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"Great October Socialist Revolution" or Bolshevik coup?

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From April, 1917 to March, 1918, Lenin engineers the overthrow of "bourgeois democracy" and constitutionalism in Russia.

From April, 1917 to March, 1918, Lenin engineers the overthrow of "bourgeois democracy" and constitutionalism in Russia.

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  • 1. The Russian Revolution 1815-1924 Great October; April, 1917-January, 1918 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 2. Major Topics • Introduction: The Hero in History • The Sealed Train • July Days • Kornilov • Great October Socialist Revolution • Land! Peace! Bread! • The Death of Constitutionalism Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 3. Sidney Hook. The Hero in History. 1940 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 4. The Soviet Holy Trinity Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 5. The Word Made Flesh Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 6. “Christ has died, Christ is risen…” Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 7. “Christ has died, Christ is risen…” LENIN- LIVED, LENIN- LIVES, LENIN- SHALL LIVE! Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 8. “Great Men” versus “Blind Forces” Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 9. “Great Men” versus “Blind Forces” •April Theses Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 10. “Great Men” versus “Blind Forces” •April Theses • July Days Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 11. “Great Men” versus “Blind Forces” •April Theses • July Days •Red October Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 12. “Great Men” versus “Blind Forces” •April Theses • July Days •Red October •Brest-Litovsk Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 13. One need not believe that history is made by “great men” to appreciate the immense importance of Lenin for the Russian Revolution and the regime that emerged from it...the regime that he established in October 1917 institutionalized, as it were, his personality….Communist Russia, therefore, was throughout its seventy-four years to an unusual extent the embodiment of the mind and psyche of one man… Pipes, p. 101 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 14. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 15. THE PARTY MIND, HONOR & CONSCIENCE OF OUR EPOCH Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 16. The Sealed Train Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 17. The locomotive which brought the The Sealed Train “Bolshevik bacillus” across Germany Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 18. 1920 photo of Lenin’s Zurich tenement Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 19. 1920 photo of Lenin’s Zurich tenement Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 20. Lenin Hits Bottom The war years were for Lenin and Krupskaya a time of severe trials, a time of poverty and isolation from Russia. They lived in quarters that bordered on slums, took their meals in the company of prostitutes and criminals, and found themselves abandoned by many past followers who had come to regard Lenin as a dangerous fanatic. The only shaft of light for Lenin during this dark period was his love affair with Inessa Armand, the daughter of two music hall artists and the wife of a wealthy Russian. She had met Lenin in Paris in 1910 and soon became his mistress under the tolerant eye of Krupskaya. Armand seems to have been the only human being with whom Lenin ever established true intimacy. Pipes, p. 112 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 21. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
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  • 25. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 26. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 27. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
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  • 29. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 30. For all his talk of civil war, Lenin had little faith in the imminence of revolution. Addressing a gathering of socialist youths in Zurich on January of 9/22 1917, he predicted that while Europe would not escape social upheaval, “we old-timers perhaps shall not live [to see] the decisive battles of the looming revolution.” Seven weeks later, tsarism collapsed. Pipes, p. 113 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 31. “There is a tide... Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 32. “There is a tide... There is a tide in the affairs of men Which taken at the flood, leads on to fortune; Omitted, all the voyage of their life Is bound in shallows and in miseries. Julius Cæsar. Act i. Sc. 3.  Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 33. The Parvus Puzzle • born in the shtetl Berezino, raised in Odessa, began associating with The Bund • 1886-age 19, fled the pogroms to Zurich • 1891-PhD in philosophy, Marxist, emigrated to Germany, joined the SPD, befriended fellow emigreRosa Luxemburg • 1900-meets Lenin in Munich, encourages the publication of Iskra • 1904-predicts Russia would lose the war with Japan, German intelligence recruits him to work against Imperial Russia born Israel Lazarevich Gelfand ( Израиль Лазаревич Гельфанд) 1867-1924 • 1905-arrives in Skt-Peterburg with false papers, tries Revolutionary nom de guerre to engineer financial collapse, exiled to Siberia PARVUS Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 34. The Strategy of “Permanent Revolution” The final act of the 1905 Revolution was played out in Moscow. On December 6, the Moscow Soviet, dominated by the Bolsheviks, called for an armed uprising to overthrow the tsarist government, convene a Constituent Assembly, and proclaim a democratic republic. The strategy behind this action, which came to be known as one of “permanent revolution,” was formulated by Alexander Helphand …. Parvus argued that socialists should not allow the first stage of the Revolution to solidify “bourgeois” rule but proceed at once to the next, socialist phase. Witte ruthlessly crushed the Moscow uprising…. Pipes, pp. 43-44 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 35. Does Parvus finance Lenin’s return? • 1906-all three Siberian prisoners, pictured here, escaped to the West; Parvus to Germany, Trotsky to NYC • Parvus arranges to produce Maxim Gorky’s play, The Lower Depths, with profits divided between Gorky & the RSDLP. He is accused of pocketing the proceeds • during the Balkan wars he is an agent for Germany in Istanbul. He also Parvus (left) with fellow Siberian exiles, profits as an arms merchant for Krupp Lev Bronstein (Trotsky) & Lev Deich & Vickers Ltd (Leo Deutch) a Menshevik leader • 1915-he convinces German intelligence to support the Russian emigres Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 36. The support that nearly all European socialist parties gave their national governments at the outbreak of war unquestionably betrayed their solemn [pacifist] pledges...provoked a crisis within the international socialist movement…. [There was a] pro-war majority against a minority with strong Russian representation, which demanded an instant suspension of hostilities. Lenin headed the extreme wing of that minority in that instead of calling for immediate peace, he insisted that the war between nations be transformed into a war between classes [even though civil war at home entailed military defeat by Germany]. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 37. Lenin’s anti-Russian propaganda, his open endorsement of Russia’s defeat, attracted the attention of the German government. One of its experts on Russian affairs was Alexander Helphand-Parvus….After the outbreak of the war, he argued that the interests of Russian revolutionaries and those of the German government coincided….In 1915 he contacted Lenin in Zurich, but at that point Lenin rejected his advances. [Lenin] agreed, however, in return for financial help, to supply another German agent...with reports on internal conditions in Russia sent to him by his followers there. These activities, as well as his relations with the Austrian government, constituted high treason and Lenin maintained about them to the end of his life complete silence. They only came to light after German and Austrian archives were thrown open. Pipes, p.111 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 38. [In 1917, after the February Revolution] the principal proponent of the “Lenin card” was Parvus….With extraordinary foresight he predicted that once Lenin returned home he would topple the Provisional Government, take charge, and conclude a separate peace. He understood Lenin’s lust for power… At 3:20 p.m. on March 27/April 9, thirty-two Russian émigrés left the Zurich railway station for the German frontier. Among the passengers were Lenin, Krupskaya, Grigorii Zinoviev with his wife and child, and Inessa Armand…. In Stockholm, Parvus awaited them. He asked to meet Lenin, but Lenin refused, turning him over to Karl Radek …it is virtually certain that the two worked out the terms of German support for the Bolsheviks. Pipes, pp. 115-117 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 39. Swiss Communist Fritz Platten, 1883-1942 • after the collapse of the Second International he joined the Zimmerwald Movement and became a communist • he was most famous for arranging the trip in the sealed train from Zurich to Stettin, thence by ferry to neutral Stockholm • 1919-Platten was active in the foundation Third (Communist) International and spent time in the USSR representing the Swiss CP Lenin and Platten in 1919 • 1938-arrested in the Stalinist purges, sent to a camp where he was shot in 1942 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 40. The Route of the “Sealed Train” Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 41. The Route of the “Sealed Train” • the trip in the sealed train from Zurich to Stettin,  • thence by ferry to neutral Stockholm  • Swedish communists then arranged the train trip north to the Swedish-Finland border  • through Russian Finland  • to the Finland Station in Petrograd Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 42. The Finland Station Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 43. The Finland Station Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 44. The Finland Station Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 45. The Finland Station Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 46. The Finland Station Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 47. The Finland Station Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 48. Lenin reads the April Theses 4 April 1917 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 49. The April Theses Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 50. The April Theses The April Theses were published in the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda and read by Lenin at two meetings of the All-Russia Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, on April 4, 1917. In the Theses, Lenin: Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 51. The April Theses The April Theses were published in the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda and read by Lenin at two meetings of the All-Russia Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, on April 4, 1917. In the Theses, Lenin: ■ Condemns the Provisional Government as bourgeois and urges "no support" for it, as "the utter falsity of all its promises should be made clear." He condemns World War I as a "predatory imperialist war" and the "revolutionary defensism" of foreign communist parties, calling for revolutionary defeatism. