Legally Binding Outcome Copenhagen_Briefing _16 Nov09
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    Legally Binding Outcome Copenhagen_Briefing _16 Nov09 Legally Binding Outcome Copenhagen_Briefing _16 Nov09 Document Transcript

    • How
to
define
and
secure
 a
fair,
ambitious
and
legally
binding
outcome
from
Copenhagen
 
 • Copenhagen
has
to
be
the
place
and
the
moment
to
strike
a
deal
on
the
fair,
ambitious
and
 binding
legal
agreement
upon
which
commitments
by
all
Parties
must
rest
in
order
to
 secure
the
survival
of
countries,
cultures
and
ecosystems.

 • Achieving
this
is
primarily
up
to
industrialized
countries,
who
need
to
unlock
key
 roadblocks.
 • Political
agreements
reached
on
the
key
issues
need
to
be
captured
already
in
Copenhagen
 as
legal
text
of
a
legal
instrument
that
will
require
ratification.

 • Having
only
a
set
of
separate
COP
and
CMP
decisions
as
an
outcome
from
Copenhagen
 would
be
unacceptable.
 • Key
actors
in
the
process,
including
the
upcoming
Danish
COP
presidency
must
change
their
 current
strategies
and
start
pursuing
a
legally
binding
outcome
from
Copenhagen.

 • The
mandate
of
the
PreCOP
to
the
COP
Presidency
and
KP
and
LCA
chairs
must
be
to
 facilitate
adoption
of
legal
instrument(s)
in
Copenhagen.
 
 What
is
at
the
heart
of
the
political
struggle
for
Copenhagen?
 
 In
Barcelona
Yvo
De
Boer
outlined
his
plan
for
the
Copenhagen
outcome,
suggesting
that
there
 wasn’t
enough
time
to
complete
a
treaty
or
treaties
anymore.
However,
it
is
clear
that
this
plan
B
 consisting
of
an
elaborate
list
of
COP
decisions
and
annexes
would
require
no
less
work
or
time.
In
 reality
what
is
lacking
is
trust
among
parties.
Heads
of
States
and
ministers
must
ensure
as
a
priority
 that
COP15
resolves
the
key
underlying
conflicts.
Otherwise
the
Copenhagen
outcome
as
well
as
any
 process
following
from
it
will
be
doomed
to
fail.
 
 1) Avoiding
catastrophic
climate
change
is
not
possible
unless
all
big
emitters
commit
to
 ambitious
action.
However,
the
differentiated
responsibilities
must
remain
clear.
 Industrialized
countries
must
take
their
fair
share
of
the
global
effort
required
to
stay
well
 below
2
degrees
warming
and
agree
on
their
Quantified
Emission
Reduction
Commitments,
 guided
by
the
Vienna
UNFCCC
conclusions
they
adopted
two
years
ago.1
This
will
enable
 major
developing
countries
to
bring
their
ambitious
domestic
actions
under
a
legally
binding
 treaty.
 2) In
order
to
secure
the
Kyoto
Protocol
and
its
architecture,
the
Industrialized
countries
that
 have
ratified
the
Kyoto
Protocol
must
take
on
a
second
commitment
period,
and
the
United
 States
must
take
on
commitments
that
are
comparable
in
ambition
and
legal
nature
to
those
 of
the
Kyoto
ratifyers,
in
order
to
ensure
that
efforts
among
industrialized
countries
are
 comparable.
 1 th At
the
4 
session
of
the
AWG‐KP
in
Vienna
August
2007
Parties
recognised
that
achieving
IPCC’s
lowest
 stabilisation
levels
would
require
Annex
I
Parties
as
a
group
to
reduce
emissions
in
a
range
of
25–40
per
cent
below
 1990
levels
by
2020.
They
also
noted
that
this
range
does
not
take
into
account
lifestyle
changes
or
wider
use
of
 flexibility
mechanisms
which
both
have
potential
of
increasing
the
reduction
range.
Parties
considered
that
this
 range
provides
useful
initial
parameters
for
the
overall
level
of
ambition
of
Annex
I
targets,
and
that
it
would
be
 reviewed
in
the
light
of
other
information,
such
as
on
lower
(than
450
ppm)
stabilization
scenarios.
Online:
 http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/awg4/eng/04.pdf 1
    • 3) Fast
start
finance
is
not
enough.
Vulnerable
countries
are
already
forced
to
adapt
to
 problems
they
didn’t
cause,
and
paying
a
high
price
for
it
both
in
monetary
terms
and
with
 their
homes
and
lives.
While
immediate
funding
is
important,
Copenhagen
needs
to
unlock
 the
fundamental
issues
related
to
long‐term
finance
solutions,
namely
the
scale,
assessed
 contributions,
innovative
sources,
governance
and
disbursement
of
industrialized
countries’
 finance
commitments.
This
money
needs
to
be
new
and
additional,
and
be
committed
and
 provided
on
top
of
developed
countries’
aid
targets
(0.7%
ODA)
including,
to
support
 mitigation
and
adaptation
and
also
solutions
that
address
insurance,
loss
and
damage.
 
