Icraf at ifad on res rupes presa part 1

ADVANCES IN PAYMENTS/REWARDS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES : EXPERIENCES FROM REWARDS FOR, USE OF AND SHARED INVESTMENT IN PRO-POOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES SCHEME ( RUPES ) AND PRO-POOR REWARDS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES IN AFRICA( PRESA ) AND WAY FORWARD Delia Catacutan, Sara Namirembe, Beria Leimona & Meine van-Noordwijk

Presentation Outline
Our challenge
Synthesis of RUPES 1: Proof of concept
Activities and outputs in RUPES 2 and PRESA: Proof of practice
Conclusions
Way forward

ICRAF’s 3 major networks of action research and learning sites on RES and climate change issues: Pro poor Rewards for Environmental Services in Africa (2008 – 2011) covering 8 sites in 5 countries ( Tanzania, Kenya, Guinea, Uganda & Malawi ) Rewards for, Use of and Shared Investment in Pro-poor Environmental Services schemes in Asia (2002-2012) covering 12 sites in 8 countries (China, Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines, Nepal, India, plus Thailand and Cambodia - upcoming) Global partnership devoted entirely to research on the tropical forest margins with 12 benchmark sites in the Amazon, Congo Basin and Southeast Asia

Bac Kan RUPES SITES IN ASIA

PRESA Sites

Concepts
Environmental services are a collection of biophysical outcomes that are the consequence of proper management of natural resources with considerable impact on human beings and wide natural processes.
Rather than control and command environmental policies, the concept of PES attempts to harness market forces, including the global community to increase positive economic and environmental outcomes.

Redirecting development pathways towards environmental integrity Positive incentives are needed to reward rural poor for the envirponmental services they can/do provide

Free and prior informed consent Efficiency Fairness Balancing act is needed

But PES actors are highly heterogeneous-- policy-makers and regulators and private sector as ES buyer, intermediaries, and local communities as ES providers have different knowledge, perceptions and ambitions which they all use to justify their individual actions.
And PES is knowledge-intensive!

Initial interest Effective increase in ES Signed contract External investors and regulators: learning curve Learning curve for local stakeholders (actors) of land use change Smooth implementation? Efficient + Fair reward systems require a two-way learning curve Negotiations

RES mechanisms differ from ‘command & control’
Conditional : a “performance” basis for the rewards /payments rather than an entitlement based on nominal entities
Voluntary : engagement of both ES providers and beneficiaries in a negotiated scheme through free choice at the individual level
RUPES 1 Synthesis
Knowledge and understanding of context:
Realistic : RES schemes are based on scientifically sound assessment of relationships of land use changes and ES provision.
Pro-poor: RES schemes must consider multiple dimensions of poverty
Context Mechanism
Payment for Environmental Services (PES) or Co-Investment in Environmental Stewardship
Co-investment and shared responsibility for stewardship, with a focus on “ integrative livelihood assets ” (natural + human + social capital) rather than only financial can be expected to provide future flows of ES
Current findings show that per-capita financial transfer from PES remain small
Collective actions, social mobilization and secure land access are main components and can act as conditional RES and reduce poverty
Outcomes &Impacts + =

PES Paradigms Conditionality
CES: C ommoditized E nvironmental S ervices
Direct interaction of ES providers & beneficiaries
Recurrent monetary payments based on supply and demand
No explicit poverty target
Actual ES delivery & direct marketability
COS: C ompensating for O pportunities S kipped
Paying for accepting restrictions
Achievement of a condition or effort
Poverty target added with certain conditions
CIS: C o- I nvestment in (landscape) S tewardship
Entrust the local resource management
Full trust of management plan & local monitoring with high social capital
flexible contract , broad sanctions
van Noordwijk and Leimona (2010) Proxies, recurrent Plans investment 'Real' ES, recurrent

Replicable tools for assessment, negotiation and design of R/PES schemes
Rapid Hydrological Assessment (RaHA)
Rapid Carbon Stock Assessment (RaCSA)
Rapid Biodiversity Appraisal (RaBA)
Participatory Landscape Appraisal (PaLA)
Rapid Tenure Assessment (RaTA)
Reverse auctions
Others (visit:http://www.worldagroforestry.org/sea/projects/tulsea)

Efficiency principle
 Realistic: causal pathways to enhance ES are clear,
real opportunity + implementation costs are offset, or benefits outweigh the costs
 Conditional: performance-based contracts, agreed MRV system for monitoring, reporting and verification
Fairness principle
 Voluntary: meets the Free and Prior Informed Consent standards; willingness to accept responsibilities
 Pro-poor: at minimum not increasing inequity, attention to gender balance

RUPES 2 – Rewards for, Use of and Shared Investment in Pro-poor Environmental Services
Goal : Rewards for provision of environmental services flow to poor people in an Asian context.
Outputs, impacts and lessons

