilion, NewYork—thus giving a significant boost to the development of acommercial arms industry in the United States.Many of these firms failed or were absorbed by others whengovernment contracts disappeared, but others survived by embracingnew technologies and finding foreign customers for their innovativeproducts.
North and South forced to procure arms from abroad North declares a naval blockade to prevent smuggling of arms to the south
• The Civil War, like the wars that preceded it, proved to be an enormous boon to the private arms industry. Once the war ended, however, the U.S. government sharply reduced its procurement of commercially manufactured weapons.• To survive in this new environment, private arms companies such as Remington, Winchester, and Colt looked to the civilian market and to foreign customers for the orders needed to survive.• This in turn spurred the introduction of new gun designs and manufacturing processes. As a result, American gun firms became adept at the mass production of cheap, reliable, and highly effective firearms.
Although the U.S. government did not always take advantage of thisburgeoning capability, other governments were less inhibited.Samuel Remington, the president of Remington Arms Company,opened a sales office in Paris and secured lucrative contracts for thesale of rifles and ammunition to several European countries.Other U.S. firms, including Winchester, also obtained significantcontracts from European governments.During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, for example, the Frencharmy ordered 100,000 rifles and 18 million rounds of ammunition fromthe Union Metallic Cartridge Company of Bridgeport, Connecticut(later a division of Remington Arms).
The capacity of American military firms to produce large quantities of weaponry in a relatively short amount of time was next tested in 1914, when World War I broke out in Europe. Although the U.S. government initially adopted a policy of neutrality in the conflict, President Woodrow Wilson allowed American firms to sell arms and ammunition to the Allied powers. Desperate to supplement their own manufacturing capabilities, Britain, France, and Russia then contracted with American companies to produce large numbers of guns and cartridges. The British, for example, ordered one million Enfield rifles from Remington. As one such order followed another, American military exports jumped from $40 million in 1914 to $1.3 billion in 1916 and $2.3 billion in the final nineteen months of war. This marked the first time that U.S. arms manufacturers played a truly significant role in the international weapons trade.
Harpers Ferry National Armory was both an armory and an arsenal. An arsenal is a place for the storage and the production of arms and military equipment while an armory is just a place of storage for such equipment. Photo: http://www.wvculture.org/history/thisdayinwvhistory/0630.html
As the largest government- owned weapons manufacturing arsenal in the western world, the Rock Island Arsenal [RIA] provides manufacturing, logistics, and base support services for the Armed Forces. The Arsenal is an active U.S. Army factory, which manufactures ordnance and equipment for the Armed Forces. Some of the Arsenals most successful manufactured products include the M198 and M119 Towed Howitzers, and the M1A1 Gun Mount.
By the time of U.S. entry into World War I, 843,239 of these rifles had been produced at Springfield Armory and Rock Island Arsenal.
Springfield Armory Winchester Harrington & Richardson International Harvester Beretta Breda F.M.A.P. Springfield Armory, Inc. (civilian)
Expanded the operations of the Naval Aircraft Factory
• The Arsenal of Democracy" was a propaganda slogan coined by U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in a radio broadcast delivered on December 29, 1940. Roosevelt promised to help the United Kingdom fight Nazi Germany by giving them military supplies while the United States stayed out of the actual fighting.• Previous policies such as the Neutrality Acts had already begun to be replaced by intensified assistance to the Allies, including the cash and carry policy in 1939 and Destroyers for Bases Agreement in September 1940.• The Lend-Lease program began in March 1941, several months after the Arsenal of Democracy address. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941—less than a year after the Arsenal of Democracy address—the United States entered the war.
From 1918 to 1924 the navy built submarines in conjunction with civilian contractors. Electric Boat Company, Groton, CT and; Lake Submarine Company of Bridgeport, CT
BUILT BY: Electric Boat Co., CT; Portsmouth NSY, NH; Mare Island NSY, CA; Boston NSY, MA; Manitowoc Shipbuilding Co., WI; Cramp Shipbuilding Co., NJ
From tank-automotive and armamentsweapons systems research and development,through procurement and fielding, tosustainment and retirement, TACOMsassociates provide "cradle-to-grave" support toAmericas armed forces.The entire complex that houses TACOMsheadquarters is located on what is known as theDetroit Arsenal.
Built in the 1920’s and 1930’s at Rock Island Arsenal, or under it’s direction. Manufacturers included: White Motor Company; Marmon-Herrington; Joseph Cunningham Son & Company Studebaker Pontiac International Harvester LaSalle Luxury Division of GM
In July 1869, the Secretary of the Navy announced the establishment of the Naval Torpedo Station on Goat Island in the harbor of Newport, Rhode Island,
The mission of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center Division,Keyport is to Provide advanced technical capabilities for testand evaluation, in-service engineering, maintenance andindustrial base support, fleet material readiness, andobsolescence management for undersea warfare.
It took twenty-one months to isolate and correct all of the Mark-14’s defects—less time than it took the OSRD to develop and field the first acoustic homing torpedo, the Mark-24, from scratch. Part of the reason it took so long to correct the Mark-14’s defects was that each problem masked the remaining ones. after operational units began experiencing problems with the weapon on combat patrols, the Navy’s Newport Torpedo Station resisted realistic testing. “The scandal was not that there were problems in what was then a relatively new weapon, but rather the refusal by the ordnance establishment [ashore] to verify the problems quickly and make appropriate alterations.” As Clay Blair documented in 1975, each of the Mark-14’s major defects was largely “discovered and fixed in the field—always over the stubborn opposition of the [Navy’s] Bureau of Ordnance.
From the War of 1812 until World War II, government arsenals produced almost all the ordinance for the U.S Army and a good share of the ordnance and ships for the U.S. Navy.
Between July 1, 1940 and June 30th 1945, the navy added 10 battleships, 18 large aircraft carriers, 9 small aircraft carriers, 110 escort carriers, 2 large crusiers, 10 heavy crusiers, 33 light cruisers, 358 destroyers, 504 destroyer escorts, 211 submarines and 82, 028 landing craft.