 Once
agreement
has
been
found
on
these
key
matters,
agreement
on
the
global
ambition
and
 other
fundamental
matters
including
the
legal
form
of
the
agreed
outcome
can
be
found.
Hence,
 what
is
needed
is
not
more
time
but
political
will.
 
 What
defines
a
comprehensive
and
legally
binding
outcome?
 
 In
Copenhagen
Heads
of
States
and
ministers
have
to
secure
clarity
on
the
following
key
aspects
of
a
 comprehensive,
legally
binding
outcome:
 
 1)
Resolve
all
crunch
issues:
Come
to
agreement
on
all
substantive
and
legal
issues
of
the
Bali
Action
 Plan.
 • The
Copenhagen
outcome
has
to
include
full
clarity
on
the
global
ambition,
mitigation
for
 developed
countries
(economy
wide
targets
and
long
term
plans)
and
developing
countries
 (actions
and
long
term
plans),
finance
and
technology
support
(level,
sources,
institutions),
 and
the
adaptation,
REDD,
and
maritime/aviation
frameworks
as
well
as
the
basic
 architecture
for
implementation,
the
compliance
regime
for
industrialized
countries
(building
 on
the
Kyoto
system)
and
facilitation
mechanisms
for
developing
countries.
 • It
needs
to
cover
a
sufficient
level
of
detail
on
intentions
and
outcome,
so
as
to
not
allow
for
 ex‐post
negotiation
that
creates
loopholes
weakening
the
agreed
ambition.
 • Any
important
unresolved
issues
must
not
be
postponed,
as
they
would
be
sidelined
if
they
 were
not
part
of
the
package
deal.
 
 2)
Agreement
on
what
each
Party
is
legally
committed
to
do:
This
includes
the
type
and
level
of
 commitment
of
each
Party,
decisions
over
the
system
of
measuring,
reporting
and
verification
of
 mitigation
and
finance
commitments
and
actions,
the
role
of
compliance
and
enforcement,
including
 international
standards
for
accounting
and
commitments,
all
of
which
are
key
to
the
international
 architecture.
Commitments
that
equate
only
to
“pledge
and
review”
have
little
credibility
and
are
not
 acceptable.


 
 3)
Agreement
on
the
legal
foundation
and
architecture:
The
legal
foundation
of
the
agreement
 needs
to
be
decided
in
Copenhagen,
namely
by
giving
clarity
on
which
legal
instrument(s)
will
bind
 parties
to
their
commitments.
Importantly,
the
agreement
on
substance
needs
to
be
captured
in
the
 form
of
treaty
text.
The
legal
outcome
must
build
on
and
enhance
the
Kyoto
Protocol
and
the
 Convention,
but
not
replace
them.

