vi- Forward to Victory! 1943-1945

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This session concludes Stalin's role in WW II through V-E Day

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vi- Forward to Victory! 1943-1945

  1. 1. !!!" !#$%&'$ Stalin’s SSSR session vi-Forward to Victory!; 1943-1945 !"!!#$ vi-%&"'"( ) &*+"("!; 1943-1945 , Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  2. 2. !!!" !#$%&'$ Stalin’s SSSR session vi-Forward to Victory!; 1943-1945 !"!!#$ vi-%&"'"( ) &*+"("!; 1943-1945 , BENEATH THE BANNER OF LENIN-FORWARD FOR THE MOTHERLAND, FOR OUR VICTORY! Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  3. 3. this session’s major topics • Introduction; The Supremo • Kursk • Teheran • To the West! • Poland’s Crucifixion • Yalta • Revenge: To Berlin! Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  4. 4. The Supremo ()*+,-'./ Verkhovnii Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  5. 5. The Supremo ()*+,-'./ Verkhovnii Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  6. 6. Operation Uranus [at Stalingrad] seemed to refresh Stalin who, observed Khrushchev, started to act “like a real soldier,” considering himself “a great military strategist.” He was never a general let alone a military genius but, according to Zhukov, who knew better than anyone, this “outstanding organizer...displayed his ability as Supremo starting with Stalingrad.” He “mastered the technique of organizing front operations...and guided them with skill, thoroughly understanding complicated strategic questions,” always displaying his “natural intelligence...professional intuition” and a “tenacious memory.” He was “many-sided and gifted” but had “no knowledge of all the details.” Mikoyan was probably right when he summed up in his practical way that Stalin “knew as much about military matters as a statesman should--but no more.” Montefiore, pp. 438-439 Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  7. 7. AND NOW WE TRIUMPH! Operation Uranus [at Stalingrad] seemed to refresh Stalin who, observed Khrushchev, started to act “like a real soldier,” considering himself “a great military strategist.” He was never a general let alone a military genius but, according to Zhukov, who knew better than anyone, this “outstanding organizer...displayed his ability as Supremo starting with Stalingrad.” He “mastered the technique of organizing front operations...and guided them with skill, thoroughly understanding complicated strategic questions,” always displaying his “natural intelligence...professional intuition” and a “tenacious memory.” He was “many-sided and gifted” but had “no knowledge of all the details.” Mikoyan was probably right when he summed up in his practical way that Stalin “knew as much about military matters as a statesman should--but no more.” Montefiore, pp. 438-439 Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  8. 8. Stalin’s “tells” (non-verbal “clues,” various warning signals) • Stalin was always pacing up and down (neutral, not a “tell”) • if the pipe was unlit (a bad omen) • if he put it down (an explosion imminent) • if he stroked his moustache with the stem of his pipe (he was pleased) • his tempers were terrifying:”he virtually changed before one’s eyes,” wrote Zhukov, “turning pale, a bitter expression in his eyes, his gaze heavy and spiteful.” (major “tell”) Tuesday, March 30, 2010
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  10. 10. The atmosphere at the GKO (Government Defense Council) War was the natural state of the Bolsheviks and they were good at it. Terror and struggle, the ruling Bolshevik passions, pervaded these meetings. Stalin liberally used fear but he himself lived on his nerves: when the new Railways Commisar arrived, Stalin simply said, “Transport is a matter of life and death...Remember, failure to carry out...orders means the Military Tribunal” at which the young man felt “a chill run down my spine….” Seconds later the Commissar, “white as a sheet,” was being shown out by Poskrebyshev who added, “See you don’t slip up.” Montefiore, p. 439 Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  11. 11. • like Stalin, a son of a shoemaker • 1917-joined RSDLP (b) • 1918-graduated training as a medical assistant • 1935-office manager of the General Secretary (Stalin), “gatekeeper” • worked 16-18 hours a day! PAS•KRO•BEE•SHUFF 1891-1965 Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  12. 12. Mikoyan was one of the chief workhorses, overseeing the rear, rations, medical supplies, ammunition, the merchant navy, food, fuel, clothing for people and armies, while also Commisar of Foreigh Trade negotiating Lend- Lease with the Allies, a stupendous portfolio. Mikoyan worked from 10 a.m. until almost 5 a.m., napping at his office. Montefiore, pp. 441 & 435 Anastas Mikoyan !"