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India Iaea Agreement

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A presentation by Dr G. Balachandran on the Agreement forwarded to the Board of Governors of the IAEA

A presentation by Dr G. Balachandran on the Agreement forwarded to the Board of Governors of the IAEA

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Transcript

  • 1. India-IAEA agreement
    • Current status:
    • India has three reactor sites under safeguards: TAPS, RAPS and Koodankulum;
    • Without NSG amendment India could have imported neither nuclear facilities nor fuel;
    • If there had been no NSG “fullscope safeguards requirement” India could have imported reactors with individual safeguards agreement only with conditions not easier than obtained in Koodankulum;
    • India could have used imported fuel only in safeguarded reactors;
  • 2. India-IAEA agreement
    • Current status:
    • The safeguards to be applied on reactors using imported fuel would be in line with GOV/1621 (NSG requirement) i.e. in perpetuity.
    • None of India’s current safeguards agreements, and for that matter no IAEA safeguards agreement, has any reference to any fuel supply guarantee. The conditions under which the safeguards are to be applied is determined by the bilateral agreement between the supplier and the recipient e.g. the original Tarapur agreement.
    • Therefore, India will have to negotiate individually with the supplier fuel supply assurances and corrective measures. IAEA will only conform to such agreements.
  • 3. India-IAEA agreement
    • Requirements:India
    • No current safeguard arrangement should have conditions stronger than the present conditions under the new arrangement;
    • No safeguard arrangement of future imported facilities should be stronger than the current standards;
    • Safeguards on future imported nuclear facilities and materials should be in conformity with the bilateral agreement governing the nuclear transfer of the facility.
  • 4. India-IAEA agreement
    • Requirements: India
    • Indigenous reactors placed under safeguards should not subject to any additional burden on the facility,beyond those that would have been experienced by the facility in the absence of the safeguards agreement.
    • India’s freedom action in respect of its strategic programs either in terms of restricting its use of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and materials must not be constrained in any manner by the agreement.
  • 5. India-IAEA agreement
    • Requirements: IAEA
    • IAEA is only a regulatory/incepting agency. It does not deny or confer nuclear weapon status on any country.
    • IAEA neither controls nor supplies nuclear fuel or material on its own to any party. At the best it is only an intermediary standing guarantee about safeguarding the material supplied by a third party.
    • It cannot guarantee fuel supply assurance. That is between the buyer and the seller.
    • The agreement will have to be approved by the IAEA Board of Governors.
    • The safeguarded material cannot be used for any weapon or military purpose.
  • 6. India-IAEA agreement
    • Does the agreement fulfill India’s requirements?
    • No current safeguard arrangement should have conditions stronger than the present conditions under the new arrangement; Yes. In fact the new safeguards conditions are somewhat less restrictive. (Art. 15 and Art. 11)
    • No safeguard arrangement of future imported facilities should be stronger than the current standards; Yes. Same as above (i)
    • Safeguards on future imported nuclear facilities and materials should be in conformity with the bilateral agreement governing the nuclear transfer of the facility-Yes. (Art.11.(b))
  • 7. India-IAEA agreement
    • Does the agreement fulfill India’s requirements?
    • Indigenous reactors placed under safeguards should not subject to any additional burden on the facility,beyond those that would have been experienced by the facility in the absence of the safeguards agreement. –Yes.
    • India’s freedom action in respect of its strategic programs either in terms of restricting its use of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and materials must not be constrained in any manner by the agreement. -Yes. No reference or application or relevance of the agreement to any unsafeguarded facility. Reference to unsafeguarded materials in conformity with Indian requirements. (Art. 84, Art. 94 etc)
  • 8. India-IAEA agreement
    • Does it fulfill IAEA and others’ requirements?
    • Yes- reference to GOV/1621. US and NSG requirements.
    • The safeguarded material cannot be used for any weapon or military purpose- Yes. (Art. 1 and Art.2)
    • The agreement will have to be approved by the IAEA Board of Governors.- Yes. Sent to the BOG for approval.