Cidanau
An activity-based reward for watershed ES from private companies
Financial reward for local infrastructure and smallholder business improvement
Extension and scaling up at provincial level
Supporting local intermediary: Communication Forum of Cidanau
Bungo
Rubber eco-certification
Improving the quality of smallholder rubber production
Supported by Bridgestone
Collaborating with Indonesian Institute of Ecolabeling
Singkarak
Community based- voluntary carbon market
Potential organic coffee
Environmental Education Centre
Agro-ecotourism
Integrated Lake Management with Ministry of Environment
Supported by FAO RAP – Assisted Natural Regeneration to combat Imperata grassland
Aceh
Contributing to Green-growth economy after recovery from tsunami
Coordinated by UNESCAP & WWF Indonesia
Sumberjaya
A performance-based reward for sedimentation reduction from HEP
Scale up to watershed level for collective financial reward
Selected as a best practice for a national GEF-UNDP project coordinated by MoF

Kuningan
Local level rewards for watershed services
Supporting a local NGO: KANOPI
Policy advocacy RES between districts
Kapuas Hulu
Scoping study on watershed hydrological function using RHA tool
Supporting the consortium WWF-CARE-IIED
Dieng
Scoping study on RES feasibility at a horticulture-rich but severely degraded watershed
Food security issue on potato farming
Supporting Safe Dieng NGO
INDONESIA
Central Sulawesi
IFAD Investment Project site with Ministry of Agriculture
Collaboration with Mars Symbioscience Indonesia to improve the cocoa agroforestry and promote RES scheme for smallholders.
Lombok
Community based- forest management
Gender study on role of women’s knowledge in increasing the sustainable NRM
Supporting a local NGO to monitor an established RES for providing good water quality for urban dwellers.

PHILIPPINES AND VIETNAM
Bac Kan
Supporting the PDD of REALU projects
Developing RES scheme for forest ES
Improving existing ecotourism scheme
Bakun
Collaborating with Cordillera Highlands Agriculture Resource Management Project
HEP royalty benefit-transfer to local indigenous group
Kalahan
Voluntary carbon market scheme by Ikalahan indigenous group in collaboration with FAO RAP
Supported by Mitsubishi company in developing carbon Project Identification Note
Potential bundling ES with watershed and biodiversity conservation
A best practice site for forest protection and NTFP marketing
Lantapan
A case study of water rights and conflicts
A sentinel site for Landcare
Supporting policy advocacy of RES , and RES design at district level

Shivapuri-Nagargun National Park (SNNP)
Managed by Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation (DNPWC)
a major source of drinking water in Kathmandu (around 21% of piped water) other services: HEP plant, irrigation, tourism
Two villages inside the park Park-people conflict (wildlife, no access to forests)
Collaboration with ICIMOD
Loktak Lake
Floodplain wetlands with unique floating lands called phumdis i.e. thick mats of vegetation intermixed sediments
Presence of Keibul Lamjao National Park for globally threathened species of Brow Antlered Deer
Construction of Ithai barrage of HEP converted a naturally fluctuating lake into a reservoir
Wetlands India and Loktak Development Authority : restoration strategies
Tibet Plateau
Incentivizing improved management of both degraded and un-degraded grasslands.
Conditional on maintaining sustainable stocking levels on lands to which herders have legal use rights.
NEPAL
Kulekhani Watershed
Hilly region watershed extends over 8 VDCs
Community forestry – on hill slopes, intensive agriculture on the slopes
Hydropower station below – reservoir based
17% of hydropower in the country (92 MW)
Government royalty collected from Hydropower generation by NEA; 12% channeled back to the district
Collaboration with ICIMOD

The development of reward for ecosystem services schemes for grass land by the China’s State Council in 2007, China
Ecological land use plan for Xishuangbanna Prefecture 2010, China
The Indian National Environment Policy on the role of economic incentives for environmental conservation in 2006.
The Indonesian Environmental Protection and Management focusing on economic instruments for ecosystem services: Act No. 32/2009 and regulations of the Ministry of Forestry on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Country (REDD).
The Nepali Leasehold Forestry Policy in 2002: degraded forest is leased for 40 years (renewable) to groups of poor households as a resource base for their exclusive use.
The draft of Philippines Climate Change Act of 2008 and a final review of Sustainable Forest Management Act (SFMA) in 2008.
The Vietnamese Decision No. 380/QD – TTG: ES buyers should pay ES providers
National level impacts

Making a case for Watershed service rewards Sara Namirembe This programme is implemented by the World Agroforestry Centre, with funding from the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the European Commission and the government of Finland. The views expressed in this presentation do not necessarily reflect the views of the funders.

Focus
Can watersheds be managed sustainably through negotiated agreements between landowners in targeted hotspots and potential beneficiaries?
PRESA seeks to generate evidence on feasibility of rewards for environmental services (RES) through action research at local level to inform and influence actions at landscape and country levels

Analysis of watershed service payments RES principle Issues Realistic Hydrologically effective Financially affordable Voluntary Sellers willing to accept payment; Buyers willing to pay Conditional Performance based contracts/agreements Propoor Does no harm Improves the lives of the poor

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Icraf at ifad on res rupes presa part 1

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Icraf at ifad on res rupes presa part 1 Presentation Transcript