#$%#$ &'()#""*$+ ,+-'.#" 1895-1978 Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  13. 13. The “terror of the Party,” Beria, who behaved like a villain in a film noir, blossomed in wartime, using the Gulag’s 1.7 million slave labourers to build Stalin’s weapons and railways. It is estimated that around 930,000 of these labourers perished during the war. But his NKVD was the pillar of Stalin’s regime, representing the supremacy of the Party over the military. Ibid. Lavrenti Beria in his NKVD Marshall’s uniform Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  14. 14. “We could all remember 1937,” said Zhukov. If anything went wrong, [we] knew “you’d end up in Beria’s hands and Beria was always present during my meetings with Stalin.” After General Voronov had twice defied him in front of Stalin, Beria was finally allowed to arrest him. When Voronov did not appear at a meeting, Stalin casually asked Beria: “Is Voronov at your place?” Beria replied that he would be back in two days. The generals are said to have coined a euphemism for these terrifying interludes: “Going to have coffee with Beria.” His minions watched the soldiers on every front... Montefiore, p. 440 & pp. 441-442 Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  15. 15. Kursk Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  16. 16. Russian infantrymen in a prepared Kursk defense with a WW I Maxim machinegun Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  17. 17. After victory at Stalingrad (Stalin’s City) the Verkhovnii, once again, felt invincible, just as he had after the battle for Moscow in early 1942. “Those who ignore the lessons of history…” Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  18. 18. LENINGRAD • 19 Feb-the front at the beginning of this map is a solid black line • Leningrad is still encircled and suffering • but the Red Army has driven the Nazis far back from Stalingrad and almost out of the Northern Caucasus NORTHERN CAUCASUS Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  19. 19. LENINGRAD • 19 Feb-the front at the beginning of this map is a solid black line • Leningrad is still encircled and suffering • but the Red Army has driven the Nazis far back from Stalingrad and almost out of the Northern Caucasus • to 18 March-the orange area indicates what the Nazis were able to re-conquer NORTHERN CAUCASUS Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  20. 20. LENINGRAD • 19 Feb-the front at the beginning of this map is a solid black line • Leningrad is still encircled and suffering • but the Red Army has driven the Nazis far back from Stalingrad and almost out of the Northern Caucasus • to 18 March-the orange area indicates KURSK what the Nazis were able to re-conquer • thus creating a dangerous salient around Kursk NORTHERN CAUCASUS Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  21. 21. LENINGRAD • 19 Feb-the front at the beginning of this map is a solid black line • Leningrad is still encircled and suffering • but the Red Army has driven the Nazis far back from Stalingrad and almost out of the Northern Caucasus • to 18 March-the orange area indicates KURSK what the Nazis were able to re-conquer • thus creating a dangerous salient around Kursk • and creating the conditions for Operation Citadel, the battle for Kursk • to 1 August-the green area shows the initial gains made by the German Army in their attempt for another Kesselschlacht NORTHERN CAUCASUS Tuesday, March 30, 2010
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  23. 23. At dawn on 5 July the Germans threw 900,000 men and 2,700 tanks into this colossal battle of machines in which fleets of metallic giants clashed, helm to helm, barrel to barrel. By the 9th, the Germans had reached their limit. On the 12th, Zhukov unleashed the costly but highly successful counter-attack. The Battle of Kursk was the climax of the Panzer era, the “mechanized equivalent of “hand-to-hand combat,” which left a graveyard of 700 tanks and burnt flesh. Agreeing to cancel Citadel, Hitler had lost his last chance to win the war. Montefiore, p. 452 Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  24. 24. badge of the Waffen SS New Tiger tanks were available for the first time in large numbers Waffen SS units were optimistic, as was Hitler Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  25. 25. the new Soviet T-34 was arguably even better. Note the sloped armor to send “incoming” ricocheting off Tuesday, March 30, 2010
