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From Doha to Bali: Why the road
should not end now
David Laborde, IFPRI
A Post-Bali Food Security Agenda
May 6, 2104
Washi...
Why should we care?
•  Global	
  Food	
  Security	
  and	
  a	
  Healthy	
  Global	
  
Trading	
  System	
  are	
  two	
  ...
The DDA: a long and painful process
•  Why	
  is	
  the	
  Doha	
  Development	
  
Agenda	
  Failing?	
  And	
  What	
  Ca...
The 2008 Modalities: a working
agenda?
•  Long	
  negoKaKons	
  since	
  2001	
  in	
  a	
  stalemate	
  
•  21	
  issues	...
Effects on Agricultural Tariffs
Region	
   Trade	
  weighted	
  Bound	
  rates	
  on	
  
Imports	
  
Trade	
  weighted	
  ...
Global consequences, % changes
Sector	
   NAMA	
  modaliDes	
   AMA	
  -­‐	
  
DomesDc	
  
Support	
  
AMA	
  -­‐	
  
Expo...
Sectoral results
7	
  
From	
  Laborde	
  (2012),	
  MIRAGE	
  CGE	
  simulaKons	
  
Illustration: Effects of the DDA:
Ag. Trade and Production
From	
  Laborde	
  (2012),	
  
MIRAGE	
  CGE	
  
simulaKons	
  
Consequences of a failed agreement:
A less resilient system
-­‐250.0	
  
-­‐200.0	
  
-­‐150.0	
  
-­‐100.0	
  
-­‐50.0	
 ...
Bali package and Beyond
	
  
•  Limited	
  achievements	
  in	
  Bali:	
  
–  Trade	
  FacilitaKon:	
  real	
  potenKal	
 ...
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From Doha to Bali: Why the road should not end now

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Presentation by David Laborde (IFPRI ), IFPRI Policy Seminar: "A Post-Bali Food Security Agenda," May 6, 2104
in Washington, DC

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Transcript of "From Doha to Bali: Why the road should not end now"

