Report IUFRO Embracing complexity: Meeting the challenges of international forest governance

International Union of Forest Research Organizations Union Internationale des Instituts de Recherches Forestières Internationaler Verband Forstlicher Forschungsanstalten Unión Internacional de Organizaciones de Investigación Forestal iUfro World series vol. 28Embracing complExity:mEEting thE challEngEs ofintErnational forEstgovErnancEA Global Assessment Report Prepared bythe Global Forest Expert Panel onthe International Forest RegimeEditors:Jeremy Rayner, Panel ChairAlexander Buck, IUFRO Executive DirectorPia Katila, Content EditorThis publication has received funding from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland,the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, the United States Forest Service,the Austrian Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Manage-ment and the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation.The views expressed within this publication do not necessarily reflect official policy ofthe governments represented by these institutions.publisher:international Union of forest research organizations (iUfro)

Recommended catalogue entry:Jeremy Rayner, Alexander Buck & Pia Katila (eds.). 2010.Embracing complexity: Meeting the challenges of international forest governance.A global assessment report. Prepared by the Global Forest Expert Panel onthe International Forest Regime.IUFRO World Series Volume 28.Vienna. 172 p.isbn 978-3-902762-01-6issn 1016-3263Published by:International Union of Forest Research Organizations (IUFRO)Available from:IUFRO HeadquartersSecretariatc/o Mariabrunn (BFW)Hauptstrasse 71140 ViennaAustriaTel: +43-1-877-0151-0E-mail: office@iufro.orgWeb site: www.iufro.org/Language editor: Alastair SarreLay out: Seppo OjaCover photographs:Metla/Erkki Oksanen, Matti Nummelin, LeoFFreitas/Flickr/Getty ImagesPrinted in Finland by Tammerprint Oy, Tampere, 2010

prefaceT he present volume is the second in the series of reports commissioned by the CollaborativePartnership on Forests’ Global Forest Expert Panels lihoods. Nonetheless, there is an undeniable sense that the regime as a whole is failing. Rates of deforestation, though declining overall, show significantinitiative. Following the highly successful report on regional variations and remain “alarmingly high” ac-Adaptation of Forests and People to Climate Change, cording to the latest State of the Forests report by thepresented to UNFF 8 in 2009, the members of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization.GFEP Steering Committee approved the topic of “the Non-state actors are conspicuous by their absenceinternational forest regime” for a new panel in the fall in many of the key initiatives and have their own is-of the same year. More than 30 experts in political sue networks existing alongside the regime. Muchscience, policy studies, law and international rela- is going on at local, national and regional levels thattions agreed to take part and met for the first time is not reflected in the regime’s outputs. In short, thein Vienna in December 2009. A subsequent meet- effect of the international forest regime is rather lessing of the whole panel was held in Nairobi in July than the sum of its many parts.2010 and smaller groups gathered in Singapore, New More than forty years ago, the distinguished phi-York and Washington DC. Every effort was made losopher and social scientist Donald Schoen wroteto draw panel members from around the world with that “we must become able not only to transformdifferent experiences and points of view. A similar our institutions in response to changing situationseffort pulled together a blue-ribbon team of review- and requirements; we must invent and develop in-ers from universities, research organizations, govern- stitutions which are ‘learning systems’, that is toments and international organizations whose careful say capable of bringing about their own continuingscrutiny of the draft report resulted in the removal transformation.” In seeking to understand what hasof many errors and a significant improvement in the gone wrong with international forest governance andclarity and direction of this document. Indispensable how it can be put right, the panel has avoided takingadministrative support for the panel was provided by positions on the various issues of instrument choicethe IUFRO Secretariat under the direction of Alexan- and organizational reform currently exercising theder Buck. The report was language edited by Alastair chief actors in the international forest regime. WeSarre and the whole editorial process overseen by have, instead, directed our efforts towards reconceiv-Pia Katila. This is truly a collaborative effort and ing the regime as a forest-focused learning systemcould not have been achieved without remarkable of the kind imagined by Schoen. It is my hope thatcollegiality and teamwork. I would like to extend those with the responsibility for forest governance atmy deepest thanks to everyone involved, almost all all levels will find this report, and its accompanyingof whom voluntarily took on what turned out to be policy brief, a useful guide to the complexities of thea considerable burden in addition to their existing regime as it currently stands and a source of inspira-professional obligations. tion for setting in motion the “continuing transforma- The topic of the international forest regime is a tion” which embraces this complexity, turning it fromcomplex one. At the heart of regime are a number of source of weakness to a source of strength.international organizations with different mandatesand capacities, all of whom are rightly proud of their Jeremy Raynerachievements in raising awareness of the threats tothe world’s forests and adopting instruments and pro- Chair of the Expert Panel ongrams designed to protect forest conditions and live- the International Forest Regime 3Embracing complExity: mEEting thE challEngEs of intErnational forEstgovErnancE

Acknowledgements This publication is the product of the collaborative We also gratefully acknowledge the generous fi- work of scientist and experts who acted as authors in nancial and in-kind support provided by the Ministry different capacities. We express our sincere gratitude for Foreign Affairs of Finland, the Swiss Agency to all of them: B.J.M. (Bas) Arts, Steven Bernstein, for Development and Cooperation, the United States Benjamin Cashore, Deborah S. Davenport, Peter Forest Service, the Austrian Federal Ministry of Ag- Glück, Michael Howlett, Constance L. McDermott riculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Manage- (coordinating lead authors); Arild Angelsen, Marie ment, and the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, Appelstrand, Samuel Assembe-Mvondo, Graeme Agriculture and Innovation. Auld, Janette Bulkan, Richard Eba’a Atyi, Reem Furthermore, we would like to thank the GFEP Hajjar, Patrick D. Hardcastle, Eva Heidbreder, Karl Steering Committee for providing overall guidance Hogl, Hans Hoogeveen, David Humphreys, Daniela and generous in-kind support: the International Union Kleinschmit, Ahmad Maryudi, Kathleen McGinley, of Forest Research Organizations (IUFRO), the Food Kathleen McNutt, Ravi Prabhu, Helga Pülzl, Patrick and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Verkooijen, Ingrid J. Visseren-Hamakers, Christoph (FAO), the Secretariat of the United Nations Forum Wildburger, Peter Wood, Yurdi Yasmi (lead authors); on Forests (UNFF), the Secretariat of the Convention and Tim Cadman, Thomas Enters, Daniela Goehler, on Biological Diversity (CBD), the Center for Inter- Lars Gulbrandsen, Shashi Kant, Robert Kozak, Kelly national Forestry Research (CIFOR), and the World Levin, Emmanuel Marfo, Pablo Pacheco, Frederic Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF). Our special thanks go Perron-Welch, Mark Purdon, Olivier Rukundo, Irene to the IUFRO Secretariat for providing indispensable Scher, Michael W. Stone, Luca Tacconi (contributing administrative and technical support to the work of authors). Without their voluntary efforts and com- the Panel. We are particularly grateful also to the mitments the preparation of this publication would Secretariat of the United Nations Forum on Forest, not have been possible. the United Nations Environment Programme, The We acknowledge and also sincerely thank the World Bank, and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public reviewers of the full report and the various chapters Policy, National University of Singapore for hosting whose comments have greatly improved the quality expert meetings. of this publication: Stephanie Caswell, Frank Bier- We are grateful for Seppo Oja for designing mann, Juergen Blaser, Gerard Buttoud, Katarina and preparing the lay out of this publication and for Eckerberg, Fred Gale, Jan Heino, A.A. Hezri, John Alastair Sarre for language editing. Hudson, Maria Ivanova, Niels Elers Koch, Max Krott, John Palmer, Michael Pregernig, Ewald Ram- Jeremy Rayner Alexander Buck Pia Katila etsteiner, Ulrich Schraml, Harri Siiskonen, Markku Panel Chair IUFRO Executive Content Simula, Ilpo Tikkanen, Adam Wellstead and Willi Director Editor Zimmermann.4 Embracing complExity: mEEting thE challEngEs of intErnational forEstgovErnancE

contentspreface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Coordinating lead author: Jeremy Rayner Lead authors: David Humphreys, Frederic Perron Welch, Ravi Prabhu and Patrick Verkooijen2 mapping the core actors and issues defining international forest governance . . . 19 Coordinating lead author: Constance L. McDermott Lead authors: David Humphreys, Christoph Wildburger and Peter Wood Contributing authors: Emmanuel Marfo (African regional instruments), Pablo Pacheco (Latin American regional instruments) and Yurdi Yasmi (Asia-Pacific regional instruments)3 core components of the international forest regime complex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Coordinating lead author: Peter Glück Lead authors: Arild Angelsen, Marie Appelstrand, Samuel Assembe-Mvondo, Graeme Auld and Karl Hogl Contributing authors: David Humphreys and Christoph Wildburger4 Discourses, actors and instruments in international forest governance . . . . . . . . . 57 Coordinating lead author: Bas Arts Lead authors: Marie Appelstrand, Daniela Kleinschmit, Helga Pülzl and Ingrid Visseren-Hamakers Contributing authors: Richard Eba’a Atyi,Thomas Enters, Kathleen McGinley and Yurdi Yasmi5 forests and sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Coordinating lead author: Deborah Davenport Lead authors: Janette Bulkan, Reem Hajjar and Patrick Hardcastle Contributing authors: Samuel Assembe-Mvondo, Richard Eba’a Atyi, David Humphreys and Ahmad Maryudi6 overcoming the challenges to integration: embracing complexity in forest policy design through multi-level governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Coordinating lead author: Michael Howlett Lead author: Jeremy Rayner Contributing authors: Daniela Goehler, Eva Heidbreder, Frederic Perron-Welch, Olivier Rukundo, Patrick Verkooijen and Christoph Wildburger7 Examination of the influences of global forest governance arrangements at the domestic level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 Coordinating lead authors: Steven Bernstein and Benjamin Cashore Lead authors: Richard Eba’a Atyi, Ahmad Maryudi and Kathleen McGinley Contributing authors:Tim Cadman, Lars Gulbrandsen, Daniela Goehler, Karl Hogl, David Humphreys, Shashi Kant, Robert Kozak, Kelly Levin, Constance McDermott, Mark Purdon, Irene Scher, Michael W. Stone, Luca Tacconi and Yurdi Yasmi8 conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 Coordinating lead author: Jeremy Rayner Lead authors: Hans Hoogeveen, Kathleen McNutt and Patrick Verkooijen Contributing author: Christoph Wildburgerappendix 1 preparatory study for the cpf Expert panel on the international forest regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147appendix 2 authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 5Embracing complExity: mEEting thE challEngEs of intErnational forEstgovErnancE

acronyms and abbreviationsa/r Afforestation/Reforestation iUcn International Union for Conservation ofabs Access and Benefit Sharing Natureacto Amazon Cooperation Treaty lEi Indonesian Ecolabelling Institute Organization lrtap Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollutionafp Asia Forest Partnership mcpfE Ministerial Conference on the ProtectionasEan Association of Southeast Asian Nations of Forests in Europeato African Timber Organization moU Memorandum of Understandingc&i Criteria and Indicators mrv Monitoring, Reporting and VerificationcbD Convention on Biological Diversity nbsaps National Biodiversity Strategies andcbfp Congo Basin Forest Partnership Action PlanscDm Clean Development Mechanism nfp National Forest ProgrammescEr Certified Emission Reduction ngo Non-Governmental Organizationcifor Center for International Forestry nlbi Non-Legally Binding Instrument on Research All Types of ForestscitEs Convention on International Trade oEcD Organization for Economic Cooperation in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Development and Flora pEfc Programme for the Endorsement ofcomEsa Common Market for Eastern and Forest Certification Southern Africa poW Program of Workcomifac Central African Forest Commission profor Programme on Forestscop Conference of the Parties rEDD Reducing Emissions from Deforestationcpf Collaborative Partnership on Forests and Forest DegradationcsD Commission on Sustainable Development saDc South African Development Communitycsr Corporate Social Responsibility sfi Sustainable Forestry InitiativeEcosoc United Nations Economic and sfm Sustainable Forest Management Social Council slimfs Small and Low Intensity Managed ForestsEfi European Forest Institute sps The Agreement on the Application ofEU European Union Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measuresfao Food and Agricultural Organization of tbt Technical Barriers to Trade the United Nations trips Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects offcpf Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Intellectual Property Rightsfip Forest Investment Program Un United NationsflEg Forest Law Enforcement and Governance UnccD United Nations Convention to CombatflEgt Forest Law Enforcement, Governance Desertification and Trade UncED United Nations Conference onfpic Free Prior and Informed Consent Environment and Developmentfsc Forest Stewardship Council UnDp United Nations Developmentgatt General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Programmegbif Global Biodiversity Information Facility UnDrip United Nations DeclarationgEf Global Environment Facility on the Rights of Indigenous PeoplesgfEp Global Forest Expert Panel UnEcE United Nations Economic Commissionghg Greenhouse Gases for EuropegtZ German Technical Cooperation UnEp United Nations Environment ProgrammeibpEs Intergovernmental Platform on Unfccc United Nations Framework Convention Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services on Climate Changeicraf World Agroforestry Centre Unff United Nations Forum on Forestsiff Intergovernmental Forum on Forests Un-rEDD programme United NationsiiED International Institute for Environment Collaborative Programme on Reducing and Development Emissions from Deforestation and Forestilo International Labor Organization Degradation in Developing Countriesimf International Monetary Fund vpa Voluntary Partnership Agreementipcc Intergovernmental Panel on vpn Virtual Policy Network Climate Change WbcsD World Business Council for Sustainableipf Intergovernmental Panel on Forests Developmentiso International Organization for WcED World Commission on Environment Standardization and DevelopmentiUfro International Union of Forest Research Wri World Resources Institute Organizations Wta World Trade Agreement 7itta International Tropical Timber Agreement Wto World Trade Organizationitto International Tropical Timber WWf World Wildlife Fund for Nature OrganizationEmbracing complExity: mEEting thE challEngEs of intErnational forEstgovErnancE

1 Introduction Coordinating lead author: Jeremy Rayner Lead authors: David Humphreys, Frederic Perron Welch, Ravi Prabhu and Patrick Verkooijen1.1 Purpose of the report 1.2 Context for the assessment 1.2.1 Evolution of international forestIn November 2009, the Global Forest Expert Panel governance(GFEP) Steering Committee established an expertpanel on the international forest regime to providea “scientific assessment of the current global forest The 1980’s saw growing international concern aboutregime and identify options for improving the effec- the destruction of tropical forests due to shifting ag-tiveness of the current regime.” The GFEP Steering riculture, cattle ranching and over-exploitation forCommittee is composed of representatives from the timber production. At the same time, attention wasCollaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF), a net- also focused on the degradation and loss of temperatework of 14 international organisations and secretari- and boreal forests due to poor forest managementats with substantial programmes relating to forests. and, in some cases, various forms of pollution fromThe CPF’s mission is to promote the management, intensive agriculture, urban and industrial develop-conservation and sustainable development of all ment. There was a new awareness of the vital im-types of forest and to strengthen long-term political portance of forests as renewable sources of a widecommitment to this end. range of goods and services at local, national and Specifically, the present assessment is intended global levels, including food, medicine, fuel, shel-to contribute to: ter, clean water, soil stabilisation, flood control, and livelihood support. Forests are home to 70% of the● International forest deliberations and international earth’s known terrestrial plant and animal species forest related processes and many have been identified as biodiversity “hot● The improvement of coordination among political spots”. Forests are also critical factors in climate actors, policy instruments and institutions change both as sources and sinks of CO2 and as eco-● International Year of Forests 2011 by raising systems that are vulnerable to climate change. awareness about the role of international instru- The World Bank estimates that more than 1.6 ments and institutions affecting forests billion people around the world depend on forests for subsistence, livelihood and employment. ThisThe report and its accompanying policy brief will contribution of forests to human well-being and “sus-provide an overview of the complex and diverse ele- tainable development” first received global recogni-ments that currently make up the global forest gov- tion in June 1992 at the United Nations Conferenceernance arrangements; will identify and analyse the on Sustainable Development (UNCED) in Rio decore components of these arrangements; and propose Janeiro when leaders adopted Chapter 11 of Agendaoptions for dealing with complexity and improving 21 on combating deforestation and the Non-Legallythe effective implementation of forest governance at Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for aglobal, regional, national and sub-national levels. Global Consensus on the Management, Conserva- Following the mandate of the CPF Global Forest tion and Sustainable Development of All Types ofExpert Panels, this assessment is based on existing Forests (the Forest Principles). These documentsscientific knowledge. It represents the Expert Panel’sunderstanding of the best available scientific litera-ture. In the case of global forest governance, that 9literature is, of course, largely drawn from the social In addition to the work of the authors and the contributionssciences, especially political science, law, interna- of the Expert Panel, this chapter has greatly benefited fromtional relations and policy studies. comments by Stephanie CaswellEMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

I INTRODUCTION represented the first global consensus on the mul- the problems in their own forests. The compromise tiple benefits provided by forests, national policies was the adoption of the non-binding Forest Prin- needed to maintain those benefits for present and ciples which established the notion, still found in future generations, and international cooperation the NLBI, that global forest governance concerns needed to support national efforts. “all types of forests”. In 1995, the Commission on Sustainable Devel- The forest convention debate resumed at the CSD opment (CSD), which had been created in 1992 un- meeting in 1995 and was taken up once again at the der the United Nations Economic and Social Council fourth and final session of the IFF in 2000. Country (ECOSOC) to ensure effective follow up to UNCED, positions shifted at both meetings, with many de- established the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests veloped and developing countries now in favor of a (IPF) with a time limited mandate to carry forward convention. However key countries, including Bra- the Forest Principles. In 1997, the CSD established zil and other members of the Amazon Cooperation the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF), also Treaty Organizations (ACTO) and the United States with a time limited mandate, to continue the work of remained skeptical of the benefits of a convention. IPF. The combined output of these two ad hoc pro- They were joined by non-governmental organisations cesses consisted of more than 280 proposals for ac- (NGOs), who feared that negotiations could only tion to enhance the “management, conservation and succeed by leveling down forest practices. sustainable development of all types of forests.” The compromise was the creation of the UNFF In 2000, ECOSOC established the United Nations with a mandate that included a five-year review. The Forum on Forests (UNFF) as a subsidiary body with review in 2005–2006 again found no consensus to universal membership to facilitate national efforts negotiate a “legally binding agreement on forests”, to implement sustainable forest management (SFM) with more countries, including African and a number and enhance coordination among international in- of European Union countries, moving away from struments, organisations and institutions with sig- the idea of convention. Opponents questioned the nificant forest-related mandates. Shortly thereafter ability of a convention to generate significant “new the CPF was established to assist the work of the and additional financial resources” for developing UNFF. In 2007, the UNFF and the United Nations countries or raise standards of forest management General Assembly adopted the Non-legally Bind- worldwide. Instead, the NLBI was concluded in 2007 ing Instrument on All Types of Forests (NLBI). The and a formal process to examine financing for forests NLBI creates a framework for national action and was launched in 2008. international cooperation to enhance implementa- While the issue of a legally binding convention tion of SFM and the achievement of the four global may be raised again in the 2015 UNFF review, this objectives on forests endorsed by the UNFF in 2006. report expresses no opinion on either the likelihood In 2015, the UNFF will review the effectiveness of or the desirability of a forest treaty. As already noted, the NLBI, as well as other efforts to achieve the four the panel’s chief concern is with developments that global objectives and to implement SFM. are already taking place and the challenge of working with the existing complex and comprehensive governance arrangements that could ultimately improve 1.2.2 The debate on a legally binding forest conditions and livelihoods. While the forest forest agreement and the approach of policy community has, until recently, devoted so much of its efforts to failed treaty negotiation, other this assessment forest-related developments have been proceeding on largely parallel tracks and now challenge the very The NLBI stands as the main output of state-centred existence of forests-focused governance. efforts to create a forests-focused international re- In the run up to UNCED, for example, the text of gime. Ever since the UNCED preparatory process, two new conventions were developed: the Conven- the issue of whether or not to negotiate a legally tion on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the United binding global forest convention has been a mat- Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ter of concern to the international forest policy dia- (UNFCCC). While these conventions were negoti- logue and United Nations (UN) diplomacy. At Rio, ated outside the UNCED preparatory process, they the views of countries were divided, with developed were opened for signature at Rio and subsequently (OECD) countries mainly favoring a convention and ratified by sufficient numbers of signatories to create developing countries (the G77 and China) opposing binding international law. Over time, the conferences one. There were many reasons for the united posi- of the parties to these conventions have increasing10 tion of developing countries. At the core was the taken up forest-related issues in the context of their view that developed countries were pressing for a own respective mandates. As chapters 2 and 3 of this convention as a way to influence the management report will explain in greater detail, the CBD and the of tropical forests, while refusing to acknowledge UNFCCC are by no means the only forest-related EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

I INTRODUCTIONtreaties; however, they are two of the most important further and adopted forest protection and conser-and their development illustrates the current chal- vation as a priority theme for future activities andlenge to forests-focused governance. also established a technical expert group on forest biological diversity. This was followed by Decision VI/22 of COP 61.2.3 Forest-related treaties, in 2002 which instituted and articulated the thematiccomplexity and fragmentation components of an expanded programme of work on forest biological diversity. The expanded program of work contains an extensive set of goals, objectivesThe CBD and its work is premised on three core and activities for the conservation of forest biodiver-objectives that relate to forest governance: the con- sity, the sustainable use of its components and theservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from theof its components and the fair and equitable sharing utilisation of forest genetic resources. Furthermore,of the benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic it explicitly recognises the complementary roles ofresources. These objectives overlap with the concept the CBD and UNFF in stemming the loss of forestof sustainable forest management as put forward by biodiversity and recognises that collaboration willthe NLBI and are reflected in the Global Objectives promote beneficial synergies in guiding immediateon Forests. and effective action by governments and other in- In addition, specific provisions of the CBD have ternational bodies.a direct bearing on the question of forest governance. Many of the organisations that form the coreFor example, Article 8(j) requests Parties to respect, of the international forest regime, whose work ispreserve and maintain traditional knowledge, inno- analysed in chapter 3 of the report, recognise thevations and practices relevant for the conservation need for coordination. In particular, the Secretariatand sustainable use of biodiversity and promote their to the CBD signed a memorandum of understandingbroader application with the approval of the holders (MoU) with the UNFF for a programme of work toof such knowledge. This article is complemented address biodiversity in forests. The agreement fol-by Article 10(c), which asks Parties to protect and lowed UNFF Resolution 8/1, which requested theencourage the customary use of biological resources Secretariat to explore a format and opportunities forthrough traditional cultural practices that meet con- collaboration and cooperation with the secretariatsservation or sustainable use requirements. Lastly, Ar- of the Rio Conventions and develop joint activitiesticle 15 is also relevant as it sets outs modalities for related to sustainable forest management, the Globalthe fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out Objectives on Forests and the NLBI. Nonetheless,of the utilisation of genetic resources. These issues the central relevance of the CBD and its protocol toof benefit sharing and the participation of indigenous forest governance is undeniable, creating complexand local communities often play a central role in new linkages between institutions and actors.forest governance. Climate change represents another critical strand As a result of this close connection, sustainable in this web of linkages constituting the system offorest management considerations have spilled over global forest governance. Until recently, politicalinto CBD. At the same time, however, spillovers have discussions about climate change paid scant atten-taken place and are likely to continue to take place tion to forests. Most policymakers viewed emissionsin the other direction, especially with respect to the resulting from forest loss as hard to measure, monitorongoing negotiations for the elaboration of an inter- and control. They felt that any benefit from efforts tonational regime on access and benefit sharing (ABS). reduce deforestation would be short-lived (the prob-This regime will likely have direct bearing on how lem of ‘permanence’) and suffer considerable ‘leak-forest genetic resources are utilised and how benefits age’ (i.e. less carbon emissions in one place wouldderived from such use are shared. The success of lead to more emissions somewhere else). Many wor-international forest governance is thus more than ried that focusing on tropical deforestation wouldever contingent on ensuring that these various inter- reduce pressure on richer countries to lower theirnational instruments constitute a comprehensive and emissions. There were fears that including forestscoherent framework that achieves goals such as ABS in trading schemes would flood the carbon marketswithout losing sight of the forests themselves. and make other mitigation measures unprofitable. As The Conference of the Parties (COP) to the CBD a result, it comes as no surprise that the Kyoto Pro-has certainly taken steps to promote the conservation tocol provided few incentives for afforestation andof forest biodiversity, placing the theme of forest reforestation and none to maintain existing forestsbiodiversity at the forefront of its agenda. As early as (Eliasch 2008). 111996, COP 2, aware of the discussions taking place Both the Stern Report (Stern 2006) and the In-at the IPF, developed their first work programme tergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC)on forest biological diversity. In 1998, COP 3 went report (IPCC 2007) contributed to shifting politicalEMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

I INTRODUCTION attention and the international forest agenda toward 1.3 Understanding inter the notion that forests will play a key role in any cost- national forest governance effective climate change mitigation arrangement. By the end of 2008, the Eliasch Review reinforced the 1.3.1 Regimes and regime theory central proposition that urgent action to tackle the loss of forests worldwide needs to be a central part The original focus of this assessment was the inter- of any future international deal on climate change national forest regime. A “regime” is a set of gover- (Eliasch 2008). The Review claimed that a deal that nance arrangements. The term is a commonly-used provides international forest financing not only re- one in the social sciences, in particular in political duces carbon emissions significantly, but also ben- science, and is applied at various spatial scales from efits developing countries, supports poverty reduc- the local level to the international. In contrast, “gov- tion and helps preserve biodiversity and other forest ernance” is the broader term, denoting any effort to services (Hoogeveen and Verkooijen 2010). coordinate human action towards goals. “Regime” is However, given the scale of emissions from the narrower term, used to characterise a particular forests, forest mitigation measures pose a daunting means or mode of coordination challenge. As UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon At the local level, ‘commons’ regimes, some- has stated: times called ’common property regimes’, are terms developed to capture the set of agreed upon rules and “Climate Change cannot be won without the world’s arrangements that govern access to and the use of forests. This, however, will be a complex and chal- natural resources, such as crops, fish or forests, for a lenging feat in terms of setting up incentive structures particular community (Ostrom 1990). Local commons and implementation mechanisms, and will require a regimes are designed to coordinate resource use in an long-term commitment. But nonetheless, it is one of effort to eliminate problems such as ’free-ridership’ the best large-scale investments we can make against leading to the degradation of the resource. climate change that could result in an equally large At the national level the term ’regime’ is tra- dividend” (Norway 2008). ditionally used to denote a particular type of government such as military regime, socialist regime, In UNFCCC negotiations, countries are working and democratic regime. While this usage has been towards a comprehensive, legally binding, global common in political science since Aristotle, it is a agreement to tackle climate change. Reducing emis- source of confusion in discussion of forest gover- sions from deforestation and forest degradation in nance, where mention of a ’regime’ is sometimes developing countries (REDD+) has emerged as a taken to mean coercive coordination. This is not the potentially crucial instrument to pursue the ultimate sense of regime used in this report. objectives of UNFCCC in holding the increase in The development and application of the regime global temperature rise below 2 degrees Celsius concept to international affairs by international re- above pre-industrial levels. REDD+ also holds the lations scholars dates only from the mid-1970s. In potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, im- 1975 John Ruggie defined an international regime as prove the livelihoods of forest-dependent people, “a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, to conserve biodiversity and to inject substantial plans, organisational energies and financial com- new funding into forest management. Although it is mitments, which have been accepted by a group of widely noted that to implement REDD+ within the states” (Ruggie 1975: 570). Building on Ruggie’s framework of sustainable development strategies will approach, Oran Young later defined international re- require broad institutional and governance reforms, gimes as “social institutions governing the actions of it remains to be seen whether this transformational those interested in specifiable activities (or meaning- change in the sector will be initiated. More to the ful sets of activities) …regimes are social structures” point of this Report, it is still unclear how REDD+ is (Young 1980: 332). going to be coordinated with the other forest related However the most often-cited definition of an initiatives to achieve forests-focused goals. Forests international regime is one put forward by the Stan- certainly are a means of storing carbon and a pool ford scholar Stephen Krasner in the early 1980s of genetic resources and a source of livelihoods but when he argued that international regimes are “sets they are much more than this. Coordinating these of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and goals – along with many others – while remaining decision making procedures around which actors’ clearly focused on this ‘more’ is the challenge of expectations converge in a given area of international forest governance relations” (Krasner 1982: 186). The Krasner defini-12 tion formed the basis of a collection of papers on international regimes published in the journal In- ternational Organization (guest edited by Krasner). Ruggie’s definition is explicit that the members of EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

I INTRODUCTIONan international regime are states (i.e. governments) a single legally-binding instrument at one end and aand only states. But later definitions, including that very loose and barely coordinated set of governanceof Krasner, were broader, stressing that regimes are arrangements at the other (Alter and Meunier 2006;agreed to and constructed by a range of ’actors’, Raustiala and Victor 2004).thus admitting non-state actors such as business, The extensive debate over the nature of inter-non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and private national regimes is by no means merely academic.financial institutions. The debate grew out of a desire to understand and Despite the emergence of this broader notion of explain the development of multilateral governanceregime, discussions based on the Krasner definition arrangements over the last 30 years. Its conclusiontended to refer almost exclusively to collective ar- that there are few, if any, comprehensive hard lawrangements agreed by states, such as the binding regimes in the narrowest sense of the original regimeGeneral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World concept is a very important one for understandingTrade Organization (GATT/WTO) international forest governance. If regime complexes are the mosttrade regime or the non-binding G7/G8/G20 regime common type of governance arrangement, then thefor international finance (for example: Breitmeier et international forest regime complex is not so differ-al. 2006; Dimitrov 2003; Downie 2005; Downs 2000; ent from the other multilateral regime complexes.Hansenclever et al. 1997; Helm and Sprinz 2000; Attention turns to meeting the particular challengesMiles et al. 2002; Rittberger 1993; Vogler 2000; of international forest governance rather than seekingYoung 1999). There was also often an assumption to make the regime conform to an ideal that turnsamong regime theorists that an international regime out to be largely imaginary.requires a multilateral legal framework overseen byan institution of some sort, such as an internationalorganisation or treaty or a conference of parties. For 1.3.2 Emerging views on an inter-example, the Vienna Convention on Ozone Depletion national forest regime complexof 1985 and Montreal Protocol to the Convention of1987 and are usually considered synonymous withthe ‘international ozone regime’. The CBD, whose By the mid-1990’s a view of an international for-relevance to forest governance has already been est regime complex had emerged that allows fornoted, is often used to denote the ‘international bio- international policy dialogue and cooperation on andiversity regime’, even though there are other bind- issue to take place between a variety of state anding agreements that address biodiversity, including non-state actors in the absence of a single multilat-the Convention on International Trade in Endangered eral legal agreement. This view found support fromSpecies of Flora and Fauna and the Ramsar Conven- international forest policy experts and internationaltion on Wetlands of International Importance. environmental lawyers. In 1995, the same year that Thus, in the regime theory literature since Kras- the IPF was created, for example, Richard Tarasof-ner, there has been a distinct tendency to picture sky argued that an international regime on forestsan international regime as a state-centric form of existed, comprising international and regional legalinternational cooperation grounded in ‘hard’ or bind- instruments and non-legally binding soft law ones.ing international law, such as a convention, protocol, Tarasofsky later defined the international forest re-agreement or other legally binding instrument. On gime as “the totality of norms, rules, standards andthis reading of regimes, soft law alone is insuffi- procedures, as expressed in international institutionscient to constitute a regime and non-state actors have and other acts” (Tarasofsky 1999: 3). At that time, hetended to be relegated to the role of ’stakeholders’ to identified three options for the future developmentbe consulted but hardly central players. This has led of the regime: negotiating a convention on forests;some observers to describe the international arrange- negotiating a protocol on forests to the Conventionment on forests as a ‘non-regime’ - defined as “trans- on Biological Diversity; and making better use ofnational policy arenas characterised by the absence existing instruments (Tarasofsky 1995).of multilateral agreements for policy coordination In 1997 the existence of an international forestamong states” (Dimitrov et al. 2007: 231). regime complex along these lines was recognised In the opinion of this panel, the current framework by the European Commission, in the context of afor international forest governance is more accurately report by the European Forest Institute on how thedescribed as a ‘regime complex’: a set of specialised regime could be further strengthened. The authors ofregimes and other governance arrangements more this report argued that ‘legal regime’ in this contextor less loosely linked together, sometimes mutu- should not be used to imply a need for a specifically reinforcing but at other times overlapping and legal instrument, but rather should be understood as 13conflicting (Keohane and Victor 2010). A regime encompassing the sum total of international instru-complex exists somewhere towards the middle of a ments and institutions that create the framework forspectrum between a comprehensive regime based on international action” (Glück et al. 1997:9).EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

I INTRODUCTION Over a decade ago, David Humphreys argued that networks, business organisations, multinational cor- the international forest regime was founded upon porations and other forms of private authority” (Oke- three broad sources: reke et al. 2009: 60). As such, the actions of NGOs in global governance parallels similar developments a) the growing body of soft international law focused at the level of regions and states, where the practice on forests; of governing on the basis of hierarchical authority is b) hard international legal instruments with a forest- often observed existing side by side with new forms related mandate (such as the CBD and UNFCCC); of coordination. Significantly, such new forms of and coordination or ‘governance arrangements’ are very c) voluntary private sector regulation, such as the often found in response to challenges arising from Forest Stewardship Council principles for forest the complexities of environment and sustainable de- management (Humphreys 1999). velopment (Lemos and Agrawal 2006) and have been observed in forestry-related contexts at national and As the access and benefit sharing and REDD+ subnational levels (Howlett et al. 2009). developments clearly demonstrate, the international Section III of Agenda 21 states that “one of the forest regime complex is a dynamic rather than a fundamental prerequisites for the achievement of static entity. It is constantly evolving as new interna- sustainable development is broad public participation tional declarations and instruments are agreed, often in decision-making”, and that “the commitment and of the forest-related rather than the forest-focused genuine involvement of all social groups” is “critical kind. However, what has really made an accurate to the effective implementation of the objectives, characterisation of the international forest regime policies, and mechanisms agreed to by governments complex so much more difficult has been the devel- in all programme areas of Agenda 21.” The CSD, opment already noted by Humphreys in connection further enshrined the important role of major groups with voluntary private sector regulation. A key driver in intergovernmental deliberations and as such rep- of change is the growing acceptance of the view resented a significant change in the attitude of the that forest problems cannot be addressed purely by United Nations system to stakeholder participation governmental and intergovernmental agreements. in intergovernmental policy discussions. Since the While the role that states play through intergovern- CSD’s creation in 1992, CSD meetings have pro- mental organisations remains an important compo- vided innovative spaces for the participation of the nent of the forest regime, the regime complex now range of non-government actors with the overall includes non-governmental actors, both for-profit purpose of informing the Commission’s decision- and not-for-profit. A state-centric definition of in- making processes. ternational regimes is increasing questioned, both The IPF/IFF proposals for action reflected this in the international relations literature (Betsill and recognition of the important contribution of a range Corell 2007; Cutler 2002; Falkner 2003; Humphreys of stakeholders in sustainable forest management, 1996; Joyner 2005; McCormick 1999; O’Neill 2009) including forest owners and managers and for- and in international institutions themselves. The role est dependent local and indigenous communities. of non-nation state actors in international politics Many countries participating in criteria and indica- and policy is the starting point for discussions of a tors processes have operationalised this recognition broader concept of forest governance. by involving national and subnational stakeholders in criteria and indicator (C&I) implementation. The UNFF has followed the CSD model of inclusiveness Beyond the International Regime Complex: interacting with major groups by convening multi- the evolving role of non-government actors stakeholder dialogues with governments, organising panels on key issues to major groups, supporting side Beginning with UNCED, there has been a recogni- events and providing financial support to participants tion that problems and issues related to sustainable from developing and transition countries. development, including forest issues, cannot be ad- In addition to efforts at broader inclusion in in- dressed solely by governments through intergovern- tergovernmental processes, public-private partner- mental agreements, and that non-government actors, ships and corporate-NGO partnerships have become both for-profit and not-for-profit, have a vital role to common in the forests arena. Inclusion has gener- play other than as sources of advice and legitima- ated funding and capacity for policy implementation for state-led processes. The growing significance tion on the ground and supported moves towards of policy coordination at a global level by actors decentralised implementation of SFM. For example,14 without formal authority to do so is captured by the Congo Basin Forest Partnership (CBFP) and the the term ‘governance´’. Governance is conducted Asia Forest Partnership (AFP) were both launched by international organisations, but also by “global at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in social movements, NGOs, transnational scientific Johannesburg in 2002, which gave special attention EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

I INTRODUCTION Box 1.1 Key terms Governance: any effort to coordinate human ac- Regime complex: a set of specialized regimes tion towards goals. In the common distinction and other governance arrangements that are more between government and governance, the latter is or less loosely linked together, sometimes mutu- usually taken to refer specifically to coordination ally reinforcing but at other times overlapping and mechanisms that do not rest on the authority and conflicting (Keohane and Victor 2010). sanctions possessed by states (Stoker 1998), but Institutions: the rules of the game in society or, the report uses “governance” in the broadest sense more formally, are the humanly devised constraints of coordination. that shape human interaction (North 1990:3). International regime: a set of governance ar- Organisations: very distinctive institutions with rangements for an issue area usually based on some formal rules of membership and practice, embed- form of agreement by states. The standard definition ded in the larger context of institutions as rules and is provided by Krasner (1982): “sets of implicit or expectations. For example, the institutionalised be- explicit principles, norms, rules and decision mak- haviour of seeking to conclude international agreeing procedures around which actors’ expectations ments to solve common problems rather than acting converge in a given area of international relations”. unilaterally has created a number of organisations, An international regime is thus much more than just most notably those that make up the UN system. a set of organisations and could in principle exist Institutions in the broad sense used here are thus without any formal organisations at all. to be distinguished from the much narrower sense of institutions as organizations.to the roles of public-private partnerships in promot- rule-making and the development of norms and ex-ing sustainable development. The CBFP, currently pectations. The private rule making found in the vari-facilitated by Germany, has generated significant ad- ous certification schemes for sustainably-producedditional funding to support forest conservation and forest products is only the tip of the iceberg in thissustainable forest based livelihoods in the region. respect. A number of regional and international initia- Thus, while it may have been possible in the pasttives have also emerged that are focused on grass to conduct an assessment of the international forestroots and community approaches to engaging local regime by focusing solely on the actors, institutionspeople in addressing forest issues. These include, and instruments found at the core of the regimeinter alia, Forest Connect (IIED, FAO, PROFOR, complex (Tarasofsky 1999), a broader kind of as-NFP Facility), Growing Forest Partnerships (FAO, sessment is now required. This assessment seeks toIUCN, World Bank, IIED), Rights and Resources accommodate the rapidly expanding and increasinglyInitiative, Responsible Asia Forestry and Trade, and diverse set of actors, institutions and ideas seekingThe Forests Dialogue (in partnership cooperation to coordinate action with respect to forests. While,with UNFF). Existing grass roots initiatives are in the technical language of political science, it mayalso strengthening their international engagement, still be appropriate to refer to them as components ofespecially in the REDD context, including the Asia- the international forest regime complex, we use thePacific Center for People and Forests, Coordinating more accessible phrase ‘international forest gover-Association of Indigenous and Community Agrofor- nance’. The definitions of the key concepts used inestry in Central America, Global Alliance of Com- this report are given in Box 1.1.munity Forestry and International Family ForestryAlliance, to name only a few. However, the introduction of new actors and 1.3.3 Expert panel’s view on inter-new ideas, while important, can often obscure the national forest governancechallenges that a more participatory kind of globalforest governance entails. Governance as coordina-tion necessarily involves institutions. Participatory The panel takes the view that the current set of inter-governance relationships are being institutionalised national forest governance arrangements is best seenin a variety of ways, creating new structures, such as a complex hybrid mix of international law, softas transnational policy networks and partnerships. law, and non-government performance-based mea-While the blurring of boundaries between pub- sures. Some are forest focused and others forest re-lic and private in these networks and partnerships lated. As discussed in chapter 2, these arrangements 15has raised concerns about legitimacy, new kinds of are now much more numerous and more complex‘entanglements’ (Porter 2009) are constantly being than those considered in previous reviews and as-generated and subsequently institutionalised through sessments. They include:EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

I INTRODUCTION a) Non-legally binding declarations, principles, Often, of course, governance problems are identi- statements, decisions, resolutions and other instru- fied at national and subnational levels in the context ments reflecting political commitments focused of ‘good governance’. In many developing countries, on forests, including the NLBI, other decisions for examples, the distribution of rights to forestlands of the UNFF, IPF/IFF proposals for action, the and resources is unclear and the laws governing for- Forest Principles and Chapter 11 of Agenda 21 est use may be incomplete and poorly enforced. The b) Legally binding conventions, agreements and report argues that the establishment of institutions other instruments with significant forest-related and decision-making processes that are widely ac- provisions, including the CBD, UNFCCC, UN- cepted as just and legitimate is a necessary condition CCD, CITES, Ramsar, as well as legally bind- to the solution of these problems. International for- ing agreements and other instruments with the est governance, by developing consensus about the potential to influence forests indirectly, such as institutional and procedural measures necessary to LRTAP improve forest conditions and livelihoods is a key c) Treaty-based organisations and institutions with part of this process. For example, the desire by an significant forest-related mandates and programs increasing number of diverse stakeholders to have or with the potential to affect forests, including their voices heard before outcomes are regarded as CIFOR, FAO, ICRAF, ITTO, World Bank, GEF, legitimate is both endorsed and given practical ex- NFP Facility and WTO pression in international forest governance. Inter- d) Other relevant organisations, institutions, net- national forest governance contributes to the setting works and processes, including GBIF, IUCN, of global goals that define key forest problems as IUFRO, UNEP and UNDP worthy of attention and provides a number of pro- e) Performance-based international initiatives of cedures and venues for learning about the appropri- NGOs and other Major Groups, including in- ate choice of policy instruments to solve them. An ternational certification schemes, such as FSC, important feature of is often complex governance is Smartwood, and PEFC and industry codes of the ‘spillover’ effect among its components, whereby conduct, such as the work of WBCSD the objectives, principles and decisions elaborated f) Regional organisations, institutions, instruments, in one international instrument may subsequently be processes, initiatives and networks, including expressed in later international instruments. ACTO, African Forest Forum, AFP, ASEAN, Nonetheless, the complexity of forest problems ATO, SADC, CBFP, Forest Europe, EFI, regional rules out simple governance solutions. The interna- C&I initiatives, regional FLEG processes, FLEGT tional forest policy community has pursued a num- and regional certification programmes such as ber of these ’quick fixes’ over the last two decades SFI with equally disappointing results. This report will g) New ‘entanglements’ – clubs of states, learning argue that the immediate effect of the developments platforms and collaborations, including REDD+ described in the previous section has been to inten- partnerships, round tables, IBPES. sify the value conflicts generated by an increasingly diverse group of stakeholders making it more difficult to achieve agreement on either goals or the 1.4 The challenge of most appropriate means to achieve them. This kind of complexity generates the familiar phenomenon of complexity: why international wicked problems. Emerging “at the juncture where forest governance matters goal-formulation, problem definition and equity issues meet” (Rittel and Webber 1973: 156), wicked The report’s main message is that global forest gov- problems are open ended, defying efforts to delineate ernance matters. It matters now because, while there their boundaries and preventing disaggregation into are valuable new initiatives in play with real potential a series of less complex and more easily manage- to sustain the world’s forests, many, if not most of able components (Ludwig 2001; Nie 2003). Current these initiatives will have a forest impact but not a trends suggest that forests are increasingly likely to forest focus. Whether their focus is actually climate be found at the intersection of an ever-more-complex change mitigation, human development, biodiversity web of cross cutting issues. These complex interlink- conservation or trade, they require a more effective ages will likely persist and become even more com- approach to coordination if they are ultimately to plex over time (Hoogeveen and Verkooijen 2010). improve forest conditions and livelihoods as well The wicked problems of international forest gov- as achieve their own goals. These developments will ernance thus demand that we embrace complexity16 continue to take place and the global forest policy rather than attempt to simplify and disaggregate. community does not have the luxury of waiting to address the resulting governance challenges in its own time. EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