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  36. 36. PROKHOROVKA Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  37. 37. battle of Prokhorovka--12 July 1943 “the greatest tank battle of all times” • the Reds launched a counter offensive, hoping to catch the Germans off balance • “best described as a very costly tactical loss but an operational draw for the Soviets” • neither accomplished their missions that day • losses a contentious subject: Soviet-200(?) 822 (?) --probably 150-300 German-80(?) “hundreds, including ‘dozens’ of Tigers” (?) --probably 70-80 “operational reductions” short/long term battlefield monument Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  38. 38. Red tank recovery vehicle towing a T-34 from the Prokhorovka battlefield Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  39. 39. strategic outcomes as series of Red Army operations lead to the crossing of the Dnieper and the liberation of Kiev, autumn of 1943 a new pattern emerges--the initiative passes to the Soviets Germans spend the rest of the war reacting to their moves the Italian front drains resources from Ostfront only the Soviets have the manpower, Lend-Lease, and industrial production to recover fully Germany will never again launch a major eastern offensive Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  40. 40. long term results the loss further convinces Hitler of the incompetence of his General Staff he continues his interference in military matters, by the war’s end he is involved in tactical decisions Stalin moves in the opposite direction, he sees Stavka’s planning justified on the battlefield, steps back from operational planning, only rarely overrules military decisions predictable results ensue for both sides: German Army moves from loss to loss as Hitler “micromanages” Soviet Army gains freedom and becomes more and more fluid Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  41. 41. Teheran, 28 Nov-1 Dec1943 Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  42. 42. age 64 age 61 age 69 Teheran, 28 Nov-1 Dec1943 Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  43. 43. Stalin’s first flights • for the first meeting of the Big Three he reluctantly took to the air • he had declined to fly to the earlier Cairo Conference, 22-27 November 1943 • 26-27 Nov--he travelled to Baku by rail and then chose among the four transport planes the one whose pilot was the most experienced • the transports were guarded by twenty-seven fighter aircraft • extremely uneasy, he “was terrified when the plane hit an air pocket” • after the return flight, he would never take to the air again Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  44. 44. the small Soviet delegation; only outside the Soviet Molotov, Voroshilov, & Beria, 12 legation, Teheran security and translators Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  45. 45. two against one the new friends Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  46. 46. two against one • both, for their own reasons, chose to treat Churchill as “odd man out” • Stalin, fearing that the “capitalists” would try to gang up on him, invited FDR to stay at the Soviet legation “for security reasons.” It made some sense as the American legation was several miles out of town and the narrow streets were hard to guard. Naturally, FDR’s rooms were “bugged” • FDR expected to charm “Uncle Joe” as he had so many others. He let Stalin know that he was no friend of the British Empire. He thought India “was ripe for a revolution ‘from the bottom’ like Russia, [he] was as ill- the new friends informed about Leninism as he was about the untouchables.” Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  47. 47. At 4:00 p.m. the Big Three gathered around the specially constructed table in a big hall…. “In our hands,” declaimed Churchill, “we have the future of mankind.” Stalin completed this…”History has spoiled us,” he said. “She’s given us very great power and very great opportunities...Let’s begin our work.” Montefiore, p. 467 Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  48. 48. Chief of the Imperial General Staff, at his desk, 1942 From the first moment of the conference, [Field Marshal Alan Brooke, Churchill’s top advisor] convinced himself that Stalin had ‘a military brain of the very highest calibre. Never once in any of his statements did he make any strategic error, nor did he ever fail to appreciate all the implications of a situation with a quick and unerring eye.’ By contrast Brooke characteristically thought Marshal Voroshilov had ‘nothing in the shape of strategic vision.’ Andrew Roberts, Masters and Commanders; How Four Titans Won the War in the West, 1941-1945. 2009. pp. 443-444 Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  49. 