Iran Nuclear Crisisand its ImplicationSubmitted To : Dr. Anand Mathur The nuclear crisis in Iran continues to poseserious challenges to international peace andsecurity. Since mid-2002, when an Iranianopposition group revealed the existencepublicly of secret nuclear activities in Iran,the world has struggled to develop anadequate response to the Iranian challenge.Iran‘s repeated threats to annihilate the stateof Israel while it develops the world‘s mostdangerous weapons have created an evenmore explosive situation. If diplomatic effortsto defuse the situation fail, Israel may see noother choice than to launch a preventivestrike against Iran‘s nuclear facilities.Furthermore Iran‘s threat to close the Straitof Hormuz in case of any aggression fromIsrael or U.S. through which around 20% ofworld oil passes which amounts to about 17million barrels of crude oil daily. In case ofany conflict the world especially developingcountries which import oil may face seriousproblems in fulfilling their oil needs. Thoughefforts are being made to solve this crisisthough diplomatic efforts and the effortshave succeeded in bringing some hope butstill the matter remains like fire in controland any specific event may act like oil in firebringing the world peace in danger.Manish Kumar Jain11/4/2012
Project Report Iran Nuclear Crisis and its ImplicationsIntroduction:One of the most difficult and politically divisive issues facing the UnitedStates and the rest of world which supports NPT is how to prevent Iran fromgetting nuclear weapons. A nuclear-armed Iran would spur proliferation inthe region, increase regional instability, and increase the chance of nuclearwar. The prospect of a Nuclear armed Iran causes acute concern not only inUnited States and Israel, but also in the Middle East and Europe and most ofthe rest part of the world. States with nuclear weapons have developedthem in conjunction with their civil nuclear energy programmes.It is the viewof many international actors, including the US administration, the EU andothers, that Iran not only must be held to its legal obligations under the NPTbut also must not be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon capability underthe guise of its power programme. Iran‘s ‗dual-use‘ centrifuge enrichmentcapabilities can supply fuel for nuclear energy and could also produce highlyenriched uranium for nuclear weapons. Under the terms of the NPT and itssafeguards arrangements with the IAEA, Iran has the right to enrichuranium. Iran could continue its enrichment activities and remain within itsobligations under the treaty until such time as it begins to manufacturenuclear weapons.On the other hand the nuclear issue has been used to cultivate nationalistfeeling in Iran; relinquishing the right to nuclear technology under the NPTwould be seen as a national humiliation. Neither reformists norconservatives appear willing to contemplate such a move. Iran has a historyas a regional power, and its nuclear advances serve as a symbol of Iran‘spolitical importance and its modernity.If, as existing states with nuclear weapons argue, such weapons conferstatus and provide security through ‗deterrence,‘ some factions in Iran mightindeed find the prospect of obtaining nuclear weapons attractive. Thecountry is situated in a war-plagued region (five major wars in less than 25years). When Iraq attacked Iran in 1980, subjecting it to the most extensiveuse of chemical weapons since the First World War, the internationalcommunity turned a blind eye. The conflict cost the lives of hundreds of
thousands of Iranians and remains a major scar on the national psyche tothis day. Iran is located between two regional nuclear weapons powers,Israel and Pakistan and is encircled by US military forces in Iraq,Afghanistan, Turkey, Kuwait, Qatar and Kazakhstan.Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is trying to convince theworld that Iran has made great strides in its nuclear program through itsown efforts, that the nuclear issue in dispute is Iran‘s right to peacefuldevelopment of nuclear energy, and that international sanctions against Iranare hypocritical and unjust. Khamenei also wishes to suggest (albeit notexplicitly) to his own people and to potential enemies that Iran could quicklydevelop nuclear weapons if it chose. Thus making Iran a major player inregional politics.ContentThis Report includesNuclear Crisis in Iran : Development of Iran‘s PolicyIsrael‘s PolicyU.S. Policy and Impact of Diplomacy and SanctionsImpact of Iran Crisis on China‘s Foreign PolicyImpact of Iran Crisis on India‘s PolicyImpact on RussiaImpact on Middle East CountriesRecent Development of talksConclusionNuclear Crisis in IranThe nuclear program of Iran was launched in the 1950s with the help of theUnited States as part of the Atoms for Peace program. The participation ofthe United States and Western European governments in Irans nuclearprogram continued until the 1979 Revolution that toppled the Shah of Iran.After the 1979 revolution, the Iranian government temporarily disbandedelements of the program, and then revived it with less Western assistancethan during the pre-revolution era.Since then Iran has invested heavily in nuclear industries in the last twentyyears. It has sought a wide range of items overseas, including nuclearreactors, uranium conversion facilities, heavy water production plants, fuelfabrication plants, and uranium enrichment facilities. The controversy overIrans nuclear programs centers in particular on Irans failure to declare
sensitive enrichment and reprocessing activities to the International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA). Enrichment can be used to produce uranium forreactor fuel or (at higher enrichment levels) for weapons. Iran says itsnuclear program is peaceful, and has enriched uranium to less than 5%,consistent with fuel for a civilian nuclear power plant. Iran also claims that itwas forced to resort to secrecy after US pressure caused several of itsnuclear contracts with foreign governments to fall through. After the IAEABoard of Governors reported Irans noncompliance with its safeguardsagreement to the UN Security Council, the Council demanded that Iransuspend its nuclear enrichment activities while Iranian President MahmoudAhmadinejad has argued that the sanctions are "illegal," imposed by"arrogant powers," and that Iran has decided to pursue the monitoring of itsself-described peaceful nuclear program through "its appropriate legal path,"the International Atomic Energy Agency.Many of its overseas purchases were thwarted, such as multiple efforts tobuy research reactors and an attempt to purchase a turn-key gas centrifugeplant from Russia in 1995.However, in general, Iran found suppliers toprovide the wherewithal to build