REDD+ Benefit-Sharing Mechanisms: Comparison of Three National Policy Approaches

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John Costenbader, IUCN Environmental Law Centre …

John Costenbader, IUCN Environmental Law Centre
26 November 2010
Presentation for ‘REDD+ Partnership Workshop on Enhancing Coordinated Delivery of
REDD+: Emerging Lessons, Best Practices and Challenges’
REDD+ Partnership Meeting, UNFCCC COP 16
Mexico, Westin Hotel, Boulevard Kukulcan, km 20, Cancún
For further documentation see: http://reddpluspartnership.org/73943/en/

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  • Policy approaches – or elements of approaches in some casesREDD+ itself overall a type of PES instrument, but sub-national approaches may build off existing forest management modelsPES, PFM & forest concessions all under exploration as REDD+ policy basis in various nation plansImportant potential differences in how each might provide for benefit deliveryDifferent approach to benefit-sharing here, perhaps uncommon to think of policy approaches for benefit sharing, but idea is to give a practical ‘big picture perspective for the sake of this meetingPES a main part of many countries’ plans (es. Latin America)PFM forms foundation of Tanzanian national REDD strategyForest concessions in several countries’ REDD planning Challenge in paper is one shared by many countries preparing REDD+ strategies: uncertain outcome of REDD+ under UNFCCC
  • PES provides historical foundations of REDD+, often said REDD+ itself a ‘multi-layer PES’greater conditionality in user-funded PES than state-funded PES - but economies of scale favor state-funded PES…State-to-state PES: e.g., Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: Performance-related conditionality on earmarked payments between national or provincial and local levelsState & community forests:
  • Equity: how to include poor/marginal landholders while ensuring goals met (hurdles: tenure, labour, capital needs, transaction costs)Exclusivity: difficulties of land tenure (confusing, conflicting claims, nonformal systems)Efficiency:challenge in scaling up while making correct payments according to opportunity, et al. costs (often payments don’t reflect OC)Conditionality:payment after performance can favor wealthier landowners w/ start-up costs  timing payments w/ some upfront & other means to help ease start-up challenge can help (key to time payments over full duration or no conditionality)Also: Per-ha. payments inversely-related to landholding size (Ecuador - Socio Bosque)
  • Some form of decentralization and devolution of state power is common in PFM approaches JFM: [us. on state land (higher-quality forest in carbon & BD)] - JFM less likely to be a successful policy approach, given lack of ownership & benefits for communitiesCBFM: [us. agreements made on ‘village’ or public land, not private] - CBFM has high potential as REDD+ benefit-delivery - For CBFM to succeed as a REDD+ policy approach, risks should be shared between communities & state
  • REDD-PLUS conservation, sustainable management of forests + enhancement of forest carbon stocks could imply increasedtransaction costs from more complex MRV… - work needed to overcome transaction cost hurdles - … simplified (part) locally-performed MRV could helpGOOD NEWS: Honduras:full forest management and production rights to communitiesChina:long-term landcontracts to communities of 30-100 years;Mexico:Strong community forests from recognition of common property  rural community ownership of 60-70 percent of forests;Brazil:new forest legislation could empower multiple Amazon communities under extractive reserve conservation areas (RESEX); Nepal:communities granted full ownership, management and 100 percent of revenues from community forests
  • National revenue-sharing determinations could overlookdifferences in opportunity costs resulting in over + underpayments (inefficient)BUT: if revenue determinations made at provincial level reflecting opportunity costs, could be highly efficient as could set aside large tracts of forest quickly