49. the agenda • the Second Front-- Churchill preferred “the soft underbelly,” a Balkan approach, using troops already in Italy and the Eastern Mediterranean • FDR was already committed to the Channel. He winked at Stalin, “the start of his gauche flirtation that greatly enhanced the Marshal’s position as arbiter…” • FDR proposed an international organization, the future United Nations • the Western generals met with Voroshilov about the Channel operation. Stalin pressed for the earliest possible date certain • FDR said he couldn’t discuss Poland because of the upcoming election.”The subordination of the fate of the country for which the war was fought to American machine politics can only have encouraged Stalin’s plans for a tame Poland.” Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  50. 50. the agenda • the final agreement promised that Overlord (the Channel) and Anvil (the invasion of Southern France) would be the top priority of 1944 and would occur no later than May • Stalin promised to launch a major offensive at the same time to prevent Hitler from shifting forces westward • Poland would be shifted westward to please Stalin. Her eastern border would be the Curzon Line of 1920. Her western border the Oder-Neisse at Germany’s expense • there would be a United Nations Organization, details to follow • agreement was reached on Iranian post-war independence Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  51. 51. Churchill’s contemporaneous memo of a conversation with Voroshilov Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  52. 52. atmospherics • Beria’s handsome son Sergo was one of those who briefed Stalin on the bugging reports. Stalin was amazed that the Americans didn’t realize he was eavesdropping on them. He was gratified that FDR seemed charmed by him. • Stalin put on the charm for his two “opposite numbers.” But he treated his subordinates “like dogs.”--Br. interpreter Hugh Lunghi • Churchill presented Stalin with a ceremonial sword from King George VI to commemorate the victory of Stalingrad. When Voroshilov dropped its scabbard with a clatter, Stalin humiliated him • Stalin joked about executing 50,000 German officers to eradicate militarism. FDR and his son Elliot made light of it. Churchill stormed out in disgust and had to be charmed back by Stalin, “I was only joking!” Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  53. 53. Leahy Brooke Voroshilov the farewell group picture with military chiefs behind them Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  54. 54. To the West! Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  55. 55. To the West! NA ZAPAD ! Tuesday, March 30, 2010
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  82. 82. THE FRONT DRAWS NEARER The way to Stalingrad was through Kiev, then the Russians in 10 months have reversed matters, now the way to Breslau is through Kiev Soviet propaganda leaflet Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  83. 83. Soviet superiority in materiel and personnel beginning in 1941, Stalin orders defense manufacturing moved east of the Urals. After the U.S. enters the war, we supply vast amounts of equipment and supplies to the USSR. he demands ruthless human sacrifices, both on the battlefield and in the factories, of his more numerous population ( 197 vs 60 million Germans) at great cost, this capacity starts turning out superior war equipment we’ve already seen the T-34 tanks now we’ll let the Shturmovik IL-2 aircraft stand for many other such weapons systems Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  84. 84. development of the 0#1*2,-&3 (Shturmovik) • throughout the mid-1930s, Soviet aircraft designers worked to develop an anti-tank attack aircraft like the Ju-87 Stuka • first prototypes were flown in 1939 • wartime production was slow until Stalin started cracking heads Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  85. 85. YOU HAVE LET DOWN OUR COUNTRY AND OUR RED ARMY. YOU HAVE NOT MANUFACTURED IL-2S UNTIL NOW. THE IL-2 AIRCRAFT ARE NECESSARY FOR OUR RED ARMY NOW, LIKE AIR, LIKE BREAD. SHENKMAN FACTORY PRODUCES ONE IL-2 A DAY AND TRETIAKOV BUILDS ONE OR TWO MIG-3S DAILY. IT IS A MOCKERY OF OUR COUNTRY AND THE RED ARMY. I ASK YOU NOT TO TRY THE GOVERNMENT'S PATIENCE, AND DEMAND THAT YOU MANUFACTURE MORE ILS. I WARN YOU FOR THE LAST TIME. STALIN. Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  86. 86. development of the 0#1*2,-&3 (Shturmovik) • throughout the mid-1930s, Soviet aircraft designers worked to develop an anti-tank attack aircraft like the Ju-87 Stuka • first prototypes were flown in 1939 • wartime production was slow until Stalin started cracking heads • the first massive use came during Uranus, the Stalingrad encirclement • by late 1944, they dominated the skies and were the scourge of the German panzers Tuesday, March 30, 2010