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 52. The April Theses The April Theses were published in the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda and read by Lenin at two meetings of the All-Russia Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, on April 4, 1917. In the Theses, Lenin: ■ Condemns the Provisional Government as bourgeois and urges "no support" for it, as "the utter falsity of all its promises should be made clear." He condemns World War I as a "predatory imperialist war" and the "revolutionary defensism" of foreign communist parties, calling for revolutionary defeatism. ■ Asserts that Russia is "passing from the first [bourgeois] stage of the revolution —which, owing to the insufficient class consciousness and organization of the proletariat, placed power in the hands of the bourgeoisie—to its second stage, which must place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest sections of the peasants"; Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 53. The April Theses The April Theses were published in the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda and read by Lenin at two meetings of the All-Russia Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, on April 4, 1917. In the Theses, Lenin: ■ Condemns the Provisional Government as bourgeois and urges "no support" for it, as "the utter falsity of all its promises should be made clear." He condemns World War I as a "predatory imperialist war" and the "revolutionary defensism" of foreign communist parties, calling for revolutionary defeatism. ■ Asserts that Russia is "passing from the first [bourgeois] stage of the revolution —which, owing to the insufficient class consciousness and organization of the proletariat, placed power in the hands of the bourgeoisie—to its second stage, which must place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest sections of the peasants"; ■ Recognizes that the Bolsheviks are a minority in most of the soviets against a "bloc of all the petty-bourgeois opportunist elements, from the Popular Socialists and the Socialist Revolutionaries down to the Organizing Committee (Chkheidze, Tsereteli, etc.), Steklov, etc., etc., who have yielded to the influence of the bourgeoisie and spread that influence among the proletariat." Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 54. The April Theses The April Theses were published in the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda and read by Lenin at two meetings of the All-Russia Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, on April 4, 1917. In the Theses, Lenin: ■ Condemns the Provisional Government as bourgeois and urges "no support" for it, as "the utter falsity of all its promises should be made clear." He condemns World War I as a "predatory imperialist war" and the "revolutionary defensism" of foreign communist parties, calling for revolutionary defeatism. ■ Asserts that Russia is "passing from the first [bourgeois] stage of the revolution —which, owing to the insufficient class consciousness and organization of the proletariat, placed power in the hands of the bourgeoisie—to its second stage, which must place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest sections of the peasants"; ■ Recognizes that the Bolsheviks are a minority in most of the soviets against a "bloc of all the petty-bourgeois opportunist elements, from the Popular Socialists and the Socialist Revolutionaries down to the Organizing Committee (Chkheidze, Tsereteli, etc.), Steklov, etc., etc., who have yielded to the influence of the bourgeoisie and spread that influence among the proletariat." ■ Condemns the establishment of a parliamentary republic. He calls this a "retrograde step." He instead calls for "a republic of Soviets of Workers', Agricultural Laborers' and Peasants' Deputies throughout the country, from top to bottom." [ALL POWER TO THE SOVIETS, JBP] Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 55. The April Theses The April Theses were published in the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda and read by Lenin at two meetings of the All-Russia Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, on April 4, 1917. In the Theses, Lenin: ■ Condemns the Provisional Government as bourgeois and urges "no support" for it, as "the utter falsity of all its promises should be made clear." He condemns World War I as a "predatory imperialist war" and the "revolutionary defensism" of foreign communist parties, calling for revolutionary defeatism. ■ Asserts that Russia is "passing from the first [bourgeois] stage of the revolution —which, owing to the insufficient class consciousness and organization of the proletariat, placed power in the hands of the bourgeoisie—to its second stage, which must place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest sections of the peasants"; ■ Recognizes that the Bolsheviks are a minority in most of the soviets against a "bloc of all the petty-bourgeois opportunist elements, from the Popular Socialists and the Socialist Revolutionaries down to the Organizing Committee (Chkheidze, Tsereteli, etc.), Steklov, etc., etc., who have yielded to the influence of the bourgeoisie and spread that influence among the proletariat." ■ Condemns the establishment of a parliamentary republic. He calls this a "retrograde step." He instead calls for "a republic of Soviets of Workers', Agricultural Laborers' and Peasants' Deputies throughout the country, from top to bottom." [ALL POWER TO THE SOVIETS, JBP] ■ Calls for "abolition of the police, the army, and the bureaucracy" and for "the salaries of all officials, all of whom are elective and displaceable at any time, not to exceed the average wage of a competent worker." Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 56. The April Theses Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 57. The April Theses Calls for "The weight of emphasis in the agrarian program to be shifted to the Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' Deputies," confiscation of all landed estates," and "nationalization of all lands in the country, the land to be disposed of by the local Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' and Peasants' Deputies. The organization of separate Soviets of Deputies of Poor Peasants. The setting up of a model farm on each of the large estates (ranging in size from 100 to 300 dessiatines, according to local and other conditions, and to the decisions of the local bodies) under the control of the Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' Deputies and for the public account." Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 58. The April Theses Calls for "The weight of emphasis in the agrarian program to be shifted to the Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' Deputies," confiscation of all landed estates," and "nationalization of all lands in the country, the land to be disposed of by the local Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' and Peasants' Deputies. The organization of separate Soviets of Deputies of Poor Peasants. The setting up of a model farm on each of the large estates (ranging in size from 100 to 300 dessiatines, according to local and other conditions, and to the decisions of the local bodies) under the control of the Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' Deputies and for the public account." ■ Calls for "the immediate union of all banks in the country into a single national bank, and the institution of control over it by the Soviet of Workers' Deputies." Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 59. The April Theses Calls for "The weight of emphasis in the agrarian program to be shifted to the Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' Deputies," confiscation of all landed estates," and "nationalization of all lands in the country, the land to be disposed of by the local Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' and Peasants' Deputies. The organization of separate Soviets of Deputies of Poor Peasants. The setting up of a model farm on each of the large estates (ranging in size from 100 to 300 dessiatines, according to local and other conditions, and to the decisions of the local bodies) under the control of the Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' Deputies and for the public account." ■ Calls for "the immediate union of all banks in the country into a single national bank, and the institution of control over it by the Soviet of Workers' Deputies." ■ States that "it is not our immediate task to 'introduce' socialism, but only to bring social production and the distribution of products at once under the control of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies." Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 60. The April Theses Calls for "The weight of emphasis in the agrarian program to be shifted to the Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' Deputies," confiscation of all landed estates," and "nationalization of all lands in the country, the land to be disposed of by the local Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' and Peasants' Deputies. The organization of separate Soviets of Deputies of Poor Peasants. The setting up of a model farm on each of the large estates (ranging in size from 100 to 300 dessiatines, according to local and other conditions, and to the decisions of the local bodies) under the control of the Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' Deputies and for the public account." ■ Calls for "the immediate union of all banks in the country into a single national bank, and the institution of control over it by the Soviet of Workers' Deputies." ■ States that "it is not our immediate task to 'introduce' socialism, but only to bring social production and the distribution of products at once under the control of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies." ■ Lists "party tasks" as "Immediate convocation of a party congress," "alteration of the party program, mainly: (1) On the question of imperialism and the imperialist war, (2) On our attitude towards the state and our demand for a "commune state," amendment of our out-of-date minimum program," and change of the Party's name." Lenin notes that "instead of "Social Democracy," whose official leaders throughout the world have betrayed socialism and deserted to the bourgeoisie (the 'defencists' and the vacillating 'Kautskyites'), we must call ourselves the Communist Party." The name change would dissociate the Bolsheviks from the social democratic parties of Europe supporting participation of their nation in World War I. Lenin first developed this point in his 1915 pamphlet "Socialism and War," when he first called the pro-war social-democrats "social chauvinists." Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 61. The April Theses Calls for "The weight of emphasis in the agrarian program to be shifted to the Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' Deputies," confiscation of all landed estates," and "nationalization of all lands in the country, the land to be disposed of by the local Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' and Peasants' Deputies. The organization of separate Soviets of Deputies of Poor Peasants. The setting up of a model farm on each of the large estates (ranging in size from 100 to 300 dessiatines, according to local and other conditions, and to the decisions of the local bodies) under the control of the Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' Deputies and for the public account." ■ Calls for "the immediate union of all banks in the country into a single national bank, and the institution of control over it by the Soviet of Workers' Deputies." ■ States that "it is not our immediate task to 'introduce' socialism, but only to bring social production and the distribution of products at once under the control of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies." ■ Lists "party tasks" as "Immediate convocation of a party congress," "alteration of the party program, mainly: (1) On the question of imperialism and the imperialist war, (2) On our attitude towards the state and our demand for a "commune state," amendment of our out-of-date minimum program," and change of the Party's name." Lenin notes that "instead of "Social Democracy," whose official leaders throughout the world have betrayed socialism and deserted to the bourgeoisie (the 'defencists' and the vacillating 'Kautskyites'), we must call ourselves the Communist Party." The name change would dissociate the Bolsheviks from the social democratic parties of Europe supporting participation of their nation in World War I. Lenin first developed this point in his 1915 pamphlet "Socialism and War," when he first called the pro-war social-democrats "social chauvinists." ■ Calls for a new "revolutionary International, an International against the social-chauvinists and against the 'Center.'" This later became the Comintern (Third International) formed in 1919. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 62. April Riots  Coalition Government Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 63. April Riots  Coalition Government • a disagreement over war aims developed between the government and the Petrograd Soviet Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 64. April Riots  Coalition Government • a disagreement over war aims developed between the government and the Petrograd Soviet • the Soviet wanted war till victory but “without annexations and indemnities” Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 65. April Riots  Coalition Government • a disagreement over war aims developed between the government and the Petrograd Soviet • the Soviet wanted war till victory but “without annexations and indemnities” • Foreign Minister Miliukov still wanted the promised Turkish Straits and Constantinople Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 66. April Riots  Coalition Government • a disagreement over war aims developed between the government and the Petrograd Soviet • the Soviet wanted war till victory but “without annexations and indemnities” • Foreign Minister Miliukov still wanted the promised Turkish Straits and Constantinople • this led to street demonstrations by the soldiers brought out by radical junior officers which the Bolsheviks joined Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 67. April Riots  Coalition Government • a disagreement over war aims developed between the government and the Petrograd Soviet • the Soviet wanted war till victory but “without annexations and indemnities” • Foreign Minister Miliukov still wanted the promised Turkish Straits and Constantinople • this led to street demonstrations by the soldiers brought out by radical junior officers which the Bolsheviks joined • in this first crisis the government appealed to the socialists in the Soviet to enter a coalition Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 68. April Riots  Coalition Government • a disagreement over war aims developed between the government and the Petrograd Soviet • the Soviet wanted war till victory but “without annexations and indemnities” • Foreign Minister Miliukov still wanted the promised Turkish Straits and Constantinople • this led to street demonstrations by the soldiers brought out by radical junior officers which the Bolsheviks joined • in this first crisis the government appealed to the socialists in the Soviet to enter a coalition • Miliukov and Guchkov were out, six socialists from the Soviet accepted ministries, and Kerensky [the only SR] became War Minister Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 69. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 70. By entering the “bourgeois” government, the socialists automatically came to share the blame for everything that went wrong, for they were now part of the establishment. This allowed the Bolsheviks, who refused to join, to pose as...the tr ue custodians of the Revolution. And since under the hopelessly incompetent administration of liberal and socialist intellectuals events were bound to go from bad to worse, they positioned themselves as the only party able to save Russia. Pipes, p. 120 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 71. Delegates to the First All-Russian Session of Workers and Soldiers Deputies photographed in the Tauride Palace, former home of the Duma, June, 1917 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 72. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 73. Street demonstration in Petrograd, June, 1917 The banner in the foreground reads: Down with the 10 capitalist ministers/All power to the Soviets of Workers, Soldiers and Peasants Deputies & to the Socialist Ministers/ We demand that Nicholas II be transferred to Peter and Paul Fortress Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 74. July Days Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 75. July Days Petrograd, July 4, 1917. Street demonstration on Nevsky Prospekt just after troops of the Provisional Government have opened fire with machine guns. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 76. Bolshevik Advantages over their Rivals Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 77. Bolshevik Advantages over their Rivals 1. their pose as the “sole alternative” to the Provisional Government Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 78. Bolshevik Advantages over their Rivals 1. their pose as the “sole alternative” to the Provisional Government 2. unlike the SRs and the Mensheviks who talked revolution, but then pulled back: Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 79. Bolshevik Advantages over their Rivals 1. their pose as the “sole alternative” to the Provisional Government 2. unlike the SRs and the Mensheviks who talked revolution, but then pulled back: • they were really willing to use force, and Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 80. Bolshevik Advantages over their Rivals 1. their pose as the “sole alternative” to the Provisional Government 2. unlike the SRs and the Mensheviks who talked revolution, but then pulled back: • they were really willing to use force, and • they had a unique paramilitary organization able to do so Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 81. Bolshevik Advantages over their Rivals 1. their pose as the “sole alternative” to the Provisional Government 2. unlike the SRs and the Mensheviks who talked revolution, but then pulled back: • they were really willing to use force, and • they had a unique paramilitary organization able to do so 3. they thought in global terms and didn’t much care what happened to Russia, for them a mere stepping-stone to the World Revolution Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 82. Bolshevik Advantages over their Rivals 1. their pose as the “sole alternative” to the Provisional Government 2. unlike the SRs and the Mensheviks who talked revolution, but then pulled back: • they were really willing to use force, and • they had a unique paramilitary organization able to do so 3. they thought in global terms and didn’t much care what happened to Russia, for them a mere stepping-stone to the World Revolution • they could act with complete irresponsibility Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 83. Bolshevik Advantages over their Rivals 1. their pose as the “sole alternative” to the Provisional Government 2. unlike the SRs and the Mensheviks who talked revolution, but then pulled back: • they were really willing to use force, and • they had a unique paramilitary organization able to do so 3. they thought in global terms and didn’t much care what happened to Russia, for them a mere stepping-stone to the World Revolution • they could act with complete irresponsibility • promise every group what it wanted Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 84. Bolshevik Advantages over their Rivals 1. their pose as the “sole alternative” to the Provisional Government 2. unlike the SRs and the Mensheviks who talked revolution, but then pulled back: • they were really willing to use force, and • they had a unique paramilitary organization able to do so 3. they thought in global terms and didn’t much care what happened to Russia, for them a mere stepping-stone to the World Revolution • they could act with complete irresponsibility • promise every group what it wanted • encourage every destructive trend Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 85. RED GUARD [of the] The banner reads: photo from 1917 factory Vulcan II. GR. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 86. Red Guard bodyguards for Bolshevik Nachalstvo (leadership) Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 87. The Other Bolshevik Tool Pravda (Truth) financed by the German government Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 88. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 89. The antiwar propaganda was carried out in muted tones, for the troops hated the Germans and Lenin was already under suspicion of being their a gent. Bolshevik newspapers distributed in vast quantities to the men in uniform carried a subtile message that was propagandistic rather than agitational in nature:* The soldiers were not to lay down their arms, but ponder who wanted war and to what end? (The answer: the “bourgeoisie”) This was a veiled appeal for civil war. The troops were exhorted under no circumstances to let themselves be used against the workers (by which was meant the Bolshevik Party). Pipes, pp. 120-21 ________________ *In the vocabulary of the Russian Revolutionaries, “agitation” meant an appeal to immediate action, whereas “propaganda” called for planting ideas in subjects’ minds which in due course would move them to act on their own Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 90. Kerensky as Warlord • an offensive was scheduled for mid-June • Kerensky’s personal contribution consisted in rousing the troops with patriotic speeches • these had an enormous immediate effect which evaporated as soon as he left • the generals regarded such rhetoric sceptically, dubbing the Minister “Persuader in Chief ” • the will to fight was no longer there • “Why should I die now when at home a new, freer life is only beginning?” Saluting in the carriage as troops pass in review Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 91. Kerensky visiting troops at the front, 1917 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 92. In Petrograd with his aides-de-camp Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 93. In Petrograd with his aides-de-camp Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 94. The Failed Kerensky Offensive Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 95. The Failed Kerensky Offensive • 16 June-the offensive opens against Lwow and Galicia--the Austrians Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 96. The Failed Kerensky Offensive • 16 June-the offensive opens against Lwow and Galicia--the Austrians • the Eighth Army under Kornilov makes good initial gains () Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 97. The Failed Kerensky Offensive • 16 June-the offensive opens against Lwow and Galicia--the Austrians • the Eighth Army under Kornilov makes good initial gains () • once again, the Germans come to the aid of their weaker ally () Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 98. The Failed Kerensky Offensive • 16 June-the offensive opens against Lwow and Galicia--the Austrians • the Eighth Army under Kornilov makes good initial gains () • once again, the Germans come to the aid of their weaker ally () • the Russian gains were erased and they fell back to the dotted line positions Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 99. The Failed Kerensky Offensive • 16 June-the offensive opens against Lwow and Galicia--the Austrians • the Eighth Army under Kornilov makes good initial gains () • once again, the Germans come to the aid of their weaker ally () • the Russian gains were erased and they fell back to the dotted line positions • the June offensive was the dying gasp of the Russian army Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 100. The Failed Kerensky Offensive • 16 June-the offensive opens against Lwow and Galicia--the Austrians • the Eighth Army under Kornilov makes good initial gains () • once again, the Germans come to the aid of their weaker ally () • the Russian gains were erased and they fell back to the dotted line positions • the June offensive was the dying gasp of the Russian army • this military failure weakened the reputation of Kerensky and his government Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 101. The July Uprising Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 102. The July Uprising • 2 July--as news from the front turned negative, four Kadet