  • No ‘one size fits all’ & all 3 approaches have strengths/weaknesses, though somevariations seem to have more negatives: - JFM & - nationally-uniform forest concession RSre efficiency: (1) bundling smallholders in group contracts, (2) simplifying MRV & (3) formal recognition of customary or informal land tenure (tho need not be actual title registration process)
  • With all the usual caveats of overly aggregate regionaldata… - Drivers helps to identify actors to be targetedLatin America: - 1) light pink = ranching/pasture conversion drives 2/3 of deforestation (largely in Amazon) - 2) dark pink = subsistence agriculture- need for PES benefits to target ranchers outside forests as well as subsistence forest dwellers inside or on frontiersAfrica: - 1) dark pink = subsistence agriculture (54%) - 2) medium pink = intensive agriculture (over 1/3!) - 3) bottom wedge = logging (10 %)Subsistence agricultural deforestation in Africa driven by insecure property rights (& agricultural expansion); - [industrial logging opens up forest to subsistence ag.] - target w/ land tenure reform (key for REDD+) [also benefits to logging & commercial agriculture actors]Asia: - subsistence & intensive agriculture each 44% - logging & ranching each 6% - (similar to Africa, but also due to large state industrial ag/logging projects) REDD+ supplemental C-benefits for CBFM & PES payments to commercial forestry may make viable a transition to SFM/RIL
  • With all the usual caveats of overly aggregate regionaldata… - Drivers helps to identify actors to be targetedLatin America: - 1) light pink = ranching/pasture conversion drives 2/3 of deforestation (largely in Amazon) - 2) dark pink = subsistence agriculture- need for PES benefits to target ranchers outside forests as well as subsistence forest dwellers inside or on frontiersAfrica: - 1) dark pink = subsistence agriculture (54%) - 2) medium pink = intensive agriculture (over 1/3!) - 3) bottom wedge = logging (10 %)Subsistence agricultural deforestation in Africa driven by insecure property rights (& agricultural expansion); - [industrial logging opens up forest to subsistence ag.] - target w/ land tenure reform (key for REDD+) [also benefits to logging & commercial agriculture actors]Asia: - subsistence & intensive agriculture each 44% - logging & ranching each 6% - (similar to Africa, but also due to large state industrial ag/logging projects) REDD+ supplemental C-benefits for CBFM & PES payments to commercial forestry may make viable a transition to SFM/RIL
  • With all the usual caveats of overly aggregate regionaldata… - Drivers helps to identify actors to be targetedLatin America: - 1) light pink = ranching/pasture conversion drives 2/3 of deforestation (largely in Amazon) - 2) dark pink = subsistence agriculture- need for PES benefits to target ranchers outside forests as well as subsistence forest dwellers inside or on frontiersAfrica: - 1) dark pink = subsistence agriculture (54%) - 2) medium pink = intensive agriculture (over 1/3!) - 3) bottom wedge = logging (10 %)Subsistence agricultural deforestation in Africa driven by insecure property rights (& agricultural expansion); - [industrial logging opens up forest to subsistence ag.] - target w/ land tenure reform (key for REDD+) [also benefits to logging & commercial agriculture actors]Asia: - subsistence & intensive agriculture each 44% - logging & ranching each 6% - (similar to Africa, but also due to large state industrial ag/logging projects) REDD+ supplemental C-benefits for CBFM & PES payments to commercial forestry may make viable a transition to SFM/RIL
  • Risk-sharing: could occur w/ help outsiders/other stakeholdersREDD+ benefits can target actors w/o carbon rights via programmes & measuresNo ‘one size fits all’ & all 3 approaches have strengths/weaknesses, though somevariations seem to have more negatives: - JFM & - nationally-uniform forest concession RSre efficiency: (1) bundling smallholders in group contracts, (2) simplifying MRV & (3) formal recognition of customary or informal land tenure (tho need not be actual title registration process)

