Russian War and Revolution: July, 1914-March, 1917

The Russian Revolution 1815-1924 The War; June, 1914-March, 1917 Sunday, October 18, 2009

Major Points • Diplomatic Considerations • Period of the Sacred Union • Disruption of the Sacred Union • On the Eve of Revolution • The February Revolution Sunday, October 18, 2009

Diplomatic Considerations Sunday, October 18, 2009

French President Poincaré visits Diplomatic Considerations Skt-Peterburg July, 1914 Sunday, October 18, 2009

Prinzip Sunday, October 18, 2009

Prinzip in prison Sunday, October 18, 2009

squandered goodwill Sunday, October 18, 2009

squandered goodwill • 28 June-Austrian police in Sarajevo capture the assassin Prinzip and immediately unravel most of the plot, clearly implicating Serbia Sunday, October 18, 2009

squandered goodwill • 28 June-Austrian police in Sarajevo capture the assassin Prinzip and immediately unravel most of the plot, clearly implicating Serbia • the initial reaction worldwide is shock and sympathy for Emperor Franz Josef, once again bereft by assassination Sunday, October 18, 2009

squandered goodwill • 28 June-Austrian police in Sarajevo capture the assassin Prinzip and immediately unravel most of the plot, clearly implicating Serbia • the initial reaction worldwide is shock and sympathy for Emperor Franz Josef, once again bereft by assassination • the days pass, Austria works behind the scenes, makes no move against Serbia, the war threat recedes , the moment of sympathy passes Sunday, October 18, 2009

squandered goodwill • 28 June-Austrian police in Sarajevo capture the assassin Prinzip and immediately unravel most of the plot, clearly implicating Serbia • the initial reaction worldwide is shock and sympathy for Emperor Franz Josef, once again bereft by assassination • the days pass, Austria works behind the scenes, makes no move against Serbia, the war threat recedes , the moment of sympathy passes • the foreign oﬃce in Vienna wants to wait until President Poincaré and his military advisors set sail back to France from their visit to their ally Russia. The idea is that by waiting, the two governments can’t coordinate a response to Austria’s move. Sunday, October 18, 2009

squandered goodwill • 28 June-Austrian police in Sarajevo capture the assassin Prinzip and immediately unravel most of the plot, clearly implicating Serbia • the initial reaction worldwide is shock and sympathy for Emperor Franz Josef, once again bereft by assassination • the days pass, Austria works behind the scenes, makes no move against Serbia, the war threat recedes , the moment of sympathy passes • the foreign oﬃce in Vienna wants to wait until President Poincaré and his military advisors set sail back to France from their visit to their ally Russia. The idea is that by waiting, the two governments can’t coordinate a response to Austria’s move. • 23 July--so the fatal 48 hour ultimatum is not sent until almost a month after the deed Sunday, October 18, 2009

The Willy-Nicky Correspondence--16 June-2 August Sunday, October 18, 2009

The Willy-Nicky Correspondence--16 June-2 August a series of secret telegrams between kaiser and tsar building on their personal relationship and attempting to bypass diplomatic channels they begin with generalized pleas to restrain one another’s allies and defuse the mounting tensions: I foresee that very soon I shall be overwhelmed by the pressure forced upon me and be forced to take extreme measures which will lead to war. To try and avoid such a calamity as a European war I beg you in the name of our old friendship to do what you can to stop your allies from going too far. Nicky. the tone becomes more speciﬁc and urgent until the last: Immediate afﬁrmative clear and unmistakable answer from your government is the only way to avoid endless misery. Until I have received this answer alas, I am unable to discuss the subject of your telegram. As a matter of fact I must request you to immediately [sic] order your troops on no account to commit the slightest act of trespassing over our frontiers. Willy neither monarch could exercise control over their military men Sunday, October 18, 2009

samples as the crisis mounts Sunday, October 18, 2009

samples as the crisis mounts Tsar to Kaiser, July 29, 1:00 A.M. Peter's Court Palais, 29 July 1914 Sa Majesté l'Empereur Neues Palais Am glad you are back. In this serious moment, I appeal to you to help me. An ignoble war has been declared to a weak country. The indignation in Russia shared fully by me is enormous. I foresee that very soon I shall be overwhelmed by the pressure forced upon me and be forced to take extreme measures which will lead to war. To try and avoid such a calamity as a European war I beg you in the name of our old friendship to do what you can to stop your allies from going too far. Nicky Sunday, October 18, 2009

Sunday, October 18, 2009

Kaiser to Tsar, July 29, 1:45 A.M. This and the previous telegraph crossed. 28 July 1914 It is with the gravest concern that I hear of the impression which the action of Austria against Serbia is creating in your country. The unscrupulous agitation that has been going on in Serbia for years has resulted in the outrageous crime, to which Archduke Francis Ferdinand fell a victim. The spirit that led Serbians to murder their own king and his wife still dominates the country. You will doubtless agree with me that we both, you and me, have a common interest as well as all Sovereigns to insist that all the persons morally responsible for the dastardly murder should receive their deserved punishment. In this case politics plays no part at all. On the other hand, I fully understand how difficult it is for you and your Government to face the drift of your public opinion. Therefore, with regard to the hearty and tender friendship which binds us both from long ago with firm ties, I am exerting my utmost influence to induce the Austrians to deal straightly to arrive to a satisfactory understanding with you. I confidently hope that you will help me in my efforts to smooth over difficulties that may still arise. Your very sincere and devoted friend and cousin Willy Sunday, October 18, 2009

Russia’s reaction to the ultimatum Sunday, October 18, 2009

Russia’s reaction to the ultimatum • 24 July-Russia advised Serbia to agree to all the points demanded short of surrendering her sovereignty Sunday, October 18, 2009

Russia’s reaction to the ultimatum • 24 July-Russia advised Serbia to agree to all the points demanded short of surrendering her sovereignty • 25 July-Nicholas II-if all eﬀorts to avoid war failed, Russia “would not remain indiﬀerent to the fate of Serbia” Sunday, October 18, 2009

Russia’s reaction to the ultimatum • 24 July-Russia advised Serbia to agree to all the points demanded short of surrendering her sovereignty • 25 July-Nicholas II-if all eﬀorts to avoid war failed, Russia “would not remain indiﬀerent to the fate of Serbia” • 28 July-Austria declares war on Serbia. The Russian Council of Ministers decides on partial mobilization against Austria. France assured Russia of her support. Sunday, October 18, 2009

Russia’s reaction to the ultimatum • 24 July-Russia advised Serbia to agree to all the points demanded short of surrendering her sovereignty • 25 July-Nicholas II-if all eﬀorts to avoid war failed, Russia “would not remain indiﬀerent to the fate of Serbia” • 28 July-Austria declares war on Serbia. The Russian Council of Ministers decides on partial mobilization against Austria. France assured Russia of her support. • the generals in all the continental countries begin to demand full mobilization Sunday, October 18, 2009

Russia’s reaction to the ultimatum • 24 July-Russia advised Serbia to agree to all the points demanded short of surrendering her sovereignty • 25 July-Nicholas II-if all efforts to avoid war failed, Russia “would not remain indifferent to the fate of Serbia” • 28 July-Austria declares war on Serbia. The Russian Council of Ministers decides on partial mobilization against Austria. France assured Russia of her support. • the generals in all the continental countries begin to demand full mobilization • 30 July-Nicholas receives War Minister Sukhomlinov, Chief of Staff Yanushkevich, and Foreign Minister Sazonov Sunday, October 18, 2009

Russia’s reaction to the ultimatum • 24 July-Russia advised Serbia to agree to all the points demanded short of surrendering her sovereignty • 25 July-Nicholas II-if all efforts to avoid war failed, Russia “would not remain indifferent to the fate of Serbia” • 28 July-Austria declares war on Serbia. The Russian Council of Ministers decides on partial mobilization against Austria. France assured Russia of her support. • the generals in all the continental countries begin to demand full mobilization • 30 July-Nicholas receives War Minister Sukhomlinov, Chief of Staff Yanushkevich, and Foreign Minister Sazonov • 31 July-Russia calls all reservists, full mobilization, general war Sunday, October 18, 2009

Judging by the outcome of the war with Japan, which was defeat followed by revolution, the rulers of Russia would have been wise to stay out of World War I: for the immediate cause of the Revolution of 1917 would be the collapse of Russia’s fragile political structure under the strains of a war of attrition…. Neutrality, however, was not an option… Pipes, p.56 Sunday, October 18, 2009

Foreign Minister Sazonov had informed the Emperor in December, 1912, that Russia could not be ready for war before 1915. But war came in 1914; and, ready or not, the country had so much at stake that it could not aﬀord to quibble. Having failed the tests of the Crimean War and the war with Japan, it needed to make a strong showing in this one for the sake of morale at home and diplomatic advantage abroad. Moreover, there was the urgency of protecting the new Russian economy, dependent to so large an extent upon the capital and the trade of Great Britain and France. Harcave, p. 438 Sunday, October 18, 2009

an altered approach to wartime diplomacy Sunday, October 18, 2009

an altered approach to wartime diplomacy • traditional thinking was that war would be prosecuted until one side admitted defeat and accepted conditions advantageous to the other Sunday, October 18, 2009

an altered approach to wartime diplomacy • traditional thinking was that war would be prosecuted until one side admitted defeat and accepted conditions advantageous to the other • its conclusion would not bring about the extinction of any of the powers but a modiﬁcation of their relationships Sunday, October 18, 2009

an altered approach to wartime diplomacy • traditional thinking was that war would be prosecuted until one side admitted defeat and accepted conditions advantageous to the other • its conclusion would not bring about the extinction of any of the powers but a modiﬁcation of their relationships • thus,wartime diplomacy would defer the division of the spoils to the post-war peace settlement, e.g., Congress of Vienna,1815; Paris, 1856; Berlin, 1878 Sunday, October 18, 2009

an altered approach to wartime diplomacy • traditional thinking was that war would be prosecuted until one side admitted defeat and accepted conditions advantageous to the other • its conclusion would not bring about the extinction of any of the powers but a modiﬁcation of their relationships • thus,wartime diplomacy would defer the division of the spoils to the post-war peace settlement, e.g., Congress of Vienna,1815; Paris, 1856; Berlin, 1878 • but it soon became evident that present military and later diplomatic problems regarding territorial arrangements could not be separated Sunday, October 18, 2009

an altered approach to wartime diplomacy • traditional thinking was that war would be prosecuted until one side admitted defeat and accepted conditions advantageous to the other • its conclusion would not bring about the extinction of any of the powers but a modification of their relationships • thus,wartime diplomacy would defer the division of the spoils to the post-war peace settlement, e.g., Congress of Vienna,1815; Paris, 1856; Berlin, 1878 • but it soon became evident that present military and later diplomatic problems regarding territorial arrangements could not be separated • for instance, the effort to bring Italy into the war required both sides to offer “many territorial prizes” and then compensations to the other countries also interested in those prizes Sunday, October 18, 2009

an altered approach to wartime diplomacy • traditional thinking was that war would be prosecuted until one side admitted defeat and accepted conditions advantageous to the other • its conclusion would not bring about the extinction of any of the powers but a modification of their relationships • thus,wartime diplomacy would defer the division of the spoils to the post-war peace settlement, e.g., Congress of Vienna,1815; Paris, 1856; Berlin, 1878 • but it soon became evident that present military and later diplomatic problems regarding territorial arrangements could not be separated • for instance, the effort to bring Italy into the war required both sides to offer “many territorial prizes” and then compensations to the other countries also interested in those prizes • so diplomacy relating to the post-war territorial arrangements couldn’t be deferred to the peace conference Sunday, October 18, 2009

The Polish Problem Sunday, October 18, 2009

The Polish Problem “German Poland” Sunday, October 18, 2009

The Polish Problem “German Poland” “Austrian Poland” Sunday, October 18, 2009

The Polish Problem “German Poland” “Russian Poland” “Austrian Poland” Sunday, October 18, 2009

The Russiﬁcation of Poland Polish architecture given a Russian façade Sunday, October 18, 2009

The Russiﬁcation of Poland • Poland had twice raised up a rebellion against their Russian masters; in 1830-31 and in 1863 • 1881-Pobiedonostsev convinced both Alexander and Nicholas of the need to Russify these proud fellow Slavs--a tall order! • 1905-during the restoration of order the noose around Poland was tightened. Stolypin gave governors general the right to try suspects in special courts-->8,856 executions 1906-1911. The bulk of these were resisters to Russiﬁcation. The greatest number, 993 were in Baltikum(Lithuania, Latvia & Estonia) Poland was a close second with 979 executions. Estimated 40,000 more died in prison. Sunday, October 18, 2009

Polish nationalists were divided on how best to resist Russiﬁcation Roman Dmowski Jozef Pilsudski 1864-1939 1867-1935 Sunday, October 18, 2009

National Democrats vs Socialists Sunday, October 18, 2009

National Democrats vs Socialists • autonomy within the empire Sunday, October 18, 2009

National Democrats vs Socialists • autonomy within the empire • resisted revolution in 1905 Sunday, October 18, 2009

National Democrats vs Socialists • autonomy within the empire • resisted revolution in 1905 • served in the Dumas Sunday, October 18, 2009

National Democrats vs Socialists • autonomy within the empire • resisted revolution in 1905 • served in the Dumas • Russiﬁcation can never erode Polish culture Sunday, October 18, 2009

National Democrats vs Socialists • autonomy within the empire • sought alliance with Japan in 1904 • resisted revolution in 1905 • served in the Dumas • Russiﬁcation can never erode Polish culture Sunday, October 18, 2009

National Democrats vs Socialists • autonomy within the empire • sought alliance with Japan in 1904 • resisted revolution in 1905 • 1905 Lodz “June Days” uprising • served in the Dumas • Russiﬁcation can never erode Polish culture Sunday, October 18, 2009

