Napoleon Part 2, session v The Sixth Coalition

  • 1,077 views
Uploaded on

This session follows Napoleon's impressive recovery from the Russian disaster, January-August, 1813.

This session follows Napoleon's impressive recovery from the Russian disaster, January-August, 1813.

  • Full Name Full Name Comment goes here.
    Are you sure you want to
    Your message goes here
    Be the first to comment
    Be the first to like this
No Downloads

Views

Total Views
1,077
On Slideshare
0
From Embeds
0
Number of Embeds
0

Actions

Shares
Downloads
18
Comments
0
Likes
0

Embeds 0

No embeds

Report content

Flagged as inappropriate Flag as inappropriate
Flag as inappropriate

Select your reason for flagging this presentation as inappropriate.

Cancel
    No notes for slide

Transcript

  • 1. Napoleon Part Two session v Sixth Coalition
  • 2. Napoleon Part Two session v Sixth CoalitionBuilt 1898-1913 by the Kaiser to Celebrate the Sixth Coalition’s Victory
  • 3. My star was fading. I felt the reinsslipping out of my grasp, and coulddo nothing to stop it. --Napoleon
  • 4. major topics for this sessionI. Down, But Not OutII. Hit ‘im Again! He’s CorsicanIII. Lützen and BautzenIV. Dresden
  • 5. 1813 Campaign Leipzig 16-19 October1814 Campaign
  • 6. I. Down, But Not Out
  • 7. I. Down, But Not Out
  • 8. The campaign of 1813 proved to be one of the longest, most expensive andultimately decisive of all the struggles of the Napoleonic Wars. Followingthe cataclysm of 1812, Napoleon was desperately attempting to regain theinitiative and repair the damage sustained by both his armies and hisreputation in the depths of Russia. For their part, the Russians--joinedsuccessively by the Swedes, Prussians and Austrians besides a number ofGerman princelings--were determined to liberate Germany from theshackles of the French connection and to carry the war to the veryfrontiers of France itself. With his Empire crumbling away in CentralEurope, over 200,000 troops and several of his ablest subordinates tieddown in conducting a deteriorating struggle in Spain, his ports blockadedby the Royal Navy, his allies falling away--Napoleon was faced with one ofthe greatest challenges of his career. Chandler, p. 865
  • 9. The true issue was simply one of survival, but in early 1813 no thought ofultimate catastrophe yet darkened the Emperor’s mind and he steadfastlyrefused all suggestions of negotiating a compromise peace. He was stillconvinced that complete victory was attainable--and indeed at certainmoments during the first part of the campaign such an outcome seemeddistinctly possible. In the end, however, a combination of awakeningGerman nationalism and fast exhausting French resources resulted inheavy defeat and the loss of almost all terrain lying to the east of theRhine. Chandler, p. 865
  • 10. Notwithstanding the immense losses Napoleon suffered in Russia, hisextraordinary administrative skills enabled him to rebuild his army by thespring of 1813. Fremont-Barnes, Napoleon, p. 36
  • 11. Rearming✦ 19 December 1812-the day after he arrived in Paris-”I am extremely pleased with the spirit of the nation. The people are prepared to make every kind of sacrifice,” he wrote to Murat✦ 31December--only 13 days after his return--he notified Berthier, “on Sunday I reviewed about 25-30,000 troops”✦ he had bought nearly 5,000 horses and had contracted for 5,000 more in France, 2,000 from Warsaw, nearly 5,000 from Hanover with more to come from Prussia and Hamburg✦ early January 1813-“Come spring I shall march with an army larger than the Grand Army at the beginning of the [last] campaign,” he wrote the Danish king✦ 31 January-250,000 conscripts and volunteers were being trained and equipped ✦ mobile columns were rounding up an estimated 100,000 conscripts who had fled the colors ✦ rich young gentlemen had volunteered as cavalry, each with his own mount, weapons & servants ✦ the gendarmerie had been culled to provide troops and horses ✦ 40,000 naval gunners were transferred to the artillery
  • 12. The thousands of teenagers pressed into service after the Russian campaign were nicknamed the Marie-Louises after the equally young empress who signed their conscription decrees in Napoleon’s absence. Through necessity, the uniform was stripped down to its most basic… [but the shako was still ornate, seen here in its foul-weather cover]…. ‘On taking the field, everyone reduced his kit to the smallest possible dimensions, ridding himself of all useless articles’ A well-packed haversack (1) might contain spare shoes (2) [note the condition of the pair he’s wearing!] a change of shirt (3) a sewing kit (4) containing needles, thread, awl and also a bag of cleaning brushes….The soldier’s few personal possessions including a spoon (5) comb (6), playing cards (7), pocket knife (8), tobacco pouch (9), pipe (10), and a handkerchief could be kept in his coat’s internal pockets. [note also the oiled rag wrapped around his musket’s lock to keep it dry in wet weather and “dinner” hanging from his haversack] COLOUR PLATE COMMENTARY, pp. 62-63Osprey, French Napoleonic Infantryman 1803-15, PLATE G
  • 13. The renascence of military might continued despite two unforeseenblows. One was the treachery of General Yorck whose Prussian corps, atleast 17,000 men and 60 guns, formed Marshal Macdonald’s rear guard toTilsit. Having fought little in the campaign Yorck defected toWittgenstein’s corps under terms said to have been negotiated mainly byCarl von Clausewitz* who had joined the Russian service shortly after thePrussian-French treaty of 1812. Yorck shortly would take his force back toPrussia to form the nucleus of a new army allied with Russia. The other event was Marshal Murat’s impulsive decision at Posen toleave the Grand Army and return to his Neapolitan kingdom. Each blowwas disappointing, neither an immediate disaster. “I find Murat’s conductvery extravagant--I can think of nothing similar,” Napoleon wrote ViceroyEugène. “This is a brave man in battle, but he lacks intelligence and moralcourage.” Napoleon gave the command to Eugène: “I am annoyed at nothaving given it to you upon my departure.” Eugène was to send as manyredundant generals as possible to France along with battalion cadresnecessary to build new regiments. Asprey, pp. 282-283*Clausewitz would become famous for his On War, a work still widely read by military professionals