 
 4)
An
agreement
that
cannot
be
reopened:
The
objective
has
to
be
that
the
agreement
struck
in
 Copenhagen
is
not
open
for
renegotiation,
only
open
to
further
refinement
that
strengthens
the
legal
 agreement.
This
means
that
also
“entry‐in‐to‐force”
language
will
be
important
to
include.
 2
    • 
 There
is
no
convincing
argument
to
be
found
as
to
why
postponing
any
of
the
above
issues
by
half
a
 year
or
more
would
in
any
way
increase
the
likelihood
of
getting
a
better
outcome.
 
 How
to
lock
political
agreement
into
legal
form
 
 Adoption
of
protocol(s)
in
Copenhagen:
The
most
secure,
legally
&
politically
sound
outcome
of
 Copenhagen
is
the
adoption
of
the
political
agreement
in
form
of
ratifiable
and
complete
treaty
text
 of
a
legal
instrument.
Per
our
proposal
for
the
appropriate
overall
legal
form
this
would
be
a
linked
 two‐Protocol
outcome,
consisting
of
an
amended
Kyoto
Protocol
and
a
new
Copenhagen
Protocol,
 accompanied
by
a
set
of
COP
and
CMP
decisions.
This
addresses
the
current
political
situation
best
 (while
recognizing
two
parallel
instruments
would
propose
some
legal
challenges).
If
necessary,
 details
could
be
finalised
in
form
of
COP
decisions
during
2010.

 
 What
would
be
an
unacceptable
outcome
of
Copenhagen
 
 Leaving
Copenhagen
with
only
a
political
declaration
or
COP
decision(s)
would
be
a
grave
waste
of
 the
momentum
of
the
Copenhagen
process,
and
an
unacceptable
outcome.
The
same
is
true
for
any
 language
that
leaves
open
the
question
of
what
countries
are
committed
to,
or
what
the
legal
nature
 of
their
commitments
are,
 
 The
Danish
Presidency
is
aiming
for
a
“Copenhagen
political
agreement”
with
series
of
“political
 commitments”,
suggesting
that
key
fundamentals
could
be
captured
into
legal
form
only
after
 Copenhagen.
This
is
a
recipe
for
a
long
process
with
unclear
results,
which
would
also
risk
the
whole
 Kyoto
Protocol
with
its
architecture.
This
option
is
way
too
weak
as
a
framework
for
a
future
 climate
regime.
It
must
be
taken
off
the
table.
Countries
can
and
must
solve
all
key
issues
in
 Copenhagen
and
capture
the
agreements
in
the
framework
of
legal
instruments
under
both
the
LCA
 and
the
KP.

 
 The
unique
momentum
of
Copenhagen
must
be
fully
utilized
to
break
the
deadlock
 
 Very
strong
political
momentum
has
been
built
up
around
the
Copenhagen
summit.
Thousands
of
 journalists
and
tens
of
thousands
of
engaged
citizens
will
be
present
to
witness
world
leaders
to
 make
the
breakthrough
they
have
promised
on
climate
change.
It
is
crucial
to
make
full
use
of
this
 moment,
to
reach
decisions
and
to
express
them
in
legal
text
that
leaves
no
room
for
reinterpretation
 afterwards.
Very
crucially
this
applies
also
to
the
shared
vision
that
must
not
be
fudged
into
a
political
 declaration.
The
shared
vision,
captured
in
legal
text
under
both
track
outcomes,
is
what
the
world
 desperately
needs,
recognising
the
right
to
survival
of
all
cultures,
committing
to
keep
overall
 warming
as
far
below
2
degrees
as
possible,
with
a
view
of
returning
to
below
1.5C
as
soon
as
 possible,
and
consequently
peaking
global
emissions
between
2013‐2017
and
capturing
main
 agreements
of
all
Bali
Action
Building
blocks.

 
 Not
agreeing
to
a
legally
binding
outcome
as
defined
in
this
briefing
can
be
equated
with
Parties
not
 having
managed
to
solve
the
crunch
issues
that
maintain
grave
mistrust.
Currently,
unlocking
these
 issues
is
mainly
up
to
industrialised
countries.
Every
year
of
delay
will
cost
lives,
but
also
economical
 losses
worth
of
500
bln
USD
per
year
in
the
energy
sector
alone,
as
assessed
by
the
IEA.
 3