Detroit Arsenal, MI Picatinny Arsenal, NJ Pine Bluff, AR Redstone Arsenal, AL Rock Island Arsenal, IL Rocky Mountain, CO Watertown Arsenal, MA Watervliet Arsenal, NY
Adelphi, MD Natick, MA Selfridge Garrison, MI
Detroit Tank Plant, MI Lima Tank Plant, OH Stratford Engine Plant, CT
Highland Industrial Park Highland Industrial Park, a storage and testing facility for Defense Department contractors in East Camden, is in Calhoun and Ouachita counties. The 17,000-acre park contains 600 munitions storage bunkers. Used for testing and storing Navy ammunitions during World War II, much of the former depot now functions as the Highland Industrial Park, where several Defense Department contractors store munitions and conduct tests. This site has been referred to by a number of names including Shumaker Ordnance Plant, Camden Naval Ordnance Plant, Naval Operations Camden-Shumaker, and U.S. Naval Ammunition Depot - Shumaker, Camden, Arkansas.
In 1802, the first great American powder factory, DuPont de Nemours, Pere et Fils; et Cie (later renamed E. I. DuPont de Nemours and Company) opened in Delaware. The new company prospered from the beginning, and its mills turned out 600,000 pounds of powder in four years.
On May 14, 1861, Meigs was appointed colonel, 11th U.S. Infantry, and on the following day, promoted to brigadier general and Quartermaster General of the Army. Meigs established a reputation for being efficient, hard-driving, and scrupulously honest. He molded a large and somewhat diffuse department into a great tool of war. He was one of the first to fully appreciate the importance of logistical preparations in military planning, and under his leadership, supplies moved forward and troops were transported over long distances with ever-greater efficiency.
His corruption was so notorious that Congressman Thaddeus Stevens, when discussing Camerons honesty with Lincoln, told Lincoln that "I dont think that he would steal a red hot stove". When Cameron demanded Stevens retract this statement, Stevens told Lincoln "I believe I told you he would not steal a red-hot stove. I will now take that back."
Three main externalities encouraged the development of a permanent defense industrial base centered on for-profit defense companies. First and foremost was the onset of the Cold War, whose central feature was the U.S.-Soviet competition in nuclear arms. A second catalyst was the determination of U.S. post-war leaders— including President Harry Truman, George Kennan, Dean Acheson, George Marshall and Paul Nitze—to “create an international system with American power at its center” in order to minimize the possibility of major power conflicts as destructive as the two world wars had been.31 And, third, the North Korean dictator Kim Il-sung’s invasion of South Korea in June 1950 precipitated a rapid increase in military spending.
The U.S. Army retains organic facilities to provide a significant part of its ordnance materiel and ammunition. What should the future hold for these 16 facilities — five of them government-owned, government-operated, the rest government-owned contractor-operated? This briefing looked at four options (in addition to maintaining the status quo): privatization, creating a Federal Government Corporation, consolidation, and recapitalization. After looking at the pros and cons of each, the authors concluded that all four were feasible and that a mixed strategy probably offered the best possibility for achieving the Army’s aims.
Over several decades and across multiple administrations, the Pentagon’s acquisition system has developed four major problems that hamper our ability to acquire critical platforms and capabilities in a timely manner and at acceptable cost.
First, the requirements for new systems are too often set at the far limit of current technological boundaries. Such ambition can sometimes help produce breakthrough developments that can significantly extend America’s technological edge. But far too often the result is disappointing initial performance followed by chronic cost and schedule overruns. The Department and the nation can no longer afford the quixotic pursuit of high-tech perfection that incurs unacceptable cost and risk. Nor can the Department afford to chase requirements that shift or continue to increase throughout a program’s life cycle.
Second, the Pentagon’s acquisition workforce has been allowed to atrophy, exacerbating a decline in the critical skills necessary for effective oversight. For example, over the past ten years, the Department’s contractual obligations have nearly tripled while our acquisition workforce fell by more than 10 percent. The Department also has great difficulty hiring qualified senior acquisition officials. Over the past eight years the Department has operated with vacancies in key acquisition positions averaging from 13 percent in the Army to 43 percent in the Air Force. There remains an urgent need for technically trained personnel— cost estimators, systems engineers, and acquisition managers—to conduct effective oversight.
Third, our system of defining requirements and developing capability too often encourages reliance on overly optimistic cost estimates. In order for the Pentagon to produce weapons systems efficiently, it is critical to have budget stability—but it is impossible to attain such stability in DoD’s modernization budgets if we continue to underestimate the cost of such systems from the start. We must demand cost, schedule, and performance realism in our acquisition process, and hold industry and ourselves accountable. We must also ensure that only essential systems are procured, particularly in a resource-constrained environment. There are too many programs under way. We cannot afford everything we might desire; therefore, in the future, the Department must balance capability portfolios to better align with budget constraints and operational needs, based on priorities assigned to warfighter capabilities.
Fourth, effective and efficient delivery of logistical support to our men and women in the field is an enduring priority and an area where continued improvements must be made. DoD is working to improve the integration of joint logistics to provide operational commanders with the flexibility and sustainability required to better support unity of effort within the joint force and between multinational, interagency, and nongovernmental elements. Wartime innovations in logistics rules, tools, and processes have helped support high levels of long- term deployments, and has enhanced operational freedom of action.
Source: Federal Procurement Data System; analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group.
The first trend is government promotion of small, disadvantaged, and disabled-veterans businesses. Since 1997, the Small Business Administration has had a goal of awarding 23 percent of government contracts to small businesses. In 2010, 22.7 percent of government contracts were awarded to small businesses, and in 2009 it was 21.9 percent The second trend is the significant growth of companies with annual revenue greater than $3 billion. While some of this growth is internal, a significant share is through mergers and acquisitions of smaller companies; in 2010, small companies represented 75 percent of government services acquisitions. As a result of these two trends, a viable cadre of mid-tier companies is being squeezed out of the federal services market
Organizational conflicts of interest (OCI) Since 2001, the transaction volume of M&A deals in the services sector has doubled The government has grown increasingly concerned about the potential for OCI. Such conflicts arise when employees of the acquired firm assume oversight responsibilities over a sister firm as a result of a preexisting federal contract. As a by-product of this activity, several scientific engineering and technical assistance (SETA) contractors were absorbed by larger firms, sometimes supervising their parent or sister companies for the federal government. Efforts are currently underway to limit OCI in contracting.