  • 14. It is difficult to fault either Napoleon’s or the French nation’s incredibleactivity during these four months, but there were some major drawbacks.The officers and non-commissioned officers needed to train recruits…werein very short supply. Equally serious was a shortage of horses. Napoleon’sinitial claims of availability soon proved [overly optimistic]. Contractssigned outside of France failed to be met in whole or in part, nor did thehome country live up to expectations. By early February the army hadreceived only 11,000 mounts, a very serious situation in view of cavalry,artillery and supply requirements. To worsen matters, the troops lackednearly everything from crossbelts to sabers, cooking utensils, water bottles,shoes, shirts, often muskets and bayonets. Quartermasters were short ofwagons, cannon needed carriages and caissons. Asprey, p. 284
  • 15. The cavalry posed altogether different problems; here the difficulties weremainly shortage of time and suitable horses. While an infantry conscriptcould be shaken into some sort of shape within a few months, a cavalryrecruit took considerably longer to train to a reasonable standard; yet theneed for new cavalrymen was pressing, for the French mounted arm hadvirtually ceased to exist by the end of 1812. Great difficulty was alsoexperienced in procuring even a proportion of the required number ofhorses. Many of the most famous horse-producing areas of Europe lay inPrussia and central Germany, but the coolness and subsequent defection ofPrussia and sundry other smaller states deprived the French army of manyof its remount sources. This weakness was never remedied, and no smallpart of Napoleon’s eventual failure in 1813 was due to his understrengthcavalry force. Deprived of vital intelligence through the paucity of hiscavalry patrol and unable to follow up his victories with the usual hell-for-leather pursuits, Napoleon was to find himself faced by almost insuperableobstacles. Chandler, p. 868
  • 16. Napoleon’s HorsemanshipNapoleon was an intrepid rider who usually rode stallions – even thoughthey can be positively dangerous when bad-tempered. He galloped with asense of daring and freedom unusual in someone so methodical. Even atbreakneck speed, no obstacle worried him. The memoirs of his staff andcourtiers show that on a horse Napoleon feared little, while his attitudetowards day-to-day stable welfare was often enlightened. He forbade hissoldiers to dock the tails of their horses, a practice then prevalent in theBritish army, and horse-buyers were instructed to avoid purchasing horseswith cut tails either for Napoleon or the French cavalry. Cropped tailssaved effort in grooming, but a brush-like stump did not swish awaytroublesome flies and other insects and also upset the horses’ balance. InBritain this cruel custom was not banned until 1949. http://www.jill-hamilton.com/pdf/marengo-the-myth-of-napoleons-horse.pdf
  • 17. Wellington’s HorsemanshipOn battlefield after battlefield, he demonstrated an uncanny ability to be atthe right place at the right time. At Salamanca, he personally sent intoaction every single Allied division. This method of control required,however, not only the ability to foresee where he would be needed, butalso many expensive horses, superb practical horsemanship and in himselfthe hard physical condition of a steeplechase jockey.11 Wellington has been accused of having a ‘poor seat’; he was perhaps not a pretty rider. But he could probably movefaster and farther than any other senior commander in European history. Maxwell, II, 28, says that on 16 June 1815,‘The Duke had ridden from Brussels 5 miles beyond Quatre Bras, 29 miles, then 7 miles to Ligny and back, 43 milesin all, before the battle began, and remained in the saddle till nightfall.’ Jac Weller, Wellington at Waterloo, p. 27
  • 18. II. Hit ‘im Again, He’s Corsican
  • 19. Austria’s Indispensable Man ✦ his father was the Austrian ambassador to the three Rhenish electors, Archbishops of Trier, Mainz & Köln ✦ 1788-at age 15, began studying law at Strasbourg ✦ 1795-married the granddaughter of Maria Teresa’s Chancellor Kaunitz ✦ 1803-05--ambassador to Saxony and Prussia ✦ 1806-in Paris, had affairs with Pauline, Caroline & Hortense! ✦ 1809-interned during the War of the Fourth Coalition, thereafter made Austrian Minister of State ✦ 1810-after Wagram, engineered a French alliance Prince Klemens Wenzel von Metternich and Napoleon’s marriage to Marie-LouiseKlemens Wenzel Nepomuk Lothar, Fürst von Metternich- Winneburg zu Beilstein ✦ 1812-as the Russian Campaign developed, he 1773 –1859 began his move to neutrality
  • 20. Napoleon naïvely hoped that his marriage to an Austrian princess would be afirm link between their two countries. His Austrian in-laws regarded MariaLouisa only as a temporary sacrifice, tossed to the Corsican ogre. However,Austria had never recovered from her financial and military losses in 1809and knew that another defeat could destroy her. Her foreign minister,Metternich, was aristocratic, courageous, devious as a basket of snakes, and asworn foe of the French Revolution---”a gangrene which must be burnt outwith a hot iron.” He chose to prepare Austria for war, while remainingostensibly neutral, thus hoping to force both sides to bid high for Austriansupport. He further planned to then demand such humiliating concessionsfrom France that Napoleon would automatically reject them. Meanwhile, hebriskly pretended friendship, sending Schwarzenberg to Paris “to the side ofhis commander in chief.” (En route, Schwarzenberg would urge Napoleon’sGerman allies to send the emperor as few troops as possible---and especiallyto send no cavalry, which Napoleon particularly needed.) Metternich himselfintrigued murkily with Murat. Esposito & Elting, after MAP 126
  • 21. Austrian Soldier Diplomat✦ 1788-entered the Imperial cavalry, fought the Turks✦ 1793-decorated for leading a cavalry charge that killed and wounded 3,000 French and brought back 32 guns✦ 1800-the only Austrian general to emerge with distinction from the defeat at Hohenlinden✦ 1805--before Mack surrendered at Ulm, his cavalry cut their way through to freedom✦ 1809-fought at Wagram, then was sent to Paris to negotiate Napoleon’s marriage to Marie Louise✦ 1812-at Napoleon’s request, he commanded the Austrian forces in the Russian campaign✦ initially, he ably defended the French right flank in Volhynia Karl Philipp Fürst zu Schwarzenberg (Charles Philip, Prince of Schwarzenberg )✦ as the campaign disintegrated, he fell back to 1771 – 1820 protect Austria’s territory in Galicia
