Instability in Thailand


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  • These “Red Shirts” are a mix of city and rural people, the majority being farmers and others of the middle and lower classes from rural areas. They demand the Thai Parliament dissolve along with the resignation of Prime Minister AbhisitVejjajiva.
  • Thai kingdom in mid 14th century.KhanaRatsadon (People’s Party) group of military and civilian officials resulted in a transition of power from King Prajadhipok
  • 2010 from March to May. protests organized by National United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) (known as "Red-Shirts")
  • 500-15,000 estimated. Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO), Pattani Islamic Mujahideen movement (GMIP),, National Revolution Front (BRN), Pattani Liberation National Front (BNPP), JemaahIslamiyah (JI)September 2006, Army Commander SonthiBoonvaratkalin received an increase in executive powers to counter the unrest. Together, Boonvaratkalin and a junta ousted Thaksin. Drive bys, arsen of schools, bombings on 60th anniversary Bhumibol,
  • Instability in Thailand

    1. 1. Instability in Thailand<br />Ashley Crow<br />
    2. 2. Brief History 1932-1992<br />Bloodless revolution led to constitutional monarchy in 1932<br />1946 King BhumibolAdulyadejto present<br />Several regimes, including military<br />1991 coup, Thailand again under <br />military dictatorship<br />Elections. Majority party invited<br /> coup leader to be Prime Minister. <br />Public protests<br />1992 Bhumibol feared civil war<br />Televised peaceful intervention<br />
    3. 3. Brief History 1992-2006<br />1997 Constitution drafted by elected Constitutional Drafting Assembly<br />2006 Thaksin government overthrown by a coup<br />US cut $24 million in military aid, humanitarian aid continued<br />Kofi Annan condemned gaining power through the barrel of the gun<br />Economistaccused coup of preventing Thai Rak Thai party from winning democratic elections<br />Destroyed a decade of democratic progress<br />Also criticized lack of international involvement<br />
    4. 4. 2010<br />Political protests began in March against current Prime Minister AbhisitVeijajiva of the Democrat Party<br />Led by National United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship (known as Red-Shirts)<br />Demands include dissolving parliament and holding elections<br />Ban Ki-moon suggests problem is internal, should be solved internally<br />
    5. 5. Southern Insurgency<br />2001 insurgency groups<br />Southern Malay states of Pattani, <br />Narawathiwat, Yala<br />Islamic influence rather than Buddhist Thai<br />Siam annexed Malay region in 1902<br />1930s ultranationalist dictator Songkhran for “norms of central Thai culture…with no deviation tolerated”<br />Local traditional separatist groups and greater mujahidin groups such as JemaahIslamiyah<br />2003 RiduanIsamuddin, AQ leading operative in SE Asia<br />Poverty is falling, but clear economic gap<br />
    6. 6. US Objectives<br />Stabilize the state and region<br />Thailand to remain as an ally for economic and strategic purposes<br />“Hush” any takfiri movements that may bloom a regional or global offensive Islamist movement from an originally defensive insurgency<br />Prevent human rights violations<br />
    7. 7. Previous US Foreign Policy<br />“…US and Australia provided extensive police assistance against money laundering, counterfeiting, people smuggling, narcotics, sea-lane security, WMD proliferation, and illegal crossborder movement” -Kilcullen<br />US assistance under the Department of Justice Office of Oversease Prosecutorial Development and Training<br />Military trainers deployed under Joint US Military Advisory Group Thailand<br />BUT NO overt deployment of US personnel in South<br />
    8. 8. Policy Options<br />1) No US involvement. No pressure to any IGO/NGO<br />2) Limited US involvement. Pressure UN for humanitarian watches and aid<br />3) Direct US military involvement<br />
    9. 9. Policy Recommendation<br />Option #2<br />Realist perspective<br />Limited US involvement<br />Pressure for UN humanitarian watches and aid<br />Emphasizes soft power and importance of democracy<br />Multilateralism in issues involving insurgencies<br />Provide intelligence for Southern insurgency<br />Whether global terrorist cells are present<br />
    10. 10. Consequences of Policy<br />UN support humanitarian assistance to low income areas, help build infrastructure<br />No physical intervention will prevent takfiri movement from Islamists such as JI or AQ<br />US will not intervene unilaterally<br />Does not have capability to do so, and cannot afford international criticism as before<br />Mahkota of Pattani United Liberation Organization<br />“There is no interest in taking operations to Bangkok or Phuket. We do not need to be on anyone’s terrorist list. Once we are on that list, it is all over.”<br />