I INTRODUCTIONWith the goal of embracing complexity in mind, the Referencesreport is organised into six chapters: Alter, Karen, and Sophie Meunier. 2006. Nested and overlapping regimes in the transatlantic banana trade dispute. Journal ofChapter 2 maps the core actors, objectives, decisions European Public Policy 13(3): 362–382. and priorities of international forest governance Betsill, Michele M., and Corell, Elisabeth, eds. 2007. NGO Di- by using a framework of six generic environmen- plomacy: The Influence of Nongovernmental Organisations tal and socio-economic themes, and discusses the in International Environmental Negotiations. Cambridge: potential for constructive and destructive interplay MIT Press. Breitmeir, Helmut, Oran R. Young, and Michael Zürn. 2006. Ana- among regime components. lyzing International Regimes: From Case Study to Data Base.Chapter 3 identifies and discusses the core compo- Cambridge: MIT Press. nents of the international forest regime, and as- Cutler, A. Claire. 2002. Private International Regimes and Inter- sesses their consistency and compatibility. Firm Cooperation. In The Emergence of Private AuthorityChapter 4 reviews and analyses the main discourses in Global Governance, ed. Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J Biersteker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, that shape forest issues and policies by distin- 23–42. guishing between three forest-related types of dis- Davenport, Deborah S. 2005. An Alternative Explanation for the courses: meta, regulatory and forest discourses. Failure of the UNCED Forest Negotiations. Global Environ-Chapter 5 explores the relationship between forest mental Politics 5(1): 105–130. sustainability and forest management, focusing on Dimitrov, Radoslav S. 2003. Knowledge, Power and Interests in International Regime Formation. International Studies the emergence of sustainable forest management Quarterly 47(1): 123–150. and the obstacles that have arisen in defining and Dimitrov, Radoslav S., Detlef Sprinz, Gerald M. DiGiusto, and Al- implementing SFM. exander Kelle. 2007. International Non-Regimes: A ResearchChapter 6 assesses the level of integration exhib- Agenda. International Studies Review 9(2): 230–258. ited by the current governance arrangements and Downie, David Leonard. 2005. Global Environmental Policy: explores ways to manage an intrinsically frag- Governing Through Regimes. In The Global Environment: In- stitutions, Law and Policy, ed. Regina S Axelrod, David Leon- mented set of arrangements through multi-level ard Downie and Norman J Vig. Washington: CQ Press. governance approaches. Downs, George W. 2000. Constructing Effective EnvironmentalChapter 7 examines the pathways through which Regimes. Annual Review of Political Science 3: 25–42. international forest governance affects national Eliasch, Johann. 2008. Climate Change: Financing Global Forests and sub-national policies and actions and the [The Eliasch Review]. London: Earthscan. Falkner, Robert. 2003. Private Environmental Governance and options for promoting international forest gov- International Relations. Global Environmental Politics 3(2): ernance goals. 72–87.Chapter 8 draws on the main points, messages and Glück, Peter, Richard Tarasofsky, Neil Byron, and IlpoTikkanen. conclusions from previous chapters to identify 1997. Options for Strengthening the International Legal Re- gime on Forests: A Report Prepared for the European Com- measures and options for improving the effective- mission under the Study Contract B7-8110/96/000221/D4. ness of the current international forest regime. Joensuu: European Forest Institute. Hansenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger. 1997.The challenge that this report seeks to address is Theories of International Regimes. Cambridge: Cambridgehow to embrace the complexity and richness of the University Press. Helm, Carsten, and Detlef F. Sprinz. 2000. Measuring the Ef-international forest regime, especially its multi-level fectiveness of International Environmental Regimes. Journalaspects, without encouraging the worst effects of of Conflict Resolution 45(5): 630–652.fragmented governance: ambiguity, overlap, duplica- Hoogeveen, Hans, Jagmohan S. Maini, William Moomaw, Adiltion and inefficiency. The report focuses particularly Najam, and Patrick Verkooijen. 2008. Designing a Foreston the potential for positive interactions between key Financing Mechanism (FFM): A Call for Bold, Collaborative and Innovative Thinking. Paper prepared for the Center forelements of the existing global forest governance International Environment and Resource Policy. Available at:architecture without adding either new elements or http://environment.tufts.edu/downloads/DesigningaForestFi-attempting over-ambitious plans for greater integra- nancingMechanism.pdf. [Cited 1 Dec 2010].tion among the parts. Our proposals recognise the ur- Hoogeveen, Hans, and Patrick Verkooijen. 2010. Transforminggency of the need to create forest focused governance Sustainable Development Diplomacy: Lessons Learned from Global Forest Governance. Doctoral thesis, Wageningenarrangements that include within their scope the full University.range of actors and institutions with the potential to Howlett, Michael, Jeremy Rayner, and Chris Tollefson. 2009.solve forest problems. We call this all-round forest From Government to Governance in Forest planning? Lessonsgovernance approach ’Forests+’. from the Case of the British Columbia Great Bear Rainforest Initiative. Forest Policy and Economics 11(5–6): 383–391. Humphreys, David. 1996. 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I INTRODUCTION Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Porter, Tony. 2009. Global Governance as Configurations of State/ [Core Writing Team, Pachauri, R.K and Reisinger, A. (eds.)]. Non-State Activity. In Advances in Global Governance, ed. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland. Jim Whitman. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 87–104. Joyner, Christopher C. 2005. Rethinking International Environ- Raustiala, Kal and David Victor. 2004. The Regime Complex mental Regimes: What Role for Partnership Coalitions? for Plant Genetic Resources. International Organization 58: Journal of International Law and International Relations 277–309. 1(1–2): 89–119. Rittberger, Volker, ed. 1993. Regime Theory and International Keohane, Robert and David Victor. 2010. The Regime Complex Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press. for Climate Change. The Harvard Project on International Rittel, Horst, and Melvin Webber. 1973. Dilemmas in a General Climate Agreements, Discussion Paper 10–33. Theory of Planning. Policy Sciences, 4: 155–169. Krasner, Stephen D. 1982. Structural Causes and Regime Con- Ruggie, John G. 1975. International Responses to Technology: sequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables. International Concepts and Trends. International Organization 29(3): Organization 36(2): 185–205. 557–583. Lemos, Maria Carmen, and Arun Agrawal. 2006. Environmental Stern, Nicholas. 2006. The Stern Review on the Economics of Governance. Annual Review of Environmental Resources 31: Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 297–325. Stoker, Gerry. 1998. Governance as Theory: 5 Propositions. In- Ludwig, Donald. 2001. The Era of Management is Over. Eco- ternational Social Science Journal 155: 17–28. systems 4: 758–764. Tarasofsky, Richard. 1995. The International Forests Regime: McCormick, John. 1999. The Role of Environmental NGOs in Legal and Policy Issues. Gland: World Wide Fund for Nature/ International Regimes. In The Global Environment: Institu- IUCN The World Conservation Union. tions, Law and Policy, ed. Norman J Vig and Regina Axelrod. Tarasofsky, Richard. 1999. Assesing the International Forest Washington CQ Press, 52–71. Regime: IUCN Environmental Policy and Law Paper 27. Miles, Edward L., Arild Underdal, Steiner Andresen, Jorgen Wet- Cambridge: IUCN the World Conservation Union. testad, Jon Birger Skjaerseth, and Elaine M. Carlin. 2002. Vogler, John. 2000. The Global Commons: Environmental and Environmental Regime Effectiveness: Confronting Theory Technological Governance. Second edition. New York: John with Evidence. Cambridge: MIT Press. Wiley and Sons. North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Young, Oran R. 1980. International Regimes: Problems of Con- Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University cept Formation. World Politics 32(3): 331–356. Press. Young, Oran R. ed. 1999. The Effectiveness of International En- Norway, Mission to the United Nations. 2008. UN and Norway vironmental Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral Unite to Combat Climate Change from Deforestation. http:// Mechanisms. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. www.norway-un.org/NorwayandUN/Selected_Topics/Cli- mate_Change/redd/.[Cited 1 Dec 2010]. Okereke, Chukwumerije, Harriet Bulkeley, and Heike Schroeder. 2009. Conceptualizing Climate Change Governance Beyond the International Regime. Global Environmental Politics 9: 56–76. O’Neill, Kate. 2009. The Environment and International Rela- tions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nie, Martin. 2003. Drivers of Natural Resource-Based Political Conflict. Policy Sciences 36, 307–341. Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.18 EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

2 Mapping the core actors and issues defining international forest governance Coordinating lead author: Constance L. McDermott Lead authors: David Humphreys, Christoph Wildburger and Peter Wood Contributing authors: Emmanuel Marfo (African regional instruments), Pablo Pacheco (Latin American regional instruments) and Yurdi Yasmi (Asia-Pacific regional instruments) Abstract: This chapter maps the core actors and issues defining international forest governance across a landscape of contemporary social and environmental challenges. The existence of multiple competing frameworks for charting this landscape highlight the politically contested nature of forest conservation and use. In order to avoid the risk of bias by adopting one of these pre-existing frameworks, the analysis is conducted using six generic environmental and socio-economic themes. The mapping exercise reveals that the involvement of diverse public and private actors both within and outside the forest sector and within and outside formal government negotiations, at both regional and global scales, has enabled a relatively comprehensive set of aspirational goals to emerge. However, conflicting actor interests and values continue to constrain the translation of these goals into coordinated mandates for on-the-ground action. The integration of forests into the international climate regime is a potential ‘win–win’ solution to cross-sectoral forest-related challenges because it enables the establishment of a global system of economic incentives tied to emissions reductions. However, attempts to operationalise these incentives reveal familiar, ongoing conflicts over the environmental and social valuation of forests. Regional and non-governmental experimentation may prove vital to overcoming these longstanding barriers to global- scale coordinated action on forests. Keywords: Forest, climate, international, governance, biodiversity, social welfare, deforestation, REDD. ■2.1. Introduction The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 discusses three perspectives that might be used toThis chapter provides a broad overview or ‘map’ of identify key international actors. Sections 2.3 andthe key actors and issues that currently define inter- 2.4 introduce and apply a thematic framework for as-national forest governance. Its purpose is threefold. sessing the core environmental, social and economicFirst, it situates forest governance within the broader forest-related goals articulated in global-scale agree-landscape of bio-physical and socio-economic prob- ments and the actors most involved in placing theselems of international concern. Second, it identifies goals on the global agenda. Section 2.5 assesses thethe range of key actors who are instrumental in role of regional and international criteria and indi-placing these issues on international agendas and in cator processes, and forest certification, as forumsframing and contesting responses. Third, it assesses exclusively focused on the definition and monitoringthe comprehensiveness of the goals and frameworks of sustainable forest management (SFM). Section 2.6established thus far through international agreement discusses regional processes in Africa, Asia-Pacific, 19and the lessons that can be learned about the role of Europe and Latin America and their interaction withdiverse actors in addressing the full scope of inter- global-scale agendas. The chapter concludes with anational forest-related challenges. summary of key findings.EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

2 MAPPING THE CORE ACTORS AND ISSUES... As echoed in the title of this report, the sheer as the Center for International Forest Research (CI- complexity of international forest governance pre- FOR). It also considers cross-organisational partner- cludes an exhaustive analysis of all potentially rel- ships such as the Collaborative Partnership on Forests evant international goal-setting activities. We encour- (CPF) and the influence of participating actors from age readers interested in more in-depth coverage of international development and financial institutions specific substantive issues to consult the primary and such as the Food and Agriculture Organization of the secondary sources cited in the text. In addition, Ap- United Nations (FAO) and the World Bank. It also pendix 1 provides a list and brief description of key takes into account the political dynamics that led global, regional and non-state international forest- many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to related instruments. Most importantly, we encourage jointly create the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) the full range of concerned stakeholders to engage as the first global certification scheme. in analyses of the kind presented in this chapter in Staff and personnel may move among the various order to facilitate the multi-actor, multi-scale and actors involved in forest governance. Often experts cross-sectoral learning that is essential for addressing and advisors are invited to serve on national delega- contemporary forest-related challenges. tions. It is not uncommon for delegations to include trade advisors from business, conservation advisors from environmental NGOs, and policy advisors from 2.2 Defining the key actors the university sector. Delegations may be subject, therefore, to multiple influences, both within and outside government. Within forest-related intergov- A vast range of actors is involved directly and/or ernmental organisations, various caucus groups have indirectly in international forest governance, and a emerged who undertake negotiations as blocs; they variety of conceptual frameworks may be used to un- include the Group of 77 Developing Countries (G77) derstand their various roles. A realist, ‘state-centric’ + China at the UNFF and the Like Minded Mega- framework (e.g. Bull 1977) focuses on the actions diverse Countries at the Convention on Biological of national governments as the entities empowered Diversity (CBD). The European Union (EU) acts to make decisions within formal intergovernmen- as a sui generis actor, the sole regional economic tal negotiations. This perspective highlights power integration organisation in the United Nations sys- struggles among nations in which actors negotiate to tem, with political authority divided between the maintain or improve the advantage of their countries Presidency (for issues that are the subject of member relative to other countries. state competence) and the European Commission In contrast, a transgovernmentalism perspec- (for issues that are the subject of community com- tive (Slaughter 2004) draws attention to the various petence). The dynamics between the Presidency and ministries that attend forest-related intergovernmen- the Commission are key to understanding European tal forums and their differing priorities and objec- forest politics. tives. Within the United Nations Forum on Forests Political power is dispersed unevenly among (UNFF), for example, some delegations are led by these various actors, with countries with high for- forestry departments, some by foreign offices, some est cover (such as Brazil) and countries with major by trade ministries and some by United Nations mis- forest-based industries (such as the United States of sions. According to a transgovernmentalism view, America) tending to exercise more influence on polit- there is an international forest policy community that ical negotiations than smaller, economically weaker transcends national boundaries and includes other countries. When international negotiations stall, a actors, such as scientists and other experts. It draws small group of ‘friends of the chair’ may be invited attention to the possible conflicts that may emerge to convene to work on compromise text. The exact between international forest-related processes and membership of friends-of-the-chair groups varies, intergovernmental organisations such as the World but within the UNFF it typically includes the United Trade Organisation (WTO). States, the EU, the G77 (with Brazil and China also A pluralist view highlights the role of differ- invited) and possibly representatives of the African ent stakeholder groups, including local community Group and the Association of Southeast Asian Na- groups, indigenous peoples, forest owners, timber tions (ASEAN). companies, the retail sector, farmers and other actors. These three perspectives on key international ac- It encompasses both governmental and non-govern- tors combine to yield a view of international forest mental organisations, including hybrid organisations governance as dynamic and evolving. Policy out- such as the International Union for Conservation of puts are the result of an inherently political process20 Nature (IUCN), entirely non-governmental organi- whereby delegations cooperate in the shared endeav- sations such as the World Wide Fund for Nature our of developing forest policy while simultaneously (WWF), the Forest Peoples Programme and Global competing to promote narrower national and sectoral Witness, universities, and research institutes such interests driven by political pressures, lobbying and EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

2 MAPPING THE CORE ACTORS AND ISSUES...influence from other actors. Policies agreed outside mental frameworks such as the regional criteria andgovernmental and intergovernmental organisations, indicator processes. Others, however, have explicitlysuch as the principles of forest certification, may also rejected such frameworks in favour of their own; theinfluence the standards and policies of governmental FSC, for example, has developed ten principles foractors. Taken together, the goals identified in both well-managed forests (see Section 2.5).governmental and non-governmental agreements are Given the level of political contention surround-the result of political pressure and lobbying; inevi- ing existing institutionalised frameworks we havetably, therefore, they are the result of compromises, chosen not to rely exclusively on any of them. In-concessions and accommodations. deed, in the process of drafting this report it became clear just how strongly many actors associate each framework with a particular set of interests; to use2.3 Mapping key forest-related one or the other, therefore, risked alienating a large segment of our desired readership. This widespreadgoals contention over the framing of forest problems, no matter how generally or broadly stated they mayThe creation of a legible overview or ‘map’ of core appear, highlights the essential roles that ideas andinternational forest-related goals requires a clear or- discourse play in international forest governance – aganisational framework. By its very nature, however, theme developed in greater depth in Chapter 4 andany framework may prioritise certain actors, issues, Chapter 5.values or perspectives while excluding others. In- In the absence of a universally accepted frame-evitably, therefore, whatever framework this chapter work we have developed a hybrid approach that drawsadopts will be open to contention. We acknowledge from the range of available discursive frames. Thisthe importance of these debates and observe that enables a comprehensive assessment of the biophysi-the very absence of a universally agreed framework cal, socio-economic and institutional dimensions ofhighlights the deeply politically contested nature of international forest-related goals, organised underforest conservation and use. the following three dimensions and six themes: One highly influential frame for forest-relatedissues is the ‘three-legged stool’ of sustainability ● Biophysicalpopularised by the Brundtland Commission’s report Theme 1: Forest extent and land-use change“Our Common Future” (UN 1987). According to Theme 2: Ecosystem processes (including forestthis metaphor, environmental, social and economic degradation/restoration)needs form separate legs of a stool, each of which Theme 3: Biodiversitymust have equal weight to achieve sustainable re- ● Socio-economicsource use. However, as discussed further in Chap- Theme 4: Economic development (including inter-ter 5, this metaphor is increasingly contested. At national trade and investment and resource trans-an abstract level it has been criticised for imply- fer from developed to developing countries)ing that unlimited economic growth is achievable Theme 5: Social welfare (including livelihoodsas long as it is ‘balanced’, and for failing to make and poverty alleviation, access and benefit-shar-clear that some, although not necessarily all, tradeing, indigenous rights and workers’ rights)offs between environmental, social and economic ● Institutionalpriorities may result in environmental degradation. Theme 6: Governance.As a classification framework, the stool metaphoris problematic because the legs are interactive and Our treatment of the institutional dimension focusesthus a given resource management issue may not fit on the ways in which problems of forest governanceexclusively into a single leg. have been framed as international issues. We do not More specialised frameworks have emerged attempt to cover the myriad procedural mechanisms,within various institutional settings that we could, such as international and national planning, monitor-in theory, use to analyse the coverage and compre- ing and reporting, that various global and regionalhensiveness of the international forest regime. These processes have developed to operationalise theirinclude intergovernmental frames such as the Millen- substantive goals; these are addressed in Chapter 4nium Development Goals of the World Summit on and subsequent chapters.Sustainable Development, the programmatic areasand goals of the CBD’s Programme of Work (dis-cussed in Chapter 3), and the seven thematic elementsof SFM developed by the CPF (discussed in Section 212.5). Some non-state actors, such as those support-ing the Programme for the Endorsement of ForestCertification (PEFC), have embraced intergovern-EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

2 MAPPING THE CORE ACTORS AND ISSUES... 2.4.Thematic assessment of Box 2.1 Key goals concerning land-use change global-scale intergovernmental (forest extent) processes ● Take positive and transparent action towards reforestation, afforestation and forest conserva- Each sub-section below starts with a brief discussion tion, as appropriate (UNCED 1992, The Forest of a given theme and the issues the theme raises for Principles, Principle 8(a)) global forest governance. This is followed by a box ● Promote sustainable management and conserva- listing the key goals and objectives that have emerged tion of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse from within global-scale forest-related processes to gases, including forests (UNFCCC 1992, Article address those issues. The goals are restricted to those 4.1(d)) listed in the conventions or agreements themselves ● The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions (as opposed to decisions, programmes of work, etc., from direct human-induced land-use change of subsequent conference of the parties [COPs] to and forestry activities, limited to afforestation, those conventions or agreements). The exceptions reforestation and deforestation since 1990, shall are those decisions of the COP to the United Na- be reviewed in accordance with the commit- tions Framework Convention on Climate Change ments of each Party included in Annex I (Kyoto (UNFCCC) related to reducing emissions from de- Protocol 1997, Article 3.3) forestation and degradation (REDD) and REDD plus ● Reverse the loss of environmental resources forest enhancement (REDD+); the latter are included (United Nations Millennium Development because of the extraordinary influence that REDD+ Goals 2000, Target 7A) negotiations have already had on the international ● Reverse the loss of forest cover worldwide forestry community in advance of a post-Kyoto Pro- through sustainable forest management, includ- tocol climate agreement. ing protection, restoration, afforestation and reforestation, and increase efforts to prevent forest degradation (UNFF NLBI 2008, Objective 1) 2.4.1 Theme 1: Forest extent and ● Reduce emissions from deforestation and for- land-use change est degradation (UNFCCC COP 13/Decision 1 (Bali Action Plan) 2008; COP 15/Decision 4 (Methodological Guidance for REDD+) Global forest cover has been reduced by an esti- 2009). mated 20–50% over the last several hundred years, primarily due to agricultural conversion (Matthews et al. 2000). Other significant catalysts of forest loss 1992 was a pivotal event for bringing tropical de- include road-building to facilitate timber extraction forestation onto the intergovernmental agenda while and mining, urbanisation, and climate change. While, also highlighting considerable tensions between de- in most developed countries, the net total forest area veloped and developing countries on the issue (Dim- is stable or expanding, the loss of tropical forests has itrov 2005; Humphreys 2006; Tarasofsky 1999). The accelerated; in the last decade, about 13 million hect- developing countries asserted their sovereign right ares of forests per year were converted to other uses to convert forests to more economically productive (FAO 2010). Increasingly, the conversion of forests use, much as now-developed countries did in the to agriculture is driven by industrial-scale production past, and further argued that if they were to refrain for urban populations (DeFries et al. 2010). Over the from forest conversion they should be compensated next 30 years, commercial agriculture is expected to for the opportunity cost incurred through the transfer continue as a lead driver of deforestation in develop- of financial resources and technology. Developed ing countries, alongside continued growth in global countries declined to provide such compensation. demand for food and biofuels (FAO 2002). Ultimately, UNCED produced two documents As further discussed under themes 2–6, this con- directly related to forests: the Non-Legally Binding tinued reduction in the global forest area is a matter Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global of environmental, social and economic concern for Consensus on the Management, Conservation and a wide range of forest stakeholders. Arguably, recent Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests estimates that forest loss accounts for 12–20% of (known as the Forest Principles), and Chapter 11 all anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (“Combating Deforestation”) of Agenda 21. The lat- (IPCC 2007; van der Werf et al. 2009) have led to ter highlighted forest loss as a recognised concern but22 international consensus on the need for global gov- contained no goals committing to its reversal. The ernance and goal-setting to address the issue. language of the Forest Principles is non-committal, The United Nations Conference on Environment including non-directory phrasing such as “take posi- and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in tive action” and “as appropriate” (Principle 8(a)). EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

2 MAPPING THE CORE ACTORS AND ISSUES... Negotiations on deforestation were carried be- carbon markets. Moreover, it offered a mechanismyond UNCED within an increasing array of forestfor addressing not only forest management but alsorelated intergovernmental processes, largely within other more lucrative land uses that currently drivethe forest sector itself. From a transgovernmentalism forest loss. REDD+ has since gained support fromperspective, these negotiations excluded the key ac- an unprecedented array of actors in many sectorstor networks in agriculture, mining and other sec- (Levin et al. 2008).tors that were playing a pivotal role in much of the It is important to note, however, that at the time ofongoing forest loss (Geist and Lambin 2002; Rudel writing the text on REDD+ remains mostly in draftet al. 2009). form and is included in this analysis only because of A notable exception was the gradual strengthen- the enormous amount of attention and resources iting, under the UNFCCC, of the link between forest has generated prior to its formal agreement (Skutschloss and GHG emissions. The text of the UNFCCC, and Mccall 2010). To date, parties have been unablewhich was agreed at UNCED, includes forestry in the to agree on many of the rules by which a REDD+broader concept of land-use change (Article 4.1(d)), mechanism would be governed. Much debate hasreflecting a greater cross-sectoral focus, albeit with centred on the need for social and environmentalthe same type of discretionary wording found in the safeguards, including mechanisms to protect theForest Principles. Along similar lines, Goal 7, Target rights of indigenous and local communities and to7A of the Millennium Development Goals (adopted conserve biodiversity. As discussed in Chapter 5,by the United Nations in 2000) calls for the reversing these debates highlight more fundamental, underly-of the loss of environmental resources and refers to ing conflicts over issues such as the definition of what“alarming” rates of deforestation, although there is constitutes a forest and whether parties should beno specific call to reverse forest loss. allowed to convert natural forests to plantations (Sa- The decision of the United States not to ratify the saki and Putz 2009). The possible role of REDD+ inUNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol further shifted actor net- international emissions trading schemes is contestedwork dynamics by removing a politically powerful and it is also unclear how the baseline or referencecountry that was strongly opposed to legally binding, rates for both deforestation and degradation will bemeasurable targets for emissions reductions (Bar- established; the measurement of forest degradationrett 1998; Hovi et al. 2003). The decision to include remains particularly problematic (e.g. Angelsen andmeasurable targets for emissions reductions within Wertz-Kanounnikoff 2008). Nevertheless, tentativethe Kyoto Protocol set the stage for the linking of progress on these issues is reflected in the decisionland-use decisions with those targets. on methodological guidance made by COP 15 of the At first, however, this linkage was strictly limited UNFCCC (Dec. 4/2009). This decision addresses thein scope. Many European countries, international identification of drivers of deforestation; the use ofNGOs, and some key developing countries – such Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change guide-as Brazil – initially resisted the inclusion of natural lines for estimating anthropogenic forest-relatedforests as carbon sinks to count towards emissions GHG emissions and changes in forest cover; andtargets and in particular argued for the exclusion of the establishment of national monitoring systems.avoided tropical deforestation as a sink under themodalities of the Kyoto Protocol. The reasons forthis resistance varied between actors; they included 2.4.2 Theme 2: Ecosystem processesconcerns over: sovereignty; capacity for adequate (including forest degradation / restora-monitoring and enforcement; and the environmental,social and economic impacts of using an abundant tion)yet vulnerable natural resource to offset fossil-fuelemissions (Boyd et al. 2008). This theme addresses the effect of human activities By 2005, however, the positions of many actors on ecosystem processes, including efforts to slowwithin both the forest and climate policy communi- and/or reverse forest degradation. It is estimated thatties had begun to change rapidly and dramatically. about two-thirds of the world’s remaining forestsIn that year, the Coalition for Rainforest Nations, have been “significantly” altered by human activ-which included Papua New Guinea, Indonesia and ity (excluding the effects of climate change) (CBDa number of other key tropical countries, submitted 2006). However, the determination of what consti-a proposal to the UNFCCC to reduce their rates of tutes degradation – as opposed to human-induceddeforestation and degradation in exchange for com- change that may be considered sustainable or well-pensation (Humphreys 2008). Unlike past demands managed – requires an agreed frame of referencefor such compensation, REDD (and its later iteration, as well as adequate monitoring capacity. To some, 23REDD+) came with the promise of substantial gov- for example, natural disturbances (such as fire orernmental and private financial support tied to legally insect outbreaks) constitute an important componentbinding emissions reduction targets and/or global of a healthy forest, while others may consider theseEMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

2 MAPPING THE CORE ACTORS AND ISSUES... detrimental to management objectives. Likewise, it Box 2.2 Key goals concerning ecosystem/forest can be difficult to determine the extent to which such degradation disturbances are within the “range of natural variability” (Landres et al. 1999) or have been exacerbated ● Combat desertification and mitigate the effects by human impacts and are detrimental to ecosystem of drought, particularly in Africa, through re- resilience. Similarly, while some view logging as habilitation, conservation and sustainable man- forest degradation and a common precursor to con- agement of land and water resources (UNCCD version, others see it as part of managing a forest 1994, Article 2) sustainably. Other human impacts are viewed more ● Prepare for adaptation to the impacts of climate consistently as negative; for example, the introduc- change, and plan for the protection and rehabili- tion (either accidentally or intentionally) of inva- tation of areas, particularly in Africa, affected sive alien species has been identified as one of the by drought and desertification, as well as floods top-three threats to biodiversity (the other two being (UNFCCC 1992, Article 4.1(e); see also UN- habitat loss and hunting and/or harvesting; Clavero FCCC decisions under Theme 1) and Garcia-Berthou 2005). ● Rehabilitate and restore degraded ecosystems A diverse array of actors is involved in framing (CBD 1992, Article 8(f)) the issue of human-induced ecosystem change; such ● Support tropical timber reforestation and rehabil- actors have chosen various intergovernmental pro- itation of degraded forest land (ITTA 1994/2006 cesses to do so. The United Nations Convention to Article 1(j)) Combat Desertification (UNCCD) is the only conven- ● Prevent the spread of alien species which threat- tion to expressly address ecosystem degradation in its en ecosystems, habitats or species (CBD 1992, title. The UNCCD was spearheaded by a coalition of Article 8(h)) African governments as a means to gain international ● Increase efforts to prevent forest degradation support for addressing the desertification and drought (UNFF NLBI 2008, Objective 1) affecting much of the African continent. Developed ● Establish a system of protected areas (CBD countries agreed to the Convention without making 1992, Article 8 (a)) additional funds available. Thus, the UNCCD was ● Increase significantly the area of protected for- created to address concerns that disproportionately ests (UNFF NLBI 2008, Objective 3) affect one region and has since struggled to find trac- ● Recognise the contributions of a range of forest tion at a global scale. values, including environmental services, to sus- Possible routes past this obstacle may have been tainable forest management (ITTA 2006, Article formed by the linking of forests to climate change via 1(q); UNFF NLBI 2008, Article 6(j)) the concept of adaptation brought to the fore by the ● Control and reduce emissions of sulphur, ni- UNFCCC, which also highlights Africa as a high- trogen oxides, ammonia and volatile organic priority focus for adaptation support (Article 4.1(e)). compounds (Gothenburg Protocol to the 1979 While such support has been slow in materialising, Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air the recent increase in attention and funding around Pollution to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication REDD+ appears to be spilling over into adaptation and Ground-level Ozone 1999, Article 2). efforts as well (Skutsch and Mccall 2010). A number of other global processes, including the CBD, the International Tropical Timber Agree- was opposed by both Brazil and the United States. ment (ITTA) and the UNFF’s Non-Legally Bind- The CBD, in contrast, has established increasingly ing Instrument on All Types of Forests (NLBI) also detailed (albeit unenforceable) targets for the expan- address ecosystem degradation, each involving dif- sion of protected areas, stratified by major biome ferent, although overlapping, transgovernmental (Schmitt et al. 2009). The IUCN’s World Commis- networks. While there appears to be some diffusion sion on Protected Areas and the World Bank–WWF of issues and ideas across these networks, this may Alliance have also been active proponents for the cre- mask underlying differences in the definition of what ation of forested protected areas. Likewise, the World constitutes forest degradation as opposed to sustain- Heritage Convention and the Ramsar Convention on able forest use. Wetlands of International Importance both promote Nevertheless, there appears to be quite wide- the designation of protected areas, including forested spread agreement on the importance of setting aside ecosystems, that meet certain specifications. areas of forest for special protection. The establish- The emergence of the concept of environmental ment of protected areas is among the key goals of services in later global agreements (e.g. the ITTA24 both the CBD and the NLBI, although each has taken 2006, Article 1(q); the NLBI, Article 1(j)) is notable a different approach. In negotiating the NLBI, some in two major regards. First, in concert with REDD+, it actors, such as the EU, had pushed for a quantitative reflects what many have noted as the growing popular- and time-bound target on protected areas, but this ity of market-based approaches that attach monetary EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

2 MAPPING THE CORE ACTORS AND ISSUES...values to socially desired goods as a means to incen- Box 2.3 Key goals concerning biologicaltivise, rather than regulate, behaviour (Paterson et al. diversity2003; Riain 2000; Simmons and Elkins 2004). This ismost directly articulated in the NLBI, which encour- ● Regulate and monitor the international trade inages parties to “reflect” the range of forest values endangered species (CITES 1973, Appendices“in the marketplace” (NLBI, 1(j)). This approach is I–III listings)consistent with the preferences of those private-sector ● Conserve biological diversity, including di-actors and states that are supportive of trade liberali- versity within species, between species and ofsation. Second, it serves, at least in theory, to expand ecosystems (CBD 1992, Articles 1 and 2)forest-related goal-setting to more comprehensively ● Promote sustainable use of the components ofcover the biogeochemical components of forests (e.g. biodiversity (CBD 1992, Article 1)water, soil, biodiversity and microclimate). In this ● In-situ/ex-situ conservation of biodiversitylatter sense, the concept of environmental services (CBD 1992, Articles 8 and 9)addresses the priorities of many conservation NGOs ● Protect biodiversity from the potential risksand is consistent with trends in earth system science posed by living modified organisms (CBD 1992,(e.g. Armitage et al. 2009; Bengtsson et al. 2003; Article 19; Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,Holling and Meffe 1996). 2000) Some of the most authoritative language address- ● Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving, by 2010, aing forest-related health issues emerged in response significant reduction in the rate of loss (Unitedto air pollution, thereby involving a different set of Nations Millennium Development Goals, 2000,transgovernmental actor networks. The 1979 Con- Target 7B).vention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollutionwas among the earliest multilateral environmentalagreements. It has since produced eight protocols, timber species are listed (e.g. bigleaf mahogany –including the 1999 Protocol to Abate Acidifica- Swietenia macrophylla – in Appendix II). In gen-tion, Eutrophication and Ground-level Ozone (the eral, while CITES was instrumental in establishing‘Gothenburg Protocol’), which was agreed partly endangered species as a matter of global concern,in response to forest dieback in Europe and North its scope is strictly limited to issues of internationalAmerica and includes legally binding targets. trade and thus it cannot address broader questions of species’ and habitat conservation. Instruments dealing with biodiversity in a more comprehensive manner have been developed only2.4.3 Theme 3: Biological diversity from the early 1990s, beginning with the influential CBD, which emerged from UNCED. The govern-Biological diversity refers to “the variability among mental drivers behind the negotiation of the CBDliving organisms”, including the “diversity within were tropical forest countries with major biodiversityspecies and of ecosystems” (CBD 1992, Article 2). hotspots; many of these countries now comprise theAnthropogenic activities have driven a global loss CBD caucus group known as Like-Minded Mega-of biodiversity at a rate that is unprecedented in the diverse Countries. Conservation organisations suchlast 65 million years (Reid and Miller 1989; Wake as IUCN, WWF and the World Conservation Moni-and Vredenburg 2008); the rate of loss continues to toring Centre also lobbied for the CBD (McConnellincrease (MEA 2005). 1996) and have been engaged in the CBD process The 1975 Convention on the International Trade throughout.of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora The CBD addresses biodiversity conservation(CITES) was the first multilateral environmental both in-situ (i.e. in the natural surroundings of theagreement to address the conservation of species. various components of biodiversity) and ex-situ (i.e.From a pluralist perspective, environmental NGOs outside the natural surroundings of those compo-played an important role in drawing international nents) (Articles 8 and 9). It also addresses the han-attention to trade in endangered species. As early dling of “living modified organisms resulting fromas 1963, IUCN called for a convention to address biotechnology”, emphasising both the equitableit and, for the following ten years, worked closely sharing of biotechnology and the management ofwith the United Nations Environment Programme the associated risks (Article 19). The risks posed by(UNEP) to bring it into being (Sands and Bedecarré living modified organisms have been of particular1989). Under CITES, species listed in Appendix I are concern to many international NGOs, and some re-prohibited from commercial trade, species listed in searchers (e.g. Betsill and Corell 2008) have credited 25Appendix II are monitored and can be traded interna- such NGOs with playing a central role in the adop-tionally with a permit, and species listed in Appendix tion, in 2000, of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.III are monitored by the listing state(s). Only a few However, a number of CBD member states have notEMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

2 MAPPING THE CORE ACTORS AND ISSUES... ratified this Protocol. Box 2.4 Key goals concerning economic The inclusion of biodiversity in the Millennium development Development Goals in 2000 was significant because it elevated the concept to a particularly high-level, ● Trade liberalisation and the principle of non- cross-sectoral forum. Reference to it can be found in discrimination (GATT 1947, 1994) a plethora of COP decisions across a wide range of ● The right to development must be fulfilled so as multilateral environmental agreements dating from to equitably meet developmental and environ- that time (McDermott et al. 2007). mental needs of present and future generations (UNCED 1992, Rio Declaration, Principle 3) ● Common but differentiated responsibilities 2.4.4 Theme 4: Economic development (UNCED 1992, Rio Declaration, Principle 7; (including international trade and UNFCCC 1992, Article 3.1; UNFF NLBI 2008, Preamble) investment and resource transfer from ● Develop a global partnership for development developed to developing countries) (Millennium Development Goals 2000, Goal 8) Worldwide, national economic growth and develop- ● Promote trade in tropical timber from sustain- ment is increasingly dependent on international trade able sources (ITTA 1994/2006, Article 1) and investment. Likewise, global trade in certain key ● Increase the proportion of forest products from agricultural products, most notably soy, palm oil and sustainably managed forests (UNFF NLBI 2008, beef, is playing an expanding role in forest loss and Objective 3) degradation (DeFries et al. 2010; Rudel et al. 2009). ● Create enabling environments for private-sector Both the benefits and costs of development are highly investment (UNFF NLBI 2008, Article 6(h)). unevenly distributed, an issue at the core of many conflicts in the negotiation of both trade and environmental agreements. As a result, parallel sets of most important is Article XX(g) of GATT, which al- goals have emerged to facilitate free trade on the lows for trade restrictions on exhaustible resources, one hand, and to address the unequal distribution of consistent with domestic laws. The status of forests environmental and social costs and benefits resulting under the principle of trade without discrimination from this trade on the other. is therefore unclear. GATT does not permit states to Currently over 150 states are members of the discriminate against “like products” (that is, products WTO and signatories of the General Agreement on with similar characteristics or end uses) on the basis Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (WTO 2010). The WTO of their manufacture. This has been interpreted to and its associated trade agreements promote the free mean that states cannot discriminate, in international trade of goods and services across national boundar- trade, between ‘sustainably managed’ timber (how- ies, with states required to make changes to national ever so defined) and timber from ‘unsustainable’ legislation consistent with WTO rules on pain of sources. So far this clause has not been tested before sanctions, requirements that are largely absent from a WTO dispute panel. However, the 1998 shrimp– the key forest-related environmental agreements turtle case brought by India, Malaysia, Pakistan and (Eckersley 2004). Thailand against the US, could have ramifications The governing norm of the WTO is trade and for forest use. In this case, the United States took investment liberalisation; all businesses and investors action against shrimp imports from countries that should be free to trade with and invest in other coun- used nets that did not include turtle-exclusion de- tries without discrimination. Under the WTO prin- vices. The WTO ruled that the action was unlawful ciple of trade without discrimination, states cannot because it was aimed only at Asian and Caribbean apply different conditions for trade and investment to countries, but it also ruled that the action would be different countries nor discriminate in favour of na- legal provided there was no discrimination between tional businesses relative to foreign businesses. WTO countries (Sarre 2009; WTO 1998). rules help explain why many developing countries The principle of non-discrimination also plays an continue to retain a large proportion of their forests important role in environmental agreements, some- under public ownership (White and Martin 2002). times to very different effect. For example, Principle Most of the world’s most powerful timber and paper- 3 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and manufacturing corporations – likely to be some of Development states that current economic develop- the main beneficiaries of tropical-forest privatisation ment opportunities should not prejudice the ability of26 – are based in developed countries. future generations to meet their own needs. However, WTO agreements do, however, include provi- by definition the actors most affected by the concept sions that allow for trade restrictions imposed with of intergenerational equity (i.e. future generations) the aim of conserving natural resources. Among the cannot enter intergovernmental negotiations and their EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

2 MAPPING THE CORE ACTORS AND ISSUES...needs, accordingly, remain only vaguely defined. they perceived to be the unwillingness of the ITTC The question of equity among countries is an and the body established to administer the ITTA, theissue that has been advocated consistently by G77 International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO),countries. As discussed under Theme 1, this issue to focus more attention on conservation issues (Hum-came to the fore at UNCED when developing coun- phreys 2006).tries demanded compensation for the costs of forego- The ITTA’s focus on the tropical timber tradeing development opportunities as a result of global was carried forward and expanded to all forests inenvironmental agreements. An outcome of these the NLBI, without the emphasis on promoting globaldemands was the introduction of the phrase “com- trade. NLBI Objective 3 calls for an increase in themon but differentiated responsibilities”. Specifically, “proportion of forest products [sourced] from sus-Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration on Environment tainably managed forests”. Also notable is Articleand Development states: “In view of the different 6(h), which suggests that member states should “cre-contributions to global environmental degradation, ate enabling environments to encourage private sec-States have common but differentiated responsibili- tor investment … in sustainable forest management”.ties. The developed countries acknowledge the re- Together with NLBI Article 1(j), which emphasisessponsibility that they bear in the international pursuit the range of forest products and services (see Themeto [sic] sustainable development in view of the pres- 3), this is consistent with increased global interest insures their societies place on the global environment private financing not only for traditional timber andand of the technologies and financial resources they non-timber forest products but also potentially forcommand.” This concept finds further voice in Goal REDD+ (Lin and Streck 2009) and payment schemes8 of the Millennium Development Goals, which calls for ecosystem services (Bond et al. 2009).for support for developing countries in accessingresources, technologies and developed markets. Principles 3 and 7 of the Rio Declaration on En- 2.4.5 Theme 5: Social welfare (includ-vironment and Development are taken up in Article ing livelihoods and poverty alleviation,3.1 of the UNFCCC, which holds that “The Partiesshould protect the climate system for the benefit of access and benefit-sharing, indigenouspresent and future generations of humankind, on the rights and workers’ rights)basis of equity and in accordance with their commonbut differentiated responsibilities and respective ca- This theme focuses on issues of social welfare andpabilities”. The phrase ‘common but differentiated equity, not across generations or nations as in Themeresponsibilities’ appears verbatim in the preamble 4 but among forest-dependent communities, indig-of the NLBI and is also embedded in the many de- enous peoples, forest workers and disadvantagedcisions made under or within those environmental populations in general. An estimated 1.6 billionagreements and processes discussed in this chapter people depend directly on forests for their liveli-that call for the transfer of technologies and resources hoods (World Bank 2004), ranging from indigenousfrom developed to developing countries. Applied to forest-dwellers to migrants and displaced popula-forests, the concept of international equity implies tions engaged in a wide range of livelihood activities,different types and levels of national responsibil- such as hunting and gathering, shifting cultivation,ity for addressing and reversing deforestation. But agroforestry and the production and trade of timberwhile there is agreement on the principle, there is less and non-timber forest products. Forests are also es-consensus on its practical application in and policy sential for the cultural survival of many indigenousrelevance to forests. communities and directly contribute to the liveli- The ITTA 1994, and its proposed successor ITTA hoods of an estimated 90% of the 1.2 billion people2006, are the only global legally binding instrument living in extreme poverty globally (ibid.).that focus expressly on forest trade, with the over- The key actors shaping many of the global goalsarching objective of promoting “the expansion and related to Theme 5 differ notably from the primar-diversification of international trade in tropical tim- ily state-centric actors central to Theme 4. In hisber from sustainably managed and legally harvested pluralist assessment of the influence of NGOs onforests and to promote the sustainable management ITTO, UNCED forest negotiations and the UNFF,of tropical timber producing forests for the purpose Humphreys (2004) credits NGOs with a central roleof producing forest products” (Article 1). Its govern- in introducing language on ‘local communities’, ‘in-ing body, the International Tropical Timber Coun- digenous knowledge’, ‘the role of women’ and ‘thecil (ITTC), has two caucus groups: tropical timber sharing of benefits that arise from the utilisation ofproducer countries and tropical timber consumer traditional or indigenous knowledge’. Other key ac- 27countries. The timber trade is well represented at tor networks that have influenced goal-setting eitherITTC sessions, but many conservation groups ceased within or outside the forest arena include indigenousattending ITTC sessions in the mid 1990s over what peoples’ organisations, the state negotiators respon-EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