ministers resigned from the Provisional (Coalition) Government over another issue Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 103. The July Uprising • 2 July--as news from the front turned negative, four Kadet ministers resigned from the Provisional (Coalition) Government over another issue • neither the Soviet nor the Bolsheviks wanted an uprising, correctly assessing that “the correlation of forces” didn’t bode well Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 104. The July Uprising • 2 July--as news from the front turned negative, four Kadet ministers resigned from the Provisional (Coalition) Government over another issue • neither the Soviet nor the Bolsheviks wanted an uprising, correctly assessing that “the correlation of forces” didn’t bode well • 3 July--nevertheless, when the government ordered forty-year-old soldiers who had been furloughed to work their farms back to the front, military demonstrations erupted Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 105. The July Uprising • 2 July--as news from the front turned negative, four Kadet ministers resigned from the Provisional (Coalition) Government over another issue • neither the Soviet nor the Bolsheviks wanted an uprising, correctly assessing that “the correlation of forces” didn’t bode well • 3 July--nevertheless, when the government ordered forty-year-old soldiers who had been furloughed to work their farms back to the front, military demonstrations erupted • 4 July--20,ooo Kronstadt sailors joined the soldiers. They marched on both the government and the Soviet demanding that the latter assume all power Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 106. The July Uprising • 2 July--as news from the front turned negative, four Kadet ministers resigned from the Provisional (Coalition) Government over another issue • neither the Soviet nor the Bolsheviks wanted an uprising, correctly assessing that “the correlation of forces” didn’t bode well • 3 July--nevertheless, when the government ordered forty-year-old soldiers who had been furloughed to work their farms back to the front, military demonstrations erupted • 4 July--20,ooo Kronstadt sailors joined the soldiers. They marched on both the government and the Soviet demanding that the latter assume all power • 5 July--the turning point Kerensky releases “forged” (were they?) documents connecting the Bolsheviks to their German paymasters Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 107. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 108. Kronstadt Sailors SMERT BOORZHOOYAM (Death to the Bourgeoisie) Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 109. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 110. Lenin’s Role? • 4 July--originally out of Petrograd in Finland, Lenin returned hastily and addressed the demonstrators outside the Tauride Palace • he counseled a peaceful demonstration but echoed their demand (originally his!) of “All Power to the Soviets” • had he planned a coup as Lunacharsky later claimed? • did he “chicken out” when he saw an unfavorable “correlation of forces” as Pipes claims (p. 127)? • was he instrumental in persuading the Bolshevik Central Committee to take a leadership role in the uprising even though it was doomed to fail and the party would be hunted down and suppressed in the aftermath? (the official Soviet history and Sidney Hook’s version) Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 111. Wiki’s “take” No public record was ever made of the internal debates of the Bolshevik Party around the July Days. There were some within the Bolshevik Party who advocated an intensification of activity on July 4th. Most prominent among those were Nikolai Podvoisky and Vladimir Nevsky, leaders of the Bolshevik Military Organization, Volodarsky a member of the Petersburg Committee and Martin Latis of the Vyborg District Bolshevik Organization, who was highly critical of the Central Committee's decision to hold back the masses. Others in the Bolshevik Party, including V.I. Lenin were split on what to do. On July 5th at two or three o'clock in the morning, after the Provisional Government dispatched a number of loyal troops from the front to the streets of Petrograd and won the support of a number of previously neutral garrisons of troops, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party decided to call off the street demonstrations. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 112. Bolsheviks on the run Lenin with a wig, as a fugitive in Finland Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 113. Bolsheviks on the run • with the arrival of loyal troops from the front Kerensky is in control Lenin with a wig, as a fugitive in Finland Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 114. Bolsheviks on the run • with the arrival of loyal troops from the front Kerensky is in control • he hunts down and arrests the Bolsheviks Lenin with a wig, as a fugitive in Finland Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 115. Bolsheviks on the run • with the arrival of loyal troops from the front Kerensky is in control • he hunts down and arrests the Bolsheviks • 25 July--Lvov resigns, Kerensky becomes Premier and keeps military command Lenin with a wig, as a fugitive in Finland Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 116. Bolsheviks on the run • with the arrival of loyal troops from the front Kerensky is in control • he hunts down and arrests the Bolsheviks • 25 July--Lvov resigns, Kerensky becomes Premier and keeps military command • the Kadets return to the government and it seems to be firmly in control Lenin with a wig, as a fugitive in Finland Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 117. Bolsheviks on the run • with the arrival of loyal troops from the front Kerensky is in control • he hunts down and arrests the Bolsheviks • 25 July--Lvov resigns, Kerensky becomes Premier and keeps military command • the Kadets return to the government and it seems to be firmly in control • despite these events, Kerensky fears a right- wing, monarchist coup more than a repetition of a Bolshevik putsch Lenin with a wig, as a fugitive in Finland Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 118. Bolsheviks on the run • with the arrival of loyal troops from the front Kerensky is in control • he hunts down and arrests the Bolsheviks • 25 July--Lvov resigns, Kerensky becomes Premier and keeps military command • the Kadets return to the government and it seems to be firmly in control • despite these events, Kerensky fears a right- wing, monarchist coup more than a repetition of a Bolshevik putsch Lenin with a wig, as a fugitive in Finland • Lenin takes this time in hiding to finish his “blueprint,” State and Revolution Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 119. Bolsheviks on the run • with the arrival of loyal troops from the front Kerensky is in control • he hunts down and arrests the Bolsheviks • 25 July--Lvov resigns, Kerensky becomes Premier and keeps military command • the Kadets return to the government and it seems to be firmly in control • despite these events, Kerensky fears a right- wing, monarchist coup more than a repetition of a Bolshevik putsch Lenin with a wig, as a fugitive in Finland • Lenin takes this time in hiding to finish his “blueprint,” State and Revolution Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 120. State and Revolution, Aug,1917 & 1918 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 121. State and Revolution, Aug,1917 & 1918 • the key concept is that the “bourgeois state” (Provisional Government) must be “shattered, broken to pieces” Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 122. State and Revolution, Aug,1917 & 1918 • the key concept is that the “bourgeois state” (Provisional Government) must be “shattered, broken to pieces” • quoting Marx--the state is “the instrument of class oppression” and its bureaucracy, police and standing army must be “broken up” (zerbrechen) and replaced by “the dictatorship of the proletariat” (Marx’s stage 2 in The Critique of the Gotha Program) Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 123. State and Revolution, Aug,1917 & 1918 • the key concept is that the “bourgeois state” (Provisional Government) must be “shattered, broken to pieces” • quoting Marx--the state is “the instrument of class oppression” and its bureaucracy, police and standing army must be “broken up” (zerbrechen) and replaced by “the dictatorship of the proletariat” (Marx’s stage 2 in The Critique of the Gotha Program) • only thus can the state begin to “wither away” (stage 3) Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 124. State and Revolution, Aug,1917 & 1918 • the key concept is that the “bourgeois state” (Provisional Government) must be “shattered, broken to pieces” • quoting Marx--the state is “the instrument of class oppression” and its bureaucracy, police and standing army must be “broken up” (zerbrechen) and replaced by “the dictatorship of the proletariat” (Marx’s stage 2 in The Critique of the Gotha Program) • only thus can the state begin to “wither away” (stage 3) • in place of ministers and bureaucrats, the stage 2 “dictatorship” will employ “managers and bookkeepers” paid “workmen’s wages” Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 125. State and Revolution, Aug,1917 & 1918 • the key concept is that the “bourgeois state” (Provisional Government) must be “shattered, broken to pieces” • quoting Marx--the state is “the instrument of class oppression” and its bureaucracy, police and standing army must be “broken up” (zerbrechen) and replaced by “the dictatorship of the proletariat” (Marx’s stage 2 in The Critique of the Gotha Program) • only thus can the state begin to “wither away” (stage 3) • in place of ministers and bureaucrats, the stage 2 “dictatorship” will employ “managers and bookkeepers” paid “workmen’s wages” • much of Lenin’s argument is to point out the errors of the Social- Democrats like Germany’s Karl Kautsky and Russian SR, Viktor Chernov Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 126. “With Lenin in hiding, the command of the Bolshevik forces passes to his associates.” (Pipes, p. 128) Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 127. “With Lenin in hiding, the command of the Bolshevik forces passes to his associates.” (Pipes, p. 128) • Trotsky is the most visible, owing to his outstanding rhetorical gifts Lev Davidovich Bronstein, AKA Leon Trotsky Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 128. “With Lenin in hiding, the command of the Bolshevik forces passes to his associates.” (Pipes, p. 128) • Trotsky is the most visible, owing to his outstanding rhetorical gifts • operational direction of the coup is entrusted to the Bolshevik Military Organization headed by N.I. Podvoiskii Lev Davidovich Bronstein, AKA Leon Trotsky Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 129. “With Lenin in hiding, the command of the Bolshevik forces passes to his associates.” (Pipes, p. 128) • Trotsky is the most visible, owing to his outstanding rhetorical gifts • operational direction of the coup is entrusted to the Bolshevik Military Organization headed by N.I. Podvoiskii • Trotsky compliments Lenin. Better read, a superior speaker, he can move crowds; whereas Lenin’s charisma is limited to his followers Lev Davidovich Bronstein, AKA Leon Trotsky Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 130. “With Lenin in hiding, the command of the Bolshevik forces passes to his associates.” (Pipes, p. 128) • Trotsky is the most visible, owing to his outstanding rhetorical gifts • operational direction of the coup is entrusted to the Bolshevik Military Organization headed by N.I. Podvoiskii • Trotsky compliments Lenin. Better read, a superior speaker, he can move crowds; whereas Lenin’s charisma is limited to his followers • but Trotsky is unpopular with the cadres: Lev Davidovich Bronstein, AKA Leon Trotsky Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 131. “With Lenin in hiding, the command of the Bolshevik forces passes to his associates.” (Pipes, p. 128) • Trotsky is the most visible, owing to his outstanding rhetorical gifts • operational direction of the coup is entrusted to the Bolshevik Military Organization headed by N.I. Podvoiskii • Trotsky compliments Lenin. Better read, a superior speaker, he can move crowds; whereas Lenin’s charisma is limited to his followers • but Trotsky is unpopular with the cadres: • he had joined the party late Lev Davidovich Bronstein, AKA Leon Trotsky Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 132. “With Lenin in hiding, the command of the Bolshevik forces passes to his associates.” (Pipes, p. 128) • Trotsky is the most visible, owing to his outstanding rhetorical gifts • operational direction of the coup is entrusted to the Bolshevik Military Organization headed by N.I. Podvoiskii • Trotsky compliments Lenin. Better read, a superior speaker, he can move crowds; whereas Lenin’s charisma is limited to his followers • but Trotsky is unpopular with the cadres: • he had joined the party late Lev Davidovich Bronstein, • he is insufferably arrogant AKA Leon Trotsky Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 133. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 134. The event that enabled the Bolsheviks to recover from their July debacle was one of the more bizarre episodes of the Russian Revolution. Known to historians as the Kornilov affair, it resulted from a struggle in Kerensky’s mind between his sense that as head of state in a situation of near-anarchy and a looming German offensive he needed the army’s support, and his fear as a socialist intellectual that the army was likely to breed a counterrevolutionary Napoleon.* Pipes, p. 129 ___________________ * In private conversations with the author, Kerensky conceded that his actions at the time had been strongly influenced by the experience of the French Revolution Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 135. Kornilov Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 136. General Lavr Kornilov Kornilov in 1917 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 137. German troops enter Riga, 3 September 1917 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 138. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 139. “…[Kornilov] had made a rapid career in the army owing to personal courage and his ability to inspire troops. He knew little and cared less about politics; such opinions as he had on the subject were neither conservative nor monarchist but rather ‘progressive.’ he was an ardent p a t r i o t . He a l w a y s d i s p l a y e d a t e n d e n c y t o insubordination.” Pipes, p. 129 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 140. Lavr Georgeivich Kornilov, 1870-1918 • born to a Siberian cossack military family • graduate of the artillery school, distinguished service in the Russo- Japanese and First World Wars • 1917-commanded the only successful part of the Kerensky offensive, he was offered command of all the Russian forces • Kornilov accepted, but on certain conditions: • removal of the most harmful provisions of Order No. 1 • reintroduction of the death penalty for desertion or mutiny, at the front or at the rear Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 141. The Two Rivals • “Kornilov loves freedom...but Russia comes for him first, and freedom second, while for Kerensky...freedom and revolution come first, and Russia second”--Boris Savinkov, Kerensky’s deputy • negotiations dragged on for two weeks before Kornilov receives agreement to his conditions. But Kerensky, hostage to the Soviet, never fulfills the agreement • 14 August--Kornilov speaks at the Moscow State Conference over Kerensky’s objection. He is wildly cheered. Liberal and conservative politicians look to him as the country’s savior. • “...after the Moscow conference it was clear to me that the next attempt at a blow would come from the right and not from the left.”--Aleksandr Kerensky Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 142. Kornilov at the Moscow Conference taking the crowd’s cheers as he tours in an open limosine Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 143. Misunderstanding or Kerensky Plot? • 22-27 August--the events of the Kornilov affair are quite complex and involve third party players who to this day remain unknown • suffice it to say that Kerensky pretended to believe that Kornilov was demanding dictatorial powers to deal with a suspected Bolshevik coup • he thereupon relieved him of command and ordered his arrest. He also armed the Petrograd Soviet and Bolsheviks to defend against a counterrevolutionary coup • at this point Kornilov did rebel “but only after having been wrongly charged with rebellion” --Pipes, p. 134 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 144. Was there a “Kornilov plot”? Almost certainly not. The available evidence indicates there was a “Kerensky plot” to discredit the commanding general as the ringleader of an imaginary but widely anticipated counterrevolution, the suppression of which would elevate the Prime Minister to a position of unrivaled popularity...Neither Kerensky nor the Bolsheviks have ever been able to identify a single person who would admit, or of whom it could be demonstrated, that he was in collusion with Kornilov: and a conspiracy of one is an obvious absurdity. Pipes, p. 135 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 145. Outcomes of the Affair Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 146. Outcomes of the Affair • Kerensky became estranged from both liberals and conservatives but failed to solidify his position with the socialists Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 147. Outcomes of the Affair • Kerensky became estranged from both liberals and conservatives but failed to solidify his position with the socialists • of the 40,000 guns distributed to the workers, a good part wound up in the hands of the Red Guards Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 148. Outcomes of the Affair • Kerensky became estranged from both liberals and conservatives but failed to solidify his position with the socialists • of the 40,000 guns distributed to the workers, a good part wound up in the hands of the Red Guards • September--the Bolsheviks showed gains in the municipal elections Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 149. Outcomes of the Affair • Kerensky became estranged from both liberals and conservatives but failed to solidify his position with the socialists • of the 40,000 guns distributed to the workers, a good part wound up in the hands of the Red Guards • September--the Bolsheviks showed gains in the municipal elections • most sinister was the break between Kerensky and the military. The officer corps despised this treatment of their popular commander and Kerensky’s pandering to the left. When, in late October, he would appeal to the military to help save his government from the Bolsheviks, he would meet with no response. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 150. Great October Socialist Revolution Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 151. Great October Socialist Revolution Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 152. The Cruiser Aurora Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 153. The Cruiser Aurora Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 154. The Cruiser Aurora Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 155. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 156. Boris Kustodiev (1878-1927) “The Bolshevik” (1920) The Treytyakov Gallery Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 157. The Timing of the Constituent Assembly Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 158. The Timing of the Constituent Assembly • 9/22 August-after interminable delays, the Provisional Government scheduled elections for 12/25 November and the first session for 28 November/10 December Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 159. The Timing of the Constituent Assembly • 9/22 August-after interminable delays, the Provisional Government scheduled elections for 12/25 November and the first session for 28 November/10 December • Lenin’s sense of urgency was was inspired by his fear of being preempted by this peasant, thus SR, dominated body Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 160. The Timing of the Constituent Assembly • 9/22 August-after interminable delays, the Provisional Government scheduled elections for 12/25 November and the first session for 28 November/10 December • Lenin’s sense of urgency was was inspired by his fear of being preempted by this peasant, thus SR, dominated body • after November he would be rebelling, not against a “bourgeois” government; but against the will of the “people” Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 161. The Timing of the Constituent Assembly • 9/22 August-after interminable delays, the Provisional Government scheduled elections for 12/25 November and the first session for 28 November/10 December • Lenin’s sense of urgency was was inspired by his fear of being preempted by this peasant, thus SR, dominated body • after November he would be rebelling, not against a “bourgeois” government; but against the will of the “people” • hence the Bolsheviks could no longer pretend to act in the name of the “people” Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 162. The Timing of the Constituent Assembly • 9/22 August-after interminable delays, the Provisional Government scheduled elections for 12/25 November and the first session for 28 November/10 December • Lenin’s sense of urgency was was inspired by his fear of being preempted by this peasant, thus SR, dominated body • after November he would be rebelling, not against a “bourgeois” government; but against the will of the “people” • hence the Bolsheviks could no longer pretend to act in the name of the “people” • although Lenin wanted immediate action, he had to yield to the majority of his associates who preferred the coup be carried out in the name of the soviets Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 163. Trotsky and the MilRevCom Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 164. Trotsky and the MilRevCom • 13 September(O.S.)-a majority of the Petrograd Soviet voted for a Bolshevik revolution Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 165. Trotsky and the MilRevCom • 13 September(O.S.)-a majority of the Petrograd Soviet voted for a Bolshevik revolution • this disowned the Menshevik-SR leadership for the first time Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 166. Trotsky and the MilRevCom • 13 September(O.S.)-a majority of the Petrograd Soviet voted for a Bolshevik revolution • this disowned the Menshevik-SR leadership for the first time • soon thereafter Trotsky was elected chairman Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 167. Trotsky and the MilRevCom • 13 September(O.S.)-a majority of the Petrograd Soviet voted for a Bolshevik revolution • this disowned the Menshevik-SR leadership for the first time • soon thereafter Trotsky was elected chairman • 18 September-Bolsheviks gained control of the Moscow Soviet Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 168. Trotsky and the MilRevCom • 13 September(O.S.)-a majority of the Petrograd Soviet voted for a Bolshevik revolution • this disowned the Menshevik-SR leadership for the first time • soon thereafter Trotsky was elected chairman • 18 September-Bolsheviks gained control of the Moscow Soviet • city after city followed Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 169. Trotsky and the MilRevCom • 13 September(O.S.)-a majority of the Petrograd Soviet voted for a Bolshevik revolution • this disowned the Menshevik-SR leadership for the first time • soon thereafter Trotsky was elected chairman • 18 September-Bolsheviks gained control of the Moscow Soviet • city after city followed • 13 October-Petrograd established the Military Revolutionary Committee with Trotsky as its chairman Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 170. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 171. The precipitating event was a German naval operation in the Gulf of Riga. When completed in early October with the occupation of three strategic islands, it created a direct threat to Petrograd. Fearing German capture, the Russian General Staff proposed to evacuate the government from Petrograd to Moscow. The Ispolkom condemned the plan...as motivated by...the desire of the Provisional Government to surrender the ‘capital of the Revolution.’ ...the Bolsheviks moved and the Soviet Plenum approved--over Menshevik objections--a motion to form a Revolutionary Committee of Defense to assume charge of the city’s security not only against the Germans but also against domestic ‘counterrevolutionaries.’ Pipes, pp. 140-41 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 172. Ispolkom “caves” to a Bolshevik 2nd Congress Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 173. Ispolkom “caves” to a Bolshevik 2nd Congress • Trotsky, as chair of the Petrograd Soviet, “stacks” the voting for calling a second All-Russian Congress of Soviets for October/November • the Ispolkom, dominated by Mensheviks and SRs, first condemned this action in the strongest terms • 26 Sept/9 Oct-they reversed themselves, agreeing to a Bolshevik-picked Congress to convene on 25 Oct/7 November • it was an astonishing and, as it turned out, a fatal capitulation • “Although aware of what the Bolsheviks had in mind, the Ispolkom gave them what they wanted: a handpicked body, packed with their adherents and allies, to legitimize a coup d’etat” Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 174. The Politburo • although the caption suggests that the graphic reflects the eve of the October Revolution, the prominence of Stalin suggests a later date • this organ is the “inner circle” of the party, within the Central Committee • Lenin had to convince this group that his timing and strategy was correct • he secretly returned to Petrograd from Finland early in October • 10/23 October-Lenin convinced all but Kamenev and Zinoviev of the need to act Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 175. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 176. Mesmerized by Bolshevik audacity, the Mensheviks and S R s r e s i g n e d t h e m s e l v e s to a n o t h e r B o l s h e v i k “adventure,” but they were not overly concerned, certain that it would fail like their July putsch. Trotsky, who during these critical days was everywhere at once, waged a war of nerves, one day admitting, the next denying, that an insurrection was under way. He held audiences spellbound with speeches that alternately promised and threatened, extolled and ridiculed. Pipes, p.142 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 177. Seizing the Key Points in Petrograd Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 178. Seizing the Key Points in Petrograd • out of the total force of 240,000 soldiers in the capital & environs, no more than 10,000 actively supported the Bolsheviks Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 179. Seizing the Key Points in Petrograd • out of the total force of 240,000 soldiers in the capital & environs, no more than 10,000 actively supported the Bolsheviks • but the government could count on even fewer! Most remained “neutral” The result of the Kornilov affair! Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 180. Seizing the Key Points in Petrograd • out of the total force of 240,000 soldiers in the capital & environs, no more than 10,000 actively supported the Bolsheviks • but the government could count on even fewer! Most remained “neutral” The result of the Kornilov affair! • and the Bolshevik Military Organization had 20,000 Red Guards Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 181. Seizing the Key Points in Petrograd • out of the total force of 240,000 soldiers in the capital & environs, no more than 10,000 actively supported the Bolsheviks • but the government could count on even fewer! Most remained “neutral” The result of the Kornilov affair! • and the Bolshevik Military Organization had 20,000 Red Guards • 24 October-Kerensky tried to arrest the Bolshevik commissars Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 182. Seizing the Key Points in Petrograd • out of the total force of 240,000 soldiers in the capital & environs, no more than 10,000 actively supported the Bolsheviks • but the government could count on even fewer! Most remained “neutral” The result of the Kornilov affair! • and the Bolshevik Military Organization had 20,000 Red Guards • 24 October-Kerensky tried to arrest the Bolshevik commissars • the Winter Palace was garrisoned with a pathetically inadequate force Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 183. Seizing the Key Points in Petrograd • out of the total force of 240,000 soldiers in the capital & environs, no more than 10,000 actively supported the Bolsheviks • but the government could count on even fewer! Most remained “neutral” The result of the Kornilov affair! • and the Bolshevik Military Organization had 20,000 Red Guards • 24 October-Kerensky tried to arrest the Bolshevik commissars • the Winter Palace was garrisoned with a pathetically inadequate force • 24-25-that night the Bolsheviks seized key points throughout Petrograd, cadet guards, told to withdraw, either did so or were disarmed Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 184. Seizing the Key Points in Petrograd • out of the total force of 240,000 soldiers in the capital & environs, no more than 10,000 actively supported the Bolsheviks • but the government could count on even fewer! Most remained “neutral” The result of the Kornilov affair! • and the Bolshevik Military Organization had 20,000 Red Guards • 24 October-Kerensky tried to arrest the Bolshevik commissars • the Winter Palace was garrisoned with a pathetically inadequate force • 24-25-that night the Bolsheviks seized key points throughout Petrograd, cadet guards, told to withdraw, either did so or were disarmed • no resistance was encountered, no shots exchanged Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 185. The Latvian Riflemen Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 186. The Latvian Riflemen • military formations assembled starting 1915 in Latvia in order to defend Baltic territories against Germans in World War I. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 187. The Latvian Riflemen • military formations assembled starting 1915 in Latvia in order to defend Baltic territories against Germans in World War I. • Initially the battalions were formed by volunteers, and from 1916 by conscription among the Latvian population. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 188. The Latvian Riflemen • military formations assembled starting 1915 in Latvia in order to defend Baltic territories against Germans in World War I. • Initially the battalions were formed by volunteers, and from 1916 by conscription among the Latvian population. • A total of about 40,000 troops were drafted into the Latvian Riflemen Division. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 189. The Latvian Riflemen • military formations assembled starting 1915 in Latvia in order to defend Baltic territories against Germans in World War I. • Initially the battalions were formed by volunteers, and from 1916 by conscription among the Latvian population. • A total of about 40,000 troops were drafted into the Latvian Riflemen Division. • 1917-resentments towards their tsarist generals led most to side with the Bolsheviks Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 190. The Latvian Riflemen • military formations assembled starting 1915 in Latvia in order to defend Baltic territories against Germans in World War I. • Initially the battalions were formed by volunteers, and from 1916 by conscription among the Latvian population. • A total of about 40,000 troops were drafted into the Latvian Riflemen Division. • 1917-resentments towards their tsarist generals led most to side with the Bolsheviks • these units became Lenin’s most reliable troops during the entire civil war (1918-1921) Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 191. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 192. TO THE CITIZENS OF RUSSIA! The Provisional Government has been deposed. Government authority has passed into the hands of an organ of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, the Militar y Revolutionary Committee, which stands at the head of the Petrograd proletariat and garrison. The task for which the people have been struggling--the immediate offer of a democratic peace, the abolition of landlord property in land, worker control over production, the creation of a Soviet Government--this task is assured. Long Live the Revolution of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants! proclaimed by Lenin, 9 a.m., 25 October 1917 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 193. Fact versus Myth • the cabinet that Lenin had declared deposed sat in the Winter Palace awaiting help • their protectors: two or three detachments of military cadets, the Woman’s Death Battalion of 140 volunteers, some cossacks, a bicycle unit, and 40 war invalids commanded by an officer with artificial legs • at dawn a half-hearted attack went forward but retreated at the first hostile fire • 6:30 p.m. an ultimatum to surrender was ignored • 9:00 p.m. the cruiser Aurora, with no live ammunition, fired a blank salvo • 11:00 p.m. the guns of Petropavlovsk fortress opened fire. Two of thirty-five rounds fired hit the target Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 194. Iconic scenes from Eisenstein’s Oktyabr, 1928 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 195. Iconic scenes from Eisenstein’s Oktyabr, 1928 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 196. The Congress of Soviets “rubber stamps” the coup • 25 October-Lenin delayed the opening of the Congress until the fall of the Winter Palace and the arrest of the ministers • only Kerensky escaped, disguised as a Serbian military officer, with the U.S. Embassy’s aid • Of the 650 delegates 338 were Bolshevik. They were supported by the Left SRs, another 98. This gave Lenin a two-thirds majority • around 1 a.m. 26 October word arrived that the Winter palace was in Bolshevik hands • thereafter followed the Decree on Peace and the Land Decrees along with creation of a new provisional government, the Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom) and a Central Executive Committee (C.E.C./ЦИК orTsIK) of the Congress of Soviets, both dominated by the Bolsheviks Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 197. Creation of the One Party State • in the weeks and months that followed “Great October” Lenin quietly discarded the pretense of a government coalition • some of the Bolsheviks expected to share power with the other socialists and the left SRs • this was never Lenin’s plan • Sovnarkom was originally styled the Provisional Government before the meeting of the Constituent Assembly • this led many to believe that nothing important had really changed with the coup • after the dismissal of the Constituent Assembly, the “provisional” was quietly dropped Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 198. Land! Peace! Bread! Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 199. FREEDOM Land! Peace! Bread! “BONDS” Poster from 1917 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 200. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 201. One of the first acts of the Bolshevik leaders was aimed at satisfying the peasant demand for land. Taking a leaf from the agrarian program of the left SRs, Lenin had proposed on 8 November [N.S.], and the Congress of Soviets had accepted, a decree on land. This decree, the most radical approach to the agrarian question ever undertaken in Russia, provided that all land owned by landlords, the crown, the churches and monasteries, together with all livestock and implements on such land, be transferred without compensation to the former owners into the temporary custody of peasant land committees and peasant soviets until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. Title to the land was to be vested in the state, but the use of it was to be given to the peasants in perpetuity. Harcave, pp. 495-96 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 202. Bolshevik Goals after “Great October” Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 203. Bolshevik Goals after “Great October” 1) solidify their power in Petrograd Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 204. Bolshevik Goals after “Great October” 1) solidify their power in Petrograd 2) expand it nationwide and globally Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 205. Bolshevik Goals after “Great October” 1) solidify their power in Petrograd 2) expand it nationwide and globally 1)in order to do this Lenin believed peace was essential Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 206. Bolshevik Goals after “Great October” 1) solidify their power in Petrograd 2) expand it nationwide and globally 1)in order to do this Lenin believed peace was essential 2)only during peace could they have a peredyshka, a “breathing spell” during which to: Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 207. Bolshevik Goals after “Great October” 1) solidify their power in Petrograd 2) expand it nationwide and globally 1)in order to do this Lenin believed peace was essential 2)only during peace could they have a peredyshka, a “breathing spell” during which to: 1) consolidate their authority Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 208. Bolshevik Goals after “Great October” 1) solidify their power in Petrograd 2) expand it nationwide and globally 1)in order to do this Lenin believed peace was essential 2)only during peace could they have a peredyshka, a “breathing spell” during which to: 1) consolidate their authority 2) organize an administration Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 209. Bolshevik Goals after “Great October” 1) solidify their power in Petrograd 2) expand it nationwide and globally 1)in order to do this Lenin believed peace was essential 2)only during peace could they have a peredyshka, a “breathing spell” during which to: 1) consolidate their authority 2) organize an administration 3) build a new, revolutionary army Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 210. Divisions within the Bolsheviks • Lenin was prepared to make peace with the Central Powers on almost any terms as long as they left him in power • this was by no means the prevalent view in Bolshevik ranks • most believed instead of making peace with her, Russia should make every effort to provoke the Proletarian Revolution in Germany • Trotsky and Bukharin led the opposition. • they argued that peace would help the enemy more than it would help Russia • let them invade. It would arouse the Russians to fight harder and “stir the souls of the working classes abroad” • “Most of the time Lenin found himself in a minority, sometimes a minority of one” Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 211. Commander of the Disintegrating Army • early Bolshevik, active in 1905 • played chess with Lenin in Zurich • ensign in the tsarist army, leader in the MilRevKom • sent to the Stavka in Mogilev when acting Commander-in-Chief Dukhonin refused to begin peace negotiations with the Germans • 20 November--the soldiers lynched Dukhonin upon Krylenko’s arrival Nikolai Krylenko (1885-1938) • he then took over and ordered individual units to negotiate cease-fires with their opposites Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 212. German and Russian troops fraternizing, winter of 1917-1918 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 213. Mogilev Brest Litovsk Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 214. • the German offensive showed no sign of relenting 220 miles Mogilev Brest Litovsk Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 215. • the German offensive showed no sign of relenting 220 miles • Russian soldiers’ desertions skyrocketed after the Bolshevik coup Mogilev Brest Litovsk Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 216. • the German offensive showed no sign of relenting 220 miles • Russian soldiers’ desertions skyrocketed after the Bolshevik coup Mogilev • many of their officers began to seek centers of resistance to the new Brest regime, others capitulated to the Litovsk Reds Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 217. • the German offensive showed no sign of relenting 220 miles • Russian soldiers’ desertions skyrocketed after the Bolshevik coup Mogilev • many of their officers began to seek centers of resistance to the new Brest regime, others capitulated to the Litovsk Reds • the Germans and Austrians promptly accepted the Russian offer of armistice talks Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 218. • the German offensive showed no sign of relenting 220 miles • Russian soldiers’ desertions skyrocketed after the Bolshevik coup Mogilev • many of their officers began to seek centers of resistance to the new Brest regime, others capitulated to the Litovsk Reds • the Germans and Austrians promptly accepted the Russian offer of armistice talks • Nov 18/Dec 3--Russian delegation departed for German headquarters in Brest Litovsk Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 219. • the German offensive showed no sign of relenting 220 miles • Russian soldiers’ desertions skyrocketed after the Bolshevik coup Mogilev • many of their officers began to seek centers of resistance to the new Brest regime, others capitulated to the Litovsk Reds • the Germans and Austrians promptly accepted the Russian offer of armistice talks • Nov 18/Dec 3--Russian delegation departed for German headquarters in Brest Litovsk • Dec 15/28--armistice talks adjourned Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 220. The signing of the armistice at Brest (November 23/December 6, 1917) Sitting on the right, Kamenev. On the German side, sitting forth from left, General Hoffmann Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 221. German Goals at Brest Litovsk • many politicians and intellectuals hoped to turn Russia into a surrogate Africa, a colonial dependency, supplying raw materials • to this end they would break up the Russian Empire along ethnic lines • Germanic Baltikum and the “breadbasket”Ukraine would become German satellites • what remained of Great Russia would be too weak to resist their demands for economic concessions • from this perspective nothing suited Germany better than the Bolshevik regime • this alliance of the “odd couple,”--radical Russia and monarchist Germany-- failed to save the kaiser but it did save Lenin Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 222. Peace Talks Resume December 27/January 9 • Germany takes a tougher line; without Russian consent recognizes Ukrainian independence, prepares to sign a separate peace treaty • Trotsky, shocked, protests in vain • an even greater blow is the proposed border, stripping away Poland, Ukraine, and Baltikum • Trotsky declares this unacceptable and departs for Petrograd • February, 1918--Germany and Austria-Hungary sign a separate peace with the Ukraine and instal a puppet government that helps them collect foodstuffs for their desperately needy home fronts Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 223. Bolsheviks in Disarray Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 224. Bolsheviks in Disarray • the majority: Bukharin-break off talks, popular uprising; Trotsky- ”neither war nor peace” would spark the World Revolution Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 225. Bolsheviks in Disarray • the majority: Bukharin-break off talks, popular uprising; Trotsky- ”neither war nor peace” would spark the World Revolution • the minority: Lenin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, & Stalin-Russia had no army to stop the Germans from invading and overthrowing them. Accepting a humiliating peace absolutely essential for survival Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 226. Bolsheviks in Disarray • the majority: Bukharin-break off talks, popular uprising; Trotsky- ”neither war nor peace” would spark the World Revolution • the minority: Lenin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, & Stalin-Russia had no army to stop the Germans from invading and overthrowing them. Accepting a humiliating peace absolutely essential for survival • 17 February--German ultimatumrenewed advance and Russian military disintegration Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 227. Bolsheviks in Disarray • the majority: Bukharin-break off talks, popular uprising; Trotsky- ”neither war nor peace” would spark the World Revolution • the minority: Lenin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, & Stalin-Russia had no army to stop the Germans from invading and overthrowing them. Accepting a humiliating peace absolutely essential for survival • 17 February--German ultimatumrenewed advance and Russian military disintegration • 18 February--Lenin loses, 7-6, till finally Trotsky switches sides. BUT the Germans keep advancing Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 228. Bolsheviks in Disarray • the majority: Bukharin-break off talks, popular uprising; Trotsky- ”neither war nor peace” would spark the World Revolution • the minority: Lenin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, & Stalin-Russia had no army to stop the Germans from invading and overthrowing them. Accepting a humiliating peace absolutely essential for survival • 17 February--German ultimatumrenewed advance and Russian military disintegration • 18 February--Lenin loses, 7-6, till finally Trotsky switches sides. BUT the Germans keep advancing • 21-22 February--panic-stricken Lenin issues “The Socialist Fatherland in Danger” Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 229. Onset of the Bolshevik Terror Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 230. Onset of the Bolshevik Terror • terms of the decree: Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 231. Onset of the Bolshevik Terror • terms of the decree: • formation of forced-labor battalions of “all able-bodied members of the bourgeois class” to dig trenches: resisters would be shot Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 232. Onset of the Bolshevik Terror • terms of the decree: • formation of forced-labor battalions of “all able-bodied members of the bourgeois class” to dig trenches: resisters would be shot • “Enemy agents, speculators, burglars, hooligans,counter-revolutionary agitators, German spies are to be executed on the spot.” Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 233. Onset of the Bolshevik Terror • terms of the decree: • formation of forced-labor battalions of “all able-bodied members of the bourgeois class” to dig trenches: resisters would be shot • “Enemy agents, speculators, burglars, hooligans,counter-revolutionary agitators, German spies are to be executed on the spot.” • introduces irrevocable penalties for crimes nowhere precisely defined Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 234. Onset of the Bolshevik Terror • terms of the decree: • formation of forced-labor battalions of “all able-bodied members of the bourgeois class” to dig trenches: resisters would be shot • “Enemy agents, speculators, burglars, hooligans,counter-revolutionary agitators, German spies are to be executed on the spot.” • introduces irrevocable penalties for crimes nowhere precisely defined • nothing said about trials or even hearings for the accused Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 235. Onset of the Bolshevik Terror • terms of the decree: • formation of forced-labor battalions of “all able-bodied members of the bourgeois class” to dig trenches: resisters would be shot • “Enemy agents, speculators, burglars, hooligans,counter-revolutionary agitators, German spies are to be executed on the spot.” • introduces irrevocable penalties for crimes nowhere precisely defined • nothing said about trials or even hearings for the accused • the decree gave the new security organ, the Cheka, the license to kill Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 236. ЧК черезвычайная комиссия (CHE • KA Cherezvychaynaya Komissiya) Extraordinary Commission (All-Russian Cheka for Combating Counter-Revolution, Profiteering, and Corruption) Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky 1877-1926 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 237. ЧК черезвычайная комиссия (CHE • KA Cherezvychaynaya Komissiya) Extraordinary Commission (All-Russian Cheka for Combating