nuclear facilities. A. Q. Khan and businessassociates in Europe and the Middle East, commonly called the Khannetwork, provided Iran the ability to build and operate gas centrifuges.Without their assistance, Iran would have likely been unable to develop agas centrifuge program.After public allegations about Irans previously undeclared nuclear activities,the IAEA launched an investigation that concluded in November 2003 thatIran had systematically failed to meet its obligations under its NPTsafeguards agreement to report those activities to the IAEA, although it alsoreported no evidence of links to a nuclear weapons program. The IAEA Boardof Governors delayed a formal finding of non-compliance until September2005, and reported that non-compliance to the UN Security Council inFebruary 2006. After the IAEA Board of Governors reported Iransnoncompliance with its safeguards agreement to the United Nations SecurityCouncil, the Council demanded that Iran suspend its enrichment programs.The Council imposed sanctions after Iran refused to do so. A May 2009 U.S.Congressional Report suggested "the United States, and later the Europeans,argued that Irans deception meant it should forfeit its right to enrich, aposition likely to be up for negotiation in talks with Iran."In exchange for suspending its enrichment program, Iran has been offered"a long-term comprehensive arrangement which would allow for thedevelopment of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respectand the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peacefulnature of Irans nuclear program." However, Iran has consistently refused togive up its enrichment program, arguing that the program is necessary forits energy security, that such "long term arrangements" are inherently
unreliable, and would deprive it of its inalienable right to peaceful nucleartechnology. In June of 2009, in the immediate wake of the disputed Iranianpresidential election, Iran initially agreed to a deal to relinquish its stockpileof low-enriched uranium in return for fuel for a medical research reactor, butthen backed out of the deal. Currently, thirteen states possess operationalenrichment or reprocessing facilities, and several others have expressed aninterest in developing indigenous enrichment programs. Irans position wasendorsed by the Non-Aligned Movement, which expressed concern about thepotential monopolization of nuclear fuel production.After delays, Irans first nuclear power plant, Bushehr I reactor wascomplete with major assistance of Russian government agency Rosatomandofficially opened on 12 September 2011 Iran has announced that it is working on a new 360 MW nuclear power plantto be located in Darkhovin. Iran has also indicated that it will seek moremedium-sized nuclear power plants and uranium mines in the future.Although Iran claims that its nuclear program is exclusively for peacefulpurposes, it has generated considerable concern that Tehran is pursuing anuclear weapons program. Indeed, the UN Security Council has responded toIran‘s refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment and heavy-waternuclear reactor programs by adopting several resolutions which imposedsanctions on Tehran.Despite this pressure, Iran continues to enrich uranium, install additionalcentrifuges, and conduct research on new types of centrifuges. Tehran hasalso continued work on its heavy-water reactor and associated facilities.Iran‘s current nuclear infrastructure is large and growing. Although manykey facilities are not finished, Iran is close to operating a large power reactorat Bushehr and has started relatively large fuel cycle facilities. Table 1summarizes the main declared nuclear facilities in Iran. Some of thesefacilities, such as Kalaye Electric, the formerly secret gas centrifuge R&D sitein Tehran, are closed and others, such as the Arak heavy water reactor andthe Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), are under construction. Butthe list shows that Iran intends to have one of the largest nuclear fuel cycleprograms in the developing world. If Iran finishes its declared nuclearfacilities, it would have a capability to produce highly enriched uranium(HEU) and weapon-grade plutonium for nuclear weapons.Although most of the facilities listed in table 1 will be used for civil purposes,the fate of others remains difficult to determine. Determining the purpose ofthese facilities has been complicated, because Iran acquired so manycapabilities in secret and did not fulfill its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to declare all its facilities, materials, and activities.The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reported regularly onIran‘s lack of adequate cooperation to allow the inspectors to fully
reconstruct the history of Iran‘s nuclear program. In addition, Iran decidedearly last year to no longer implement the Additional Protocol and othertransparency measures required by the IAEA. The February 22, 2007 IAEAreport concluded that without more cooperation and transparency, the IAEA―will not be able to provide assurances about the absence of undeclarednuclear material and activities or about the exclusively peaceful nature ofthat program.‖To address concerns that its enrichment program may be diverted to non-peaceful uses, Iran has offered to place additional restrictions on itsenrichment program including, for example, ratifying the Additional Protocolto allow more stringent inspections by the International Atomic EnergyAgency, operating the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz as amultinational fuel center with the participation of foreign representatives,renouncing plutonium reprocessing and immediately fabricating all enricheduranium into reactor fuel rods. Irans offer to open its uranium enrichmentprogram to foreign private and public participation mirrors suggestions of anIAEA expert committee which was formed to investigate the methods toreduce the risk that sensitive fuel cycle activities could contribute to nationalnuclear weapons capabilities.
Details of the Work going on at these sites areArak - Heavy water plantThe existence of a heavy water facility near the town of Arak first emergedwith the publication of satellite images by the US-based Institute for Scienceand International Security in December 2002.Heavy water is used to moderate the nuclear fission chain reaction either ina certain type of reactor - albeit not the type that Iran is currently building -or produce plutonium for use in a nuclear bomb.In August 2010, the IAEA visited the IR-40 heavy water reactor site at Arak.It said the facility was still being built but some major equipment had beeninstalled. Iran told the IAEA the operation of the reactor was planned to startby the end of 2013.
