Joint Strike Fighter Risk Analysis
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Risk Analysis of Joint Strike Fighter Department of Defense Program

Risk Analysis of Joint Strike Fighter Department of Defense Program

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Joint Strike Fighter Risk Analysis Joint Strike Fighter Risk Analysis Document Transcript

  • Joint Strike Fighter Risk Analysis by James Didier Software Risk Management SE 529-801 Professor Harold Streeter March 21, 2009
  • JSF Risk Analysis 2 Table of Contents Abstract 3 Introduction 3 Requirements, Capabilities, & Systems 4 Fighter Variants 6 Vendors & Partners 7 Risk Management 8 Requirements 9 Technology 11 Lessons Learned 13 Conclusions 15 Cited References 18 Non-Cited References 19
  • JSF Risk Analysis 3 ABSTRACT This complicated research evaluates the risk involved in the U.S. Department of Defense’s Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. The main purpose of this program is to develop a new stealthy strike fighter for the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, & U.S. Marine Corps that is cost efficient to replace their legacy fighters. The program will also export these fighters to specific countries and allow these countries to participate the JSF program. This research will focus on the risk analysis involved. The JSF program was chosen since it is the perfect example of software-intensive systems and all of the risks that the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) will face in future military projects. This research also incorporates the JSF lessons learned documentation written by Lockheed Martin and the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). With this documentation, I comment on ways to reduce risk for this and future military projects. INTRODUCTION The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program originally started as the U.S. Department of Defense’s Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) program in 1993. In the post- Cold War era the U.S. military was looking into advanced fighter modernization, that was affordable, to maintain the ability to fight and win two major wars simultaneously. By the end of 1994 JAST had adsorbed the Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter (CALF) program and further research suggested that fighters, having as much commonality between them as possible, would be the most cost efficient. The DoD wanted a light weight fighter that that can incorporate the strike fighter requirements from the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps. In 1996, Lockheed Martin and Boeing were
  • JSF Risk Analysis 4 awarded contracts to develop prototypes to participate in the JSF military procurement competition. The Lockheed X-35 beat the Boeing X-32 and was awarded the Joint Strike Fighter contract due to the initial prototype’s superior performance. Now, the project is officially known as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program. This stealthy strike fighter is known as the F-35 Lightning II. Requirements, Capabilities, & Systems In order to understand the risk analysis of the JSF I need to briefly describe the Joint Strike Fighter. The exact JSF capabilities and requirements remain classified. Some high-level requirements and capabilities are made available to the public. The F-35 Lightning II will be the world’s premier strike fighter through 2040. The F-35 will have automatic logistics capability. This means support and maintenance systems will keep this strike fighter ready to fly. Maintenance hinders many of the legacy aircraft and many man-hours are put into preparing an aircraft for flight. For the F-35, simply plug in a personal digital assistant (PDA). You will get the current performance, configuration, scheduled upgrades, history, predictive diagnostics, and the plane will even analyze what is wrong with it. All materials used must be tolerant and weather resident. Materials used in other stealth aircraft often caused delays due to their fragile nature. All hardware must be quickly and easily maintainable in combat situations. The production must be quick, sustainable, and efficient. Productivity and supportability do win wars. Commonality is another requirement. The U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Marine Corps each have their own fighter version that share approximately 80% of parts
  • JSF Risk Analysis 5 between them. They share approximately 100% of their avionics. This lowers manufacturing and maintenance costs. The F-35 will feature low observability and air-to- air survivability will only be inferior to the U.S. F-22 Raptor air superiority fighter. F-35 is a 5th generation stealth fighter 1. Lockheed’s assessment includes both current and projected threats. The performance requirements include weight, g-force tolerance, robust structure for landing, supersonic speed using one engine and diverterless inlets, combat radius, and low speed high alpha turning among others. Weapons will be stored internally and may, in non-stealth missions, have additional weapons carried external. A distributed aperture system will increase the pilot’s situational awareness informing the pilot of all threats regardless of their location or type. The Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA), essentially radar, can track and engage multiple targets simultaneously. It is speculated that this radar can identify what the target is, can jam other radars, destroy sensitive electronics, track cruise missiles, and implant false information into other weapon systems. The electro-optical targeting system (EOTS) allows extended range air-to-air and air-to- Figure 1: F-35’s Helmet. ground targeting. Communications will no longer be by radio but by data links. This way the F-35s will share radar information with one another and all other military assets in the battle space including satellites. All avionics, communications, navigation will be integrated. All data will be displayed in one large touch screen cockpit and within the pilot’s helmet illustrated in Figure 1. The information will be filtered so the pilot gets the most important information increasing survivability.