Counter-Revolution, Profiteering, and Corruption) • the first of the Soviet secret police Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky 1877-1926 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 238. ЧК черезвычайная комиссия (CHE • KA Cherezvychaynaya Komissiya) Extraordinary Commission (All-Russian Cheka for Combating Counter-Revolution, Profiteering, and Corruption) • the first of the Soviet secret police • murders during the civil war are reckoned between the absurdly low official 12,733 to as high as 500,000 Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky 1877-1926 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 239. ЧК черезвычайная комиссия (CHE • KA Cherezvychaynaya Komissiya) Extraordinary Commission (All-Russian Cheka for Combating Counter-Revolution, Profiteering, and Corruption) • the first of the Soviet secret police • murders during the civil war are reckoned between the absurdly low official 12,733 to as high as 500,000 • the most horrible tortures are documented Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky 1877-1926 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 240. ЧК черезвычайная комиссия (CHE • KA Cherezvychaynaya Komissiya) Extraordinary Commission (All-Russian Cheka for Combating Counter-Revolution, Profiteering, and Corruption) • the first of the Soviet secret police • murders during the civil war are reckoned between the absurdly low official 12,733 to as high as 500,000 • the most horrible tortures are documented • its chief, a Polish nobleman, founder of the Polish Marxist party (SDKPiL), imprisoned and tortured by the Okhrana, from the 1890s to February, 1917 Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky 1877-1926 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 241. ЧК черезвычайная комиссия (CHE • KA Cherezvychaynaya Komissiya) Extraordinary Commission (All-Russian Cheka for Combating Counter-Revolution, Profiteering, and Corruption) • the first of the Soviet secret police • murders during the civil war are reckoned between the absurdly low official 12,733 to as high as 500,000 • the most horrible tortures are documented • its chief, a Polish nobleman, founder of the Polish Marxist party (SDKPiL), imprisoned and tortured by the Okhrana, from the 1890s to February, 1917 • supported Lenin from the April theses on Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky 1877-1926 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 242. ЧК черезвычайная комиссия (CHE • KA Cherezvychaynaya Komissiya) Extraordinary Commission (All-Russian Cheka for Combating Counter-Revolution, Profiteering, and Corruption) • the first of the Soviet secret police • murders during the civil war are reckoned between the absurdly low official 12,733 to as high as 500,000 • the most horrible tortures are documented • its chief, a Polish nobleman, founder of the Polish Marxist party (SDKPiL), imprisoned and tortured by the Okhrana, from the 1890s to February, 1917 • supported Lenin from the April theses on Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky 1877-1926 • 20 December 1917-Sovnarkom creates Cheka, chooses him to head it Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 243. The Move to Moscow Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 244. The Move to Moscow Because he did not trust the Germans to stop their aggression even after their terms had been unconditionally accepted, Lenin thought it prudent to transfer the capital from Petrograd to Moscow. The relocation of government personnel took place in the first half of March. Lenin himself sneaked out of Petrograd on the night of March 10-11 in a train guarded by Latvians. The journey was organized in deepest secrecy and only his sister greeted him on arrival. He established his residence and office in the medieval Kremlin fortress; several of his commissars did likewise. Security arrangements of the complex were entrusted to the Latvians. It...reflected the new leaders’ morbid fear for their personal security. Pipes, p.174 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 245. The Peace of Brest Litovsk, 3 March 1918 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 246. The Peace of Brest Litovsk, 3 March 1918 • Russia gives up Poland, Finland, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 247. The Peace of Brest Litovsk, 3 March 1918 • Russia gives up Poland, Finland, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia • this includes 26% of her population, 28% of her industrial plant and three- quarters of her coal and iron deposits Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 248. The Peace of Brest Litovsk, 3 March 1918 • Russia gives up Poland, Finland, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia • this includes 26% of her population, 28% of her industrial plant and three- quarters of her coal and iron deposits • here grows 37% of the country’s grain Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 249. The Peace of Brest Litovsk, 3 March 1918 • Russia gives up Poland, Finland, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia • this includes 26% of her population, 28% of her industrial plant and three- quarters of her coal and iron deposits • here grows 37% of the country’s grain • she agrees to demobilize her armed forces Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 250. The Peace of Brest Litovsk, 3 March 1918 • Russia gives up Poland, Finland, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia • this includes 26% of her population, 28% of her industrial plant and three- quarters of her coal and iron deposits • here grows 37% of the country’s grain • she agrees to demobilize her armed forces • the SRs withdraw their participation in protest Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 251. The Peace of Brest Litovsk, 3 March 1918 • Russia gives up Poland, Finland, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia • this includes 26% of her population, 28% of her industrial plant and three- quarters of her coal and iron deposits • here grows 37% of the country’s grain • she agrees to demobilize her armed forces • the SRs withdraw their participation in protest • the Allies feel betrayed and now face the prospect of defeat, begin to consider intervention Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 252. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 253. While [industrial] production and commerce flagged, the peasants added to the general plight by continuing to refuse grain to the cities in exchange for paper money which would buy little at the prevailing inflated prices. The grain shortage was the more accute because the loss of the rich Ukrainian granary had cut deeply into the potential supply of the country. ...In desperation the government the government adopted the policy of wresting surplus grain from the kulaks [wealthier peasants] and pitting the poor peasants and city workers against them. Harcave, p. 506 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 254. the famine of 1921-22 HELP Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 255. the famine of 1921-22 • product of the cumulative effect of war, civil war, confiscation of seed grain, and class war against the kulaks HELP Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 256. the famine of 1921-22 • product of the cumulative effect of war, civil war, confiscation of seed grain, and class war against the kulaks • the policy of prodrazyvyorstka (food apportionment) devastated future harvests to relieve current shortages HELP Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 257. the famine of 1921-22 • product of the cumulative effect of war, civil war, confiscation of seed grain, and class war against the kulaks • the policy of prodrazyvyorstka (food apportionment) devastated future harvests to relieve current shortages • approximately 5 million died, most in the Volga-Ural region HELP Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 258. the famine of 1921-22 • product of the cumulative effect of war, civil war, confiscation of seed grain, and class war against the kulaks • the policy of prodrazyvyorstka (food apportionment) devastated future harvests to relieve current shortages • approximately 5 million died, most in the Volga-Ural region • only food aid organized by Herbert Hoover’s American Relief Organization prevented even worse consequences HELP Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 259. The Death of Constitutionalism Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 260. CITIZENS COMRADES The Death of PREPARE Constitutionalism YOURSELVES FOR A MANIFESTATION ON OPENING DAY (of the) CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 261. The All Russian Constituent Assembly (Всероссийское Учредительное Собрание, Vseros•SIIS•ko•e Uchre•DI•telno•e So•BRA•ni•e) was a democratically elected constitutional body convened in Russia after the October Revolution of 1917. It met for 13 hours, from 4 PM to 5 AM 5 January–6 January 1918 (OS). It was elected by popular vote and dissolved by the Bolshevik government. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 262. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 263. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 264. Lenin had maintained, even before the elections, that the Second Congress of Soviets reflected the real will of the people and that the duty of the Constituent Assembly would be to recognize the authority of the Congress of Soviets and then quietly dissolve. The majority of the delegates to the Constituent Assembly, however, refused to hand over their mandate to the Soviet Government as requested and, in so doing, doomed the Assembly. Early on the morning of January 19 [N.S.], the pro- Bolshevik guard entered the meeting hall and complaining that the “guard is tired,” instructed the delegates to close the meeting. They had no choice but to comply. Later that day the C.E.C. of the Congress of Soviets issued a decree “officially” dissolving the Constituent Assembly. Harcave, pp. 494-95 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 265. The Kronstadt Sailors Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 266. The Kronstadt Sailors • 1917-from the February Revolution, through the Civil War, the sailors based at Kronstadt, were indeed the “Avantgarde of the Revolution” Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 267. The Kronstadt Sailors • 1917-from the February Revolution, through the Civil War, the sailors based at Kronstadt, were indeed the “Avantgarde of the Revolution” • they, along with the Latvian Rifles, made up the guards who sent the Constituent Assembly off Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 268. The Kronstadt Sailors • 1917-from the February Revolution, through the Civil War, the sailors based at Kronstadt, were indeed the “Avantgarde of the Revolution” • they, along with the Latvian Rifles, made up the guards who sent the Constituent Assembly off • delegates complained that some of the sailors worked the bolts of their rifles and mockingly took aim at the politicians Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 269. The Kronstadt Sailors • 1917-from the February Revolution, through the Civil War, the sailors based at Kronstadt, were indeed the “Avantgarde of the Revolution” • they, along with the Latvian Rifles, made up the guards who sent the Constituent Assembly off • delegates complained that some of the sailors worked the bolts of their rifles and mockingly took aim at the politicians • 1921-the Kronstadt mutiny would be the last domestic armed resistance to Communism until 1991 Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 270. 1921 poster ridiculing the Constituent Assembly Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 271. 1921 poster ridiculing the Constituent Assembly t h e t a t te r e d s a i l i s l a b e l l e d “Constituent Assembly.” •Standing - a French militar y advisor with a bag of gold. • S e a te d - - a c a p i t a l i s t , W h i te general, and SR Viktor Chernov. •Above--vultures circle We will see in the next class how remnants of the assembly fought in the Civil War as the “true” government of Russia Tuesday, October 20, 2009
  • 272. Tuesday, October 20, 2009