The IAEA said that based on satellite imagery, the heavy water productionplant appeared to be in operation, but had not had access to it to confirmsuch reports.Bushehr - Nuclear power stationIrans nuclear programme began in 1974 with plans to build a nuclear powerstation at Bushehr with German assistance.The project was abandoned because of the Islamic revolution five yearslater, but revived in the 1990s when Tehran signed an agreement withRussia to resume work at the site. Moscow delayed completion on theproject while the UN Security Council debated and then passed resolutionsaimed at stopping uranium enrichment in Iran. In December 2007, Moscowstarted delivering the canisters of enriched uranium the plant needs.Earlierin the same month, a US intelligence report said Iran was not currentlyrunning a military nuclear programme. There are two pressurised waterreactors at the site.Gachin - Uranium mineIn December 2010, Iran said it had delivered its first domestically produceduranium ore concentrate, or yellowcake, to a plant that can make it readyfor enrichment. Irans nuclear chief Ali Akbar Salehi said the first batch ofyellowcake had been sent from Gachin mine sent to a conversion facility atIsfahan. Mining operations started at the Gachin in 2004.Iran was believedto be running low on its stock of yellowcake, originally imported from SouthAfrica in the 1970s.Isfahan - Uranium conversion plant
Iran is building a plant at a nuclear research facility to convert yellowcake into three forms: Hexafluoride gas - used in gas centrifuges Uranium oxide - used to fuel reactors, albeit not the type Iran is constructing Metal - often used in the cores of nuclear bombs. The IAEA is concerned about the metals use, as Irans reactors do not require it as fuel. Natanz - Uranium enrichment plant Iran resumed uranium enrichment work at Natanz in July 2004, after a halt during negotiations with leading European powers over its programme. It announced in September 2007 that it had installed 3,000 centrifuges, the machines that do the enrichment. In 2010, Iran told the IAEA Natanz would
be the venue for new enrichment facilities - construction of which wouldstart around March 2011.This is the facility at the heart of Irans dispute with the United NationsSecurity Council. The Council is concerned because the technology used forproducing fuel for nuclear power can be used to enrich the uranium to amuch higher level to produce a nuclear explosion.ParchinOne area at Parchin has been identified as a suspected nuclear weaponsdevelopment facility.The overall complex is one of Irans leading munitions centres - for theresearch, development and production of ammunition, rockets and highexplosives. A limited inspection carried out by the IAEA in 2005 found noproof of any nuclear weapons activity at Parchin.But according to information from an IAEA report in November 2011, it isbelieved the site has also been used for testing high explosives that could beused in nuclear weapons.Qom - Uranium enrichment plantIn January 2012, Iran said it had begun uranium enrichment at the heavilyfortified site of Fordo near the holy city of Qom. It had revealed theexistence of the facility, about 30km (20 miles) north of the city, in
September 2009.Iran initially informed the IAEA that it was constructing theplant to produce uranium enriched up to 5% - commonly used in nuclearpower production.In June 2011, Iran told the IAEA that it was planning to produce uraniumenriched up to 20% at Fordo - and would subsequently stop 20% fuelproduction at Natanz.In January 2012, the IAEA confirmed Iran had startedthe production of uranium enriched up to 20%.Iran says the Highly EnrichedUranium (HEU) is for use as a fuel in research reactors. Uranium - with aconcentration of 20% or more - is needed to build nuclear weapons.The IAEA says environmental samples taken from the site at Fordo in April2011 did not indicate the presence of enriched uranium.Israel’s StandThe question of whether a nuclear-weapons-capable Iran will or will not posean existential threat to Israel has become an important debate among Israelileaders. Some Israeli officials express concerns, based on Iranian leaders‘long-standing pronouncements against the existence of Israel, that Iranmight seek to use a nuclear weapon against Israel even if faced with theprospect of near-certain retaliation from Israel‘s presumed but officiallyundeclared nuclear .The general view in Israel is concern that a nuclear Iranwould compromise traditional Israeli security doctrine and practices—basedon principles of self-reliance and maintaining overwhelming militarysuperiority—and lead to an unacceptable level of national securityuncertainty. This in turn would fundamentally damage the quality of life andpsychological sense of safety that Israelis deem critically important to theircountry‘s continued viability as a Jewish national home. Israel "warned that it is prepared to take unilateral military action againstIran if the international community fails to stop any development of nuclearweapons at the countrys atomic energy facilities". It cited Israeli defenseminister Shaul Mofaz stating, "under no circumstances would Israel be ableto tolerate nuclear weapons in Iranian possession".Some Israelis worry that even if Iran did not attack Israel with a nuclearweapon, mere possession of a weapon or the capability to assemble onequickly would make it more difficult to deter Iran from pursuing greaterregional influence and amplifying threats to Israeli security through proxiesand allies—the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah, Hamas and otherPalestinian militants in Gaza, and possibly even the beleaguered Asadregime in Syria
Long-standing Israeli national security doctrine emphasizes Israel‘sprerogative to ―defend itself, by itself.‖ In a January 24, 2012, speech in theKnesset, Prime Minister Netanyahu said, in reference to the Iranian nuclearissue, ―In the end, with regard to threats to our very existence, we cannotabandon our future to the hands of others. With regard to our fate, our dutyis to rely on ourselves alone.‖An Israeli strike against Iran‘s nuclear facilities would not be unprecedented.Israel has launched preventive air strikes at nuclear facilities developed byhostile states in the past. In June 1981, Israel launched a successful airstrike against Iraq‘s Osiraq reactor and inflicted a major setback on the Iraqinuclear weapons program. In September 2007,Israel launched an air strikeagainst a nuclear facility in Syria that was being built with North Koreanassistance. The Israeli warplanes penetrated Syrian air defenses—whichwere more formidable than the air defense systems currently protectingIranian nuclear sites—with little apparent problem.Israel could opt to launch a single surprise attack at a limited number of keyfacilities to disrupt the Iranian nuclear weapons effort. The overall success ofsuch a mission would depend on the quality of Israeli intelligence on Iran‘snuclear facilities, the capabilities of Iran‘s air defenses, the accuracy of thestrikes and the capability of Israeli ordnance to penetrate hardened targets.A single wave of attacks would not bring lasting benefits; Israel would haveto launch multiple follow-up strikes to inflict higher levels of damage onIran‘s nuclear infrastructure.From Israel‘s perspective, buying even a small amount of time to postponean existential threat is a worthwhile endeavor. The 1981 strike on Iraq‘sOsiraq nuclear reactor did not end Iraq‘s nuclear weapons efforts, but it paidlarge dividends because Saddam Hussein‘s regime never was able to replacethe reactor. Iraq‘s nuclear program suffered further setbacks due to U.S. airstrikes during the 1991 Gulf war and the U.N. sanctions that followed afterIraq refused to abide by the subsequent ceasefire agreement. An Israelimilitary operation that delayed the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran alsowould have the benefit of delaying the prospective cascade of nuclearproliferation that would accelerate a nuclear arms race among other statesthreatened by Iran, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, which wouldfurther destabilize the tense region and immensely complicate Israel‘ssecurity environment. An Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilitieswould be a much more difficult and complex operation than the 1981 raid onIraq‘s Osiraq reactor.