National Democrats vs Socialists • autonomy within the empire • sought alliance with Japan in 1904 • resisted revolution in 1905 • 1905 Lodz “June Days” uprising • served in the Dumas • boycotted Duma, urged revolution • Russiﬁcation can never erode Polish culture Sunday, October 18, 2009

National Democrats vs Socialists • autonomy within the empire • sought alliance with Japan in 1904 • resisted revolution in 1905 • 1905 Lodz “June Days” uprising • served in the Dumas • boycotted Duma, urged revolution • Russiﬁcation can never erode • “The Germans take your land, the Polish culture Russians take your souls” Sunday, October 18, 2009

1914--How would Polish nationalism “play”? Sunday, October 18, 2009

1914--How would Polish nationalism “play”? • Poland, partitioned, had not disappeared. Polish nationalism was very much alive. Sunday, October 18, 2009

1914--How would Polish nationalism “play”? • Poland, partitioned, had not disappeared. Polish nationalism was very much alive. • all three eastern front belligerents planned to exploit or suppress it: Sunday, October 18, 2009

1914--How would Polish nationalism “play”? • Poland, partitioned, had not disappeared. Polish nationalism was very much alive. • all three eastern front belligerents planned to exploit or suppress it: • Austria-Hungary permitted Jozef Pilsudski to raise the Polish Legion in Galicia to ﬁght the Russians Sunday, October 18, 2009

1914--How would Polish nationalism “play”? • Poland, partitioned, had not disappeared. Polish nationalism was very much alive. • all three eastern front belligerents planned to exploit or suppress it: • Austria-Hungary permitted Jozef Pilsudski to raise the Polish Legion in Galicia to ﬁght the Russians • Germany promised the post-war creation out of Russian Poland a constitutional monarchy under a German monarch Sunday, October 18, 2009

1914--How would Polish nationalism “play”? • Poland, partitioned, had not disappeared. Polish nationalism was very much alive. • all three eastern front belligerents planned to exploit or suppress it: • Austria-Hungary permitted Jozef Pilsudski to raise the Polish Legion in Galicia to ﬁght the Russians • Germany promised the post-war creation out of Russian Poland a constitutional monarchy under a German monarch • Russia promised that after the war all Poland (Russian, German and Austrian) would be united under Russian rule and granted freedom of language, religion, and local rule. This was a non-starter with Poles who wanted independence Sunday, October 18, 2009

1914--How would Polish nationalism “play”? • Poland, partitioned, had not disappeared. Polish nationalism was very much alive. • all three eastern front belligerents planned to exploit or suppress it: • Austria-Hungary permitted Jozef Pilsudski to raise the Polish Legion in Galicia to ﬁght the Russians • Germany promised the post-war creation out of Russian Poland a constitutional monarchy under a German monarch • Russia promised that after the war all Poland (Russian, German and Austrian) would be united under Russian rule and granted freedom of language, religion, and local rule. This was a non-starter with Poles who wanted independence • Sazonov urged Nicholas to “up the ante” to an independent Poland united to Russia by a personal union under the Romanovs, who would retain authority in Poland only over questions aﬀecting both states. But he had little support at court. Sunday, October 18, 2009

Slavdom beyond Russian Poland Sunday, October 18, 2009

Slavdom • Russia’s propaganda presented the war as a struggle to rescue the Slavs--Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, and Poles--from oppression by the Central Powers • German and Austrian Poles were not responsive but the others were • among the Slavs outside those two countries the results were uneven • the Serbs, for whose sake the Russians entered the war were distant and could not be given aid when they most needed it • March, 1915--those in Bulgaria ignored the call and joined the Central Powers Sunday, October 18, 2009

The Ancient Dream Sunday, October 18, 2009

Bidding for Turkey • Germany had been wooing Turkey since the 1880s • August 5, 1914--although the Turks had signed a secret alliance with Germany (2 August), Enver Pasha suggested to Russia that he would join the Entente side for a price: • the return of Western Thrace and the Greek islands • this was too high a price for Russia to consider. Bulgaria was still sitting on the sidelines and this would push her into the Central Powers. Besides, Sazonov, correctly, didn’t trust Enver. • October, 1914-Turkey openly joined the Central Powers Sunday, October 18, 2009

Military loss for the Allies=political gain for Russia Sunday, October 18, 2009

Military loss for the Allies=political gain for Russia • Turkey’s hostility justiﬁed the ancient dream of restoring the double- headed eagle over Constantinople and annexation of the Turkish Straits Sunday, October 18, 2009

Military loss for the Allies=political gain for Russia • Turkey’s hostility justiﬁed the ancient dream of restoring the double- headed eagle over Constantinople and annexation of the Turkish Straits • Sazonov overcame the Allied resistance to the idea by oﬀering Russian support for their territorial acquisitions in other parts of the dismembered “sick man” Sunday, October 18, 2009

Military loss for the Allies=political gain for Russia • Turkey’s hostility justiﬁed the ancient dream of restoring the double- headed eagle over Constantinople and annexation of the Turkish Straits • Sazonov overcame the Allied resistance to the idea by oﬀering Russian support for their territorial acquisitions in other parts of the dismembered “sick man” • March, 1915-Britain acquiesced. A month later, so did France. each had their own goals: The Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Mesopotamia. Sunday, October 18, 2009

Military loss for the Allies=political gain for Russia • Turkey’s hostility justified the ancient dream of restoring the double- headed eagle over Constantinople and annexation of the Turkish Straits • Sazonov overcame the Allied resistance to the idea by offering Russian support for their territorial acquisitions in other parts of the dismembered “sick man” • March, 1915-Britain acquiesced. A month later, so did France. each had their own goals: The Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Mesopotamia. • In addition to Turkish spoils, Russia offered Britain the “neutral zone” of Persia as a British sphere of influence Sunday, October 18, 2009

Military loss for the Allies=political gain for Russia • Turkey’s hostility justified the ancient dream of restoring the double- headed eagle over Constantinople and annexation of the Turkish Straits • Sazonov overcame the Allied resistance to the idea by offering Russian support for their territorial acquisitions in other parts of the dismembered “sick man” • March, 1915-Britain acquiesced. A month later, so did France. each had their own goals: The Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Mesopotamia. • In addition to Turkish spoils, Russia offered Britain the “neutral zone” of Persia as a British sphere of influence • these agreements were secret but Russia’s hoped-for reward became public knowledge in Russia Sunday, October 18, 2009

Period of the Sacred Union Sunday, October 18, 2009

THE UNION OF ALL- RUSSIAN LANDS for aiding the ill and injured Founded under the patronage of her imperial highness GRAND DUCHESS ELIZABETH THEODOROVNA ... an appeal in 1914 evoking Dmitri Donskoy and the 1380 victory of Kulikovo Field for the Sacred Union Sunday, October 18, 2009

Russian War Spirit Sunday, October 18, 2009

Russian War Spirit • August, 1914-like the majority in all the belligerents, Russian public opinion supported the war: Sunday, October 18, 2009

Russian War Spirit • August, 1914-like the majority in all the belligerents, Russian public opinion supported the war: • first declarations of war by the Central Powers seemed more important than the fact that Russia mobilized first. This “proved” that Germany was the aggressor and Russia was fighting a defensive, therefore just, war Sunday, October 18, 2009

Russian War Spirit • August, 1914-like the majority in all the belligerents, Russian public opinion supported the war: • first declarations of war by the Central Powers seemed more important than the fact that Russia mobilized first. This “proved” that Germany was the aggressor and Russia was fighting a defensive, therefore just, war • Austria’s declaration against Serbia allowed Russia to be the protector of brother Slavs, much to the satisfaction of the Russian Pan-Slav movement Sunday, October 18, 2009

Russian War Spirit • August, 1914-like the majority in all the belligerents, Russian public opinion supported the war: • first declarations of war by the Central Powers seemed more important than the fact that Russia mobilized first. This “proved” that Germany was the aggressor and Russia was fighting a defensive, therefore just, war • Austria’s declaration against Serbia allowed Russia to be the protector of brother Slavs, much to the satisfaction of the Russian Pan-Slav movement • even the Russian socialists, with few exceptions, reverse their pre-war pacifism; just as they were everywhere else in Europe Sunday, October 18, 2009

Russian War Spirit • August, 1914-like the majority in all the belligerents, Russian public opinion supported the war: • first declarations of war by the Central Powers seemed more important than the fact that Russia mobilized first. This “proved” that Germany was the aggressor and Russia was fighting a defensive, therefore just, war • Austria’s declaration against Serbia allowed Russia to be the protector of brother Slavs, much to the satisfaction of the Russian Pan-Slav movement • even the Russian socialists, with few exceptions, reverse their pre-war pacifism; just as they were everywhere else in Europe • in Paris, Plekhanov rallies Russian émigré volunteers for service in the French army! Sunday, October 18, 2009

8 August--Special Session of the Duma Sunday, October 18, 2009

8 August--Special Session of the Duma We are ﬁghting to deliver our fatherland from foreign invasion, to liberate Europe and Slavdom from German hegemony...In this struggle we are united: we do not make any conditions, we demand nothing, we simply place in the balance of war our ﬁrm will to conquer. Deputy Paul Milyukov, leader of the opposition Cadet Party Sunday, October 18, 2009

the war economy Sunday, October 18, 2009

the war economy • 1914-much better keyed for war than in 1904: Sunday, October 18, 2009

the war economy • 1914-much better keyed for war than in 1904: • booming basic industries could supply a large part of the army’s needs Sunday, October 18, 2009

the war economy • 1914-much better keyed for war than in 1904: • booming basic industries could supply a large part of the army’s needs • allies would supply the rest, if they could make deliveries Sunday, October 18, 2009

the war economy • 1914-much better keyed for war than in 1904: • booming basic industries could supply a large part of the army’s needs • allies would supply the rest, if they could make deliveries • the present military front was much closer to the bases of supply than had been the front of 1904 Sunday, October 18, 2009

the war economy • 1914-much better keyed for war than in 1904: • booming basic industries could supply a large part of the army’s needs • allies would supply the rest, if they could make deliveries • the present military front was much closer to the bases of supply than had been the front of 1904 • however, Russia--and this was true of all the other powers as well--was not prepared for an extended war Sunday, October 18, 2009

the war economy • 1914-much better keyed for war than in 1904: • booming basic industries could supply a large part of the army’s needs • allies would supply the rest, if they could make deliveries • the present military front was much closer to the bases of supply than had been the front of 1904 • however, Russia--and this was true of all the other powers as well--was not prepared for an extended war • military planners expected decision within weeks, certainly within months. Years? Impossible! Sunday, October 18, 2009

the war economy • 1914-much better keyed for war than in 1904: • booming basic industries could supply a large part of the army’s needs • allies would supply the rest, if they could make deliveries • the present military front was much closer to the bases of supply than had been the front of 1904 • however, Russia--and this was true of all the other powers as well--was not prepared for an extended war • military planners expected decision within weeks, certainly within months. Years? Impossible! • a pre-war pamphlet had declared modern war impossible because the rate of munitions expenditure would outstrip countries’ economic ability to replace them. 1915 would test this thesis. Sunday, October 18, 2009

the war economy • 1914-much better keyed for war than in 1904: • booming basic industries could supply a large part of the army’s needs • allies would supply the rest, if they could make deliveries • the present military front was much closer to the bases of supply than had been the front of 1904 • however, Russia--and this was true of all the other powers as well--was not prepared for an extended war • military planners expected decision within weeks, certainly within months. Years? Impossible! • a pre-war pamphlet had declared modern war impossible because the rate of munitions expenditure would outstrip countries’ economic ability to replace them. 1915 would test this thesis. • for that reason Russia had no plan to transition from a peacetime to a wartime economy Sunday, October 18, 2009

Ivan Stanislavich Bloch, Is W now Impossible? ar (1898) Sunday, October 18, 2009

Ivan Stanislavich Bloch, Is W now Impossible? ar (1898) His name was Ivan Bloch, a truly brilliant, prescient guy. Wiki has a solid biography you can consult after reading this. Oddly, his arguments had an enormous impact on military planners in Berlin, especially Moltke the Younger; he concluded that Germany had only a limited time to knock France out of the war (what modern historians have called the "short war illusion"). After the Marne, Falkenhayn read the top-secret after action reports and advised the Kaiser to settle up [make peace]. But by that time, Germany was winning in the East and Fritz Haber's system of extracting nitrogen from the air meant that German war effort had assumed a momentum of its own. Professor E. B. Bukey, e-Mail to JBP, 7/1/09 Sunday, October 18, 2009

Bloch’s Prescient Points (1836-1901) Sunday, October 18, 2009

Bloch’s Prescient Points New arms technology (e.g. smokeless gunpowder, improved riﬂe design, Maxims) had rendered maneuvers over open ground, such as bayonet and cavalry charges, obsolete. Bloch concluded that a war between the Great powers would be a war of entrenchment and that rapid attacks and decisive victories were likewise a thing of the past. He was able to calculate that entrenched men would enjoy a fourfold advantage over infantry advancing across open ground. (1836-1901) Sunday, October 18, 2009

Bloch’s Prescient Points New arms technology (e.g. smokeless gunpowder, improved riﬂe design, Maxims) had rendered maneuvers over open ground, such as bayonet and cavalry charges, obsolete. Bloch concluded that a war between the Great powers would be a war of entrenchment and that rapid attacks and decisive victories were likewise a thing of the past. He was able to calculate that entrenched men would enjoy a fourfold advantage over infantry advancing across open ground. ■ Industrial societies would have to settle the resultant stalemate by committing armies numbering in the millions, as opposed to the tens of thousands of preceding wars. An enormous battlefront would develop. A war of this type could not be resolved quickly. (1836-1901) Sunday, October 18, 2009