One area that is still expected to experience growth, however, is the expansion of DoD’s in-house contracting and acquisition corps. The insourcing of functions, higher oversight scrutiny, as well as the declining requirement for support services in contingency operations are likely to have a limiting effect on spending for services contracting.
An issue that has more recently captured the limelight is service contracts for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Services account for well over sixty percent of the value of federal contracts performed in those two countries and their theaters. GAO has scrutinized inadequacies of some of the practices employed for service contracts in support of operationsin these theaters
The shipbuilding industrial base sector, consisting of six major U.S. shipyards building nearly all of the Navy’s ships, continues to produce the most capable warships in the world. While the quality of the ships being produced for the Navy has remained high, the quantity of ships the domestic shipbuilding base can produce in one year pales in comparison to the leading international shipyards. A low volume of production makes it extremely difficult for U.S. shipyards to match the improvements in technology and productivity seen in the international shipyards. Serial production and a stable design are key elements that U.S. shipyards must have to increase productivity and reduce the cost of shipbuilding for the U.S. Navy.
In the space industrial base sector, fifteen of the top U.S. space companies remain financially healthy. The companies were generally profitable at a five percent return on assets or better with all companies having positive gross profit margin. All but one of the companies had increased backlog from the previous year, indicating guaranteed work in the queue. While about half the companies had debt ratios above 60 percent (two of which appear to have high leverage and low liquidity), most were liquid with quick ratios close to or above one.
Since many Americans of the revolutionary generation had strong distrust of permanent or standing armies, the Continental Army was quickly disbanded after the Revolution. General Washington, who throughout the war deferred to elected officials, averted a potential crisis and resigned as commander-in-chief after the war, establishing a tradition of civil control of the U.S. military.
The American Civil War was one of the earliest true industrial wars. Railroads, the telegraph, steamships, and mass-produced weapons were employed extensively. The practices of total war, developed by Sherman in Georgia, and of trench warfare around Petersburg foreshadowed World War I in Europe.
From 1865 to about 1913, the U.S. grew to become the worlds leading industrial nation. Land and labor, the diversity of climate, the ample presence of railroads (as well as navigable rivers), and the natural resources all fostered the cheap extraction of energy, fast transport, and the availability of capital that powered this Second Industrial Revolution. The average annual income (after inflation) of nonfarm workers grew by 75% from 1865 to 1900, and then grew another 33% by 1918.
German efforts to use its submarines ("U-boats") toblockade Britain resulted in the deaths of Americantravelers and sailors, and attacks on passenger linerscaused public outrage.Most notable was torpedoing without warning thepassenger liner Lusitania in 1915. Germany promised not torepeat but decided in early 1917 that unrestricted U-boatwarfare against all ships headed to Britain would win thewar, albeit at the cost of American entry.When Americans read the text of the German offer toMexico, known as the Zimmermann Telegram, they saw anoffer for Mexico to go to war with Germany against theUnited States, with German funding, with the promise ofthe return of the lost territories of Arizona, New Mexico,and Texas.Congress voted on April 6, 1917 to declare war, but it wasfar from unanimous.
Pershing wanted an American force that could operate independently of the other Allies, but his vision could not be realized until adequately trained troops reached Europe. In order to rush as many troops as possible to France, the AEF left its heavy weapons behind and used French and British equipment. Particularly appreciated were the French canon de 75, the canon de 155 C modele 1917 Schneider and the canon de 155mm GPF. American aviation units received the SPAD XIII and Nieuport 28 fighters and the US tank corps used the French Renault FT17 light tanks. Pershing established facilities in France to train new arrivals with their new weapons. The Renault FT The Nieuport 28 (N.28C-1) Canon de 75 modèle 1897
On the battlefields of France in spring 1918,the fresh American troops wereenthusiastically welcomed by the war-wearyAllied armies in the summer of 1918.They arrived at the rate of 10,000 a day, at atime that the Germans were unable to replacetheir losses.After the Allies turned back the powerful finalGerman offensive (Spring Offensive), theAmericans played a central role in the Alliedfinal offensive (Hundred Days Offensive).Victory over Germany achieved on November11, 1918.
The first and most important mobilization decision was the size of the army. When the United States entered the war, the army stood at 200,000, hardly enough to have a decisive impact in Europe. However, on May 18, 1917 a draft was imposed and the numbers were increased rapidly. Initially, the expectation was that the United States would mobilize an army of one million. The number, however, would go much higher. Overall some 4,791,172 Americans would serve in World War I. Some 2,084,000 would reach France, and 1,390,000 would see active combat.
Once the size of the Army had been determined, the demands on the economy became obvious, although the means to satisfy them did not: food and clothing, guns and ammunition, places to train, and the means of transport. The Navy also had to be expanded to protect American shipping and the troop transports. Contracts immediately began flowing from the Army and Navy to the private sector. The result, of course, was a rapid increase in federal spending from $477 million in 1916 to a peak of $8,450 million in 1918. The latter figure amounted to over 12 percent of GNP, and that amount excludes spending by other wartime agencies and spending by allies, much of which was financed by U.S. loans.
Food Administration: created by the Lever Food and Fuel Act in August 1917. Herbert Hoover, who had already won international fame as a relief administrator in China and Europe, was appointed to head it. The mission of the Food Administration was to stimulate the production of food and assure a fair distribution. Fuel Administration: Created under the same Act as the Food Administration. Harry Garfield, the son of President James Garfield, and the President of Williams College, was appointed to head it. Its main problem was controlling the price and distribution of bituminous coal. Railroad Administration: The Wilson Administration nationalized the railroads and put them under the control of the Railroad Administration in December of 1917, in response to severe congestion in the railway network that was holding up the movement of war goods and coal. Wilsons energetic Secretary of the Treasury (and son-in-law), William Gibbs McAdoo, was appointed to head it. The railroads would remain under government control for another 26 months War Industries Board: In March 1918 the Board was reorganized, and Wilson placed Bernard Baruch, a Wall Street investor, in charge. Baruch installed a "priorities system" to determine the order in which contracts could be filled by manufacturers. Contracts rated AA by the War Industries Board had to be filled before contracts rated A, and so on. Although much hailed at the time, this system proved inadequate when tried in World War II. The War Industries Board also set prices of industrial products such as iron and steel, coke, rubber, and so on. This was handled by the Boards independent Price Fixing Committee.