  • JSF Risk Analysis 6 With cameras being placed outside the aircraft, this allows the pilot to see through any aircraft’s surface in either day or night. The aircraft’s systems can be activated by voice. The helmet, along with other avionics, allows off-boresight missile capability. Instead of maneuvering the aircraft to fire a missile the missile will maneuver to the threat regardless of the F-35’s position. If the threat is behind you, the missile it will turn 180 degrees missing the F-35 and hitting the target. Now the F-35 has even more capabilities but this review ends here. The point is that these advanced systems and avionics must all be networked together. All these systems work as one within the F-35. And the F-35 must be networked to other military assets within the battle space. This network may include military assets from North Atlantic Trade Organization (NATO) among other allies. Net-centric warfare, pioneered by United States, means a system of systems. All military assets will be a part of a large global network that is coordinated allowing forces to take advantage of superior technology and applying concentration of force. A software intensive system is a system where software represents a significant segment in any of the following points: system functionality, system cost, system development risk, development time 2. This is why the F-35 is defined as a software-intensive system. Fighter Variants The U.S. Air Force wants the F-35A conventional take off and landing (CTOL) variant. The F-35A is the smallest and lightest variant that includes an internal gun. The U.S. Air Force wants to replace the F-16 Fighting Falcon and A-10 thunderbolt II. The
  • JSF Risk Analysis 7 F-35 must match the F-16’s high-g performance. This variant is schedule to be available in 2013. The U.S. Marine Corps wants the F-35B short take off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant. The F-35B can take off and land vertically. This aircraft is to replace the F/A-18 Hornet, AV-8B Harrier II, and EA-6B Prowler. The F-35B will be the first Figure 2: Fighter variants. STOVL fighter that can go supersonic. There are strict weight requirements for this version. This variant is schedule to be available in 2012. The U.S. Navy wants the F-35C carrier variant (CV). The Navy wants to replace the F-18A-D versions. This variant has larger foldable wings suitable for low speed and the overall reinforced structure for carrier landings. Carrier landings will be done automatically by computer. This variant is schedule to be available in 2015. All fighter variants are illustrated in Figure 2. Vendors & Partners The primary customer of the F-35 is the United States of America with an estimated purchase of 2,400 planes. The nine major partner nations plan to acquire over 3,100 planes. The United Kingdom is a tier 2 partner. The Netherlands and Italy are tier 3 partners. Canada, Turkey, Australia, Norway, and Denmark are tier 4 partners. Security cooperative partners are Israel and Singapore. Japan has also talked about the possibility
  • JSF Risk Analysis 8 of buying the fighter. The higher the tier, tier 1 being the highest, indicates higher monetary investment and the greater technology transfer. BAE Systems is developing the electronic warfare system, aft fuselage, empennages, tail, fuel system, flight control software, life support, and escape systems. The AN/APG-81 AESA radar is designed by Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems. The EOTS is being developed by Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems. The F-35B Rolls- Royce Lift System is patented by Lockheed Martin and built by Rolls-Royce. Pratt & Whitney will develop the F135 engine with the assistance of Hamilton Sundstrand. General Electric and Rolls-Royce will develop the F136 engine. The pentagon wanted an engine competition but one of the engines may be dropped due to cost overruns in the project as a whole. Lockheed Martin performs final assembly, overall system integration, mission systems, forward fuselage, wings, and the flight controls system. Alenia is reportedly doing all assembly in Europe except for the United