Bloch’s Prescient Points New arms technology (e.g. smokeless gunpowder, improved riﬂe design, Maxims) had rendered maneuvers over open ground, such as bayonet and cavalry charges, obsolete. Bloch concluded that a war between the Great powers would be a war of entrenchment and that rapid attacks and decisive victories were likewise a thing of the past. He was able to calculate that entrenched men would enjoy a fourfold advantage over infantry advancing across open ground. ■ Industrial societies would have to settle the resultant stalemate by committing armies numbering in the millions, as opposed to the tens of thousands of preceding wars. An enormous battlefront would develop. A war of this type could not be resolved quickly. ■ The war would become a duel of industrial might, a matter of total economic attrition. Severe economic and social dislocations would result in the imminent risk of famine, disease, the "break- up of the whole social organization" and (1836-1901) revolutions from below. Sunday, October 18, 2009

the war economy Sunday, October 18, 2009

the war economy • rail transportation Sunday, October 18, 2009

the war economy • rail transportation • true, France had supplied funds to build lines in Poland to bring Russian troops to the German border Sunday, October 18, 2009

the war economy • rail transportation • true, France had supplied funds to build lines in Poland to bring Russian troops to the German border • but there was no long range plan for moving men and material in war. There wasn’t even adequate rolling stock Sunday, October 18, 2009

the war economy • rail transportation • true, France had supplied funds to build lines in Poland to bring Russian troops to the German border • but there was no long range plan for moving men and material in war. There wasn’t even adequate rolling stock • supply lines from the outside world Sunday, October 18, 2009

the war economy • rail transportation • true, France had supplied funds to build lines in Poland to bring Russian troops to the German border • but there was no long range plan for moving men and material in war. There wasn’t even adequate rolling stock • supply lines from the outside world • Russia should have seen that in addition to having her Baltic coast and western borders closed in war, Turkey’s entry would also “bottle up” her Black Sea ports and ﬂeet Sunday, October 18, 2009

the war economy • rail transportation • true, France had supplied funds to build lines in Poland to bring Russian troops to the German border • but there was no long range plan for moving men and material in war. There wasn’t even adequate rolling stock • supply lines from the outside world • Russia should have seen that in addition to having her Baltic coast and western borders closed in war, Turkey’s entry would also “bottle up” her Black Sea ports and ﬂeet • “Wartime Russia has been compared to a house to which entry could only be gained by way of the chimney. And even the chimney was clogged!” (Pipes, p. 59) Sunday, October 18, 2009

the war economy • rail transportation • true, France had supplied funds to build lines in Poland to bring Russian troops to the German border • but there was no long range plan for moving men and material in war. There wasn’t even adequate rolling stock • supply lines from the outside world • Russia should have seen that in addition to having her Baltic coast and western borders closed in war, Turkey’s entry would also “bottle up” her Black Sea ports and ﬂeet • “Wartime Russia has been compared to a house to which entry could only be gained by way of the chimney. And even the chimney was clogged!” (Pipes, p. 59) • this meant she needed to prepare her White Sea ports, Arkangel and Murmansk. Their facilities and the single narrow gauge railroad were totally inadequate to the wartime strain put on them Sunday, October 18, 2009

the war economy • rail transportation • true, France had supplied funds to build lines in Poland to bring Russian troops to the German border • but there was no long range plan for moving men and material in war. There wasn’t even adequate rolling stock • supply lines from the outside world • Russia should have seen that in addition to having her Baltic coast and western borders closed in war, Turkey’s entry would also “bottle up” her Black Sea ports and ﬂeet • “Wartime Russia has been compared to a house to which entry could only be gained by way of the chimney. And even the chimney was clogged!” (Pipes, p. 59) • this meant she needed to prepare her White Sea ports, Arkangel and Murmansk. Their facilities and the single narrow gauge railroad were totally inadequate to the wartime strain put on them • Russia was ill prepared for any but a short victorious war Sunday, October 18, 2009

Army Reforms Sunday, October 18, 2009

Army Reforms • the poor showing in the Russo-Japanese War convinced military leaders of the need to reform. Some progress was made, but the time was too short, the resources too few. Sunday, October 18, 2009

Army Reforms • the poor showing in the Russo-Japanese War convinced military leaders of the need to reform. Some progress was made, but the time was too short, the resources too few. • the quality of training was better and the equipment upgraded. Still the Russian military was ranked lower than that of all the other belligerents, save Austria-Hungary: • the General staff was poorly organized and staffed • intelligence organization was ineffectual • there were not enough trained officers and NCOs • supply and medical services were rudimentary Sunday, October 18, 2009

Russia’s Only Strength • lay in her seemingly inexhaustible supply of manpower, the “Russian Steamroller” • however, at the outbreak of war, a large proportion of the conscripts had no training and others only some training • 1914- the standing army was 1,423,000 and the reserves, 3 million • during the war more than 15 million would be called to the colors Sunday, October 18, 2009

“The Russian Steamroller” Sunday, October 18, 2009

Pre-war Military Planning Sunday, October 18, 2009

Pre-war Military Planning • 1890-Chief of the German Großgeneralstab (Great General Staﬀ)Alfred Schlieﬀen develops a plan for 2 front war Sunday, October 18, 2009

Pre-war Military Planning • 1890-Chief of the German Großgeneralstab (Great General Staﬀ)Alfred Schlieﬀen develops a plan for 2 front war • it is based on the notion that Russian mobilization would be like a steamroller, slow to build up steam and start moving, then advancing slowly, almost impossible to stop Sunday, October 18, 2009

Pre-war Military Planning • 1890-Chief of the German Großgeneralstab (Great General Staﬀ)Alfred Schlieﬀen develops a plan for 2 front war • it is based on the notion that Russian mobilization would be like a steamroller, slow to build up steam and start moving, then advancing slowly, almost impossible to stop • Germany must throw her full strength against France, leaving only a thin line on the eastern border. She must win a quick decision in the west, as at Sedan, 1870 (six weeks into the war) Sunday, October 18, 2009

Pre-war Military Planning • 1890-Chief of the German Großgeneralstab (Great General Staﬀ)Alfred Schlieﬀen develops a plan for 2 front war • it is based on the notion that Russian mobilization would be like a steamroller, slow to build up steam and start moving, then advancing slowly, almost impossible to stop • Germany must throw her full strength against France, leaving only a thin line on the eastern border. She must win a quick decision in the west, as at Sedan, 1870 (six weeks into the war) • then she could shift her troops east and repel the “steamroller” Sunday, October 18, 2009

Pre-war Military Planning • 1890-Chief of the German Großgeneralstab (Great General Staff)Alfred Schlieffen develops a plan for 2 front war • it is based on the notion that Russian mobilization would be like a steamroller, slow to build up steam and start moving, then advancing slowly, almost impossible to stop • Germany must throw her full strength against France, leaving only a thin line on the eastern border. She must win a quick decision in the west, as at Sedan, 1870 (six weeks into the war) • then she could shift her troops east and repel the “steamroller” • the Schlieffen Plan remains central to Germany’s war plans with only minor, but disasterous, adjustments Sunday, October 18, 2009

Pre-war Military Planning Sunday, October 18, 2009

Pre-war Military Planning • Russian War Minister Sukhomlinov institutes military reforms which dramatically reduce the time which the “steamroller” needs to “build up steam” (mobilize) Sunday, October 18, 2009

Pre-war Military Planning • Russian War Minister Sukhomlinov institutes military reforms which dramatically reduce the time which the “steamroller” needs to “build up steam” (mobilize) • Franco-Russian plans assume Germany’s major blow would be in the west. Russia’s role is to relieve this pressure by requiring Germany to keep 5 or 6 army corps in the east to meet a Russian oﬀensive of 800,000 men against Prussia or Posen by D+16 after mobilization Sunday, October 18, 2009

Pre-war Military Planning • Russian War Minister Sukhomlinov institutes military reforms which dramatically reduce the time which the “steamroller” needs to “build up steam” (mobilize) • Franco-Russian plans assume Germany’s major blow would be in the west. Russia’s role is to relieve this pressure by requiring Germany to keep 5 or 6 army corps in the east to meet a Russian oﬀensive of 800,000 men against Prussia or Posen by D+16 after mobilization • two problems: • this assumes no hitches in the mobilization • this requires Russia to immediately risk most of her trained troops Sunday, October 18, 2009

Military Operations, 1914 Sunday, October 18, 2009

Military Operations, 1914 Russian troops in improvised ﬁeld fortiﬁcations Sunday, October 18, 2009

Following war’s outbreak Grand Duke Nicholas began the planned oﬀensive on two fronts: the northwest against Prussia and the southwest against Austrian Galicia. General Rennenkampf was to enter Prussia with the Russian First Army on August 17, the Second Army under General Samsonov, moving north from Warsaw, was to cross the border two days later. The two had a fateful enmity dating from Samsonov’s criticism of his rival’s conduct during the battle of Mukden in 1905. Legend had it that they actually exchanged blows on the railway station platform there. German intelligence was aware of this and it would play a key role in the initial battles of August. Sunday, October 18, 2009

Second Army Commander Aleksandr Samsonov 1859-1914 First Army Commander Paul von Rennenkampf 1854-1918 Sunday, October 18, 2009

The Butcher’s Bill Russian German KIA & WIA 78,000 <20,000 POW 92,000 negligible guns captured >500 0 Sunday, October 18, 2009

Outcomes from Tannenberg • Germany was elated, Russia dismayed by this first trial of arms. It took sixty trains to haul the captured equipment back to Germany • Russian troops would not march again on German soil until the end of World War II • Samsonov was so humiliated that he shot himself • Hindenburg was raised to the status of a demigod. Wooden statues and gold, silver, & bronze fund-raising nails. • Moltke’s unnecessary shifting of a corps to the east made a crucial difference in the close-fought [five] battle[s] of the Marne Sunday, October 18, 2009

A German staff officer was said to have joked, if the battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton, the battle of Tannenberg was lost on the railway platform at Mukden. Sunday, October 18, 2009

Tannenbergdenkmal Sunday, October 18, 2009

A note about the battle’s name Sunday, October 18, 2009

A note about the battle’s name The Battle of Ger. Tannenberg (pine hill); Polish, Grunwald; Lithuanian, Zalgiris 1410 One of the most important battles of late medieval history. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth defeated the Teutonic Order. Hindenburg wanted the 1914 battle so named because it reversed the victory of Slavs over Germans 504 years earlier Sunday, October 18, 2009

1914--review of the opening battles Sunday, October 18, 2009

German strength vs Austrian weakness German newspaper account of Russian capture of Lemberg/Lvov/Lviv on 3 September 1914 Sunday, October 18, 2009

The Industrial Slaughterhouse Sunday, October 18, 2009

“If artillery is the king of battles, then the bayonet is the queen. “ 18th century military proverb Sunday, October 18, 2009

The new equation--trench warfare • never so dominant on the eastern front as it was on the 443 mile western front, from Belfort to the Channel • still after the carnage of September, 1914 produced by bayonet charges against entrenched infantry supported by machine guns, both sides tried to adapt to the new technology of death • artillery barrages were supposed to prepare the enemy so that once again infantry could go “over the top” and achieve the “breakthrough” with “cold steel” • common soldiers came to despise the staff officers, miles behind the front, who ordered assault after assault with no significant military gain and horrible casualties Sunday, October 18, 2009

bayonet men grenade thrower squad leader grenade carriers barricaders Sunday, October 18, 2009

The length of the front in the east was much longer than in the west. The theatre of war was roughly delimited by the Baltic Sea in the west and Moscow in the east, a distance of 1,200 kilometers, and Saint Petersburg in the north and the Black Sea in the south, a distance of more than 1,600 kilometers. This had a drastic effect on the nature of the warfare. While World War I on the Western Front developed into trench warfare, the battle lines on the Eastern Front were much more fluid and trenches never truly developed. This was because the greater length of the front ensured that the density of soldiers in the line was lower so the line was easier to break. Once broken, the sparse communication networks made it difficult for the defender to rush reinforcements to the rupture in the line to mount a rapid counteroffensive and seal off a breakthrough. There was also the fact that the terrain in the Eastern European theatre was quite solid, often making it near impossible to construct anything resembling the complicated trench systems on the Western Front, which tended to have muddier and much more workable terrain. In short, on the Eastern front the side defending did not have the overwhelming advantages it had on the Western front. Because of this, front lines in the East kept on shifting throughout the conflict, and not just near the beginning and end of the fighting, as was the case in the West. In fact the greatest advance of the whole war was made in the East by the German Army in the summer of 1915.[the Gorlice-Tarnow offensive] Sunday, October 18, 2009

1915 Sunday, October 18, 2009

Germany’s dilemma Sunday, October 18, 2009

Germany’s dilemma • she confronted what she dreaded most: a prolonged two-front war that she could not win given the enemy’s superiority in manpower and resources. Russia had to be knocked out of the war. Sunday, October 18, 2009

Germany’s dilemma • she confronted what she dreaded most: a prolonged two-front war that she could not win given the enemy’s superiority in manpower and resources. Russia had to be knocked out of the war. • late 1914-Germany’s High Command adopted a defensive strategy in the west and planned a decisive campaign against Russia with the aim of forcing her to sue for peace Sunday, October 18, 2009

Germany’s dilemma • she confronted what she dreaded most: a prolonged two-front war that she could not win given the enemy’s superiority in manpower and resources. Russia had to be knocked out of the war. • late 1914-Germany’s High Command adopted a defensive strategy in the west and planned a decisive campaign against Russia with the aim of forcing her to sue for peace • the brilliant General von Mackensen commanded the combined forces Sunday, October 18, 2009