2 MAPPING THE CORE ACTORS AND ISSUES... sible for the Millennium Development Goals, and the Box 2.5 Key goals concerning social welfare International Labour Organization (ILO). The goal of protecting traditional ecological ● Respect, preserve and maintain the knowledge, knowledge and practices appears in a number of innovations and practices of indigenous and forest-related instruments, including the CBD (Ar- local communities embodying traditional life- ticle 8(j)) and the UNCCD, which requires parties to styles (CBD 1992, Article 8(j); UNFF NLBI “protect, promote and use in particular relevant tra- 2008, Paragraph 6(f); UNDRIP 2007, Article ditional and local technology, knowledge, know-how 31.1; World Heritage Convention 1972) and practices” (UNCCD, Article 18.2). The role of ● Promote the fair and equitable sharing of the forests in cultural heritage is recognised in the 1972 benefits arising out of traditional knowledge and World Heritage Convention (Sayer et al. 2000). practices relevant to conservation and sustain- Another set of core goals relates to ‘access able use [including appropriate access to those and benefit-sharing’ (ABS), a phrase first coined resources – CBD] (CBD 1992, Articles 1, 8(j), within the CBD in the context of access to genetic 15; UNFF NLBI 2008, Paragraph 6(f)) resources (Articles 1 and 15). The NLBI also ad- ● Indigenous people have the right to free, prior opted this concept, applying it to “traditional forest- and informed consent (UNDRIP 2007, Articles related knowledge and practices in sustainable forest 10, 11.2, 19, 28.1, 29.2 and 32.2) management” (Article 6(f)). The CBD’s treatment ● Indigenous and tribal peoples have the right to of ABS therefore appears to be relatively narrowly decide their own priorities for the process of de- defined, but it has significant ramifications for inter- velopment as it affects their lives, beliefs, institu- national trade that potentially conflicts with the rules tions and spiritual well-being (ILO Convention of the WTO. Patents on the use of genetic resources 169, 1989, Article 7.1) are often registered by transnational pharmaceuti- ● Eradicate/alleviate poverty (Millennium Devel- cal, agricultural and biotechnology corporations, in opment Goals 2000, Goal 1; ITTA 2006, Article many cases against the wishes of the governments 1(c); UNCCD 1994, Article 4.2(c); UNFF NLBI of countries within which the resources have been 2008, Article 6(d)) harvested. Patents are permissible under the Agree- ● Enhance forest-based economic, social and envi- ment on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights ronmental benefits, including by improving the (TRIPS), which requires that any royalties derived livelihoods of forest-dependent people (UNFF from the commercial exploitation of patents accrue NLBI 2008, Objective 2) to patent-holders. One interpretation of benefit-shar- ● Allow worker freedom of association and col- ing in the context of forests is that such royalties lective bargaining; eliminate forced labour, dis- should be shared with those communities that had crimination and child labour (The eight ILO core knowledge of the properties of forest species prior conventions: C-29; C-87; C-98; C-100; C-105; to patenting and with the governments of countries C-100; C-111: C-138; C-182). that form part of the natural range of those species. While there is some measure of international agreement that benefits should be shared equitably among The Millennium Development Goals have been business corporations, governments and communi- instrumental in attracting greater international at- ties, there is so far no agreement on a formula to tention to social welfare issues, particularly pov- guide such sharing. erty alleviation, with ramifications both within and The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of outside the forest sector. Goal 1 is notable for its Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) takes the question of strong language (i.e. to “eradicate extreme poverty indigenous rights well beyond the issue of genetic and hunger”) and is accompanied by specific tar- patents. A central goal of UNDRIP is to require the gets. This focus on poverty is also reflected in some “free, prior and informed consent” of indigenous forest-related instruments, including the UNCCD, people for all economic and development activities which also calls for poverty “eradication” (Article that take place on their lands and territories. This 4.2(c)), and the ITTA 2006 (Article 1(c)) proposed means that any such consent should be free (that successor agreement to ITTA 1994, and the NBLI is, freely given or withheld), prior (that is, obtained (Article 6(d)), which more modestly refer to poverty before implementation) and informed (that is, based “alleviation” and “reduction”, respectively. on a full understanding of how livelihoods and lands The eight ILO core conventions are of particular will be affected). ILO Convention 169 (Article 7.1) relevance to the protection of workers employed in also backs the goal of indigenous self-determination, industrial forestry. They cover diverse fundamental28 including “the right to decide their own priorities for rights, such as freedom of association and collective the process of development”, although it does not bargaining (C-87 and C-98), and include stipulations mention the principle of free, prior and informed against forced labour (C-29 and C-105). ILO conven- consent. tions C-100 and C-111 prohibit discrimination on the EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

2 MAPPING THE CORE ACTORS AND ISSUES...basis of a variety of criteria, including race, colour, Box 2.6 Key goals concerning governancesex, religion, political opinion, national extractionand social origin (C-111). Child-labour requirements ● Improve forest law enforcement and governance(C-138 and C-182) include various definitions and and address illegal logging and related trade inprohibitions against harmful childhood labour, set- tropical timber (ITTA 2006, Article 1(n))ting a minimum employment age of at least 15 (or ● Promote and strengthen measures, including14 for lesser-developed countries), and requiring that international cooperation, against corruptionemployment should not interfere with basic school- (United Nations Convention against Corrup-ing. tion 2003, Article 1) ● Involve stakeholders/the public in resource management decision-making (Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 1992, Principle2.4.6 Theme 6: Governance 10; CBD 1992, Article 14.1(a); UNCCD 1994, Article 10.2(f); UNFF NLBI 2008, Article 2(c),The issue of forest governance is increasingly ac- 6(w))cepted as a core challenge facing global forestry. In ● Guarantee the rights of access to information,many developing countries, forest tenure – that is, public participation in decision-making, and ac-the distribution of rights to forestlands and resources cess to justice in environmental matters (Aarhus– is unresolved and/or disputed. The laws govern- Convention 1998, Article 1).ing forest use are often incomplete, conflicting, ex-traordinarily complex and/or poorly enforced (Mc-Dermott et al. 2010). Central to overcoming these (FLEG) initiatives to tackle illegal logging. To date,challenges is the establishment of institutions and these FLEG processes have been most active in Asiadecision-making processes that are widely accepted and Africa (see the regional boxes below and Ap-as just and legitimate (Buchanan and Keohane 2010; pendix 1.Cashore 2009; World Bank 2009). All of the global In many countries, illegal logging is aided andagreements and processes discussed in this chapter abetted by clientelism in the public sector. An in-have generated decisions addressing the institutional creasing confluence of actors in both developedand procedural measures necessary to achieve their and developing countries are now agreeing to framesubstantive goals. The focus here is not these instru- this phenomenon as an issue of corruption (Singermental decisions but rather the setting of global goals 2009; Tacconi 2007) as well as to seek internationalthat define key forest governance ‘problems’. agreements to address it. It has been argued that the The growing international attention on illegal sheer volume of information, money, drugs and armslogging is arguably one of the most significant recent flowing across borders has “destroyed the illusion offorest-related developments that has emerged largely corruption as a domestic political issue to be left tofrom within the sector itself (Tacconi 2007). Key individual countries” (Webb 2005). Shifting perspec-actors include coalitions of environmental groups, tives could also be due in part to influential NGOsdeveloped-country timber producers concerned with such as Global Witness and Transparency Interna-protecting market share, and developing countries tional (Wang and Rosenau 2001) and more broadlyconcerned with control over their forest resources to the growing number of developing countries andand the capture of state revenues from timber pro- their relatively empowered citizenry that are com-duction. mitted to strengthening democratic processes (Keefer The ITTA 2006 proposed successor agreement to and Vlaicu 2008) and/or ridding themselves of rivalITTA 1994 reflects this growing consensus with an political parties (Khan 1998). In a similar way toobjective to strengthen “the capacity of members to illegal logging, international agreements to tackleimprove forest law enforcement and governance, and corruption first took strong shape at the regionaladdress illegal logging and related trade in tropical level (Webb 2005). In 2003, the issue moved into thetimber” (Article 1(n)). The appearance of this objec- global sphere with the signing of the United Nationstive in the agreement illustrates how principles in Convention against Corruption. The current globalthe international forest regime can be reinforced as interest in REDD+ has brought the question of cor-they spill from one institution to another. The need ruption further to the fore of international concernfor action to address illegal logging and the trade in about forests. Addressing corruption will be a key toillegally harvested timber was first recognised in the the success of REDD+ payments, particularly given1997 ‘proposals for action’ of the Intergovernmental the apparent global consensus that REDD+ paymentsPanel on Forests. It was then included in the G8 Ac- will be coordinated by national governments. 29tion Programme on Forests (1998–2002). In 2001 the Also connected to the development of effectivefirst steps were taken in the creation of a network of governance processes is the principle that stake-regional Forest Law Enforcement and Governance holders – such as communities, farmers, local busi-EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

2 MAPPING THE CORE ACTORS AND ISSUES... nesses and indigenous peoples – should participate operating outside intergovernmental negotiations. in policymaking processes. This principle, champi- Like the C&I processes, forest certification schemes oned in particular by conservation, social and indig- have engaged in the comprehensive definition of enous NGOs and other non-governmental interests SFM. Unlike the C&I processes, however, these (Humphreys 2004; Tollefson et al. 2008), has gained schemes have focused expressly on the evaluation considerable normative strength over the last several of procedural and substantive performance at the decades. It appears, for example, in the Rio Declara- level of individual forest management units and/or tion on Environment and Development (Principle associations of forest producers. 10), the CBD (Article 14.1(a)), the UNCCD (Article The following subsections provide a brief over- 10.2(f)), the NLBI (Articles 2(c) and 6(w)) and the view of the key actors, concepts and goals that these World Bank’s operational policy on forests (World instruments have contributed to international forest Bank 2002). The principle is thus a broad one that governance. has been articulated in several legal codes and policy declarations. There is some disagreement, however, on how it should be defined and implemented. There is a distinction between consultation (which merely 2.5.1 Criteria and indicators for SFM gives stakeholders the right to present their views) and participation (which carries with it the ability ITTO pioneered the development of international to influence decisions and contribute to the shaping C&I with its 1992 publication of C&I for tropical of policy). forests. In the same year, at UNCED, tropical country The 1998 Aarhus Convention fuses the principle leaders pushed for the inclusion of temperate and of participation with two other principles: the rights boreal forest issues in intergovernmental negotia- of access to information and access to justice in en- tions (Humphreys 2006). Consistent with this ex- vironmental matters. The Aarhus Convention is a panded focus, the Forest Principles and Agenda 21 regional convention of the United Nations Economic called for the development of international criteria Commission for Europe. Former United Nations for monitoring national forest resources in all types Secretary-General Kofi Annan has commented that of forests worldwide (Forest Principle 8(d) and “although regional in scope, the significance of the Agenda 21 Objective 11.33 (a)). This spurred the Aarhus Convention is global. It is by far the most development of seven regional (i.e. Pan-European impressive elaboration of Principle 10 of the Rio Forest, African Timber Organization, Dry Forest in Declaration … {and} the most ambitious venture in Asia, Dry-Zone Africa, Lepaterique, Near East and the area of environmental democracy so far under- Tarapoto) and two international (i.e. Montreal and taken by the United Nations” (Annan undated). ITTO) C&I processes involving about 150 countries (Wijewardana 2008). The creation of nine processes suggests that in- 2.5. Internationally negotiated fluential forest actors favoured a relatively decentralised approach to framing SFM. Nevertheless, the conceptual frameworks for frameworks thus generated have, in turn, been used SFM in a simplified form by global institutional actors such as the CPF as a means to link the reporting and Parallel to, and distinct from, the above sets of aspi- measurement of progress across global forest-related rational goals and commitments established through international instruments. The core goal of the CPF intergovernmental negotiations are two other types of is to “increase cooperation and coordination on for- instrument that provide overarching, cohesive frame- ests” (CPF 2010) through collaborative work among works for assessing and/or evaluating forest manage- 14 international organisations and secretariats with ment at the global to local levels. The first involves “substantial programmes on forests” (i.e. CIFOR, an array of regional and international processes to FAO, ITTO, IUFRO, CBD, GEF, UNCCD, UNFF, develop criteria and indicators (C&I) for SFM that UNFCCC, UNDP, UNEP, the World Agroforestry were catalysed through global-scale agreement. Centre, the World Bank and IUCN; CPF 2010). The These processes are unique in the intergovernmental CPF Task Force on Streamlining Forest-Related arena in their combined focus on comprehensively Reporting (CPF 2004) analysed the nine C&I pro- defining the components of SFM (generally at the cesses and found that all shared in common “seven national level); their emphasis on national-level mea- thematic areas of sustainable forest management”. suring and monitoring rather than normative goal- These are:30 setting; and their globally initiated and supported, but regionally generated, goal-setting. 1) Extent of forest resources The second type of instrument, forest certifica- 2) Biological diversity tion, is a market-driven approach governed by actors 3) Forest health and vitality EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

2 MAPPING THE CORE ACTORS AND ISSUES...4) Productive functions of forest resources 1) Compliance with laws and FSC principles5) Protective functions of forest resources 2) Tenure and use rights and responsibilities6) Socio-economic functions 3) Indigenous peoples’ rights7) Legal, policy and institutional framework. 4) Community relations and worker’s rights 5) Benefits from the forestThese thematic areas have since been endorsed by 6) Environmental impactthe UNFF, the International Conference on Criteria 7) Management planand Indicators in Guatemala (CICI 2003), and the 8) Monitoring and assessmentFAO Committee on Forestry. Likewise, the FAO/ 9) Maintenance of high-conservation-value forestsITTO Expert Consultation on Criteria and Indica- 10) Plantations.tors formally recognised the importance of the seventhematic areas in facilitating international communi- The launch of the FSC sparked considerable contro-cation on forest-related issues (CPF 2004). versy among forest industry and government actors, who questioned the authority of the FSC to define and evaluate appropriate forest practices (Cashore et al. 2004; Elliott 2000; Meidinger et al. 2003). In2.5.2 Forest certification standards response, a number of forest producer associations in North America and Europe formed competing cer-As described in numerous historical accounts (e.g. tification schemes, sometimes with the involvementAuld et al. 2008; Cashore et al. 2004; Rametsteiner of government agencies and/or national industryand Simula 2003), forest certification was champi- standards organisations. Many such schemes haveoned initially by international environmental and so- since united under the umbrella of the PEFC, whichcial organisations mostly headquartered in Europe began as a European scheme and was re-launched inand North America (e.g. the Rainforest Alliance, 2003 as a global organisation. In contrast to the FSC,Friends of the Earth, WWF), along with a small the PEFC has not established a global performancegroup of sympathetic business interests (including standard. Instead, it endorses certification schemethe United Kingdom-based retail giant B&Q). The standards on the basis of their consistency with thecore idea behind certification was to harness the regional and international C&I processes discussedmarket to promote responsible forest management above.by awarding an ecolabel to forest products produced In a further example of public/private goal diffu-according to agreed-upon environmental and social sion, support for voluntary timber labelling schemesstandards for ‘responsible’ forestry. It is notable that is now expressly stated in some global intergovern-a number of the early promoters of forest certification mental processes, including those that were initiallyfirst explored the development of timber labelling resistant to the idea. For example, the NLBI callswithin both ITTO and the International Organization on state actors to “encourage” the development offor Standardization (ISO – a global consortium of na- private voluntary instruments “such as voluntary cer-tional standard-setting bodies). In the case of ITTO, tification systems” (Article 6(x)), and certificationtropical-country negotiators objected to even the vol- is similarly mentioned in the ITTA 2006 (Articleuntary labelling of tropical timber on the grounds 1(o)).that it constituted a barrier to trade. In the contextof the ISO, industry interests eschewed specific per-formance standards in favour of a systems-based ap- 2.6. Regional processes andproach that allowed businesses to establish their ownperformance thresholds (Elliott 2000). their interaction with global The FSC thus emerged in 1993 as a new, globalforest-related goalsscale, non-governmental organisation with a gover-nance structure that excluded government partici- The following boxes provide examples of key goalspation and strictly limited the influence of actors and associated processes that have emerged at the re-with a direct economic interest in the production gional level in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin Amer-and sale of forest products. Within the parameters of ica. The intent of this analysis is not to be exhaustivethis structure, the FSC produced ten principles and but rather to illustrate ways in which regional pro-criteria that define responsible forestry worldwide. cesses may serve to translate and internalise globalThe ten principles echo a number of the issues that commitments into regional contexts, to establishconservation and social-welfare NGOs have been regionally specific priorities, and/or to provide al-instrumental in framing and promoting within global ternative goal-setting venues in areas where global 31intergovernmental processes (e.g. see theme 5). They consensus has not yet been reached (e.g. the EU’sare: proposed legally binding agreement on forests).EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

2 MAPPING THE CORE ACTORS AND ISSUES... Box 2.7 African regional agreements Box 2.8 Asia-Pacific regional agreements Theme 2: Biological diversity Theme 1: Forest extent and land-use change ● The African states, under the African Conven- ● The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) tion on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Leaders’ Declaration on Climate Change, En- Resources, established, as a fundamental prin- ergy Security and Clean Development (Sydney, ciple, the adoption of the measures necessary to Australia, 2007) indicates a regional aspirational ensure the conservation, utilisation and develop- goal of increasing forest cover in the APEC re- ment of soil, water, flora and faunal resources in gion by at least 20 million hectares of all types accordance with scientific principles and with of forests by 2020. due regard to the best interests of the people Theme 2: Biological diversity (Article 2). ● The ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Theme 5: Social welfare Nature and Natural Resources (1985) aims to ● The African Union, the African Development promote the maintenance of essential ecologi- Bank and the Economic Commission for Africa cal process and life-support systems, preserve are jointly implementing a regional initiative genetic diversity, and ensure the sustainable to develop a Pan-African Framework on Land utilisation of harvested natural resources. Policy for Securing Rights, Enhancing Produc- ● The ASEAN Declaration on Environmental Sus- tivity and Improving Livelihoods. tainability (2007) states the aims of achieving, Theme 6: Governance by 2010, a significant reduction in the current ● The New Partnership for Africa’s Development rate of loss of biodiversity, conserving the rich (NEPAD), established in 2001, is a programme biodiversity in ASEAN member states, strength- of the African Union. The action plan of NE- ening efforts to implement the ASEAN Regional PAD’s environment initiative is a region-wide Action Plan on Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora, framework for, among other things, promoting and promoting the conservation and sustainable the sustainable use of African natural resources management of key ecosystems, including for- and improving the institutional framework for est, coastal and marine habitats. regional environmental governance. The Afri- Theme 6: Governance can Ministerial Conference on the Environment The Ministerial Declaration arising from the 2001 monitors the implementation of the plan. Ministerial Conference on Forest Law Enforcement ● The African Forest Forum is being established and Governance in East Asia committed countries as a mechanism to mobilise and represent Afri- from the East Asian and other participating regions can voices in international forest platforms such to: as the UNFF. ● “Take immediate action to intensify national ef- ● The Ministerial Declaration arising from the forts, and to strengthen bilateral, regional and Ministerial Conference on African Forest Law multilateral collaboration to address violations Enforcement and Governance in 2003 commits of forest law and forest crime, in particular il- to fighting illegal logging and improving laws legal logging, associated illegal trade and cor- and regulations, forest-sector governance and ruption, and their negative effects on the rule of local development. law” (Paragraph 9) ● The Central African Forests Commission, a ● “Review existing domestic forest policy frame- ministerial consortium established under the works and institute appropriate policy reforms, legal authority of the 1999 Yaoundé Declaration, including those relating to granting and moni- coordinates forest governance and conservation toring concessions, subsidies, and excess pro- efforts across Central Africa. cessing capacity, to prevent illegal practices” ● Ghana, Congo and Cameroon are the world’s (Paragraph 18). first countries to sign voluntary partnership agreements (VPAs) under the EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) process. The VPAs were signed in 2008, 2009 and 2010, respectively.32 EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

2 MAPPING THE CORE ACTORS AND ISSUES...Box 2.9 European regional agreements Box 2.10 Latin American regional agreementsTheme 3: Biodiversity Theme 1: Forest extent and land-use change● The goal of the legally binding Bern Convention ● In 2008, Central American countries completed is “to conserve wild fauna and flora and their a Regional Agri-environmental and Health Strat- natural habitats”, especially focusing on coop- egy 2009–2024, which was formulated by an eration in protecting endangered and threatened inter-ministerial technical committee compris- species in Europe. The parties to the Convention ing the ministries of agriculture, environment specify their respective species in the annexes to and health of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, the Convention. Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panamá.● The EU’s Natura 2000 network also aims to pro- The goals of this strategy include sustainable tect natural habitats and related species. Based land management, improving regional capacities on two directives it designates conservation areas for adapting to climate change, and promoting in EU member states and establishes a legally biodiversity conservation and traditional knowl- binding protection status for them. The Council edge. The implementation of the strategy is led of Europe’s Emerald Network of Protected Areas strives for the same goal in non-EU European by the Inter-sectoral Council of Ministries of countries. Agriculture, Environment and Health of CentralTheme 6: Governance America, supported by the Tegucigalpa Proto-● At the Fourth Ministerial Conference on the Pro- col (Article 16). In the context of this strategy, tection of Forests in Europe, the European coun- the Central American countries, with German tries decided “to strengthen synergies for SFM support, have initiated a process of consulta- through cross-sectoral cooperation and national tion to design common compensation policies forest programmes”. They adopted a common ap- for avoided deforestation. proach to national forest programmes in Europe Theme 3: Biological diversity and committed themselves to developing and ● In 2002 the Andean Council of Ministries of implementing those national forest programmes Foreign Affairs, comprising representatives of accordingly. Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezu-● In its FLEGT Action Plan the EU has set the ela (although the latter is no longer a member), goal of combating illegal harvesting and illegal approved a regional biodiversity strategy (De- timber trade in environment and development cision 523). This strategy aims to contribute to cooperation policies. Consequently, it adopted the generation of economic development alter- a regulation on a FLEGT licensing scheme for natives based on sustainable natural resource imports of timber that allows the control of tim- management and the formulation of common ber trade with countries entering into a VPA. To regional positions in international negotiations date, three VPAs have been concluded, seven on biodiversity conservation. In 2010, the four are in negotiation and about 15 other countries countries of the Andean Community of Nations have indicated their interest in participating in a initiated a Regional Program of Biodiversity in VPA. In addition, an EU regulation prohibiting the Andean–Amazon region. the sale of illegally harvested timber in the EU and requiring operators to exercise due-diligence Theme 6: Governance ● The EU FLEGT facility has carried out scop- procedures to ascertain if products are legal is close to adoption. ing missions in Ecuador, Colombia, Guyana and● FOREST EUROPE (previously known as the Bolivia to discuss possible VPAs. Ministerial Conference on the Protection of Forests in Europe) has started a discussion on the potential added value of and possible options for a legally binding agreement on forests in Eu- rope. A working group has been established and is preparing proposals for the next Ministerial Conference, to be held in June 2011. A group of like-minded countries in favour of a legally binding agreement has initiated the process in reaction to developments in global forest governance in recent years. As yet, however, there is no agreement to negotiate such an agreement; several signatories of FOREST EUROPE commitments are hesitant to take this step, while oth- 33 ers are waiting to see its possible content and legal characteristics.EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

2 MAPPING THE CORE ACTORS AND ISSUES... 2.7. Conclusion: Conflicts, gaps Diverse environmental and social non-governmental and synergies organisations have played critical roles in expanding the scope of global agreements around forests, particularly in regards to issues of biodiversity con- This chapter has mapped the core substantive issues servation and human rights. These actors have also and actors that currently shape international forest generated new institutions to by-pass stalled gov- governance. As highlighted by the initial theoretical ernmental processes and have catalysed competing overview of actor networks, different lenses may be efforts among the commercial private sector, thereby used to view the social construction of international broadening the level of societal engagement in forest- forest-related goals. Increasingly, however, the trans- related decision-making. governmentalist and pluralist perspectives offer critical insights into the cross-sectoral, multi-scale (e.g. ● Many actors that play key roles in forest change global and regional) and non-state actor networks lie outside the forest sector and have not been that shape global forest strategies. engaged in forest-related negotiations. Given this complexity, and the amount of time and energy this diverse array of actors invests in Many of the greatest challenges for sustaining the competing and/or cooperating in the definition of world’s forests lie outside the forest sector in the the global agenda, it is easy to lose sight of the core growing demand for agricultural products, biofuels, forest challenges that international forest governance non-renewable materials and energy; urbanisation; aims to address – in other words to ‘fail to see the and climate change. Forest-sector activities and poli- forest for the trees’. The comprehensive mapping cies interact with these other economic drivers by al- of the core substantive issues, we argue, is essential tering the value of forests relative to other land uses, to bring attention purposefully and holistically back thereby either facilitating or dis-incentivising forest to the forests and to the communities that depend conversion. Yet forest-related processes have gener- upon them. ally failed to generate cross-sectoral communication As explained in the introduction, there is no uni- and collaboration among the full range of producers versally agreed framework for creating a definitive and consumers who are driving forest change. map, and the landscape of key actors and goals is both dynamic and contested. Nevertheless, we argue ● Regional and non-governmental processes pro- that our assessment serves to highlight the follow- vide pathways for bypassing stalled global-scale ing points: agreement. ● An increasingly comprehensive suite of goals Global-scale processes have frequently become has emerged to guide international forest gover- locked in debates over the desirability of legally nance. binding commitments to slow forest conversion or promote SFM. Meanwhile, various regional forums A plethora of international goals has been agreed and non-governmental forest certification schemes within each of the six broad themes discussed above. have made significant progress in framing and imple- These goals may conflict at times, and there is wide menting relatively comprehensive approaches. These variation in the level of political commitment and processes are limited, however, in their ability to resources available to fulfil them. Nevertheless, their address drivers outside the forest sector. articulation within widely recognised international institutions indicates a substantial sharing of norms. ● Greater coordination is needed and requires a These shared norms and associated aspirational goals widespread perception of common interest cou- could provide a foundation for holistic international pled with legitimate environmental and social action on forests. However, ongoing conflicts over safeguards. such fundamental issues as how to define a forest, how to prioritise environmental, social and economic Our analysis suggests that widespread norm diffu- objectives, and whether or not there is a need for le- sion across a broad array of actors has occurred, gally binding commitments have greatly constrained although purposeful holistic coordination is currently the translation of aspirational goals into coordinated the exception rather than the rule. The diffusion of mandates for on-the-ground action. ideas across both state and non-state actor networks at the global and regional levels is such that priori- ● The comprehensiveness of international forest- ties rejected by one actor network may be taken up34 related goals is the result of power struggles over by another and may ultimately achieve widespread ideas and resources involving a wide diversity of acceptance (e.g. forest certification and regional ini- actors and institutions. tiatives to stop illegal logging). The forest–climate linkage appears to represent EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

2 MAPPING THE CORE ACTORS AND ISSUES... Buchanan, Allen, and Robert O. Keohane. 2010. The Legitimacythe most significant case of cross-sectoral, global- of Global Governance Institutions. Ethics & Internationalscale coordination around forests via the incorpo- Affairs 20(4): 1–33.ration of natural forests into emissions reduction Bull, Hedley. 1977. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order intargets. This linkage could incentivise substantial World Politics, London: Macmillan.public and private investment in reversing defores- Cashore, Benjamin. 2009. Discussion Paper: Key components of Good Forest Governance Part I: Overarching principles andtation by changing the economic incentives driving criteria. Asean Forest Clearing House Mechanism 6.forest conversion. 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3 Core components of the international forest regime complex Coordinating lead author: Peter Glück Lead authors: Arild Angelsen, Marie Appelstrand, Samuel Assembe-Mvondo, Graeme Auld and Karl Hogl Contributing authors: David Humphreys and Christoph Wildburger Abstract: From the existing full set of international policy instruments on forests, eight core components are identified and submitted to two differing assessments. The first (consistency assessment) uses a policy design approach to match the core components with their goals, policy tools, target group preferences and justifications for the choice of goals and policy tools.The second (compatibility assessment) examines the institutional inter-linkages of the core components. Both assessments reveal a series of challenges for international forest governance that can, however, be turned into opportunities. It is proposed that the coordination of and cooperation between the representatives of forest and non-forest users be strengthened at the national, regional and international levels, under the shared overarching idea of sustainable forest management, by means of ‘forests+’ policies. Forests+ policies go beyond the forest sector and acknowledge both the inter-sectoral character of forest policymaking and the importance of international regimes that have a decisive impact on forests but for which forests are not the main focus of attention. Keywords: International forest regime, international forest governance, international policy instruments on forests, international forest policy, policy design approach, institutional inter-linkages, hard and soft law on forests, REDD+, forests+ policies. ■3.1 Introduction involve substantial policymaking for the sustainable development of forests and people.Chapter 2 gives a synopsis of the existing set of In order to assess the role of a core componentinternational forest governance arrangements (the in international forest governance arrangements, two‘international forest regime complex’), which is a questions are addressed. The first is: Are the inter-hybrid mix of hard, soft and private international nal goals coherent and the means to achieve themlaw. These arrangements are highly fragmented and consistent? To interrogate this question the policycharacterised by a multiplicity of state and non-gov- design approach is applied. This theoretical approachernmental actors and institutions. In these respects matches the core components with their goals, policythey resemble the larger set of international envi- tools, target group preferences and justifications forronmental governance arrangements, of which they the choice of goals and policy tools. Since the coreform a significant part. For the sake of reducing com- components pursue different goals, a second ques-plexity, this chapter identifies a subset of the forest tion arises: Are the relationships between the coregovernance arrangements as core components of the components neutral, synergistic or conflicting? Thisfull set of international policy instruments on forests. question is answered by examining the institutionalAlthough they pursue different goals, such as sustain- inter-linkages of the core components. In addressingable forest management (SFM), the enhancement both questions, the potential of these core compo- 37of forest biodiversity and the mitigation of climate nents to take on a more deliberative role in coordinat-change by reducing deforestation and forest degrada- ing global forest governance is analysed.tion, the core components all deal with forests and all The chapter is divided into four sections. TheEMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

3 CORE COMPONENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL... core components are identified in section 3.2. As This selection is intended to be neither exhaustive there are both legally binding and non-legally bind- (due to constraints in space and capacity) nor defini- ing core components, the advantages and disadvan- tive. However, it was not challenged by the GFEP in tages of this aspect are discussed in general terms in subsequent sessions. section 3.3. Section 3.4 assesses the individual core The core components can be grouped into legally components by means of the policy design approach binding instruments (‘hard’ law) and non-legally and section 3.5 assesses the compatibility of the core binding instruments (‘soft’ law). The relationship components. The key findings of both assessments between hard law and soft law has great practical rel- on the challenges and opportunities for global forest evance to the international forest regime complex. governance are presented in section 3.6. 3.3 Advantages and disadvan- 3.2 Identification of the core tages of hard and soft law components The international norms and rules that have been The Global Forest Expert Panel (GFEP) defined the developed as tools of global governance can be core components of the international forest gover- placed on a continuum from traditional top-down, nance arrangements as international multilateral hierarchical hard-law treaties to the vaguest volun- intergovernmental treaties and agreements which tary soft-law mechanisms (Karlsson-Vinkhuysen and directly address forests, either focusing on SFM or Vihma 2009). In the forest sector, there exist hard- more specific goals, such as biodiversity conserva- law regulations with (e.g. WTAs) and without (e.g. tion or climate change mitigation; and have achieved, CBD) legal sanctions as well as a variety of soft-law or have the potential to achieve, significant effects agreements characterised by a lack of legal sanc- on forests. GFEP members generally agreed on the tions. The most important international examples of policy measures crucial for resolving economic, the latter are the Non-Legally Binding Authorita- ecological and social conflicts in forests that have a tive Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus transboundary or ‘international commons’ compo- on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable nent. There is, however, no inter-subjective approach Development of All Types of Forests (known as the for judging the significance of any given measure Forest Principles) and the NLBI (Auer et al. 2005). at a global level. Therefore, at its first meeting in The failure at the state-to-state level to successfully December 2009 in Vienna the GFEP agreed to leave negotiate an international convention on forests has this decision to a sub-group*, which subsequently no doubt paved the way for the emergence of ‘soft’, proposed the following eight policy instruments as voluntary processes such as certification. core components of the international forest regime complex: ● Non-legally Binding Instrument on All Types 3.3.1 Definition of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law of Forests (NLBI) ● International Tropical Timber Agreement Definitions of hard law tend to focus on authority. (ITTA) According to Abbott and Snidal (2000), hard law ● forest certification schemes relies primarily on the authority and power of the ● world trade agreements (WTAs) state. This point is also emphasised by Kirton and ● forest law enforcement, governance and trade Trebilcock (2004: 9), who state that hard law relies (FLEGT) “primarily on the authority and power of the state – ● Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in the construction, operation, and implementation, ● Convention on International Trade in Endan- including enforcement, of arrangements at interna- gered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) tional, national, or sub-national level”. Accordingly, ● the climate change regime. the essence of hard law is legally binding obligation. Three dimensions are sometimes considered when evaluating the ‘hardness’ of legal commitments: pre- cision, obligation and delegation (of authority) (Ab- bott and Snidal 2000). Each of these dimensions may vary considerably in different national settings.38 *) The sub-group comprises the following GFEP members: Various authors have explored the role of soft-law Samuel Assembe-Mvondo, Benjamin Cashore, Steven Bern- approaches and standard-setting, not least in the for- stein, Peter Glück, David Humphreys, Karl Hogl and Jeremy est sector. Some regard soft-law approaches as con- Rayner. troversial, as formal international law remains largely EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

3 CORE COMPONENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL...absent and competing standards strive for dominance precursor and proving ground for hard law and can(Cashore 2002; Cashore et al. 2004, 2005; Kirton and therefore be a useful intermediate step towards hard-Trebilcock 2004). Nonetheless there is agreement that law commitments (Tollefson 2004). Soft law cansoft law at the global level extends downward from strengthen hard law by enhancing implementation,the commanding, highly legalised heights of hard and ambitious norms can be achieved more easilylaw to embrace specialised agencies of the United in soft-law settings than in legally binding ones (Sk-Nations (UN) and the non-binding Forest Principles, jaerseth et al. 2006). In some circumstances (e.g. for-voluntary standards and forest certification. As a legal est certification), soft-law norms can be more preciseconcept, soft law can be broadly defined as “rules of than those of hard law (e.g. Cashore 2002; Cashoreconduct which, in principle, have no legally binding et al. 2005). This suggests that soft law could haveforce but which nevertheless have practical effects” a comparative advantage in producing new regimes(Mörth 2004: 6); it is located “in the twilight between with innovative principles and norms, while hardlaw and politics”(Thürer 2000). A somewhat more law can be used to add the effective enforcementactor-oriented definition is supported by Kirton and mechanisms over time.Trebilcock (2004: 9), who state that soft law “relies Nonetheless, the soft-law approach comes withprimarily on the participation and resources of non- its own challenges. Soft law can lead to uncertaintygovernmental actors in the construction, operation, because actors remain unclear about the costs ofand implementation of a governance arrangement”. compliance (or their absence). Collaborative, ‘softer’The essence of these definitions is that soft law can be processes can also be time-consuming and costly,classified procedurally as non-legally binding rules and democratic participation might be compromisedand that it comes in many varieties. The meaning when particular stakeholders are excluded. Becauseof soft law and its applicability must therefore be of the lack of legal sanctions, a certain amount ofconsidered contextually; the boundaries between voluntary compliance is needed, and the question of‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law are, in practice, often blurred legitimacy, especially in practical applications (e.g.and difficult to differentiate. forest certification), remains unclear (Bernstein and Cashore 2004; Kirton and Trebilcock 2004; Tollef- son 2004).3.3.2 Positive and negative traits of This suggests that securing sustainability requireshard-law and soft-law policy a flexible and open use of instruments, both hard and soft. Given the complexity and multiple causesinstruments of current global forest problems, a portfolio of all available policy instruments should be applied, tak-Even though command-and-control steering has ing advantage of mutually supportive steering instru-sometimes succeeded in dampening environmental ments, processes, organisations and actors in the in-destruction, it has limitations as a solution to com- ternational arena and taking into account differencesplex, systemic environmental problems such as cli- in national policy contexts. According to this view,mate change or the decline of biological diversity. hard law and soft law should be seen as complementsHard law can be rigid, slow and inflexible to changes rather than competitors because they serve differentin society and often involves a non-inclusive, top- purposes – as long as soft law does not crowd outdown approach that favours bureaucratic, hierarchi- hard law when the latter is necessary.cal systems (Gunningham and Grabosky 1998). Inspecific contexts hard law has direct advantages tosofter approaches, offering the legitimacy, the strong 3.4 Consistency assessmentsurveillance and enforcement mechanisms and theguaranteed resources that soft law often lacks. Hard- 3.4.1 Policy design approachlaw instruments are also often subject to more thor-ough negotiation and preparation which, unless The policy design approach allows the analyst tosubstantive targets have been watered down, make deconstruct a policy output into a set of attributes andbehavioural change and problem-solving more likely to reconstruct and assess the ‘intervention logic’ of a(Skjaerseth et al. 2006). programme (deLeon 1990; Linder and Peters 1984; The soft-law approach offers many advantages. Schneider and Ingram 1997; Weimer 1992). On thisOptimistic authors argue that soft law has value in basis the core components of the international forestmaking and enforcing new norms and standards and regime complex are assessed here by matching theas an effective means for direct civil-society partici- core components with the attributes of the policypation in global governance (cf. Kirton and Trebil- design approach. The attributes are as follows: 39cock 2004). In particular, it is claimed that soft lawhas greater flexibility with respect to participationand sectoral emphasis. Soft law can also serve as aEMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

3 CORE COMPONENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL... ● policy goals; est policies in developing countries (Dimitrov et al. ● policy tools – the means proposed to achieve the 2007). In 1997 the United States officially switched desired ends; from a stance that was pro a forest convention to a ● the preferences and behaviours of internal target stance that was opposed to one. In the subsequent groups – the public or private actors (e.g. states) Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF), which responsible for implementing the instruments; convened from 1997 to 2000, Brazil and the United ● the preferences and behaviours of external target States led an anti-treaty coalition with the effect that groups – those actors whose behaviour the forest delegates decided to forego a legally binding instru- policies intend to influence (e.g. forest users and ment. Instead, they established another forum for consumers of forest products); non-binding discussions, the UN Forum on Forests ● rationales – the expressed justifications for the (UNFF), which, according to Dimitrov et al. (2007: choice of goals and policy tools, including the 243), “they explicitly deprived of a policymaking causal beliefs that underpin them and the theoreti- mandate”. cal connections between attributes. There are several possible explanations for the failure of negotiations on a worldwide forest con- By reviewing these attributes of the core components vention. Lipschutz (2001) argues that national for- of the international forest regime complex it is pos- est practices can be regulated through trade instru- sible to determine the extent to which the policy goals ments because they directly relate to commerce. of each component are internally coherent; the policy Humphreys (2006) sees the main reason for the tools chosen to achieve the goals are consistent with non-regime in the prevailing anti-regulatory prin- each other; and the policy instruments themselves ciples of neo-liberalism, global capitalism and free conform to the general preferences of the interna- trade. Dimitrov et al. (2007) point to the absence of tional target groups. reliable scientific knowledge about the transboundary impacts of deforestation and forest degradation and also suggest that unilateral forest policies can 3.4.2 Non-Legally Binding Instrument effectively address forest-related issues internally. on All Types of Forests Davenport (2005) uses an economic analysis to argue that the United States ceased to support a convention because it perceived that the economic costs of doing The international forest deliberations so would exceed the economic benefits. The Forest Principles lay the foundations for two The NLBI is the latest international soft-law agree- principles that have since dominated negotiations on ment on forests, the first being the Forest Principles forests and which are also part of the NLBI: (i) the and Chapter 11 of Agenda 21, both of which were sovereign right of nation states to exploit their for- agreed at the UN Conference on Environment and De- est resources according to their own environmental velopment (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. policies, linked to the responsibility to avoid trans- The lack of a hard-law instrument since UNCED boundary harm; and (ii) the sustainable management is particularly remarkable given that several states, of forest resources and forest lands to meet the social, including the United States of America, proposed economic, ecological, cultural and spiritual needs of the negotiation of a global forest convention in the present and future generations. In addition, the NLBI preparatory negotiations for UNCED between 1990 contains the principle of common but differentiated and 1992. At the time of UNCED, a legally binding responsibilities of states, as also set out in Principle forest regime was regarded by many developed states 7 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and De- as desirable because it would have the potential to velopment and Article 3.1 of the UN Framework improve the collective welfare of participants by re- Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). ducing the adverse transboundary consequences of deforestation and forest degradation. Malaysia and other developing countries, however, refused to ne- Focus on national forest programmes gotiate a convention, referring to their sovereign right to exploit their forests (Davenport 2005; Humphreys Under the overarching goal of SFM, the NLBI estab- 1996). In 1993, however, Malaysia became one of lishes objectives and policies to promote SFM at the the leading proponents of a convention that would international, regional and national levels. Together compensate tropical forest states for the opportunity with its associated work programme, the NLBI pre- costs of implementing SFM. Nevertheless, in the scribes and gives guidance for the implementation40 aftermath of UNCED, the Intergovernmental Panel of four global goals set out in UNFF Resolution on Forests (IPF), which convened from 1995 to 1997, 2007/40 of 17 October 2007. The global goals are could not agree on either the need for a convention (cf. chapter 2): (i) reverse the loss of forest cover; (ii) or financial assistance for the implementation of for- enhance forest-based economic, social and environ- EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

3 CORE COMPONENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL...mental benefits; (iii) increase significantly the area of 3.4.3 International Tropical Timberprotected forests worldwide and other areas of sus- Agreementtainably managed forests, as well as the proportionof forest products from sustainably managed forests; The International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA)and (iv) reverse the decline of official development is actually a series of agreements that follows a speci-assistance for SFM. fied cycle. The first ITTA was signed in 1983 and In order to achieve these goals the NLBI recom- entered into force in 1985. A second ITTA was ne-mends that member states apply a mix of regulatory, gotiated in 1994 and entered into force in 1997. Afinancial and information policy tools with a distinct third ITTA was agreed in 2006.focus on national forest programmes (NFPs) based According to Article 1 of the ITTA, 2006, theon criteria and indicators for SFM. NFPs are a com- main goal of the Agreement is “to promote the ex-monly agreed but novel framework for SFM which pansion and diversification of international trade inis applicable to all countries and to all types of for- tropical timber from sustainably managed and le-est. NFPs strive to render politics on forests more gally harvested forests and to promote the sustainablerational, more oriented to the long term, and better management of tropical timber producing forests”.coordinated (Glück et al. 2003). To achieve this goal, a mix of economic and informa- The rationale for using NFPs to pursue the tion policy tools are used, focusing on, among otherNLBI’s four global goals at the national level is, in things, the promotion of sustainable developmentprinciple, to make states accountable to other states and poverty alleviation, the improvement of forestfor the implementation of their NFPs (Humphreys law enforcement and governance, the encouragement2004). As the NLBI is a form of soft law, however, of forest certification, and the promotion of tropicalno state has any obligation at all to take action that timber and non-timber forest products. The underly-is consistent with it. ing rationale is to provide information and positive The influence of the proposed tools, in particu- incentives rather than sanctions. For this purposelar NFPs on member states (internal target groups) ITTA gathers tropical timber-producing and con-depends on these states’ preferences and behaviour sumer countries around the same table. The ITTAtowards forests. Conditions for the formation and creates the International Tropical Timber Organiza-updating of NFPs are more favourable in states with tion (ITTO), which comprises two groups of mem-a participatory policy style (Glück and Voitleithner bers – tropical timber ‘producer’ member countries2002) because NFP processes require the establish- and tropical timber ‘consumer’ member countries.ment and maintenance of a climate of mutual trust in The highest authority of ITTO is the Internationalwhich participants (external target groups) are pre- Tropical Timber Council, which consists of all thepared to remain at the negotiation table and to regard members of the Organization. ITTO is responsiblethe dialogue on forest-related issues as an iterative for the administration of the ITTA.and open-ended process (Glück et al. 2005). Such aclimate allows all actors with a stake in forests to beembraced, not only within the forest sector but also Tropical timber trade versus SFMbeyond it. However, empirical evidence suggests thatthe success of the process depends on factors such The ITTA, 1994, was the first international legallyas land tenure, legal regulations, financial incentives binding instrument to use ‘sustainable forest man-and political culture (Glück et al. 2003; Humphreys agement’ terminology. In this respect, Humphreys2004). (2004) argues that the evolution of the ITTA can To sum up, the NLBI strengthens the principle of be attributed not only to the members but also, tonational sovereignty and allocates the responsibility some extent, to the influence of non-governmentalfor achieving global objectives i–iii to member states. organisations (NGOs) on ITTO.It recommends NFPs, which represent a paradigm ITTO cannot be understood without examiningshift in forest policy from traditional to new forms of its voting structure, which critics argue has oftengovernance; they work best in states where the sup- stymied normative change. It is based on the pro-porting conditions of new governance already exist. ducer and consumer groups, each of which has aSimultaneously, NFPs could provide the backbone total of 1000 votes. The votes of individual consumerfor implementing an international legally binding members are decided on the basis of their share ofinstrument on forests, should one be agreed (Glück tropical timber imports, while the votes of individualet al. 1997; Humphreys 2004). Regarding the ac- producer members are decided by a complex for-complishment of global objective iv, it remains to mula that takes into account each member’s share ofbe seen whether member states are able to mobil- tropical timber exports and its forest area. Among the 41ise new financial resources from their own or other producer members, the first 400 votes are reservedsources. equally for countries from Africa, Asia-Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean. Another 300 votesEMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