Kingdom. RISK MANAGEMENT The Joint Strike Fighter program is one of the largest and most complicated military procurement programs in U.S. history. The risk involved in this project is tremendous. Both GAO and Lockheed analyzed the risks involved. Lockheed developed the F-22 Raptor air superiority fighter so they understand the risks. GAO has reported that this program may have a significant increase in cost. Lockheed is a company that has approximately 70,000 scientists/engineers; 25,000 IT professionals; 140,000 more employees; has over a 1,000 facilities; and is located world wide 3. Lockheed uses the Capability Maturation Model Integration
  • JSF Risk Analysis 9 (CMMI) to improve their software systems and practices. Lockheed incorporates Lean development in both manufacturing and software development. Development also includes evolutionary methodologies and Six-Sigma. Lockheed has a workforce management plan that respects employees and tries to increase the quality of work life. Due to the riskiness of their technologically advanced projects Lockheed had decided to implement the best business practices understanding that their success depends on the ingenuity and retention of their employees. Requirements As Lockheed decided to take on multiple requirements and met with all the stakeholders including the DoD. Lockheed must first understand all the requirements. This was an area of contention since the U.S armed forces usually compete for their budgets. Everyone wants what is the best for their needs. The U.S. Navy wanted a twin-engine fighter version because of the belief that two engines are Figure 3: F-35B. safer than one. This value is of significant importance when carrier landings are so dangerous. For the U.S Marine Corps this might be a disadvantage since two engines add more weight and the U.S Marine Corps needs an aircraft capable of STOVL. The F-35B is illustrated in Figure 3. In fact, in the near future weight issues almost got the contract cancelled. Lockheed went back to the U.S. Navy and showed them empirical data indicating that a single engine is just as safe a twin engine fighter. Now this reduces the risk of the plane being over weight but adds to
  • JSF Risk Analysis 10 another risk… speed. Generally speaking two engines go faster than one but through risk analysis they decided it was simply more cost efficient to use one engine. Through the requirement phase you often had this exchange and compromise. Other problems arise from the strategic verses tactical requirements. For example the military wants an advanced fighter, only second in air-to-air survivability to the F-22 Raptor, cheaply as the cost of technology is on the rise in the defense industry. The strategic requirement of having the best strike fight affects the overall cost per unit. At the same time you have some of the more advanced Russian Sukhoi fighters that are very competitive on foreign markets. There is an added risk that the Russians might develop a fighter that is capable of stealth due to the F-117 Night Hawk being shot down by the Yugoslav Army on March 27, 1999. This F-35 is developed to be exported as well. This adds more risk within the requirement phase. Competitors, with advanced technology, will try to outbid the U.S. on foreign defense contracts. The F-35 sales are limited due to the threat of technology transfer to adversaries. Some countries, like the U.K., technology transfer is allowed. The other few allies, that may receive the F-35, might not be allowed to access specific sensitive systems. In fact, the U.K. had to go to the U.S. congress and have them agree with this technology transfer. The requirements are a balancing act involving business, technology, managing expectations, and ensuring U.S. air superiority to 2040. Lockheed identifies these risks and tried to reduce them as much as possible within the requirement and design phases using evolutionary methodology. The risks that can not be eliminated are entered into a risk response plan. Even though many of the risks are not published some of the controversy, involving foreign F-35 sales, led to various responses to reduce concern.