Germany’s dilemma • she confronted what she dreaded most: a prolonged two-front war that she could not win given the enemy’s superiority in manpower and resources. Russia had to be knocked out of the war. • late 1914-Germany’s High Command adopted a defensive strategy in the west and planned a decisive campaign against Russia with the aim of forcing her to sue for peace • the brilliant General von Mackensen commanded the combined forces • secretly shifting forces east, Germany gained a considerable advantage in manpower and a forty-to -one superiority in artillery! Sunday, October 18, 2009

Germany’s dilemma • she confronted what she dreaded most: a prolonged two-front war that she could not win given the enemy’s superiority in manpower and resources. Russia had to be knocked out of the war. • late 1914-Germany’s High Command adopted a defensive strategy in the west and planned a decisive campaign against Russia with the aim of forcing her to sue for peace • the brilliant General von Mackensen commanded the combined forces • secretly shifting forces east, Germany gained a considerable advantage in manpower and a forty-to -one superiority in artillery! • the plan was for a gigantic pincer movement. One German army with Austrian support would advance into Poland from the southwest, another would strike from the northwest Sunday, October 18, 2009

Germany’s dilemma • she confronted what she dreaded most: a prolonged two-front war that she could not win given the enemy’s superiority in manpower and resources. Russia had to be knocked out of the war. • late 1914-Germany’s High Command adopted a defensive strategy in the west and planned a decisive campaign against Russia with the aim of forcing her to sue for peace • the brilliant General von Mackensen commanded the combined forces • secretly shifting forces east, Germany gained a considerable advantage in manpower and a forty-to -one superiority in artillery! • the plan was for a gigantic pincer movement. One German army with Austrian support would advance into Poland from the southwest, another would strike from the northwest • the objective: capture the four Russian armies deployed in central Poland Sunday, October 18, 2009

results Sunday, October 18, 2009

results • June 30/July 12-Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich faced a painful choice: • EITHER stand his ground and risk being trapped • OR retreat and abandon Poland, 13% of the Empire’s population Sunday, October 18, 2009

results • June 30/July 12-Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich faced a painful choice: • EITHER stand his ground and risk being trapped • OR retreat and abandon Poland, 13% of the Empire’s population • he wisely chose the second course, still was scapegoated. The tsar, against good advice, assumed personal command Sunday, October 18, 2009

results • June 30/July 12-Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich faced a painful choice: • EITHER stand his ground and risk being trapped • OR retreat and abandon Poland, 13% of the Empire’s population • he wisely chose the second course, still was scapegoated. The tsar, against good advice, assumed personal command • Russia suﬀered her worst losses of the war. 2 million KIA,WIA, or POW Sunday, October 18, 2009

results • June 30/July 12-Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich faced a painful choice: • EITHER stand his ground and risk being trapped • OR retreat and abandon Poland, 13% of the Empire’s population • he wisely chose the second course, still was scapegoated. The tsar, against good advice, assumed personal command • Russia suﬀered her worst losses of the war. 2 million KIA,WIA, or POW • Her elite professional oﬃcer corps was virtually destroyed. Its replacements lacked the respect of the troops. A grim harbinger of things to come Sunday, October 18, 2009

Gallipoli-”a turning point which failed to turn” BLACK SEA Sunday, October 18, 2009

Gallipoli-”a turning point which failed to turn” • to solve the problem of Russia’s near inaccessibility, First Sea Lord Winston Churchill launched an ambitious plan to force the Black Sea Straits, and knock Turkey out of the war Sunday, October 18, 2009

Gallipoli-”a turning point which failed to turn” • to solve the problem of Russia’s near inaccessibility, First Sea Lord Winston Churchill launched an ambitious plan to force the Black Sea Straits, and knock Turkey out of the war • April, 1915-when a purely naval attempt met heavy losses, a hastily and poorly planned amphibious landing was executed Sunday, October 18, 2009

Gallipoli-”a turning point which failed to turn” • to solve the problem of Russia’s near inaccessibility, First Sea Lord Winston Churchill launched an ambitious plan to force the Black Sea Straits, and knock Turkey out of the war • April, 1915-when a purely naval attempt met heavy losses, a hastily and poorly planned amphibious landing was executed • December, 1915-after heroic but wasted loss of life the narrow beachhead was abandoned Sunday, October 18, 2009

Gallipoli-”a turning point which failed to turn” • to solve the problem of Russia’s near inaccessibility, First Sea Lord Winston Churchill launched an ambitious plan to force the Black Sea Straits, and knock Turkey out of the war • April, 1915-when a purely naval attempt met heavy losses, a hastily and poorly planned amphibious landing was executed • December, 1915-after heroic but wasted loss of life the narrow beachhead was abandoned • Churchill’s career was threatened but that of a Turkish major, Mustafa Kemal, was launched Sunday, October 18, 2009

Gallipoli-”a turning point which failed to turn” • to solve the problem of Russia’s near inaccessibility, First Sea Lord Winston Churchill launched an ambitious plan to force the Black Sea Straits, and knock Turkey out of the war • April, 1915-when a purely naval attempt met heavy losses, a hastily and poorly planned amphibious landing was executed • December, 1915-after heroic but wasted loss of life the narrow beachhead was abandoned • Churchill’s career was threatened but that of a Turkish major, Mustafa Kemal, was launched • the most important result was that Russia’s supply problem remained acute. It’s hard to imagine the revolution occurring if the Gallipoli campaign had succeeded Sunday, October 18, 2009

Outcomes from the year of decision • “...the Germans impressive victories on the eastern front lost them the war.” (Pipes, p. 63) • the oﬀensive in Poland achieved neither of its objectives • Germany’s emphasis on the east gave the western front a year of relative stability. Britain built up a citizen army and converted her vast industrial plant to war production. • 1916-Germany resumed oﬀensive operations in the west, but found the enemy well prepared • the disaster of 1915 may well have been Russia’s greatest, if unintended, contribution to Allied victory Sunday, October 18, 2009

Disruption of the Sacred Union Sunday, October 18, 2009

Disruption of the Sacred Union RUSSIAN WOUNDED GOING TO THE REAR. Motor ambulances are a rare luxury in Russia and the wounded are frequently two and three days in peasant's carts before they reach the railhead or base hospitals. National Geographic, 1917 Sunday, October 18, 2009

Disruption of the Sacred Union Sunday, October 18, 2009

economic debility Sunday, October 18, 2009

economic debility • exports decline by 98%, imports by 95%  munitions shortage Sunday, October 18, 2009

economic debility • exports decline by 98%, imports by 95%  munitions shortage • replacement troops were sent to the front without riﬂes. They were expected to supply themselves from the fallen Sunday, October 18, 2009

economic debility • exports decline by 98%, imports by 95%  munitions shortage • replacement troops were sent to the front without riﬂes. They were expected to supply themselves from the fallen • many artillery batteries had no shells or were rationed to 4/day Sunday, October 18, 2009

economic debility • exports decline by 98%, imports by 95%  munitions shortage • replacement troops were sent to the front without riﬂes. They were expected to supply themselves from the fallen • many artillery batteries had no shells or were rationed to 4/day • with the loss of Poland, Russia lost her best railroads  • excessive loads on those remaining  mismanagement • some regiments lacked boots, others had too many • allied shipments of riﬂes lay rusting in Vladivostok and Arkangelsk Sunday, October 18, 2009

manpower mismanagement • men were called up for the draft indiscriminately • peasants needed for food production • skilled artisans needed for defense production • conversion to war production was likewise ineﬃcient • plants already in war production were swamped with orders • others, engaged in civilian production, were left idle because of lack of raw materials, labor shortage, or absence of orders Sunday, October 18, 2009

ministers -- inept and reactionary Prince Ivan Goremykin Ivan Shchglovitov 1839-1917 1861-1918 Prime Minister, 1914-16 Minister of Justice, 1906-15 “a weak old man, capable at best of “more energetic in his friendship petty, childish tricks, clinging to power, towards the Black Hundreds than or, rather, to those material goods in his support of the country’s which power brought him” general interests” Sunday, October 18, 2009

fear of power sharing Sunday, October 18, 2009

fear of power sharing “...the spokesmen of public opinion, the leaders within the Duma, and the moving spirits of the unions of Zemstvos and cities were willing to continue full cooperation in the war effort, encouraging the people to do likewise. The government, however, preferred to dispense as much as possible with the proffered aid. The Duma had been summoned for a one-day session on August 8, 1914, and then dismissed until...February, 1915, for a three-day session… It appeared that the government intended to limit the people to the traditional roles of working, fighting, and paying taxes.” Harcave, p. 449 Sunday, October 18, 2009

Mikhail Vladimirovich Rodzyanko, 1859-1924 • 1877-85-served with the Mounted Regiment • 1905-one of the founders of the League of October 17th • deputy in the Third and Fourth Dumas, chairman, 1912-17 • 1914-organized and led the Committee for War Relief • August, 1915-founder and leader of the Progressive bloc • Feb, 1917-“That fat Rodzyanko has again sent me some nonsense to which I wi$ not even reply” -- Nicholas II, about news of the Revolution Sunday, October 18, 2009

Domestic Political Eﬀects of the Great Retreat of 1915 Sunday, October 18, 2009

Domestic Political Eﬀects of the Great Retreat of 1915 • March, 1915-an intimate of War Minister Sukhomlinov, Col. Sergei Myasoyedov, had been discovered to be a German spy & hanged Sunday, October 18, 2009

Domestic Political Eﬀects of the Great Retreat of 1915 • March, 1915-an intimate of War Minister Sukhomlinov, Col. Sergei Myasoyedov, had been discovered to be a German spy & hanged • May--as the German oﬀensive led to a series of defeats in addition to the economic hardships, public opinion began to turn against both military and civilian leadership Sunday, October 18, 2009

Domestic Political Effects of the Great Retreat of 1915 • March, 1915-an intimate of War Minister Sukhomlinov, Col. Sergei Myasoyedov, had been discovered to be a German spy & hanged • May--as the German offensive led to a series of defeats in addition to the economic hardships, public opinion began to turn against both military and civilian leadership • a stupid military policy towards the Poles and Jews in the areas being abandoned to the German advance. They were compelled to flee, often with much brutality, to the interior of Russia Sunday, October 18, 2009

Domestic Political Effects of the Great Retreat of 1915 • March, 1915-an intimate of War Minister Sukhomlinov, Col. Sergei Myasoyedov, had been discovered to be a German spy & hanged • May--as the German offensive led to a series of defeats in addition to the economic hardships, public opinion began to turn against both military and civilian leadership • a stupid military policy towards the Poles and Jews in the areas being abandoned to the German advance. They were compelled to flee, often with much brutality, to the interior of Russia • 3 million refugees brought poverty, disease and despair to already overburdened Russian cities and towns Sunday, October 18, 2009

initial concessions Sunday, October 18, 2009

initial concessions • Nicholas ﬁnally faces the dangerous situation on the home front Sunday, October 18, 2009

initial concessions • Nicholas ﬁnally faces the dangerous situation on the home front • the most reactionary ministers are replaced Sunday, October 18, 2009

initial concessions • Nicholas ﬁnally faces the dangerous situation on the home front • the most reactionary ministers are replaced • June, 1915-a Special Council was established to coordinate munitions and other military supplies. Chaired by the new War Minister, General Polivanov, it was composed of representatives from government, the Duma, industrial and public organizations. It received extraordinary powers over industry and transportation Sunday, October 18, 2009

initial concessions • Nicholas ﬁnally faces the dangerous situation on the home front • the most reactionary ministers are replaced • June, 1915-a Special Council was established to coordinate munitions and other military supplies. Chaired by the new War Minister, General Polivanov, it was composed of representatives from government, the Duma, industrial and public organizations. It received extraordinary powers over industry and transportation • subsequently other Special Councils were created for transport, fuel, food, defense and refugees--revolutionary “shadow governments,” some involving worker representatives! Sunday, October 18, 2009

initial concessions • Nicholas ﬁnally faces the dangerous situation on the home front • the most reactionary ministers are replaced • June, 1915-a Special Council was established to coordinate munitions and other military supplies. Chaired by the new War Minister, General Polivanov, it was composed of representatives from government, the Duma, industrial and public organizations. It received extraordinary powers over industry and transportation • subsequently other Special Councils were created for transport, fuel, food, defense and refugees--revolutionary “shadow governments,” some involving worker representatives! • August 1, 1915-as the next step, a new session of the Duma was reconvened. This one was much less pliable than the earlier ones. Sunday, October 18, 2009

A New Spirit of Contentiousness Sunday, October 18, 2009

A New Spirit of Contentiousness • the Progressive Bloc, organized by the Kadet (Constitutional Democratic) Party, commanded a majority, 300/420, all but the most extreme right and left Sunday, October 18, 2009

A New Spirit of Contentiousness • the Progressive Bloc, organized by the Kadet (Constitutional Democratic) Party, commanded a majority, 300/420, all but the most extreme right and left • their agenda: Sunday, October 18, 2009

A New Spirit of Contentiousness • the Progressive Bloc, organized by the Kadet (Constitutional Democratic) Party, commanded a majority, 300/420, all but the most extreme right and left • their agenda: 1. ministerial responsibility (ministers chosen by and dismissible by the Duma, not the tsar) Sunday, October 18, 2009

A New Spirit of Contentiousness • the Progressive Bloc, organized by the Kadet (Constitutional Democratic) Party, commanded a majority, 300/420, all but the most extreme right and left • their agenda: 1. ministerial responsibility (ministers chosen by and dismissible by the Duma, not the tsar) 2. extension of local self-government Sunday, October 18, 2009