The Iranian dictatorship learned the lessons of Israel‘s 1981 strike on Iraq‘snuclear reactor: The Iranian nuclear infrastructure is more decentralized,dispersed, hardened, and protected than was Iraq‘s nuclear program. Someof the nuclear sites have been located in cities, which would magnify the col-lateral casualties of air strikes. Other sites have been built deepunderground with assistance from North Korea, which has developed world-class tunneling technology.Israel may not have the specialized ―bunker buster‖ ordnance necessary todestroy some of the hardened facilities buried deep underground. But theIsraelis may strike the entrances of the underground facilities to shut themdown, at least temporarily. Israeli warplanes could destroy nearby powerplants to deprive some of the facilities of the electrical power necessary fortheir operation. The Israeli air force also has trained to destroy Iraniantargets by using low-yield nuclear weapons. But it is doubtful that Israelwould break the nuclear taboo attacks with chemical, biological, orradiological weapons of mass destruction.Israel has repeatedly signaled a willingness to attack Iran‘s nuclear sites ifdiplomacy fails to dissuade Iran from continuing on its current threateningcourse. The Israel Air Force staged a massive and widely publicized airexercise over the Mediterranean Sea in June 2008 in which Israeliwarplanes, refueled by aerial tankers, simulated attacks on targets that weremore than 870 miles away, approximately the same distance from Israel asIran‘s uranium enrichment facility at Natanz.From May 31 to June 4, 2009, Israel staged its largest country-wide civildefense drill, which simulated widespread missile attacks. In late June, anIsraeli Dolphin-class submarine transited the Suez Canal for the first time todeploy in the Red Sea, and two Israeli Saar-class warships followed in July.An Israeli official warned that if Iran failed to halt its nuclear program,―These maneuvers are a message to Iran that Israel will follow up on itsthreats.‖The general perception in Israel can be known from the statement thatIsraels leaders cannot countenance even the risk that a regime like that ledby Mahmoud Ahmedinajad will go nuclear, says Bergman an Israeli journalistwho has recently completed a long series of interviews with senior Israelileaders. "Once you face or you think you face a danger of another Holocaust,a threat of annihilation, then you need to do everything that you can inorder to prevent this threat," he says ."The probability is that Israel will strike during 2012," says Ronen Bergman,"The military in Israel is preparing for a strike, there is a huge military build-up," he says.
The crisis is coming to a head now because Israels intelligence agencies areworried that Irans nuclear facilities - especially at Fordow, near Qom wherethey have been enriching uranium - will enter a "zone of immunity" in ninemonths time.So having the example of Iran in mind and the having an accepted fact thata nuclear Armed Iran is an existential threat to Isreal‘s Sovereignty, Israelcan go to any degree to stop Iran from making a nuclear weapon.U.S. Policy and Diplomatic Pressure through SanctionsDespite the diplomatic efforts of several U.S. Administrations, Iran hasrepeatedly rejected offers to permanently defuse the long-simmeringconfrontation over its illicit nuclear weapons program. Tehran temporarilyfroze its uranium enrichment efforts from 2003 to 2005, undoubtedly due tofear of possible U.S. military action after American interventions inneighboring Afghanistan and Iraq.But once the Iranian regime concluded that the U.S. was bogged down inIraq, it dropped the charade of negotiations with the EU-3 (Britain, Franceand Germany) and resumed its nuclear efforts in 2005 after hard-linePresident Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took power. The Bush Administrationendorsed the EU-3 diplomatic initiative and later joined the broader P5 +1(the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany)diplomatic initiative, but Tehran dismissed these diplomatic offers andignored three rounds of mild sanctions imposed by the United NationsSecurity Council.The Obama Administration sweetened the U.S. diplomatic offer and soughtto engage Iran diplomatically without any preconditions. But PresidentObama‘s engagement policy has failed to budge Tehran, which hasaccelerated its uranium enrichment efforts and again was caught cheating onits legal obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty by building asecret nuclear facility near Qom that was revealed by President Obama inlate September. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) suspectsthat Iran has additional secret nuclear facilities that it has illegally hiddenfrom the IAEA.Diplomacy backed by timid U.N. Security Council sanctions is not likely todissuade Iran from continuing its nuclear weapons program. It is too late inthe game and Tehran has invested too much scarce economic resources,human capital, and prestige to refrain from taking the final steps to attaininga nuclear capability. Moreover, Iranian hardliners, who have established anincreasingly firm grip on power, are vehemently opposed to better relationswith the United States. They fear that improved bilateral relations with the―Great Satan‖ would pose a threat to their own dominant position within Iran
because it would tempt disillusioned Iranians to join a ―soft revolution‖against them. They know that three previous Iranian revolutions wereaborted after westernized elements defected from the revolutionary coalitionand cooperated with foreign powers.The United States has the advantage of being geographically further awayfrom Iran than Israel and thus less vulnerable to an Iranian nuclear attack.But it must be sensitive to its ally‘s security perspective. Vice PresidentJoseph Biden spoke the truth when he said on July 5 that ―Israel candetermine for itself—it‘s a sovereign nation—what‘s in their interest andwhat they decide to do relative to Iran and anyone else.‖ Biden recognizedthat, ―Look, we cannot dictate to another sovereign nation what they canand cannot do when they make a determination—if they make adetermination that they are existentially threatened.‖President Obama quickly denied that his Vice President‘s comments signaleda green light for an Israeli attack. But Vice President Biden was correct inassessing that Israel cannot afford to bet on Iranian self-restraint. TheChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, also has warnedthat ―there is a leadership in Israel that is not going to tolerate‖ a nuclearIran.Given this reality and Iran‘s public threats to attack the United States inretaliation for an Israeli attack, the Obama Administration must be mindfulof the fact that the United States inevitably will be drawn into an Israeli–Iranian crisis.Washington should not seek to block Israel from taking what it considers tobe necessary action against an existential threat. The United States does nothave the power to guarantee that Israel would not be attacked by a nuclearIran in the future, so it should not betray the trust of a democratic ally bytying its hands now. Although an Israeli attack on Iran‘s nuclear programwill entail increased risks for U.S. interests in the Middle East, these riskswould be dwarfed by the threats posed by a nuclear-armed Iran. Not onlywould a nuclear Iran pose a much more dire direct threat to the U.S., Israel,and other allies, but Tehran might pass a nuclear weapon to one of itsIslamist terrorist surrogates.Alternatively Washington could go one step ahead and knowing that theUnited States is likely to be attacked by Iran in the aftermath of an Israelistrike anyway, it may be logical to consider joining Israel in a preventive waragainst Iran. But the Obama Administration is extremely unlikely to followthis course.