The international economic position of the United States was permanently altered by the war. The United States had long been a debtor country. The United States emerged from the war, however, as a net creditor. The turnaround was dramatic. In 1914 U.S investments abroad amounted to $5.0 billion, while total foreign investments in the United States amounted to $7.2 billion. Americans were net debtors to the tune of $2.2 billion. By 1919 U.S investments abroad had risen to $9.7 billion, while total foreign investments in the United States had fallen to $3.3 billion: Americans were net creditors to the tune of $6.4 billion. Before the war the center of the world capital market was London, and the Bank of England was the worlds most important financial institution; after the war leadership shifted to New York, and the role of the Federal Reserve was enhanced.
To meet its overwhelming expansion schedule for the Aviation Section, the United States was forced to take drastic action to acquire raw materials. For example, more than 27,000 officers and men were assigned to the Spruce Division (working in forests and lumber mills) to supply sufficient wood for building planes. Since castor oil was needed for lubricating airplane engines, 100,000 acres of land in the southern United States had to be planted in castor beans. Also, to acquire material for lining flying clothing, 450,000 Nuchwang dog skins were purchased from China.
Americas greatest technological contribution to thewar effort was the development and mass productionof the 12-cylinder Liberty engine.During a five-day period beginning May 29, 1917, Mr.J.G. Vincent of Packard Motors and Mr. E.J. Hall of Hall-Scott Motors redesigned an experimental 8-cylinderengine previously built and tested by Packard.Weighing only 710 pounds but delivering 410 hp, theLiberty far surpassed all other aviation engines in theworld.Production lines were set up by various automobilemanufacturers and by the end of 1918, they had built17,935 Liberties, 5,827 of which had been sent toEurope.The engine was destined to be a mainstay in the U.S.Air Service for 10 years following WWI.Major Henry H. Arnold with first Liberty V12 engine completed
On 2 April 1917 President Woodrow Wilson cited Germany’s refusal to suspend unrestricted submarine warfare in the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean in his request for a declaration of war on Germany. In that April 1,250,000 deadweight tons were sunk with 122 ocean going ships sunk in the first two weeks after that declaration of war. British losses in that period equaled an average round trip voyage loss of 25%. Allied losses had already been heavy before U.S. entry so that construction in yards outside the U.S. was unable to sustain current losses.
The United States entered World War I in April 1917. Within days, the federal government created the Emergency Fleet Corporation (EFC) to construct a fleet of merchant ships. The EFC hired the American International Shipbuilding Corporation to build and operate the largest shipyard in the world: Hog Island, near Philadelphia. This badge identified the wearer as a member of the World War I Hog Island shipbuilding team.
The EFC was a subject of controversy. The armistice took effect before the yards, Hog Island being by far the largest and most publicized, reached full production and the expense was very large. The wooden ship program in particular resulted in a Some of the several designs are large number of hulls with no useful purpose that commonly named Ferris Designs were then a disposal problem. after Theodore E. Ferris, the official Gearing up for wartime production produced a glut naval architect for the USSB. of ships and a market problem with peace. Ferris designed both steel and wood In retrospect some considered the entire effort waste. There were allegations of fraud, with one ships for mass production. One involving charges and civil suits against Charles W. design, 1001, was for wooden 3,500 Morse. ton steam freighters built largely of precut, numbered components of The USSB and EFC are used by both those of the opinion government is too close to industry in pine or Douglas fir. collaboration for war projects and those with the view government should stay out of such matters and a source of waste even in national emergency.
Country Public Debt %GDPJapan 220%Italy 119%United States 91.6France 84.3%Canada 84%Germany 80%United Kingdon 101.3%
This system of outsourcing has greatly benefited our military operations in many respects, providing an abundance of support (arguably the U.S. mission in Iraq is now among the best supplied and equipped in history), while avoiding added pressures on the active and reserve forces that would occur if there was not so much contracting. Additionally, the ad hoc manner in which this system has grown and the lack of an overall DoD strategy concerning contracting missions has incurred great costs. The Pentagon estimates that as much as $10 billion dollars have gone missing or been misspent by private military contractors in Iraq. Literally thousands of weapons have similarly disappeared in Iraq and Afghanistan, with some even ending up in the hands of local insurgents or transnational terrorist groups. As many as 15 or more U.S. troops have died inside U.S. bases as a result of shoddy electrical work performed or improperly supervised by logistics contractors. And, at the strategic level, contractors were involved in many of the most egregious and embarrassing incidents in the war, including Abu Ghraib and the Nisour Square shootings in September 2007. These incidents matter not only because of the consequent embarrassment to the nation, but also because many military officers believe private contractors have undermined our counterinsurgency goals, reflecting negatively upon U.S. grand strategy across in the region. The Regulation of New Warfare Defense, Defense Strategy, U.S. Military, U.S. Department of Defense Peter W. Singer, Director, 21st Century Defense Initiative The Politic Brookings Institute
NY Times Sunday 24 July 2010By Elisabeth BumillerWashington –Like everything else, war is a lot more expensive than it usedto be.
A quick calculation shows that the United States has been at war for 47 of its 230 years, or 20 percent of its history. Put another way, Americans have been at war one year out of every five.
Truman was somewhat taken aback at the costs associated with the reports recommendations. As a politician, he hesitated to publicly support a program that would result in heavy tax increases for the American public, particularly since the increase would be spent on defending the United States during a time of peace. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, however, prompted action. Truman signed NSC-68 into policy in September 1950. As one State Department official noted, "Thank God Korea came along," since this act of communist aggression was believed to be crucial in convincing the public to support increased military spending. NSC-68 remained the foundation of U.S. Cold War policy until at least the 1970s.