3 CORE COMPONENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL... are divided between producer members on the ba- on improving forest management in other countries, sis of their relative share of tropical forest cover. since certification appeared less likely to being ruled The final 300 votes are apportioned according to illegal under the General Agreement on Tariffs and the average of the values of each producer member’s Trade (GATT; Bartley 2003). net exports of tropical timber during the previous three years. It is often argued by some environmental NGOs that this voting structure, which is used Two approaches to forest certification by the International Tropical Timber Council when making decisions, limits the promotion of SFM be- Two main approaches to forest certification have cause while forest size is a consideration, most votes emerged. The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) are allocated according to a country’s share in the was launched in 1993 by a coalition of business and international tropical timber trade. non-governmental actors seeking to advance the goal Nevertheless, ITTO has developed a series of of improving forest management worldwide (Elliott SFM tools and technical norms which it places at 2000; Elliott and Schlaepfer 2001; Gulbrandsen the disposal of its member countries. The important 2004; Synnott 2005). The FSC coordinates an array methodological tools developed by ITTO include of independent certification activities, including the management guidelines, principles, criteria and in- Rainforest Alliance’s SmartWood programme and dicators for SFM (ITTO 2006). ITTO also plays an attempts by retailers and publishers to trace and en- important role as a sponsoring body by financing sure the sustainability of their fibre supplies. The projects and studies in various tropical-timber pro- FSC is governed by a general assembly that since ducer member countries towards the goals of pro- 1996 has comprised three membership chambers – moting the timber trade and SFM. To some extent, social, environmental and economic – each holding the effectiveness of this instrument can be judged one-third of voting rights, with geographical bal- by its impact on the behaviour of its members. In ance between the global north and south ( FSC 1999; an assessment of the progress that had been made Synnott 2005). Day-to-day operations are run by a towards SFM in tropical forests since the first such secretariat, which reports to an elected nine-member assessment in 1988, the former Executive Director board and carries out the membership’s directives of ITTO states: “The data indicate that significant and the board’s strategic plans. progress has been made since 1988 towards the sus- A second approach to certification is the develop- tainable management of natural tropical forests, but ment of country-level certification schemes, which the extent of such progress remains far from satisfac- emerged to pre-empt regulation and in reaction to the tory” (ITTO 2006: 3). FSC, which many forest companies, forestland owners and governments saw as a threat because of its standards and the decision-making power it granted to social and environmental interests (Cashore et al. 3.4.4 Forest certification schemes 2004, 2006; Ghazali and Simula 1996; Gulbrandsen 2004). Country-level programmes were also endorsed Forest certification emerged in the 1980s as an by an ITTO-commissioned report, which concluded economic policy tool for ensuring SFM at the man- that an international forest certification programme agement unit level amid increasing concern about was unnecessary given the small proportion of tim- global forest degradation and questions about the ber entering global trade (Poore 2003). This support effectiveness of boycotts and intergovernmental and the above-noted emphasis on NFPs following processes in tackling the problem (Cabarle et al. UNCED (Elliott 2000: 50; Humphreys 1996: 138) 1995; Poore 2003). ITTO’s unwillingness to sup- were the foundations of numerous national certifica- port NGO proposals for a sustainable timber labeling tion initiatives. system led a coalition of actors to conclude that such Many of these country-level initiatives were a system would operate better as a private initiative consolidated as a global substitute for the FSC, par- (Gale 1998; Humphreys 1996: 74–75). This opinion ticularly after 2002 when the Programme for the En- strengthened as preparatory meetings for UNCED dorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC), which was ended the hopes of developed countries for a binding established (as Pan European Forest Certification) in forest convention. All the while interest was growing 1998, broadened its acceptance criteria (Auld 2009: in finding positive incentives for improved manage- 268). The PEFC is governed by a general assembly ment rather than the negative incentive of boycotts, comprising representatives of endorsed national which some argued exacerbated forest degradation schemes, with voting power ranging from one to42 by inducing shifts to other land-uses, such as agri- four votes on the basis of members’ annual harvest culture (Cabarle et al. 1995; Varangis et al. 1993). volumes. By early 2010, 34 schemes held PEFC Finally, certain governments saw certification as a membership, 28 of which were officially endorsed by policy tool that could substitute for legislation intent the PEFC. Initially, supportive organizations could EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

3 CORE COMPONENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL...be extraordinary members (with no voting rights). In certified content (Synnott 2005). Gradual changesNovember 2009 the PEFC introduced membership have reduced the percent-thresholds and introducedfor international stakeholders with the same rights new rules for acceptable non-FSC content, such asas national-scheme membership but only one vote recycled content (Auld 2006; Cashore et al. 2004;per member; in aggregate, the vote of international FSC 2004; Meidinger 2006). Tracking requirementsstakeholders cannot exceed 50% of the assembly’s under the PEFC are now very similar to those of thetotal votes. A 2–10 member elected board, supported FSC, permitting either physical separation or per-by a secretariat, oversees the PEFC’s overall opera- centage methods and specifying similar procedurestions (PEFC 2009). to exclude controversial sources, particularly illegal timber (PEFC 2005). To ensure credible claims, both programmes require applicant operations be certi-Standards-setting and auditing fied by an independent inspection audit. However, oversight of these certifiers, known as accreditation,As policy tools, both the FSC and the PEFC tar- does differ between the two programmes. The FSCget forest-product companies and forestland own- initially performed accreditation itself, but in 2006ers along the market’s supply chain (external target it created an independent organization, Accredita-groups) with the aim of influencing and improving tion Services International, to provide this serviceforest management. To do this, the programmes set (Auld 2009). In contrast, PEFC schemes rely on thestandards for the social and/or environmental impacts accreditation services provided by state-sanctionedof the production and manufacturing processes and bodies (Meidinger 2006).require product-tracking through to the final consum-er. The FSC’s standards are specified at two levels.Its international principles and criteria cover, amongother things, tenure and use rights and responsibili- 3.4.5 World trade agreementsties; indigenous peoples’ rights; community relationsand workers’ rights; the use of forest products and The post-Second World War international trade re-services; maintaining biodiversity and high-conser- gime has the broad goal of advancing trade liberal-vation-value forests; forestry planning, monitoring ization. The rationale for this goal is the belief thatand assessment; and the planning and management a rule-based, predictable agreement on trade is in theof plantations. Indicators and verifiers are developed interest of all due to its benefits in enhancing growthlocally through national (or sub-national) stakeholder and welfare. As a result, talks among states haveprocesses and must be endorsed by the FSC board. long focused on this broad policy goal. After failedIn regions without endorsed standards, an accredited attempts to form an International Trade Organizationcertifier may develop a ‘generic’ assessment standard through the Havana Charter (UN 1948), attention(Evison 1998). Requirements for this process have shifted to GATT, which was signed by 23 contract-recently been updated to increase transparency and ing parties (internal regulatory targets) in Octoberstakeholder engagement (FSC 2009). 1947. This agreement was superseded by GATT 1994 Under the PEFC, schemes must develop local and the creation of the World Trade Organizationstandards that fit within the structure of the relevant (WTO), which commenced operations on 1 Januaryintergovernmental criteria-and-indicator definitions 1995 after the eight-year Uruguay Round negotia-of SFM. The process must be open to relevant parties, tions (WTO 2008; Barbier 1996). At its formationalthough forestland owners are considered the appro- the WTO had 123 contracting parties (‘members’)priate initiator of a standards-setting process (PEFC and the liberalization agenda included anti-dumping2006). Both the FSC and the PEFC cover similar formeasures, non-tariff barriers, services, and intellec-est management issues, although the FSC generally tual property rights (WTO 2008). As a policy tool,has more stringent requirements and restricts certain the WTO introduced a stronger dispute settlementactivities, such as the use of genetically modified procedure, with binding decisions and a need fororganisms, that are permitted by PEFC schemes. consensus among members to annul a settlement de-Variations within the FSC and PEFC programmes cision, which supplanted the past approach where amake blanket comparisons difficult (McDermott et single party could block it. Parties to the dispute areal. 2008, 2009). also allowed to appeal for a review by the Appellate To provide incentives for participation, both the Body (Article 17, Annex 2) (Rao 2000). Together,FSC and the PEFC have on-product labels to en- these changes have given judicial decisions more in-able product differentiation and possible price pre- fluence over the development of trade law, especiallymiums, although in practice premiums have been since normal negotiations have slowed as developing 43less widespread than some hoped for or expected countries have gained bargaining power (Goldstein(Overdevest and Rickenbach 2006). The FSC be- and Steinberg 2009: 219–221).gan by only labeling products with 100% FSC-EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

3 CORE COMPONENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL... Relevance to forest product trade if a TBT complaint is ever raised (Auld et al. 2008; Bernstein and Hannah 2008). GATT 1994 includes several policy tools relevant to The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary the trade of forest products. The Uruguay Round ush- and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures, also a product ered in significant commitments to tariff reductions of the Uruguay Round, seeks to eliminate protec- (WTO 2008). Developed-country members com- tionist and unscientific restrictions guised as poli- mitted to reducing tariffs on most forest products, cies aiming to protect against invasive species, pests with a complete phasing out of tariffs on pulp and and pathogens (WTO 1998). SPS measures received paper products in 8–10 years. Some members also limited attention before the Uruguay Round, which committed to eliminating tariffs on furniture imports allowed countries to create complex barriers to im- and there was a general agreement to reduce tariff ports justified as SPS measures and led to frequent escalation (the practice of setting higher tariffs for trade disputes (Barbier 1996). manufactured versus primary products). Additional One such dispute arose over the pinewood nema- commitments were made to replace preferential tode. Acting on fears that this pest would infect Eu- treatment for certain countries (most-favoured-nation ropean forests, the European Community banned the status) with bound tariff rates – a ceiling rate that if import of softwood lumber from Canada, the United exceeded would justify retaliatory trade sanctions States, Japan and China unless heat-treated or kiln- (Barbier 1996). dried and accompanied by a government-approved The Uruguay Round also introduced the Agree- phytosanitary certificate, a restriction considered ment on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), which by many softwood producers to be a non-tariff bar- extended an agreement on the issue reached by 33 rier (Cohen et al. 2003). The SPS agreement aims GATT contracting parties in the late 1970s (WTO to address these disputes. It calls for, among other 2005). The TBT seeks to eliminate technical regu- things, the harmonisation of standards, encouraging lations – mandated rules for product size, design or members to work within the Codex Alimentarius and other characteristics – and associated standards that the framework of the International Plant Protection serve protectionist aims, parsing these from rules Convention to advance international standards on with legitimate aims such as the prevention of illegal SPS measures (Article 3.5). or deceptive practices and the protection of environ- With both the TBT and SPS agreements, mem- mental and human health (Barbier 1996). With these bers have responsibility for ensuring that sub-national legitimate goals, the TBT requires member states governmental bodies and non-governmental bodies to develop policies that are non-discriminatory and are compliant (external target groups). This, too, has least trade-restrictive (Article 2.2) and to notify and raised questions about how voluntary forest certifica- consult when developing new technical regulations tion schemes will be viewed in relation to these re- (Article 2.9), giving flexible timelines for enforce- quirements (Bernstein and Hannah 2008; Rotherham ment where appropriate (Articles 2.10–2.12). It also 2003). The SPS agreement also presents challenges promotes harmonisation across technical regulations for the efforts of members to manage threats from (Article 2.6) and requires members states to use invasive species, pests and pathogens. The require- “relevant international standards” if they “exist or ment for a scientific risk analysis (Article 5) burdens their completion is imminent,” with some exceptions the importing country with generating and supplying where local circumstances would reduce effective- the scientific evidence to justify standards of pro- ness (Article 2.4). In the forest sector, many technical tection above those agreed internationally (Clarke regulations, such as building codes and grading rules, 2004). Existing trade law affects forest-products potentially fall under the TBT definition (Barbier trade in other ways. For example, the Agreement 1996). Yet it is still uncertain whether the TBT defini- on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures delineates tions (TBT Annex 1) will cover non-product-related acceptable subsidies and countervailing actions when production and processing methods, as advanced by unacceptable subsidies exist (WTO 2008). Canada certification schemes, or whether these standards used this agreement to challenge the countervailing will be covered by GATT’s requirements to treat measures of the United States in the most recent like products the same (Article III) and its general softwood lumber dispute (Zhang 2007). Beyond the exceptions for health and safety considerations (Ar- WTO, there are bilateral and regional trade agree- ticle XX) (Bernstein and Hannah 2008). The pos- ments, customs unions and common markets that sible applicability of the TBT to forest certification further affect the trade of forest products (Rao 2000). schemes is likely to remain unclear unless a WTO These are beyond the scope of this review. member brings a case against such schemes before44 a WTO dispute resolution panel. The provision requiring deference to existing or nearly completed international standards will also have relevance for considering how certification systems will be viewed EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

3 CORE COMPONENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL...3.4.6 Forest law enforcement, up systems and policy and technical tools to ensuregovernance and trade the proper application of the provisions of the VPA. The time factor is important because as a bilateral agreement between two subjects of international law,Although illegal forest practices are a global issue, VPAs must comply with domestic procedures put inmost progress in addressing them at an international place by governments for the ratification of similarlevel has been made in Europe. Historically, the basis international instruments, notably by tabling themfor the European Union (EU) Forest Law Enforce- before the national parliament. As of August 2010,ment, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan Congo, Ghana and Cameroon had signed VPAs. Theis the Council Resolution of 15 December 1998 on export authorization provided by VPAs is based ona “Forestry Strategy for the European Union”. This standards derived from the national laws and regula-non-binding instrument defines the policy basis for a tions of each partner tropical- timber-exporting coun-new forest strategy within the EU. However, the EU try. Thus, agreements focus mainly on environmentalFLEGT Action Plan has emerged as one of the main protection, rules governing the harvesting of species,thrusts of the EU Forest Action Plan 2007–2011, the payment of fees and taxes, conditions for timberwhich was adopted by the Council on 30 May 2005. processing, standards for the transportation of prod-The EU FLEGT Action Plan is an expression of pol- ucts, and local community rights.icy commitments made by the EU, its member states Strictly speaking, VPAs do not constitute anand producer partner countries within the framework international timber trade regime. First, their goalof the G8 Action Programme on Forests. It has led to is to combat illegal timber trade. In doing so theythe organisation of regional ministerial conferences may help reduce deforestation and protect some spe-on the application of forest laws, regulations and cies threatened with extinction due to overexploita-governance, with World Bank support (EFI 2009). tion. Second, VPAs differ from one another in both substance and procedure because their contents are based on diverse forest legislations (although the keyVoluntary partnership agreements principles of forest sustainability may be the same for all countries). Thus, they may also contributeThe overall goal of the EU FLEGT Action Plan is to the fragmentation of the rules governing interna-to promote good governance in the forest sector and tional timber trade. Third, the impact of any givento reduce deforestation by ensuring that European VPA on the fight against illegal forest exploitationcompanies buy timber only from producer (tropical) will be limited because, in line with the principlescountries that comply with the ecological, social and of international law, a bilateral agreement does noteconomic requirements stipulated in their own forest have a direct effect on non-parties (Daillier and Pel-laws. The plan therefore seeks to develop and pro- let 2002). In other words, the effect of VPAs willmote market security to ensure that only legally pro- be weak where tropical timber is traded by partiesduced timber is imported into the EU by encouraging not subject to a VPA. For example, it is difficult tofirms and consumers to pay the real cost of timber verify the origin of tropical timber used in a piece ofproduction in keeping with laws, rather than seeking furniture imported by a European consumer from aonly to minimise prices. For this purpose the EU is non-party. Compliance with forest legality is just onecurrently preparing voluntary bilateral agreements step in the long road to SFM; indeed, it constitutes(‘voluntary partnership agreements’ – VPAs) with a minimum requirement (Cerutti et al. 2008). In ef-countries that export tropical timber to its member fect, the verification of legality ensuing from VPAsstates as appropriate policy tools. The underlying alone may be inadequate if the desired objective isrationale is to ensure the rule of law. However, many to ensure sustainability. VPAs can still contribute tostakeholders involved in forest exploitation, such as the fight against illegal activities and deforestation,exporter and buyer companies, consumers, NGOs albeit in limited fashion.and local people, are concerned about the successful In an attempt to pre-empt certain weaknesses inor failed implementation process of VPAs. Although the FLEGT/VPA approach, the EU has decided toVPAs are considered voluntary for export countries, supplement it by adopting a special illegal timberthey commit the EU and signatory countries to con- regulation. This regulation, which is currently un-tributing to the improvement of forest governance der preparation, is expected to help tropical timberby establishing efficient systems for regulating forest importers to reduce the risks of illegality in theirpractices and for tracing timber and its by-products, international transactions, imposing on them theand issuing authorisation/licensing schemes for tim- obligations of resources, results and accountability.ber exports to EU countries (EFI 2009). The EU’s illegal timber regulation will have a similar 45 After signing a VPA, the two parties (i.e. the EU effect to the Lacey Act in the United States, whichand a tropical- timber-exporting country) have a pe- was amended in 2008 to (among other things) pro-riod of time (a “transitional phase”) in which to set hibit commerce in plants, including timber products,EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

3 CORE COMPONENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL... that are harvested illegally in any country. Under the goals into sectoral or cross-sectoral policies, facili- Lacey Act, importers must declare the species and tated by consultative mechanisms for implementa- origin of harvest of all plants. Penalties for viola- tion, monitoring, evaluation and periodic revision tions include forfeiture of goods and vessels, and (UNEP/CBD 2002). The COP stresses that NBSAPs imprisonment. constitute a cornerstone of CBD implementation In short, the aim of current international and na- (ibid.). National formulation and implementation tional initiatives against illegal logging (VPAs and is supported by guidelines that provide procedural the Lacey Act, or other initiatives as well) are to rules and guiding objectives but leave broad areas hold not only states, but also the perpetrators and of discretion. No sanction mechanisms are provided major beneficiaries of economic crimes – such as for cases of non-compliance. multinational corporations accountable and liable As of May 2010, 170 of the 193 parties had defor illegal transactions. veloped NBSAPs (CBD Secretariat 2010), indicating considerable success in the spread of the strategy approach. However, progress in implementation 3.4.7 Convention on Biological has remained comparatively poor. In-depth reviews Diversity indicate that NBSAPs have been far less successful in effectively integrating the CBD’s objectives into national policies; they have also detected a lack of As noted in chapter 2, the CBD is built around three problem awareness, capacities, political commitment overarching and interrelated goals: i) the conserva- and horizontal and vertical coordination (UNEP/ tion of biological diversity; ii) the sustainable use of CBD 2007a, 2007b, 2007c). its components; and iii) the fair and equitable sharing Responsibility for the implementation of the of the benefits arising from the utilisation of genetic POW rests with the parties, who are expected to resources. The CBD was the first global agreement do so on a voluntary basis “in the context of their to address these three goals in an integrative man- national priorities and needs” (UNEP/CBD 2002). ner (Rosendal 2003). It also strives to reconcile the An in-depth review in 2006 indicated that national development imperatives of the developing countries implementation is often hampered by a range of ob- with the interests of developed countries in access- stacles, such as a lack of data and capacities, and ing and conserving biological diversity (cf. McGraw insufficient cross-sectoral coordination (UNEP/CBD 2002). In doing so the CBD rests on the principle 2007d). As a consequence, the COP requested the of the sovereign rights of states over their biological CBD’s Executive Secretary to increase collaboration resources, also reaffirming their sovereign authority with the UNFF Secretariat and members of the Col- to determine access to their resources (Article 15). laborative Partnership on Forests (CPF, see chapter The overarching goals are further defined by a 2) for more effective implementation (ibid.). number of more specific objectives, as set out in More generally, national implementation of CBD the Convention or agreed upon at meetings of the obligations is to be facilitated by global-level coordi- Conference of the Parties (COP) to the CBD: they nation mechanisms such as the Joint Liaison Group include goals to conserve ecosystems and viable of the Rio Conventions, the CPF and the Biodiversity populations of species through in-situ and ex-situ Liaison Group (cf. Wildburger 2009). Most of the conservation, to respect and preserve indigenous conventions and processes involved have been un- knowledge, and to cover developing countries’ in- der way for decades. However, the need to enhance cremental implementation costs (CBD Article 20). coordination is still high on the agenda, seemingly The parties to the Convention (states) comprise both indicating persistent coordination problems. the internal and external target groups of the CBD’s Another tool for facilitating implementation is major policy tools. The COP decides on obligations; national reporting (Article 26), which is the only responsibility for implementation rests largely with CBD mechanism for monitoring the national-level each individual party. implementation of NBSAPs and the POW. Reports are to be delivered at approximately three-year in- tervals, based on COP guidelines. Again, no sanc- A cross-sectoral strategy approach tioning mechanisms are provided for non-reporting. More importantly, no formalised review procedures In general terms, national biodiversity strategies, have been established to date, although aggregated plans or programmes (NBSAPs) and the programme reviews are discussed in meetings of the COP and of work (POW) on forest biological diversity, includ- national reports are made available online. Besides46 ing, in 2002, an expanded POW, are the main CBD regional workshops, few routines exist for facilitat- policy tools that directly address forests and forest ing mutual learning. The CBD seems to suffer from management. The Convention’s Article 6 requires a lack of institutionalised forums for learning from parties to develop NBSAPs that integrate the CBD’s national-level experiences. EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

3 CORE COMPONENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL... While the POW is necessarily more forest-cen- 3.4.8 Convention on Internationaltred than NBSAPs, the two policy tools are synergis- Trade in Endangered Species of Wildtic, with similar overarching goals; the POW can be Fauna and Floraseen as complementary to the thematically broaderNBSAPs. In fact, parties are urged to incorporate theobjectives and activities of the POW into NBSAPs CITES was signed in Washington, D.C., Unitedas well as into NFPs (COP Decision 6/22). States in 1973 and entered into force in 1975. The goal of this international legal instrument is to regulate the international trade in plant and animal spe-Demanding prerequisites cies which are threatened by overexploitation. CITES does not forbid trade in species but seeks to control itIt is clear from the design of NBSAPs and the POW through the institutionalisation of a system of permitsthat the CBD strongly relies on a voluntary, national- and certificates (policy tool) by member states. Thislevel, cross-sectoral and inclusive strategy and policy requires a system of authorisation to enhance theplanning approach for the integration of its goals into control of international trade in species listed in threenational forest policymaking. Overall, the CBD is appendixes, which distinguish between three levelsnot an instrument that, in a strict sense, regulates the of threat and corresponding rules, as follows:conduct of its target groups: obligations are impre-cise (i.e. there is ambiguity with respect to the con- ● Appendix I (Article 2 (1)), which includes theduct required) and there is no delegation of authority most endangered species, or those most affectedto third parties for interpreting and implementing by commercial activities. The trade in and exploi-the Convention. Although outwardly an example tation of these species is prohibited;of hard international law, the CBD elaborates soft ● Appendix II (article 2 (2)), which comprises twocommitments, illustrating the continuum between types of species: those that are not threatened buthard law and soft law described above. The underly- are likely to become so due to uncontrolled com-ing rationale of the CBD is that it needs national- mercial exploitation, and those whose trade is freelevel cross-sectoral policy learning, coordination in principle but which are subject to the systemand cooperation to achieve its various goals, which of control; andare concerned with a wide diversity of ecosystems, ● Appendix III, which includes species nominatedsectors and interests in various national contexts. by range states to help prevent their illegal or un-However, scholarly findings have shown that these sustainable exploitation. These species are pro-kinds of target-setting, inclusive and cross-sectoral tected by the regulations of member states.approaches are highly demanding (e.g. Jänicke andJörgens 2006). Hence, they frequently remain inef- The CITES appendices contain a large number offective: often, the use of biological resources is the forest species (Sand 1997), and certainly contributeproductive foundation of powerful sectors, which to the protection and sustainability of such species.tend to avoid the effective integration of environ- Very few tree species are listed in the CITES appen-mental concerns into their sectoral policies (e.g. by dices, partly because of controversies with economicrejecting the formulation of operational targets, time operators about the role of CITES in regulating theframes for implementation and monitoring proce- trade of economically valuable species. This situa-dures, or by promoting ‘business as usual’ targets; tion stems from controversies with economic op-ibid.). Moreover, they presuppose, among other erators of the sector about economically valuablethings, sufficient capacity and incentives for the en- species. Nevertheless, CITES certainly contributesgagement of actors, as well as the existence of an to the overall process of forest resources sustainabil-appropriate infrastructure of rights and information ity through the trade arrangements it has instituted(ibid.), transparent, accurate and problem-focused (Assembe-Mvondo 2008).information and, not least, high-ranking institutionalsupport. In many contexts, none of these prerequi-sites can be taken for granted. Administration of the licensing system The underlying rationale of the CITES licensing system is based on thorough monitoring of endangered species. In accordance with Article 9 of the Conven- tion, each member state (internal target group) is required to nominate a national management authority, 47 which administers the licensing system, and one or more scientific authority to provide guidance to the national management authority on the effects of tradeEMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

3 CORE COMPONENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL... on conservation status of the species in question. both carbon sinks and sources of carbon dioxide The national management authority is responsible emissions, the former by sequestering carbon through for implementing the Convention in a country and tree growth and the latter through deforestation and is the sole body which can grant import and export forest degradation (IPCC 2007). Correspondingly, permits and re-export certificates on behalf of that Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol specifies that “di- country. The implementation of CITES involves rect human-induced land-use change and forestry many external target groups, including NGOs (es- activities, limited to afforestation, reforestation and pecially TRAFFIC and the International Union for deforestation” (Decision 1/CP.3, 1997) may be used Conservation of Nature) and private companies. to partly meet the emission reduction commitments Proposals for the inclusion of timber species in of Annex I (developed) countries. The contentious Appendix II were made during the eighth and ninth issue of including forestry activities in developing sessions of the CITES COP (Wijnstekers 2003) but, countries as a policy tool to offset GHG emissions given the importance of the trade of these species, under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) they were hotly debated (Ruis 2001; Sand 1997). The was resolved during COP 7 (held in Marrakech in Preamble of Resolution 10.13 (COP 15) recognizes 2001). The CDM includes afforestation/reforestation that amendment proposals for the inclusion of timber (A/R) projects but – for both technical and political species should contain the maximum amount of bio- reasons – not avoided deforestation or degradation. logical and trade information on the taxon concerned While, in general, the CDM is considered a success and that such information could be obtained from in terms of the number of projects and volume of Cer- international organisations that have expertise related tified Emission Reductions (CER), it has been unsuc- to timber trade and/or forest management. The Reso- cessful in raising significant funds for A/R projects. lution also recognised the need to clearly define the As of May 2010, only 16 of the 2191 registered CDM parties and products mentioned in the interpretation projects are A/R projects (CDM 2010). of Appendices I, II and III. Moreover, member states were requested to report adequately on their annual trade in timber and to use agreed units of measure- High expectations for REDD+ ment. The obligation to submit reports enables the CITES Secretariat General to ensure monitoring and The Bali Action Plan, which was agreed at COP 13 control (Sand 2008). of the UNFCCC, proposes an additional policy tool CITES member states have underscored the need – the reduction of emissions from deforestation and to promote the sustainable management of various forest degradation (REDD). REDD, or REDD+ as timber species from different tropical regions traded now labeled, is a mechanism to create an incentive on the international market, including by creating a for forested developing countries to protect, better Timber Working Group at COP 9. It was noted that manage and wisely use their forest resources, thus some timber species are threatened with extinction contributing to the global efforts to limit climate owing to overexploitation and international trade. change. The underlying rationale of REDD+ is to Resolution 12.3 (COP 15) requires permits and make forests more valuable than alternative land- certificates to be issued for species included in Ap- uses – hence deterring deforestation and forest deg- pendices II and III with the annotation “designates radation – by creating a financial value for the carbon logs, sawn wood and veneer sheets”. For the specific stored within them (UN-REDD Programme 2010: 4). cases of trade in Percopsis Elata, Gonyxtylus spp., In return for avoiding emissions by reducing defor- Swietenia macrophylla, only sawnwood is subject estation and forest degradation, countries participat- to harvesting – export quotas. Resolution 14.4 (COP ing in REDD+ would receive payments for verified/ 14) is significant for timber species because it recom- certified emission reductions and removals, either mends and institutionalises cooperation between the through a market-based or fund-based mechanism, Executive Secretariat of CITES and ITTO concern- or a combination of these. ing international trade in tropical timber species. REDD+ is now ‘mainstreamed’ into climate change negotiations and debates. Yet progress on negotiations on REDD+ have been limited since 2007, except in a few areas such as local/indigenous rights 3.4.9 The climate change regime and monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) (cf. Decision 4/CP.15). Behind the broad support for The role of forests REDD+ are a number of unresolved controversies related to funding, integration into carbon markets,48 The goal of the UNFCCC is the mitigation of green- MRV requirements, reference levels (and ensuring house-gas (GHG) emissions and the adaptation of additionality), scale of implementation, perfor- ecosystems to climate change (Article 2). Forests mance criteria (e.g. emission-based vs stock-based play a key role in climate change because they are payments), the type of activities to be credited (e.g. EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

3 CORE COMPONENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL...reduced impact logging), and the rights of local/in- initiatives and – perhaps – the gradual inclusion ofdigenous communities (Angelsen 2008). REDD+ in national/regional compliance carbon mar- Developing the international REDD+ regime kets (Meridian Institute 2009).depends on the readiness of forested developing Despite the current bleak short-term prospectscountries (internal target groups) and will take time. for an all-inclusive post-2012 climate agreement,Most existing REDD+ activities are still in an initial REDD+ can achieve its main goal of reducing emis-phase: more than 40 countries are in the process of sions if it succeeds at two levels. At the interna-developing national REDD+ strategies, hundreds of tional level, sufficient funding must be mobilised anddemonstration activities are in the pipeline or on the sound mechanisms established to channel fundingground, and there are several large bilateral and mul- to REDD+ countries. At the national level, funds re-tilateral initiatives. Some countries have taken steps ceived for REDD+ must be used to undertake policyto initiate and implement large policy reforms, while reforms and create incentive mechanisms that deliveragreements that Norway has entered into with Brazil real emission reductions. Effective REDD+ policiesand Guyana are performance-based with payments must also be identified and designed. Institutions aredirectly linked to emission reductions (although not needed to manage the flow of information on changesto carbon markets). in forest carbon stocks (or proxies of that), and the flow of funding from domestic and international sources. Many actors will be seeking REDD+ rents,Future prospects and the successful implementation of REDD+ will hinge on good governance and domestically drivenAn initial vision of REDD+ as part of a market reforms.mechanism in a post-2012 climate agreement is un-likely to be realised in the short to medium term.In addition to the slow progress towards an overallclimate agreement, in particular on post-Kyoto emis- 3.4.10 Discussionsion reduction targets, many long-standing issuesare not yet satisfactorily resolved. Even if a new cli- As well as differences, the policy design approachmate agreement is not concluded (or if REDD is not revealed many commonalities between the core com-included in such an agreement), however, REDD+ ponents of the international forest regime complex,credits can potentially become an offset option in a although they target different aspects of forests. Com-future United States carbon market and integrated monalities can be found in the goals, policy tools andinto the EU’s existing emissions trading scheme. A rationales, and in the preferences and behaviours ofthird option for inclusion in a compliance carbon the internal and external target groups.market – a market where countries or companies The goals of the core components have in com-have been assigned a cap on emissions – would be mon that they aim to resolve forest issues in which ata broadening of the CDM but this has not yet been least two main sets of actors are involved: powerfulthe subject of negotiations. economic actors who use timber and other biologi- After the failure of COP 15 to reach consensus cal resources, and actors who share environmentalon a post-2012 climate agreement in Copenhagen in and social concerns. Sabatier and Jenkins-SmithDecember 2009, the REDD+ Partnership was formed (1999) call the normative commitments and causalby 58 Partner countries on 27 May 2010 in Oslo, perceptions across a subgroup of actors “policy coreNorway to complement and feed into the UNFCCC beliefs”. These are the fundamental glue of the indi-process. As a voluntary, non-legally binding frame- vidual subgroups (“advocacy coalitions”; ibid.) andwork for REDD+ efforts, the partnership aims to are difficult to modify. The high level of conflict be-mobilize further public funding, establish a database tween advocacy coalitions results in agreement onlyfor information exchange, and attempt to coordinate on generalised and vague goals in the formulation ofactivities. REDD+ is likely to develop as an umbrella policies (cf. Chapter 5). In the implementation phase,term for a large number of heterogeneous projects, powerful sectors use the ambiguity in the phrasingpolicy initiatives and funding mechanisms. Several of goals to advance their own interests. Consensus ismultilateral mechanisms have been established – no- most likely to be achieved only on some empiricallytably the UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing accessible elements (“secondary aspects”; ibid.) byEmissions from Deforestation and Forest Degrada- policy-oriented learning (e.g. Elliott 2000).tion in Developing Countries, the Forest Carbon Part- In almost all core components, soft policy toolsnership Facility, the World Bank’s Forest Investment prevail, even if their use is authorised by a legallyProgramme and the REDD+ Partnership – and will binding instrument. Among the examples identified 49provide some overall coordination. However, loosely in this chapter are the CBD and the ITTA. In contrast,coordinated national, bilateral and private efforts are the WTAs are endowed with the authority to enforcelikely to play a dominant role along these global strict rules for the liberalisation of trade, includingEMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

3 CORE COMPONENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL... changes to national law on pain of sanctions. In en- 3.5 Compatibility assessment vironmental policy, soft policy tools use a mix of economic and information means. In the cases of for- The core components of the international forest gov- est certification and REDD+, the focus is on positive ernance arrangements are not independent of each economic incentives to induce behavioural change other but, rather, intersect. ‘Institutional linkages’ are in forest users. The NLBI and the CBD target states politically significant connections between multiple, by means of national programmes, national strate- nominally separated institutions, including regimes gies and programmes of work in order to achieve (Young 1994). Four types of institutional linkage their multifaceted goals. The latter require a climate can be distinguished (ibid): (i) embedded, when re- of mutual trust to be effective and will fail if there gimes share a broader context of existing principles is a lack of problem awareness, capacity, political (e.g. the NLBI and CBD share the principle of state commitment and coordination. FLEGT relies on the sovereignty and both promote protected areas as a voluntary consent of timber-producing countries to conservation tool); (ii) nested, when one agreement uphold the rule of law in combating illegal forest is established under a wider framework agreement practices. CITES uses a licensing system for pro- (e.g. the Kyoto Protocol under the UNFCCC); (iii) tecting endangered tree species which, however, is clustered, when different functional arrangements determined not only by scientific knowledge but also are combined in comprehensive package deals (e.g. by powerful interests in the international trade of Joint Implementation and the CDM in the climate tropical timber. change regime); and (iv) overlapping, when the The rationales underlying each individual core functional scope of one regime protrudes into the component correspond to the goals of that core functional scope of others. Among these four types component and the policy tools to be applied. The of institutional linkage, overlapping regimes are de- justification for the trade rules of the WTAs is the cisive for the purpose of assessing the compatibility belief that predictable agreements on trade are in of the core components. the common interest of all. FLEGT tries to combat Selin and VanDeveer (2003) differentiate between illegal logging by ensuring the rule of law through functional and political overlaps. Functional over- VPAs. In contrast to the hard multilateral provisions laps exist in biophysical and socio-economic terms of the WTAs, however, FLEGT VPAs are bilateral and occur when a biophysical or socio-economic and voluntary. The use of financial incentives to pro- process in one issue area has consequences for an- mote SFM (such as the disbursement of aid for ITTO other. For example, new plantations of fast-growing projects, the promise held out by forest certification exotic species for carbon sequestration will help to schemes of growing market share, and the opportu- meet the objectives of the climate change regime but nity to receive financial returns for conserving rather may have negative ramifications for the objectives than converting forests under REDD+) is often justi- of the CBD. The clearfelling of forests for agricul- fied by empirical evidence that such incentives are tural production will help to promote food security more effective than coercive policies such as fines but will reduce both carbon-sink capacity and the and sanctions. New modes of governance such as the area of habitat available for biodiversity conserva- national programmes and strategies favoured by the tion. In political overlaps, the content and design CBD and the NLBI can enable the active participa- of one regime or the interests and capabilities of tion and involvement of manifold political actors regime actors affect the formation or operation of with different interests, values and power. In the another. This can be observed between various global process they can also promote cross-sectoral policy regimes and between global and regional regimes. learning, vertical and horizontal coordination, and The CPF can facilitate the management of some of cooperation. The CITES licensing system and much these overlaps but because it lacks executive power of the work of the UNFCCC operates on the basis it cannot manage them all. of scientific monitoring. Finally, overlaps can be synergistic, when two With the exception of forest certification, which institutions are mutually reinforcing; or conflictive, targets international supply chains, all core com- when the objectives of two institutions contradict ponents target national policy processes to achieve each other, hampering international cooperation and intended goals (cf. chapters 6 and 7). The outcomes problem-solving. An example of synergistic overlap of these efforts depend on whether an international is that between CITES and the CBD. While these policy instrument on forests increases governmen- two regimes have different emphases – CITES has tal concern, enhances the contractual environment a species-specific focus while the CBD applies at and increases national capacity (Keohane and Levy the level of ecosystems – each promotes nature con-50 1996). To determine the extent to which this occurs, servation, and the effective implementation of one empirically based research would be required. will likely promote the objectives of the other. Syn- ergistic overlaps also occur between the aims of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol on the one hand EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

3 CORE COMPONENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL... Table 3.1 Types of overlap between the core components Compatible norms Diverging norms Compatible rules I (e.g. CBD/NLBI) II (e.g. CBD/ITTA) Diverging rules III (e.g. CBD/UNFCCC-KP) IV (e.g. TBT/forest certification) Source: Rosendal (2001: 98)and those of the Vienna Convention for the Protec- Type III overlaps share compatible norms buttion of the Ozone Layer and the Montreal Protocol diverging rules, as is the case in the relationshipon Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer on the between the CBD and the UNFCCC and its Kyotoother. The reduction of chlorofluorocarbons (which Protocol. Both aim to reduce deforestation and forestare major greenhouse gases) under the Montreal Pro- degradation, but for different reasons. From a climatetocol contributes to the objectives of the UNFCCC. change perspective, plantations with uniform, fast-An example of overlaps that may be conflicting is the growing tree species would be the most efficient wayrelationship between the WTAs, which aim to further to ensure carbon sequestration. However, this mayliberalise international trade, and forest certification not be compatible with the objective of enhancingschemes, which aim to promote the trade of timber biodiversity (Rosendal 2001). In Type III overlaps,only from sustainably managed forests. some compromises may be necessary if the goals Rosendal (2001: 97) proposes a matrix that of all instruments are to be realised and collectivedistinguishes between “the norms generated by a welfare maximised.regime, and the explicit rules to which states may Type IV overlaps occur between regimes (e.g. thecommit themselves. Norms refer to the overall policy TBT and forest certification) in which both the normsobjectives and principles of a regime that tend to have and rules relating to an issue area diverge. Type IVlegitimacy among participating actors. Explicit rules overlaps may be assumed to represent the situationprescribe specified regulations for state behaviour in with the highest potential for conflict. Learning morethe implementation phase.” Norms and rules can be about such situations, however, requires additionalcompatible or diverging; thus, four types of overlap investigation that would go beyond the scope of thiscan be identified (Table 3.1). chapter. Rosendal (2001) proposes further research Type I shows a largely synergistic situation; on the potential interests behind diverging norms;among the core components the relationship be- they can be either policy core beliefs or secondarytween the CBD and CITES and between the CBD aspects in the sense of Sabatier and Jenkins-Smithand the NLBI are examples. With regard to the latter, (1999).there are synergies between the four NLBI objectives Regarding diverging rules, Rosendal (2001: 101)and the three CBD principles. Rosendal (2001: 98) distinguishes between regulatory (i.e. they refer topoints out that even though a synergistic situation explicit obligations) and programmatic (i.e. they re-provides a high degree of scope for exploiting syn- fer to enhancing knowledge in an issue area) rules.ergies between overlaps, this potential is not neces- The situation with the highest scope for conflict issarily tapped: “Overlap between two or more such an overlap between regimes with diverging normsinstitutions may result in significant double work relating to the core beliefs of an issue area and within terms of, for instance, national reporting. Type I diverging regulatory rules. “The other three typeswill not automatically give rise to synergies, unless of situations will be assumed to have a relativelythe parties establish some form of cooperation or higher potential for synergies, because learning andcoordination mechanisms”. In the case of the link- diffusion of policy ideas may give rise to compatibleages between the CBD and the NLBI, coordination solutions” (ibid.).may also be impeded by ideological convictions andcompetition between the bureaucracies. Type II overlaps are characterised by a relatively 3.6 Conclusionssynergistic situation with diverging norms and com-patible rules. An example is the relationship betweenthe CBD or the NLBI on the one hand and the ITTA This chapter identifies eight core components that areon the other, the principal goal of the latter being central to international forest governance arrange- 51to increase the international trade in tropical timber ments. Embedded within these core components –and promote the sustainable management of tropical which encompass a hybrid mix of hard, soft andtimber-producing forests. private international law on forests and forest-relatedEMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

3 CORE COMPONENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL... issues – are many different goals – some of which wide range of regulatory, economic and information are complementary and some of which are conflict- policy tools. Nevertheless, the different actors share ing – that reflect the various values of the political an overarching idea – SFM (cf. chapter 5), albeit not actors with a stake in forest conservation and use. always consistently. The broad and all-encompassing Given the complexity and multiple causes of current nature of SFM provides an opportunity to embrace all global forest problems, a portfolio of hard and soft actors with a stake on forests, not only those in the law should be applied. Hard and soft law should forest sector but also in other sectors at the national be seen as complements rather than competitors be- (e.g. those involved in NFPs), regional (e.g. those cause they serve different purposes – as long as soft involved in the Ministerial Conference on the Pro- law does not crowd out hard law when the latter is tection of Forests in Europe) and international (e.g. necessary. members of the CPF) levels with the aim of creating a The consistency and compatibility assessments climate of mutual understanding. The active engage- of the core components reveal a series of challenges ment of all actors is a precondition for integrating to international forest governance that can, however, SFM in other sectors by means of forests+ policies. be turned into opportunities. Although more research Forests+ acknowledges the inter-sectoral character is needed to comprehensively map the areas of over- of forest policymaking and the importance of in- lap, the compatibility assessment shows that many ternational regimes that have a decisive impact on overlaps between the core components are more forests but for which forests are not the main focus or less synergistic. This is certain the case for the of attention, such as those on biodiversity and climate relationship between the NLBI and the CBD and change. Nonetheless, forests+ is intended to retain, as therefore the preconditions exist for close coopera- the fundamental organising principle for the various tion between the UN Forum on Forests (responsible goals of global forest governance, the improvement for the implementation of the NLBI) and the CBD of forest conditions and forest livelihoods. Secretariat. There are many other synergistic rela- If deforestation and forest degradation are to be tionships between the core components, or at least slowed and, ultimately, halted, the main challenge parts of them (e.g. the adaptation of forests to climate that needs to be addressed is the dominance of pow- change is a goal shared by the NLBI and the climate erful economic actors who impede the integration of change regime) that merit coordinating around com- environmental and social concerns in almost all the mon strategies and work programmes. In addition core components. These actors are partly inside but to synergistic relationships there are also more or mainly outside the forest sector within the interna- less diverging overlaps, such as the legally unclear tional trade, agriculture, energy production, mining situation between the TBT and forest certification and infrastructure sectors. They make use of forests and the impacts of CDM-promoted monoculture for non-forest uses and are largely responsible for afforestation on biological diversity. Engaging the deforestation and forest degradation in developing various actors in dialogue, mediating among their countries. The policy tools applied in the past to goals and coordinating common activities could be reduce deforestation and forest degradation at the an additional responsibility of the CPF, although final national level are very likely to fail if the opportu- decision-making authority will continue to reside nity costs of foregone alternative socio-economic with the governing bodies of the various international benefits are not adequately compensated. Therefore, instruments. great hope is placed in REDD+. While REDD+ is, The core components of international forest in many respects, a new approach, to be effective governance differ from those found in many other its implementation on the ground must draw on the regimes (e.g. the trade regime) in that there is a wide decades of experience that have been gained in SFM variety of political actors with different interests, and forest conservation. Successful REDD+ imple- values and expectations who introduce different dis- mentation also requires forests+ policies that go be- courses to forest policy to legitimise their political yond the forest sector to influence the main drivers positions (cf. chapter 4). The core components are of deforestation and forest degradation. more diffuse than the trade regime and are administered by many bureaus and secretariats rather than by one organisation such as the WTO. It can be argued that this situation is not accidental, with a majority of the world’s states assigning more political will and resources to the objectives of the WTO relative to those of international environmental instruments.52 With no coordinated and coherent system of governance for forests equivalent to that of the WTO the bureaus and secretariats of forest-related instruments seek to achieve their various goals by means of a EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