  • JSF Risk Analysis 11 One of the responses involved allowing F-35 partners access to classified information including a review of the statistical analysis used to determine the F-35 kill ratio with other known threats. Australia has been very concerned with F-35 sales since most of the countries in the vicinity will buy Sukhoi fighters. These advanced fighters are noted for having large radars and being extremely maneuverable. Some think they might be more maneuverable than the F-35. Australia even has considered acquiring the F-22 and did talk with the U.S. Congress about lifting the F-22 international sales restriction. If the Russians find a way to eliminate the stealth advantage some think a one-on-one dog fight could be Figure 4: F-35 spherical awareness. disastrous for the F-35. All things being equal you will want to buy the cheaper fighter. In this case it would be the Sukhoi. Lockheed thinks dog fighting is over due to the emergence of off-boresight targeting. Figure 4 illustrates the spherical situation awareness that allows off-boresight targeting. Regardless of the enemy’s location fire and forget. No maneuvering necessary. The problem is that the U.S. thought the era of the dog fighter was over in Vietnam but they were wrong. . Technology Technology is always a concern because defense contractors must incorporate new technology into their designs. The Joint Strike Fighter started in the 1990s and must incorporate the newest technologies from the late 2000s. This will add incredible risk to
  • JSF Risk Analysis 12 any project but it is also necessary to secure air dominance until 2040. On March 2006 the GAO produced a highly critical report stating that the overlap between test completion and production is risky. Often contract schedules are influenced by DoD current and future threat assessments. These assessments can change on a dime. The threat assessments look at the U.S. military’s readiness to respond, equipment, and other factors. All weapons systems have certain roles and life-spans. When there is a gap between decommissioning of equipment and its replacement that is considered a risk to national security. This risk can be exploited by any country with their new equipment. To eliminate this risk the JSF program must be completed within a schedule. To make the schedule Lockheed started low-rate initial production using cost-reimbursement contracts. The other option is to limit the technology and add additional future upgrades, called “blocks”, to the F-35. The opposition to this states that doing the majority of testing and development immediately might reduce cost later on. In the mid-course risk reduction plan Lockheed cut 2 test aircraft, reduced the number of test flights, used ground facilities to test, and used various other fighter test-beds. A fighter test-bed is putting F-35 components on another test aircraft that can simulate the F-35 during sub- system tests. This is more cost effective than using expensive prototypes. The technological development has been increasingly difficult with software- intensive systems. The GAO has stated that almost all U.S. Air Force projects have difficulty achieving cost, schedule, and performance requirements. Carnegie Mellon is teaching something called the Capability Maturity Model Integration Acquisition Model (CMMI-AM). The model helps with the acquisition and risk involved with software- intensive systems. This model takes into account how to evaluate both suppliers and their
  • JSF Risk Analysis 13 software products. It also emphasizes procedures to track supplies and monitor vendor performance. Emphasis is also place on software development of large scale systems. The Joint Program Office (JPO) was created for the joint strike fighter to keep all stakeholders in informed about contracts and risk. The stakeholders should be involved in all technical reviews. Quality Assessment of Software- Intensive System Architecture (QUASAR) was developed to assess the quality of software and Figure 5: F-35 cockpit. training was provided. Other assessment tools were provided as well. The acquisition of this software is complicated. The U.S. military increasingly turns to commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software to limit the overall project cost. Using COTS software might increase the F-35’s vulnerability to electronic warfare. There is always the possibility that both COST hardware and software might not be able to handle the extreme conditions. Lockheed does evaluate all software. This reduces the risk of system failure later on during flight tests. Figure 5 illustrates the system integration in the cockpit. Lessons Learned In the 2007 International Support Equipment Conference, Gary Baxter talks about lessons learned in the JSF F-35 project 4. The requirements need to be understood by all stake holders. In the statement of work (SOW) the word “shall” might not mean “will”. This gets even more complicated when requirements get translated into different
  • JSF Risk Analysis 14 languages. The suppliers must give monthly status reports. All parties must review design documents for clarity and omissions. Material and supply delivery must be verified early on. Top-down architect and bottom-up detailed design is expected. Plan to spend more time on up-front sub-system definitions. Since the F-35’s systems are networked within a net-centric warfare environment much time is needed to verify interfaces, functions, input/output values, and tolerances. Reviews must be conducted on a regular basis using either NetMeeting or teleconferencing. Be aware of language barriers in all forms of communication. System Requirement Review (SRR), Preliminary Design Reviews (PDR), Critical Design Reviews (CDR), and Program Management Reviews (PMR) are required. A PDR did find a weight problem with the F-35 that led to changes in requirements. At the time of discover this may have added a 16-22 month delay and additional cost. Cost overruns were largely due