Rebuilding after Natural Disasters: Lessons from the Aceh Tsunami and Yogyakarta Earthquake

Rebuilding after Natural Disasters: Lessons from the Aceh Tsunami and Yogyakarta Earthquake
Budy P. Resosudarmo

8 am, 26 December 2004
death toll of 167,000 people
500,000 displaced persons
loss of over 110,000 houses and 2,000 school buildings
Aceh Tsunami

6am. 27 May 2006
death toll of 5,700 people
37,900 were injured
1,000,000 homeless
loss of over 156,700 houses and 2,200 school buildings
Yogyakarta Earthquake

Planning and the Management of Rebuilding
The goal: Building better
Master plan
Aceh: Initially top-down, but more relax later on
Took about 5 months
Lack of local government ownership
Resistance from local people
More difficult exit strategy
Yogyakarta: Bottom-up / more relax
Took about 2 months
Management of rebuilding
Aceh: BRR  coordination, later on developer
Lack of solid local government and conflict
Issues of accountability
Victim of dissatisfaction
Yogyakarta: Local government  coordination

Aceh:
Early period: strong emphasis on housing
Longer stay in temporary shelters
Delaying the process of livelihood recovery
Sequence of Rebuilding
Yogyakarta:
Livelihood recovery was conducted at the same time as building houses
Within a year, 85% of enterprises have resumed their operations
( important research topic: resilience and adaptation)
Shorter stay in temporary shelters
Relatively quick recovery of livelihood

Input Prices and Management
Lower local supplies, higher demand of materials and labour, as well as influx of large money supply  increasing costs of living, housing and infrastructures
Lessons
Aceh: Ensuring the economy is open
Special regulations on material imports
Establishing peace and allowing massive movement of goods and labour from neighbouring regions
Yogyakarta: Domestic provision of materials
Provision of materials is part of livelihood recovery support brick factories and wood building materials
Possible adjustments on cost estimation / supports

Cash vs In-kind
Aceh: mostly in-kind (houses and boats)
Certainty that houses were built / boats were provided
Relatively protected from price fluctuations
Time delay in receiving support
Dissatisfaction on house specifications
Yogya: mostly cash
Uncertainty on the use of the cash
Sensitive to price fluctuations
Faster distribution of support
Dissatisfaction on the size of compensation

Managing Expectations
High expectations  Dissatisfaction / social unrest  Unsmooth process of rebuilding
Announcement of building better
Ambitious plan: schedule/quantity and quality
Aceh: 92,000 houses in 2006 or 108,000 houses by end of 2006  too ambitious
Arrival of large-scale support
Warning people that reconstruction takes time
Socialization on relative variations of quality
Improve living conditions in shelters

Donor Commitments and Exit Strategy
Donor commitments:
Commitments may not materialize in a timely manner
May not translate into actual flow of funds
Amount spent on the ground vs for donors’ own administration
Domestic capacity to absorb aid
Effective communications with donors
Exit strategy
No exit strategy can lead to:
A big shock to the local economy
Sudden huge responsibility to local governments
Gradual exit and involvement of local people since the beginning of rebuilding

After Rebuilding
Better livelihood
New house
New Market
New school

Rebuilding after Natural Disasters: Lessons from the Aceh Tsunami and Yogyakarta Earthquake

by International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)

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Rebuilding after Natural Disasters: Lessons from the Aceh Tsunami and Yogyakarta Earthquake Presentation Transcript