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  88. 88. When I was working on my book Red Phoenix, I did interview a number of German pilots who told me of the overwhelming numbers of Soviet a/c [aircraft] (supplemented with USA Lend Lease). At the [Smithsonian] Museum, I just turned in the restoration package for our Il-2 Shturmovik, one of a handful of survivors of a production effort of over 30,000 warplanes of this type. Von Hardesty, Aerospace Museum Smithsonian Institution, e-Mail to JBP, 17 April 2008 Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  89. 89. Ostfront 1944 Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  90. 90. Ostfront 1944 Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  91. 91. Soviet Spring Offensive--4 March-12 May Soviet gains during their winter offensive leave them well positioned for the new assault the Ukraine was the focus of the Spring Offensive the Red Army drove from the Dnieper to the Bug to the Dniester Rivers 10 April--with the fall of Odessa it became impossible to supply the German forces in the Crimea DEATH 10 May--Sevastopol is evacuated by TO THE GERMAN FASCIST ROBBER! sea Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  92. 92. ON THE JOYOUS DAY OF FREEDOM FROM THE YOKE OF THE GERMAN DESTROYERS THE FIRST WORDS OF BOUNDLESS GRATITUDE AND LOVE OF THE LIBERATED SOVIET PEOPLE ARE TO OUR FRIEND AND FATHER COMRADE STALIN--THE ORGANIZER OF OUR STRUGGLE FOR THE FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE OF OUR MOTHERLAND Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  93. 93. Operation Bagration Soviet Summer Offensive opens 22 June-- the third anniversary Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  94. 94. Operation Bagration Soviet Summer Offensive opens 22 June-- the third anniversary STRIKE GERMAN BEASTS! TO DESTROY THE HITLERITE ARMY--IT’S POSSIBLE & NECESSARY Tuesday, March 30, 2010
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  96. 96. Nazi POWs from the Fourth Army are marched through Moscow 17 July 1944 Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  97. 97. Poland’s Crucifixion Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  98. 98. Poland’s Crucifixion Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  99. 99. Katyn, 1939-1940--intensification of Poland’s hatred for Russia Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  100. 100. Katyn, 1939-1940--intensification of Poland’s hatred for Russia Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  101. 101. Katyn, 1939-1940--intensification of Poland’s hatred for Russia Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  102. 102. Katyn, 1939-1940--intensification of Poland’s hatred for Russia Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  103. 103. Katyn, 1939-1940--intensification of Poland’s hatred for Russia Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  104. 104. Katyn, 1939-1940--intensification of Poland’s hatred for Russia Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  105. 105. 5 March 1940 NARODNII KOMISSARIAT abbreviation for Central VNUTRENNIX DEL (NKVD) Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik) (to) tovarish STALIN J Sta lin K Vor oshilo v V Molo tov A Mik oyan (copies to) T. (for tovarish, comrade) Kalinin T. Kaganovich Beria’s request for approval of the Katyn massacres Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  106. 106. Symbol of the Polish Home Army Kotwica (anchor) PW has a double signification: 1) Polska Walczaca (Poland fights) 2) Powstanie Warszawskie (Warsaw Uprising) 1 August-2 October 1944 Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  107. 107. The Soviet summer offensive, forces two of Hitler’s allies, Rumania and Bulgaria, out of the war. By August the Red Army reaches central Poland Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  108. 108. Operation Bagration brings Soviet forces to the outskirts of Warsaw by August, 1944 the Polish Home Army begins an uprising to assist in driving out Nazi forces and to win a place at the peace table as not merely the passive recipient of Russian aid. Free Polish leaders were aware of Stalin’s Lublin Committee Tuesday, March 30, 2010