In fact the path chosen by Obama Administration is to put sanctions andtrouble the economy of Iran, in such manner that there starts a generalimpression on people in Iran to forget about Nuclear Weapon and startfocusing on saving the economy and people.Numerous nations and multinational entities have imposed sanctions againstIran. Sanctions commonly bar nuclear, missile and certain military exportsto Iran; investments in oil, gas and petrochemicals; exports of refinedpetroleum products; business dealings with the Iranian Republican GuardCorps; banking and insurance transactions, including with the Central Bankof Iran; and shipping. The United States imposed sanctions on Iran followingthe Islamic revolution of 1979, while more recent rounds of sanctions by theU.S. and other entities were motivated by Irans nuclear program.UN sanctions against Iran United Nations Security Council Resolution 1696 - passed on 31 July 2006. Demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but did not impose sanctions. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 - passed on 23 December 2006. Banned the supply of nuclear-related materials and technology and froze the assets of key individuals and companies related to the program. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747 - passed on 24 March 2007. Imposed an arms embargo and expanded the freeze on Iranian assets. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1803 - passed on 3 March 2008. Extended the asset freezes and called upon states to monitor the activities of Iranian banks, inspect Iranian ships and aircraft, and to monitor the movement of individuals involved with the program through their territory. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1835 - Passed in 2008. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 - passed on 9 June 2010. Banned Iran from participating in any activities related to ballistic missiles, tightened the arms embargo, travel bans on individuals involved with the program, froze the funds and assets of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, and recommended that states inspect Iranian cargo, prohibit the servicing of Iranian vessels involved in prohibited activities, prevent the provision of financial services used for sensitive nuclear activities
Other Bilateral Sanctions imposed by various other countries Australia has imposed financial sanctions and travel bans on individuals and entities involved in Irans nuclear and missile programs or assist Iran in violating sanctions, and an arms embargo. Canada imposed a ban on dealing in the property of designated Iranian nationals, a complete arms embargo, oil-refining equipment, items that could contribute to the Iranian nuclear program, the establishment of an Iranian financial institution, branch, subsidiary, or office in Canada or a Canadian one in Iran, investment in the Iranian oil and gas sector, relationships with Iranian banks, purchasing debt from the Iranian government, or providing a ship or services to Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, but allows the Foreign Minister to issue a permit to carry out a specified prohibited activity or transaction. European Union restrictions have reduced cooperation with Iran in foreign trade, financial services, energy sectors and technologies, and banned the provision of insurance and reinsurance by insurers in member states to Iran and Iranian-owned companies. On 23 January 2012, the EU agreed to an oil embargo on Iran, effective from July, and to freeze the assets of Irans central bank. The next month, Iran symbolically pre-empted the embargo by ceasing sales to Britain and France (both countries had already almost eliminated their reliance on Iranian oil, and Europe as a whole had nearly halved its Iranian imports). India enacted a ban on the export of all items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology that could contribute to Irans nuclear program. In 2012, the country said it was against expanding its sanctions. India imports 12 percent of its oil from Iran and cannot do without it. The country sent a "huge delegation" to Iran in mid-March 2012 to further bilateral economic ties. Israel banned business with or unauthorized travel to Iran under a law banning ties with enemy states. Israel has also enacted legislation that penalizes any companies that violate international sanctions. Following reports of covert Israeli-Iranian trade and after the US sanctioned an Israeli company for ties with Iran, Israel imposed a series of administrative and regulatory measures to prevent Israeli companies from trading with Iran, and announced the establishment of a national directorate to implement the sanctions. Japan imposed a ban on transactions with some Iranian banks, investments with the Iranian energy sector, and asset freezes against individuals and entities involved with Irans nuclear program. In January 2012, the second biggest customer for Iranian oil announced
it would take "concrete steps" to reduce its dependency on Iran. The country had already reduced its imports by about 20% during 2011, the reductions having been made even after the countrys most powerful ever earthquake of that year. South Korea imposed sanctions on 126 Iranian individuals and companies. Japan and South Korea together account for 26% of Irans oil exports. The US was displeased by a March 2012 IEA report that showed the country had "sharply" increased its imports of Iranian oil at the start of the year. Switzerland banned the sale of arms and dual-use items to Iran, and of products that could be used in the Iranian oil and gas sector, financing this sector, and restrictions on financial services. Turkey cut its purchases of Iranian oil by 20% in March 2012, bowing to US pressure and sanctions that could have locked Turkeys Halkbank out of the US financial system The United States has imposed an arms ban and an almost total economic embargo on Iran, which includes sanctions on companies doing business with Iran, a ban on all Iranian-origin imports, sanctions on Iranian financial institutions, and an almost total ban on selling aircraft or repair parts to Iranian aviation companies. A license from the Treasury Department is required to do business with Iran. The NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act of 2012) calls for sanctions on foreign financial institutions that knowingly engage in significant financial transactions with the Central Bank of Iran or ―designated Iranian financial institutions,‖ a term that refers to Iranian financial institutions whose property interests have been blocked in connection with Iran‘s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or its support for international terrorism. NDAA sanctions have the potential to effectively cut off foreign financial institutions from the U.S. financial system by prohibiting the opening of, requiring the closing of, or imposing strict conditions on, the maintenance of correspondent or payable-through accounts at U.S. financial institutions.Effects of these SanctionsThe sanctions bring difficulties to Irans $352 billion, oil-dominatedeconomy. Data published by the Iranian Central Bank show a declining trendin the share of Iranian exports from oil-products (2006/2007: 84.9%,2007/2008: 86.5%, 2008/2009: 85.5%, 2009/2010: 79.8%, 2010/2011(first three quarters): 78.9%). By March 2012, Iranian production was at aten-year low, with the prospect of further falls to levels not seen since theIran-Iraq war during the 1980s. The loss of Iranian oil supply was easily
covered, primarily by an increase in Saudi Arabias output to a thirty-yearhigh.The sanctions have had a substantial adverse effect on the Iranian nuclearprogram by making it harder to acquire specialized materials and equipmentneeded for the program. The social and economic effects of sanctions havealso been severe, with even those who doubt their efficacy, such as JohnBolton, describing the EU sanctions (subsequently tightened further anddramatically), in particular, as "tough, even brutal." Iranian foreign ministerAli Akhbar Salehi conceded that the sanctions are having an impact. Chinahas become Irans largest remaining trading partner.Sanctions have reduced Irans access to products needed for the oil andenergy sectors, have prompted many oil companies to withdraw from Iran,and have also caused a decline in oil production due to reduced access totechnologies needed to improve their efficiency Iran may be annually losingas much as $60 billion in energy investment. Many international companieshave also been reluctant to do business with Iran for fear of losing access tolarger Western markets. As well as restricting export markets, the sanctionshave reduced Irans oil income by increasing the costs of repatriatingrevenues in complicated ways that sidestep the sanctions; Iranian analystsestimate the budget deficit for the 2011/2012 fiscal year, which in Iran endsin late March, at between $30bn to $50bn.The effects of U.S. sanctionsinclude expensive basic goods for Iranian citizens, and an aging andincreasingly unsafe civil aircraft fleet. According to the Arms ControlAssociation, the international arms embargo against Iran is slowly reducingIrans military capabilities, largely due to its dependenceon Russian and Chinese military assistance. The only substitute is to findcompensatory measures requiring more time and money, and less effective.According to at least one analyst the market for imports in Iran is dominatedby state enterprises and regime-friendly enterprises, because the way to getaround the sanctions is smuggling, and smuggling requires strongconnections with the regime. This has weakened Iranian civil society andstrengthened the state.The value of the Iranian rial has plunged since autumn 2011, causingwidespread panic among the Iranian public, and fell a further 10%immediately after the imposition of the EU oil embargo. "The rial is goingdown", remarked former Mossad director Efraim Halevy in March 2012. "Itsgone down by over 50 percent. Its almost impossible to describe thedamage done." Former Israeli foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami emphasised:"When a national currency loses 50% of its value in a matter of weeks,economic collapse is at hand. Businessmen find it impossible to use the rialeven for domestic transactions, because inflation is spiraling out of control.