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4 Discourses, actors and instruments in international forest governance Coordinating lead author: Bas Arts Lead authors: Marie Appelstrand, Daniela Kleinschmit, Helga Pülzl and Ingrid Visseren-Hamakers Contributing authors: Richard Eba’a Atyi, Thomas Enters, Kathleen McGinley and Yurdi Yasmi Abstract: Politics are not only about interests and institutions but discourses as well. Discourses are (dominant) ideas, concepts and categorisations in a society that give meaning to reality and that shape the identities, interests and preferences of individuals and groups.The assumption of this chapter is that forest discourses are constitutive to global forest politics. Three forest-related types of discourses are distinguished: meta discourses that relate to global economics, politics and culture; regulatory discourses that deal with the regulation and instrumentation of policy issues; and forest discourses that shape forest issues and policies in specific ways. On the basis of a scientific literature review, the main discourses within these three categories (meta, regulatory and forest discourses) as well as three regional forest discourses (Africa, Asia and Latin-America) are analysed.This analysis leads to a number of policy messages: (1) policy makers should try to understand and embrace discursive complexity (instead of artificially reducing it); (2) awareness of this discursive complexity improves global forest negotiations; (3) orchestrated collective action might lead to discursive change; and (4) there is a need for new, open, discursive arenas to improve global forest policymaking. Keywords: Global forest policy, meta discourse, regulatory discourse, forest discourse, discursive arenas. ■4.1 Introduction fies the dedication of a chapter on forest discourses in this report. This chapter shows that global discourses on for-It is generally accepted that the social and political ests have indeed shaped international policymakingsciences have undergone an “argumentative turn” over time and moreover that discursive change has(Fischer and Forrester 1993), meaning that, increas- gone hand-in-hand with policy change (Pülzl 2010).ingly, scientists are taking the roles of ideas and Moreover, it makes clear not only that discoursesdiscourse in political processes just as seriously as, shape the thoughts, actions and identities of peoplefor example, the roles of interests and institutions (although this often remains unacknowledged), but(Schmidt 2005). Words matter, as both mediums for also that political actors (try to) shape policy dis-and means of politics (Hajer 1995; Van den Brink courses strategically. In addition, policy discoursesand Metze 2006). Some scientists also claim that mediate choices of instrument (e.g. the neo-liberaldiscourses constitute politics, and hence, conceptu- discourse favours voluntary market instruments overally, have precedence over interests, institutions and state regulation). 57outcomes (Foucault 1994). Whatever one’s approach In daily usage, discourse is often equated to ‘mere(see Box 4.1 for an overview of the main discourse discussion’. The meaning of the concept in politicaltheoretical approaches), the argumentative turn justi- science, however, is very different. Hajer (1995: 44)EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

4 DISCOURSES, ACTORS AND INSTRUMENTS... for example, defines discourse as: 1960s. We distinguish three types of discourses: (i) meta discourses that relate to global economics, “An ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations politics and culture in general and that have affected that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a forest-specific discourses (Section 4.2); (ii) regula- particular set of practices and through which mean- tory discourses that deal with the regulation and ing is given to physical and social realities.” instrumentation of global issues, including forests (Section 4.3); and (iii) forest discourses that have This is just one of many definitions. In the broad shaped international forest governance arrangements review of literature on forest discourses presented (Section 4.4). For each type of discourse, the role of in this chapter, we discuss various discursive ap- actors in discursive dynamics is scrutinised (to the proaches and definitions. Yet Hajer’s definition offers extent that literature is available). In Section 4.3, the a broadly shared ‘anchor’ for discourse analysis. A dialectics between regulatory discourses and instru- forest discourse can be considered as a set of ideas ment choices in international forest governance are (e.g. ‘forests as carbon stocks’), concepts (e.g. ‘sus- also analyced. Finally, we draw some conclusions tainable forest management’ – SFM) and categorisa- on global forest discourse analysis in general and on tions (e.g. forests versus non-forests) that are created global forest policymaking in particular (4.5). Media and changed in forest-related social practices – such analysis however indicates that the global forest dis- as global forest policy or forest sciences – and which course is highly biased towards the Western world give meaning to forests as both physical and social (see Kleinschmit 2010) and we assume the same for phenomena. the scientific literature. Therefore, three text boxes Crucial for discourse theory is not whether such provide African, Asian and Latin-American perspec- ideas, concepts and categorisations are true or false tives (see boxes 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4). but that they exist – shaped by certain social practices In undertaking this study we generally followed to help make sense of the physical and social worlds. the ‘IPCC model’; that is, we reviewed and integrated It is also crucial that discourses are not considered the existing scientific literature on forest(-related) to be ‘objective givens’ but, rather, ‘historical con- discourses. Hence, readers should keep in mind that structs’ of language-in-use, societal norms, various this chapter does not present a discourse analysis but, types of knowledge (e.g. scientific, professional rather, a review of the literature on global forest(- and lay) and power mechanisms in a society over related) discourses. The basic method used for data long time frames (Fischer 2003; Fischer and For- collection and analysis, was a literature search based rester 1993). Hence, discourses are neither ‘objective on Google Scholar, Scopus and ISI Web of Sciences truths’ nor ‘false ideologies’ but exist at the interface using the key terms ‘global’, ‘forest’, ‘discourse’, of politics, science, values and knowledge. ‘policy’, ‘regime’, ‘actor’ and ‘instrument’ (and their Discourses, like institutions, generally exhibit a combinations and synonyms). This methodology im- so-called ‘long durée’ (Giddens 1984): that is, they plies that the overview of forest(-related) discourses can be very stable and they seldom change overnight. is probably incomplete. Only those discourses (as This does not, however, exclude discursive change, well as actors and instruments related to those dis- e.g. through agency. Discursive change agents are courses) referred to in the existing scientific literature those actors, groups or coalitions that are able to on global forest policy are listed and analysed below. reframe a certain discourse (Benford and Snow 2000; Nonetheless, because only a relatively small part of Schmidt 2008). The Brundtland Commission, for the literature has a fully global perspective, scholarly example, reshaped the sustainability discourse in the literature using ‘lower-level’ conceptions of forest 1980s. Hence influential actors may change discours- discourse is included as well. es, when, for example, their interventions resonate in the media, in science and in politics. So the relationships between discourses and actors is dialectical. 4.2 Meta discourses Discourses shape the perspectives of actors, while the latter, in turn, can reshape the former. We assume Based on our literature search, we reconstructed the a similar dialectical relationship between discourses emergence, fall and existence-in-parallel of a num- and regulatory instruments. In a given period, the ber of meta discourses that relate to global forest choice of instrument (e.g. protocol, fund, voluntary policy. In Figure 4.1 the environmental meta dis- market) is not made in a discursive vacuum but is courses are depicted in yellow. Overlapping those informed by the ideas, concepts and categorisations are the economic and governance meta discourses of the regulatory instruments that are dominant at (in blue) and the regulatory discourses (in red). The58 the time. meta discourses are discussed below; the regulatory Based on existing scientific literature this chapter discourses are addressed in Section 4.3. presents a longitudinal analysis of global forest(- related) discourses and their dynamics since the EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

4 DISCOURSES, ACTORS AND INSTRUMENTS...Figure 4.1 Meta and regulatory discourses. Box 4.1 Discourse-theoretical approaches There is no one discourse theory. Several approach- practices’. Critics of such views argue that, for es build on various ontologies, epistemologies, the- example, a person will fall if he or she steps out ories and methodologies, with a basic distinction of the window of a skyscraper, even if he or she between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ discourse-theoretical ap- believes otherwise. Adherents of thick approaches proaches. Thin approaches consider discourse as counter that the point is not that gravity does not one factor among others, such as agency, resources exist but that observers do not have direct access to and rules, to explain politics. Hence, a distinction its ‘material reality’. Examples of thick approaches is made between the discursive and the non-dis- are Foucault’s post-structuralist philosophy, Fair- cursive. Examples of thin approaches are frame clough’s critical discourse analysis, and the work analysis, theories of deliberative democracy and of scholars of the Essex School, such as Laclau, discursive-institutionalism; the latter, for example, Mouffe and Howard. For Foucauldians, discourses considers discourses as sets of innovative ideas that are disciplinary ensembles of language, knowledge can cause institutional change in a society. Thick and power that produce the generally accepted ob- approaches, on the other hand, do not distinguish jects and subjects of a society (the ‘normal’) and between the discursive and the non-discursive. exclude the others (the ‘abnormal’). They consider that all reality is discursive and therefore socially constructed because it is impossible Sources: Arts and Buizer 2009; Benford and Snow to escape a social system of meaning in order to 2000; Fischer 2003; Foucault 1994; Pülzl 2010; directly observe reality. Hence, both the physical Schmidt 2005, 2008; Van den Brinck and Metze and social worlds are to be considered ‘discursive 2006. 59EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

4 DISCOURSES, ACTORS AND INSTRUMENTS... 4.2.1 Modernisation 4.2.3 Ecological modernisation The modernisation discourse was mostly popular in This discourse, which has been influential in the past the middle of the 20th century. According to Eisen- two decades, embraces the dominant socio-economic stadt (1966), modernisation is both a type of change paradigm of technological progress within capitalist and a response to change (see also Halpern 1966). political economies and argues that economic growth Thus, modernisation and its related development and development can be achieved while protecting theories are based on the idea of economic growth, the environment. The ecological modernisation dis- industrialisation, control over natural and social recourse has helped raise, within industrialised coun- sources (including forests), and social change (Tipps tries, the acceptance of environmental problems and 1973). According to this discourse, resources should the need for action (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006). be transferred from the agrarian sector to the industri- The identification of ecological modernisation origi- al sector, which will lead to structural transformation nated with German social scientists (Huber 1982; (Rostow 1960 in Umans 1993: 28). Critics (e.g. Shils Jänicke 1985 in Dryzek 1997: 141) and a meeting 1965) argue, however, that modernisation draws on of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Western values and views traditions as a barrier to Development (OECD) in 1984. virtue and progress. The modernisation discourse From the perspective of ecological modernisa- was mainly triggered by American elites. tion, environmental policymaking follows an approach in which nature is seen as both a resource and a pollutant recycler. It questions the limits-to-growth discourse by depicting environmental degradation as 4.2.2 Limits to growth a solvable problem and – unlike sustainable development – does not necessarily argue for economic re- The ‘discourse of limited growth’ (Dryzek 1997) is direction (Dryzek 1997: 141–144). It is also strongly a critical response to the modernisation trajectory, intertwined with the idea of a shift ‘from government which produced an ‘ecological crisis’ (Berger et al. to governance’ (see below), facilitating an enhanced 2001). This crisis started to be acknowledged in the role for the private sector and voluntary regulation. late 1960s and early 1970s. Before then, natural re- In sum, the ecological modernisation discourse calls sources were seen as an indefinite resource (Porter for a ‘decentralised liberal market order that aims and Brown 1991); they were strongly linked to the to provide flexible and cost-optimal solutions to the national or home environments and thus did not gain environmental problem’ (McGee and Taplin 2009; much global political attention (e.g. Dauvergne 2005: see also Berger et al. 2001). 11–12; Pülzl and Rametsteiner 2002). This discourse Prominent actors in the promotion of ecological can be considered a radical discourse in the sense modernisation have included the World Bank, the that it suggests absolute limits to growth. It holds OECD and corporate bodies (McAfee 1999). Support that the carrying capacity of the Earth’s ecosystem for this discourse is also growing among mainstream has been surpassed and that the planet’s resources conservation organisations such as the International are (nearly) depleted. It provides specific solutions Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the World to global problems that focus mainly on technical Resources Institute (WRI) and the World Wide Fund fixes and political elites rather than on people and For Nature (WWF) and among scientists and envi- communities (Dryzek 1997: 34, 129). Critics (e.g. ronmental policymakers. However, it has also created Sills 1975) however argued that the assumptions of political space for counter-discourses of peasant and this discourse are flawed. indigenous peoples’ movements, with more radical A number of publications supported the eleva- non-governmental organisations (NGOs) challenging tion of environmental issues to the global (change) the ‘techno-optimist’ and ‘eco-imperialist’ claims of agenda, including “Silent Spring” (Carson 1962), ecological modernisation. “The Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin 1968), “The Population Bomb” (Ehrlich 1968), “The Lim- its to Growth” (Meadows et al. 1972) and “Small is Beautiful” (Schumacher 1973). The emergence of 4.2.4 Sustainable development the discourse was also linked to a number of global events, such as the United Nations Conference on The sustainable development discourse became the Human Environment (Stockholm, 1972), the cre- popular with the publication of “Our Common Fu- ation of the United Nations Environment Programme ture”, although the idea emerged well before then60 (UNEP), the establishment of national environmental (e.g. IUCN 1980). A second important event, which ministries, and the oil crisis (Pülzl 2010). further facilitated the institutionalisation of this discourse, was the United Nations Conference on En- vironment and Development (UNCED), which was EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

4 DISCOURSES, ACTORS AND INSTRUMENTS...held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The sustainable de- Several authors discuss the role of actors whovelopment discourse is characterised by the follow- represent the neo-liberal discourse in internationaling (Adger et al. 2001; Baker et al. 1997; Holmgren regimes. For example, the neo-liberal discourse has2008; Jordan 2008; Lélé 1991; Pülzl 2010): (i) it been furthered by multinational corporations, whodoes not acknowledge fixed limits to growth; (ii) have promoted international regulatory convergence,it requires inter-generational and intra-generational standard setting and policy harmonisation (Dahan etsatisfaction of one’s needs (hence, equity among al. 2006). According to Kamat (2004), a neo-liberalgenerations); (iii) the managerial notion of regula- consensus exists within the Bretton Woods institu-tion prevails, since the dominant belief of UNCED tions – the World Bank and the International Mon-was that global environmental problems are solvable etary Fund (IMF) – and the World Trade Organiza-through coordinated public and private action; (iv) tion (WTO). Kamat also states that these institutionsthe management, conservation and use of resources try to regulate civil society. On the one hand, theseare not viewed as contradictory; and (v) other con- institutions are pluralising the term ‘NGO’ by alsocerns, such as public participation, global equity and including market, industry and business actors in it.technology transfer from developed to developing On the other hand, they depoliticise NGOs throughcountries are taken into consideration. their donor policies, causing community-based This discourse substantially overlaps with the NGOs to move away from education and empower-ecological modernization discourse. Some authors ment programmes towards more technical manage-(e.g. Hajer 1995; Pülzl 2010) argue that the former is rial approaches to social issues (Kamat 2004). Hum-part of the latter, and others (e.g. Dryzek 1997) treat phreys (1996, 2008) states that even though NGOsthem as separate. We decided to distinguish among have sometimes successfully influenced internationalthem, however taking their strong overlap into ac- negotiations (see ‘global governance’ below), theycount. One reason to differentiate between the two have not been able to influence the dominance of theis that sustainable development exhibits a broader neo-liberal discourse.worldview than ecological modernisation – it’s bothmore global in nature (taking into account the con-cerns of developing countries) and more inclusive (inaddition to economic and ecological issues, it deals 4.2.6 Civic environmentalismwith social issues as well) (Arts 1994). The scientific literature widely recognises the The discourse of civic environmentalism becameimportant role of the “Our Common Future” and popular in the 1992 with UNCED. Associated withNGOs, in the development and strengthening of the this discourse is language of ‘stakeholders’ and ‘par-sustainable development discourse (Arts 1998; Hau- ticipation’, which entered the international arena ac-fler 1993; Humphreys 2008). companied by terms such as democratic efficiency, bottom-up approaches and governance arrangements (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006). Authors differentiate between various types of NGOs and4.2.5 Neo-liberalism civic environmentalism. Humphreys (2004), for example, distinguishes outsider tactics of ”systemThe neo-liberalist discourse can be characterised transformation oriented NGOs” from insider tacticsas a meta discourse, because it influences a range of more collaborative, ”system reformation orientedof other discourses. Humphreys (2009) describes NGOs”. Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2007) divide theneo-liberalism as a highly political-ideological discourse of civic environmentalism into radical anddiscourse (although there is a link with economics reformist civic environmentalism. The former advo-as a science – e.g. monetarism), attributing the fol- cates a fundamental transformation of consumptionlowing three principles to the neo-liberal discourse: patterns and existing institutions to realize a more(i) the increasing role of markets; (ii) the enhanced eco-centric and equitable world order. The reform-role of the private sector; and (iii) voluntary, legally ist civic environmentalism discourse suggests thatnon-binding regulation. In other words (see Jessop increased stakeholder participation can enhance the2002), neo-liberalism seeks for market expansion, legitimacy and accountability of multilateral insti-the deregulation of markets and the privatisation of tutions (McGee and Taplin 2009). Brosius (1999)state-owned enterprises and services. Accordingly, describes reformist civic environmentalism as a dis-the role of corporate non-state actors in governance course that excludes moral or political imperatives inactivities is increasingly advocated and expanded favour of techno-scientific forms of intervention.(McCarthy 2006: 99 in Toke and Lauber 2007: 679). Several authors highlight the consequences of 61The neo-liberalist discourse has been highly influen- the reformist civic environmentalism discourse fortial in international negotiations on various topics, the roles of NGOs. Lemos and Agrawal (2006),including forests. for example, emphasise the fact that outsiders andEMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

4 DISCOURSES, ACTORS AND INSTRUMENTS... disempowered groups continue to have few oppor- has been institutionalised, policy making has been tunities for participation. Grassroots environmental partly delegated to the private sector, and partici- movements are displaced by ‘moderate’ environ- pation has been broadened (Elliott and Schlaepfer mental NGOs (such as WWF and IUCN), and by 2001a, 2001b). large transnational institutions. Visseren-Hamakers (2009) warns that a more fundamental critique may become increasingly unaccepted in the longer term 4.3 Regulatory discourses if the dominance of moderate NGOs continues. Falkner (2003) concludes that the involvement of NGOs in private governance alters their role and Regulatory discourses deal with the regulation and identity as non-state actors. They may become ‘co- instrumentation of policy issues. These are distin- opted’, which would undermine their ability to play guished from meta discourses in the sense that they a ‘conscience-keeping’ role (Yamin 2001). are more directly related to policymaking through the shaping of regulatory styles and policy instruments within sectors. Nevertheless, regulatory discourses transcend individual policy domains (like forests), 4.2.7 Global governance too; thus, in our view, a separate section on regulatory discourses is justified. The global governance Traditionally, global regulation has been used as a meta discourse is related to the regulatory discourse, synonym for intergovernmental arrangements, ruled but we consider the former to be an overarching by sovereign nation states (Arts 2006). Since the discourse, challenging the Westphalian nation-state 1970s, however, the role of the state as the prime model at a global level. Regulatory discourses, on sovereign agent of international (environmental) the other hand, focus more on the concrete ‘meso governance has declined. Instead, globalisation has level’ of organising policy implementation processes enhanced public participation and increased the di- (although they may be influenced by global gover- versity of actors shaping environmental governance nance ideas). Below, three regulatory discourses are (Lemos and Agrawal 2006). Also, the diversity of distinguished, as deduced from the scientific litera- rules – public, private, binding and voluntary – gov- ture. These three seem to form regulatory ‘phases’ erning the environment has grown (Cashore 2002). or ‘fashions’, chronologically replacing and partly Various authors (e.g. Martello and Jasanoff 2004) paralleling each other over time (see Figure 4.1). explain the rise of environmental governance at the global level in different ways. Some (Meidinger 1997) link it to transnationalism and the growth in global civil society; others (e.g. Falkner 2003) view 4.3.1 State regulation and hard law the development of the ‘late’ capitalist forces as the source. Part of the global governance discourse In the late 1960s and early 1970s, as people inis the quest for good governance. There is a broad creasingly became aware of and protested against consensus about its essential elements (Rametsteiner environmental degradation, the response of most 2009): rule of law, accountability and transparency, Western states was to initiate a wide range of laws participation, and effectiveness and efficiency. in line with a command-and-control model (Gun- The emergence of the global governance dis- ningham and Grabosky 1998; Kirton and Trebilcock course has been shaped by many actors. For example, 2004). Thereby, these states were the main actors various scholars emphasise the role of international responsible for the development of the discourse. organisations, like the United Nations and the Eu- Even though this form of steering has never fully ropean Union (Arts 2006; Hunphreys 2008; Lemos succeeded in supplanting other forms of social con- and Agrawal 2006), while NGOs have also played trol, such as education, information, and voluntary influential roles. While pressuring for the protec- agreements, it was the predominant legal discourse tion of (tropical) forests since the late 1970s (Sears in early environmental politics and for a long time et al. 2001), NGOs were able to include language shaped environmental policy formulation. This form on participation, women, traditional forest-related of steering is linked to the limits-to-growth meta dis- knowledge, benefit-sharing and land tenure securi- course, which holds that natural resources are scarce ty in international environmental agreements (Arts and in need of protection. 1998). Moreover, NGOs and private-sector actors A landmark for the ‘greening’ of global policy have taken leading roles in private voluntary rule- was the United Nations Conference on the Human62 making, such as forest certification (Cock 2008; Environment in Stockholm in 1972, which was the Elliott and Schlaepfer 2001a, 2001b; Humphreys starting point of global environmental regulation. It 1996; Perez-Aleman and Sandilands 2008; Sears et was followed by the ratification of key environmental al. 2001). Through certification, NGO involvement agreements in the 1970s such as the Ramsar Conven- EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

4 DISCOURSES, ACTORS AND INSTRUMENTS...tion, the World Heritage Convention and the Con- tive Statement of Principles for a Global Consensusvention on International Trade in Endangered Spe- on the Management, Conservation and Sustainablecies (McDermott et al. 2007; Pülzl 2010). Dimotrov Development of All Types of Forests. In addition,(2005) argues that, in general, states have internalised the voluntary Intergovernmental Panel on Foreststhe “norm of environmental multilateralism”, which (IPF) was launched soon after UNCED to further theimplies that the neglect of important environmental global forest dialogue (which proceeded in the Inter-issues, such as deforestation, can no longer be jus- governmental Forum on Forests, IFF, and the Unitedtified nor international environmental cooperation Nations Forum on Forests, UNFF, later on). Overavoided. However, the reliance on intergovernmental time, new voluntary rules were designed (includingregulation and hard law became subject to increas- criteria and indicators for SFM and the Non-legallyingly strong criticism. By the late 1970s it was evi- Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests). In linedent that much command-and-control regulation had with these bottom-up approaches, forest certifica-not performed the way in which policymakers had tion was advocated by both NGOs and (part of) theintended. In various cases it was found to be both corporate sector as a new ‘non-state market-drivenineffective and powerless (e.g. Elliott and Thomas governance system’ (Cashore 2002).1993). 4.3.3 Smart regulation and instrument4.3.2 De-regulation, self-regulation mixesand soft law De-regulation has often not lived up to its promises.During the 1980s, neo-liberal tendencies in both Gunningham and Grabosky (1998) therefore advo-politics and science turned against the existing top- cate a regulatory “third way” that positions itselfdown regulation system and advocated extensive between traditional top-down regulation and fashion-de-regulation. The self-regulation of the market able de-regulation. They call it “smart regulation”,and voluntary policy instruments were believed to a term that has received considerable attention inbe more effective and efficient than the old ‘rigid’ the (scientific) policy literature (Howlett and Raynerregulation system (Humphreys 2008; Osborne and 2004; Van Gossum et al. 2010). It refers to findingGaebler 1992). As pointed out by Gunningham and ‘smart’ solutions to complex policy problems, basedGrabosky (1998), however the traditional legal type on cleverly designed instrument mixes, both gov-of steering succeeded in mitigating environmental ernmental and binding and non-governmental anddeterioration in several areas (including forests). But voluntary, in order to create win-win solutions inthis simple fact was downplayed by the discursive specific policy areas. Smart regulation has particu-hegemony of neo-liberalism. larly been applied to environmental policy, including An important example of self-regulation in global forest policy (Van Gossum et al. 2009).environmental policy is corporate social responsibil-ity (CSR). This discourse started in the United Statesof America and Europe in the 1970s (Charkiewicz 4.4 Forest discourses2005) and was developed by religious organisations,research institutes and NGOs. The 2002 World Sum-mit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg All discourses directly connected to global forestsaw the consolidation of the global discourse on CSR policy are described here. Meta and regulatory dis-in what was known as the “Global Compact” and courses, as distinguished above, affect the initiali-in other partnerships between the United Nations sation and direction of forest discourses; similarly,and corporations. According to critics, CSR implies forest discourses can play a role in shaping meta anda further ‘hollowing out’ of the state. Charkiewicz regulatory discourses. For analytical reasons, forest(2005) claims that while it may position NGOs inside discourses are here described consecutively, althoughthe corporate orbit, it simply offers them a “voice in reality they are difficult to separate because theywithout influence”. interact, overlap and compete with each other. Fig- The discourse on de-regulation has also affected ure 4.2 depicts the intensity of the respective forestglobal forest regulation. At UNCED a number of par- discourses in the period 1960–2005 (based on theticipants pushed for the creation of a legally binding literature review).agreement on forests (Humphreys 1996; Poore 2003;Pülzl 2010; Schneider 2006). No such agreement has 63so far been reached, however. Instead, two ‘soft law’instruments on forests were produced: Chapter 11 ofAgenda 21 and the Non-Legally Binding Authorita-EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

4 DISCOURSES, ACTORS AND INSTRUMENTS... 4.4.1 Industrial forestry that they were “the lungs of the world” (Adger et al. 2001). The content of the deforestation discourse The industrial forestry discourse links forests to eco- changed over time, however. In the 1980s the dis- nomic development, prioritising the production func- course centred around the view that farmers were tion of forests and seeking economic profit on the the main causers of tropical deforestation (Zhouri basis of the sustainable yield of the resource (Umans 2004). By 1990s however, famers had come to be 1993). This discourse was supported by ‘scientific perceived as victims, while logging companies and forestry’, which aimed to maximise the long-term related transnational interests were identified as the economic return (Farrell et al. 2000). In line with main causes of tropical deforestation (Cline-Cole the meta discourse on modernisation, foresters be- 2007). lieved that the selection of fast-growing tree species Also in the 1990s, the deforestation discourse as well as the harvesting of tropical wood in develop- broadened in two ways. First, northern temperate ing countries would trigger economic growth through and boreal forests were perceived to also be subject the creation of wood-processing industries, thereby to deforestation (Pülzl 2010). Second, the discourse sustaining local livelihoods (Umans 1993: 28). shifted towards the meta discourse on sustainable This discourse was dominant in the 1960s, es- development and was linked to related issues such pecially in developing countries, where Western as biodiversity loss, poverty reduction and climate foresters advocated industrial forestry and Western change. During the first decade of the 21st century, companies attained large timber concessions. Ac- the discourse shifted again towards avoiding de- cording to Umans (1993: 28), however, this discourse forestation by compensating actors if they reduce met with considerable criticism. Modernisation was deforestation (Singer 2008) mainly as a means to perceived a threat to (small-scale) agriculture and reduce carbon dioxide emissions. considered contradictory to the ‘limits to growth’ In the emergence of the deforestation discourse, discourse that dominated the 1970s. Western NGOs played influential roles. Stott (1999) even argues that NGOs (re-)invented the term ‘tropical rainforest’ using it to refer to virgin, undisturbed, old-growth forests in the tropics. Stott (1999) argues 4.4.2 Woodfuel crisis that the concept is a myth, since such forests are neither thousands of years old nor free from historical- The woodfuel discourse became prominent in lo- cultural influences, and that the term represents a cal (African) areas in times of war and drought. Its Western agenda. global popularity started with the oil crisis in the early 1970s. Eckholm (1975) termed it ‘the other energy crisis’ of the 1970s. The argumentation at 4.4.4 Conservation in protected forest that time was that an increasing number of people areas (forest parks) in developing countries were becoming dependent on woodfuel for their energy needs; this would lead to a devastating depletion of forest resources, with The discourse on forest conservation was high on the huge negative consequences for local livelihoods international political agenda in the 1980s (Singer (Arnold et al. 2006). In this way, the woodfuel dis- 2008). The scientific discourse on forest parks (le- course linked up with the discourse on deforesta- gally designated protected forests) oscillates be- tion (Cline-Cole 2007; see below). In the mid-1980s, tween the question of whether parks, fences and however, it was argued that the nature and impact fines adequately protect biodiversity and the extent of the woodfuel crisis was overestimated (Arnold to which local residents should be involved in deci- et al. 2006) and interest in this particular discourse sion-making processes, should take on management declined, although it was later reframed into a dis- responsibilities, and might wisely use some of the course on wood energy in general and, most recently, natural resources in protected areas (Hayes 2006). into a discourse on innovative wood-based bio-fuels The advocates on ‘people-free’ parks focused on (Cline-Cole 2007). the protection of biodiversity by prohibiting human access . For many years this contested perspective dominated. At global level, however, the discourse on forest conservation became strongly influenced by 4.4.3 Deforestation sustainable forest management ideas after 1987. Now the ‘sustainable use of forest resources’ became part64 Deforestation emerged as a global forest discourse of the forest conservation agenda. Parks and people in the 1980s and focused mainly on the destruction were no longer exclusively separated. of tropical rainforests (Humphreys 1996). A collective metaphor used at the time for rainforests was EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

4 DISCOURSES, ACTORS AND INSTRUMENTS... Figure 4.2 Intensity of forest discourses 1960–2005. Box 4.2 Forest discourse in Africa During the colonial era, European colonists greatly contributor to national economies through enhanced admired Africa’s tropical forests for their exotic foreign exchange earnings. In some Central Afri- nature and complexity. They embarked on pro- can countries (e.g. Cameroon, Congo and Gabon), grammes of forest conservation, which resulted in projects initiated with the support of the donor com- the protection of large areas of forest. Most existing munity conducted national forest resource inven- protected areas on the continent were created during tories to enable better planning of forest industry the colonial period. After independence, however, development. In parallel, feasibility studies were in most African countries the views and discourses undertaken for the establishment of large-scale on forests underwent a series of changes driven by timber-processing firms for the production of ply- the quest for rapid economic development. wood, veneer and pulp. In the 1960s, the growth of the agricultural sec- After UNCED a new discourse was initiated tor was very high on the agendas of all the newly that emphasised the need for sustainability in the independent African countries. For most, economic management of African forest resources. Political development was to be achieved through the pro- stakeholders became eager to show their aware- duction of cash crops such as cocoa, coffee and ness of the key role they could play in both the cotton and natural forests were considered simply sustainable management of natural resources and as land reserves for agricultural expansion. In Cam- the development of the human societies they rep- eroon, for example, natural forests were seen as resented. An important moment in this discourse potential areas for cocoa cultivation; the govern- was the First Central African Heads of State Sum- ment facilitated land ownership for those people mit on Forests, which was held in March 1999 able to increase the value of rural lands by cutting in Yaoundé, Cameroon. In the resultant Yaoundé down forests to establish cocoa farms, and interna- Declaration, the Heads of State proclaimed: “The tional investors were invited to invest in industrial Heads of States proclaim: …their commitment to farms. the principle of biodiversity conservation and the During the 1970s and the 1980s, partly because sustainable management of the forests ecosystems 65 of the timber firms that were established to take of Central Africa…the right of their peoples to be advantage of cheap logging rights, the political elite able to count on the forest resources to support their started to identify the forest industry as a substantial endeavors for economic and social development”EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

4 DISCOURSES, ACTORS AND INSTRUMENTS... Box 4.3 Forest discourses in Asia Until the mid 1970s, most Asian countries were forests, conflicts inevitably arise, often involving characterized by widespread poverty and economic local communities and indigenous peoples against growth was a top priority. Many countries used forest industries and governments. In the past, local their vast and rich natural forests as engines of resistance to forest exploitation was often labelled growth. Investments in forest industries increased as ‘anti-government’ or ‘anti-growth’. When de- dramatically, and the sector generated much-need- forestation rates increased dramatically during the ed revenue to fund national development and the 1980s and 1990s it was therefore only a small step fight against poverty. During much of the 1970s for local people to be branded forest destroyers. and 1980s, forests were valued almost exclusively Shifting cultivation was, and to some extent still for their timber. is, identified by governments, forest industries A significant shift began to take place in the mid and development agencies as the main cause of 1990s as, increasingly, forests came to be valued deforestation. for their environmental and ecosystem services. By the 1990s, anthropologists had begun to With this new valuation, efforts to restore and pro- show that blaming shifting cultivators for defor- tect forests gained momentum. To some extent, estation was both unfair and ungrounded. Shifting this turnaround was triggered by the outcomes of cultivation can be a sustainable practice that does the UNCED in 1992, and national governments less damage to forests than commercial logging began to realise that overexploitation had massive operations. Traditional and indigenous knowledge environmental and economic impacts. Logging became increasingly valued, with various local for- bans became fashionable; in many countries, they est management systems described and recognised are still in place. Most countries – and particularly as sustainable and beneficial to biodiversity conser- China, Viet Nam and India – have also expanded vation. Widespread forest fires in 1997 also made protected areas and planted billions of trees on clear to the world that small-scale farmers were degraded lands. Most Asian forests are formally not the main culprit, but large-scale plantation de- owned by the state. Hundreds of millions of rural velopment was. Ultimately, local people came to people, however, are dependent on forests for their be viewed as part of the solution to deforestation livelihoods, and thousands of domestic and inter- and forest degradation and as potential guardians national investors want to obtain land for develop- of the forest. ment. As many actors simultaneously lay claims to 4.4.5 Forest decline 4.4.6 Sustainable forest management The discourse on forest decline started in the late The SFM discourse is congruent with the meta dis- 1970s, hitting its peak in the mid 1980s. The starting course on sustainable development. It drew attention points of the discourse were emerging environmental away from developing countries with tropical rain- issues in Central and Eastern Europe (Hajer 1995; forest towards global threats to forests, raising is- Hinrichsen 1987), and in the eastern part of North sues such as participation, the distribution of produc- America (Skelly and Innes 1994). Forest decline was tion and consumption, and financial assistance and part of the acid-rain debate, in which acidic deposi- technology transfer from developed to developing tions produced by industry and traffic were held to countries (Holmgren 2008). The emphasis of SFM negatively affect forests. The pollution prevention changed over time, away from timber production as and precaution approach became the dominant policy the dominant use towards a broader understanding of on acid rain and thus the forest-decline discourse the role of forests and their multiple-use management was linked to the ecological modernisation meta dis- (e.g. Wang and Wilson 2007). This has especially course (Hajer 1993). The forest-decline discourse been true at the global political level, where forests coincided with growing interest in environmental are increasingly understood as part of the global eco- issues (Kleinschmit 2010). Although the discourse system and the importance of their global functions is no longer hegemonic, the term forest death and is gaining recognition. However, although the SFM even its original German variant Waldsterben is still discourse was meant to turn attention away from66 used, albeit no longer restricted to acid rain (Krum- tropical rainforest countries, it has been criticised land 2004). from within such countries for perceived Western bias (Bending and Rosendo 2003; Boyd 2009; Pal- mujoki 2009). EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

4 DISCOURSES, ACTORS AND INSTRUMENTS... A more radical discourse, which centres on the importance of the former decreased during theecosystem management, is linked to SFM. This dis- late 1990s.course, which originated in North-America in the An alliance of forest peoples, developmental1970s, considers that nature is not only useful but NGOs and conservationists played an influentialalso has intrinsic values (Dekker et al. 2007). role in the emergence of the forest-related traditional knowledge discourse in the early 1990s (Newing 2009), building a public image of indigenous peoples as ‘natural conservationists’ who have important4.4.7 Forest biodiversity traditional knowledge. By mid 1990s, however, the compatibility between biodiversity conservation, de-The biodiversity discourse was cleaved by the diverg- velopment and indigenous peoples was increasinglying interests of developed and developing countries being called into question. This was due largely to the(Forte 1999). Since UNCED the biodiversity dis- further recognition of indigenous rights by the Unitedcourse has been associated with the discourse on Nations, which reduced the reliance of indigenoussocial justice (Zhouri 2004). Besides conservation peoples on the alliance (Newing 2009).objectives, the issue of forest biodiversity has beenintrinsically linked to access to resources and tech-nology as well as to benefit-sharing in the sustain-able use of forests. Since a global instrument for 4.4.9 Forests and climate changebiodiversity, but not for forests, was agreed upon,forest biodiversity is dealt with globally mainly un- Climate change gained international attention in theder the umbrella of the Convention on Biological mid 1980s (Cohen et al. 1998). Since then ‘forestsDiversity (1992). However, critical scholars argue in the context of climate change’ has been part of athat the global agenda is driven by ‘traditional for- managerial discourse (Boyd 2009; Decasper Chacónestry’ because the focus has been on tradable biologi- 2009). Discussion on the Clean Development Mech-cal and genetic resources – just as previously it was anism (CDM) and reduced emissions from defor-on timber (Forte 1999; McAfee 1999). Forte (1999) estation and degradation (REDD) are examples ofrecognises a decreasing intensity in the biodiversity attempts to find economically efficient solutions fordiscourse, explained by a shift from the ‘old’ argu- several problems at once: deforestation, forest degra-ment of protecting biodiversity for itself towards an dation, livelihoods and climate change (Boyd 2009).argument of conserving tropical forests to address The global debate on forests and climate change cur-climate change. On the basis of this argumentation, rently focuses on REDD, which was placed on thesome authors frame the global forest biodiversity global agenda in 2005 by the Coalition for Rain-discourse as ecological neo-liberalism, driven by su- forest Nations (Papua New Guinea, Costa Rica andpranational environmental institutions like the World some other countries), supported by environmentalBank (McAfee 1999). NGOs (Boyd 2009). Ariell (2010) argues that the current debate on REDD is influenced by, among other things, the neo-liberalism discourse. Other4.4.8 Forest-related traditional critics are worried that biodiversity and livelihoodsknowledge will be neglected or even sacrificed in an effort to maximise carbon budgets, or that REDD will dimin- ish the incentives to change consumption patterns inThe discourse on forest-related traditional knowl- developed countries in order to reduce carbon diox-edge mainly focuses on developing countries and ide emissions (Lemos and Agrawal 2006).their indigenous peoples and local communitiesliving in forests. A major issue is the protection ofintellectual property rights (Rosendal 2001). Thediscourse is closely linked to issues such as bio- 4.4.10 Illegal loggingpiracy, bio-prospecting, sustainable use and indig-enous peoples as conservationists (Newing 2009). Another forest discourse emerged in the late 1990sBesides the ‘simple’ knowledge about forests and when illegal logging became a major issue in in-their useful products, this discourse addresses the ternational forest governance. The term was firstsymbolic meaning of forests – such as forests as ‘cul- mentioned in international negotiations in 1996tured spaces’ or as ‘wilderness’ that remains beyond (McAlpine 2003) and again by the G8 Action Pro-human control (Nygren 1999). The convergence of gramme on Forest in 1998 (Humphreys 2008). By 67the discourse on forest-related traditional knowledge 2001, donors spearheaded by the United States De-and the discourse on SFM has been emphasised by partment of State, United Kingdom Department ofseveral scholars (e.g. Humphreys 2004). However, International Development and the World Bank hadEMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

4 DISCOURSES, ACTORS AND INSTRUMENTS... Box 4.4 Forest discourse in Latin America In Latin America the development of forest policy agement regulations at the domestic level. Such instruments reflects changes over time in the legal regulations echoed an increasing recognition of and forest discourses. Early forest legislation was ecological and social forest values common to the oriented predominantly toward forest extraction. international forest discourse and related agree- For example, Ecuador’s first forest law, enacted in ments (e.g. Agenda 21, the Forest Principles and 1875, declared public forests open to exploitation the International Tropical Timber Agreement – by all; an amendment in 1913 established taxes on ITTA) at that time. For example, as indigenous and the harvest of industrial wood. Nonetheless, the community forest rights became more prominent implementation of early forest laws was limited in the global forest discourse, conflicts emerged throughout the region and their influence on for- throughout Latin America between legal and cus- ested landscapes was minimal compared to the in- tomary access to forest resources, often leading fluence of agro-development policies that promote policymakers to integrate indigenous and commu- forest clearance for access to land and title. nity rights into national forest policies and other By the mid 1900s, most Latin American coun- related policies. tries had developed forest legislation that defined During the 1990s an effort was made to de- forest areas for protection and production, regu- crease state involvement in forest control, for ex- lated forest harvests, taxed forest production, and ample through the devolution of public forest lands, established incentives for reforestation. Awareness the development of fiscal incentives for sustainable of deforestation in Latin America and its impacts forest management and reforestation, and the pro- not only on economic but also environmental and motion of forest certification; nevertheless forest social values grew domestically and globally dur- loss and degradation persisted in the region. In the ing the 1960s and 1970s. This growing awareness early 2000s, new approaches to forest governance was reflected in the contemporary public discourse, appeared that increasingly incorporated multiple which included debate on ‘protection versus pro- instruments and actors in the administration of duction’ and the development of forest policies that forests and their uses. In 2010, governmental for- increasingly incorporated production, protection est regulation remains a key instrument in overall and conservation elements. Such forest policies forest policy in most Latin American countries, principally took a command-and-control approach as demonstrated by the recent and ongoing devel- to forest use, and their influence was limited by a opment of new forest laws across the continent. lack of enforcement. Notably, these new laws reflect a broader focus Although most Latin American countries had, that aims to balance the production of forest goods by the early 1990s, embraced and in many cases and the protection of forest services. Moreover, for- surpassed a goal of incorporating 10% of the total est policy processes have shifted from being pre- land area in protected areas, forest loss continued, dominated by governmental organisations towards as did pressures on the forest sector; this, in turn, a more pluralistic institutional structure that also often gave rise to increasingly complex forest man- incorporates the private sector and civil society. convened on a process known as forest law enforce- A number of NGOs have incorporated it in their ment and governance (FLEG) (Singer 2008). FLEG campaigns, and the issue is also being addressed is designed to encourage the enforcement of forest through bilateral and regional collaboration (Bass laws in tropical countries and the eradiction of ille- and Guéneau 2007). gal timber from the domestic markets of importing countries. Participatory forms of governance have also been encouraged by FLEG (Bass and Guéneau 4.5 Conclusions 2005). The G8 and World Bank have played major roles in developing the illegal logging discourse in general. This chapter reviewed the changes in global discours- Subsequently, the World Bank played an important es and their related impacts on actors and policy role in the development of the Forest Law Enforce- instruments that have shaped international forest68 ment and Governance processes in particular, and governance since the 1960s. Based on this longitu- the European Union took up the issue in its Forest dinal analysis, a number of conclusions can be drawn Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) on forest(-related) discourses; actors; policy instru- action plan (Gulbrandsen and Humphreys 2006). ments; policy making; and public policy analysis. EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