According to the report, the United States should vigorously pursue a policy of "containing" Soviet expansion. NSC-68 recommended that the United States embark on rapid military expansion of conventional forces and the nuclear arsenal, including the development of the new hydrogen bomb. In addition, massive increases in military aid to U.S. allies were necessary as well as more effective use of "covert" means to achieve U.S. goals. The price of these measures was estimated to be about $50 billion; at the time the report was issued, America was spending just $13 billion on defense.
Significant foreign policy challenges persisted into Truman’s second term. The President committed the United States to the defense of South Korea in the summer of 1950 after that nation, an American ally, was invaded by its communist neighbor, North Korea. The American military launched a counterattack that pushed the North Koreans back to the Chinese border, whereupon the Chinese entered the war in the fall of 1950. The conflict settled into a bloody and grisly stalemate that would not be resolved until Truman left office in 1953. The Korean War globalized the Cold War and spurred a massive American military build-up that began the nuclear arms race in earnest.
The invitation received by about 15 defense industry chief executives in 1993 to drop by the Pentagon for dinner was signed by Defense Secretary Les Aspin. It was, as the saying goes, an invitation one simply couldn’t refuse. The events that took place that evening forever changed the character of the U.S. defense industry. After a brief introduction by Secretary Aspin, the presentation was largely made by Deputy Secretary Perry. He indicated the government had no intention of paying ballooning overhead costs as companies tried to preserve their headquarters and corporate aircraft fleets, even as their factories and labs disappeared. Ironically, no one seemed particularly concerned at the time. CEOs, being CEOs, each logically
TIMELINES PHOTOS 3 STEPS Hog Island Naval Shipyard Philadelphia Ship Mass Production Liberty Ship Construction Ship Type 2751 Liberty’s from 1941-1945 Eighteen Shipyards Four Major Types
TIMELINES PHOTOS 3 STEPS WW II Production Bombers 49,123 Levingston Shipyard Orange, Texas Inspecting Ammunition Fighters 63,933 Cargo 14,710 Total 127,766 Aerospace Shipbuilding Munitions
DOD relies extensively upon contractors to support overseas contingency operations. As of March 2011, DOD had more contractor personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq (155,000) than uniformed personnel (145,000). Contractors made up 52% of DOD’s workforce in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since December 2009, the number of DOD contractors in Afghanistan has exceeded the number in Iraq. 7-5700 www.crs.gov R40764
The modern process of preparing armies for war originated in the middle of the nineteenth century. The recruitment of volunteers to fill the ranks no longer sufficed. Governments turned to conscription, created huge forces, and harnessed their national economies to conduct war. The word mobilization was first used in the 1850s to describe the preparation of the army of Prussia for deployment. The American Civil War marked the appearance in the United States of the draft and mass armies, along with the organization of productive resources to sustain them. The volunteer tradition of the minutemen was on its way to becoming little more than a sacred memory, and the logistical simplicity of the American Revolution was gradually falling by the wayside. The era of mobilization, the reallocation of a nations resources for the assembly, preparation, and equipping of forces for war had arrived.
The very size of the forces assembled during the Civil War, with millions of men under arms at one time or another, bespoke a new era. Moreover, the principle of a national military obligation was successfully asserted by both sides, and the Confederacy sought to organize its economy to prosecute the war. In the years that followed as the United States became an industrial power with interests beyond its borders, this growing stature and the wartime experience in Cuba, the Philippines, and along the Mexican border compelled Congress and military leaders to think more about mobilization issues. In 1903 the Army acquired a General Staff, whose mission included planning for mobilization and defense. Thereafter, signs of a broader conception of the Armys role appeared in revised field service regulations and in training exercises involving ever-larger troop organizations.
In 1923 the General Staff produced its first peacetime plan for the assembly of an army. The plan called for six field armies with a strength rising from 400,000 on the day of mobilization known as M-day to 1.3 million in four months and increasing every month thereafter. It acknowledged that the availability of supplies and equipment determined the rate at which troops could be absorbed. However, the plan neglected the critical issue of the resources needed to create the supplies on which mobilization depended. It assumed that production would adjust to strategic plans, expanding when necessary and contracting when not. It also left unresolved the question of whether different plans were needed for different contingencies. This initial plan incorporated the outmoded World War I concept of M-day as the basis for planning. In the summer of 1914 the European armies, one after the other, had mobilized on specific M-days, triggering complex and apparently irreversible processes that followed rigid timetables. These mobilizations generated similar responses from adversary armies and made hostilities almost inevitable. But M-day as a concept and tool for planning was more convenient than helpful. It made no allowances for gradual changes in preparedness or a measured transition to a mobilized state. Instead it posited an overnight complete conversion. In the interwar period the M-day fixation kept American planners from visualizing any situation that required implementation of mobilization measures before the official outbreak of war.
The plans first thorough revision in 1925 failed to correct this shortcoming. In fact, the 1928 plan represented a step backward giving supply a secondary position and putting the emphasis back on manpower. Materiel, only recently considered the pacing factor, was assumed to take care of itself. Men would simply be equipped supplied and trained as they entered service. While these plans for the assembly of forces for war were being developed separate plans for wartime procurement were under way in the War Department. The assistant secretarys office relied on the supply services for detailed planning on wartime procurement, a task that was clearly understood to be part of the military mission. Procurement Planning for mobilization involved assessing the types of supplies and equipment needed to meet given emergencies and calculating quantities needed at specific intervals. Each supply branch had its own procurement planning section as early as May 1921. In the 1920s the needs of the War Department represented the bulk of requirements for a war production program. The supporting mobilization plans for raw materials, labor, power, fuel, and transport, as well as the associated development of economic controls, were seen as derivative functions.