Transcript

  • 1. REDD+ BENEFIT SHARING: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THREE NATIONAL POLICY APPROACHES Presentation for ‘REDD+ Partnership Workshop on Enhancing Coordinated Delivery of REDD+: Emerging Lessons, Best Practices and Challenges’ 26 November 2010 John Costenbader IUCN Environmental Law Centre INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE
  • 2. Flow of presentation • Forest policy approaches: - PES PFM Forest Concessions • Architectural comparison • Drivers • Challenges & lessons
  • 3. Payments for Environmental Services (PES) approach • Key feature of PES is conditionality of payments on provision of environmental services – PES can provide link between national & sub-national REDD+ activities • PES projects so far usually deal with private land, and literature mostly considers payments to individuals • But issues relevant in upscaling PES to REDD+ – PES encompasses wider array of payment arrangements, including national-subnational (IGFT) – Around 80% tropical forests de jure state forest, and some countries have large areas community forest
  • 4. PES as REDD+ benefit delivery instrument • Challenges in delivering benefits to/across local level… – Equity, exclusivity, efficiency & conditionality • …. but good news, too: – Bundling smallholders (Oddar Meanchey, Cambodia) – Simplified monitoring (Plan Vivo projects, global) – Local carbon inventorying (Kyoto: Think Global Act Local project, global) – Prioritized equitable criteria for accepting payment applicants (PSAH program, Mexico)
  • 5. Participatory Forest Management (PFM) approach • PFM represents decentralized strategy to local forest management • Two main types of PFM: – Joint (Collaborative) Forest Management (JFM) • State-retained ownership, responsibility • Fewer rights and benefits to local communities – Community-Based Forest Management (CBFM) • Devolution of rights, ownership, responsibility, benefits • But with responsibility also comes risk….
  • 6. PFM: good potential to complement REDD'+' • PFM promising as REDD+ platform: – Devolution of forest land ownership and benefits to local communities often results in improved management and conservation – SFM benefits can complement REDD+ benefits, where either alone might fail to provide adequately to local communities • Major improvements needed to ensure equity & incentives: – Elite capture of benefits (horizontal & vertical) – Administrative controls can overly complicate PFM projects & restrict access to forest benefits – Fuller devolution needed of ownership, benefits • But good news as well: – Recent examples of state devolution of forest management, ownership and benefits to local control
  • 7. Forest concession approach • A default REDD+ benefit-sharing option based on agreements for splitting concession revenues – Generally state decides a split of revenues between state, loggers and villagers nearby forest • Revenue-sharing percentages determined at national level could miss differing opportunity costs • Vertical & horizontal benefit allocation challenging • Concessions could exclude poor smallholders • But also potential efficiencies as may upscale quickly
  • 8. PES PFM Forest Concession Equity (+) Potentially high if poor/marginal groups targeted (-) JFM: likely low (+) CBFM: potentially high if poor/marginal groups targeted & liability sharing (-) potential small holder exclusion (both from customary lands & benefits) Efficiency (+) Good if opp. costs continually estimated (-) Transaction costs in upscaling (+) Wide potential group of beneficiaries if mixed w/ SFM (-) Transaction costs in upscaling (+) Low transaction costs, easily upscaled (-) Likely over/underpayments (if national mgmt.) Effectiveness (+) potential for long-term sustainability (+) potential for multiple PES instruments (+) CBFM: incentives if locally-owned /benefits (-) JFM: likely low if state-owned/controlled (+) Provincial mgmt. allowing for local opp. cost estimates (-) National mgmt. using uniform RS split Land Ownership / Tenure Regime Likely private ownership & control (but need to clarify tenure) Mixed: • CBFM: more private ownership/control • JFM: state ownership/ control Likely state ownership; private control for leasehold (but potential land tenure concerns)
  • 9. Regional deforestation drivers & potential benefit-sharing implications
  • 10. Regional deforestation drivers & potential benefit-sharing implications
  • 11. Regional deforestation drivers & potential benefit-sharing implications
  • 12. Common challenges, lessons & questions • Need to balance payments between actors and programs outside and inside forests • Benefits should target poor/marginal actors or they risk receiving insignificant benefits or even may be negatively affected • Exploring the ‘plus’ in REDD+ can help make viable a transition to sustainable economies and livelihoods • ‘Carbon rights’ determine actors eligible for benefits, but REDD+ benefits may indirectly target actors without rights also • Mechanisms to promote equity, efficiency & effectiveness essential to REDD+ success • Given difficulties of resolving land tenure, alternative indirect benefit-sharing means should be considered