Connecting the Dots
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Connecting the Dots

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Presented at InnoTech Oklahoma 2013. All rights reserved.

Presented at InnoTech Oklahoma 2013. All rights reserved.

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  • Metasploit like framework to lessen the learning curve

Transcript

  • 1. Connecting the dots…. Footprints in the ether, and other musings. Sean Satterlee – Principal Security Engineer
  • 2. Disclaimer THIS IS PURELY FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSE. Myself, any identities that I may use, Net Source, Inc., NetSourceLabs, NetSourceSecure and any other organizations that I am affiliated with cannot be held liable for any negligence or illegal activity that may result in the disclosure of the information included in this briefing.
  • 3. About me intentionally left blank
  • 4. A “howto” or “readme.txt” • A quick guide to a talk by me. • Be prepared – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – Topics will be all over the place I will chase rabbits I use profanity to make my point I am passionate about my work If you get up during this talk, be prepared to be heckled. Did I mention that I will jump around on topics? I will bring in points that I find interesting, while they might not be germane to the exact topic, you may find them useful. If I switch languages for a certain word or concept. Do not get angry. Write it down, google it, you can figure it out for yourself later. I may repeat things every now again. I will chase rabbits I need to make a “logic-chart” for following my talks I should also remember to start using the “notes” feature for powerpoint. I like it when people clap immediately after pseudo profound statements. I do not like the obligatory applause at the end of my talks My talks are interactive. Several of my friends are in the crowd – – Sometimes I will just skip slides because I don’t feel like talking about them. It’s alright though, you can download this slide deck The detailed sections are out of order. Sorry, I don’t want to fix it. • They are not “plants”, but I will sometimes call on them to help me remember antic dotes.
  • 5. Business Intelligence? • A nice name for Corporate Espionage • Knowing the business model for a given target (read: client), and you will further understand the areas of their infrastructure that may be less guarded • Knowing more about your target will lead you to appropriate attack vectors
  • 6. Dox? • Is it necessary to publish this information? • In short, the answer is no.
  • 7. HOWEVER… • Having information is one thing. • Displaying that you have this information is another. • An entire generation raised with the notion that “knowledge is power” has caused this. • Displaying this information as a means to show power and to hinder some else‟s operations is something completely different.
  • 8. Forms of Reconnaissance and Intel Gathering • Physical • Social • OSINT
  • 9. Subsets of Physical • Drive-bys – Done at multiple times throughout the day/night. – Establish key employees and work shifts – Use a rental car with a contour cam (HD), just leave it. • Wardrive – Don’t get too close – Use everything you can in BT5, or Kali • Dumpster Dive – Do this at night – Avoid the critters
  • 10. • Get a tour, make note of how physical security is managed. – Organics – CCTV – RFID – Magstrips – Electronic Keypads – “Secure” keylocks
  • 11. • Make note of the badges, if you are conducting a social, you may need to create one. • It doesn’t need to “work”, Just pass a glance.
  • 12. • RFID? Sure, we can do that…
  • 13. • Magstrips? Yeah, that too. Info available on instructables.com
  • 14. Keylocks • Seriously? Are you kidding me? • Medco, Chubb, and Bonowi keys are now available for download to be printed on your reprap
  • 15. Physical Locks
  • 16. Security Keypads Type Procedure Sentex Keypads ***00000099#* DoorKing *029999 AeGIS #,0 (same time) followed by 0000 Elite “Program” button, followed by 7777 Linear #,9,# 123456 add your code by: 0,1,#,%desired code% Multicode 1234 (no lockout, just keep pecking)
  • 17. Keys to a successful “Social” • Accurate data • Susceptible targets • Audacity
  • 18. USB drops and rubber duckies
  • 19. CD/USB drop • Curiosity killed the cat • Think of this as a „reverse dead drop‟. Pseudo public place, and you WANT it to be found. – You may ask yourself, “who would actually plug this in?” – Now tell yourself, “too many people that probably work with me.”
  • 20. You knew this would come up
  • 21. Other methods • The USB drop isn‟t always needed – If you can gain physical access: • a rubber-ducky can be used to drop a payload and a reverse, persistent shell – If you can‟t gain physical access: • You can squeeze a rubber-ducky into anything that uses a USB connection. Ship it to someone in the target company. Human stupidity will take over, and SOMEONE will plug it in.