  • 22. Prussian Traitor or Patriot? ✦ his father was an army officer under Frederick the Great ✦ the family were Kashubians from Pomerania ✦ 1772-joined Frederick’s army but cashiered after 7 years for criticizing his superior’s recruiting methods. Served in the Dutch and French armies until Frederick’s death ✦ 1794--back in the Prussian army, won honors in putting down Kosciuszko’s Polish uprising. Later developed Prussia’s light infantry and the tactic of skirmishing ✦ 1806-fought ably in the disastrous Jena campaign ✦ 1807-after Tilsit, led in the reorganization of Prussia’s army. Became commander of the contingent Prussia was forced to send on the Russian campaignJohann David Ludwig Graf Yorck von Wartenburg 1759 - 1830
  • 23. Prussian Traitor or Patriot? ✦ his father was an army officer under Frederick the Great ✦ the family were Kashubians from Pomerania ✦ 1772-joined Frederick’s army but cashiered after 7 years for criticizing his superior’s recruiting methods. Served in the Dutch and French armies until Frederick’s death ✦ 1794--back in the Prussian army, won honors in putting down Kosciuszko’s Polish uprising. Later developed Prussia’s light infantry and the tactic of skirmishing ✦ 1806-fought ably in the disastrous Jena campaign ✦ 1807-after Tilsit, led in the reorganization of Prussia’s army. Became commander of the contingent Prussia was forced to send on the Russian campaign ✦ December 1812-after it became clear that the campaignJohann David Convention of Tauroggen The Ludwig Graf Yorck von Wartenburg was doomed, he changed sides 30 December 1812 1759 - 1830 ✦ he began Prussia’s shift to the Sixth Coalition
  • 24. Since Jena, the regenerating political activities of the statesman Stein, themilitary reforms of Scharnhorst, the patriotic cultural influence of Arndt andKörner, and the pervasive, secret power of the Tugendbund or League ofVirtue, had between them produced an entirely new popular atmosphere, andby 1813 Prussia was ripe for revolt. The fact was amply demonstrated whenthe Provincial Assembly of East Prussia---without reference to Berlin---declared its support for General Yorck and announced its defiance ofNapoleon. So widespread became this defiant mood that the monarchy wascompelled to follow suit. In late February the Convention of Kalisch betweenPrussia and Russia was secretly ratified; by it Prussia promised to enter thewar on the side of the Allies in the very near future...while Russia undertookto see that Prussia would be restored to her pre-1806 boundaries. The Tsarguaranteed to provide 150,000 soldiers; Frederick William to field at least80,000 more. Chandler, pp. 870 & 872
  • 25. The prospect of continued war appalled the states of the Confederation of theRhine. They had pledged Napoleon loyalty; in return, he had increased theirterritory and prestige (at the expense of Austria and Prussia), and left theirinternal affairs alone. But now the Russians were moving westward, whileYorck’s and Schwarzenberg’s defections hinted that Prussia and Austria wereabout to again switch sides. Prussian “liberation,” Russian occupation, andFrench vengeance seemed equally dreadful. Eventually, each did whatseemed safest. Baden, Hesse, Nassau, Westphalia, and Frankfurt---beingunder the guns of French fortresses---promptly raised new contingencies forNapoleon. His country partially overrun, the King of Saxony fled to Bavaria,ordering his army to remain neutral. At Austria’s urging, Bavaria andWürttemberg considered neutrality. Esposito & Elting, after MAP 126
  • 26. Krumpersystem und Freikorps ! 1807-Napoleon limited by treaty the Prussian army to 42,000 men ! late 1812-as his Grande Armée disintegrated, he authorized a further 33,000. Now these became his enemies! Körner ! Scharnhorst had already created a clever ploy to “beat” the ceiling, the so-called Krumpersystem ! a proportion of the regulars were retired each year, replaced by recruits who were trained, then placed in reserve ! February 1813-33,000 reservists were thus producedAuf Vorposten: Heinrich Hartmann (liegend, links) Theodor ! but the greatest surge would come from theKörner (sitzend, mitte) und Friedrich Friesen (stehend, rechts) alsLützower Jäger (Gemälde von Georg Friedrich Kersting 1815) unofficial militias, the Freikorps
  • 27. We will consider this rising tide of German nationalism in moredetail during our next session.
  • 28. The Russians were momentarily exhausted. Happily convinced that he wastruly a military genius, Alexander felt a divine mission to become the liberatorof Europe and the champion of its “legitimate” rulers. At the same time,strictly in the interests of international justice, he would extend Russia’sfrontiers. Kutusov favored letting England fight France. He had muchpopular support, and temporarily restrained Alexander. Esposito & Elting, after MAP 126
  • 29. Once the Grand Army had retreated across the Niemen River Kutusov hadhalted his advance owing to casualties and a high sickness rate from lack offood and cold weather. His army now numbered only around 40,000effectives (not counting Platov’s Cossacks). Kutusov was old and tired (hewould soon die[ 28 April 1813]), he had done his duty, Russia was free ofenemy, it was time for peace. Asprey, pp. 286-287
  • 30. England and the “Second American Revolution”✦ 1 June 1812-President Madison had struggled unsuccessfully to keep his “War Hawk” wing of the (Jeffersonian) Republican party under control. They almost declared war on France as well as Britain!✦ Lord Liverpool’s government had just been formed after the assassination of his predecessor✦ now Britain had to divide her meager land forces between Wellington’s Peninsular War and the defense of her North American and Caribbean possessions✦ her overwhelming naval superiority would soon limit US ability to interfere with her commerce as well as producing a crushing blockade of our commerce (New England almost seceded in 1814)✦ 1813-due to this Second Front, Britain could only contribute her financial and diplomatic resources to the Sixth Coalition (beyond her very important Spanish offensive)✦ in North America, Britain’s Indian allies, the Canadian militia, supported by a modest number of British regular units, soon put the American forces on the defensive except on Lake Erie✦ December 1814-with Napoleon gone, having abdicated in April, Britain turned her full fury on the “impudent Yankees,” drove our navy from the seas, burned DC and was preparing to conquer New Orleans when we sued for peace on the basis of status quo ante bellum
