ISSN: 2277 – 9043                  International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science and Electronics Engineer...
ISSN: 2277 – 9043                   International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science and Electronics Enginee...
ISSN: 2277 – 9043                   International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science and Electronics Enginee...
ISSN: 2277 – 9043                   International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science and Electronics Enginee...
Upcoming SlideShare
Loading in...5
×

12 15

372

Published on

Published in: Technology, Education
0 Comments
0 Likes
Statistics
Notes
  • Be the first to comment

  • Be the first to like this

No Downloads
Views
Total Views
372
On Slideshare
0
From Embeds
0
Number of Embeds
0
Actions
Shares
0
Downloads
17
Comments
0
Likes
0
Embeds 0
No embeds

No notes for slide

12 15

  1. 1. ISSN: 2277 – 9043 International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science and Electronics Engineering Volume 1, Issue 6, August 2012 Detection/Removal of Black Hole Attack in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks Sandeep Lalasaheb Dhende1, Prof. Mrs. D. M. Bhalerao2 Department of E&TC, Sinhgad College of Engg., Pune, India. technique to identify black attack and a solution toAbstract- The inherent features (such as-open medium, discover a safe route avoiding black hole attack.dynamically changing network topology, lack ofcentralized monitoring and management point, and lack II. BLACK HOLE ATTACK PROBLEMof a clear line of defense) of the MANET make itvulnerable to a wide range of attacks. There is no In an ad hoc network that uses the DSR/AODVguarantee that a communication path is free from protocol, a black hole node pretends to have a freshmalicious or compromised nodes which deliberately enough routes to all destinations requested b all thewish to disrupt the network communication. So nodes and absorb the network traffic.protecting the mobile ad-hoc network from maliciousattacks is very important and challenging issue. In this When source node broadcasts the RREQ messagepaper we address the problem of packet forwardingmisbehavior and propose a mechanism to detect and for any destination, the black hole node immediatelyremove the black attack. responds with the RREP message and with next hope details. This message is perceived as, if it is comingKeywords: ad hoc networks, black hole, security, from the destination or from a node which has a freshrouting, AODV enough route to the destination. The source node assume that the destination is behind the black hole I. INTRODUCTION node and next hope node and perceives the other RREP packets with next hope node coming from Ad hoc network is a wireless network without other nodes [5].having any fixed infrastructure. Each mobile node inan ad hoc network moves arbitrarily and acts as botha router and a host [1]. A wireless ad-hoc networkconsists of a collection of "peer" mobile nodes thatare capable of communicating with each otherwithout help from a fixed infrastructure. Theinterconnections between nodes are capable ofchanging on a continual and arbitrary basis. Nodeswithin each others radio range communicate directlyvia wireless links, while those that are far apart useother nodes as relays. Nodes usually share the samephysical media; they transmit and acquire signals atthe same frequency band. However, due to theirinherent characteristics of dynamic topology and lackof centralized management security, MANET isvulnerable to various kinds of attacks [2]. Black hole Figure 1. Propagation of RREQ and RREP from A to Eattack is one of many possible attacks in MANET.Black hole attack can occur when the malicious node The source node then start to send out its dataon the path directly attacks the data traffic and packets to the black hole node and after small timeintentionally drops, delay or alter the data traffic interval to the other node, trusting that these packetspassing through it [3] [4]. There is lots of detection will reach to the destination either by one link [6].and defense mechanisms to eliminate the intruder thatcarry out the black hole attack. We present a In the following illustrated Figure 2, imagine a malicious node „M‟. When node „A‟ broadcast a 12 All Rights Reserved © 2012 IJARCSEE
  2. 2. ISSN: 2277 – 9043 International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science and Electronics Engineering Volume 1, Issue 6, August 2012RREQ packets, nodes „B‟ „D‟ and node „M‟ receivesit. Node „M‟ being a malicious node does not checkup with its routing table for the requested route tonode „E‟. Hence, it immediately sends back a RREP packet,claiming a route to the destination. Node „A‟ receivesthe RREP from „M‟ ahead of the RREP from „B‟ and„D‟. Node „A‟ assumes that the route through „M‟ is theshortest route and sends any packet to the destinationthrough it. When the node „A‟ sends data to „M‟, itabsorbs all the data and thus behaves like a „Blackhole‟. However in that solution next hope alsobehaves as a malicious node they cannot identify it. Figure 3. Detection of Black hole According to this proposed solution the requesting node without sending the DATA packets to the reply node at once, it has to wait till other replies. After receiving the first request it sets timer in the „Timer Expired Table‟, for collecting the further requests from different nodes. It will store the „Sequence Figure 2. Black hole attack in AODV number, and the time at which the packet arrives, in a first „Collect Route Reply Table‟ (CRRT). III. SOLUTION After the timeout value, we considered another destination node D1 in same network to repeat route We proposed a solution that is an enhancement of establishment process to collect route replies fromthe basic AODV routing protocol, which will be able same nodes in second „Collect Route Reply Table‟to avoid and detect black holes. To reduce the (CRRT). Here we can obtain two different „Collectprobability it is proposed to wait and check the Route Reply Table‟ (CRRT) because of two routereplies from all the neighboring nodes to find a safe establishment process as shown below.route. Table 1. Routing details Source Reply Destination s M D s 1 D s 2 D 13 All Rights Reserved © 2012 IJARCSEE