to design maturation efforts, schedule extensions, and revised labor. All vendors need to understand the environment in which their item will be used and all items must be checked for conformity. Each purchased item must go through qualification testing and user acceptance testing. All items must have proper readable barcodes and must be tracked using a reader. The label should be made of durable material. Logistics should account for Customs and licensing in their schedule. This might seem small but if this happens in a large international project, like the F-35, it can have a major impact. Risk management is an important and large part of this international program. Risks must be identified, categorized, and tracking. Risk reviews should be done in all design reviews. According to the GAO the JSF enter system development without demonstrating the maturity of the critical systems working together and major risks still remained. The
  • JSF Risk Analysis 15 design was not well defined and led to requirement changes due to weight challenges. This increased costs by $4.9 million dollars and added 18 months to the project 5. Critical design reviews were delayed by 16-22 months. When 85% of the engineering designs were due only 35% have been submitted. The prototype used did not have it systems fully integrated at the time of demonstration. These systems were tested apart from one another as technology was still maturing. Since production line has not proven it can develop the F-35 efficiently the DoD used cost reimbursement type Figure 6: F-35A in flight. contracts. Fixed price contracts are only used for normal production with a mature system. In 2004, some experts say the cost increased by 19.4% due to design maturation. Lockheed stated to the GAO, in March of 2004, that most of the design is completed and they resolved the weight problem. This program incorporates a spiral methodology and software integration is being done sooner than any other legacy fighter program. Please take into account that the JSF Program is currently ongoing and the lessons learned will be modified in the future. Some of the information remains classified. Figure 6 illustrates the F-35A in flight. CONCLUSIONS The JSF program is an indication of things to come for the defense industry. Not all the information was made available but, from my research, risk analysis needs to
  • JSF Risk Analysis 16 evolve more to keep up with the defense industry. With that being stated, you must also understand the environment. From the very beginning these requirements were difficult and changed over time to keep the technology current. Lockheed must keep to a schedule to avoid any national security risks and their product must be one of the most advanced until 2040. The JSF program needs to improve in a few areas. All stakeholders should be present during reviews and all documents should be verified when translated into different languages. Risk analysis should be brought up in all meetings. Requirement changes need to be minimized and there needs to be DoD & Lockheed standardization of when additional features can be added. There needs to be a greater emphasis placed on business risk when products will be sold on the foreign market. All products and suppliers need to be monitored. Deliveries need to be tracked and supplies need to be verified for quality. I suggest building a database to evaluate all suppliers and keep records. This can be used for vendor selection reducing the chances of late deliveries. There seems to be difficulty, in Lockheed’s spiral methodology, baselining design documents and I think the majority of this was due to reducing weight by streamlining the aircraft. Structural architecture has significant risk in aircraft design since it is static and everything is dependent on it. All you avionics, wiring, fuel locations, weapon departments, etc… depend on the structural architecture. Greater emphasis needs to be placed on structural architecture to reduce this risk. One of the biggest concerns is technology maturation. The Lockheed engineers must look ahead and decide will this specific advance technology be mature enough to be included in the near future. Now they bring out their crystal ball. This assessment adds
  • JSF Risk Analysis 17 risk but it must be done to insure U.S. air dominance for years to come. This is what the GAO complains about. The GAO also added criticism that systems were not integrated early on and were tested using fighter test-beds. This was done to reduce the cost overruns due to the weight issues with the F-35B. The F-35B is doing something that has never been done before. Lockheed is making an STOVL strike aircraft supersonic. I honestly think this schedule was too tight. Working on everything concurrently minimizes the time but simple changes in one system might trickle down on have a large impact elsewhere. For example, over weight engines or radar can lead to the whole design being over weight. The weight reduction risk response plan is applied to every system since the speed requirement is critical. The schedule did too many things concurrently and Lockheed needs to calculate more error into their estimates. Lockheed must also do a better job in managing their customer’s expectations. What is needed is a new approach to risk management that incorporates the lessons learned here. Most military contracts will be jointly funded to reduce cost. The JSF was the guinea pig. Developing a system, within in a net-centric environment, simply adds to the complexity. You will begin to see risk management being more proactive and it will incorporate a larger role in defense contracts. Emphasis will be placed on international management of vendors and suppliers, requirements, communication, managing expectations, technology integration and acquisition, process improvement, schedule estimation, sales, and cost reduction. The JSF program is still active so let’s wait and see how Lockheed handles risk in the near future.