  • 31. III.Lützenand Bautzen
  • 32. III.Lützenand Bautzen
  • 33. With Blücher massing around Dresden, the Elbe River was no longer a tenable line of defense. Eugene therefore swung his right flank behind the lower Saale River. He had neither held as much ground nor gained as much time as Napoleon had desired, but he had built up an effective army and now occupied a strong position.EUGENE Vi st ul a Ri Od ve e rR r i ve Sa Elb r a le R eR ive ive r r
  • 34. With Blücher massing around Dresden, the Elbe River was no longer a tenable line of defense. Eugene therefore swung his right flank behind the lower Saale River. He had neither held as much ground nor gained as much time as Napoleon had desired, but he had built up an effective army and now occupied a strong position.EUGENE Wittgenstein … linked up with Vi Blücher. Nevertheless, the Allies found st ul themselves considerably overextended. a Ri Od They had to leave detachments to ve e rR besiege the various Polish and German r i ve Sa Elb r fortresses, and Kutusov (now dying) a le R eR stubbornly held most of the Russian ive ive r r army at Kalish. On 19 April came a rumor that Napoleon was advancing
  • 35. Russia’s General VEET•gen•SHTAYN! descended from a medieval family from the Rhineland whose lands (since the 1300s!) were lost in 1792 to France, then given to the Grand Duchy of Hesse Darmstadt in 1806 (Rheinbund) Sayn and Wittgenstein ca. 1450
  • 36. Russia’s General VEET•gen•SHTAYN! descended from a medieval family from the Rhineland whose lands (since the 1300s!) were lost in 1792 to France, then given to the Grand Duchy of Hesse Darmstadt in 1806 (Rheinbund)! 1769-born near Kiev in the Ukraine. His family had been military service nobility to the tsars since Peter the Great! 1793-fought Kosciuszko as a major of a Ukrainian light cavalry regiment! 1805-a major general at Austerlitz; 1806, fought the Turks; 1807, fought Napoleon at Friedland Ludwig Adolph Peter, Prince Wittgenstein! 1812-defended St. Petersburg in the 1st & 2nd battles of Polotsk. Awarded the Cross of St George (Pyotr Khristianovich Wittgenstein) (German: Ludwig Adolph Peter Fürst zu Sayn-Wittgenstein Russian: Пётр Христиа́нович Ви́тгенштейн)! 1813-age 44, takes command of the Russian army 1769 - 1843 after the death of Kutusov
  • 37. Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher Fürst von Wahlstatt * German pronunciation:  [ˈɡɛphaɐ̯t ˈleːbəʁɛçt fɔn ˈblʏçɐ] 1742 – 1819
  • 38. ! 1658-began as a Swedish hussar (age 16). Born in Rostock, Mecklenburg, just west of Swedish PomeraniaDuring the Napoleonic Wars, the Prussian generalPrince Blücher defeated a French army underMarshal Macdonald at the Katzbach, a small riverin the Battle of Katzbach on 26 August 1813. Inhonor of this victory Blücher received the titlePrince of Wahlstatt on 3 June 1814.
  • 39. ! 1658-began as a Swedish hussar (age 16). Born in Rostock, Mecklenburg, just west of Swedish Pomerania ! captured during the Seven Years War, he “turned his coat” and became a hussar for Frederick the Great ! In peace, however, his ardent spirit led him into excesses of all kinds, such as mock execution of a priest suspected of supporting Polish uprisings in 1772. Due to this, he was passed over for promotion to Major. Blücher sent in a rude letter of resignation, which Frederick the Great granted in 1773: Der Rittmeister von Blücher kann sich zum Teufel scheren (Cavalry Captain von Blücher can go to the devil) ! 1789-received the Pour le Mérit (the Blue Max) ! 1801-made general (age 59)During the Napoleonic Wars, the Prussian generalPrince Blücher defeated a French army underMarshal Macdonald at the Katzbach, a small river ! 1806-fought at Jena-Auerstadt, ably, but outnumberedin the Battle of Katzbach on 26 August 1813. Inhonor of this victory Blücher received the titlePrince of Wahlstatt on 3 June 1814. ! during the “humiliation” became leader of the Patriots
  • 40. ! 1658-began as a Swedish hussar (age 16). Born in Rostock, Mecklenburg, just west of Swedish Pomerania ! captured during the Seven Years War, he “turned his coat” and became a hussar for Frederick the Great ! In peace, however, his ardent spirit led him into excesses of all kinds, such as mock execution of a priest suspected of supporting Polish uprisings in 1772. Due to this, he was passed over for promotion to Major. Blücher sent in a rude letter of resignation, which Frederick the Great granted in 1773: Der Rittmeister von Blücher kann sich zum Teufel scheren (Cavalry Captain von Blücher can go to the devil) ! 1789-received the Pour le Mérit (the Blue Max) ! 1801-made general (age 59)"Marschall Vorwärts" (1863) ! 1806-fought at Jena-Auerstadt, ably, but outnumbered ! during the “humiliation” became leader of the Patriots
  • 41. Bonaparte’s Strategic Plan for 1813What use did Napoleon think to make of [the] considerable armament [builtup after his failure in Russia]? For some time a master plan had beenformulating in his mind, and although circumstances made it impossible toput it into execution it is important to grasp its main outlines [emphasisadded] as the Emperor never completely forgot it…. Chandler, p. 875
  • 42. The Master Plan
  • 43. The Master Plan✦ “...press back over the Elbe and march on Berlin BERLIN
  • 44. The Master Plan✦ “...press back over the Elbe and march on Berlin✦ “...establish the seat of war between the Elbe and the Oder, moving under HAMBURG the protection of the fortresses of Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdeburg and Hamburg BERLIN MAGDEBURG WITTENBERG TORGAU
  • 45. The Master Plan✦ “...press back over the Elbe and march on Berlin DANZIG✦ “...establish the seat of war between THORN the Elbe and the Oder, moving under HAMBURG the protection of the fortresses of MODLIN Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdeburg and Hamburg BERLIN MAGDEBURG Vistula River WITTENBERG✦ “if circumstances permitted he would TORGAU then relieve the fortresses besieged on the Vistula--Danzig, Thorn and Modlin✦ “If this vast plan succeeded, it could be hoped that the coalition would be disorganized and that all the princes of Germany would confirm their fidelity and alliances with France.”Montholon, Mémoires de Napoléon, quoted in Chandler, Ibid.