A New Spirit of Contentiousness • the Progressive Bloc, organized by the Kadet (Constitutional Democratic) Party, commanded a majority, 300/420, all but the most extreme right and left • their agenda: 1. ministerial responsibility (ministers chosen by and dismissible by the Duma, not the tsar) 2. extension of local self-government 3. curbing of military interference in civilian aﬀairs Sunday, October 18, 2009

A New Spirit of Contentiousness • the Progressive Bloc, organized by the Kadet (Constitutional Democratic) Party, commanded a majority, 300/420, all but the most extreme right and left • their agenda: 1. ministerial responsibility (ministers chosen by and dismissible by the Duma, not the tsar) 2. extension of local self-government 3. curbing of military interference in civilian aﬀairs 4. granting of autonomy for Poland Sunday, October 18, 2009

A New Spirit of Contentiousness • the Progressive Bloc, organized by the Kadet (Constitutional Democratic) Party, commanded a majority, 300/420, all but the most extreme right and left • their agenda: 1. ministerial responsibility (ministers chosen by and dismissible by the Duma, not the tsar) 2. extension of local self-government 3. curbing of military interference in civilian aﬀairs 4. granting of autonomy for Poland 5. removal of legal disabilities on the Jews Sunday, October 18, 2009

A New Spirit of Contentiousness • the Progressive Bloc, organized by the Kadet (Constitutional Democratic) Party, commanded a majority, 300/420, all but the most extreme right and left • their agenda: 1. ministerial responsibility (ministers chosen by and dismissible by the Duma, not the tsar) 2. extension of local self-government 3. curbing of military interference in civilian aﬀairs 4. granting of autonomy for Poland 5. removal of legal disabilities on the Jews 6. termination of religious persecution, amnesty for persons accused of religious crimes Sunday, October 18, 2009

A New Spirit of Contentiousness • the Progressive Bloc, organized by the Kadet (Constitutional Democratic) Party, commanded a majority, 300/420, all but the most extreme right and left • their agenda: 1. ministerial responsibility (ministers chosen by and dismissible by the Duma, not the tsar) 2. extension of local self-government 3. curbing of military interference in civilian aﬀairs 4. granting of autonomy for Poland 5. removal of legal disabilities on the Jews 6. termination of religious persecution, amnesty for persons accused of religious crimes 7. reestablishment of the trade unions which had been curbed at the beginning of the war Sunday, October 18, 2009

Aleksandr Kerensky (1881-1970) Sunday, October 18, 2009

Aleksandr Kerensky “One of the most aggressive speakers was a thirty-four-year-old radical lawyer...who, as became known after the Revolution, utilized his parliamentary immunity to organize forces for the overthrow of tsarism” Pipes, p.65 (1881-1970) Sunday, October 18, 2009

A majority of the Council of Ministers favored coming to some terms with the...opposition in the legislature, but Goremykin was opposed; and he had the support of the Emperor, the Empress, the Council of the United Nobility and the court. On September 16, the Duma was adjourned [after only six weeks] and, contrary to the fundamental law, no date was set for a new meeting. Harcave, p. 451 Sunday, October 18, 2009

Стачка! (stachka) • strikes had virtually come to an end at the outbreak of hostilities • April, 1915-food shortages (from disorganized transportation) in the cities led ﬁrst to food riots, then strikes • September, 1915-the closing of the Duma produced the ﬁrst strikes of a pronouncedly political character • the police tried to divert public anger by encouraging attacks on stores owned by people with German or other foreign names Sunday, October 18, 2009

the absentee tsar Sunday, October 18, 2009

the absentee tsar • perhaps the single stupidest miscalculation of Nicholas II’s long career was his decision to go to the front as personal commander of the troops Sunday, October 18, 2009

the absentee tsar • perhaps the single stupidest miscalculation of Nicholas II’s long career was his decision to go to the front as personal commander of the troops • when he left for Stavka at Mogilev the chief authority in Petrograd fell to Alexandra, both a reactionary and a hysterical religious fanatic Sunday, October 18, 2009

the absentee tsar • perhaps the single stupidest miscalculation of Nicholas II’s long career was his decision to go to the front as personal commander of the troops • when he left for Stavka at Mogilev the chief authority in Petrograd fell to Alexandra, both a reactionary and a hysterical religious fanatic • she informed the British ambassador:”The tsar unfortunately is weak; but I am not, and I intend to be ﬁrm.” Sunday, October 18, 2009

the absentee tsar • perhaps the single stupidest miscalculation of Nicholas II’s long career was his decision to go to the front as personal commander of the troops • when he left for Stavka at Mogilev the chief authority in Petrograd fell to Alexandra, both a reactionary and a hysterical religious fanatic • she informed the British ambassador:”The tsar unfortunately is weak; but I am not, and I intend to be ﬁrm.” • but this, in turn, led to the rise of “Our Friend,” the venal and carnal mystic, Grigori Rasputin Sunday, October 18, 2009

the absentee tsar • perhaps the single stupidest miscalculation of Nicholas II’s long career was his decision to go to the front as personal commander of the troops • when he left for Stavka at Mogilev the chief authority in Petrograd fell to Alexandra, both a reactionary and a hysterical religious fanatic • she informed the British ambassador:”The tsar unfortunately is weak; but I am not, and I intend to be firm.” • but this, in turn, led to the rise of “Our Friend,” the venal and carnal mystic, Grigori Rasputin • September, 1915-December, 1916-ministers rose or fell according to his whim, confidence at home and abroad fell, the throne lost its power as a unifying symbol, Alexandra became vilified Sunday, October 18, 2009

Batyushka (the little father) blesses the troops Sunday, October 18, 2009

An icon; Our Lady of Kazan? Batyushka (the little father) blesses the troops Sunday, October 18, 2009

1916 Sunday, October 18, 2009

General Aleksei Brusilov, 1853-1926 • born in Tibilisi, Georgia, Russian father, Polish Mother, 3rd generation army oﬃcer • distinguished in the Turkish War, 1877-78 • 1914-commanded the eighth army on the Galician front, accomplished major advances, captured Lemberg, but Tannenberg compelled general Russian retreat • 1915-again successful against Austria, but Gorlice-Tarnow  another withdrawal • 1916-his new tactics so successful the Germans copied them! • 1917-supported tsar’s abdication, victory all important picture, 1917 Sunday, October 18, 2009

Brusilov’s new tactics Sunday, October 18, 2009

Brusilov’s new tactics To increase the points of sally thereby preventing a concentration of the enemy's strategic reserve. The enemy is to be confused by several points of attack. Sunday, October 18, 2009

Brusilov’s new tactics To increase the points of sally thereby preventing a concentration of the enemy's strategic reserve. The enemy is to be confused by several points of attack. ■ To make the width of attack wide, greater than 30 kilometers. Sunday, October 18, 2009

Brusilov’s new tactics To increase the points of sally thereby preventing a concentration of the enemy's strategic reserve. The enemy is to be confused by several points of attack. ■ To make the width of attack wide, greater than 30 kilometers. ■ To limit the duration of bombardment, less than 5 hours. Sunday, October 18, 2009

Brusilov’s new tactics To increase the points of sally thereby preventing a concentration of the enemy's strategic reserve. The enemy is to be confused by several points of attack. ■ To make the width of attack wide, greater than 30 kilometers. ■ To limit the duration of bombardment, less than 5 hours. ■ To advance artillery in secrecy and to cooperate with the infantry. Sunday, October 18, 2009

Brusilov’s new tactics To increase the points of sally thereby preventing a concentration of the enemy's strategic reserve. The enemy is to be confused by several points of attack. ■ To make the width of attack wide, greater than 30 kilometers. ■ To limit the duration of bombardment, less than 5 hours. ■ To advance artillery in secrecy and to cooperate with the infantry. ■ To advance strategic reserve beforehand and to join with the storm troops after a breach of the enemy's front trench has been achieved. Not to employ cavalry. Sunday, October 18, 2009

Brusilov’s new tactics To increase the points of sally thereby preventing a concentration of the enemy's strategic reserve. The enemy is to be confused by several points of attack. ■ To make the width of attack wide, greater than 30 kilometers. ■ To limit the duration of bombardment, less than 5 hours. ■ To advance artillery in secrecy and to cooperate with the infantry. ■ To advance strategic reserve beforehand and to join with the storm troops after a breach of the enemy's front trench has been achieved. Not to employ cavalry. ■ To get the trench lines as close as possible to the enemy's before the battle. Sunday, October 18, 2009

Tsar Nicholas and the Tsarevich Alexei visit Brusilov’s headquarters Sunday, October 18, 2009

Results of the Brusilov Oﬀensive Sunday, October 18, 2009

Results of the Brusilov Oﬀensive Brusilov's operation achieved the original goal of forcing Germany to halt its attack on Verdun and transfer considerable forces to the East. It also broke the back of the Austro-Hungarian Army which lost nearly 1.5 million men (including 400,000 prisoners). The Austro-Hungarian Army was never able to mount a successful attack from this point onward. Instead it had to rely on the German Army for its military successes. The early success of the offensive convinced Romania to enter the war on the side of the Entente, though with disastrous consequences. Russian casualties were also considerable, numbering around half a million. The Brusilov Offensive is listed among the most lethal battles in world history. Sunday, October 18, 2009

Results of the Brusilov Oﬀensive Sunday, October 18, 2009

Rumanian ﬁasco Sunday, October 18, 2009

Rumanian ﬁasco • summer, 1916-France insists that Rumanian belligerence is needed to relieve pressure on the Somme Sunday, October 18, 2009

Rumanian ﬁasco • summer, 1916-France insists that Rumanian belligerence is needed to relieve pressure on the Somme • Russia, aware of Rumania’s weakness, believes correctly that her neutrality is more useful Sunday, October 18, 2009

Rumanian ﬁasco • summer, 1916-France insists that Rumanian belligerence is needed to relieve pressure on the Somme • Russia, aware of Rumania’s weakness, believes correctly that her neutrality is more useful • late August-the success of the Brusilov oﬀensive encourages Rumania to take the plunge Sunday, October 18, 2009

Rumanian ﬁasco • summer, 1916-France insists that Rumanian belligerence is needed to relieve pressure on the Somme • Russia, aware of Rumania’s weakness, believes correctly that her neutrality is more useful • late August-the success of the Brusilov oﬀensive encourages Rumania to take the plunge • after initial Rumanian success against Austria in Transylvania, Germany once again turns the tide Sunday, October 18, 2009

Rumanian ﬁasco • summer, 1916-France insists that Rumanian belligerence is needed to relieve pressure on the Somme • Russia, aware of Rumania’s weakness, believes correctly that her neutrality is more useful • late August-the success of the Brusilov oﬀensive encourages Rumania to take the plunge • after initial Rumanian success against Austria in Transylvania, Germany once again turns the tide • December, 1916- General Falkenhayn’s troops enter Bucharest Sunday, October 18, 2009

Rumania’s Defeat Sunday, October 18, 2009

Rumania’s Defeat Limit of Rumanian advance into Transylvania 27 Aug-18 Sept Sunday, October 18, 2009

Rumania’s Defeat Situation 26 Nov Operations since 18 Sept Sunday, October 18, 2009

Rumania’s Defeat Final Ops 26 Nov 1916- 7 Jan 1917 Sunday, October 18, 2009

Falkenhayn’s cavalry arrive in the conquered capital Sunday, October 18, 2009

Russia’s fatal generosity Sunday, October 18, 2009

Russia’s fatal generosity Thus the fighting on the Eastern Front during 1916 ended in disaster for Rumania and a stalemate along the Russian lines. But it had brought relief to the Allies, for the Eastern fighting had taken the attention of eighty-three divisions of the enemy. The Russian army, however, was left in a torpor from which it could not recover. Yet the Russian military leaders, displaying the same generosity and lack of prudence that had characterized them since 1914, agreed in September, 1916, to prepare a new offensive for the spring of 1917 to coincide with an Allied offensive on the Western Front. Harcave, p.456 Sunday, October 18, 2009

On the Eve of Revolution Sunday, October 18, 2009

Rasputin among his On the Eve of Revolution sycophants and genuine admirers Sunday, October 18, 2009

Military Exhaustion Sunday, October 18, 2009

Military Exhaustion • Aug, 1914-Dec, 1916--Russia calls up >13 million men: nearly 2 mill KIA, 4 mill WIA. The Brusilov oﬀensive (June-Sept, 1916) alone=1 mill casualties Sunday, October 18, 2009

Military Exhaustion • Aug, 1914-Dec, 1916--Russia calls up >13 million men: nearly 2 mill KIA, 4 mill WIA. The Brusilov oﬀensive (June-Sept, 1916) alone=1 mill casualties • her best troops and, even more important, her leadership cadres are gone Sunday, October 18, 2009

Military Exhaustion • Aug, 1914-Dec, 1916--Russia calls up >13 million men: nearly 2 mill KIA, 4 mill WIA. The Brusilov oﬀensive (June-Sept, 1916) alone=1 mill casualties • her best troops and, even more important, her leadership cadres are gone • food shortages meant troops have to forage and extract food from their own population by force Sunday, October 18, 2009

Military Exhaustion • Aug, 1914-Dec, 1916--Russia calls up >13 million men: nearly 2 mill KIA, 4 mill WIA. The Brusilov oﬀensive (June-Sept, 1916) alone=1 mill casualties • her best troops and, even more important, her leadership cadres are gone • food shortages meant troops have to forage and extract food from their own population by force • morale is at rock bottom. Desertions are skyrocketing Sunday, October 18, 2009

Military Exhaustion • Aug, 1914-Dec, 1916--Russia calls up >13 million men: nearly 2 mill KIA, 4 mill WIA. The Brusilov oﬀensive (June-Sept, 1916) alone=1 mill casualties • her best troops and, even more important, her leadership cadres are gone • food shortages meant troops have to forage and extract food from their own population by force • morale is at rock bottom. Desertions are skyrocketing • The scandals questioning the imperial couple, especially the “German” empress and their evil “puppet master” Rasputin, are widespread Sunday, October 18, 2009