  • 22. Just how easy is that? • Not calling anyone out, but certain people in this industry are literally, batting 1000 using this technique. – But seriously, how easy is it?
  • 23. I was going to make a political joke here, but… well, let’s just skip that part as I don’t really have any politics.
  • 24. OSINT • TheHarvester • Maltego • NetGlub • Spokeo • Palantir
  • 25. Quality of Sources • None of these tools are worth the processing power of launching them if you don’t know where to look.
  • 26. Sources, you say? • • • • • • • • Spokeo Anywho Lexis-Nexis Ancestry Public Records for target area ESRI – GIS data County Assessors office Social Networks – – – – – Twitter Facebook Myspace Google+ Youtube
  • 27. Twitter?
  • 28. Flickr? Why flickr? • Because sometimes smart people do very stupid things. • You can do something about it…
  • 29. OR…
  • 30. Examples, you say? • Users will come up with a “clever” password… – And reuse it. – And reuse it. – And reuse it.
  • 31. So what comes of this behavior?
  • 32. Again
  • 33. And again…
  • 34. Why Facebook?
  • 35. Inadvertent Excess • Go into the Kinko‟s closest to your target. • Say you “forgot your thumbdrive” • They show you a box, you say “that‟s it!” • YAHTZEE!
  • 36. A quick note about ‘excessed equipment’ • Please wipe configs on hardware and remove drives • 4th Saturday sales have yielded quite a few Cis** devices with current configs for an organization STILL ON THEM.
  • 37. Recon-ng • Recon gets it’s own slide, because. Well, it’s cool.
  • 38. Create your own transforms • There is a wealth of information in public databases – Property taxes – Marriages, divorces, VPO’s, traffic citations, etc – Foreclosures – Birth records, death certificates – blogs
  • 39. Quality of Product • Your information is only as good as your starting point – Use CORRECT and ACCURATE information. Do not guess.
  • 40. Otherwise… • The signal to noise ration is horrendous This entire section is total junk and incorrect data
  • 41. Social Engineering • I will not pretend that neuro-linguistics has gotten me past some serious security measures. – However, a fake accent did get ri0t and I quite a few drinks in Vegas. • How does it work? – You appeal to a person’s sensibility and logic.
  • 42. Seriously though, what does SE get us? • It gets us physical access to a location to actually DO the CD/USB drop • If the target is in a shared office location, hangout in the smoker’s area. – – – – Listen Sniff RFID Snarf bluetooth Pay attention to visual layout of ID badges in case you need to fabricate one – Possibly tailgate a person into a secure area
  • 43. • Become a customer/client of the target. • Remember, people are inherently stupid and willing to trust. Exploit this. – “Give them an ounce of quality lies, and you will get a pound of truth in return.” - me
  • 44. Qualify your statements and questions • Don’t ask stupid questions that are DIRECT. • You will always need to fill some gaps, it’s important to do this without inferring a fictional story. • Be knowledgeable of the subject matter at hand. – This means taking an interest in whatever widget you are trying to gather information about
  • 45. Pushing in • So what options do I have to exploit a location using the information I have gathered? – – – – – CD/USB drops Social Engineering Client-side Attacks Intranet access portals with weak user/pass combos Sub-domains for test/development environments to attack via web applications to extract data – Complete Breach of network via wireless to create a C&C
  • 46. Wait, I just said wireless “techie LUsers” – let me tell you why they are your biggest problem.
  • 47. “Why?” you ask? • Because they are the ones that take it upon themselves to create and fix things with only half of the ‘larger picture’ • Which, in turn, just ends up causing more problems • Like?
  • 48. Rogue AP’s anyone?
  • 49. People who build “labs” at work
  • 50. How this can cause issues • Vast majority of ‘labs’ are default passwords • Rogue AP’s lack strong encryption or any at all • A shared password used over an open wifi connection • Unused accounts with the “default P@ssw0rd!”
  • 51. How is this remedied? • • • • Strengthen your policies Educate users Educate users (yes, that’s twice on purpose) Self audit – Old machine accounts in AD – Maintenance (service) accounts – Accounts that have never been used
  • 52. In conclusion • Try harder • Enable yourself and your staff – Come to local hacker meetings – We will gladly show you stuff • No such thing as a stupid question. – Just stupid people, that don’t ask questions.
  • 53. Any questions that relate to the actual topic? • I like to eat steak cooked medium rare • I have two cats, a dog, a planted aquarium and a entire school of carnivorous fish • My favorite color is clear • Etc…
  • 54. Errata http://netsourcelabs.com/ Email: sean@netsourcesecure.com Twitter: @seanwayne http://www.linkedin.com/in/satterleesean