By 1930, procurement planning had gone far enough that War Department attention could turn to a system for presidential control and direction of industry in an emergency. Moreover, with the Army finally using up its World War I surplus stocks, new procurement was becoming critical. Depression-era retrenchment, most severe in 1933-34, still held back purchasing. However, an upward trend in appropriations followed and procurement planning expanded. It included surveys and the allocation of manufacturing plants among the procuring services, along with production studies and even occasional "educational" orders small actual orders that gave manufacturers experience with military specifications and standards and other aspects of providing needed supplies to the Army. This process added realism to the program. Industrial mobilization planning, as understood by the end of the 1920s, concerned all activities necessary to ensure the success and minimize the burdens of wartime procurement. The series of industrial mobilization plans that started in 1930 and culminated in 1939 finally came to grips with the old assumption that supplies would simply be available when needed. The plans also went beyond the role of the Army and examined how the nation should organize the control of industry in war. Implicit was the expectation that management of the economy and particularly, control of industry in wartime were presidential functions that would be exercised through temporary agencies run and largely staffed by civilians. This assumption reflected a realistic understanding of the American political system and the transcendent character of industrial mobilization. The issue was bigger than any one service or department. The plans showed familiarity with the tools for wartime economic control, from preference lists and priorities for facilities and commodities, to control of foreign trade, and as a last resort, to the establishment of government corporations, price controls, and seizures. The editions of 1930, 1933, 1936, and 1939 amounted to administrative blueprints for wartime civilian control and direction of the nations resources.
Each version centered on national agencies that would control production. Early editions included four superagencies, managing war industries, selective service, public relations, and labor. By 1936, the War Industries Administration, which was understood from the start to be the largest and most important wartime agency, had been renamed the War Resources Administration. Its responsibilities were to include control of war finance, trade, labor, and price control organizations, with only the selective service and public relations still autonomous. The superagency, which would have powers beyond those of the War Industries Board also would be responsible for acquiring and controlling strategic and critical materials. The plans greatest flaw lay in its failure to consider effective control over the allocation of basic materials, such as steel, copper, and aluminum. In the development of these plans the Army-Navy Munitions Board showed its usefulness. With the Navy an increasingly active participant but the office of the assistant secretary of war still the driving force, the board sponsored the industrial mobilization plans of the 1930s. In so doing, it actually became a transitional agency, until the establishment of the projected civilian superagency at the outset of war. As such, the board drew up lists of critical materials, studied raw material needs, and eventually obtained modest appropriations for importing and stockpiling critical materials. The board also made industrial surveys and apportioned productive capacity of firms and industries whose products were sought by both services. By mid-1939, President Franklin D. Roosevelt recognized the boards importance by placing it in the executive office of the president. Thereafter, Roosevelt had direct control of the board which in turn enjoyed unanticipated prestige and visibility. By 1939, the industrial mobilization plans broke free of the M-day concept. That years plan stipulated that the War Resources Administration should be established as early as practicable when an emergency was envisioned. No longer would economic mobilization for war be tied to the actual outbreak of hostilities. The policy change tacitly recognized the increasingly hostile international environment and the long lead-times necessary to produce the increasingly sophisticated tools of war.
By late 1942 it was clear that Nelson and the WPB were unable to fully control the growing war economy and especially to wrangle with the Army and Navy over the necessity of continued civilian production. Accordingly, in May 1943 President Roosevelt created the Office of War Mobilization and in July put James Byrne — a trusted advisor, a former U.S. Supreme Court justice, and the so-called "assistant president" — in charge. Though the WPB was not abolished, the OWM soon became the dominant mobilization body in Washington. Unlike Nelson, Byrnes was able to establish an accommodation with the military services over war production by "acting as an arbiter among contending forces in the WPB, settling disputes between the board and the armed services, and dealing with the multiple problems" of the War Manpower Commission, the agency charged with controlling civilian labor markets and with assuring a continuous supply of draftees to the military (Koistinen, 510).
The total cost of the war to the federal government between 1941 and 1945 was about $321,000,000,000 (10 times as much as World War I). Taxes paid 41 percent of the cost, less than Roosevelt requested but more than the World War I figure of 33 percent. The remainder was financed by borrowing from financial institutions, an expensive method but one that Congress preferred over the alternatives of raising taxes even higher or making war bond purchases compulsory. In consequence the national debt increased fivefold, amounting to $259,000,000,000 in 1945. The Revenue Act of 1942 revolutionized the tax structure by increasing the number who paid income taxes from 13,000,000 to 50,000,000. At the same time, through taxes on excess profits and other sources of income, the rich were made to bear a larger part of the burden, making this the only period in modern history when wealth was significantly redistributed
Four main-assembly factories: Two Boeing operated plants at: Renton, Washington, and Wichita, Kansas, The Bell plant at Marietta, Georgia ("Bell-Atlanta"), and The Martin plant at Omaha, Nebraska ("Martin-Omaha").
Aerospace provides one crucial example. American heavy bombers, like the B-29 Superfortress, were highly sophisticated weapons which could not have existed, much less contributed to the air war on Germany and Japan, without innovations such as bombsights, radar, and high- performance engines or advances in aeronautical engineering, metallurgy, and even factory organization. Encompassing hundreds of thousands of workers, four major factories, and $3 billion in government spending, the B-29 project required almost unprecedented organizational capabilities by the U.S. Army Air Forces, several major private contractors, and labor unions (Vander Meulen, 7) Overall, American aircraft production was the single largest sector of the war economy, costing $45 billion (almost a quarter of the $183 billion spent on war production), employing a staggering two million workers, and, most importantly, producing over 125,000 aircraft, which Table 6 describe in more detail.
Bombers 49,123 Fighters 63,933 Cargo 14,710 Total 127,766 Source: Air Force History Support Office
Shipbuilding offers a third example of innovations importance to the war economy. Allied strategy in World War II utterly depended on the movement of war materiel produced in the United States to the fighting fronts in Africa, Europe, and Asia. Between 1939 and 1945, the hundred merchant shipyards overseen by the U.S. Maritime Commission (USMC) produced 5,777 ships at a cost of about $13 billion while navy shipbuilding cost about $18 billion.
Though important and gigantic, the Manhattan Project was an anomaly in the broader war economy. Technological and scientific innovation also transformed less-sophisticated but still complex sectors such as aerospace or shipbuilding. The United States, as David Kennedy writes, "ultimately proved capable of some epochal scientific and technical breakthroughs, [but] innovated most characteristically and most tellingly in plant layout, production organization, economies of scale, and process engineering" (Kennedy, 648).
