Ppt hickey sh antwerp seminar april 2012 presentation


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Ppt hickey sh antwerp seminar april 2012 presentation

  1. 1. 2-5-2012 New thinking on the politics of development:  New thinking on the politics of development: From incentives to ideas?  Insights from Uganda Sam Hickey, IDPM, University of Manchester Co‐Research Director, Effective States and Inclusive Development Centre Seminar on Rethinking State, Economy and Society:  Political settlements and transformation potential of African States. 27 April 2012, IOB, University of Antwerp Effective States and Inclusive Development  (ESID) Research Centre• www.effective‐states.org www effective‐states org• “What kinds of politics can help secure inclusive  development & how can these be promoted?”• Based at the Institute for Development Policy and  Management (IDPM), University of Manchester, • Partner countries: Ghana, Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda,  Bangladesh, India  1
  2. 2. 2-5-2012 Structure• Rethinking the politics of development  – Problems with the new mainstream• The new politics of development in Uganda:  towards structural transformation?• Implications: theory and practice Beyond new institutionalism• “…historical political economy offer(s) a more robust  explanation of institutional change and development than new  institutional economics” (di John and Putzel 2009: 6) l ” (d h d l ) – ‘political settlements’ Mushtaq Khan (2000, 2010)• Historical institutionalism: theories of path generation  – ‘Limited access orders’ (North, Wallis & Weingast 2009) – Autonomy, interests, power and coalitions (Mahoney and Thelen 2011)• Some important differences (e.g. on capitalism) but more unites  than separates them viz. earlier work• Increasingly influential: theory and practice 2
  3. 3. 2-5-2012 Key insights • Elite bargaining as central to political settlements/social order – Elites centralise violence and establish institutions that align the  distribution of benefits with the underlying distribution of power  (Khan 2010).  – Elite bargains give rise to institutions that shape social change; in  ‘limited access orders’ these involve special deals based on  personalistic ties not impersonal organisations (North et al 2009)• Explains how rent‐seeking & patronage dominates the politics  of development in most developing countries• Shapes the capacity of the state to act and establishes the  incentives to which elites respond – Explains the failure of the good governance agenda Critical problems• Problems of application – Limited elaboration and testing to date Limited elaboration and testing to date – Danger of conceptual over‐reach• Intrinsic: ontological oversights – Elitist: downplays the role of subordinate groups  – Foundational: lack proximity to policy and policy actors p y p y p y – Rational‐actor approach: tends to overlook the role of  ideology, beliefs, discursive politics (e.g. nationalism) – Tend towards methodological nationalism 3
  4. 4. 2-5-2012 Materialism/incentives vs. ideas • Khan: elites as rational actors intent only on securing and  maintaining power. Ideology important only in keeping ruling  gp gy p y p g g coalitions together • North et al (2009: 262): beliefs as an outcome of different  social orders not a cause: “Controlling violence through rent‐ seeking results in a society based on personal identities and  privilege”: rules out ideas around equality or impersonality• Broader literature takes more account of ideas – Nationalism, national identity and developmental states (e.g. SE Asia) – Critical to social democracy in South: Sandbrook et al (2007) on  programmatic political parties; Singh (2010): ‘we‐ness’ and ‘equality’ – Clarke (2012): ‘incentives’ versus ‘idealist’ approaches to the English  Industrial Revolution: ‘historical materialism’ as a hybrid approach Insights from beyond the mainstream• African studies, e.g. ‘negotiated statehood’ – ““…states are not only the product and realm of bureaucrats, policies  l h d d l fb li i and institutions, but also of imageries, symbols and discourses.  (Hagmann and Peclard 2010: 543).  – “By these and other processes, political power in Africa is increasingly  ‘internationalized’ and statehood partly suspended (Schlichte, 2008).”  (Hagmannn and Peclard 2010: 556), with reference to China, South‐ South transfers, transnational migration etc. • Critical political theory and cultural political economy Critical political theory and cultural political economy – e.g. Jessop’s (2007) strategic‐relational approach to state power – Discursive hegemonic strategies central to state power – Transnational: “international relations intertwine with these internal  relations of nation‐states, creating new, unique and historically  concrete combinations”.  4
  5. 5. 2-5-2012Thinking about the politics of inclusive development:  a relational approach 5