Military Exhaustion • Aug, 1914-Dec, 1916--Russia calls up >13 million men: nearly 2 mill KIA, 4 mill WIA. The Brusilov oﬀensive (June-Sept, 1916) alone=1 mill casualties • her best troops and, even more important, her leadership cadres are gone • food shortages meant troops have to forage and extract food from their own population by force • morale is at rock bottom. Desertions are skyrocketing • The scandals questioning the imperial couple, especially the “German” empress and their evil “puppet master” Rasputin, are widespread • rumors are widespread that France and Britain are bleeding Russia and not doing their fair share Sunday, October 18, 2009

Military Exhaustion • Aug, 1914-Dec, 1916--Russia calls up >13 million men: nearly 2 mill KIA, 4 mill WIA. The Brusilov oﬀensive (June-Sept, 1916) alone=1 mill casualties • her best troops and, even more important, her leadership cadres are gone • food shortages meant troops have to forage and extract food from their own population by force • morale is at rock bottom. Desertions are skyrocketing • The scandals questioning the imperial couple, especially the “German” empress and their evil “puppet master” Rasputin, are widespread • rumors are widespread that France and Britain are bleeding Russia and not doing their fair share • February, 1917--still, an Allied mission to Petrograd concludes that Russia is ready for the Spring Oﬀensive, two weeks before the revolution Sunday, October 18, 2009

Cossacks--”the ace in the hole” Sunday, October 18, 2009

Cossacks--”the ace in the hole” • October, 1916--two regiments of the Petrograd infantry garrison were called out to break up a strike Sunday, October 18, 2009

Cossacks--”the ace in the hole” • October, 1916--two regiments of the Petrograd infantry garrison were called out to break up a strike • they joined the strike and ﬁred upon the police instead Sunday, October 18, 2009

Cossacks--”the ace in the hole” • October, 1916--two regiments of the Petrograd infantry garrison were called out to break up a strike • they joined the strike and fired upon the police instead • Cossacks are called in to restore order • ethnically Christian Slavs, but different from the Great Russian population. 18th century border fighters from the steppes, enemies of Tartars and Turks. Long supporters of peasant revolts, they became the Praetorian Guards of the tsarist army. Given privileged status and used to keep the rest of the population in fear Sunday, October 18, 2009

Cossacks--”the ace in the hole” • October, 1916--two regiments of the Petrograd infantry garrison were called out to break up a strike • they joined the strike and fired upon the police instead • Cossacks are called in to restore order • ethnically Christian Slavs, but different from the Great Russian population. 18th century border fighters from the steppes, enemies of Tartars and Turks. Long supporters of peasant revolts, they became the Praetorian Guards of the tsarist army. Given privileged status and used to keep the rest of the population in fear • in the late 19th century Cossacks assumed a dual role: (1) in the forefront of government- encouraged pogroms against the Jews and (2) security forces, as here, against revolutionaries and disloyal regular troops Sunday, October 18, 2009

Cossacks--”the ace in the hole” • October, 1916--two regiments of the Petrograd infantry garrison were called out to break up a strike • they joined the strike and fired upon the police instead • Cossacks are called in to restore order • ethnically Christian Slavs, but different from the Great Russian population. 18th century border fighters from the steppes, enemies of Tartars and Turks. Long supporters of peasant revolts, they became the Praetorian Guards of the tsarist army. Given privileged status and used to keep the rest of the population in fear • in the late 19th century Cossacks assumed a dual role: (1) in the forefront of government- encouraged pogroms against the Jews and (2) security forces, as here, against revolutionaries and disloyal regular troops • their function was similar to Hitler’s SS a half century later Sunday, October 18, 2009

Minin & Pozharsky WAR BONDS THE MOTHERLAND NEEDS YOUR HELP SUBSCRIBE TO THE LOAN Sunday, October 18, 2009

Economic Crisis • although $4 of the $21 billion war loans were borrowed abroad, the remainder were covered by “running the printing presses,” adding non-convertible (not backed by gold) rubles to the money supply  inﬂation • so, at the same time prices were inﬂating >300% over 1914 values, wages rose only 100% • food shortages: • the loss of Poland • conscription of peasant labor • requisition of horses for the cavalry & military transport, cattle for feeding the troops Sunday, October 18, 2009

Economic Crisis Sunday, October 18, 2009

Economic Crisis • the real problem was to get food from the ﬁeld to the consumer Sunday, October 18, 2009

Economic Crisis • the real problem was to get food from the ﬁeld to the consumer • peasants were reluctant to sell grain to the government Sunday, October 18, 2009

Economic Crisis • the real problem was to get food from the field to the consumer • peasants were reluctant to sell grain to the government • government sought to buy it at fixed prices without considering inflation Sunday, October 18, 2009

Economic Crisis • the real problem was to get food from the field to the consumer • peasants were reluctant to sell grain to the government • government sought to buy it at fixed prices without considering inflation • transportation difficulties Sunday, October 18, 2009

Economic Crisis • the real problem was to get food from the field to the consumer • peasants were reluctant to sell grain to the government • government sought to buy it at fixed prices without considering inflation • transportation difficulties • railroads in 1916 were required to carry twice the freight of 1913 with less rolling stock, and what there was, in much worse condition Sunday, October 18, 2009

Economic Crisis • the real problem was to get food from the field to the consumer • peasants were reluctant to sell grain to the government • government sought to buy it at fixed prices without considering inflation • transportation difficulties • railroads in 1916 were required to carry twice the freight of 1913 with less rolling stock, and what there was, in much worse condition • government’s efforts to distribute fairly-- too little, too late Sunday, October 18, 2009

Economic Crisis • the real problem was to get food from the field to the consumer • peasants were reluctant to sell grain to the government • government sought to buy it at fixed prices without considering inflation • transportation difficulties • railroads in 1916 were required to carry twice the freight of 1913 with less rolling stock, and what there was, in much worse condition • government’s efforts to distribute fairly-- too little, too late • local authorities-- often conscientious, but often inefficient Sunday, October 18, 2009

Economic Crisis • the real problem was to get food from the field to the consumer • peasants were reluctant to sell grain to the government • government sought to buy it at fixed prices without considering inflation • transportation difficulties • railroads in 1916 were required to carry twice the freight of 1913 with less rolling stock, and what there was, in much worse condition • government’s efforts to distribute fairly-- too little, too late • local authorities-- often conscientious, but often inefficient • no systematic policy of rationing and price control  long queues  competition for inadequate supplies at high prices  rumors of theft & corruption  angry riots and window-smashing mobs Sunday, October 18, 2009

Renewal of Restiveness Sunday, October 18, 2009

Renewal of Restiveness • both Britain and France experienced severe strains during the war but neither were close to revolution. The diﬀerence? Sunday, October 18, 2009

Renewal of Restiveness • both Britain and France experienced severe strains during the war but neither were close to revolution. The diﬀerence? • neither had an autocratic government which couldn’t connect with its people Sunday, October 18, 2009

Renewal of Restiveness • both Britain and France experienced severe strains during the war but neither were close to revolution. The diﬀerence? • neither had an autocratic government which couldn’t connect with its people • Russia herself had had worse tests in the past: the Time of Troubles, 1812 Sunday, October 18, 2009

Renewal of Restiveness • both Britain and France experienced severe strains during the war but neither were close to revolution. The diﬀerence? • neither had an autocratic government which couldn’t connect with its people • Russia herself had had worse tests in the past: the Time of Troubles, 1812 • but in 1916 the bonds of the past which had held the people in check--Throne, Church, Tradition--were losing their power Sunday, October 18, 2009

Renewal of Restiveness • both Britain and France experienced severe strains during the war but neither were close to revolution. The diﬀerence? • neither had an autocratic government which couldn’t connect with its people • Russia herself had had worse tests in the past: the Time of Troubles, 1812 • but in 1916 the bonds of the past which had held the people in check--Throne, Church, Tradition--were losing their power • the rising strike movement was indicative: Sunday, October 18, 2009

Renewal of Restiveness • both Britain and France experienced severe strains during the war but neither were close to revolution. The diﬀerence? • neither had an autocratic government which couldn’t connect with its people • Russia herself had had worse tests in the past: the Time of Troubles, 1812 • but in 1916 the bonds of the past which had held the people in check--Throne, Church, Tradition--were losing their power • the rising strike movement was indicative: • 1915-strikes aﬀected 539,000 workers Sunday, October 18, 2009

Renewal of Restiveness • both Britain and France experienced severe strains during the war but neither were close to revolution. The difference? • neither had an autocratic government which couldn’t connect with its people • Russia herself had had worse tests in the past: the Time of Troubles, 1812 • but in 1916 the bonds of the past which had held the people in check--Throne, Church, Tradition--were losing their power • the rising strike movement was indicative: • 1915-strikes affected 539,000 workers • 1916-strikes affected 951, 000 workers Sunday, October 18, 2009

May “Manifestation” at Putilovsky Works Sunday, October 18, 2009

Preparation for Revolt from Below • 1916-the decline of morale was not the work of revolutionaries but it certainly played into their hands • Lenin, arrested in Galicia at war’s outbreak, was allowed by the Austrian police to go to neutral Switzerland • September, 1914-he had written Seven Theses on the War denouncing the Second International for its weak stance • September, 1915-the Zimmerwald conference united anti-war socialists of many countries. • Bolsheviks included Lenin, Zinoviev:somewhere in between, Trotsky, Mensheviks, Martov and Axelrod, representatives of the anti-war SRs • a future Bolshevik leader was Karl Radek of the Polish SDs Sunday, October 18, 2009

Possible Coup from Above • 1 November, 1916--a new rebellious session of the Duma opened. Milyukov gave his famous “Is it stupidity or is it treason?” speech • Premier Stürmer, Rasputin’s replacement for Goremykin, was suspected of pro-German tendencies • the government responded with ambivalence: • the Duma was forbidden to publish anti-government speeches • Stürmer was replaced by an ineﬀectual and even less popular Alexander Trepov • December 30--once again the Duma was prorogued until late January, 1917 • the next day the public learned that Rasputin had been assassinated • rumors of a right wing coup against the royal couple were rife Sunday, October 18, 2009

The February Revolution Sunday, October 18, 2009

Then came the great, great year of 1917. Hunger, cold and trials of war broke the patience of the women workers and the peasant women of Russia. In 1917, on the 8th of March (23rd of February), on Working Women's Day, they came out boldly in the streets of Petrograd. The women – some were workers, some were wives of soldiers – demanded The February Revolution "Bread for our children" and "The return of our husbands from the trenches." At this decisive time the protests of the working women posed such a threat that even the Tsarist security forces did not dare take the usual measures against the rebels but looked on in confusion at the stormy sea of the people's anger.-- 8 MARCH-DAY a Marxist website OF THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN Sunday, October 18, 2009

It is significant that the three major periods of change after 1800-- those beginning in 1861, 1905, and 1917--were the aftermaths of military reversals. Just as the military misfortunes suffered between 1914 and 1917 were far greater than those experienced between 1853-1856 and between 1904-1905, so the changes which began in 1917 were far greater than those which began in 1861 and 1905. The Revolution of 1917 was, in fact, the most radical event in more than a thousand years of Russian history and the greatest political and social upheaval in modern times. It was the first successful mass effort to transform the entire society and government of Russia by the use of force, which Karl Marx had called the midwife of new societies. One of the big problems which the Russian people had to face, even while the revolution was in progress, was just what form the changes were to take. Some hoped that their country would follow the example of Western countries and become a liberal, democratic state; others placed the achievement of social and economic justice above civil and political liberties. Harcave, p.461 Sunday, October 18, 2009

After two mild winters, the winter of 1916-17 proved unusually cold; temperatures fell so low that peasant women refused to cart food to the towns. Blizzards disabled locomotives…. The weather had a devastating effect on deliveries to the northern cities, notably distant Petrograd. Bakeries had to shut their doors for lack of either flour or fuel. Fuel shortages also forced some factories to close and lay off tens of thousands of workers. Sunday, October 18, 2009

The Tsar, reassured by Protopopov [the hated Interior Minister] that he had the situation in hand, left for the front on February 22 [O.S.]: he would return two weeks later as Nicholas Romanov, a private citizen. Sunday, October 18, 2009

Suddenly the weather took a turn for the better, the temperature rising from an average of 6ºF to 46ºF, where it would remain until the end of the month. People whom freezing weather had kept conﬁned for weeks to poorly heated rooms, now streamed outdoors to enjoy the sun. Pipes, p. 75 Sunday, October 18, 2009

Revolution = a change in political leadership arising from long range causes Sunday, October 18, 2009

Revolution = a change in political leadership arising from long range causes determines the particular Immediate Causation form and the timing of the event Sunday, October 18, 2009

Revolution = a change in political leadership arising from long range causes determines the particular Immediate Causation form and the timing of the event Long Range determines whether the Causation event will happen or not Sunday, October 18, 2009

Revolution = a change in political leadership arising from long range causes determines the particular Immediate “Great Causation form and the timing of the Men” event Long Range determines whether the Causation event will happen or not Sunday, October 18, 2009

Revolution = a change in political leadership arising from long range causes determines the particular Immediate “Great Causation form and the timing of the Men” event Long Range determines whether the “Blind Causation event will happen or not Forces” Sunday, October 18, 2009

Revolution = a change in political leadership arising from long range causes Immediate Causation Long range Causation Sunday, October 18, 2009

Revolution = a change in political leadership arising from long range causes Immediate the weather Causation Long range Causation Sunday, October 18, 2009

Revolution = a change in political leadership arising from long range causes Immediate strikes & the weather + Causation lock outs Long range Causation Sunday, October 18, 2009