Reconversion from military to civilian production had been an issue as early as 1944, when WPB Chairman Nelson began pushing to scale back war production in favor of renewed civilian production. The militarys opposition to Nelson had contributed to the accession by James Byrnes and the OWM to the paramount spot in the war-production bureaucracy. Meaningful planning for reconversion was postponed until 1944 and the actual process of reconversion only began in earnest in early 1945, accelerating through V-E Day in May and V-J Day in September.
The most obvious effect of reconversion was the shift away from military production and back to civilian production. As Table 7 shows, this shift — as measured by declines in overall federal spending and in military spending — was dramatic, but did not cause the postwar depression which many Americans dreaded.
The high level of defense spending, in turn, contributed to the creation of the "military- industrial complex," the network of private companies, non-governmental organizations, universities, and federal agencies which collectively shaped American national defense policy and activity during the Cold War.
Before the war the center of theTIMELINE world capital market was London, and the Bank of England was the worlds most important Three main externalities encouraged the development of a permanent defense industrial base centered on for-profit financial institution; after the war defense companies. leadership shifted to New York, and the role of the Federal First and foremost was the onset of the Reserve was enhanced. Cold War, whose central feature was the Manhattan U.S.-Soviet competition in nuclear arms. Project A second catalyst was the determination of U.S. post-war leaders— including President Harry Truman, George Kennan, Dean Acheson, George Marshall and Paul Nitze—to “create an international system with American power at its center” in order to minimize the possibility of major power conflicts as destructive as the two world wars had been. Borrowing from individuals And, third, the North Korean dictator Reliance on Allies Kim Il-sung’s invasion of South Korea in and governments. Equipment for AEF June 1950 precipitated a rapid increase in Inflationary aspects of Competing with the British Eddie Rickenbacker’s SPAD military spending. Guns and Butter for domestic suppliesRevolutionary War Civil War WW I WW II Korea Cold War/ Vietnam First Industrial War Johnson had another motive for playing down the commitment in North blockades the Military –Industrial Complex Southeast Asia. After the Democrats won by a landslide in south and retains most the 1964 election, the president believed he had a two-year domestic means of Income Tax window of opportunity to push During the Revolutionary War, the National Security Act of 1947 through Congress legislation for his Continental Congress borrowed production. Draft Created DoD, Great Society. He was painfully money from Americans, such as aware of what happened to Robert Morris and Haym Salomon, as well as foreign governments, such as Rationing The CIA Wilsons and Roosevelts comparable programs when they France, Spain, and the Netherlands. The National Security Council fell victim to "guns-over-butter” . The Continental Congress printed and the USAF Incrementally escalating the war in Vietnam, Johnson was able to have money, but as the war went on, the "guns and butter" without value of that money continued to go increasing taxes to pay for both down causing a rapid rise in prices of Arsenal of Democracy projects. This decision had a every type of good and service. profound impact on the American economy. British control of the sea which made exporting and importing difficult and Willow Run Detroit, MI expensive contributed to the high prices. When the war ended the newly freed United States was forced to come to grips with high prices and a large public debt.
Timeline 1942 1943 1944 1945Pearl Harbor / Midway Tarawa / Rabaul Iwo Jima Hiroshima Battle of Leyte Gulf Nagasaki 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 1 2 3 6 7 9 10 11 12 Africa Italy Normandy Paris Berlin
Bay of Pigs SR-71 Timeline Rhyolite/Aquacade Soviets in Afghanistan All Volunteer Force 1950’s 1960’s 1970’s 1980’s Polaris Détente Korea Cold War Space Gap Mercury Sputnik 1 Apollo Iran–Contra affair 13 Panama InvasionJoseph McCarthy U-2 Shoot down Iranian Hostage Crises Cambodia Watergate Pentagon Papers 12Alger Hiss Berlin Wall Korea Vietnam Rolling Thunder Spies 1950-1954 Berlin Wall Falls 1961 1975 John A. Walker Robert Hanssen Mỹ Lai KH-11 Keyhole Aldridge Ames Christopher Lee Boyce Lt William Calley Nixon in China USS Pueblo
The Cold War Soviet Invasion of Hungary NSC -68 1956 Policy of "containing" Soviet expansion. NSC-68 Korean War Julius and Ethel Rosenberg executed recommended that the United States embark on 1950-1953 Korean armistice. rapid military expansion of conventional forces and Soviets explode hydrogen bomb. first artificial the nuclear arsenal, satellite to be put including the Fidel Castro Titan I (SM-68A) ICBM into Earths orbit by development of the new B-52 First Flight overthrows the Batista hydrogen bomb. the Soviet Union regime in Cuba U-2 piloted by Francis Gary "Open Skies" Powers is shot down over the U.S.S.R. 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 Chinese forces capture Seoul USS Nautilus U.S.Chinese Inchon Truman fires Douglas McArthur MarinesCommunist AQUATONE into U.S. tests U-2 LebanonVictory Development first aerial Lockheed hydrogen bomb First Successful test of Polaris French defeat at Dien Bien Phu Events during the Cold War
Just Cause Panama U.S. launches TIMELINES PHOTOS missile attacks on targets in 1993 World Trade Center bombing Sudan and Operation Uphold Democracy Afghanistan followingIraq invades Kuwait CIA’s Counter terroristleading to the Gulf War. Terrorism attacks on USS Cole The Gulf War is waged in the Middle East, by a Center creates a U.S. U.N. coalition force Haiti special unit Kosovo embassies in from thirty-four focusing nations, led by the U.S. U.S. soldiers are killed in Kenya and specifically on and United Kingdom, ambush by Somali Tanzania against Iraq. militiamen in Mogadishu bin Laden. U.S. and Soviet Union sign START I treaty 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1999 Operation Desert Shield. began on 7 August 1990 Oklahoma City Bombing when U.S. troops were Somali sent to Saudi Arabia Operation Desert Storm Bosnia U.S. launches air strikes on Bosnia to prevent ethnic cleansing. 66 cruise missiles rained down on the training camps. An additional 13 missiles were fired at a pharmaceutical plant. Multilaterial if we can unilateral if we must.