  • JSF Risk Analysis 18 CITED REFERENCES 1. Lockheed Martin [Internet]. Bethesda (MD): F-35 Lightning II Future is Flying; [cited 2009 Mar 17]. Available from: http://www.lockheedmartin.com/data/assets/aeronautics/products/f35/A07-20536AF-35B roc.pdf. 2. Information Technology for European Advancement. Software Intensive Systems in the Future. [report on the Internet]. Internet: IDATE; 2005 [cited 2009 Mar 20]. Available from: http://www.itea2.org/attachments/150/ITEA_SIS_in__the_future__Final_Report.pdf. 3. Johnson RO. Workshop on Hard Questions for Process Improvement in Multimode Environments [Internet]. [cited 2009 Mar 17]. Available from: http://www.sei.cmu.edu/prime/documents/JohnsonPRIMEWorkshop.pdf. 4. Baxter G. Lightning II F-35 Lessons Learned. In: International Support Equipment Conference; 2007 [cited 2009 Mar 17]. p. 1-29. Available from: http://www.lockheedmartin.com/data/assets/sts/ISEC2007/Day2-4- ISECLessonsLearned_05_22_2007.ppt. 5. United States Government Accountability Office (US). Defense Acquisitions Assessment of Selected Major Weapon Programs Support. Report to Congressional Committees. Washington (DC): United States Government Accountability Office (US); 2005 Mar [cited 2009 mar 20]; GAO-05-301. p. 79-80. Available from: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05301.pdf.
  • JSF Risk Analysis 19 NON-CITED REFERENCES 6. Strategic Thought Group [Internet]. Washington (DC): Risk Management Case Study; 2007 [cited 2009 Mar 17]. Available from: http://www.strategicthought.com/Assets/Downloadablefile/EU-Lockheed-Case- Study-15363.pdf. 7. Software Engineering Institute. NAVAIR/MITRE/SEI (NMS) Collaboration. In: Acquisition of Software-Intensive Systems Conference; 2003 Jan 28-30 [cited 2009 Mar 17]. p. 1-41. Available from: http://www.sei.cmu.edu/programs/acquisition-support/conf/ 2003-presentations/hageman.pdf. 8. Gallagher B, Shrum S. Improving Defense Software-Intensive Systems Acquisitions with CMMI-AM [Internet]. Software Engineering Institute: Carnegie Mellon; 2005 [cited 2009 Mar 17]. Available from: http://www.sei.cmu.edu/news-at- sei/features/2005/1/pdf/feature-1-2005-1.pdf. 9. Introduction to CMMI Acquisition Module (CMMI-AM) Module 6 [Internet]. Software Engineering Institute: Carnegie Mellon; 2005 [cited 2009 Mar 17]. Available from: http://www.sei.cmu.edu/programs/acquisition- support/presentations/tutorialmod6.pdf. 10. Introduction to CMMI Acquisition Module (CMMI-AM) Module 5 [Internet]. Software Engineering Institute: Carnegie Mellon; 2005 [cited 2009 Mar 17]. Available from: http://www.sei.cmu.edu/programs/acquisition- support/presentations/tutorialmod5.pdf.
  • JSF Risk Analysis 20 11. Introduction to CMMI Acquisition Module (CMMI-AM) Module 1 [Internet]. Software Engineering Institute: Carnegie Mellon; 2005 [cited 2009 Mar 17]. Available from: https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=44485&lang=en-US.