  • 46. The Constraining Circumstances(1)Napoleon considered that he needed 300,000 men to make the plan foolproof, and by April his numbers were still far below that figure.(2)He doubted whether the raw material of his new forces would be capable of much sustained marching.(3)His reliance on the assistance of the Confederation of the Rhine and the south German states proved overoptimistic, for both Saxony and Bavaria proved understandably hesitant.(4)The enemy was still advancing in the Dresden area, and there would not be sufficient French troops available to assure the Saale line if the Army of the Main set out on its ambitious project. Chandler, p. 876
  • 47. Blücher and Wittgenstein...began shifting into closer contact. They knew they would be outnumbered, and could see only two courses of action: to retire behind the Elbe… , or to attack BERLIN Napoleon when he advanced across the Saale….if they could catch [him] astride the steep-banked Saale, they might be able to destroy his leading corps. East of the river the terrain was open, favoring their superiority in cavalry (four to one) and artillery (almost two to one). Their well- trained, now largely veteran soldiers should be individually and collectively superior to the French conscripts. Oder River LEIPZIG DRESDEN Saale River Elbe River LEIPZIG CAMPAIGNSituation 25 April 1813, andConcentrations Prior to the Battle ofLützen10 0 10 20 30 MILES
  • 48. BERLIN With Kutusov dying, Alexander decreed Oder River that the overall command should go to Wittgenstein, the youngest of the ranking LEIPZIG generals in both armies. Blücher was agreeable, but Tormassov and Miloradovich asserted their seniority. Lacking character DRESDEN enough to discipline them, Alexander placed them under his personal command, leaving Wittgenstein only his own corps, the Saale River Prussians and Winzengerode. A hot Allied debate over future plans ended in quick decision when Napoleon was reported to be in Weissenfels. The Allies began assembling between Leipzig and Elbe River LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN A l t e n b u r g . I f N a p o l e o n ’s a d v a n c eSituation 25 April 1813, and continued, they would advance on Lützen toConcentrations Prior to the Battle ofLützen strike his right flank. In the ensuing10 0 10 20 30 confusion, Bülow was left without orders. MILES
  • 49. (1) Lauriston’s corps drives Kleist out of Leipzig(2) Winzegorode, Yorck and Blücher attack Ney, who is retreating on Lützen to “bait the trap”(3) Napoleon springs the trap with a double envelopment. Marmont’s Grande Batterie devastates(4) Wittgenstein counterattacks(5) Napoleon puts in the Guard, driving the Allies from the fieldWittgenstein and Blücher were in danger of sufferinganother defeat on the scale of Austerlitz, but the greenand exhausted French troops, who had been marchingand fighting all day long, could not follow through. Inaddition, darkness was closing in as night approached.This allowed the allied force to retreat in good order.The lack of French cavalry meant there would be nopursuit. Wikipedia
  • 50. Napoleon reached the field at 2:30 P.M. He found the situation critical. Ney’s weary and shaken corps was on the point of dissolution, while Marshal Bertrand had halted his advance a g a i n s t B l ü c h e r ’s l e f t o n d i s c o v e r i n g Milodoradovich approaching Zeitz. Marmont, too, was hard pressed by the Allies. It was a moment calling for personal leadership---and Napoleon proved more than equal to the occasion. Riding among the wavering conscripts, the Emperor exhorted and cajoled them back into their ranks and then repeatedly led them up toward the enemy. The effect of his presence was almost magical. New confidence and resolution flooded back into his troops. “This was probably the day, of his whole career, on which Napoleon < LUTZEN incurred the greatest personal danger on the field of battle,” recorded Marmont. “He exposed himself constantly, leading the men of defeated IIIrd Corps back to the charge.” From all sides rang cries of “Vive l’Empereur!” “Hardly a wounded man passed before Bonaparte without saluting him with the accustomed vivat. Even those who had lost a limb, who would in a few hours be the prey of death, rendered him this homage.”< ZEITZ Chandler, p. 884
  • 51. BATTLE OF LUTZEN BATTLE OF LUTZENSituation About 1100, 2 May 1813 Situation About 1830, 2 May 18131 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1
  • 52. BATTLE OF LUTZEN BATTLE OF LUTZENSituation About 1100, 2 May 1813 Situation About 1830, 2 May 18131 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 The Allies went hurriedly to the rear….Lacking cavalry, Napoleon could not pursue effectively. French losses seem to have been approximately 20,000; Allied, 20,000. Though the effective Allied propaganda system claimed that Napoleon had been completely surprised and practically defeated, the legend of Napoleonic invincibility was largely re- established. Esposito & Elting, MAP 129
  • 53. Soldiers, I am pleased with you!You have fulfilled my hopes! In asingle day you have overturned allthese murderous conspiracies. Weshall throw these Tartars back totheir dreadful country that theyought not to have left. Let them stayin their frozen deserts, home ofslavery, barbarism and corruptionwhere man is reduced to the level ofa beast. --Napoleon-- 3 May 1813
  • 54. (30,000) (84,000) (96,000) (115,000)
  • 55. Leaving Ney’s crippled corps at Lützen to reorganize, Napoleon followed (0300, 3 May)the Allied retreat….having the initiative and superior forces, on 4 May he began forminga second army...under Ney. Initially, Ney would secure Torgau...and raise the siege ofWittenberg. Concurrently, he would constitute a potential threat to Berlin, which--Napoleon hoped--would cause the Prussians to break away northward. In that case, theEmperor should be able to destroy the Allies in detail; in the meantime, he wouldcontinue his drive on Dresden. (30,000) (84,000)Lützen (96,000) (115,000)
  • 56. (30,000) On 7 May, the Allies began recrossing the Elbe. Russian attempts to destroy the Dresden bridges were (84,000) bungled, the French advance guard capturing a good many pontons.Lützen (96,000) DRESDEN (115,000)