Revolution = a change in political leadership arising from long range causes Immediate strikes & International the weather + + Causation lock outs Woman’s Day Long range Causation Sunday, October 18, 2009

Revolution = a change in political leadership arising from long range causes Immediate strikes & International inconsistent the weather + + + Causation lock outs Woman’s Day policing Long range Causation Sunday, October 18, 2009

Revolution = a change in political leadership arising from long range causes Immediate strikes & International inconsistent the weather + + + Causation lock outs Woman’s Day policing army + mutiny Long range Causation Sunday, October 18, 2009

Revolution = a change in political leadership arising from long range causes Immediate strikes & International inconsistent the weather + + + Causation lock outs Woman’s Day policing army Duma leaders + + mutiny power play Long range Causation Sunday, October 18, 2009

Revolution = a change in political leadership arising from long range causes Immediate strikes & International inconsistent the weather + + + Causation lock outs Woman’s Day policing army Duma leaders Nicholas’ + + + mutiny power play vacillation Long range Causation Sunday, October 18, 2009

Revolution = a change in political leadership arising from long range causes Immediate strikes & International inconsistent the weather + + + Causation lock outs Woman’s Day policing army Duma leaders Nicholas’ + + + mutiny power play vacillation Repressive Policies--inconsistently applied Long range Causation Sunday, October 18, 2009

Revolution = a change in political leadership arising from long range causes Immediate strikes & International inconsistent the weather + + + Causation lock outs Woman’s Day policing army Duma leaders Nicholas’ + + + mutiny power play vacillation Repressive Policies--inconsistently applied Long range Causation Stage of Economic Development--state capitalism & peasant agriculture Sunday, October 18, 2009

Revolution = a change in political leadership arising from long range causes Immediate strikes & International inconsistent the weather + + + Causation lock outs Woman’s Day policing army Duma leaders Nicholas’ + + + mutiny power play vacillation Repressive Policies--inconsistently applied Long range Causation Stage of Economic Development--state capitalism & peasant agriculture World War I--suﬀering at the front and on the home front, loss of the leadership cadres, rotten morale, desertions Sunday, October 18, 2009

Petrograd chronology (dates, O.S.//N.S.) Sunday, October 18, 2009

Petrograd chronology (dates, O.S.//N.S.) • 23 Feb//8 Mar-International Woman’s Day demonstration organized by the Socialists-peaceful, but the Cossacks seem to sympathize with the women’s clamor for bread Sunday, October 18, 2009

Petrograd chronology (dates, O.S.//N.S.) • 23 Feb//8 Mar-International Woman’s Day demonstration organized by the Socialists-peaceful, but the Cossacks seem to sympathize with the women’s clamor for bread • 24/2//9/3-now 200,000 idle workers (strikers/locked out) ﬁll the streets--”Down with the autocracy!” “Down with the war!” Sunday, October 18, 2009

Petrograd chronology (dates, O.S.//N.S.) • 23 Feb//8 Mar-International Woman’s Day demonstration organized by the Socialists-peaceful, but the Cossacks seem to sympathize with the women’s clamor for bread • 24/2//9/3-now 200,000 idle workers (strikers/locked out) ﬁll the streets--”Down with the autocracy!” “Down with the war!” • 25/2//10/3-emboldened by the lack of a vigorous response, crowds grow still more aggressive. red banners appear, “Down with the German Woman.” Duma Socialists discuss forming a “workers’ soviet.” Nicholas’ telegram demands order be restored by force Sunday, October 18, 2009

Petrograd chronology (dates, O.S.//N.S.) • 23 Feb//8 Mar-International Woman’s Day demonstration organized by the Socialists-peaceful, but the Cossacks seem to sympathize with the women’s clamor for bread • 24/2//9/3-now 200,000 idle workers (strikers/locked out) ﬁll the streets--”Down with the autocracy!” “Down with the war!” • 25/2//10/3-emboldened by the lack of a vigorous response, crowds grow still more aggressive. red banners appear, “Down with the German Woman.” Duma Socialists discuss forming a “workers’ soviet.” Nicholas’ telegram demands order be restored by force • 26/2//11/3-Sunday morning--troops in combat gear occupy Petrograd. Demonstrators on Znamenskii square refuse to disperse. Troops open ﬁre. Forty civilian casualties Sunday, October 18, 2009

Demonstrators on Znamenskii Square 26 February 1917 Sunday, October 18, 2009

Petrograd chronology (dates O.S.) Sunday, October 18, 2009

Petrograd chronology (dates O.S.) • 26/2-angry workers report the massacre to the Pavlovskii Guards at their barracks. Some soldiers rush to the scene, exchange shots with mounted police, return to plan the next response. Sunday, October 18, 2009

Petrograd chronology (dates O.S.) • 26/2-angry workers report the massacre to the Pavlovskii Guards at their barracks. Some soldiers rush to the scene, exchange shots with mounted police, return to plan the next response. • night of 26-27/2--the regiment votes to disobey orders to ﬁre on civilians. Messengers go to other units to gain their support Sunday, October 18, 2009

Petrograd chronology (dates O.S.) • 26/2-angry workers report the massacre to the Pavlovskii Guards at their barracks. Some soldiers rush to the scene, exchange shots with mounted police, return to plan the next response. • night of 26-27/2--the regiment votes to disobey orders to ﬁre on civilians. Messengers go to other units to gain their support • 27/2-full scale military rebellion. Of the 160,000-man garrison, half are in full mutiny, the remainder adopt a “neutral” stance. Some oﬃcers are killed; police, lynched; crowds storm Okhrana headquarters. Widespread looting of shops, restaurants and private residences. Sunday, October 18, 2009

Petrograd chronology (dates O.S.) • 26/2-angry workers report the massacre to the Pavlovskii Guards at their barracks. Some soldiers rush to the scene, exchange shots with mounted police, return to plan the next response. • night of 26-27/2--the regiment votes to disobey orders to ﬁre on civilians. Messengers go to other units to gain their support • 27/2-full scale military rebellion. Of the 160,000-man garrison, half are in full mutiny, the remainder adopt a “neutral” stance. Some oﬃcers are killed; police, lynched; crowds storm Okhrana headquarters. Widespread looting of shops, restaurants and private residences. • authorities are powerless with only 2,000 loyal troops, 3,500 policemen and a few mounted cossacks Sunday, October 18, 2009

rebel troops identiﬁed themselves with the symbolic color--soon to be called Red Guards Sunday, October 18, 2009

AT THE FACTORY ROOF WITH RIFLE FIRE rebel troops identiﬁed themselves with the symbolic color--soon to be called Red Guards Sunday, October 18, 2009

T h e m u t i n e e r s we r e l e a d e r l e s s r a b b l e . W h e n threatened, they instantly panicked and ran for cover. But the Duma leaders ﬁrst convinced themselves and then the generals that they alone could restore order. In reality, it was their pressure on Nicholas to abdicate that transformed a local mutiny into a nationwide revolution. Pipes, p.80 Sunday, October 18, 2009

28 Feb (O.S.)--The Duma leaders who had for so long clamored for power lost nerve now that power was within their grasp…. After lengthy deliberations they resolved to form an executive bureau of twelve Duma members, still of a private nature, to be known as “The Provisional Committee of Duma Members for the Restoration of Order in the Capital and the Establishment of Relations with Individuals and Institutions.”...Its ludicrously cumbersome name reﬂected the timidity of its founders. And, indeed, an eyewitness says that the Provisional Committee--now the de facto government of Russia--was established in a manner that resembled the appointment in normal times of a Fisheries Committee. Pipes, pp. 80-81 Sunday, October 18, 2009

The Other “Government” The Petrograd Soviet & Its Ispolkom Sunday, October 18, 2009

The Other “Government” The Petrograd Soviet & Its Ispolkom • 28 Feb--formed on the same day as the “bourgeois” Provisional Committee, the Petrograd Soviet represented the “proletariat” Sunday, October 18, 2009

The Other “Government” The Petrograd Soviet & Its Ispolkom • 28 Feb--formed on the same day as the “bourgeois” Provisional Committee, the Petrograd Soviet represented the “proletariat” • convened on the initiative of the Mensheviks with the assistance of their “creature,” the Central Workers’ Group Sunday, October 18, 2009

The Other “Government” The Petrograd Soviet & Its Ispolkom • 28 Feb--formed on the same day as the “bourgeois” Provisional Committee, the Petrograd Soviet represented the “proletariat” • convened on the initiative of the Mensheviks with the assistance of their “creature,” the Central Workers’ Group • of the 3,000 deputies, by the second week, more than 2,000 were soldiers--this in a city with two or three times as many workers as soldiers Sunday, October 18, 2009

The Other “Government” The Petrograd Soviet & Its Ispolkom • 28 Feb--formed on the same day as the “bourgeois” Provisional Committee, the Petrograd Soviet represented the “proletariat” • convened on the initiative of the Mensheviks with the assistance of their “creature,” the Central Workers’ Group • of the 3,000 deputies, by the second week, more than 2,000 were soldiers--this in a city with two or three times as many workers as soldiers • such a large group naturally required an executive committee, the Ispolkom(исполнительный комитет,iz•pol•NI•tyel•nie kom•i•TYET) It was not chosen by the soviet but, as had been the case in 1905, was made up of nominees of the socialist parties, each of which was allotted three seats Sunday, October 18, 2009

A “Manifestation” on the Nevsky Prospekt: “Hail the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies…” Sunday, October 18, 2009

Petrograd Soviet Plenum the period of dvoevlastie or “dual power” Sunday, October 18, 2009

Instead of serving as a true executive organ of the Soviet, therefore, the Ispolkom became a coordinating body of the socialist parties, superimposed on the Soviet and acting in its name. ...three grave consequences (1) expanded artiﬁcially the representation of the Bolshevik Party, which had a small following among the workers and virtually none among the soldiers (2) strengthened the moderate socialists and (3) most important, bureaucratized the Ispolkom, making it a self-appointive executive body that acted independently of the Soviet plenum, whose decisions were determined by caucuses of socialist intellectuals. Pipes, p. 82 Sunday, October 18, 2009

Order No. 1 Sunday, October 18, 2009

Order No. 1 • ostensibly the organ of “democratic control” of a “bourgeois” government, the Ispolkom at once arrogated to itself legislative functions Sunday, October 18, 2009

Order No. 1 • ostensibly the organ of “democratic control” of a “bourgeois” government, the Ispolkom at once arrogated to itself legislative functions • 1 March--it at ﬁrst deﬁed the government with the notorious Order No. 1, which it issued without so much as consulting it Sunday, October 18, 2009

Order No. 1 • ostensibly the organ of “democratic control” of a “bourgeois” government, the Ispolkom at once arrogated to itself legislative functions • 1 March--it at ﬁrst deﬁed the government with the notorious Order No. 1, which it issued without so much as consulting it • supposedly it resolved soldiers’ grievances Sunday, October 18, 2009

Order No. 1 • ostensibly the organ of “democratic control” of a “bourgeois” government, the Ispolkom at once arrogated to itself legislative functions • 1 March--it at first defied the government with the notorious Order No. 1, which it issued without so much as consulting it • supposedly it resolved soldiers’ grievances • its socialist authors’ real purpose was to emasculate the officer corps which they saw as the prime breeding ground of counterrevolution Sunday, October 18, 2009

Order No. 1 • ostensibly the organ of “democratic control” of a “bourgeois” government, the Ispolkom at once arrogated to itself legislative functions • 1 March--it at first defied the government with the notorious Order No. 1, which it issued without so much as consulting it • supposedly it resolved soldiers’ grievances • its socialist authors’ real purpose was to emasculate the officer corps which they saw as the prime breeding ground of counterrevolution • addressed to the Petrograd garrison, it was immediately interpreted as applicable to all troops Sunday, October 18, 2009

Order No. 1 • ostensibly the organ of “democratic control” of a “bourgeois” government, the Ispolkom at once arrogated to itself legislative functions • 1 March--it at first defied the government with the notorious Order No. 1, which it issued without so much as consulting it • supposedly it resolved soldiers’ grievances • its socialist authors’ real purpose was to emasculate the officer corps which they saw as the prime breeding ground of counterrevolution • addressed to the Petrograd garrison, it was immediately interpreted as applicable to all troops • it called for elected “committees” in all military units, subordination to the Petrograd Soviet in regard to all “political actions,” giving to it the right to countermand orders of the Provisional Government Sunday, October 18, 2009

Order No. 1 • ostensibly the organ of “democratic control” of a “bourgeois” government, the Ispolkom at once arrogated to itself legislative functions • 1 March--it at first defied the government with the notorious Order No. 1, which it issued without so much as consulting it • supposedly it resolved soldiers’ grievances • its socialist authors’ real purpose was to emasculate the officer corps which they saw as the prime breeding ground of counterrevolution • addressed to the Petrograd garrison, it was immediately interpreted as applicable to all troops • it called for elected “committees” in all military units, subordination to the Petrograd Soviet in regard to all “political actions,” giving to it the right to countermand orders of the Provisional Government • as a result, officers were ignored, insulted, and, in some cases, killed Sunday, October 18, 2009

Public Announcement of the Formation of the First Provisional Government, 2 March 1917 (O.S.) The Temporary Committee of the members of the State Duma, with the help and the support of the army and the inhabitants of the capital, has now attained such a large measure of success over the dark forces of the old regime that it is possible for the Committee to undertake the organisation of a more stable executive power. With this end in mind, the Temporary Committee of the State Duma has appointed the following persons as ministers of the first cabinet representing the public; their past political and public activities assure them the confidence of the country: Minister-President and Minister of the Interior Prince G.E. L'vov (Non-Party) Minister of Foreign Affairs P.N. Miliukov (Kadet) Minister of War and Navy A.I. Guchkov (Octobrist) Minister of Transport N.V. Nekrasov (Kadet) Minister of Trade and Industry A.I. Konovalov (Kadet) Minister of Finance M.I. Tereshchenko (Non-Party) Minister of Education A.A. Manuilov (Kadet) Ober-Procurator of the Holy Synod V.N. L'vov (Centrist) Minister of Agriculture A.I. Shingarev (Kadet) Minister of Justice A.F. Kerenskii (SR) Sunday, October 18, 2009

