From self-sufficiency to foodsecurity: changing minds, changing      market access policies     David Laborde – d.laborde@...
SOME IDEASINTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Two Simple Ideas       “An empty stomach is not a good political adviser.”                                            Albe...
A Public Goods Story  • As any public goods:  • Who will suffer the most without them?        • The weakest entities in th...
Trade and Food Security: the links• Food security: availability, affordability and quality• Self Sufficiency is not Food S...
SOME FACTSINTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Trade Policies: Let’s tax the hungry ?                                                    Breakdown by nutritional content...
Volatility of food supply:                                                        Trade brings stability                  ...
Self Sufficiency vs Trade:   a sustainable way to achieve food security                                                   ...
Do high tariffs enough to reduce hunger? No                        90%                        80%                        7...
A Snapshot of Policies                                  Small country casePolicy Instrument               Domestic       D...
SOME MODELINGINTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
IMPORT DUTIES AND THE DOHAROUND    For more on IFPRI works on the Doha Round and Import restrictions:    http://www.ifpri....
Market access can be delivered with the DDA                     Applied tariffs faced on exports                     Appli...
Visible and Invisible gains of the Doha                        Round                                                      ...
Consequences• Tariffs in Agriculture remain high: Doha Round will provide significant    market access in developed countr...
EXPORT RESTRICTIONS ANDUNCOOPERATIVE POLICIES    For more on IFPRI works on export taxes:    http://www.foodsecurityportal...
An illustration with the wheat market: Effects on world prices of            trade policy reactions for selected countries...
An illustration with the wheat market: Effects on real income        of trade policy reactions for selected countries     ...
Consequences• Strong incentives to not “unilaterally” disarm and  dismantle protection: No discipline on export restrictio...
Looking for a solution• Elimination of export restrictions may be a first best but domestic  political economy will make u...
Conclusions• Food security will need a secure trading system to be achieve, and  trade liberalization needs to deliver foo...
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From self sufficiency to food security: changing minds, changing market access policies

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By: David Laborde, IFPRI Senior Research Fellow
WTO Public forum 2011

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From self sufficiency to food security: changing minds, changing market access policies