  • 57. BERLIN (30,000) (84,000) Lützen (96,000) DRESDEN (115,000) Breslau…(9 May), in a brilliant, surprise assault crossings, utilizingcaptured pontons and the wreckage of a stone bridge,Napoleon seized two bridgeheads on the east bank atDresden. The Allies, already worried by Ney’s activities,withdrew tamely. After much squabbling (the Prussians wanted to coverBerlin; the Russians, Breslau and Warsaw), the Alliesdecided to attempt another battle before retreating behindthe Oder River. A strong position east of Bautzen wasselected, and Russian engineers were sent ahead to prepareit.
  • 58. BERLIN (30,000) (84,000) Bautzen Lützen (96,000) DRESDEN (115,000) Breslau…(9 May), in a brilliant, surprise assault crossings, utilizingcaptured pontons and the wreckage of a stone bridge,Napoleon seized two bridgeheads on the east bank atDresden. The Allies, already worried by Ney’s activities,withdrew tamely. After much squabbling (the Prussians wanted to coverBerlin; the Russians, Breslau and Warsaw), the Alliesdecided to attempt another battle before retreating behindthe Oder River. A strong position east of Bautzen wasselected, and Russian engineers were sent ahead to prepareit.
  • 59. Deutsch: Schlacht bei Bautzen 1813. Napoleon auf einem weißen Pferd, umgeben von seinen Offizieren, empfängt einen Boten.English: Battle of Bautzen (1813). Napoleon on white horse surrounded by his officers, receives a messenger.
  • 60. Wittgenstein drew his men up in two strong defensive lines along a 10-kilometre front, with strongpoints invillages and along ridges.By the 19th, Bonaparte had set up his plan to pin the enemy to their lines and then bottle them up withNeys men but, concerned that the Prusso-Russians had more men on the field than they actually had, theemperor would not spring his trap until they had been softened up.The next day the attack began around midday. Hours of heavy fighting saw the French overpowering thefirst defensive lines and seizing the town of Bautzen itself.By nightfall, the French were ready to cut the defenders off from their line of retreat but Ney becameconfused and his faulty positioning left the door open for the Allies to escape.Fighting on the 21st was hard and after several hours the initial success of the renewed French attacksbegan to lose impetus.Again Ney became distracted by tactical matters - the seizing of the village of Preititz - and lost sight of thestrategic importance of his sealing the Allies in.By 4pm, however, the Prusso-Russians were being pushed back and when the Imperial Guard was sent inthey began an all-out retreat.While Bautzen was a success for Bonaparte it was not a decisive result. Both armies lost some 20,000 menbut Neys failure to cut the line of retreat robbed the French of complete victory. http://www.napoleonguide.com/battle_bautzen.htm
  • 61. ! the Blöserwasser is a marshy stream running through the Allied positions before joining the Spree ! the Allies planned to contain Napoleon’s attack; then to counterattack, envelop his left flank, and drive him into the mountains along the Austrian frontierBlöserwasser
  • 62. ! the Blöserwasser is a marshy stream running through the Allied positions before joining the Spree ! the Allies planned to contain Napoleon’s attack; then to counterattack, envelop his left flank, and drive him into the mountains along the Austrian frontier ! Napoleon’s main concern was to fix and distract the Allies long enough for Ney’s enveloping maneuver (which could not be delivered in strength before 21 May) to developBlöserwasser
  • 63. ! the Blöserwasser is a marshy stream running through the Allied positions before joining the Spree ! the Allies planned to contain Napoleon’s attack; then to counterattack, envelop his left flank, and drive him into the mountains along the Austrian frontier ! Napoleon’s main concern was to fix and distract the Allies long enough for Ney’s enveloping maneuver (which could not be delivered in strength before 21 May) to developBlöserwasser ! the Allied position being too strong for a frontal attack, he spent the morning of the 20th maneuvering his left and center into their assault positions ! 1200- the French artillery opened heavily ! 1500-Oudinot confirmed the tsar’s fears by driving deep into the ridges on the Allied left ! 1700-Macdonald and Marmont pinched out Bautzen, forcing Miloradovich to retire
  • 64. r ve Ri e reSp SYMBOL FOR MARSHY GROUND BATTLE OF BAUTZEN BATTLE OF BAUTZEN Situation Early 20 May 1813 and Situation at Noon 21 May 1813, Allied Advance of Napoleon’s Forces Prior to Dark Routes of Withdrawal and French Pursuit
  • 65. For the 21st, Napoleon ordered Oudinot to attackvigorously at daybreak, so as to distract all possibleenemy troops. Macdonald would support him;Marmont and Soult would stand ready to extendNey’s attack. Ney would seize Dresha, then r veadvance toward Weissenberg. Subsequent Ri edevelopments are difficult to unravel. re Sp BATTLE OF BAUTZEN BATTLE OF BAUTZEN Situation Early 20 May 1813 and Situation at Noon 21 May 1813, Allied Advance of Napoleon’s Forces Prior to Dark Routes of Withdrawal and French Pursuit
  • 66. Ney energetically snarled the situation….Despitesplendid fighting, Blücher and Yorck were steadilydriven in, Maison penetrating southward throughPlieskowitz. However, Kleist managed to drive the DRESHA runsupported Souham back on Gleina, and Ney lost ve Rihis remaining wits….Almost trapped, but keeping e re Sptheir men under tight control, Blücher and Yorckslipped out past Ney. WEISENBERG BATTLE OF BAUTZEN BATTLE OF BAUTZEN Situation Early 20 May 1813 and Situation at Noon 21 May 1813, Allied Advance of Napoleon’s Forces Prior to Dark Routes of Withdrawal and French Pursuit
  • 67. DRESHA r ve Ri e re SpPleading lack of cavalry, Ney hesitated to pursue….Hoping to retrieve Ney’s failure, at 1600 Napoleon WEISENBERGthrust at the Allied center with the Guard andLatour-Maubourg, but the Allies were alreadywithdrawing in good order. Each side had lostapproximately 20,000 men; Napoleon’s onlytrophies were wrecked guns and woundedprisoners. He had planned an annihilating hammerblow, but, because of Ney’s blunderings, had wononly an ordinary victory. Esposito and Elting, MAP131 BATTLE OF BAUTZEN BATTLE OF BAUTZEN Situation Early 20 May 1813 and Situation at Noon 21 May 1813, Allied Advance of Napoleon’s Forces Prior to Dark Routes of Withdrawal and French Pursuit