The U.S. Petraeus rejects returns suggestions that the TIMELINES PHOTOS President Bush sovereignty U.S. shift from a counterinsurgency to an interim operation to trainingUSS Cole (DDG-76) is signs legislation governmentbombed in Yemeni waters, Iraqi forces andkilling seventeen U.S. sailors. creating a new in Iraq, but fighting terrorists. cabinet maintains Instead, he says the department of roughly U.S. must continue Homeland 135,000 Hurricane Katrina all three missions BP Oil Spill Security. troops in the World Trade Center country to fight a growing Credit Markets Meltdown insurgency 201 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 0 G.W Bush elected by 537 votes in Florida George W. Bush orders a troop surge which Invasion of Iraq Invasion Rumsfeld Resigns substantially increases the number of U.S. Afghanistan troops in Iraq and Operation ultimately leads to reductions in casualties "Enduring and major victories for coalition and Iraqi Freedom" forces, against the insurgency. 2000 -2010
Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945 (1955). Civilian labor is covered in The Army and Industrial Manpower, by Byron Fairchild and Jonathan Grossman (1959). R. Elberton Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization (1959), covers resource allocation, contracting, and procurement, Lenore Fine and Jesse A. Remington, Construction in the United States (1972), deal with building of troop facilities and industrial capacity. Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces (1964), by I. B. Holley, Jr., provides separate treatment of purchasing and production for the air arm.
Five combatant commanders have geographic area responsibilities. These CINCs are assigned an area of operations by the Unified Command Plan and are responsible for all operations within their designated areas: U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern Command.
The new design replaced much riveting, which accounted for one-third of the labor costs, with welding.During World War II, there were nearly 1,500 instances of significant brittle fractures.Twelve ships, including three of the 2,710 Liberties built, broke in half without warning, including the SS John P. Gaines which sank on 24 Novembe
This ideology goes back to the first years of the Cold War. During the late 1940s, theU.S. was haunted by economic anxieties. The Great Depression of the 1930s hadbeen overcome only by the war production boom of World War II. With peace anddemobilization, there was a pervasive fear that the Depression would return. During1949, alarmed by the Soviet Unions detonation of an atomic bomb, the loomingcommunist victory in the Chinese civil war, a domestic recession, and the lowering ofthe Iron Curtain around the USSRs European satellites, the U.S. sought to draftbasic strategy for the emerging cold war.The result was the militaristic National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68) draftedunder the supervision of Paul Nitze, then head of the Policy Planning Staff in theState Department. Dated April 14, 1950, and signed by President Harry S. Trumanon September 30, 1950, it laid out the basic public economic policies that the UnitedStates pursues to the present day.
In its conclusions, NSC-68 asserted: "One of the most significant lessons of our World War II experience was that the American economy, when it operates at a level approaching full efficiency, can provide enormous resources for purposes other than civilian consumption while simultaneously providing a high standard of living."
On May 1, 2007, the Center for Economic and Policy Research of Washington, D.C., released a study prepared by the global forecasting company Global Insight on the long-term economic impact of increased military spending. Guided by economist Dean Baker, this research showed that, after an initial demand stimulus, by about the sixth year the effect of increased military spending turns negative. Needless to say, the U.S. economy has had to cope with growing defense spending for more than 60 years. He found that, after 10 years of higher defense spending, there would be 464,000 fewer jobs than in a baseline scenario that involved lower defense spending.
In order to get an approximation of the economic impact of the increase in U.S. military spending associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, CEPR commissioned the economic forecasting company Global Insight to run a simulation with its macroeconomic model. It produced a simulation of the impact of an increase in annual U.S. military spending equal to 1 percent of GDP, approximately the actual increase in spending compared with the pre-war budget. Global Insights simulation shows higher military spending raises interest rates, which reduces net exports, housing construction and car sales, thereby slowing the economy and job creation.
As the big defense contractors continue to restructure themselves and theirworkforces for what is expected to be a period of decline in spending morelayoffs were announced this week. The pressure too from the U.S. and othergovernments to be more price conscious is also affecting decisions related tothe size of overhead and support employees.Many of the major U.S. corporations have already announced plans to reducetheir overall number of employees including General Dynamics (GD), Boeing(BA) and Lockheed Martin (LMT).Despite all three having strong sales and many major programs they feel thatit is best to begin creating a leaner overall structure.Read more: http://www.defenseprocurementnews.com/2011/09/28/more-defense-related-layoffs-announced/#ixzz1jHf0NRkz
In a bigger move British defense giant, BAE Systems(BAE:LSE), said that it would plan on reducing itsworkforce by about 3,000 positions.Most of these would be related to aircraft productionwhere the EurofighterTyphoon is near the end of its production run. Most ofthe original European customers have ordered all of thataircraft that they plan to buy leaving it needing ForeignMilitary Sales (FMS) customers to keep the line goingbeyond the next decade.Read more: http://www.defenseprocurementnews.com/2011/09/28/more-defense-related-layoffs-announced/#ixzz1jHfYw1z5
Weaknesses in Shipment Verification Process Continue, and; Expanded Monitoring Program Lacks Guidance for Country Visits DOD Lacks Information Needed to Effectively Administer and Oversee the FMS Program GAO-09-454 Defense Exports
DoD asked IDA to assess the impact of current and proposed U.S. export controls in four industries: satellite manufacturing, semiconductors, machine tools, and advanced materials. Results showed that U.S.-based industry has not suffered severe economic impacts to date from export control policies but this may change in the future. Although licenses are rarely denied, U.S. companies experience more conditions on foreign sales and longer, less predictable waiting periods for license approval than competitors in Europe or Japan selling comparable products. Staffing costs and other administrative burdens contribute to the rising cost of compliance among U.S. firms. IDA recommended changes to the U.S. export control regulations and their implementation to enable companies to better compete in world markets.
Among the other important areas that the latest Military Balance investigates, the assessments of Russian military reforms and Indian defence policy are particularly worthy of attention. These further emphasise the key theme that while the military sector in the West is, overall, contracting as a result of financial constraints, elsewhere the picture is often quite different. Many states are seeking to translate their economic strength into military power which they may then use in support of national goals ranging from protecting their energy supplies to asserting territorial claims.
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