Commodity prices, moreover, are skyrocketing". In January 2012, thecountry raised the interest rate on bank deposits by up to 6 percentagepoints in order to curtail the rials depreciation. The rate increase was asetback for Ahmadinejad, who had been using below-inflation rates toprovide cheap loans to the poor, though naturally Iranian bankers weredelighted by the increase. Not long after, and just a few days after Iranseconomic minister declared that "there was no economic justification" fordevaluing the currency because Irans foreign exchange reserves were "notonly good, but the extra oil revenues are unprecedented," the countryannounced its intention to devalue by about 8.5 percent against the U.S.dollar, set a new exchange rate and vowed to reduce the black marketsinfluenceImpact on China’s Foreign PolicyAfter the referral of Iran‘s nuclear issue to the UNSC, China‘s foreign policydropped in a dilemma. How to realize a balance between Sino-US andSino-Iranian relationship and how to keep the image of a ―responsible‖power as maintaining the friendship with Iran, became great challenges toChina‘s foreign policy. As for U.S., persuading China to back up its plan andmaking use of China‘s diplomatic resources to give a pressure to Iranare also part of American strategyFor China, Iran‘s nuclear crisis interrupted the normal process of Sino-Iranian relationship and China had to seek for the balance of the relationswith U.S. and Iran. At first, China didn‘t want to recognize it was a crisis andbelieved that Iran was pursuing the peaceful nuclear technology byterms of the increasing friendship with Iran. But with the exacerbation of theinternational environment toward Iran‘s nuclear issue and the pressure fromU.S., China finally compromised and cast the deliberative vote to support thereferral of Iran‘s nuclear issue to the UN Security Council.Although China agreed to the referral, it still appealed to resolve the crisis bythe political and diplomatic ways.What influenced the attitudes of U.S. and China toward Iran‘s nuclear issueand their different definitions on this crisis is a complicated combinationwhich includes the national interest, the political experience, and thehistorical feeling.
Even if they are many similarities between China and Iran, China‘s policy isdetermined by the realistic politics in which national interest is the keyelement. On the one hand, the Sino-American relationship is the priority inChinese foreign policy; on the other hand, it is difficult to resist thetemptation of the benefits from the close economic relation with Iran. So,China has to make a hard decision on dealing with Iran‘s nuclear issue.That‘s why China hesitantly agreed on the referral ofIran‘s nuclear issue to UN Security Council until 2006, four years after theemergence of that crisis.In addition to balance the relationship of Sino-U.S. and Sino-Iran, how toenhance the image of a responsible power is another importantconsideration for China, especially when U.S. criticized that China alwaysdon‘t want to take more international responsibility. As a permanentmember of US Security Council, China has the responsibility to support thesanctions against the proliferation country. But how can China to reallysanction a country that has a close connection with its economicdevelopment?One of the differences of U.S. and China‘s attitudes towards Iran‘s nuclearissue is that China supported that this crisis should be resolved in theframework of IAEA through the political and diplomatic way while Americanspreferred to the referral of Iran‘s nuclear issue to the UN SecurityCouncil by the enforceable sanction. This difference reflected theirdivergence on the establishment and functions of various internationalregimes, such as the Non-proliferation Treaty.Kevin J. Cooney has said, ―When thinking about the Sino-Americanrelationship one could easily get the picture of two men hugging each otherin ‗friendship‘ with knives poised at each other‘s back waiting for the other tomake a wrong move. Each side needs the other; either trusts the other.‖It is really a vivid description of the Sino-U.S. relation.
Impact on IndiaDespite official statements reiterating the important position Iran holds,India has been adopting an ambiguous position on Iran of late. New Delhihas repeatedly voted in favour of the International Atomic Energy Agency‘s(IAEA) resolutions against Iran on grounds that a nuclear Iran is not inIndia‘s interests. However, it also emphasizes that it favours dialogue anddiplomacy as a means of resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis.More specifically on the issue of energy relations, India claims that Iran is animportant partner as well as an important source for hydrocarbon resourcesand that it is keen to further strengthen existing ties. Iran is also one ofIndia‘s largest suppliers of crude oil, and India in turn is also a majorsupplier of refined petroleum products for Iran. While the UNSC resolutiondoes not affect India‘s oil trade with Iran, the US sanctions have had animpact.The US has been applying pressure against Indian companies which haveenergy relations with Iran. The most prominent is the Iran-Pakistan-India(IPI) gas pipeline project. Iran and Pakistan have announced that they willgo ahead with the project at a bilateral level for the time being. India seems to have de-linked from the same though the governmenthas not officially announced its withdrawal. India claims that security andpricing issue vis-à-vis Pakistan and Iran, respectively, are the mainimpediments to its participation though there has been substantial pressurefrom Washington against proceeding with the project. Some analysts are ofthe opinion that as large reserves of natural gas have been discovered inIndia‘s offshore territory, India is not as concerned about imports. Howevergiven India‘s projected huge and growing demand for gas, it will requireimport of gas, least in the future, and Iran is an important source due to itsstatus as the second large reservoir of conventional natural gas. That isprobably why India is not officially closing option on the IPI project. As anIndian official who was closely involved with the negotiation said, barring afew issues, everything is in place for the project to be brought to fruition. Aand when India feels the time is right for implementing the project, it will doso.