  • 68. Why did the Emperor agree to an armistice after he had won two importantbattles and had the enemy on the run? Scores of his detractors, followingBaron Jomini’s malicious lead, have gleefully pointed out that, such was thedeplorable state of the allied forces, had he continued his pursuit...he wouldhave won his “decisive victory” to finish the war. Whew! The Allies had indeed suffered heavy casualties but the reverse side of thecoin was that ample reinforcements would soon fill the gaps….Defeat hadresulted in retreat, not rout….. And the French army? Notwithstanding inspired and incredibly bravebattle performances the cost in men, horses, weapons, ammunition andmateriel had been heavy. Time was necessary to repair the damage and restthe troops. Above all Napoleon desperately needed more horses….Withoutthe tactical impetus provided by trained cavalry and fast-moving artilleryNapoleon was unlikely ever to find that elusive “decisive battle.” Asprey, pp. 304-305
  • 69. Even supposing his army wascombat-ready [on 4 June] which itwas not, an end-play around theenemy’s right at Schweidnitz wouldhave been not only a formidable but adangerous undertaking. Asprey, p. 305 at the beginning of the armistice 4 June
  • 70. Even supposing his army wascombat-ready [on 4 June] which itwas not, an end-play around theenemy’s right at Schweidnitz wouldhave been not only a formidable but adangerous undertaking. Schweidnitz Asprey, p. 305 at the beginning of the armistice 4 June
  • 71. I want peace which is of moreconcern to me than to anyone else…but I shall not make either adishonorable peace or one thatwould bring an even more violentwar within six months. --Napoleon to General Savary Dresden 12 June 1813
  • 72. Battle of Dresden 26-27 August 1813IV. Dresden
  • 73. ✦ Napoleon was well aware that he couldn’t count on his south German allies and especially his father-in-law Francis, the emperor of Austria✦ “...Napoleon was not dealing so much with the Austrian emperor as with a very shrewd, cunning, unscrupulous and altogether nasty piece of work named Klemens von Metternich”-Asprey, p. 306✦ 26 June-at Dresden, Metternich, Austria’s 40-year-old foreign minister, maintaining the façade of neutrality, offered his services as peacemaker✦ his terms: in return for peace, France must agree that ✦ the Grand Duchy of Warsaw be given to Russia ✦ Prussia gets her 1806 boundaries, including the fortress of Danzig ✦ the Confederation of the Rhine be dissolved ✦ Austria would get Dalmatia (the “Yugoslav” coast), Salzburg and Tyrol, and the Venetian provinces Prince Klemens Wenzel von Metternich Klemens Wenzel Nepomuk Lothar, Fürst von Metternich-Winneburg zu Beilstein 1773 – 1859
  • 74. Napoleon was understandably furious--if this was the result of hiswinning two important battles, what would have been the result had helost them? “Everything makes me think that Austria...would like toprofit from [present] circumstances to recover her losses in recentwars….It appears...she had deployed 60,000-80,000 soldiers at Prague.”As one result he was forming a large corps at Würzburg under MarshalAugereau’s command. Asprey, pp.307-308
  • 75. at the beginning of the armistice 4 June< AUGEREAU PRAGUE at the end of the armistice 16 August
  • 76. BERLIN The Emperor appears to have formulated hisplan of action only shortly before the reopeningof the campaign. Eventually he conceived of atwo-part plan. ...the French army would begenerally divided into two wings. The larger(numbering the 200,000 men...would adopt a OUDINOTstrategic defensive based upon the Saxon capital at the beginning ofof Dresden….Dresden itself, with its great the armisticedepots and camps, formed the kingpin of the 4 Juneentire system…. The second part of the armywas entrusted to Oudinot, he was givencommand over almost 120,000 men...this forcewas intended to launch a heavy attacknorthward against Berlin and thereafter tackleBernadotte’s army. In this scheme we can detect traces of theoriginal master plan of April, as well as a DRESDENvindictive desire to see a disloyal monarch and atreacherous ex-marshal heavily punished. Chandler, p. 902 at the end of the armistice 16 August
  • 77. “[Napoleon] suddenly realized that a golden opportunity to rout theArmy of Bohemia was presenting itself. With almost all his forcesdrawn up to the south of Dresden, Schwarzenberg was exposinghis communications to a sudden blow through Königstein andPirna. op. cit, p. 904
  • 78. “If this plan was to succeed it was vital that:1) St Cyr should continue to defy and pin theAllies at Dresden until Napoleon’s master strokecould fully develop2) It was also important that Macdonald shouldsucceed in keeping Blücher fully occupied away tothe east,3) and that Oudinot should continue to dominateBernadotte to the south of Berlin. “In the event, however,complications arose on all these sectorswhich eventually ruined the plan’s implementation.” op. cit, p. 905
  • 79. Day TwoThe Allied plan for the battle on the 27th was to mass two thirds of their strength in the center,leaving generals Bianchi and Wittgenstein with approximately 25,000 apiece to hold the left andright wings respectively.
  • 80. Day TwoFor his part, Napoleon was planning a holding action in the center and a double envelopment ofthe enemy flanks...
  • 81. Day TwoFor his part, Napoleon was planning a holding action in the center and a double envelopment ofthe enemy flanks...
  • 82. Day TwoThe French attack on the right opened at six in the morning.[It] quickly drove Wittgenstein’s sodden and dispirited troopsout of the Blasewitz woods and began to bend back the right ofthe Allied line.
  • 83. Day TwoMurat was making famous progress on the other flank. Bianchiproved incapable of withstanding the fury of Marshal Victor’sattack; his line broke, and a large part of his command found…their backs to the swollen Weisseritz….As the key bridge atPlauen had already fallen into French hands, the Allied centerwas relegated to the role of helpless spectators as Bianchi’s menwere driven into the river….my midafternoon the Allied lefthad ceased to exist. Thirteen thousand prisoners fell intoFrench hands in the sector, and all the rest of Bianchi’s troopswere dead or scattered.