4 DISCOURSES, ACTORS AND INSTRUMENTS...4.5.1 Forest(-related) discourses eralism and global governance; (3) the influence of business on for example the certification and CSRVarious meta discourses that relate to forest policy as discourses; and (4) the roles of developed and de-well as to other environmental policy areas are found veloping countries in inhibiting the negotiation of ain the scholarly literature: they are discourses on legally binding convention on forests.modernisation, limits to growth, sustainable develop- Based on the literature review it can be concludedment, ecological modernisation, neo-liberalism, civic that discursive change can bring about changes inenvironmentalism and global governance. These the types of actors that are involved in global forestevolved over time and are rather well described in governance. This governance system was dominatedthe scientific literature. Some discourses (e.g. eco- by states until the 1980s, the period during whichlogical modernization and sustainable development) the limits-to-growth discourse was hegemonic. Theare said to be overlapping, some (e.g. limits to growth roles of non-state actors (including both private andand sustainable development) are mutually exclu- civil-society actors) have grown significantly sincesive, and others (e.g. sustainable development and the 1980s, when the ecological modernisation andneo-liberalism) are inclusive and seem apparently sustainable development discourses were starting tonot contradictory. While the discourses on limits to dominate. The role of the Bretton Woods institutionsgrowth, ecological modernisation and sustainable in global environmental and forest politics has alsodevelopment succeeded each other with relatively become more prominent and they have been activelittle overlap, those on neo-liberalism, civic environ- in the development of policies that fit the neo-liber-mentalism and global governance have taken place alism and ecological modernisation discourses well.more-or-less simultaneously. Three relevant regula- However, the current hegemonic discourses tend totory discourses (regulation, de-regulation and smart exclude specific types of actors, such as those NGOsregulation) were identified in the global forest policy with more radical perspectives and political critiques.literature; although they were initiated in sequence, They are increasingly being replaced by (more)they still exist in parallel and in combination. moderate NGOs, whose strategies better match the These meta and regulatory discourses relate to current discourses on sustainable development andother, more specific forest discourses on industrial global governance.forestry; the woodfuel crisis; deforestation; conser-vation in forest parks; forest decline; sustainable for-est management; forest biodiversity; forest-relatedtraditional knowledge; forests and climate change; 4.5.3 Policy instrumentsand illegal logging. Some are relatively local (e.g.woodfuel) or focus on a specific group of countries Three developments in the choice of policy instru-(e.g. forest-related traditional knowledge), while oth- ments in global forest policy making can be observeders are more global (e.g. sustainable forest manage- in the literature. In the early 1970s, governments pre-ment). Some discourses have been reframed (e.g. the ferred command-and-control instruments for regulat-discourse on woodfuel and deforestation), some have ing environmental degradation. These were in linelost importance (e.g. industrial forestry and forest de- with discourses on woodfuel, deforestation and forestcline), and others (e.g. conservation of forest parks) conservation. During the 1980s, however, the de-have been absorbed by the hegemonic sustainable regulation discourse which held that market forcesforest management discourse. would take care of the environment, became vogue, in line with neo-liberal ideas. In the 1990s there was a shift towards governance and so called ‘smart regulation’ which seeks to apply more pluralistic approach-4.5.2 Actors es to environmental protection. These changes in the choice of global instruments has gone hand-in-handFrom a discourse-theoretical point of view, discours- with a shift from hard to soft law. In the 1970s andes are said to influence actors’ roles and percep- beginning of the 1980s, legally-binding treaties thattions and the other way around. However, we did not relate to protection issues (e.g. Ramsar Conventionfind many examples of scholarly work that directly on Wetlands, Convention on International Trade inlinked actors’ behaviour to discursive dynamics (or Endangered Species and Wild Fauna and Flora –vice versa). The following roles of actors in the de- CITES and ITTA) were concluded. In the 1980s andvelopment of discourses feature prominently in the early 1990s, legally-binding instruments referring toliterature: (1) the role of NGOs in for example the both protection and management issues were agreedsustainable development, illegal logging and forest on (e.g. Convention on Biological Diversity – CBD, 69certification discourses; (2) the role of international United Nations Framework Convention on Climateinstitutions such as the World Bank and the Inter- Change – UNFCCC and United Nations Conventionnational Monetary Fund in the shaping of neo-lib- to Combat Desertification – UNCCD), but a globallyEMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

4 DISCOURSES, ACTORS AND INSTRUMENTS... binding forest treaty could not be concluded. More initiatives into account, and to link forest nego- recently, several soft-policy instruments on forest tiations to other discussions and meta discourses, use, management and conservation have been con- thereby improving the negotiation process. cluded by governments or initiated by civil society 3. Discourses can be reframed collectively: Once groups (forest certification schemes). actors are able to distinguish between discourses (e.g. neo-liberalism or SFM) and their employed mechanisms they can try to reframe the dominant discourses so that they resonate with their own 4.5.4 Policy making policy preferences, thus granting such preferences more legitimacy and authority to the latter. To do What policy-relevant insights and lessons can poli- this requires collective action and long-term com- cymakers draw from this chapter? It is difficult to mitment. Some scholars have developed ‘framing directly retrieve useful policy recommendations strategies’ to better relate individual and group from a review of scientific literature in which dif- frames to societal discourses (Benford and Snow ferent (and often opposing) authors, approaches 2000) Reframing can also be used to create syn- and policy perspectives are integrated. This is even ergies among actors. For example, global forest more the case for discourse-theoretical perspectives, policy might need a new collective frame in or- which generally do not lend themselves to ‘linear’ der to overcome opposites in the current policy recommendations (i.e. ‘if policy A, then effect B’). arena, to re-energise policymaking and to meet Nonetheless, we deem the following messages to challenges such as climate change and competing be relevant: claims on forest resources. 4. Need for open and deliberative arenas: In order 1. Understanding and embracing complexity: Our to make such reframing processes possible, open review makes it clear that international forest discursive arenas´ that allow the participation of governance is so complex because it is fuelled relevant state and non-state actors, are needed to by and nested in many meta, regulatory and forest enable the deliberations and social learning nec- discourses that are taking place simultaneously. essary to create a new global forest policy that Although discourses may come and go, many is future-proof. Here, participation should not be exhibit a long durée, so that ever more forest(- a hollow phrase. All relevant arguments should related) discourses exist in parallel over time. be heard, not only those of the ‘usual suspects’. Policy actors may be influenced by all of them – A global forest policy that is capable of meet- often subconsciously – or they may deliberately ing future challenges needs all the creativity and pick and choose ideas and arguments from them, intelligence that it is possible to mobilise. This for example to make choices on certain legal inis not to say that a one-solution-fits-all outcome struments. Hence, global forest policy making is should be the result or that this will be possible far from coherent and consistent. This is not due or desirable once all arguments are on the table. to a lack of rationality in the system, but a con- On the contrary, the complexity of the forest is- sequence of (unacknowledged) discursive diver- sue and the need for future-proof policies require sity. Hence, it seems better to acknowledge and reflexive learning and adaptive management that embrace this discursive complexity than to try to enables experimenting, allows multiple pathways reduce it artificially. and accepts failure as part of a learning process 2. Awareness of discourses can improve negotia- that enables progress. tions: As discourses impact on actors’ understand- ings and the way they rationalise policy problems, they also guide the formation of actors’ interests and preferences. Neither interests nor preferences 4.5.5 Public policy analysis are written in stone. Scholars have shown that the influence of discourses on actors’ perceptions of Given the high number of publications we encoun- problems, preferred instrument choices and em- tered in the literature, discourse analysis is rather ployed practices is substantive. Regularly, actors popular among forest policy scholars. We found, unconsciously identify themselves closely with however, that the scholarly literature is fragmented certain (meta-)discourses, influencing the man- with regard to the use of discourse-theoretical ap- ner in which they frame issues. Thus, improved proaches. While some authors use the term discourse awareness about the development of discourses, as a label for ‘discussion’, others employ diverse the-70 relations among discourses, and one’s own ‘dis- oretical concepts that stem from various schools in a course attachments’ can help policymakers to put sometimes unsystematic manner. This creates confu- current negotiations into perspective, to more eas- sion. This urges for more attention to be granted to ily take the lessons learned from earlier policy theoretical concepts and methodological techniques. EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

4 DISCOURSES, ACTORS AND INSTRUMENTS... Bass, Steven, and Stéphane Guéneau. 2007. Global Forest Gov-In addition, the scholarly literature is biased towards ernance: Effectiveness, Fairness and Legitimacy of Market-certain topics (e.g. neo-liberalism). Scholars should Driven Approaches. In Participation for Sustainability inbroaden their views and become (more) embedded in Trade, ed. Sophie Thoyer and Benoit Martimort-Asso. Al-the general discourse theoretical literature as well as dershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 161–183.in the broader international relations literature. Bending, Tim, and Sergio Rosendo. 2003. Forest Policy and the global portrayal of forest dwellers: understanding the Our review also shows that discursive shifts have role of environmentalist discourses in Brazil and Malaysia.rarely been analysed systematically. Nor did we find CSERGE Working Paper EDM 03-17.many references to discursive change agents, such Benford, Robert D., and David A. Snow. 2000. 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5 Forests and sustainability Coordinating lead author: Deborah Davenport Lead authors: Janette Bulkan, Reem Hajjar and Patrick Hardcastle Contributing authors: Samuel Assembe-Mvondo, Richard Eba’a Atyi, David Humphreys and Ahmad Maryudi Abstract: International forest governance has developed and evolved as concern for sustaining forests grew beyond the local level, culminating thus far in numerous institutions at the global level, each of which claims some mandate over various aspects of forest or forest-related policy. This situation can be understood as a result of the evolution of conceptualisations of what sustaining all forest values entails, which itself is the result, at least in part, of both shifting international interests and the relative dominance of various forest values in the different institutions. This chapter explores conceptualisations of forest sustainability as manifested in some of the key global instruments existing today and proposes reasons why these have not yet succeeded in achieving the overall goal of sustaining the world’s forests. Keywords: Forest, sustainability, sustainable forest management. ■5.1 Forest sustainability: structure and composition of forests, in responsean evolution to the same drivers that led to the domestication of livestock and food plants (Rackham 2001). In many forest communities, the effects of the over-harvestingForest policymaking at the global level does not take of forest goods and unreliable natural regenerationplace within an engineered structure or a designed have long been appreciated, for example when therearchitecture. Global forest governance is, rather, are noticeable reductions in populations of game ani-the fragmented product of a disjointed evolution, mals or in the size or number of tree fruits and nutswith increasing numbers of global intergovernmen- (Lamb and Whitmore 2002). Forest degradation andtal entities and instruments, both binding and non- deforestation have been recognised for at least 2500binding, having authority over specific aspects of years in Europe and even longer in Egypt and China.forests. Various, sometimes conflicting, views and A vast literature from ancient civilisations about de-interests with regard to forest sustainability, as well nuded hills losing topsoil after forest degradationas shifts in interests and in the dominance of certain and deforestation testifies to ancient awareness ofconcerns over others, have directly influenced the basic principles of ecosystem sustainability, even ifcreation and development of global instruments with such awareness may not have prevented ecologicala mandate on forest policy. Both the piecemeal nature problems. Some societies were able to recover theirof international forest governance and the reasons forests, and others were not. The Fertile Crescentfor its evolution in this way have implications for was historically just that; today it is mainly desertits effectiveness, the issue that implicitly underlies (Diamond 1999: 410–411; Geist 2005: 5; Meiggsthis report. 1982). The relationship between sustainability and in- Numerous communities in the world are creditedternational forest governance dates back to the first historically with having instituted forest managementrecognition of forest deterioration and loss of for- systems, as recorded in oral and written traditions,est goods and services upon which human societies that recognised and sustained natural forests, wood- 75depend, and to recognition of the need to take mea- lands and trees as providers of goods and services.sures to sustain forests (Mather 1997). From time Many traditional systems of forest management, suchimmemorial, human societies have manipulated the as shifting agriculture, have depended on being ableEMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

5 FORESTS AND SUSTAINABILITY to move centres of exploitation periodically to al- investment funds and/or the requirement for a high low forest or particular species to regenerate. For rate of return on capital (Brown 1999; Hardcastle example, researchers in Malawi found that over 90% et al. 1998, 1999; Hardcastle and Davenport 2010). of the Miombo woodland had been cleared during Maximising financial returns from forests leads to a the previous two centuries by indigenous people predominance of intensive, short-rotation crops based engaged in shifting agriculture (Young and Brown on high-yielding monocultures grown as cheaply as 1962). Such ‘shifting’ forest management becomes possible (Perley 2003). Maximum yield forestry, in less feasible as the available space diminishes (Ran- both plantations and natural forests, came to domi- jan and Upadhyay 1999). nate in aid and development plans in some parts of In some cases, however, awareness of potential the world after the Second World War. It lies at the shortfalls in supply of forest goods and services led to root of many recent criticisms of forest management the development of rules for allocating harvests such generally, particularly in tropical countries (Banuri that supplies could be sustained (Bray et al. 2003; and Marglin 1993; Innes 1993; Lansky 1992). CBD Secretariat 2009; Clay 2001; Colchester 1994: The first global intergovernmental body to ad- Rietbergen 1993; Sunderlin et al. 2005). The English dress forest sustainability was the Food and Agri- Charter of the Forest 1217 of Henry III complemented culture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the Magna Carta of 1215 (Osmaston 1968:310–22). which was formed in 1945 (Kone et al. 2004). The Successive waves of local regulation responded to FAO Forestry Department had a specifically techni- increased threat of snow avalanches due to forest loss cal focus on sustaining and replenishing the world’s in the Swiss Alpine village of Andermatt in the 14th supply of timber in the aftermath of the Second century (Mather and Fairbairn 2000). World War. Despite good intentions, however, FAO The modern era of concern about forest sustain- was unable to halt the increasing loss of forest at the ability beyond a relatively local scale can be traced to global level. There were many reasons for this but a timber supply crisis in Europe 300 years ago. This two were particularly significant. First, FAO’s early crisis was caused by factors such as overcutting for efforts neglected the ecological requirements of the fuel (including for smelting mineral ores and glass- forests. This was due at least in part to its focus making), the use of timber for construction and in at the time on plantations of exotic timber species, mines, livestock grazing which prevented regenera- given the dominance of the maximum yield para- tion, and forest loss during the Thirty Years’ War. digm in many influential countries and FAO’s role Forest-dwelling people lost income, suffered from as a technical organisation under the direction of floods, soil erosion and avalanches, and lacked leaf its member countries (FAO 1945). Indeed, FAO’s litter for winter bedding, fodder and soil fertility. focus on plantations can still be seen in the highly The crisis led to the pursuit of ‘scientific forestry’, influential FAO definition of forest, which includes particularly in France, Germany and Switzerland. monoculture tree plantations (Lange 2004; also see Although scientific forestry was concerned primar- Sasaki and Putz 2007). Second, FAO was given no ily with timber demand and relied heavily on the mandate to address the causes of deforestation aris- quantification of predictable and sustainable timber ing outside the timber sector, such as the conversion yields, its principles took into account limitations in of forestland for agriculture (ibid.). the capacity of forests to regenerate, and there was In the US, however, in the 1950s and 1960s, a substantial ecological component (Maryudi 2005; competition for land increased, particularly in areas Hardcastle et al. 1998; Lowood 1990; Klose 1985; of population growth, causing the ‘maximum yield’ Knuchel 1953; also see Oosthoek 2000; Vierenklee paradigm to be superseded by a ‘multiple use’ ap- 1767; and von Carlowitz 1713). The scientific approach aimed at the sustained provision of an optimal proach was subsequently exported to many countries mix of dynamically varying products and services outside Europe (Barton 2002). However, the much for humans (McArdle 1960; US Government 1960; greater ecological complexity of certain forests else- Wiersum 1995). where, combined with limited ecological knowledge With continuing forest loss in other parts of the and, later, pressure to increase the return on capital world, particularly the loss of primary forest values, from the forest resource, meant that in many cases new concepts of forest sustainability such as ‘ecosys- it was much less effective in sustaining forests than tem-based forest management’, ‘new forestry’, and it was in Europe. ‘close-to-nature forestry’ emerged in the 1980s and Return on capital is the focus of ‘maximum yield’ 1990s. These based pursuit of sustainability of the forestry, which came to dominate in influential coun- forest resource on sound ecological models which tries, such as the US, where problems associated with included consideration of ecosystem complexity, the76 forest loss were not as visible as they were in Europe. adaptability and accountability of management prac- Under this approach, timber yield is maximised in the tices, the human role in achieving ecosystem sustain- short term for strategic or investment purposes. It is ability, and human needs within the constraints of driven by economics, in particular by competition for ecological objectives (Christensen et al. 1996). EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

5 FORESTS AND SUSTAINABILITY Most of the international and global institutions conflicting interests underlie differences in the inter-that address forest-related issues today were influ- pretation of SFM (Schanz 2004) and it is possibleenced, however, by the report of the Brundtland Com- that very influential sub-state actors have an interestmission (WCED 1987), which interpreted sustain- in paying lip-service to the ideal of practising SFMability through the lens of development, expressed without actually halting unsustainable practices onin the concept of ‘sustainable development’: meeting the ground. Indeed, debates over SFM during thethe needs of the present without compromising the negotiation of the NLBI indicated that some statesability of future generations to meet their own needs. were interested in omitting definitions of SFM alto-This definition rests on what has come to be called gether, in order to allow more leeway for their ownthe three pillars of sustainability – social, economic interpretations that perhaps have little to do withand environmental needs and values. sustaining forests (Davenport et al. 2007). Sustainable development became the theme ofthe 1992 United Nations Conference on Environmentand Development (UNCED) and a catchphrase in 5.2 Contrasting intergovern-multitudes of processes that stemmed from it. Theterm clearly implies that the environment is subordi- mental approaches to sustain-nate to human needs, as does ‘conservation’, a term ing forestsused in earlier environment-related negotiations.Reference to sustainable development was intended, Given existing definitional weaknesses of SFM,however, to help build a perception that environmen- it is little wonder that different conceptualisationstal concerns are part and parcel of human welfare and of sustainability have been formulated within twoof improving human welfare through development significant binding regime frameworks of relevanceand thus to increase global acceptance of the need to forests: the Convention on Biological Diversityfor environmental sustainability. (CBD) and the United Nations Framework Conven- The goal of sustainable forest management tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Global policy-(SFM), which became the guiding principle of for- making on biodiversity conservation has centred onestry today, builds on the three pillars of sustainable an ‘ecosystem approach’, not as a scientific term butdevelopment. Probably the most often-cited defini- as negotiated politically, to address sustainability intion of SFM is that formulated by the Ministerial all ecosystems, including forests.Conference for the Protection of Forests in Europe Forests are not mentioned specifically in the textin 1993 and later adopted by FAO. It is: of the CBD. There are, however, forest-relevant sections in the text and a CBD Forest Programme ofThe stewardship and use of forests and forest lands in Work; the latter was adopted in 1998 and expandeda way, and at a rate, that maintains their biodiversity, in 2002 to include both research and practical actionproductivity, regeneration capacity, vitality and their (CBD Secretariat 2010).potential to fulfil, now and in the future, relevant Both the CBD Conference of the Parties (COP)ecological, economic and social functions, at local, and FAO have addressed the relationship betweennational, and global levels, and that does not cause SFM and the ecosystem approach by generatingdamage to other ecosystems (MCPFE 1993). knowledge on it through research (e.g. Wilkie et al. 2003) and, in the case of the CBD COP, formallyWhile this definition itself leaves open many ques- recognising that:tions of how SFM should be achieved, the muchmore recent Non-legally Binding Instrument on All SFM, as developed within the framework establishedTypes of Forests, negotiated by the United Nations by the Rio Forest Principles, can be considered asForum on Forests in 2007, merely calls SFM “a dy- a means of applying the ecosystem approach to for-namic and evolving concept aim[ing] to maintain ests.and enhance the economic, social and environmental Decision VII/11, paragraph 7, 2004.value of all types of forests, for the benefit of presentand future generations”, a much weaker text. Given An international coalition of NGOs also recognisedthe ambiguity built into this definition of SFM, it is that:unsurprising that Global Witness (2009: 4) observesthat “many operations claiming to practice SFM fail There has been a widespread movement in Canadato achieve even sustained timber yields, let alone towards adopting sustainable forest managementsustainability with regard to other non-timber values in the broad sense, bringing consideration of othersuch as biodiversity”. values besides timber yields into forest management 77 Ultimately, SFM must be put into practice on planning. For example, emulation of natural distur-the ground by forest users and managers, depending bances has been incorporated into public policy inon their own priorities in different contexts. Various most jurisdictions as an approach intended to fos-EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

5 FORESTS AND SUSTAINABILITY ter ecosystem-based management. This approach is The potential effects of REDD funding on the compatible with the Ecosystem Approach enshrined economic and social pillars of sustainability are of in the CBD/POW. particular concern. Noting cases of violations of the (Global Forest Coalition 2008: 17) human rights of indigenous individuals who refuse to leave territories proposed as carbon sinks, the United Forest management practices have been addressed Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues has in a slightly different way within the global climate argued that proposed REDD mechanisms will lead change governance structure. Specifically, negotia- to the further exclusion of indigenous people from tions stemming from the 2007 Bali Action Plan have their forests and to the criminalisation of their tra- taken up consideration of “[p]olicy approaches and ditional livelihoods (UNPFII 2008). ‘Land grabs’ positive incentives on issues relating to reducing for carbon are already occurring in many countries emissions from deforestation and forest degrada- without consultation with local forest users (Vidal tion in developing countries [(REDD)]; and the role 2008). If traditional, legal activities are curtailed by of conservation, sustainable management of forests measures to maintain or enhance carbon stocks, it can [(SMF)] and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in be argued that there is a moral obligation to provide developing countries” (UNFCCC 2008: 3). The po- options for other livelihoods of at least equivalent tential inclusion in REDD of the role of conservation, value. SMF and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks in While free prior and informed consent (FPIC) is developing countries has been termed ‘REDD+’. now advocated by a number of entities promoting Braatz (2009) notes that SMF refers only to “the REDD, there can be no FPIC without an explanation application of forest management practices primarily of REDD in terms that are meaningful to stakehold- for sustaining carbon stocks over time”. Blaser and ers. REDD deals may not be explicit about the time Thompson (2010) favour including the wider concept periods over which they will run and the beneficia- of SFM, as applied in production forests, in REDD+ ries/sellers of carbon credits may not understand because unsustainable forest management degrades the notion of permanence associated with tempo- living biomass and reduces the carbon stocks in for- rary payments and time-limited contracts (Wittman ests, while natural forest that is managed sustain- and Caron 2009). Insurance companies involved ably for timber and non-wood products maintains all in carbon trading need to better explain the legal major functions related to the production of goods and financial consequences of such trading in cases and services, including the maintenance of carbon where there are either accidental or deliberate losses stocks, over time. of carbon stocks; those explanations that exist are These battles over labels have almost no reso- often not available in wording suitable for local com- nance outside convention halls or practical signifi- munities and therefore FPIC should not be claimed cance with regard to sustaining forests themselves. (although some countries do assert that FPIC has Politically, however, it matters which of these in- been obtained) (de Chavez and Tauli-Corpuz 2008; struments – with their various conceptualisations of Griffiths 2007). sustainability – guides forest-related activities and Even putting aside the questions that potential projects because it affects the distribution of donor REDD funding raises about power, influence and funds. Far more money is being pledged to support the prioritisation of some forest values over others, forest-related activities that address climate change forest sustainability – whether denoted as SFM or than to support any other forest values – although, the ecosystem approach – has not been well served as of mid 2010, only a few of these pledges have by any of the fully established international policy been converted into money flows (Broder and Rosen- instruments relevant to forests. This is evident from thal 2010; CFA 2010; Zwick 2010). Nonetheless, the poor forest practices that still dominate in many although climate-related funding for forest activities regions. Indeed, forest practices in some former may enhance the sustainability of other forest val- colonial territories are actually worse today than ues, these are considered only ‘co-benefits’, or side they were before independence, due to unfortunate benefits, of activities to mitigate or adapt to climate combinations of factors (see, for example, Kowero change (Angelsen et al. 2009). Conflict between et al. 2001). maximising the carbon sequestration potential of forests and other forest values is becoming increasingly heated (Humphreys 2008; White 2010). Within the UNFCCC, REDD will hinge on resolving these conflicts. Meanwhile the funding mechanisms for78 afforestation and reforestation in developing countries that already exist under the UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol have distributed very few funds for forest- related endeavours (Davenport et al. 2009). EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

5 FORESTS AND SUSTAINABILITY5.2.1 Differing interests and forest common goals, as has been demonstrated formallysustainability (Rapoport and Channah 1965). The pursuit of private gains rather than the common good may detrimentally affect maintenance of collective goods.The inability to sustain forest or to restore it when it This is true with regard to true public goods such asis lost is related to causes of deforestation and for- free trade, but even more so with regard to commonest degradation themselves. Forests are vulnerable goods that are depletable (Davenport 2006), as isto the effects of numerous drivers, usually arising the case with all environmental goods and servicesfrom competition for forest resources or for other re- and those provided by forests. There are abundantsources associated with the land on which the forest empirical examples of this phenomenon associatedsits. The Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (which with forests: over-exploitation for timber or otherexisted from 1995 to 1997) distinguished between forest products; clearance for industrial development,direct causes (i.e. forest conversion or deliberate urbanisation or other land uses such as palm, soy andmodification) and underlying causes (i.e. a series cattle production (Barraclough and Ghimire 2000;of causal events that result in an observed effect), Grainger 2009); and destruction by mining. Appliedstressing that the links are complex and vary greatly to forest management, then, sustainability might befrom country to country. Most of these drivers result defined as maximising the yield of the private goodsfrom human actions and interactions that embody and services that forests provide only insofar as thisdiffering interests in forest lands, combined in many does not lead to the degradation of the collectivecases with significant differences in power. goods and services provided by those forests (Hum- The desire to sustain a forest depends on whether phreys 2006).other interests exist, such as in converting forestland Forests have been called the “common heritagefor cultivation or another purpose or in obtaining a of mankind” (Kottary 1992, quoted in Davenportshort-term benefit from the unsustainable harvesting 2006:138) because of the global values they en-of forest products in the context of high discount compass. Yet unlike true global commons, forestsrates, as might be associated with imminent threats lie within territory claimed by sovereign states. Thisto survival. Wear et al. (1998: 350) point out that means that states themselves traditionally have the“in most cases it is not the value of forests that de- power to determine, within their borders, what for-termines whether land becomes forested [or defor- est practices are legal and whether they will be en-ested]; rather, it is the relative value of non-forest forced.uses of land”. Even a common interest in maintain- Superficially, sustainability and legality maying a forest does not obviate tensions, as there are seem congruent, but this may not always be the case.numerous, frequently incompatible, reasons for such Sustainability is a normative concept that must beinterest and no guarantee that they can all be met. defined and concretised by the legislator, a processTensions thus exist across a broad spectrum of for- that may not adequately capture its full meaning.est issues, between various interest groups. Indeed, Given inherent conflicts around the concept, such asin some areas, links between forests and open, vio- those between conservation and preservation, sus-lent conflict are increasingly recognised (e.g. IUCN tainability between generations and equity within2008; Wallace and Conca forthcoming). one generation, and the common good versus private In some cases, poverty at its most fundamental interests, policies and legal frameworks that do notlevel may necessitate the conversion of forest lands foster sustainability should not be dismissed simplyfor food production, leading to a broader question as demonstrating a lack of awareness or an arrogantof what must be sustained and what that requires. lack of concern for the multiple values of forests.Given widening gaps between rich and poor and Even where there is ostensible agreement on theincreasingly restrictive border controls that hinder need for sustainable forest practices, as well as onemigration from desperate conditions, it is unrealistic what these are and the need to enforce them, legalto expect that all extant forests will be sustained. frameworks may have the effect of marginalisingWithout significant effort to counter it, many for- or criminalising the activities of local communities.ests will inevitably be converted to agricultural land, For example, forest sustainability may be addressedregardless of the sustainability of such action and through the demarcation of legally protected areasregardless of whether such conversion will ultimately with restrictions on human access, thus making thelead to global ecological disaster. activities of locals communities ‘illegal’ (for exam- The sustainability of forests depends not only ples in India and Nepal see Blaikie et al. 2007; foron awareness of the need for forests or the myriad examples in Africa see Brockington 2002 and Daviesgoods and services they provide but also on how and Brown 2007). As already noted, this problem 79forest values can be safeguarded in a world where may resurface if forests are put aside as carbon sinksprivate actors try to maximise their self-interests. under the guise of climate change mitigation.Pursuit of self-interest conflicts with the pursuit of Legal frameworks that define acceptable and sus-EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

5 FORESTS AND SUSTAINABILITY tainable practices based on industrial forest manage- or permission, may be the norm, possibly based on ment models also sometimes criminalise traditional long-standing cultural rituals (Robbins 2000). In communities. In Brazil, the industrial model, with many countries “[i]t is common – indeed it is of- its many legal requirements and heavy regulations ten necessary in order to stay in business – to bribe governing large-scale forest industry, has also been enforcement officers and customs officials” (Clapp used as the basis for promoting community forestry, and Dauvergne 2005:170). National and sub-national even though its technical and organisational require- forest policies, forest product processing strategies, ments are often beyond the capacity of communi- laws and regulations, forest management manuals, ties (Benatti et al. 2003). Hajjar et al. (forthcoming) communications systems and training guides (often report cases in which traditional communities are developed by non-national technical experts hired hindered from practising family or community for- by donor agencies) may sit unused, in part because estry by a restricted interpretation of legality – if feudal patron-client relationships stultify objective they are unable to obtain legal management plans, technical approaches to forest management (Bryant selling wood from lands that they manage using and Bailey 1997; Ross 2001). traditional practices and low-impact manual labour It is common that natural forests in public owner- is considered illegal. Complicated bureaucracy and ship have complex arrays of resource access taxes the high costs involved in obtaining management which are irrationally low, set arbitrarily, rarely in- permits dampen the motivation to take the necessary dexed to inflation or currency movements, applied steps for legality; this is exacerbated by mistrust and according to political criteria, minimised through misunderstanding between the government and tradi- bribery or improperly negotiated foreign invest- tional communities and a lack of knowledge within ment arrangements, under-invoiced, rarely collected government of the extractivist lifestyle necessary for in full, or not penalised if paid late or under-paid survival in the forest. Traditional communities and (Grut et al. 1991). In practice, such tax arrangements the legal authorities have diverging definitions of may be intended to open under-the-table negotia- good forest management, resulting, in a few cases, tions between politicians, government agencies and in the criminalisation of what may be highly sustain- potential harvesters about who will pay how much able activities. to whom (Bulkan and Palmer 2008a, 2008b). This is Problems arising from domestic legal interpreta- far removed from recommendations for tax regimes tions of sustainability are often exacerbated by other that would help sustain forest resources and which issues related to governance. In many countries, for would 1) cover the full cost of administration and example, forest management systems have become field management of resources, including protection outdated with respect to demographic trends and against incorrect and illegal activities (Troup 1939) changes in the understanding of forest values. In and 2) compensate for the ‘nature’s bounty’ gained some developing countries, rural populations have from felling a natural forest with a standing volume quadrupled in the last 50 years, yet forest manage- accumulated over a very long period which cannot ment systems still seek (at least on paper) to max- be recovered economically in subsequent rotations or imise timber production. There may be a lack of felling cycles. In other words, nature’s bounty should capacity or political will to revise and adapt forest be taxed as a wasting asset like minable minerals, management systems to changing rural demograph- rather than as a renewable resource, while the prod- ics and urban demands, or indeed to address the need ucts from subsequent managed rotations are taxed ac- to sustain forests. This mismatch leads to ineffective cording to the costs of management (Penna 1999). forest management policies and procedures, which Current incompatibilities between government often also lead to lower production, with implica- policies and legal frameworks and forest sustainabil- tions for livelihoods and human survival (Westoby ity might be addressed by involving all stakeholders 1979). in decisions affecting forest sustainability. Transpar- Forest management concepts and systems de- ent debate can lead to effective consensus, at least at pend on a socio-economic environment in which the local level, particularly when actions beneficial to the rule of law is recognised and upheld impartially sustainability are supported by cost-benefit analyses and equitably. Corruption exists in all parts of the that include the internalisation of historically exter- world, its severity dependent on the extent to which nalised costs and show that benefits accrue to all (or private interests are privileged or are able to capture at least the most powerful) actors. For example, a particularistic benefits for themselves at the expense calculation that it is cheaper to constrain land uses in of the public interest (see, for example, Howlett and New York State water catchments than to build water- Rayner 1995 on clientelistic forest policy networks). filtration facilities makes stakeholder consensus less80 Corruption is particularly problematic where feudal difficult (Bulkan 2009). patron-client relations prevail, as in some develop- Problems arise when there is a lack of win-win ing countries. Bribery, in which business relations options. In such cases, one or more stakeholders may include gift-giving to induce favourable decisions dominate, imposing decisions that are not mutually EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

5 FORESTS AND SUSTAINABILITYacceptable and that favour their own interests over forests than on actively destroying them in orderthe interests of others or the common good. This to release land for the production of soya, cattle ormay lead disgruntled marginalised stakeholders to oil palm or for the extraction of minerals face evenseek gain, such as by harvesting timber, when and fewer controls, especially when their activities arewhere they can. The alienation experienced by forest viewed favourably by national political elites (Hum-stakeholders is often a key reason for high deforesta- phreys 2006).tion and forest degradation rates. Although deforesta- The power of the market has stirred the creationtion would not necessarily cease if all stakeholders of certification schemes with the purpose of using thehad equal decision-making power, it is frequently an timber market as a source of funding for sustainingoutcome of power disparity. non-timber values in timber-producing forests. This has several limitations, however. For example, there is only limited consumer willingness to pay a premi- um in order to preserve wider forest values, and even5.2.2 Power, money and sustainability then only in certain, primarily developed, countries. Attempts to reform forest management practices inThe effects of competing interests in forests de- forests used for timber production through market-pend on the relative power of the actors: that is, the related instruments such as the voluntary, indepen-imbalance of resources between the various actors dent, third-party certification of forest managementwho vie for use of forests. Asymmetries in wealth, (see below) promise some success if market accesseconomic status or other forms of power influence is sustained or enhanced. Schemes for the verifi-how forest lands are used and affect perceptions of cation of legal origin and law compliance, such assustainability and the prospects for its achievement. the recent amendment to the Lacey Act in the USHistorically, material benefits from forest lands have and new illegal timber regulations in the EU (Blackmainly been limited to profits from timber production 2010; Brack 2007, 2010) are also having an effector the conversion of forest land to other uses (such as on reducing the amount of illegally harvested timberagriculture, industrial development or urbanisation). in the international market (Lawson and MacFaulThose who stand to benefit from deforestation, such 2010). However, timber-related market instrumentsas the mining industry, also frequently hold more have little role in sustaining forests that contain noeconomic, and thus political, power than those who commercially valuable timber because they cannothave more interest in forest sustainability. To the ex- address the primary source of degradation and foresttent that realising private gains may conflict with the loss in many tropical countries – the use of wood forachievement of a common good, the greater power fuel – nor the most significant causes of deforesta-of actors seeking private gains may detrimentally tion elsewhere which come from outside the for-affect the maintenance of collective goods. est sector, such as the more economically powerful The consent of government is necessary before mining sector.forest businesses can legally operate, and in the world Funding for sustaining forests can also come insystem of state sovereignty it is the government of the form of direct payments for forest goods and ser-a state that is ultimately responsible for protecting vices other than timber. Environmental economistsand upholding the common good within its terri- have attempted to develop methodologies to valuetory. However, the economic power that business the externalised costs and benefits of forest goodscan bring to bear in its dealings with government and services and instruments to internalise them inmay provide an opportunity to wield political influ- market mechanisms. It should be noted, however,ence, particularly in situations of poverty or great that the forest value of overwhelmingly greatest in-economic disparity. Businesses, of course, seek pri- terest is of course carbon absorption. The interna-vate gain, in the form of profit. The corporate drive tional community’s sense of urgency about climatefor expansion and profit and the resistance of many change contrasts with its relative lack of interest inbusinesses to regulation have combined to drive other forest values, such as in providing habitat. Thislogging-led deforestation in many countries in the explains, in part, the huge interest in funding theAsia-Pacific (Dauvergne 1997, 1998, 2001). In most maintenance or enhancement of climate-associatedcases, businesses have more power than local com- forest values. Interest in forest carbon is also linkedmunity groups whose interests are often more aligned to market power, as it is expected that a mandatorywith preservation of the multitude of forest values. market for carbon credits produced through REDD Sears et al. (2001) argue that although the timber will be created and economically powerful investorsindustry has been targeted by the international for- are interested in profiting from this. Such a market,est regime, it has proved adept at avoiding pressure however, risks skewing REDD funding towards for- 81to balance the quest for short-term profits with the est systems that absorb more carbon than those thatlong-term requirements of SFM. Businesses whose are valuable for other reasons, to the possible detri-profit-making activities depend less on sustaining ment, for example, of high-biodiversity habitats.EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

5 FORESTS AND SUSTAINABILITY Box 5.1 The three pillars of SFM Balancing the economic, social and environmental Such an approach may not achieve the full sustain- functions of forests is difficult. Using financial re- ability of all forest goods and services (including turn as the sole guiding principle of management biodiversity) at all locations, but at the landscape leads to short-rotation monocultures established at level sustainability may be achieved. A landscape minimum cost. Yet poor outcomes can also result approach requires planning and management at from the neglect of economic and environmental is- large spatial and long temporal scales (Blaser and sues. For instance, excessive focus on social aspects Thompson 2010). may lead to sub-optimal yields and insignificant In Central Africa, for example, distinctions are benefits from collaborative forest management. being made between the economic, social and eco- Many nations and sub-national jurisdictions are logical functions of forests in most forest legislation adopting a zoning approach to managing their for- and regulations, and forest lands are being allocated est landscapes (e.g. Hunter and Calhoun 1996) that for specific purposes. The key task is to develop involves protected areas and extensively and inten- models of SFM that balance the three sustainability sively managed forests, including planted forests. pillars at the national level. Efforts to protect and enhance non-commodified challenge is how to balance the three pillars of SFM, values of forests can come in the form of non-market- given that the pursuit of any one pillar may conflict driven aid or subventions from multiple sources at with the pursuit of one or both of the others. In some both the national and international levels (FAO 2008). areas, such a balance has been pursued at the national Such assistance always depends, at least partly, on scale (Box 5.1). the priorities of funders, whether they are govern- The operationalisation of SFM has also been mental, intergovernmental or private. For instance, attempted through numerous regional initiatives to non-market-based, forest-related funding is available develop criteria and indicators (C&I) for assessing for carbon sequestration and storage (for example, forest practices on the ground. Attempts to define Wittman and Caron 2009 report that an electricity C&I originated with the ITTO process to develop company in a developed country is paying farmers C&I for the sustainable management of natural tropi- in the tropics for planting and maintaining additional cal forests, which began in 1989. The momentum of trees); biodiversity protection (for example, conser- sub-global C&I initiatives* accelerated in the acri- vation donors are paying landowners to set aside or monious aftermath of UNCED (see, for example, restore areas to create biological corridors; see Dud- Box 5.2), when uncertainty existed on whether forest ley et al. 2005); watershed protection (for example, policy would ever again be discussed at the global Ortega-Pacheco et al. 2009 report that downstream level (Davenport 2006). These international C&I ini- water users are paying upstream farmers to adopt tiatives have served as models for national or sub- land uses that limit deforestation, soil erosion and national standards, adapted to varying circumstances flooding risks); or landscape beauty (for example, and priorities, in many countries (Prabhu et al. 1999), tourism operators are paying local communities not but few have actually been applied systematically to hunt in forest used for tourist wildlife viewing; or addressed in legal reforms or codes of practice see Nasi et al. 2002). (Lindstadt and Solberg 2010). In general, however, aid has not been associated Many C&I schemes share similar principles, but with decreased forest loss or degradation. Attempts there are differences in thematic emphasis reflect- to reform the socio-economic context through techni- ing different balances between the social/cultural, cal aid projects have been largely unsuccessful or of economic and environmental pillars of sustainable short duration; attempts to redress this by focusing on development. They also exhibit diversity in their con- forest policy have neglected technical aspects (see, tent and structure (Pokorny and Adams 2003), defor example, Fruhling and Persson 2001; Hardcastle velopment and implementation (Mrosek et al. 2006), 2005; LTS 2003). and monitoring and reporting requirements (Gough et al. forthcoming; Hickey and Innes 2006). The various C&I processes were intended to pro- 5.3 Enhancing the effectiveness vide a common understanding of SFM for specific of international forest governance * Prominent processes include the Helsinki (MCPFE) Process82 for development of pan-European C&I, the Montreal Process All of the factors considered above have had some on C&I for temperate and boreal forests, the Tarapoto Pro- influence on the lack of effectiveness of international cess for Amazonian forests, and the Lepaterique Process for forest governance in actually sustaining forests. The Central America. EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

5 FORESTS AND SUSTAINABILITYBox 5.2 The ATO/ITTO principles, criteria and indicators In 1995, the African Timber Organization (ATO) for evaluating and monitoring the forest policy ad- started a process to develop regional principles, cri- opted by each ATO/ITTO member state. It focuses teria and indicators (PCI), based on the ITTO C&I. on measures taken by governments within their legal Supported by the international community, in par- and institutional mandates to favour SFM. ticular the European Union, France and the Center Principles 2–4 allow for the monitoring, evalua- for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), the tion and planning of forest management at the forest ATO produced a set of PCI applicable to African management unit (FMU) level. They address the natural tropical forest in 2000. In 2001 the ATO and sustainable supply of required goods and services ITTO engaged in an initiative to harmonise their (Principle 2), the maintenance of the main ecologi- respective PCIs. The harmonised set was published cal forest functions (Principle 3), and the contri- in 2003. bution of forest management to the economic and The ATO/ITTO PCI for the Sustainable Manage- social well-being of concession workers and local ment of African Natural Tropical Forests consists of populations (Principle 4). four principles. Principle 1 provides a frameworkforest types and to provide a common framework Stewardship Council (FSC) and the Programme forfor describing, assessing and evaluating the progress Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC). Theof countries towards SFM (Grayson and Maynard PEFC functions as a way of directly putting the vari-1997). Efforts have been made to apply indicators ous intergovernmental C&I into effect at the FMUdeveloped at the regional and national scales to the level, while the FSC principles, criteria and indica-smaller scale of the forest management unit (FMU) tors (PCI) move even further from the maximum-(Prabhu et al. 1999). Many analysts argue that C&I yield timber production paradigm, particularly inprocesses have been a success because they have terms of stakeholder participation (FSC 2010).led to the re-evaluation of forest management and to These certification schemes differ from C&I pro-progress in assessing and communicating successes cesses in being mostly private or non-state-drivenand failures in management (Prabhu et al. 2001). and have increasing influence in the validation of There has also been criticism, however, of ‘SFM SFM on the ground. A number of government-ledas C&I’, part of which comes from those who believe certification schemes have also been put in place.that C&I have been created by top-down approaches Interestingly, rather than these usurping or water-of questionable relevance to local or decentralised ing down the certification requirements of privateforest management (e.g. Hajjar et al. 2009; Karjala schemes, in several countries the opposite has beenand Dewhurst 2003; and see Box 5.3). Others con- true. For example, the United Kingdom Forest Stan-tend that indicators have been selected on the basis dard is fully compatible with FSC standards (seeof political expediency, data availability and ease Box 5.4).of measurement rather than informational content Nevertheless, certification schemes share some(Brang et al. 2002) or need, and that forest practi- of the problematic aspects of C&I processes. Whattioners have avoided using indicators that are expen- is measured is an issue: should indicators measuresive to monitor (Gough et al. forthcoming). Due to the appropriateness of ‘processes’, or the degree ofthe complexities confronting efforts to define SFM achievement of appropriate ‘outcomes’, or both? For(Gough et al. 2008), C&I processes can quickly be- example, since 1994 Cameroon has made improve-come mired in enormous ‘laundry lists’ of possible ments in its forestry laws, one measure of this be-indicators for a broad spectrum of values (Gustavson ing the increasing number of approved managementet al. 1999). They do not give guidance on balancing plans in effect. However, a study by Cerutti et al.conflicting objectives in forest management, nor on (2008) finds that the government has not succeededthe “causal link between international policy recom- in implementing effective minimum sustainabilitymendations and national situation” (Lindstad and safeguards and that, through a combination of a legalSolberg 2010:188). loophole and poor oversight, almost 70 percent of timber production in 2006 was conducted as if no improved management rules were in place. A deeper issue is the possibility that the pro-5.3.1 SFM through certification cesses of developing arrangements for monitoring may undermine the trust relationships that must existForest certification systems have developed along- in order for the practices being monitored to function 83side the more general C&I processes for operation- appropriately (McDermott forthcoming). Demandalising SFM at the FMU level. Most certification is for legalistic approaches is frequently driven by dis-done under one of two global schemes, the Forest trust based on perceptions of value differences andEMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