  3. 3. ISSN: 2277 – 9043 International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science and Electronics Engineering Volume 1, Issue 6, August 2012 Table 2. Routing details According to this proposed solution we considered another destination node D1 in same network, to Source Reply Destination repeat route establishment process to collect route replies from same nodes in second „Collect Route s M D1 Reply Table‟ (CRRT). Which shows, if S wants to transmit to D1. So it first transmits the route request to all the neighboring nodes. Here node 1, node M s 2 D1 and node 2 receive this request. The malicious node has no intention to transmit the DATA packets to the s 1 D1 destination node D but it wants to intercept/collect the DATA from the source node S. So it immediately replies to the request as M. Instead of transmitting the DATA packets immediately through M, S has to wait Now compare first route reply from both the for further reply from the other nodes. After some„Collect Route Reply Table‟ (CRRT), if we found the time it will receives the reply from node 1 as 1 andsame node replying very firstly in two different route node 2 as 2 as shown in table.establishment processes then such node can be Table 3. Routing detailsmalicious node. Then we can choose second routereply from first routing table for further Source Reply Destinationcommunication as shown below. S M D S 1 D s 2 D Table 4. Routing details Source Reply Destination Figure 4. Solution to Black hole s M D1 Thus Black hole attacks can greatly be detected and s 2 D1reduced and DATA packets can be transmitted alongwith chosen path. s 1 D1 IV. WORKING PRINCIPLE of AODV In the above figure 3, S wants to transmit to D. Soit first transmits the route request to all the Now compare first route reply from both theneighboring nodes. Here node 1, node M and node 2 „Collect Route Reply Table‟ (CRRT), if we found thereceive this request. The malicious node has no same node replying very firstly in two different routeintention to transmit the DATA packets to the establishment processes then such node can bedestination node D but it wants to intercept/collect malicious node. Then we can select second routethe DATA from the source node S. So it immediately reply from first routing table for furtherreplies to the request as M. Instead of transmitting the communication as shown below.DATA packets immediately through M, S has to waitfor further reply from the other nodes. After sometime it will receives the reply from node 1 as 1 andnode 2 as 2. 14 All Rights Reserved © 2012 IJARCSEE
  4. 4. ISSN: 2277 – 9043 International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science and Electronics Engineering Volume 1, Issue 6, August 2012 Attacks in AODV Based MANET”, International Journal of Computer Science Issues, Vol.2 2009. [9] Kejun Liu, Jing Deng, “An Acknowledgment Based Approach for the Detection of Routing MIsbahavior in MANETS, IEEE Transaction in Mobile Computing, Vol. 6, Vol. 5, May 2007. [10] Satyajayant Misra, Kabi Bhattarai, Guoliang Xue, “BAMBi: Blackhole Attacks Mitigation Multiple Base station in Wireless Sensor Networks”, 2007 IEEE. Figure 5. Prevention of Black hole V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK According to the proposed solution the requiredsecurity in MANET can be achieved with minimumdelay and control overhead and simultaneously wecan detect the Black hole attack and transmit DATApackets to the destination. As future work, we intend to develop simulations toanalyze the performance of the proposed solution. REFERENCES[1] Latha Tamilselvan, Dr. V Sankaranarayanan, “Prevention of Black hole Attacks in MANET”, The 2nd international Conference on Wireless Broadband and Ultra Wideband Communications, 2007 IEEE.[2] N. Bhalaji, Dr. A Shanmugam, “Assosiation Between Nodes to Combat Blackhole Attacks in DSR Based MANET”, 2009 IEEE.[3] Mehdi Medadian, M. H. Yektaie, A. M. Rahmani, “Combat with Blackhole Attack in AODV Routing Porotocol in MANET”, 9th Malaysia International Conference on Communication, 15-17 December 2009.[4] Yanzhi Ren, Mooi Choo Chuah, Jiee Yang Yingying Chen, “Detecting Blackhole Attacks in Disruption- Tolerant Networks through Packet Exchange Recording”, 2010 IEEE.[5] Jaydip Sen, Sripad Koilakoda, Arijit Ukil, “A Mechanism for Detection of Cooperative Blackhole Attack in Mobile Adhoc Networks”, 2nd International Conference on Intelligent Systems Modeling and Simulation, 2011.[6] Saurabh Gupta, Subrat kar, S Dharmaraja, “BAAP: Blackhole Attack Avoidance Protocol for Wireless NEtworks”, International Conference on Computer and Communication Technology, 2011.[7] Lalit Himral, Vishal Vig, Nagesh Chand, “Preventing AODV Routing Protocol from Blackhole Attack”, International Journal of Engineering, Science and Technology, May 2011.[8] Payal N. Raj, Prashant B. Swadas, “DPRAODV: A Dynamic Learning System Against blackhole 15 All Rights Reserved © 2012 IJARCSEE

×