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  111. 111. Powstanie Warszawskie (Warsaw Uprising) • part of a nationwide rebellion, Operation Storm • initially the Poles seized substantial areas of the city • 16 Sept-Soviet forces reach a point a few hundred meters from Polish positions across the Vistula • they made no further gains during the Uprising • Polish: about 16,000 KIA, 6,000 WIA--150-200,000 civilians die, mostly from mass murder by German troops • German: over 16,000 KIA, 9,000 WIA Positions held by the Polish Home Army on Day 4 of the • Jan 1945- when Soviets entered, 85% of the city in ruins uprising Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  112. 112. unequal conflict initially the Poles had 45,000 soldiers (only 23,000 armed and combat ready) the German Warsaw garrison, 11,000 ultimately, the Germans deployed 90,000 combat hardened forces to crush the Poles here, the Dirlewanger brigade employs the Thor siege mortar which they had used to capture Sevastopol Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  113. 113. Thor’s target Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  114. 114. soldiers of the Armia Krajowa Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  115. 115. soldiers of the Armia Krajowa Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  116. 116. soldiers of the Armia Krajowa Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  117. 117. soldiers of the Armia Krajowa Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  118. 118. soldiers of the Armia Krajowa Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  119. 119. soldiers of the Armia Krajowa Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  120. 120. soldiers of the Armia Krajowa Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  121. 121. soldiers of the Armia Krajowa Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  122. 122. soldiers of the Armia Krajowa Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  123. 123. Instead of coming to their aid as the Poles expect, the Red Army waits for 63 days while the Germans butcher the less well armed Poles. Now the way is clear for the Soviet puppets, the Lublin Committee, to be the post-war communist government of Poland. Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  124. 124. Today, a less sinister, less “Cold War” explanation is offered: The Red Army was exhausted by their offensive, they hadn’t asked for the uprising. “We report. You decide!” Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  125. 125. Monument to the Uprising notice the bullet scars this bank was one of the last centers of resistance the kotwica continues to be a nationalist symbol Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  126. 126. age 67 Yalta age 70 age 65 Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  127. 127. Marshall Brooke Arnold Portal Leahy Cunningham age 67 Friday, 9 Feb 1945 Yalta age 70 age 65 courtyard of the Livadia Palace Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  128. 128. 1944-Preparing for the peace settlement • immediately after Teheran, as the Red Army approached the pre-war Polish border, a dispute began between London and Moscow over governance there • the Polish government-in-exile (the London Poles) recognized by Stalin until the 1943 discovery of Katyn • the Lublin Committee-(formally proclaimed 21 July 1944) Stalin’s “tool” for administering the reconquered Polish territories • June 1944-the British propose dividing the Balkans into zones of occupation on a percentage basis • Rumania, Bulgaria & Hungary--80% Soviet, 20% British; Greece-- 100% British; and Yugoslavia--50%, 50% • Oct 1944-the Big Three agree on this formula in Moscow Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  129. 129. in no shape for a 50 K ride in cold weather in a jeep Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  130. 130. in no shape for a 50 K ride in cold weather in a jeep Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  131. 131. in no shape for a 50 K ride in cold weather in a jeep Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  132. 132. differing views on FDR’s fitness • hindsight focused on this issue after: • the public shock of his death two months later • the Cold War search for blame as to why Eastern Europe was “sold out” at Yalta • opinions varied: • Lord Ismay of the British Imperial General Staff thought he was “more than half gaga” • Adm Cunningham: “The President, who is undoubtedly in bad shape and finding difficulty in concentrating...does not appear to know what he is talking about” Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  133. 133. differing views on FDR’s fitness • opinions varied: • Gen Marshall: “[FDR] looked very, very tired” • Cordell Hull: “The President looked dreadful when he was wheeled into the room-- sagging jaw, drooping shoulders. He appeared almost oblivious of his surroundings and of his guests. After several strong martinis, however, he seemed to come to life.” • Stewart Crawford: “half dead with grey sunken cheeks and little spark of vitality.” • Nonetheless, Admiral Land: that Roosevelt was not so ill at Yalta as the photos there might suggest, but was merely “having trouble with his dentures”, which had “affected his speech and caused his face to fall unduly.” Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  134. 134. a conference site at the Livadia Palace Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  135. 135. The Polish Question Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  136. 136. The Polish Question Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  137. 137. The Polish Question Oder River Stettin Neisse River Breslau Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  138. 138. The Polish Question & Occupation Zones Berlin Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  139. 139. It is hard to be naive and cynical at the same time, but Roosevelt was both when it came to Stalin and the fate of the Poles. ‘Of one thing I am certain, he told the Polish Prime Minister-in-exile Stanis!aw Miko!ajczyk,‘Stalin is not an imperialist.’ To the former American Ambassador to France, William C. Bullitt, he also said: ‘I have a hunch that Stalin doesn’t want anything other than security for his country, and I think that if I give him everything I possibly can and ask for nothing in return, noblesse oblige, he won’t try to annex anything and will work for a world of democracy and peace.’ To the British minister Richard Law in late December 1944, the President said that ‘he was not afraid of Communism as such. There are many varieties of Communism and not all of them are necessarily harmful.’ Roberts, p. 557 Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  140. 140. Major agreements • priority was Germany’s “unconditional surrender.” After the war there would be four occupation zones • Germany would undergo demilitarization and denazification • German reparations would be partly in the form of forced labor to repair the damage Germany had inflicted • Poland’s Provisional Government which had been installed by the USSR would be reorganized “on a broader democratic basis” • Poland’s eastern border would follow the Curzon Line and Poland would receive compensation in the West from Germany Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  141. 141. Major agreements • Poland’s eastern border would follow the Curzon Line and Poland would receive compensation in the West from Germany • Churchill alone pressed for free elections there. Stalin agreed, but never honored his promise. • Citizens of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were to be handed over to their respective countries regardless of their consent • Stalin agreed to enter the war against Japan within 90 days after the defeat of Germany • Nazi war criminals were to be hunted down and brought to justice Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  142. 142. the United Nations Organization (UNO) • 1943-the idea emerged in declarations signed at conferences in Moscow and Teheran • Aug-Oct 1944-the Dumbarton Oaks Conference (Wash DC) of France, the Republic of China, UK, USA, and USSR, made preliminary plans • Feb 1945- at Yalta, it was agreed that membership would be open to nations that had joined the Allies by 1 March 1945 • Stalin initially held out for separate delegations in the General Assembly for each republic • 25 April-the UN Conference on International Organization began in San Francisco to draft a charter for the organization • 24 Oct 1945- 51 original members signed its “birth certificate,” the Charter of the UNO Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  143. 143. The Charge of the Light Brigade Although Balaklava mattered much to men like Churchill and Brooke who had grown up with Tennyson’s poem, the Prime Minister complained that the local Russian guides had shown ‘no sort of feeling’ there. ‘Either they thought they had won the battle or they had never heard of it.’ ‘I wish you could have seen Sir Alan Brooke, with a school history book in one hand, explaining the battle of Balaclava to an audience of field marshals. We stood on a little ridge on the end of that famous battlefield where the Charge of the Light Brigade took place. All around us were the twisted remains of German anti-tank guns.’ Roberts, p. 553 Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  144. 144. All that Yalta did was to recognize the facts of life as they existed and were being brought about....The only way we could have in any way influenced that in a different way was not to have put our main effort into France or the Low Countries but to put it into the Balkans….It might have meant that Bulgaria, Rumania, and possibly others of those Eastern European countries that are now Communist-dominated would have other types of control at present. But...it would also mean that all of Germany and probably a good portion of the Low Countries, Belgium, Holland and even France, General John Hull, Vice Chief of Staff,in an oral interview at the might have Soviet influence over them rather than Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 1974 Western influence. To me there was no choice to make. Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  145. 145. The fascist vulture has learned, that we’re not a lamb! Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  146. 146. ND NEM Y’S LA ! TO THE E O VICTORY DT FO R W AR Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  147. 147. LET’S GO TO BERLIN ! Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  148. 148. Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  149. 149. Strike to the heart Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  150. 150. Tuesday, March 30, 2010
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  152. 152. Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  153. 153. the death of Berlin Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  154. 154. Soviet Katyusha rockets mounted on a Studebaker Lend-Lease truck. By war’s end 10,000 launchers are produced Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  155. 155. “Stalin’s organs” in action Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  156. 156. “Stalin’s organs” in action Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  157. 157. “Stalin’s organs” in action Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  158. 158. Stalin’s Winter Offensive, 17 January 1945 • with massive superiority, the Red Army drives all before it • civilians clog the roads • German forces, stripped for the Ardennes Offensive, fall back • Königsberg and Posen, encircled, hold out Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  159. 159. Stalin’s Winter Offensive, 17 January 1945 • with massive superiority, the Red Army drives all before it • civilians clog the roads • German forces, stripped for the Ardennes Offensive, fall back • Königsberg and Posen, encircled, hold out Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  160. 160. As rumors of the approach of Soviet forces reach German civilians, they flee on foot Goebbels has no need to exaggerate the infamies which vengeful Red soldiers inflict Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  161. 161. A Google Earth view of the terrain Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  162. 162. with the fall of the Seelow heights the road to Berlin lay open • 16-19 April--the Soviet offensive begins with the biggest artillery barrage of the war • 2.5 million men, 6,250 tanks, 7,500 aircraft, 41,600 artillery pieces and mortars, 3,255 truck- mounted Katyusha launchers & 95,383 motor vehicles • German trenches atop the Seelower Höhe were evacuated before the opening barrage • 143 searchlights were supposed to blind the defenders as the Reds crossed the river under fire. Actually, they were counterproductive Allied propaganda sheet to demoralize the Germans • finally, after four days, numbers prevailed Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  163. 163. Soviet victory monument Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  164. 164. the end game • a race is encouraged between Zhukov’s generals, Konev and Chuikov, to see who can enter Berlin first. This adds to the unnecessary loss of Russian as well as German life • a terrible slaughter of German soldiers and civilians occurs on the narrow roads of the pine forests south of Berlin • Hitler continues to micromanage from the Führerbunker beneath the Reichschancellery • 20 April-by Hitler’s last birthday, Berlin is invested Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  165. 165. the U-bahn stations were cautiously emptied Tuesday, March 30, 2010
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  168. 168. Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  169. 169. WE SET IN PLACE IN BERLIN THE BANNER OF VICTORY! Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  170. 170. Victory in the war...turned Stalin into the embodiment of patriotism, world power and a radiant future for the country. And such was his despotic authority that innumerable people lived their lives on the assumption that they had to accept the political structures and the official ideology. Many millions of course hated him in the 1930s and continued to detest him to the end of his days. But supporters of one kind or another certainly existed widely among people in the USSR. Service, p. 602 Tuesday, March 30, 2010
  171. 171. Tuesday, March 30, 2010

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