“The two outstanding members as well as bitter rivals…” Alexander Feyodorovich Kerensky, Paul Nikolaievich Milyukov, 1859-1943 1881-1970 Sunday, October 18, 2009

“The two outstanding members as well as bitter rivals…” • leader of the Kadet Party Sunday, October 18, 2009

“The two outstanding members as well as bitter rivals…” • leader of the Kadet Party • 58 years old, unbounded energy Sunday, October 18, 2009

“The two outstanding members as well as bitter rivals…” • leader of the Kadet Party • 58 years old, unbounded energy • professional historian Sunday, October 18, 2009

“The two outstanding members as well as bitter rivals…” • leader of the Kadet Party • 58 years old, unbounded energy • professional historian • editor of the Kadet party paper Sunday, October 18, 2009

“The two outstanding members as well as bitter rivals…” • leader of the Kadet Party • 58 years old, unbounded energy • professional historian • editor of the Kadet party paper • lacked political “instincts” Sunday, October 18, 2009

“The two outstanding members as well as bitter rivals…” • leader of the Kadet Party • 58 years old, unbounded energy • professional historian • editor of the Kadet party paper • lacked political “instincts” • as the country’s best-known political Sunday, October 18, 2009

“The two outstanding members as well as bitter rivals…” • leader of the Kadet Party • 58 years old, unbounded energy • professional historian • editor of the Kadet party paper • lacked political “instincts” • as the country’s best-known political ﬁgure, he had every reason to see Sunday, October 18, 2009

“The two outstanding members as well as bitter rivals…” • leader of the Kadet Party • 58 years old, unbounded energy • professional historian • editor of the Kadet party paper • lacked political “instincts” • as the country’s best-known political ﬁgure, he had every reason to see himself as the premier of democratic Sunday, October 18, 2009

“The two outstanding members as well as bitter rivals…” • leader of the Kadet Party • 58 years old, unbounded energy • professional historian • editor of the Kadet party paper • lacked political “instincts” • as the country’s best-known political ﬁgure, he had every reason to see himself as the premier of democratic Russia Sunday, October 18, 2009

“The two outstanding members as well as bitter rivals…” • leader of the Kadet Party • ﬁery 36 year old SR radical • 58 years old, unbounded energy • professional historian • editor of the Kadet party paper • lacked political “instincts” • as the country’s best-known political ﬁgure, he had every reason to see himself as the premier of democratic Russia Sunday, October 18, 2009

“The two outstanding members as well as bitter rivals…” • leader of the Kadet Party • ﬁery 36 year old SR radical • 58 years old, unbounded energy • brilliant speaker with no • professional historian • editor of the Kadet party paper • lacked political “instincts” • as the country’s best-known political ﬁgure, he had every reason to see himself as the premier of democratic Russia Sunday, October 18, 2009

“The two outstanding members as well as bitter rivals…” • leader of the Kadet Party • ﬁery 36 year old SR radical • 58 years old, unbounded energy • brilliant speaker with no • professional historian apparent political philosophy • editor of the Kadet party paper • lacked political “instincts” • as the country’s best-known political ﬁgure, he had every reason to see himself as the premier of democratic Russia Sunday, October 18, 2009

“The two outstanding members as well as bitter rivals…” • leader of the Kadet Party • ﬁery 36 year old SR radical • 58 years old, unbounded energy • brilliant speaker with no • professional historian apparent political philosophy • editor of the Kadet party paper • burned with political ambition • lacked political “instincts” • as the country’s best-known political ﬁgure, he had every reason to see himself as the premier of democratic Russia Sunday, October 18, 2009

“The two outstanding members as well as bitter rivals…” • leader of the Kadet Party • ﬁery 36 year old SR radical • 58 years old, unbounded energy • brilliant speaker with no • professional historian apparent political philosophy • editor of the Kadet party paper • burned with political ambition • lacked political “instincts” • vain and impulsive where • as the country’s best-known political ﬁgure, he had every reason to see himself as the premier of democratic Russia Sunday, October 18, 2009

“The two outstanding members as well as bitter rivals…” • leader of the Kadet Party • ﬁery 36 year old SR radical • 58 years old, unbounded energy • brilliant speaker with no • professional historian apparent political philosophy • editor of the Kadet party paper • burned with political ambition • lacked political “instincts” • vain and impulsive where • as the country’s best-known political Milyukov was cold & calculating ﬁgure, he had every reason to see himself as the premier of democratic Russia Sunday, October 18, 2009

“The two outstanding members as well as bitter rivals…” • leader of the Kadet Party • ﬁery 36 year old SR radical • 58 years old, unbounded energy • brilliant speaker with no • professional historian apparent political philosophy • editor of the Kadet party paper • burned with political ambition • lacked political “instincts” • vain and impulsive where • as the country’s best-known political Milyukov was cold & calculating ﬁgure, he had every reason to see • rose meteorically & just as himself as the premier of democratic Russia Sunday, October 18, 2009

“The two outstanding members as well as bitter rivals…” • leader of the Kadet Party • ﬁery 36 year old SR radical • 58 years old, unbounded energy • brilliant speaker with no • professional historian apparent political philosophy • editor of the Kadet party paper • burned with political ambition • lacked political “instincts” • vain and impulsive where • as the country’s best-known political Milyukov was cold & calculating ﬁgure, he had every reason to see • rose meteorically & just as himself as the premier of democratic meteorically burned out Russia Sunday, October 18, 2009

Public Announcement of the Formation of the First Provisional Government--2 March 1917 (O.S.) The actual work of the cabinet will be guided by the following principles: 1. An immediate and complete amnesty in all cases of a political and religious nature, including terrorist acts, military revolts and agrarian offences, etc. Sunday, October 18, 2009

Public Announcement of the Formation of the First Provisional Government--2 March 1917 (O.S.) The actual work of the cabinet will be guided by the following principles: 1. An immediate and complete amnesty in all cases of a political and religious nature, including terrorist acts, military revolts and agrarian offences, etc. 2. Freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and the right to form unions and to strike and the extension of political freedom to persons serving in the armed forces limited only by the demands of military and technical circumstances. Sunday, October 18, 2009

Public Announcement of the Formation of the First Provisional Government--2 March 1917 (O.S.) The actual work of the cabinet will be guided by the following principles: 1. An immediate and complete amnesty in all cases of a political and religious nature, including terrorist acts, military revolts and agrarian offences, etc. 2. Freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and the right to form unions and to strike and the extension of political freedom to persons serving in the armed forces limited only by the demands of military and technical circumstances. 3. The abolition of all restrictions based on class, religion, and nationality. Sunday, October 18, 2009

Public Announcement of the Formation of the First Provisional Government--2 March 1917 (O.S.) The actual work of the cabinet will be guided by the following principles: 1. An immediate and complete amnesty in all cases of a political and religious nature, including terrorist acts, military revolts and agrarian offences, etc. 2. Freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and the right to form unions and to strike and the extension of political freedom to persons serving in the armed forces limited only by the demands of military and technical circumstances. 3. The abolition of all restrictions based on class, religion, and nationality. 4. The immediate arrangements for the calling on the Constituent Assembly on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage and secret ballot, which will determine the form of government and the constitution of the country. Sunday, October 18, 2009

Public Announcement of the Formation of the First Provisional Government--2 March 1917 (O.S.) The actual work of the cabinet will be guided by the following principles: 1. An immediate and complete amnesty in all cases of a political and religious nature, including terrorist acts, military revolts and agrarian offences, etc. 2. Freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and the right to form unions and to strike and the extension of political freedom to persons serving in the armed forces limited only by the demands of military and technical circumstances. 3. The abolition of all restrictions based on class, religion, and nationality. 4. The immediate arrangements for the calling on the Constituent Assembly on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage and secret ballot, which will determine the form of government and the constitution of the country. 5. The substitution of a people's militia for the police, with elective officers responsible to the organs of local self-government. Sunday, October 18, 2009

Public Announcement of the Formation of the First Provisional Government--2 March 1917 (O.S.) The actual work of the cabinet will be guided by the following principles: 1. An immediate and complete amnesty in all cases of a political and religious nature, including terrorist acts, military revolts and agrarian offences, etc. 2. Freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and the right to form unions and to strike and the extension of political freedom to persons serving in the armed forces limited only by the demands of military and technical circumstances. 3. The abolition of all restrictions based on class, religion, and nationality. 4. The immediate arrangements for the calling on the Constituent Assembly on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage and secret ballot, which will determine the form of government and the constitution of the country. 5. The substitution of a people's militia for the police, with elective officers responsible to the organs of local self-government. 6. Elections to the organs of local self-government are to be held on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage and secret ballot. Sunday, October 18, 2009

Public Announcement of the Formation of the First Provisional Government--2 March 1917 (O.S.) The actual work of the cabinet will be guided by the following principles: 1. An immediate and complete amnesty in all cases of a political and religious nature, including terrorist acts, military revolts and agrarian offences, etc. 2. Freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and the right to form unions and to strike and the extension of political freedom to persons serving in the armed forces limited only by the demands of military and technical circumstances. 3. The abolition of all restrictions based on class, religion, and nationality. 4. The immediate arrangements for the calling on the Constituent Assembly on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage and secret ballot, which will determine the form of government and the constitution of the country. 5. The substitution of a people's militia for the police, with elective officers responsible to the organs of local self-government. 6. Elections to the organs of local self-government are to be held on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage and secret ballot. 7. Those military units which took part in the revolutionary movement shall be neither disarmed nor withdrawn from Petrograd.[i.e., sent to the Front, JBP] Sunday, October 18, 2009

Public Announcement of the Formation of the First Provisional Government--2 March 1917 (O.S.) The actual work of the cabinet will be guided by the following principles: 1. An immediate and complete amnesty in all cases of a political and religious nature, including terrorist acts, military revolts and agrarian offences, etc. 2. Freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and the right to form unions and to strike and the extension of political freedom to persons serving in the armed forces limited only by the demands of military and technical circumstances. 3. The abolition of all restrictions based on class, religion, and nationality. 4. The immediate arrangements for the calling on the Constituent Assembly on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage and secret ballot, which will determine the form of government and the constitution of the country. 5. The substitution of a people's militia for the police, with elective officers responsible to the organs of local self-government. 6. Elections to the organs of local self-government are to be held on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage and secret ballot. 7. Those military units which took part in the revolutionary movement shall be neither disarmed nor withdrawn from Petrograd.[i.e., sent to the Front, JBP] 8. While preserving strict military discipline on duty and during military service, the soldiers are to be freed from all restrictions in the exercise of those civil rights which all other citizens enjoy. Sunday, October 18, 2009

Public Announcement of the Formation of the First Provisional Government--2 March 1917 (O.S.) The actual work of the cabinet will be guided by the following principles: 1. An immediate and complete amnesty in all cases of a political and religious nature, including terrorist acts, military revolts and agrarian offences, etc. 2. Freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and the right to form unions and to strike and the extension of political freedom to persons serving in the armed forces limited only by the demands of military and technical circumstances. 3. The abolition of all restrictions based on class, religion, and nationality. 4. The immediate arrangements for the calling on the Constituent Assembly on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage and secret ballot, which will determine the form of government and the constitution of the country. 5. The substitution of a people's militia for the police, with elective officers responsible to the organs of local self-government. 6. Elections to the organs of local self-government are to be held on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage and secret ballot. 7. Those military units which took part in the revolutionary movement shall be neither disarmed nor withdrawn from Petrograd.[i.e., sent to the Front, JBP] 8. While preserving strict military discipline on duty and during military service, the soldiers are to be freed from all restrictions in the exercise of those civil rights which all other citizens enjoy. The Provisional Government wishes to add that it has no intention whatsoever of taking advantage of the military situation to delay in any way the carrying through of the reforms and the measures outlined above. Sunday, October 18, 2009

Citizen Nicholas Romanov • his ﬁrst reaction, to dismiss the news • 25 Feb-then to order military repression, again dismissing warnings--”That fat Rodzianko…” • 2 March-then to abdicate • 4 March-then to submit to arrest at Tsarskoe Selo, expecting to be allowed to go into exile • “...not with a bang, but a whimper” Sunday, October 18, 2009

The record leaves no doubt that the myth of the Tsar being forced from the throne by the rebellious workers and peasants is just that. The Tsar yielded not to a rebellious populace but to generals and politicians, and he did so from a sense of patriotic duty. Pipes, p. 390 Sunday, October 18, 2009

“The most striking aspect of the February Sunday, October 18, 2009

“The most striking aspect of the February Revolution was the extraordinary rapidity with which the Russian state fell apart. It was as if the greatest empire in the world had been an artiﬁcial construction…. The instant the monarch withdrew, the entire structure collapsed in a heap. ...By late April, eight weeks after the Revolution had broken out, Russia was foundering. On April 26, the Provisional Government issued a pathetic appeal in which it conceded that it could no longer run the country. Russians, having got rid of tsarism, on which they were accustomed to blame all their ills, stood stunned in the midst of their newly gained freedom.” Pipes, pp. 96-97 Sunday, October 18, 2009

Russian War and Revolution: July, 1914-March, 1917

by Jim Powers on Oct 18, 2009

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Russian War and Revolution: July, 1914-March, 1917 — Presentation Transcript