Impact on RussiaRussia has played an important role in helping Iran to complete its BushehrNuclear Reactor. In July 2002, just a few weeks before the major militaryexercises on the Caspian, Moscow announced that not only would it finishBushehr (despite U.S. opposition), but also stated that it had begundiscussions on the building of five additional reactors for Iran. It remainedunclear at the time, however, whether the spent fuel would be sent back toRussia so that it could not be made into nuclear weapons.There appeared to be four central reasons for Moscow‘s unwillingness tocooperate with Washington on the nuclear issue. First, the sale of the reactorearns hard currency for Russia, and Putin cannot be sure that, even ifPresident Bush promised large sums of money to Russia, the U.S. Congresswould allocate them in a time of escalating U.S. deficits. Second, once thefirst reactor begins operating, Iran has hinted repeatedly to Moscow that itwill purchase a number of additional reactors. Third, the Bushehr reactor,and the factories in Russia which supply it, employ a large number ofRussian engineers and technicians and thus help keep Russia‘s nuclearindustry alive—something Putin hopes will help not only earn Russia muchneeded hard currency, but also help in the high tech development of theRussian economy. Fourth, by standing firm on Bushehr, Putin coulddemonstrate to domestic audiences Russia‘s independent policy vis-à-vis theUnited States, as both the Duma and presidential elections neared.In case of any war in the Gulf Russia will have huge Economic benefits byexporting oil at higher prices. Russia has walked a fine line on the Iraniannuclear crisis. Having sold nuclear reactors to Iran it also mixes carefulcriticism with praise for its approach to the issue. The EU has imposedsanctions on buying Iranian oil, the natural resource providing more than80% of Tehrans foreign revenue.The US has imposed new sanctions targeting Irans central bank, whichstrategically thwarts its refiners ability to buy and pay for crude oil. Thesanctions are linked to Irans disputed uranium enrichment programme,which the US and its allies suspect is aimed at developing nuclear weapons.Iran denies the charges, saying the programme is solely about generatingenergy and research.
Impact on Countries of Middle EastThe dynamics of the Israeli-Arab conflict, and Israel‘s relative militarysuperiority, invariably affect the thinking of all the Arab andPersian communities in the region. Iranian acquisition of nuclear weaponsand long-range missile delivery system is likely to affect its behavior in theregion. Obtaining nuclear weapons will give Iranian leaders self confidencein dealing with thorny policy issues. These weapons in the hands of thefanatic regime in Tehran will grant them a membership card in the opennuclear club. They will become the ninth member, along with the fivepermanent members of the UN Security Council, India, Pakistan, and NorthKorea.A nuclear capability would give Iran the confidence to obstruct and challengeU.S. power and Western influence in the Middle East. A nuclear capabilitywould also be an immediate guarantee against forcible regime change.A third motivation for Iran to build a nuclear bomb is their regionalambitions. Iran seeks to become the indispensable power in the MiddleEast. Dealing with neighbors from a position of strength and by exploitingits leverage in the region, Teheran has not abandoned AyatollahKhomeini‘s vision of becoming the dominant force in the Muslim world either.Domestic economic pressures and a generally inferior posture with regionalcompetitors dictate a defensive strategy. As the largest and the mostpopulous country bordering the Persian Gulf, Iranian leaders believe that it istheir country‘s natural right and destiny to dominate the geographical regionand the Muslim world. Iran continues developing a sea-denial capabilitywith missiles while cultivating the trust of the Gulf States with confidence-building measures and talk about new security arrangements. Iran alsoseeks to be preeminent in supporting the Palestinians while inhibiting Arabreaction to Iranian policies. This would devastate the stability of nuclearnonproliferation in the world and drastically increase the risk of nuclear warby opening the floodgates through which Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia andothers could flow. The Iranians, as well as other Islamic fanatics, havemissile delivery systems and much of the knowledge required to developnuclear weapons.Teheran maintained a ―charade‖ of sincerity during negotiations, effectivelydelaying progress until international opinion had shifted to its favor.They now seem to believe that they are in a much stronger position due tothe continued need for U.S. military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, rising oilprices, increased bargaining leverage with oil imports, and its diplomaticcultivation of China‘s and Russia‘s influence with resolution brought beforethe United Nation Security Council. Iran‘s new president is firmly committedto Iran‘s nuclear program and remains determined to develop a completenuclear fuel cycle which would eventually give it fissionable material fornuclear weapons.