5 FORESTS AND SUSTAINABILITY Box 5.3 C&I processes vs. community forest management Difficulties can arise in applying national or inter- Aboriginal peoples in C&I has been criticised on national-level C&I to forest operations of different the grounds that Aboriginal issues are unique and scales, tenure systems and management intensities, require their own criterion (National Aboriginal even within the same country or region. This is Forestry Association 1995). Hajjar et al. (2009), especially so for the increasing area of forest land however, demonstrate that C&I cannot adequately coming under indigenous and other community address the unique worldview of traditional and control (White and Martin 2002). C&I created Aboriginal forest operations. The high regard that through top-down approaches tend to favour in- traditional and Aboriginal people have for local, dustrial forestry; most were created as part of a historical and qualitative knowledge and for rela- push for more sustainable industrial practices and tionships among people and between humans and reflect more concern over the impacts of forest op- nature, and their spatial integration of land, water erations on local communities than the needs of and forest management, make it difficult to silo community-run forestry operations (Hajjar et al. and categorise their values as they are presented 2009). Their usefulness to communities may there- in existing C&I. fore be questioned. Some work has been done to develop C&I for Internationally, consideration is being given to local-level or joint forest management initiatives small and low intensity managed forests (SLIMFs) (Pokharel and Suvedi 2007; Sherry et al. 2005); less through the Forest Stewardship Council, but this is has been done to allow for the unique management mostly limited to calls for less monitoring to reduce structure of community-owned or -managed forest the costs of certification (see below) and for the operations (Pokharel and Suvedi 2007). Hajjar et al. adaptation of national standards to low management (2009) conclude that while C&I are useful for de- intensity situations. The unique characteristics of fining and monitoring management practices, they community-managed forest operations and tradi- must be updated to reflect growing global recogni- tional and indigenous management practices are tion of the importance of community-based forest often not reflected in national and regional C&I, management. Gough et al. (forthcoming), meanwhile such top-down templates are themselves while, caution that the highly contextualised nature criticised for not generating information specific of communitarian discourses makes it difficult to enough to address local issues (Karjala and Dew- find commonalities between local definitions of hurst 2003). sustainability in order to build SFM policy up to The Canadian approach to participation of the national or sub-national level. Box 5.4 LEI–FSC harmonisation When the Indonesian Ecolabelling Institute (LEI) Although it successfully certified an Indonesian was created as early as 1995 it was criticised by forest company (van Assen 2005), the joint pro- NGOs who feared that FSC standards would be gramme was terminated in 2005 (Maryudi 2009). watered down in order to pay lip-service to certi- While LEI had started to gain international recog- fication for marketing purposes. The LEI and the nition in core markets (e.g. the United Kingdom – FSC were indeed different initially (Elliott 2000), Stringer 2006), its subordination to the FSC in the the former having been established with strong sup- partnership was the subject of concern (MPA-LEI port from the Indonesian government and business 2009). Meanwhile, the fact that the jointly certified groups, who set visibly more flexible standards than company continued to receive complaints against its those of the FSC. However, facilitated by changes certification dampened the interest of other forest in the Indonesian polity which enabled the separa- companies in engaging in the programme (Maryudi tion of LEI from government influence (Maryudi 2005; Valentinus and Counsell 2002), which did not 2005), the two schemes signed an agreement in benefit the FSC. 2001 to launch a unique programme with jointly Despite the ending of the collaboration, LEI has agreed standards for certifying Indonesia’s natu- maintained the improved standards brought about ral forests (van Assen 2005). Through this joint by its partnership with the FSC. In fact, several in- programme the LEI attained exposure to interna- dependent assessments (e.g. Hinrichs and Prasetyo tional timber markets, while the FSC attained wider 2007; Maryudi 2009) have noted that the LEI is still84 adoption of its certification standards by Indonesian on par with the FSC in terms of meeting require- forest companies. The collaboration facilitated the ments for credible forest management and chain of harmonisation of the certification standards of the custody. As of mid 2010, discussions between FSC two bodies (Maryudi 2005). and LEI are continuing. EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

5 FORESTS AND SUSTAINABILITYa resultant desire to control distrusted actors. Such more 1998).approaches are likely to be counter-productive by Variation in forest resilience also implies differ-decreasing opportunities for the voluntary coopera- ences in their vulnerability to the effects of climatetion and trust-building which are necessary if actors change. Definitions of SFM need to be adjustedwith perceived value differences are to “create new according to forest type but also to accommodatearenas of shared meaning” (Sitkin and Roth 1993, environmental changes. Managers of some types ofcited in McDermott forthcoming: 5). Ultimately, this forest will have to adapt their practices according toprocess “leads to the desire for control and coercion changes caused by climate-induced shifts in ecosys-among all conflicting parties” (McDermott forthcom- tem dynamics (Innes et al. 2009).ing:7) and is reduced to a question of power – whose With regard to the economic and social pillarsjudgments carry more weight? (the ‘human’ pillars) of sustainability, it has been Finally, in the absence of broader enforceable amply shown that where the sustainability of for-land-use policies, no scheme or process that focuses ests conflicts with, or is perceived to conflict with,on forest management – and even less those that other human needs, forest sustainability will not befocus only on forests producing for the international prioritised.timber market – can address the causes of deforesta- Just as there are differences in forest types thattion that originate outside the forest sector, particu- are currently not addressed in attempts to definelarly forest conversion for agriculture or industrial and operationalise SFM, there are also differencesor urban development, or forest destruction caused in human social and economic needs (see Box 5.5).by mining. ‘Forested land’ and ‘forest’ are frequently regarded as separate resources: in cases of hunger for land, forest is seen simply as an obstacle to cultivation. Especially in densely populated countries, forests5.3.2 Achieving SFM will not be sustained unless they provide for human needs to a greater extent than would alternative usesAscertaining achievement of SFM depends on the of the land (Schenk et al. 2007).ability to measure progress on all three pillars of Frequently, however, the economic and social pil-sustainability. There are obstacles to creating vi- lars of sustainability are pursued through measuresable SFM measurement efforts, however, not least that may have unintended or even perverse effects,because of the problems that exist in attempting to or are neglected altogether. For instance, humandefine SFM at a global level. survival requires technical understanding of forest The robustness of the environmental pillar of systems as well as what is required for human sur-SFM is determined by the question of what practices vival. Many efforts and projects to implement SFMare necessary to ensure the survival of a particular have wasted time and resources, and many attemptsecosystem. The problem is that ‘one size’ does not to regenerate or restore forests have failed, due to a‘fit all’; the appropriateness of specific approaches lack of technical knowledge (Davenport 2009).to achieving SFM depends on forest type. Tropi- For example, global forest governance entitiescal forests are much more complex and fragile than such as the UNFF and the ITTO encourage the har-European temperate forests and also vary in their vesting of NTFPs as a livelihood alternative to timbervulnerability to loss or degradation due human activ- harvesting (or forest destruction for agriculture ority (Sands 2005; Whitmore 1998). mining). However, NTFPs have not generally proven Forests differ widely in their capacity to produce to be sufficiently remunerative to obviate the need todesirable products and services, their accessibility to exploit timber resources as well (Whitmore 1998).humans, and, from an environmental standpoint, the Nor does the harvesting of NTFPs rather than tim-natural resilience to disturbance of the ecosystem ber ensure forest sustainability; NTFPs can also beof which they form a part. Forests are dynamic and overharvested, although little attention has been paidhave evolved in response to environmental factors to this phenomenon to date (Ninon 2007; Wong etsuch as climate fluctuations, fire, earthquakes, floods al. 2001).and pests; in broad terms, the natural resilience of a ‘Full stakeholder participation’ in resourceforest ecosystem correlates with the level of natural management decisions (see Costanza et al. 1997)disturbance to which it is subject. A high frequency is also linked to addressing the survival needs ofof disturbances caused by fire, floods, hurricanes or forest-dwelling people. Yet participation does notearthquakes leads to highly resilient forests – such necessarily imply forest sustainability because itas the savannas of East Africa (Robertson 1984) and cannot be assumed that those who value standingthe forests of the Yucatan Peninsula. A low frequency forests most will hold sway in a truly participatory 85of disturbance can produce stable ecosystems, such decision-making process. In addition, participationas the wet forests of Central and West Africa, but carries heavy time costs for individuals and com-these may be less resilient to abrupt change (Whit- munities who must work to survive, especially asEMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

5 FORESTS AND SUSTAINABILITY Box 5.5 SFM in Rwanda and Gabon Rwanda, the most densely settled country in Africa loss rate is negligible and has been so for more (384/km²) has less than 10% of its land area under than 20 years. natural forest. Forest produce for the highly rural Both countries aim to secure SFM but the differ- (80%) population comes mainly from exotic trees ences in forest type, dependency and use mean that planted in and around farms. Gross domestic prod- while the principles may be similar, the application uct (GDP) per capita (PPP) is USD 738. Following will be very different. The balance of interests, the severe forest loss, the situation has now stabilised relative importance of production and service val- with an active tree planting programme and a sys- ues and the whole system of management will all be tem setting aside the remaining natural forest in at opposite ends of the spectrum of what constitutes protected areas. sustainability; SFM must be interpreted to take ac- Gabon is one of the least heavily settled (5/km²), count of these differences while maintaining its has only 16% rural population and a GDP per capita wider aims (FAO 2009; Hardcastle forthcoming). (PPP) of USD 14 208. Forest cover is 84% and the rewards for participating may be neither immediate levels, with appreciation of specific requirements for nor material. There are also costs in providing infor- sustaining forests of different types in various eco- mation at an appropriate level to ensure that FPIC logical and human contexts. For example, the envi- requirements are actually met (LTS 2003). This is ronmental pillar of sustainability suggests that forests not to say that some interests should not have a voice of most value for biodiversity should be conserved on resource management decisions – although build- to secure these biodiversity values. This would also ing democratic institutions requires building trust in meet the requirements of the economic pillar if the government to represent and be accountable to the economic value of not logging biodiversity-rich, in- interests of communities (Jordan 2001). Efforts to tact natural forest exceeded the value obtained from rely on direct participation as a ‘default’ in all cases logging them (Davenport 2009). Giving biodiversity may have the perverse effect of undermining efforts the highest priority in natural forests might also meet toward political development more generally (Dahl the requirements of the social pillar if it is politically 1989; Hardcastle et al. 2010a). more acceptable to a wide cross-section of society The most significant potential influence on for- than alternatives. est sustainability is the expected infusion of re- There have been recent initiatives to develop sources at the intergovernmental level in relation to context-specific C&I such as ITTO’s C&I, noted ear- the REDD mechanism currently under discussion lier. Perusal of such C&I processes shows, however, within the UNFCCC framework. If REDD monies that they have not fully tackled all context-specific increase the likelihood that leaving forests standing issues, such as the relative level of subsistence use, will be favoured over alternative land uses then they the regeneration ecology of the forest type, the pro- have the potential to increase forest sustainability. portion of species producing timber, or the relative Yet safeguards remain to be agreed and enforced for importance of NTFPs. Meanwhile, reporting burdens ensuring that other forest benefits and values, includ- related to forests are increasing. The international ing social values, are not swept aside in the pursuit forest governance processes related to forests en- of greenhouse gas reductions. Given that some key compasses numerous schemes for assessing not only REDD negotiators are climate scientists rather than progress toward SFM, as discussed above, but also foresters or land-use planners, there is a risk that other more specific aspects of sustainability such as forest values other than carbon sequestration will the legality of harvested and traded timber and the be shortchanged.* state of biodiversity and carbon sources and sinks. Achieving truly sustainable forest management Assessments are required at both national and sub- requires recognition of different forest contexts. Yet national levels. However, the increasing burden of context is rarely noted in discussions and proposals reporting is inadequately addressed in capacity- within international governance bodies. Global forest building and technical and financial assistance at governance entities can improve their effectiveness the intergovernmental level. on the ground if the huge diversity of forest ecosys- On the other hand, it should be noted that while tems is acknowledged and addressed at the highest the burden of reporting related to the forest sector is huge, products that originate from mining (for86 example) carry no such reporting obligations, nor is there evidence at the intergovernmental level of * Interview with a national head of delegation to the UN pressure for them to do so. Yet, in some contexts, Climate Conference, Bonn, 9 June 2010. mining is a major cause of forest loss. It is well EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

5 FORESTS AND SUSTAINABILITYknown that international attention on forest practices often reflecting conflicts of interests and powercontrasts sharply with a relative lack of concern over asymmetries amongst forest users. Since everyonethe environmental and social impacts of mining (see, wants to appear to be acting ‘sustainably’, conceptsfor example, ITTO 2003). The lack of international of sustainability are developed accordingly. How-oversight or control of mining and the relative in- ever, the intergovernmental instruments whose focuseffectiveness of NGOs and indigenous peoples in is forests themselves overwhelmingly support theexposing the impacts of mining have been linked to concept of SFM as a key tool for sustaining forests.the fact that, in many countries, the economic power Specific ideas for improving the utility of SFM as aof the mining industry is far greater than that of the tool for sustaining forests are currently under con-forest sector (Hardcastle et al. 2010b). sideration in some national and intergovernmental Given limitations on resources, there is new inter- contexts, including the refinement of indicators ofest among some governments in ideas for reducing progress in varying contexts and measures to sup-the reporting burden with regard to forests for those port those who are responsible for both SFM and itswith least capacity and resources, most commonly assessment on the ground.countries where progress towards SFM has been least Perhaps the greatest challenge that SFM cur-and which often have the most ecologically complex rently faces is the development of forest-relatedforests. Ideas being considered include: programmes with potentially competing goals. With burgeoning global interest in sustaining forests in● The identification of a minimum number of out- relation to climate-change mitigation and adapta- come-based indicators, such as a set of key bio- tion, there is an increased need to refine SFM at the diversity indicators or locally relevant indicators intergovernmental level into a more effective tool for of human well-being. sustaining forests and all forest values.● Risk-based assessments using a minimum number of critical indicators – failure to meet standards would trigger a more detailed assessment of sub- References sidiary indicators to identify where deficiencies lie. Angelsen, Arild, Maria Brockhaus, Markku Kanninen, Erin Sills, William D. Sunderlin, and Sheila Wertz-Kanounnikoff. 2009. Realising REDD+: National Strategy and Policy Options.5.4 Conclusions Bogor Barat, CIFOR. Banuri, Tariq, and Frederique Apffel Marglin. 1993. 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5 FORESTS AND SUSTAINABILITY an overview. World Development 33: 1383–1402. Westoby, Jack. 1979. Forest industries for socio-economic devel-Troup, Robert Scott. 1939. Colonial forest administration. Oxford: opment. Commonwealth Forestry Review 58(2): 107–116. Oxford University Press. White, Andy. 2010. Ensuring Systems of Standards, SafeguardsUNFCCC 2008. Report of the Conference of the Parties on its and Recourse Mechanisms. Paper presented at 4th Rights thirteenth session, held in Bali from 3 to 15 December 2007. and Resources Initiative Dialogue on Forests, Governance Addendum Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the and Climate Change, London, 6 April 2010. Parties at its thirteenth session. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1*, White, Andy, and Alejandra Martin. 2002. Who Owns the World’s 14 March 2008. Available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/ Forests? Forest Tenure and Public Forests in Transition. For- docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf#page=3. [Cited 16 Oct est Trends, Washington, D.C. 2010]. Whitmore, Timothy C. 1998. An Introduction to Tropical RainUNPFII 2008. UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues State- Forests (2nd Edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press. ment on Biodiversity and Climate Change, 23 May 2008. Wiersum, Freerk. K. 1995. 200 years of sustainability in for- CBD 9th Conference of the Parties, Bonn, Germany. estry: lessons from history. Environmental Management 19:US Government 1960. United States of America, Multiple Use 321–329. Sustained Yield Act 1960. Public Law 86–517; Approved Wilkie, Mette Loyche, Peter Holmgren, and Froylan Castaneda. June 12, 1960. 2003. Sustainable Forest Management and the EcosystemValentinus, Arbi, and Simon Counsell. 2002. PT. Diamond Raya Approach: Two Concepts, One Goal. Forest Management Timber, Indonesia Case Study 9. In Trading in Credibility: Working Paper. Rome: FAO. The Myth and Reality of the Forest Stewardship Council, ed. Wittman, Hannah K., and Cynthia Caron. 2009. Carbon offsets Simon Counsell and Kim Terje Loraas l. Rainforest Founda- and inequality: social costs and co-benefits in Guatemala and tion UK., 136–143. Sri Lanka. Society and Natural Resources 22: 710–726.Van Assen, Bart Willem. 2005. Diamond Raya Timber Conces- Wong Jenny L.G., Kirsti Thomber, and Nell Baker. 2001. Re- sion: Diamonds are Forever. In In search of excellence: source assessment of non-wood forest products: Experience exemplary forest management in Asia and the Pacific, ed. and biometric principles. NWFP Series 13. Rome: FAO. Patrick B. Durst, Chris Brown, Henrylito D. Tacio, and Mi- Young, Anthony, and Peter Brown. 1962. The Physical Environ- yuki Ishikawa. RAP Publication 2005/02. FAO Regional ment of Northern Nyasaland. Zomba, Malawi: Government Office for Asia and the Pacific (FAO RAP) and Regional Printer. Community Forestry Training Center for Asia and the Pacific Zwick, Steve. 2010. REDD+ Partnership Talks Stall in Blur of (RECOFTC), Bangkok, 303–314. Finger-Pointing. Ecosystem Marketplace. 7 October. Avail-Vidal, John. 2008. The great green land grab. The Guardian. 13 able at: http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/ February. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environ- dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=7757&section=news_ ment/2008/feb/13/conservation. [Cited 1 Nov 2010]. articles&eod=1. [Cited 1 Nov 2010].Vierenklee, Johann Ehrenfried. 1767. Mathematische Anfangs- gründe der Arithmetik und Geometrie, in so fern solche denjenigen, die sich dem höchstnötigen Forstwesen auf eine vernünftige und gründliche Weise widmen wollen, zu wissen nöthig sind. Leipzig: Weidmanns Erben und Reich.von Carlowitz, Hans Carl 1713. Sylvicultura oeconomica, oder haußwirthliche Nachricht und Naturmäßige Anweisung zur wilden Baum-Zucht.Wallace, Jennifer, and Ken Conca. Forthcoming. Building Peace through Sustainable Forest Management in Asia: Lessons Learned from USAID Initiatives. In Building Peace or Spoil- ing the Future: Managing High-Value Resources in Post- Conflict Countries, ed. Päivi Lujala and Siri Aas Rustad. London: Earthscan.WCED (World Commission on Environment and Development). 1987. The Report of the UN World Commission on Environ- ment and Development: Our Common Future.Wear, David N., Robert Abt, and Robert Mangold. 1998. People, space, time: factors that will govern forest sustainability. Transactions of the 63rd North American Wildlife and Natu- ral Resources Conference,1998 March 20–25, Orlando, FL. Washington, DC: Wildlife Management Institute, 348–361. 91EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

6 Overcoming the challenges to integration: embracing complexity in forest policy design through multi-level governance Coordinating lead author: Michael Howlett Lead author: Jeremy Rayner Contributing authors: Daniela Goehler, Eva Heidbreder, Frederic Perron-Welch, Olivier Rukundo, Patrick Verkooijen and Christoph Wildburger Abstract: Forest policy at the international level suffers from both difficulties in securing agreement on policy goals as well as a lack of implementation on the ground. Attempts to respond to these problems through repeated efforts at top-down regime redesign have so far had little success. Even though many continue to argue that creation of a new treaty-based international regime might be an optimal solution, it remains an unrealistic option given the highly fragmented institutional architecture of the existing mix of international agreements, the multiple interests of public and private actors, and the complex policy problems that need to be addressed in the sector. Rather than persist in advocating exclusively for the creation of a treaty-based top-down regime, this chapter argues that reformers should, rather, embrace complexity and design incremental additions or ‘patches’ to the existing mix of regime elements which can help overcome their problems of fragmentation and poor policy coordination. Some regional organisations have successfully applied new governance instruments to existing mixes in such a fashion and lessons can be drawn from those experiences. Examples from the European Union and ASEAN in particular illustrate the potential of this decentralized approach to global forest policy design. Keywords: International governance, governance regimes, international forest regimes, regime complexes, fragmentation, subsidiarity. ■6.1 Introduction again as discussed in Chapter 3, it includes elements that were designed to address a wide variety of policyInternational forest governance arrangements are goals. Second, as shown in Chapter 5, each of thenot based on a single instrument that places legally elements is supported by various political groupings,binding obligations on signatory states. Rather, as making them resistant to redesign and reorientationshown in Chapter 2, the existing international regime towards new goals (McDermott et al. 2007; Pülzlis composed of multiple international agreements, 2009; Tarasofsky 1999). Third, what currently existssome with an explicit focus on forests and some that in terms of an international forest regime is embed-address forest-related issues indirectly. As argued in ded in the larger context of global forest governance,Chapter 3, it is a heterogeneous mix of soft and hard which includes all the global environmental and so-law and is more properly termed a ‘regime complex’ cial governance arrangements discussed in chaptersthan a ‘regime’, per se. 2 and 3. Fourth, neither the international regime itself Several important characteristics of these exist- nor the larger governance framework can be thought 93ing international governance arrangements can be of as ‘designed’; they are better described as broadlyidentified. First, the existing mix of elements has self-organising and as the unintended outcomes of adeveloped incrementally over a number of years and, variety of separate initiatives undertaken over severalEMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

6 OVERCOMING THE CHALLENGES TO INTEGRATION... decades. And, fifth, chapters 2, 3 and 4 have shown that an idea around which the various policy elements “The policy market faces the following situation. could be recombined into an integrated, intentional On the demand side, contemporary problems are design remains elusive. Neither ideas generated complex and inter-related, defying treatment by within the more narrowly defined understanding of means either of narrow, sectoral policies or of all- the international forest regime, such as sustainable encompassing, super-policies. On the supply side, forest management (SFM), nor those generated by numerous policies, related to particular aspects of attempts to incorporate forest-related policy elements one of more of these problems, exist.” into a larger governance assemblage dealing with issues such as biodiversity conservation or climate- This, she notes, means it is often “unnecessary to change mitigation, are able to function as a normative devise new policies each time a problem arises.” foundation for the (re)design of international forest Policymakers rather often can achieve efficiency policymaking. gains through the integration of existing policies; Within this context, this chapter presents a range reconciling overlaps and duplication between policy of alternatives which aim to balance the integration elements. In so doing they seek consistency and co- and fragmentation of key policy elements in the herency in the creation of ‘new’ governance strate- development of a new global forest governance ar- gies that address interrelated policy problems using chitecture which transcends an emphasis on interna- modifications to existing policy components. tional treaty-making and top-down regime formation. While most of the academic work on policy inte- First we focus conceptually on various dimensions gration has been done at the domestic level, interna- of integration to generate criteria for assessing the tional policymaking faces many similar situations in potential effectiveness of a regime complex (Keo- which complex problems must be addressed amid a hane and Victor 2010; Underdal 2004). Next, we wide variety of existing institutions and instruments identify instruments that provide alternative models (Biermann et al. 2008, 2009a, 2009b; Dimitrov to that of top-down international policy development. 2006; Keohane and Victor 2010). Like its domestic Third, we outline options for achieving a more ef- counterpart, international governance is a complex fective mix of existing and new components based arrangement of multiple goals and means that, in on principles of new governance that seek not to many cases, has developed incrementally over many eliminate but rather to benefit from the complexity years. of forest policy. As Keohane and Victor (2010) note, international Experience suggests that the best approach is to governance arrangements vary along a number of focus on multi-level governance and the tools and lines. These include: instruments required to put an effective multi-level architecture in place. Much can be learned in this ● determinacy – the extent to which the policy out- area from the experiences of the Asian countries in puts of the regime complex are unambiguous and regional-level policymaking, while the experiences convey a clear message to participants; of the European Union (EU) with the open method of ● effectiveness – the extent to which the regime coordination (OMC) and its principle of subsidiarity complex can change its legitimacy and encourage in institutional policy design are also very instruc- compliance with its rules and norms; and tive. These experiences, principles and elements are ● sustainability – the ability of the regime complex discussed towards the end of the chapter. to survive changes in circumstances and conditions, continue to provide its members with benefits, and encourage both new and established ac- 6.2 Integrating complex policy tors to engage with the regime complex to address relevant problems. mixes: coherence, consistency and congruence Integration involves the alteration of specific elements of an existing policy mix – the goals, objectives Faced with coordination problems caused by global and calibrations of existing policy tools – in order governance complexity and fragmentation, policy to produce a new mix, with the aim of avoiding the integration through top-down treaty-based interna- counterproductive or sub-optimal policy outcomes tional regime formation is one possible option for associated with the old arrangement and enhancing resolving gaps and contradictions between institu- its determinacy, effectiveness and sustainability. tions, actors and existing regime elements. However, Overcoming the contextual ‘stickiness’ of earlier94 there are other, less well studied, design possibilities regime elements is critical to the success of this kind as well. of policy integration reform effort (Keysar 2005; Briassoulis (2005:2) uses a market analogy to de- Saglie et al. 2006) and is a major problem with re- scribe the dilemma policymakers face in many com- spect to global forest governance arrangements. Pre- plex areas of contemporary social and political life: EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

6 OVERCOMING THE CHALLENGES TO INTEGRATION... Table 6.1 Types of international regime complexes Synergistic Cooperative Conflictive Institutions One core institution; others Multiple core institutions; Multiple, largely unrelated integrated others loosely integrated institutions Norms Core norms are integrated Core norms do not conflict Core norms conflict Actors All relevant actors support Some actors are outside core Major actors support differ- the core institution institutions but supportive ent institutions Source: Adapted from Biermann et al. (2008, 2009a, 2009b).vious chapters have shown that current international situ biodiversity conservation and the conversion offorest governance is not the kind of tightly integrated, natural forests to other uses) such that the imple-comprehensive arrangement that early international mentation of the policy can lead to the attainmenttreaty proponents, and early regime theorists in gen- of only some or none of its goals. Policy tools areeral, considered desirable. Instead, it exhibits the consistent when they work together to support afeatures of a fragmented governance architecture: it policy goal. They are inconsistent when they workis a patchwork of international institutions that are against each other and are counter-productive – suchdifferent in their character (organisations and implicit as macro-economic policies that increase the valueand explicit norms and goals), constituencies (public of agricultural land relative to forest land and regula-and private), spatial scope (from bilateral to global), tory policies that seek to prevent the conversion ofand subject matter (from specific policy fields to uni- forest to agricultural land. Congruence is achievedversal concerns) (Biermann et al. 2009b). when a consistent instrument mix serves a coherent set of policy goals. The extent of consistency and coherency must be6.3 International forest policy evaluated empirically on a case-by-case basis (Un- derdal 1980). However, congruence is the main goalas a fragmented regime of policy integration in a fragmented regime. Exactlycomplex how it can be attained, though, depends on the nature of the fragmentation found in a particular sector.In evaluating governance arrangements, Keohane Here Biermann et al. (2009a, 2009b) have arguedand Victor (2010) focus on two key aspects of their that it is possible to identify several common types ofstructure and behaviour: international governance arrangements by arranging regime complexes along a continuum from integrated● their ‘epistemic’ quality – that is, their ability to fragmented. As a further simplification, Biermann to perform in accordance with, and to promote, and his colleagues present three typical architectural technical and scientific knowledge of the cause- ‘styles’ at key points on this continuum: synergistic, and-effect relationships in the field in question; cooperative and conflictive (Table 6.1). and In this view, complexes come about as the re-● their accountability – the mechanisms through sult of the unintended consequences of long-term which individual actors are able to express their processes such as layering and fragmentation and views and participate in governance activities as may have positive as well as negative consequences. well as the extent to which they are held account- Unmanaged conflict may result in governance failure able for their actions. or the movement of fragmented arrangements away from a synergistic style towards an openly conflictiveAs Howlett and Rayner (2006a) note, both these one (Dimitrov 2006, Dimitrov et al. 2007).aspects of regime structure and behaviour focus at- That is, most international governance arrange-tention on the congruence of a regime’s component ments exhibit some degree of fragmentation (e.g.parts – that is, the extent to which the policy elements Alter and Meunier 2006; Dimitrov et al. 2007; Keo-comprising a regime are coherent and consistent. hane and Victor 2010) and, typically, the challengePolicy goals can be considered coherent if they are is not so much how to remove it, but rather how itlogically related to the same overall policy aims and can be successfully managed. As noted in Chapter 95objectives and can be achieved simultaneously with- 1, although global forest governance has sometimesout significant trade-offs. They are incoherent if they been described as a ‘non-regime’ (Dimitrov 2002,are contradictory (e.g. simultaneously promoting in Dmitrov et al. 2007), the current framework is moreEMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

6 OVERCOMING THE CHALLENGES TO INTEGRATION... Table 6.2 Key conclusions of previous assessments of international forest governance: common themes Tarasofsky (1999) Chaytor (2001) Dimitrov (2005) Hoogeveen and Verkooijen (2010) Lack of coordination at all Increased coordination Absence of instruments for Legitimate multiple arenas levels needed policy coordination that create management problems Lack of effective financing Lack of financial resour- Complex cross-sectoral and implementation ces for implementation issues Fragmentation that impedes impedes effectiveness Lack of clear rules and Increasing fragmentation No substantive policy measurable standards content Unhelpful fixation on creat No consensus on ing a legal instrument No consensus on a ‘bottom the need for regulatory up’ approach instrument Non-state actors not fully engaged Interdependence of stakeholders not fully recognised Central Problem Identified Gaps in the regime more Significant coordination Absence of reliable infor Lack of effective leadership serious than overlaps problems mation on causation accurately described as a “regime complex” – a set national governments operate. For example, in the in- of specialised sectoral and issue-based regimes and ternational trade in forest products – which gave rise other governance arrangements more or less loosely to the first legal instrument in the international forest linked together, sometimes mutually reinforcing and regime complex, the International Tropical Timber sometimes overlapping and conflicting (Keohane and Agreement – the issue is clearly of concern to both Victor 2010). producer and importer countries but affects differ- Previous assessments of international forest gov- ent countries in different ways. Trade is often linked ernance, summarised in Table 6.2, have detailed the to the problem of illegal logging, which, in turn, is drawbacks of such a fragmented governance archi- linked to questions of fairness in international trade tecture, and often blame this situation on the ab- and the potential for a ‘race to the bottom’ in forest sence of forest-focused hard law at the international management standards. Illegal logging can also be level. linked to problems in the countries where it takes However, analyses of other kinds of international place, such as its effects on revenue generation and regimes, especially those studies dealing with regime its capacity to undermine governance by promoting fragmentation and the interplay between regimes, corruption. Other linkages relate to the effects of suggest that the ‘failure’ of a regime to develop hard illegal logging on development or the conservation law may simply reflect the lack of need for such ef- of biodiversity, which themselves are linked by the forts at the international level and the functional need importance of forest products and functioning eco- to deal with an issue at a regional, national or local systems to forest-dependent communities, the size level instead. Rather than signal a failure of initiative and significance of which vary by jurisdiction. Ef- at the level of political and policy elites at a global forts are often made to make this linkage between level, in such circumstances fragmentation would not development and conservation as visible as possible, necessarily be solved by a forest convention; in fact, stressing the economic costs of biodiversity loss. In adding a new layer of complexity to such a regime practice, however, the costs and benefits of forest complex might make matters worse. use are shared unequally. In the forest policy case, there is a large set of Again, such problems affect different countries issues and linkages that are of varying concern to in different ways, making it difficult to devise a ‘one different actors. International forest governance, in size fits all’ binding international convention on the particular, is distinguished by the fact that many of subject. Even the legal timber trade creates patterns96 its component instruments and institutions are only of public and private gain that are often unrelated ‘forest-related’ rather than exclusively ‘forest-fo- to the needs of development, especially in forest- cused’. Linkages between issues are highly complex dependent communities (Hoogeveen and Verkooijen and often depend on the specific contexts in which 2010). A variety of potential linkages can lead in a EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

6 OVERCOMING THE CHALLENGES TO INTEGRATION...number of directions, for example towards the impact complex. Their proposals for action at the nationalof policy decisions in other sectors on the compara- level helped to firmly establish the concept of NFPstive value of land uses and the consequent pressure in international forest policy discourse. As noted infor deforestation or degradation. Chapter 3, the Non-legally Binding Instrument on As a result of such complex linkages, internation- All Kinds of Forests (NLBI) subsequently put par-al forest governance has developed over time into a ticular emphasis on NFPs as a means of realising itsweak and fragmented regime with a conflictive rather four global goals. The Ministerial Conference on thethan cooperative architecture (Braatz 2003; Hum- Protection of Forests in Europe (MCPFE) was anphreys 1996; Pülzl 2009; Tarasofksy 1995, 1999). early adopter of the NFP concept, in part as a wayThe achievement of more cooperative relationships of promoting convergence between forest planningamong the broad range of actors at play in this con- and practice in both EU and non-EU countries. Theflictive environment is impeded by, for example: Convergence Plan agreed to by the heads of state of Central African countries in 2005 when they signed● resistance to the idea that forest issues are global the Yaoundé Declaration was intended in part to serve rather than local (Betsill et al. 2007; Dimitrov as a basis for the formulation of national forest pro- 2005); grammes (Koyo and Foteu 2006). Since 2002, FAO● continuing opposition to the norms of SFM by has administered an NFP facility that helps finance many influential NGOs (Humphreys 2001, 2004); the development of NFPs in developing countries. and Early evaluations of NFPs in Europe revealed a● the parallel development of related treaty and non- set of impeding and supportive factors for the suc- treaty regimes such as the Convention on Bio- cess of NFPs, many of which lay outside the con- logical Diversity (CBD) and the climate change trol of national forest authorities and underlined the regime (Gehring and Oberthuer 2009). importance of cross-sectoral policy coordination even at this level. In Europe, the implementationAt the very least, these factors, are formidable ob- of NFPs encountered significant problems in thestacles to positive regime interactions in the forestry capacity and political will to improve forest policycase (Ivanova 2005, 2007). Nevertheless, in terms of processes. An early assessment of European NFPsinternational regime architectures none is especially showed that half lacked a budget, concrete objectivesunusual, and the forest governance regime complex and long-term commitments and that evaluation andrepresents difficult but not unique challenges to glob- monitoring were weakly institutionalised (Zimmer-al governance design (Florini and Sovacool 2009; man and Mauderli 2002) (see also Table 6.3 below).Sending and Neumann 2006). The possibility that NFPs could be used in ways that simply reinforced the status quo at the national level or provided a merely symbolic response to regional6.4 Difficulties in coordinating and international obligations was noted early on in their development (Papageorgiou et al. 2005; Howlettnational-level initiatives: les- and Rayner 2006a and 2006b). Subsequent researchsons from the NFP experience has suggested that the situation is even worse than originally suggested (Winkel and Sotirov 2010). TwoIn many cases, the remedy for the fragmentation criticisms, in particular, recur in this literature. Theof a global governance arrangement may be not so first is that the participatory requirements of an NFPmuch continuing top-down treaty-making efforts as are typically used to co-opt opponents of the statusbuilding more regime coherence through ‘bottom- quo. The other is that NFPs often fail to be translatedup’ coordination efforts at the national and regional into action on the ground.levels. Perhaps the most significant such attempt to As noted in Chapter 3, the main reason for thebuild on national coordination in the forest sector has disappointing performance of NFPs as instrumentsbeen the promotion of national forest programmes of coordination is clear. NFPs are ‘new-governance’(NFPs) in regional and international agreements. Un- arrangements adopted as part of a common responsefortunately, however, the record of these efforts at the by national governments to the need for change innational level in forest policy is mixed and efforts to a situation where international hard law initiativesuse national initiatives as the basis for global coordi- were blocked. However, decades of piecemeal ad-nation have been correspondingly disappointing. justment, layering and drift at the national level also As discussed in earlier chapters, the NFP idea had resulted in a patchwork of overlapping and am-emerged in the early 1990s when the Intergovern- biguous national regulations and perverse incentivesmental Panel on Forests and the Intergovernmental in the forest sector. New-governance arrangements 97Forum on Forests produced a body of soft law – the in the sector such as NFPs sought to alter incentive‘proposals for action’ – that forms part of the legal structures in order to motivate private actors to pur-framework of the existing international forest regime sue public purposes without close regulatory supervi-EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

6 OVERCOMING THE CHALLENGES TO INTEGRATION... Table 6.3 Supportive and impeding factors related to NFP formulation and implementation Supportive factors that directly affect Impeding factors that may indirectly affect forest use forest use Land tenure Land tenure patterns in forests Land tenure in areas surrounding forests; e.g. generate capable but not veto-capable the agriculture–forestry interface, urban areas industrial organizations Legal regulations Legal regulations designed exclu- Legal regulations on national sustainable de- sively or principally for forests allow velopment policy and agriculture; other legal for effective control of industrial arrangements that may affect forest use activities Financial incentives Grants and tax breaks directed at The broader national tax/revenue structure; forest owners and users encourage the national budget and financial plans compliance with government aims at a reasonable cost Political culture A culture of cooperation exists be- The national political culture tween national and regional forest authorities Institutional aspects The existence of high capacity institu- Institutions with other mandates, such as those tions with an exclusive or predomi- that include an indirect forest-related mandate, nantly forest mandate and those with no forest-related mandate but which may affect forest use Source: Humphreys (2004). sion. The various forms of self-regulation, coupled 6.5 The recent proliferation of with the threat of closer supervision for persistent laggards contained in many NFPs are examples of regional agreements this approach (Howlett and Rayner 2006b). But fine-tuning the policy instruments needed to make Although less well studied in their scope and im- new-governance arrangements work has been unex- pact, recent efforts at the national and global levels pectedly challenging. In the case of NFPs, for ex- to improve forests and forest practices have been ample, if organisational weaknesses in the private matched by regional-level processes. Regional-level sector prevent collective action, the state must have forest-related processes have tended to be more flex- the capacity and willingness to act as a political en- ible than global-level arrangements in their use of trepreneur in order to promote a substantive NFP hard-law and new-governance instruments and also and coordinate state and private sector behaviour, show greater integration with regional governance attributes which are commonly lacking. structures, and several examples of the successful Significant investments have been made in NFPs: application of new-governance instruments exist at they are providing, however imperfectly, the basis for this scale. the development of national forest goals and priori- Appendix 6.1 sets out the existing legally binding ties. However, confidence that NFPs will be a key regional forest processes and related agreements, and instrument, exclusiv of international support and in Appendix 6.2 lists those that are non-legally binding. their own right, for realising the goals of the NLBI These sets of regional multi-level agreements consti- is misplaced; on their own, NFPs tend to repeat the tute a key building block in a strategy of diversifying pattern of existing forest policymaking at the national and widening the policy instrument toolbox in order level. A consensus is emerging, however, that NFPs to embrace the complexity of forestry problems and and similar arrangements at the regional level may overcome the deadlock that the international regime-98 have a role to play in a more multi-level governance building pathway has encountered. architecture that can help re-orient both national and The number and size of regional organisations international forest policy and policymaking. have grown as international and national efforts have stalled, notably in the area of climate change but also EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

6 OVERCOMING THE CHALLENGES TO INTEGRATION...in international trade. Following the regime complex- tion. COMIFAC and its signatories receive guidancebuilding logic set out above (Bierman et al. 2009a), on navigating the complex issues surrounding ABStheir proliferation raises additional challenges for through the national support office of the Deutschepolicy integration, given the possibility of a large Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ),number of possibly counter-productive initiatives the novel multi-donor initiative, the ABS Capacityin different regional agreements and organisations Development Initiative for Africa, and the CBD Sec-(Strand 2004). Not all regional organisations have retariat. Nevertheless, increased capacity buildingalways delivered better results than international efforts remain crucial for further success (Schmidtagreements; nor have they done better than individual et al. 2009). Notably, COMIFAC remains separatestates in implementing the components of regional from regional economic integration bodies such asagreements. But some successes are apparent. the Economic and Monetary Community of Central As an example of the challenge posed by the Africa and the Economic Community of Central Af-proliferation of regional agreements and organisa- rican States, which may weaken its efficacy (Mvondotions, consider the Central African Forest Commis- 2006).sion (COMIFAC). This regional organisation was More successful regional initiatives differ deci-created to coordinate and harmonise subregional sively from the COMIFAC model because they arepolicy and legislation affecting the conservation linked to wider regional polity-building projects.and sustainable management of the forests of Cen- New governance in these frameworks serves broadertral Africa on the basis of well-recognised interna- political interests. Thus, it is not merely a cheapertional forest principles (Mvondo 2006). In addition way of implementing international agreements, itto the various SFM-based initiatives promoted by involves the embedding of voluntary coordinationthe international forest regime, COMIFAC is now within the firmer regional governance structures thatcharged with monitoring and coordinating REDD facilitate it. The Association of Southeast Asian Na-(‘reducing emissions from deforestation and forest tions (ASEAN) and the EU have shown that new-degradation’), the implementation of the Action Plan governance tools can enhance the positive effectsfor Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade of intergovernmental and supranational governance(FLEGT) and the CBD’s access and benefit-sharing structures (in both cases at the regional level).(ABS) initiative. Unlike the forest-focused COMIFAC, ASEAN In theory, a great deal of progress can be made aims to create an ASEAN Community by 2015 thaton all these fronts simultaneously by identifying new comprises three pillars – the ASEAN Political –protected areas with large carbon stocks, promoting Security Community; the ASEAN Economic Com-the reforestation of degraded forest land and improv- munity; and the ASEAN Socio-cultural Community.ing forest management practices (Denis et al. 2009). Forest issues lie within both the economic and socio-REDD, for example, constitutes an opportunity cultural communities. In 2009, with the endorsementfor developing countries to advance or accelerate of the ASEAN Multi-Sectoral Framework on Climatemore coherent sectoral and cross-sectoral strategies Change: Agriculture and Forestry Towards Food Se-through a series of institutional, legal and educational curity (AFCC), forest policy became a forerunner formeasures (TFD 2009). Similarly, COMIFAC’s biodi- integrating sectoral policies into broader strategicversity working group (known as GTBAC) is devel- frameworks in support of greater policy coherenceoping a subregional ABS strategy to guide countries and better cross-sectoral coordination. Through thein the implementation of national ABS legislation AFCC, ASEAN is attempting to address the regionaland related measures. The strategy will address the particularities of climate change (ADB 2009) relatedresults of a recent study that shows numerous incon- to food security in the most vulnerable countries andsistencies in approaches to ABS in Central Africa subregions of Southeast Asia (Yusuf and Franciscobased on the NLBI and the CBD, particularly around 2009). A number of regional soft-law agreementsthe definition of ‘genetic resources’, and a whole have been embedded into the new cross-sectoralrange of differences in practice and aspiration at the approach. These include the ASEAN Criteria andnational level (Cabrera et al. 2010). Indicators (C&I) for SFM, the associated monitoring, COMIFAC, however, finds itself in the middle of assessment and reporting format, and the ASEANthese efforts, needing both coherent direction from C&I for Legality of Timber. The timber legalitythese overlapping international regimes and a will- standard forms part of ASEAN’s phased approachingness on the part of its signatory states to address to forest certification (Hinrichs 2009).their own shortcomings. Several multi-stakeholder Besides regional benchmarking and monitoringinstitutional mechanisms, such as the Congo Basin efforts, ASEAN has also created transnational expertForest Partnership and the Conference on Humid and networks to support better-informed policymaking 99Dense Forest Ecosystems of Central African Rainfor- and scientific collaboration on forest-related issuesests, have been created to help facilitate subregional (Thang 2009). The ASEAN Regional Knowledgeforest policy development and regime implementa- Network on Forest Law Enforcement and Govern-EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