  1. 1. From Doha to Bali: Why the road should not end now David Laborde, IFPRI A Post-Bali Food Security Agenda May 6, 2104 Washington, DC More  on  IFPRI’s  Doha  page:   h3p://www.ifpri.org/book-­‐6308/ourwork/researcharea/doha-­‐round    
  2. 2. Why should we care? •  Global  Food  Security  and  a  Healthy  Global   Trading  System  are  two  criKcal  public  goods   for  a  peaceful  and  sustainable  growth;   •  Food  Security  and  Self  Sufficiency  are  two   different  and  in  many  cases  opposite  noKons;  
  3. 3. The DDA: a long and painful process •  Why  is  the  Doha  Development   Agenda  Failing?  And  What  Can   be  Done?  (Bouet  and  Laborde,   2009)   •  Eight  years  of  Doha  trade  talks   Where  Do  We  Stand?  (Bouet   and  Laborde,  2009)   0   20   40   60   80   100   120   140   160   Agricultural  World  Trade,  USD  Blns,   annual  changes  by  2025  
  4. 4. The 2008 Modalities: a working agenda? •  Long  negoKaKons  since  2001  in  a  stalemate   •  21  issues  among  which  Agriculture   •  Agriculture  negoKated  over  3  pillars  (Market  access,  DomesKc  Support,  Export   subsidies)   •  Mix  of  strict  disciplines  and  flexibiliKes  (lower  disciplines  for  Small  and  Vulnerable   Economies,  sensiKve  and  special  products)   •  Specific  iniKaKves  on  some  products:  e,g,  Tropical  products   •  Different  visions  of  what  is  a  “development  round”   •  Keep  in  mind:  Doha  is  far  from  free  trade  and  agricultural  markets  in  developing   countries  nearly  untouched     •  More  details  available  in  Laborde  and  MarKn  (2011),  several  chapters  in   Unfinished  Business  (h3p://go.worldbank.org/L8904MG5A0)  and  Laborde  and   MarKn  (2012)  and  Laborde  (2012).  
  5. 5. Effects on Agricultural Tariffs Region   Trade  weighted  Bound  rates  on   Imports   Trade  weighted  Applied  rates  on  Imports   (including  preferenDal  regimes)   Trade  weighted  Applied  rates  on  exports   (including  preferenDal  regimes)   B a s e   rate   DDA  without   flexibiliKes   DDA   with   flexibiliKes   B a s e   rate   DDA   without   flexibiliKes   D D A   w i t h   flexibiliKes   Base   rate   DDA   without   flexibiliKes   D D A   w i t h   flexibiliKes   ALL   40.3   20.7   29.9   14.6   9   11.9   14.6   9   11.9   HIC   30.9   12.1   18.4   15.5   7.5   11.1   15.1   9.3   12.3   LMIC   53   33   45.4   13.3   11.3   13.2   14.3   8.6   11.5   LDCs   94.1   59.3   93.7   12.5   12.2   12.5   7.4   6.5   7.1   As  a  %  of  reducKon  from  the  base  rate   ALL       -­‐49%   -­‐26%       -­‐38%   -­‐18%       -­‐38%   -­‐18%   HIC       -­‐61%   -­‐40%       -­‐52%   -­‐28%       -­‐38%   -­‐19%   LMIC       -­‐38%   -­‐14%       -­‐15%   -­‐1%       -­‐40%   -­‐20%   From  Laborde  and  MarKn  (2011,  2012)   Regions   Bound  tariffs  on  Imports   Average  Applied  tariffs   Average  Applied  Tariffs  faced  on  exports       Baseline   Formula   Formula  +  Flex   Baseline   Formula   F o r m u l a   +   Flex   Baseline   Formula   Formula  +  Flex   Brazil   41.8   26.7   34.9   4.8   4.7   4.8   18.8   9.8   13.7   Chile   26.4   17.3   24.8   1.7   1.7   1.7   8.7   5.2   6.4   Mexico   52.9   32.7   41.2   3.9   3.3   3.9   4.2   2.3   3.1   Rest  of  LAC   58.7   35.6   50.9   9.8   9.4   9.8   13.4   6.7   10.1  
  6. 6. Global consequences, % changes Sector   NAMA  modaliDes   AMA  -­‐   DomesDc   Support   AMA  -­‐   Export   Subsidies   AMA  -­‐  Market   Access   Developed   AMA  -­‐  Market   Access  Developing   Total  AMA   AMA+NAMA   World  Trade  -­‐   Volume   Agricultural   trade   -­‐0.16     -­‐1.02     -­‐0.64     6.22     0.62     5.18   5.02   Non  Agricultural   trade   3.35     -­‐0.00     -­‐0.00     -­‐0.01     0.00     -­‐0.01   3.34   All  Goods   2.68     -­‐0.01     -­‐0.02     0.32     0.03     0.32   3.00   World  Trade  -­‐   Value   Agricultural   trade   0.39     0.21     -­‐0.45       6.21     0.63     6.6   6.99   Non  Agricultural   trade   3.33     -­‐0.02     -­‐0.00     0.02     0.00     0.00   3.33   All  Goods   2.66     -­‐0.05     -­‐0.03     0.29     0.03     0.24   2.90   World  Welfare   0.08     0.010     -­‐0.001     0.067     0.002     0.078   0.158   as  a  share  of   AMA  and  NAMA   gains   50.6%   6.3%   -­‐0.6%   42.4%   1.3%   49.4%   100%   as  a  share  of   AMA  gains       12.8%   -­‐1.3%   85.9%   2.6%   100%       From  Laborde  (2012),  MIRAGE  CGE  simulaKons  
  7. 7. Sectoral results 7   From  Laborde  (2012),  MIRAGE  CGE  simulaKons  
  8. 8. Illustration: Effects of the DDA: Ag. Trade and Production From  Laborde  (2012),   MIRAGE  CGE   simulaKons  
  9. 9. Consequences of a failed agreement: A less resilient system -­‐250.0   -­‐200.0   -­‐150.0   -­‐100.0   -­‐50.0   0.0   50.0   Developed  countries   Developing  countries   Annual  Real  Income  changes,  $Blns  by  2025   DDA   Increase  to  UR  bound  tariffs   Increase  to  post  DDA  bound  tariffs   Increase  to  last  ten  years  tariff  peaks  within  UR  limits   Increase  to  last  ten  years  tariff  peaks  within  DDA  limits   See  Bouet  and  Laborde,  2008   “The  potenKal  cost  of  a  failed  Doha  Round”  
  10. 10. Bali package and Beyond   •  Limited  achievements  in  Bali:   –  Trade  FacilitaKon:  real  potenKal   –  DomesKc  support  and  co3on  case:  nothing  new   –  Export  restricKons:  no  moratorium   –  Food  Security:  OpportuniKes  and  Challenges     •  But  an  impressive  commitment  of  countries  to   negoKate  and  keep  alive  the  DDA   •  More  informaKon  in  Diaz-­‐Bonilla  and  David   Laborde,  2014.  
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