  • 84. Day TwoMurat was making famous progress on the other flank. Bianchiproved incapable of withstanding the fury of Marshal Victor’sattack; his line broke, and a large part of his command found…their backs to the swollen Weisseritz….As the key bridge atPlauen had already fallen into French hands, the Allied centerwas relegated to the role of helpless spectators as Bianchi’s menwere driven into the river….my midafternoon the Allied lefthad ceased to exist. Thirteen thousand prisoners fell intoFrench hands in the sector, and all the rest of Bianchi’s troopswere dead or scattered.
  • 85. Day TwoMurat was making famous progress on the other flank. Bianchiproved incapable of withstanding the fury of Marshal Victor’sattack; his line broke, and a large part of his command found…their backs to the swollen Weisseritz….As the key bridge atPlauen had already fallen into French hands, the Allied centerwas relegated to the role of helpless spectators as Bianchi’s menwere driven into the river….my midafternoon the Allied lefthad ceased to exist. Thirteen thousand prisoners fell intoFrench hands in the sector, and all the rest of Bianchi’s troopswere dead or scattered.
  • 86. Day Two However, the battle in the center was not going so well for the severely outnumbered St. Cyr and Marmont. Three assaults failed...and when Napoleon rode back to Dresden at 4:00 P.M. he fully anticipated a third day’s fighting on the morrow.
  • 87. Day TwoThe Allied commanders, however, hadexperienced enough….a cannonballnarrowly missed the Tsar Alexander, andthis narrow escape dampened what littleardor the Allied high command could stillmuster….Accordingly, orders were issuedfor an overnight retreat toward Bohemia.
  • 88. Day TwoOver the two days’ fighting the Allies hadlost some 38,000 men; the French hademerged lightly with barely 10,000casualties. It appeared that the legend ofFrench invincibility had been fully re-established. Chandler, pp. 910-911
  • 89. Victory at Dresden, but…Early on the 28th , French patrols had found nothing at Dresden but a handful ofrear guards facing them. Napoleon had at once set about organizing a pursuit; ifonly Vandamme could reach Teplitz ahead of the enemy, the Army of Bohemiawould be hopelessly trapped amid the mountains. However the Emperor was farfrom well; furthermore, distressing details of Oudinot’s failure against Bülow onthe 23rd had now reached headquarters. No sooner had these been assimilatedthan news of another blow arrived. In complete disobedience of his orders, itappeared that Macdonald had rashly pushed ahead over the Katzbach[River]pursuing Blücher…. By the end of the 26th , Macdonald’s army hadsuffered a severe and costly defeat (losing 15,000 prisoners and 100 cannon)completely reversing the strategic situation…. Napoleon’s success at Dresdenwas already being overshadowed by the failures of his subordinates on othersectors. His mind filled with the need to devise new measures to offset thesesetbacks, Napoleon returned to Dresden on the afternoon of the 28th , leaving thepursuit of Schwarzenberg to his underlings.
  • 90. After the Battle of Dresden and Situationof 30 August During Battle of Kulm
  • 91. “In the absence of the master, the French pursuit of the various columns of the Allied army proceeded with fair élan but insufficient coordination. As a result Vandamme’s corps became increasingly isolated….falling back toward Kulm. Here on the 30th , he suddenly...found himself beset from the rear….with only 32,000 troops...to oppose 54,000 Allies...although over half his men escaped the commander of 1st Corps and 13,000 of his troops fell into Allied hands…. Chandler, p.912After the Battle of Dresden and Situationof 30 August During Battle of Kulm
  • 92. “In the absence of the master, the French pursuit of the various columns of the Allied army proceeded with fair élan but insufficient coordination. As a result Vandamme’s corps became increasingly isolated….falling back toward Kulm. Here on the 30th , he suddenly...found himself beset from the rear….with only 32,000 troops...to oppose 54,000 Allies...although over half his men escaped the commander of 1st Corps and 13,000 of his troops fell into Allied hands…. Chandler, p.912 KULMAfter the Battle of Dresden and Situationof 30 August During Battle of Kulm
  • 93. OUDINOT MACDONALD Situation Evening of 30 Aug 1813 After Vandamme’s defeat at Kulm
  • 94. In the Allied camp, of course, there was much rejoicing fraught with heartfeltrelief….Thus Dresden joined Lützen and Bautzen on the growing list ofpractically valueless French victories. Chandler, p.912 OUDINOT MACDONALD Situation Evening of 30 Aug 1813 After Vandamme’s defeat at Kulm
  • 95. The Trachtenberg Plan was concocted by Allied commanders [at this point]. The planadvocated avoiding direct engagement with the French emperor, Napoleon I. This resultedfrom fear of the Emperors now legendary prowess in battle. Consequently the Alliesplanned to engage and defeat the French Marshals and Generals separately, and thusweaken his army while they built up an overwhelming force even he could not defeat. It wasdecided upon after a series of defeats and near disasters by the Coalition at Napoleonshands at the battles of Lützen, Bautzen and Dresden. The plan ultimately worked and at theBattle of Leipzig, where the Allies had a considerable numerical advantage, the Emperorwas soundly defeated and driven out of Germany, across the Rhine back into France itself.The plan was the work of the Austrian chief of staff of the allied coalition, Radetzky.* Wikipedia* In whose honor the Radetzky March was named. It will become the military theme song of 19th century Austria.
  • 96. More generally, like Hitler’s from December 1941, Napoleon’s inherentweaknesses had become more apparent from mid-1813, once he facedunited opposition in the Sixth Coalition, and the Formation of the SeventhCoalition in 1815 was part of this process. Indeed, war followed politics.Once Austria, Prussia, Russia and Britain cooperated effectively, as theydid from 1813, Napoleon was rapidly defeated, although his owninappropriate and indifferently executed strategy in 1813 contributedgreatly to the defeat. The Waterloo campaign was a reprise of the situationin 1813-1814, Napoleon’s assumption that a military victory could translateinto political success was seriously flawed. It reflected a failure tounderstand the general European context as well as the limitations ofFrench resources and will. Black, The Battle of Waterloo, p. 152