  1. 1. From self-sufficiency to foodsecurity: changing minds, changing market access policies David Laborde – d.laborde@cgiar.org WTO Public forum 2011
  2. 2. SOME IDEASINTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
  3. 3. Two Simple Ideas “An empty stomach is not a good political adviser.” Albert Einstein Food Security is a public good at the country and at the global level« et le libre échange lui-même la condition absolue de la paix. » (to establish absolute free trade, and by this very fact to ensure universal peace.) Leon Walras Global and free trade is a public good at the global level that is intrinsically tied to Food Security INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
  4. 4. A Public Goods Story • As any public goods: • Who will suffer the most without them? • The weakest entities in the system • How to provide it? Who will pay for it? • Challenge of Cooperation • Challenge of Free Riders  A clear role for WTO, even an extended role Which role for IFPRI? “Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from anyintellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. ” John Maynard Keynes IFPRI as a knowledge broker INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
  5. 5. Trade and Food Security: the links• Food security: availability, affordability and quality• Self Sufficiency is not Food Security• International Trade as the bridge between needs and resources: an history as long as History• International Trade beyond Agriculture: Source of Income growth• International Trade: Source of cheap food• International Trade: Source of stable food supply• International Trade: Source of productivity gains• Food quality and International trade• Comparative Advantages and Specialization: fears and realities• But limits: unfair competition, and twisted specialization, exposure to other policies INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
  6. 6. SOME FACTSINTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
  7. 7. Trade Policies: Let’s tax the hungry ? Breakdown by nutritional contentsAverage World Tariffs and level of developments 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% Cereals Fruits Average Tariffs on Food Products Vegetables Dairy Average Tariffs on Calories Meat High Income CountriesAll Food products Middle and Low Average Tariffs on income All goods Proteins countries Least Developed 0 20 40 60 countries Based on Boumelassa, Laborde and Mitaritonna, 2009; Bouet and Laborde 2009.INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE More at http://gatt.ifpri.info/
  8. 8. Volatility of food supply: Trade brings stability 4500000 4000000 Standard Deviation of KiloCalories by Ha 3500000 3000000 2500000 1980-1990 2000000 1990-2000 2000-2010 1500000 1000000 500000 0 From Deason & Laborde, 2011 based on FAOSTATINTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
  9. 9. Self Sufficiency vs Trade: a sustainable way to achieve food security 4500 Wheat Exports and Production of Saudi Arabia 4000 3500 Thousands of Tonnes 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 Export Quantity 500 Production Quantity 0 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Year FAOSTAT• Quick depletion of the fossil water • 21 km3 a year for desert irrigation, 340 km3 of total accessible resources… USE=940% of renewable resource FAOSTAT, AquastatINTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
  10. 10. Do high tariffs enough to reduce hunger? No 90% 80% 70% Tariffs on Calories 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 0 10 20 30 40 Global Hunger Index, IFPRIINTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
  11. 11. A Snapshot of Policies Small country casePolicy Instrument Domestic Domestic Trade Self production consumption Sufficiency ( Hunger?)Import duties + - -- ++Import subsidy - + ++ --Production subsidy ++ 0 - +Consumption subsidy + ++ + -Export Tax - + -- (-)Export Subsidy + - ++ (+) But large countries or numerous small countries create externalities...INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
  12. 12. SOME MODELINGINTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
  13. 13. IMPORT DUTIES AND THE DOHAROUND For more on IFPRI works on the Doha Round and Import restrictions: http://www.ifpri.org/book-6308/ourwork/researcharea/doha-round http://gatt.ifpri.info/dda0/ http://www.ifpri.org/publication/eight-years-doha-trade-talks http://www.ifpri.org/publication/potential-cost-failed-doha-round http://www.ifpri.org/publication/why-doha-development-agenda- failing-and-what-can-be-doneINTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
  14. 14. Market access can be delivered with the DDA Applied tariffs faced on exports Applied tariffs on imports with with Base Formula flexibilities Base Formula flexibilities All countries 14.6 9 11.9 14.6 9 11.9 Developing (non-LDC) 14.3 8.6 11.5 13.3 11.3 13.2 High income countries 15.1 9.3 12.3 15.5 7.5 11.1 LDCs 7.4 6.5 7.1 12.5 12.2 12.5 Applied tariffs on imports Applied tariffs faced on exports Formula with flexibilities Formula with flexibilities 0% All WTO countries -10% Developing (non-LDC) -20% High income countries -30% LDCs -40% -50% -60%INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
  15. 15. Visible and Invisible gains of the Doha Round Effects of finalizing the DDA negotiations: + $68 Bn annually of Agricultural TradeTotal cost Potential effects of not the DDA reaching an agreement failure and tariff increase to last 10 years maximum: - $116 Bn annually of Agricultural Trade Bouet and Laborde, 2009 INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
  16. 16. Consequences• Tariffs in Agriculture remain high: Doha Round will provide significant market access in developed countries (1/3 reduction in applied tariffs even with flexibilities) and reduce binding overhang in developing countries.• Developing countries have a lot of flexibilities. The Food Security argument is used but also misused (delicate issues surrounding the SSM)• Concluding the Doha Round will be beneficial for Food Security • By removing distortions and increasing farm profitability where it is needed (to attract investments) • By removing uncertainties in applied trade policy, it will promote trade (Laborde and Roy, 2009: cutting binding overhang raises agricultural trade through extensive margins) and investments • Aid for Trade, and trade facilitation, will help to link markets and eliminate waste. Productivity improvements need to be associated to market access to support income growth. • Least Developed countries situation still deserve specific attentionINTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
  17. 17. EXPORT RESTRICTIONS ANDUNCOOPERATIVE POLICIES For more on IFPRI works on export taxes: http://www.foodsecurityportal.org/agricultural-trade-policies-and-food-crisis-will-they-help-or-hurt http://www.ifpri.org/publication/economics-export-taxation-context-food-crisis Bouet, A., D. Laborde, 2010, « The economics of export taxes in a context of food security », in OECD, The Economic Impact of Export Restrictions on Raw Materials, Paris, OECD Trade Policy Studies, Trade and Agriculture Division, 59-78. and Bouet and Laborde 2012: Food Crisis and Export Taxation: the Cost of Non-Cooperative Trade Policies. Review of World Economics. no 1, 2012INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
  18. 18. An illustration with the wheat market: Effects on world prices of trade policy reactions for selected countries Exogenous demand increase [initial perturbation] Policy Effects Effects of increases in export taxes to mitigate the shock on domestic “Natural” prices Shock Effects of decrease in import duties to mitigate the shock on domestic prices Interaction effects between import and export restrictions 0% 10% 20% Source: Bouet and Laborde, 2009. MIRAGE simulationsINTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
  19. 19. An illustration with the wheat market: Effects on real income of trade policy reactions for selected countries “Natural” Egypt Shock “Natural”Argentina Shock -0.40% -0.30% -0.20% -0.10% 0.00% 0.10% 0.20% 0.30% 0.40% Exogenous demand increase [initial perturbation] Effects of increases in export taxes to mitigate the shock on domestic prices Effects of decrease in import duties to mitigate the shock on domestic prices Interaction effects between import and export restrictionsINTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
  20. 20. Consequences• Strong incentives to not “unilaterally” disarm and dismantle protection: No discipline on export restrictions imply limitations to improve agricultural liberalization• But still they also hurt incentives for long term investments in agriculture in countries using them• Self enforcing mechanisms to enforce cooperation? • Not a legal framework to retaliate: most export restrictions are WTO compatible • And in practice, no real capacity to retaliate • Asymmetry of market power • Limited tools (import duties have limited interests) INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
  21. 21. Looking for a solution• Elimination of export restrictions may be a first best but domestic political economy will make unrealistic such outcome• What can be done? • Monitoring and notifications • Protection for the vulnerable countries • Punishing “bad” behaviors (if we can not ban them)• Potential solutions: • Reversed “Quota” for SVE importers: amount of imports (on historical basis) that should be allowed for SVE, free of restrictions in all situations • Permits to restrict exports, like permits to pollute, countries using export restrictions have to pay for this deviation from the set of good trade practices, creating negative externalities. The collected money help affected SVE to pay increased import bills on world marketsINTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
  22. 22. Conclusions• Food security will need a secure trading system to be achieve, and trade liberalization needs to deliver food security to be sustainable.• Providing such public goods need international cooperation• But the paradigm has changed: WTO is designed to fight policies depressing prices, not increasing them (e.g. Biofuels)• Policy makers should help to create a more stable environment to help private investments in agriculture (production and marketing) and therefore eliminate policy volatility that increase overall uncertainty• These needs have to be fully understood and decisions have to be taken quickly (e.g. even a Doha “light” with large cut in binding overhang is valuable)• The scope of negotiations has to be enlarged and new disciplines have to cover export restrictions to get a balance and sustainable outcomeINTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

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