  6. 6. 2-5-2012 Trends in PAF funding 1997/98‐20010/111997/98 - 2005/06 (PEAP evaluation: PSR 2005); 2007/10 (BPR excluding donorsfor 2008-9); 2010-11: National BFP 10/11-14/15; 2011-12: National BFP 11/12-15/15 Allocations & Performance: Roads and Energy 6
  7. 7. 2-5-2012 Uganda’s new political economy Domestic/aid shares of budgetSource: 2003/4 (BTTB 2009/10); 2004/5-2006/7 (BTTB 2010/11); 2007/08-20010/11(BTTB 2011:43); 2011/12 (Budget Speech 2011). *= Budget 7
  8. 8. 2-5-2012 The return of multi‐partyism• Shoring up the ruling coalition• Deepened the clientelistic political settlement• The ambiguous politicisation of policy-making •Personalised patronage; but also programmatic? Ideas matter• Political/Presidential discourse on ‘modernisation’  and  transformation and ‘transformation’ – Historical: reignited by political/political economy shifts• NDP: no poverty data; review of E Asian experience• Transnational – World Bank Country Memo (2007): gains traction amongst  some leading technocrats – Financial crisis further undermines neoliberalism 8
  9. 9. 2-5-2012 A new convergence? • ‘As economic tectonic  plates have shifted,  paradigms must shift too’ di t hift t ’ • ‘This is no longer about the  Washington Consensus’  • ‘Securing transformation’ – Robert Zoellick, WB President  (Sept 2010) • Th ‘ The ‘new structural  l economics’ – Justin Lin, Chief Economist  • BUT: an idea without  agency on the ground Will the NDP be implemented?INITIALCONDIT IDEOLOGY & DISCOURSE ‘Transformation’ displaces PWC (growth & IONS POLITICAL poverty) but lacks agency in policy circles ?? New oil ECONOMY finds;; Oil & rising powersdeclinin displace trad donors g food POLITICAL COALITIONS DEVELOPMENTsecurity; Growth creates new SETTLEMENTS AND PACTS* STRATEGY rising constituencies In transit: pro- Transformation? cost of Ruling coalition poor pact (aid, Jobless growth? living; narrowing, MoF & CSOs) Social protection? rising reduced broken youth C&Cunemplo legitimacy? New deals & yment DELIVERY Remains highly actors required MECHANISMS INSTITUTIONAL clientelistic for new strategy Declining PS FORMS not yet in place performance f Presidentialist Districtisation ‘Multiparty’ politics Subord groups disorganised Corruption Feedback UNDERLYING CONDITIONS FOR PROXIMATE CONDITIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT 9
  10. 10. 2-5-2012 Implications• Achieving structural transformation requires more than a new  political and political context and a new strategy – Shifts in elite‐level relations are critical: but within policy coalitions as  well as political coalitions – Ideas matter: not just about incentives – Transnational factors (actors, flows) interplay with both• Theory  – Need to go beyond the new mainstream: critical insights from the  margins• Practice  – Ideas (not just institutions) provide external actors with an interface  for engagement – Developing agents for structural transformation? Introducing ESID• A six‐year research consortium funded by the UK  epa e o e a o a e e op e Department for International Development• One of four new consortia focused on governance• Roughly £6.25 mn, 2011‐2016• Research, capacity‐strengthening & uptake• Moving into primary research phase now 10
  11. 11. 2-5-2012 Who are we?• Based at the Institute for Development Policy and  Management (IDPM) and the B k W ld P M (IDPM) d h Brooks World Poverty  Institute (BWPI), University of Manchester, • CEO: David.Hulme@manchester.ac.uk• Research Directors: Sam.Hickey@manchester.ac.uk;  Kunal.Sen@manchester.ac.ukConsortium partners:  p• Institute for Economic Growth, India• BRAC Development Institute, Bangladesh• University of Malawi• Centre for Democratic Development, Ghana• Centre for International Development at KSG, Harvard.  ESID’s Core research questionsWhat kinds of politics can help secure inclusive  development & how can these be promoted?1. What capacities do states require to help deliver inclusive  development? 2. What shapes elite commitment to delivering inclusive  h h l d l l development and state effectiveness? 3. Under what conditions do developmental forms of state  capacity and elite commitment emerge and become  sustained?  11
  12. 12. 2-5-2012 Research programmes1. Concepts, Theory and Measurement2. The Politics of Accumulation • Development and growth strategies • Natural resources: exploitation and governance3. The Politics of Social Provisioning • Basic services; social protection; focus on implementation4. The Politics of Recognition g • Elite commitment to inclusion (e.g. quotas, anti‐discrimination) • Impact of inclusion on state capacity and development outcomes5. The Transnational Politics of Development • New geopolitics of aid (e.g. non‐traditional donors, new approaches  to governance reform) • Beyond aid: transnational drivers of capacity and commitment 12