Recent Developments and Agreement to Start TalksThe United States, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdomwill hold a critical meeting this week in Istanbul, Turkey, withrepresentatives of Iran to discuss relations with that country and theimplications of its nuclear development program.International concern about Irans program and intentions -- in particular,whether the program, as it claims, is designed to meet its nuclear energyand scientific needs or whether it also intends to develop a nuclear weaponscapacity -- has led already to damaging economic sanctions against theIslamic state with more to come.In that context the meeting, which starts Friday, is of great economic as wellas political importance since the threat to Irans petroleum productioncapacity posed by the sanctions has already been used by speculators andeven more responsible petroleum market players to run up the price of oil onthe world market.The continuing rise in the price of gasoline at the pump for Americans is inno small part due to what operators in the market have been able to do withboth the sanctions against Iran and the threats and exhortations to attackIran emanating from Israel and some elements in the United States.It is obvious that the sensible first step in tackling the problem is for the sixnations -- the five permanent members of the United Nations SecurityCouncil plus Germany, the European Unions most powerful member -- tomeet face to face with the Iranians. A major goal on their side of the tableshould be close inspection of all of Irans nuclear facilities, including thosethat are military-controlled, by representatives of the International AtomicEnergy Agency.Iran suggested at the same time that it agreed to this weeks meeting that itwas prepared to see such inspection take place.On the U.S. side, there are a couple of issues to watch. One is that those inthe Washington political equation who would like to see either the UnitedStates and Israel, or Israel with U.S. support, carry out a military attack on
Iran, which would most likely start a war, are eager for the talks to fail. Theyhave already tipped their hand by putting the United States, in advance ofthe talks, in the role of presenting an opening position that leaves theIranians little room to bargain.Another is the suggestion that the problems for U.S. forces in Afghanistanare a result of Iranian support of actions there, which is an attempt tocapitalize on growing disfavor and frustration over the Afghan war in theUnited States. This claim is unrealistic in the event. The Taliban are firmlySunni Muslims; Iran is Shiite. Although Iran might like to pull Americas tailin Afghanistan, in general it is very much to the advantage of Iran, whichhas a long border with Afghanistan, to see peace and quiet there.These talks are important. It shouldnt be the case, but another MiddleEastern war for the United States may be in play to a degree in a touchypresidential election year.Faced with mounting pressure from the world powers over its controversialnuclear program, Iran said last month that it was ready to re-engage withthe IAEA.As a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Iran has theright, like other countries, to enrich uranium for commercial and researchreactors. But the same facilities that are used for peaceful enrichment canbe used to enrich uranium for a bomb. And thats what many Westerncountries suspect Iran is doing. Iran insists its nuclear program is exclusivelyfor peaceful purposes.The country suggested over the weekend that it may be willing to reduce theamount of uranium it is enriching at 20%."Based on our needs and once therequired fuel is obtained, we will decrease the production and we may eventotally shift it to the 3.5%," Iranian nuclear chief Fereydoun Abbasi said in atelevised interview, according to state-run Press TV.Iran does not plan to produce 20% enriched uranium for long, Abbasi said,according to Press TV.Uranium enriched at 20% is typically used for hospital isotopes and researchreactors, but is also seen as a shortcut toward the 90% enrichment requiredto build nuclear weapons. Nuclear experts say Irans supply is far greaterthan it would need for peaceful purposes.Iran says there is a medical purpose to its nuclear program.The Gulf nations economy has been hit hard by U.S. and European oil andfinancial sanctions over its nuclear activities.
Israel has threatened to attack Irans nuclear sites should peacefulalternatives be exhausted, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahureiterating last month that Israel reserved the right to defend itself from thethreat of a nuclear-armed Iran.Conclusion1. The pessimists predict failure, but there are hints of progress.The last round of talks 15 months ago collapsed after Iran insisted on aseries of ―conditions‖ that were deemed unacceptable by the U.S. andEurope. It is thought unlikely Iran will try this approach again. With thethreat of military action against Iran and worsening Western sanctions, thestakes are high. Tehran surprised observers by even agreeing to attend talksabout the ―nuclear issue.‖ Although the meeting will not produce animmediate breakthrough, there is hope these talks will restart a ―diplomaticprocess.‖ The starting of new talks in Turkey appears to be a ray of hope forthe world peace and apparently it might be Iran just buying time. If latter isthe case than a conflict seems to be inevitable2. The sanctions against Iran appear to be hurting.President Barack Obama gave the go-ahead for the tightest sanctions everagainst Iran‘s oil industry. In the past, Iran has been able to survivesanctions of various kinds, but these latest moves target its pivotal oilindustry. They will inevitably cut to the heart of Iran‘s economy. Israel‘s UNambassador, Ron Prosor, told reporters that these sanctions against Iran are―much more effective than people think and. . . might change behaviourpatterns if we continue with them.‖3. The Americans are working overtime to keep Israel at bay.There were charges that the U.S. sabotaged an Israeli plan to use Azerbaijanas a ―secret staging ground‖ for an attack on Iran. An article in the Americanmagazine Foreign Policy quoted unidentified U.S. officials as saying ―Israelhas recently been granted access to airbases on Iran‘s northern border.‖Former American ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, charged ―this leak ispart of the (Obama) administration‘s campaign against an Israeli attack.‖ Inthe magazine article, one of the U.S. intelligence sources was quoted assaying: ―We‘re watching what Iran does closely.
4. Contrary to public assurances, the U.S. and Israel are not on the samepage.There were assurances after summit between Israeli Prime MinisterBenjamin Netanyahu and Obama that their two countries were as oneregarding the issue of Iran. But that‘s not quite accurate. Each side stillviews the other with suspicion. A revealing illustration of that was evident onMarch 19, 2012 when two contrasting news stories appeared prominently.In The New York Times, American military officials leaked the details of aclassified war simulation of an Israeli attack on Iran. Their conclusion wasthat it would lead to a wider regional war that would draw in the UnitedStates and leave hundreds of Americans dead. However, Bloomberg Newscolumnist Jeffrey Goldberg, who has very close connections with theNetanyahu government, reported on the same day that Israeli officialssecretly believe an attack on Iran wouldn‘t lead to a wider war, wouldn‘tresult in Iranian retaliation and would ultimately get American support.5. If there is to be a breakthrough, both sides need to compromise,big time.The history of this conflict doesn‘t provide much reason for optimism. Afterall, there have been decades of misunderstanding between Iran and theUnited States. But certain things are emerging from the fog. The U.S. andother Western powers will not tolerate a nuclear-armed Iran. Tehran mustknow that by now. Iran, for its part, asserts that nuclear arms are ―sinful‖and its nuclear ambitions are solely peaceful. The U.S. and the West musthear that. If these opening talks lead to serious negotiations, one crucialissue for Tehran may be what it secretly offered the United States in itsproposed ―Grand Bargain‖ in 2003, which was rejected. In exchange for solidguarantees regarding nuclear arms, they may require similarly solidguarantees that the U.S. and the West abandon their desire for ―regimechange‖ in Iran.
References : IDSA issue Brief US Sanctions on Iran and their impact on India CARE Ratings Impact of Iran Crisis ACA Iran Nuclear Brief Congressional Research Services : Iran‘s Nuclear Program CRS Report For Congress : Iran‘s Nuclear Program Recent Developments CRS Report for Congress : Iranian Nuclear Sites CRS Israel : Possible Military Strikes against Iran‘s Nuclear Facilities BBC news articles CNN news articles Wikipedia Articles on Nuclear Program of Iran