6 OVERCOMING THE CHALLENGES TO INTEGRATION... ance advises decision-makers and others on a re- this multi-level complexity to heart. As Bierman et gional standard to assess forest law enforcement and al. (2009a) have argued, the management of such a governance in ASEAN member states (Pescott et al. complex set of arrangements may take the form of a 2010). The ASEAN Regional Knowledge Network new international treaty but this is quite rare. More on Forests and Climate Change also played an im- common is the creation of a set of institutions and portant role in facilitating the deliberations of an instruments which allows positive interplay among ASEAN common-position paper on REDD, which the various elements and levels of the regime com- was submitted to the 14th Conference of the Par- plex (Oberthuer 2009; van Asselt 2007). ties to the United Nations Framework Convention Where a conscious effort is made to design a on Climate Change. The establishment of an expert more coherent governance architecture, the chal- network, whose research agenda includes issues such lenge is to achieve a clearer nested division of com- as benefit-sharing and methodological approaches, petencies rather than overlap, ambiguity and gaps and the common-position paper process, exemplify (Alter and Meunier 2006; Nilsson et al. 2009). Most ASEAN’s efforts to address REDD at the regional commonly, effective regime interplay is achieved scale. An overall regional climate change policy through the careful use of procedural policy instru- in ASEAN is still in the making (Eucker and Hein ments and other techniques common to multi-level 2010). governance in other sectors (Gehring and Oberthuer Regional agreements and organisations like 2000; Hafner 2003; Oberthur 2005; van Asselt 2007). COMIFAC and ASEAN are important parts of the This has been illustrated empirically in the case of puzzle in terms of assessing how to improve coordi- ASEAN, whose success in implementing forest pol- nation and overcome fragmentation in forest govern- icy elements has been based not on the top-down ance architecture in the context of an already existing implementation of international agreements but on forest regime complex. Evaluated purely from the the application of alternative procedures within its perspective of unifying top-down treaty-based in- own emerging polity framework. ternational regime-building, they create confusion Promising governance approaches are also emerg- and are counterproductive to efforts to create such ing in the realm of REDD+, which is an expanded a regime. They are unable, on their own, to manage concept of REDD encompassing also the conserva- the complexity of a fragmented forest governance tion and enhancement of forest carbon stocks and architecture and are ineffective if they are established sustainable management of forests in developing merely as an additional layer in an already complex countries. system of international and national elements and The multitude of multilateral and bilateral insti- components. Yet if this level of agreements is linked tutions and initiatives supporting REDD+ suggests to more substantive polity-building and political or that there are both opportunities for and challenges economic integration projects at the regional level, to the coordination of international efforts aimed at they can be a most promising unit for the implemen- reducing deforestation and forest degradation and tation of new-governance tools. restoring forests in developing countries. In particular, it has been suggested that if these institutions do not collaborate and build on their comparative 6.6 Towards a multi-level forest advantages, efforts to address REDD+ will create unnecessary redundancies and competition (Hoog- governance alternative: eveen and Verkooijen 2010). Recognising this, vari- patching forest governance ous international institutions have called for a more architecture coordinated and harmonised approach to REDD+ financing and technical assistance among existing multilateral REDD+ institutions, especially the For- As this discussion has shown, the global forest gov- est Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), the Forest ernance architecture has multiple levels comprising Investment Program (FIP) and the United Nations a host of initiatives at the international, regional and Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions national levels and a very mixed record of success. from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in De- It is important to note, however, that the various lev- veloping Countries (UN-REDD), as well as other els, although often treated as such in the scholarly emerging bilateral and other multilateral efforts. literature, are not independent but, rather, exist in The governing bodies of the three main global a ‘nested’ form. International and regional regime programs – FCPF, FIP and UN-REDD – have man- elements, for example, have an impact at the national dated their secretariats to collaboratively develop op-100 level by prescribing or demanding detailed objectives tions to enhance cooperation and coherence among and plans for the implementation of specific aspects REDD+ institutions in support of REDD+ efforts of forest-related industrial and other activity, and vice (CIF 2010). Although this coordination is still in its versa. Successful forest governance reform must take formative stages, ongoing cooperation among the EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

6 OVERCOMING THE CHALLENGES TO INTEGRATION...various instruments on readiness activities and stake- ditional layer in a structure with poor links betweenholder engagement has already yielded significant the international and national levels will lack theresults. For example, FCPF and UN-REDD have conditions to trigger voluntary coordination and thusaligned some of their REDD+-readiness processes policy learning.and standards in an effort to reduce transaction costs In ASEAN and the EU, institutions are enshrinedfor countries that are developing national REDD+ in larger polity-building processes and at least astrategies, especially those participating in both ini- limited ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Heritier and Eckharttiatives. 2008; Heritier and Lehmkuhl 2008) can be cast on In many areas, however, the locus classicus of the participating states. New governance is there-enhanced multi-level coordination is the European fore part of a larger polity-building objective that,Union. The institutionalisation of the EU goes be- intuitively, will make the concept of voluntary co-yond that of an intergovernmental entity; it is the ordination buy-in by actors more plausible. Accord-world’s most integrated regional organisation with ingly, regional organisations that have progressedextensive sub-national, national, regional and inter- significantly towards the formation of a supranationalnational components. As the above discussion has entity can also more easily trigger the creation ofindicated, given the failure of top-down international governance networks.treaty talks, the solution to many existing forest gov- The existing international forest governanceernance problems lies in better efforts at coordinat- architecture lacks both a top-down coordinatinging multi-level governance initiatives in the sector. mechanism as well as such supranational entity fea-Examining the EU’s multi-level governance system tures. While the former may be difficult, if not impos-thus can provide important insights into the nature sible, to achieve, the latter can be adopted in a moreof effective multi-level governance in any sector, piecemeal fashion, reconciling contradictions andincluding forest policy. needs between levels and improving coordination in a bottom-up fashion. To be successful, governance networks must either be embedded in supranationalLessons from the EU multi-level governance entity formation – which is not in the cards in theexperience forest sector – or emerge from bottom-up policy or issue networks that have staked their claim on a policyTwo kinds of multi-level governance are often dis- issue. Promoting such bottom-up interest formationtinguished in the academic literature on the subject: is a major challenge that states may be willing andType I, which comprises the traditional territorial able to realise only in part. And in this regard, thedivision of labour found in federal systems; and Type examination of the EU experience with multi-levelII, where there is a need for a tailored governmental governance arrangements is particularly useful.body to address an issue that is not susceptible topolicy action by a Type I organization, for example,in the international arena and when there are par- The Open Method of Coordinationticular functional governance problems (Hooghe andMarks 2001, 2003; Skelcher 2005). An aspect of the EU experience that is especially As Skelcher (2005) notes, however, the two types instructive for forest governance reform is the ‘opentypically exist side by side in polycentric governance method of coordination’ (OMC). The notion of OMCarrangements. While the version in which a Type II first arose in the conclusions of the Lisbon Summit ininstitution is embedded in a traditional state form March 2000, although it had already been envisaged(e.g. an agency embedded in a state) has been studied in the procedures for coordinating national economicwidely, the reverse – that is, where states are em- policies established in the Maastricht Treaty and inbedded in an international regime, with significant the employment chapter of the regional Amsterdamregional components – is equally common. In the Treaty. The method involves the creation of commonforest sector, as we have seen, Type I elements still guidelines that are translated into national policy anddeliver on-the-ground forest conservation and man- periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review or-agement. While Type II elements, on the other hand, ganised as mutual learning processes and accom-are primarily concerned with two sets of problems: panied by indicators and benchmarks for compar-coordination and policy learning; and participation ing practices. As Borras and Jaccobson (2004:187)and conflict resolution. Polycentric multi-level gov- state:ernance implies that these problems have to be ad-dressed at three levels: international, regional and “The OMC seeks the goal of strategically bridgingnational, and the success of new governance depends policy areas in a double horizontal way, by link- 101to a large extent on the multi-level governance frame- ing national policies with each other, and by linkingwork in which forestry institutions are embedded. A functionally different policies at EU level (and …)regional organisation that serves merely as an ad- explicitly seeks a further interlinking of domesticEMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

6 OVERCOMING THE CHALLENGES TO INTEGRATION... policy-making and co-operation at EU level, com- means to command and control, but they also need bining common action and national autonomy in an a minimum level of authority in order to impose unprecedented manner. The intention with the OMC a policy when private actors lack the incentive to is to integrate action at various levels of governance; involve themselves in self-steering. For new modes this opens up the possibility for truly bottom-up po- of governance to come into effect, a shadow of hi- litical dynamics, which differ from the top-down erarchy is therefore indispensable – even if it does structures of the previous soft law-making.” not need to be very long (ibid.). In the international forest context experimenta- The OMC involves actors other than state actors, tion with the OMC is a promising way for overcom- is designed to foster cooperative practices and net- ing observed governance deficiencies, especially as working, and is based on the principles of volun- a strategy for quickly plugging gaps without waiting tarism, subsidiarity, flexibility, participation, policy for consensus on the use of a regulatory approach or integration and multi-level integration (Borras and the development of financial mechanisms (Schaefer Jacobsson 2004). While international agreements 2004). Moreover, the observation that the OMC pro- that establish hard law to be implemented by states motes ideational convergence or social learning, even also build on a multi-level structure, the OMC takes in the absence of policy learning (May 1992), is im- cross-level interactions further. It builds multiple portant given the deep ideational rifts in the existing links and networks between levels, while hard-law forest regime complex. international agreements require sovereign states to implement commonly agreed rules in a ‘silo’ fashion. In the context of multi-level governance, Benz (2007) Subsidiarity refers to the OMC as a form of performance competition. Benchmarks are defined at a central level This is the idea, based on practical experience with through negotiations or hierarchical processes, while 50 years of policymaking in the European Union competition for best practice takes place at a decen- – that it is possible to promote integration in a de- tralised level. He points out that such performance centralized and de-concentrated non-regime by competition may contribute to the “scientification” delegating activity as much as possible to the level of policy if experts are involved in the definition of of administration capable of effective policy inter- standards of comparison (ibid.). vention, but no further. That is, not that all activity Significantly for the international forest regime, should happen at the local level but only that activ- the EU’s OMC received political support from state ity which is suitable for higher levels should occur and non-state actors in areas where it was not pos- at those levels (van Hecke 2003). The ‘principle of sible to get consensus on the use of EU regulatory subsidiarity’ thus regulates authority within a politi- instruments. It is generally accepted in the literature cal order, directing that powers or tasks should rest (e.g. Citi and Rhodes 2007; Zeitlin et al. 2005) that with the lower-level sub-units of that order unless the OMC supports compromise-finding on trans- allocating them to a higher-level central unit would boundary policy issues among sovereign states. ensure higher comparative efficiency or effectiveness The effectiveness of the OMC has been the sub- in achieving them (Føllesdal 1998). ject of controversial discussion, with assessments As Føllesdal has argued, the principle holds that of it ranging from ‘paper tiger’, to ‘powerful policy an allocation of authority must satisfy a condition of tool’ and “an alternative to both intergovernmental- comparative efficiency. Two important issues con- ism and supranationalism” (Zeitlin et al 2005:22). cern when and how central unit intervention may take Some scholars suggest that the logic of soft law or place. Firstly, limits may be placed on the sectors to voluntary modes of governance such as the OMC which the principle of subsidiarity applies, or else work only (Börzel 2005; Héritier 2003; Scharpf the sectors to which it applies may be determined by 1993) or better (Hogl et al. 2009) in the shadow of the principle of subsidiarity itself. The former op- hierarchy. Radaelli (2003) and others argue, however, tion is illustrated in the European context by treaties that the absence of sanctions is not a problem in a specifying that the principle of subsidiarity applies governance system that is based on incentives for to environmental regulations, the Social Charter and learning and allows flexibility in policy processes. media policies. The latter pattern is found in so far Many authors (e.g. Héritier 2003; Héritier and as the Community can intervene as necessary to pro- Eckert 2008; Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008; Scharpf mote a free market in goods and services: there the 2002; Smismans 2008) have discussed the conditions principle of subsidiarity is said to regulate its own needed for new modes of governance to produce scope of application.102 more efficient outcomes in such multi-level situa- Secondly, the principle of subsidiarity can also tions. Börzel (2007, 2010) refers to the paradox of regulate how the central unit is to act, so as to re- non-hierarchical governance: states draw on new spect sub-unit autonomy. This Minimal Intervention governance in cases in which they lack sufficient Condition may have various implications. Central EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

6 OVERCOMING THE CHALLENGES TO INTEGRATION...regulation ought, firstly, to respect sub-unit discre- 6.7 Conclusion:tion. For instance, other things being equal, a central policy patching – repairing andunit might employ directives which stipulate results,while leaving choice of means to member states, upgrading a fragmentedrather than adopting detailed regulations which governance architectureare directly applicable to member states, firms andindividuals. Thus, for example, EU environmental In many sectors, including forestry, the record oflegislation contains directives specifying maximum attempted replacement strategies at the internationalemission standards for carbon dioxide, leaving it to level that aim to create an integrated regime foundedmember states to decide how to meet those targets. on a hierarchical, treaty-based, architecture is poor.Secondly, the central unit might actually bolster sub- Disorganisation is a very common outcome of longunit capability, for example, by offering to monitor periods of incremental policy change characterisedcompliance by sub-units to agreements. by processes of layering and drift. While opening The principle of subsidiarity can also include a up better space for local innovation, disorganisa-“Necessity Condition”, allowing central unit action tion frustrates effective implementation, fuellingonly when sub-units cannot achieve the desired result demands for integrated strategies that would allowon their own. It is not always clear when this criterion multiple stakeholders to operate in a new, commonapplies, though. Parties may disagree, for instance, and credible policy framework. However, the addedwhether joint action is required and efficacious for complexity of attaining requisite levels of multi-sec-environmental problems. Thus, Denmark, Germa- toral coordination in a policy regime complex contextny and the Netherlands have higher environmental is daunting (Hooghe and Marks 2001, 2003).standards than the common level set in the EU and The difficulties of coordinating government re-may just not desire any joint action. The principle of sponses across sectors in an effort to promote opti-subsidiarity can proscribe central unit action in the mal forest policy integration are many (e.g. Fafardabsence of comparative efficiency, thus protecting and Harrison 2000; Hogl 2002; MacKendrick 2005;the sub-units from intervention by the central unit. Martinez de Anguita et al. 2008; Saglie et al. 2006;Alternatively, intervention from the central unit may Torenvlied and Akkerman 2004; Westcott 2002;be required when it is comparatively more efficient. Witter et al. 2006). However, rather than reformingImportant governance dilemmas arise when the sub- the existing international forest regime complex inunits disagree on goals, and hence on whether coop- a top-down way, the most promising alternative is toeration is desirable. Respect for sub-unit autonomy better manage the existing regime through improvedmay grant each sub-unit a veto; alternatively, central multi-level governance arrangements. As discussedunit action may override objections to combat free- above, based on the EU experience and the lessonsriding. derived from successful regional initiatives in Asia, The operation of the principle of subsidiarity in for example, patching the existing regime to allowEU policymaking is significant with regard to the positive interplay between regime elements on thereform of international forest policymaking in many basis of enhanced multi-level governance with aways. Firstly, the EU level provides a political arena strong regional component is a promising strategyfor coordinating national policies and positions in the for overcoming global regime fragmentation and im-context of international processes, which parallels proving outcomes through enhanced coordinationthat of many existing regional forest regimes and (Lidskog and Elander 2010).can provide lessons about how that level should op- Pushing international forest policymaking in aerate. Secondly, although the European Union Trea- multi-level direction that not only considers lowerties make no provision for a common EU policy on echelons as implementing agents of intergovernmen-forests, there is a large body of EU policies that af- tal agreements but also produces outcomes throughfect the forest sector either directly or indirectly and, voluntary coordination at the regional level based onagain, provide lessons on how such polices should mechanisms of information distribution, peer pres-be structured. Community actions like the Common sure (benchmarking), open-methods of coordination,Agricultural Policy, environment, and rural develop- subsidiarity and policy learning is essential if exist-ment policies all affect forestry. Thirdly, the evolu- ing problems are to be overcome (Hoogeveen andtion of a multi-level system of joint decision-making Verkooijen 2010; Najam 2003, 2005; Najam et al.in the EU has brought about substantial changes in 2006).the logic of influence for domestic actors which In a highly complex issue area such as forests,might also be replicated at the regional and interna- multiple governance modes and regime logics aretional forest regime levels. The supranational level inevitable. The goal, therefore, is to avoid clashing 103comprises new actors and institutionalised arenas, architectures by promoting as much cooperation asprovides additional points of access, and requires possible in a fragmented architecture. As Grandeactors to broaden their perspectives. (1996:333) suggested in the case of the EU:EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

6 OVERCOMING THE CHALLENGES TO INTEGRATION... “Compared to the ideal model of state sovereignty, a battles, encouraging the use of negotiated link- decentralized, multi-layered state with its fragment- ages that promote the spill-over of rules and norms ed power and its integrated, consensual decision- from one regime to another. Both REDD[‘+’] and making must, of course, be inferior. If we take the ABS have significant potential in this respect. political reality of modern democracies with their ● Exploring the full range of informational and pro- powerful interest groups as a standard, however, a cedural instruments capable of promoting bottom- multi-layered state with joint decision-making is not up coordination. necessarily the less desirable alternative.” The view of the international forest regime complex In practice, designing and implementing such an as a fragmented, multi-level governance arrangement approach requires both substantial policy analyti- presented here suggests that its effectiveness can be cal capacity in relevant organisations and effective improved by careful learning from the experience governance capacity. For the latter, this implies the of entities such as the EU and ASEAN. This could existence of arrangements that facilitate and promote include experimentation with the OMC as a means multi-level, multi-sectoral and multi-actor policy- of patching gaps in the governance architecture. As making (Gerber et al. 2009; Weber et al. 2007). The Hoogeveen and Verkooijen (2010) note, the continu- multi-level governance literature is an important ing focus on ‘apex-level’ diplomacy has led to the source of information on procedural instruments relative neglect of the task of gathering broad support that create cooperative relationships between the and legitimacy and hence to many of the implementa- international, regional and national levels (Bauer tion problems noted in the assessment of the regime 2006; Monni and Raes 2008; Nilsson et al. 2009; contained in earlier chapters. Torrenvlied and Akkerman 2004). It includes studies This chapter has elaborated on this alternative by of the importance of governance at an appropriate illustrating what the linking of the various elements scale, such as the relative success of regional agree- of a highly complex set of governance arrangements ments vis-à-vis international-level and national-level would imply. It has focused on extending the toolbox agreements, and the possibility of making more of of policy instruments and distilling from existing the principle of subsidiarity in international forest international, national and regional experiences what governance as a tool to promote positive regime in- the conditions are that need to be in place for new teraction (Carozza 2003; Hogl 2000; van Kersbergen governance to be an effective alternative to traditional and Verbeek 2007). regime-building through top-down treaty-making. 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6 OVERCOMING THE CHALLENGES TO INTEGRATION... Appendix 6.1 Legally binding regional forest-related agreements Name Date Membership Content Yaoundé Declaration 1999 10 Central African This declaration constitutes the basis of the treaty estab- countries lishing COMIFAC. The scope of both the Declaration and COMIFAC is the conservation and sustainable management of forests in Central Africa African Convention 1968 The original conven- This convention aims to enhance environmental protec- on the Conservation tion entered into force tion; foster the conservation and sustainable use of natural of Nature and Natural in 1969 and has been resources; and harmonise and coordinate policies in these Resources ratified by 30 parties. fields with a view to achieving ecologically rational, The revised conven- economically sound and socially acceptable development tion has been signed policies and programmes (Article II) by 36 countries but not yet ratified. Common Market for 1994 COMESA has evolved COMESA’s forestry management strategy outlines key Eastern and Southern a comprehensive priority sectors for investment in the forest sector, such as Africa (COMESA) decision-making payments for ecosystem services, combating illegal trade structure, at the top of in forest products, and capturing the value of the sector in which are the heads of national economies state of the 20 member countries South African Devel- 1992 15 member states in SADC members agreed on the Forestry Protocol in 2002, opment Community the South African the objectives of which are to promote the development, (SADC) region conservation, sustainable management and utilisation of all types of forests and trees; promote trade in forest products throughout the region in order to alleviate poverty and generate economic opportunities for the peoples of the region; achieve effective protection of the environment; and safeguard the interests of both the present and future generations (Article 3). To achieve the objectives, the protocol sets out measures and guiding principles for cooperation Regional Convention 1993 6 signatory states in The objectives of this convention are to prevent land-use for the Management Central America changes in forested areas located on properties that are and Conservation suitable for woodlands; restore deforested areas; establish- of Natural Forest ing a standard soil classification system; readjust settle- Ecosystems and ment policies in forested areas; discourage the destruction Development of For- of forests in lands that are suitable for woodlands; and estry Plantations promote land management and sustainable options (Article 2) Central American 1989 5 Central American The main objectives of this convention are coordinated Convention for the States action for sustainable development and conservation and Protection of the the determination of priority areas for action, including for Environment tropical forest management (Article 2) Association of South- 1967 10 states in Southeast For the forest sector, ASEAN has developed actions under east Asian Nations Asia the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, with a (ASEAN) focus on enhancing intra- and extra-ASEAN trade and the long-term competitiveness of forest products; actions under the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint, with a focus on promoting the sustainable management of natural resources and biodiversity, responding to climate change and addressing its impacts, and promoting SFM; and a number of strategic thrusts under the ASEAN Multi- Sectoral Framework on Climate Change: Agriculture and Forestry Towards Food Security108 EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

6 OVERCOMING THE CHALLENGES TO INTEGRATION... Name Date Membership Content Convention on the 1979 50 parties The aims of this convention are to conserve wild flora and Conservation of Eu- fauna and their natural habitats, especially those species ropean Wildlife and and habitats whose conservation requires the cooperation Natural Habitats of several states; and promote such cooperation (Article 1). Particular emphasis is given to endangered and vulnerable species, including endangered and vulnerable migratory species Convention on the 1991 8 European Alpine The Protocol on Mountain Forests, agreed in 1996, aims Protection of the Alps Countries to preserve mountain forests as near-natural habitat and, whenever necessary, to develop them or increase their extent and improve their stability (Article 1). The protocol commits parties to general and specific measures regarding forest management, the integration of its provisions in other sector policies, local participation, international cooperation, planning procedures, protective, economic, social and ecological functions of forests, access to forests, forest reserves, incentives, research, education, and information Framework Conven- 2003 All countries in the This convention sets out legally binding measures to tion on the Protec- Carpathian region integrate the conservation and the sustainable use of tion and Sustainable biological and landscape diversity into sectoral policies, Management of the such as mountain forestry; to promote and support the use Carpathians of instruments and programs, compatible with internationally agreed principles of sustainable forest management; to apply sustainable mountain forest management practices in the Carpathians, taking into account the multiple functions of forests; and to designate protected areas in natural, especially virgin, forests. Recently, a Protocol on Forests has been discussed in the fora of the Carpathian Convention, but has not yet been agreed Forest-related legisla- Vari- 27 member states Regulation (EC) No. 2152/2003 provides for measures tion of the European ous such as the harmonised collection, handling and assess- Community years ment of data regarding atmospheric pollution, forest fires, biodiversity, climate change, carbon sequestration, soils and protective functions of forests. This regulation expired on 31 December 2006 and was replaced by a new financial tool for the environment, LIFE+, which operates in a broader context. In the context of combating illegal harvesting and illegal timber trade in environmental and development cooperation policies, the European Commission adopted the Action Plan for Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade; this plan was later endorsed by the EU Council. The Council also adopted Council Regulation (EC) No 2173/2005 on the establishment of a licensing scheme for imports of timber into the European Community 109EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

6 OVERCOMING THE CHALLENGES TO INTEGRATION... Appendix 6.2 Non-legally binding forest-related processes Lepaterique Process Central America, 7 participating countries Tarapoto Process Amazon forest, 8 participating countries Dry-zone Africa process 28 participating countries Dry forest in Asia process 9 participating countries Near East process 30 participating countries Montreal process Temperate and boreal forests outside Europe; 12 participating countries Europe and North Asia Forest 2004 An international steering committee comprising 13 countries, Law Enforcement and Govern- the European Commission and the World Bank was established ance process to guide the process East Asia Forest Law Enforce- 2001 ment and Governance process African Forest Law Enforce- 2003 ment and Governance process FAO regional commissions Six regional African Forestry and Wildlife Commission, Near East Forestry forestry com- Commission, European Forestry Commission, North American missions estab- Forestry Commission, Latin American and Caribbean Forest lished between Commission, Asia-Pacific Forestry Commission 1947 and 1959 The Ministerial Conference 1988 46 European countries and the European Community on the Protection of Forests in Europe Pan-European Biological and 55 countries Landscape Diversity Strategy African Timber Organization 1976 14 African member states110 EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

7 Examination of the influences of global forest governance arrangements at the domestic level Coordinating lead authors: Steven Bernstein and Benjamin Cashore Lead authors: Richard Eba’a Atyi, Ahmad Maryudi and Kathleen McGinley Contributing authors: Tim Cadman, Lars Gulbrandsen, Daniela Goehler, Karl Hogl, David Humphreys, Shashi Kant, Robert Kozak, Kelly Levin, Constance McDermott, Mark Purdon, Irene Scher, Michael W. Stone, Luca Tacconi and Yurdi Yasmi Abstract: The ultimate goal of many international and transnational attempts to address global problems is to influence domestic policymaking processes rather than simply to constrain or modify the external behaviour of states. This chapter reviews existing scholarship on the impacts that global forest governance arrangements have had on domestic policymaking processes and decisions. We apply a framework that distinguishes ‘economic globalisation’ – the phenomenon of increasing economic integration – from ‘internationalisation’, in which international and transnational pressures influence domestic policymaking (Bernstein and Cashore 2000).We review the effects of four distinct pathways of internationalisation in shaping domestic policies: international rules; international norms and discourse; markets; and direct access to domestic policy processes.This framework overcomes longstanding debates about whether globalisation forces a ‘ratcheting down’ of domestic standards in a ‘race to the bottom’, or whether increasing economic and political interdependence can create a ‘race to the top’. The application of the framework to cases in Southeast Asia, Latin America, Africa, Europe and North America reveals that economic globalisation is not determinative. Rather, it interacts with other factors (operating internationally, transnationally and/or domestically) that condition its effects. Key lessons emerge from this review on the conditions under which, and interventions through which, the international forest regime has affected domestic forest policies, as well as on the interventions that might be nurtured to influence and nurture future policy development. Keywords: globalisation, internationalisation, domestic forest policy, comparative public policy, norms, markets. ■7.1 Introduction influence domestic policies and outcomes, with the aim of identifying the conditions under which theyThe ultimate goal of many international and trans- shape desired behaviour.national attempts to address global problems is to This chapter reviews existing scholarship on theinfluence domestic policymaking processes rather impacts that global forest governance arrangementsthan simply to constrain or modify the external be- have had on domestic policymaking processes andhaviour of states. This is certainly the case for forest decisions. We organise this material by applying agovernance because, while forest resources lie within framework developed by Bernstein and Cashorestate borders, the consequences of their uses or pres- that distinguishes ‘economic globalisation’ – the 111ervation may have global implications. Recognition phenomenon of increasing economic integration –of this has led recent scholarship to systematically from ‘internationalisation’, in which internationalexplore how international institutions and processes and transnational pressures influence domesticEMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

7 EXAMINATION OF THE INFLUENCES... policymaking (Bernstein and Cashore 2000). The 7.2 The framework: four path- framework encompasses four distinct pathways ways of international influence that have unique causal logics in shaping domestic policies: international rules; international norms and on domestic policy change discourse; markets; and direct access to domestic policy processes. The distinction between globalisation and in- 7.2.1 International rules ternationalisation overcomes longstanding debates about whether globalisation forces a ‘ratcheting The ‘international rules’ pathway highlights the in- down’ of domestic standards in a ‘race to the bot- fluence of issue-specific treaties (e.g. the Conven- tom’, or whether increasing economic and political tion on International Trade in Endangered Species interdependence can create a ‘race to the top’. Bern- of Wild Fauna and Flora – CITES), trade agreements stein and Cashore (2000) argue that while in some (e.g. the World Trade Organization agreements) and cases economic globalisation has acted as a break to the policy prescriptions of powerful international improving existing regulations and standards, and/or organisations (e.g. the World Bank), whether per- has encouraged companies to locate in ‘regulatory ceived as resting on consent or coercion. The logic friendly’ jurisdictions, it is also a prerequisite for of this pathway is that rules are binding and create a successfully traversing some of the four pathways “pull toward compliance” (Franck 1990: 24) because – such as the markets pathway – that could lead to they came into being by generally accepted rules of higher domestic policy standards or improved prac- right process, regardless of whether they are enforced tices. In other words, economic globalisation is not (domestic factors and politics can influence imple- determinative. Rather, it interacts with other factors mentation and compliance, but the obligation ex- (operating internationally, transnationally and/or ists regardless). Sometimes even non-governmental domestically) that condition its effects. organisations (NGOs) or institutions that include We chose the framework of Bernstein and Cashore non-state representation (such as the International (2000) over the regime effectiveness literature be- Organization for Standardization and forest certifica- cause of the latter’s preoccupation with “hard law” tion systems) can be authoritative sources of rules to emanating from formal international conventions which states or firms commit (Bernstein and Cashore over a specific problem or sector . While there are 2007; Clapp 1998; Meidinger 2006). Systems that some legally binding agreements that address forest are not mandated by states or intergovernmental issues, none have forests as their primary focus and agreements exhibit the logic of the international none address forest issues comprehensively. Thus, a rules pathway when their standards gain broad rec- focus on regime effectiveness is likely to miss other ognition and come to be understood as binding by influences worthy of sustained attention. The chosen firms or other targeted actors that sign on to them framework also permits us to draw on recent theoreti- (Vogel 2008). cal developments and questions with an eye to uncov- ering new relationships and insights. In this chapter we identify important causal trends and identify and 7.2.2 International norms and assess the full range of impacts of international fordiscourse est governance arrangements. Section 7.2 presents the framework in greater detail. Sections 7.3 and 7.4 review relevant literature to provide an understand- International norms and discourse can both define ing of whether, when and how one or more of the and regulate appropriate behaviour. Particular norms four pathways have been travelled in the shaping embodied in institutions or informed by broader of domestic forest policies. This review draws on practices of global governance can affect domestic experiences in five regions: Southeast Asia, Africa, policies or lead to policy change. Chapter 4 of this Latin America, Europe and North America. Section report identifies shifts in international discourses 7.5 contains findings and recommendations. around forests; the goal here is to identify, assess and analyse how and under what conditions discourses around appropriate behaviour and particular norms become institutionalised domestically or lead to policy change. Keck and Sikkink (1998) outline a series of strategies that transnational actors can undertake to encourage states to follow norms – the politics of112 information, symbolism, leverage and accountability. According to Keck and Sikkink’s model, domestic policymaking structures or networks only matter to the degree they cause a ‘boomerang’ effect that EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

7 EXAMINATION OF THE INFLUENCES...induces domestic actors to go international to seek 7.2.5 The role of economicallies and bring international scrutiny (ibid.). Global globalisationnorms can also be mediated by domestic policymak-ing structures (Risse-Kappen 1995) or, as Acharya Bernstein and Cashore (2000) hypothesise that the(2004) finds, by the ability of local actors to recon- role of economic globalisation differs according tostruct international norms to fit with local norms or the pathway along which influence over domesticto reinforce local beliefs or institutions. policies is pursued. The degree to which economic globalisation creates dependence on foreign markets is a determinant of the effectiveness of the markets7.2.3 Markets pathway and is often important for the international rules pathway because many international rules resultThe markets pathway encompasses processes or tac- from attempts to manage economic interdependence.tics that attempt to manipulate, work with or leverage Economic globalisation is not, however, a precon-markets to create domestic policy change. It includes dition for the international norms and discourse orboycott campaigns that target foreign export markets direct access pathways.to put pressure on exporters, certification systemsthat attempt to regulate or socially and environmen-tally embed markets directly without state media- 7.3 Economic globalisation oftion, and the use of market mechanisms in general.This pathway, therefore, includes both direct action the forest sector– where transnational actors exert market pressure tochange domestic behaviour – and indirect action. In The forest sector is highly globalised. Prices and de-indirect action, certification systems with pre-estab- mand for wood products are affected by global struc-lished standards (for example) may use carrots, such tural changes such as the shift of wood productionas the provision of market access, firm recognition and manufacturing from developed to developingand price premiums, as well as sticks, such as the countries (Yasmi et al. 2010). The shift in produc-conferring of negative attention on non-joiners, to tion, especially to China (which in turn imports frominfluence behaviour. tropical developing countries in Southeast Asia and Africa), has resulted in the consolidation of sawmill industries in many developed countries. It has also7.2.4 Direct access to domestic led to a reduction in employment in the pulp andpolicymaking processes paper industry in developed countries, including the United States (Ince et al. 2007). Increasing consumption in developed countriesDomestic policies may be influenced along the direct accounts for some of these trends. For example, theaccess pathway through direct funding, education, United States now imports 25 billion board feet oftraining, assistance and capacity building, and possi- softwood lumber, up from 12.1 billion board feet 20bly even by attempts at co-governance through part- years ago, and sales of wood furniture produced innerships between domestic and international public China has expanded from 20% to 50% of the totaland private actors and authorities. Any attempts at market (White et al. 2006). European demand hasinfluence along this pathway must navigate concerns followed a similar trend, with imports from China tri-about sovereignty and risk being viewed as foreign pling between 1997 and 2006 (ibid.). The increasingor international interference. To be successful, non- role of previously unexploited timber from Russiadomestic actors must avoid the perception that they has also shaped forest products markets and supply.challenge state autonomy by focusing on altering the The African timber industry is highly dependent onbalance of power among existing domestic organised both Asian and European markets (ibid.), the latterinterests and their participation in policy networks. of which, as we discuss below, has been the sourceTransnational actors may accomplish their mission of significant NGO pressure on timber procurementby sharing resources, ideas, knowledge and expertise policies.with existing groups, or by facilitating the creation The drivers of economic globalisation can beof new groups or coalitions. traced, in part, to domestic and international policies that create tax breaks, liberalise export fees, increase free-trade zones and ease restrictions on immigration to further reduce labour costs (Essmann et al. 2007). Another factor is changing technology, which both 113 drives globalisation and offers significant potential for shifting the global forest industry towards sustainability (Auld et al. forthcoming; Essmann et al. 2007).EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

7 EXAMINATION OF THE INFLUENCES... 7.4 The four pathways can also be found in a number of non-forest-specific agreements, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity, CITES and, although perhaps less direct- 7.4.1 International rules ly, the World Trade Organization and regional trade agreements. In addition, recent initiatives to build Context regional Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (FLEG) agreements and international commitments Despite the absence of a comprehensive forest on forests within the climate-change regime can be treaty, forest-related international agreements and understood as attempts to travel the international institutions have emerged that influence domestic rules pathway. For example, the ‘reducing emis- rules and standards. For example, the International sions from deforestation and degradation’ (REDD) Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO), created by concept is likely to lead, eventually, to one of the the International Tropical Timber Agreement, has first sets of rules in international forest governance played a major role in the development of criteria and to have a binding impact on domestic practices such indicator (C&I) for sustainable forest management as land-use change and logging. (SFM). Unlike hard law, however, C&I processes Forest certification is also showing signs of af- aim to define and assess rather than mandate SFM; fecting policy along an international rules pathway, the hope is that such processes will help states to in two ways. First, some systems are seeking rec- develop internal standards, such as when an Indo- ognition for their standards with a status equal to nesian ministerial decree adopted C&I for sustain- other international standards recognised under in- able management of production forests. Although ternational trade law (Bernstein and Hannah 2008). changes in domestic policy do not necessarily mean Second, there are signs that support for forest cer- changes in on-the-ground behaviour, both their in- tification may not just be a result of market pres- fluence on policy development and the question of sure such as boycotts; it may also be based on the whether and when governments can meet their own perception that certification systems themselves are domestic commitments (Chrystanto and Justianto a legitimate authority through which to develop ap- 2003) are important. propriate standards (Bernstein and Cashore 2007; Processes (IPF/IFF/UNFF) initiated in the wake Cashore 2002). of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992, as well as other international fora such as the Food and Agriculture Impacts on domestic policymaking Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Commit- tee on Forestry, have promoted high-level commit- Impact of international forest soft law on national ment to the monitoring, reporting and assessment policy priorities: Much of the impact of international of SFM. In 1995 the Intergovernmental Panel on soft law has been expressed in the development of Forests issued more than 270 ‘proposals for action’. NFPs. Due to space limitations, we provide illustra- Processes to develop and implement C&I for SFM tions of these impacts from just one region, Latin at the regional level were also initiated (Humphreys America. In Guatemala, domestic policymakers 2006; McDermott et al. 2007; Wijewardana 2008); explicitly justified the introduction and content of currently there are nine such processes, encompass- an NFP by showing that it drew on internationally ing 150 countries and nearly 90% of the world’s agreed concepts “within the international dialogue forests. on forests, particularly the Intergovernmental Panel Arguably, the ‘soft pull’ of the non-binding state- on Forests (IPF) and the Intergovernmental Forum ment of forest principles negotiated at UNCED facil- on Forests (IFF)” (Hurtarte et al. 2006: 35). Such itated the development of national forest programmes concepts included consensual formulation and ap- (NFPs) through Agenda 21, which was also agreed proval; the identification, design and application of at UNCED. Sepp and Mansur (2006) have identified new forest policy instruments (such as the National NFPs as important tools for the implementation of Forest Incentives Program); and monitoring and a Agenda 21’s proposals for action. They also provide multi-stakeholder approach (which included the in- a framework within which countries can “implement troduction of forest policy round-tables in the coun- international commitments to enhance sustainable try’s nine forest regions) (ibid.). forest management following deliberative and par- Like Guatemala, Brazil followed international ticipatory approaches at the national level” (Pülzl norms by developing a national forest plan that and Rametsteiner 2002:1), while also allowing them included extensive stakeholder and cross-sectoral114 to develop their own forest management priorities consultations and led to important legislative re- (McDermott et al. 2007). forms. New financing instruments were promoted As shown in Chapter 3, international rules that af- for encouraging responsible forest management. fect forests, resources within them, or forest products The Ministry of Environment was charged with de- EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

7 EXAMINATION OF THE INFLUENCES...veloping an NFP action plan and the Coordinating Peru, the largest exporter of bigleaf mahogany, hasCommission with supporting and evaluating com- made significant changes in forest law, regulationpliance (Alba 2008), which served to meet Brazil’s and trade control with the aim of reducing the im-international obligations for improved monitoring pact of international trade on the conservation ofand evaluation. the species. In 1997, following agreements made at and after Trade agreements: While trade agreements areUNCED, the Lepaterique process was initiated to certainly aimed at nurturing economic globalisation,develop C&I for SFM in Central America, with sup- the 2009 United States–Peru Trade Promotion Agree-port from FAO; this process has had a measurable ment* demonstrates how negotiators are insertingpolicy influence in each of the seven Central Ameri- language to address concerns that trade liberalisationcan countries (Blas Zapata 2005). The Lepaterique could come at the expense of forest stewardship. Theprocess includes both regional and national-level Agreement is accompanied by a carefully wordedelements. annex (Annex 18.3.4**) that requires Peru to put In Honduras, the Directive Counsel to the Presi- into force the following regulatory and control meas-dent recognises that the Lepaterique C&I process ures: increasing its administrative, monitoring andprovides the conceptual framework for the formula- enforcement staff; implementing specific measurestion and evaluation of forest laws and policies as a to reduce corruption; providing criminal and civilmeans to meeting the country’s international NFP liability for a range of activities that undermine thecommitments (Barahona and Eguigurems 2004). sustainable management of Peru’s forest resources;These regional and global processes have had an implementing provisions to combat illegal logging;influence at the forest management unit level, where adopting and implementing specific policies to pro-the government’s technical norms for forest manage- tect tree species listed in CITES appendices; promot-ment have been adapted to the new C&I. Similarly, ing capacity building; and ensuring that the views ofCosta Rica’s 1996 forest law and accompanying reg- indigenous groups and other stakeholders are consid-ulations require that forest management plans com- ered in decision-making. Annex 18.3.4 also includesply with the standards of the National Commission a series of measures for compliance, joint monitoringfor Forest Certification, which were set according to and enforcement, including third-party audits of pro-norms developed by global C&I processes (Espinoza ducers to ensure compliance with laws, regulationsCamacho 2005).* and verification procedures. Non-compliance could The Convention on International Trade in Endan- lead to the banning of exports, and the entire annexgered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora: CITES moni- is subject to dispute resolution. The United States–tors and restricts the trade of species facing extinc- Peru Trade Promotion Agreement has already “beention by, among other things, identifying and listing a driving force to change the Peruvian Forest Law,species banned from international trade (Appendix as well as to introduce other changes that are gener-I) or that require a CITES export permit for interna- ally in line with CITES requirements” (Tomasellitional trade (Appendix II). The impacts of CITES and Hirakuri 2009:13). There are worries, however,are often region-specific on the basis of the location that the Agreement is worded in such a way that itof the protected species. In Latin America, for ex- ignores the possibility of trans-shipments of illegalample, several important timber species, including timber through third countries such as Mexico andbigleaf mahogany (which was listed in Appendix China (McClanahan 2010).II in 2003**), have been listed following concerns Most other trade agreements stop short of ex-over illegal harvesting and after scientific research plicitly referencing the forest sector. Some includeby international scientific and conservation bodies a reference to environmental concern modelled on(Grogan and Barreto 2005). Such listings have led a side-agreement to the North American Free Trademany producer countries to establish national CITES Agreement (NAFTA), the North American Agree-management authorities, often by adapting legisla- ment on Environmental Cooperation, which createdtion (Tomaselli and Hirakuri 2009). For example, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation. Like the NAFTA model, however, most bilateral agreements mandate monitoring and promote the* See the Costa Rica National Standard for Sustainable For-est Management, first published in 1998 (updated in 2001and 2009). * Available at: http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/ameri-** Timber species listed in Appendix I include Brazilian rose- cas/peru, [Cited 4 Jun 2010].wood (Dalbergia nigra), Guatemala fir (Abies guatemalensis). 115Timber species listed in Appendix II include Pacific coast ** http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agree-mahogany (Swietenia humilis), Caribbean mahogany (S. ma- ments/fta/peru/asset_upload_file953_9541.pdf. [Cited 2hogoni) and bigleaf mahogany (S. macrophylla). Dec 2010].EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

7 EXAMINATION OF THE INFLUENCES... effective enforcement of national laws rather than A final potential impact involves the way in create formal international obligations. As a result, which trade rules might evolve to address climate the Dominican Republic–Central America–United change. There is enormous uncertainty in this area, States Free Trade Agreement includes an Environ- but similar issues could arise if, for example, an ment Chapter which states that “each Party shall economically important country decides to intro- ensure that its domestic laws and policies provide duce a border tax on forest products imported from for and encourage high levels of environmental countries with low or no carbon emission standards protection”(Office of the United States Trade Rep- (Hufbauer et al. 2009). resentative 2010). Regional forest agreements and initiatives: In the Trade rules may also have indirect effects when absence of a comprehensive and universal forest con- they delineate acceptable international standards. For vention, an emerging trend among international aid example, certification standards could be subject to agencies, the World Bank and NGOs is to address trade disputes if, when adopted by a country, they forest management and policy through regional proc- are perceived to have been developed in a way that esses. Many of these have been developed under the is inconsistent with requirements for legitimate in- auspices of FLEG processes.* Co-hosted by pro- ternational standards under the Technical Barriers ducer and consumer countries and the World Bank, to Trade Agreement (and its annexes) of the World early FLEG outputs included an East Asian FLEG Trade Organization (Bernstein and Hannah 2008). Ministerial Declaration (Bali, 2001) and ministerial- Trade law and jurisprudence have not been explicitly level declarations in Africa (Yaoundé, 2003), and tested in this area, however. Europe and North Asia (St Petersburg, 2005). Initial Complicating the picture further, other bodies talks were also held in Latin America. As a result of have arisen to define acceptable social and environ- these declarations, a number of projects and initia- mental standards, most notably the International tives were created to promote FLEG at various scales Social and Environmental Accreditation and Label- and in various regions (Brown et al. 2008; Kaimow- ling (ISEAL) Alliance, an umbrella organisation itz 2003; Magrath et al. 2007; Perkins and Magrath of some certification systems (including the Forest 2005; World Bank 2005, 2006, 2007a). Stewardship Council – FSC). The ISEAL Alliance In the Association of Southeast Asian Nations was created to develop agreement on best practices (ASEAN) countries, a regional FLEG process opened for its members and to gain credibility and legiti- the door for new initiatives and experiments within macy for its members’ standards. Its detailed code and across countries (BBC 2007; Brack 2005; Brown of good practices references the Technical Barriers et al. 2008; Cashore et al. 2006; Ching 2007), with to Trade Agreement but goes beyond it by augment- varying levels of involvement of civil-society and ing requirements for the participation of developing forest-sector stakeholders (Thang 2008). countries and an emphasis on production process Many of the FLEG processes focused much of standards in addition to the usual focus on perform- their effort on building greater capacity for the en- ance or product standards. forcement of existing laws (Tacconi 2007), reduc- Meanwhile, the way in which the exceptions for ing contradictory legal regimes, enlisting NGOs to environmental protection written into many interna- monitor on-the-ground activities, and reducing high tional trade agreements are interpreted can determine levels of illegal logging through labelling and market which domestic practices or regulations are accepted access (Brown et al. 2008; FAO and ITTO 2005; as legitimate and which are subject to dispute. A FLEG News 2007). full discussion of relevant rules and controversies is While a thorough review of these regional ef- beyond the scope of this chapter; we note, however, forts is beyond the scope of this chapter, we note that debates around whether production processes – that they, too, rely on soft agreements to promote both product-related and non-product-related – and good forest governance (Byron 2006). For example, product characteristics can be considered in limiting the Bali Ministerial Declaration committed partici- imports could have an impact on forest practices in pating (ASEAN) countries to, among other things, exporting countries. Developing countries in particu- “take immediate action to intensify national efforts, lar have raised concerns over the implications of such and to strengthen bilateral, regional and multilateral rules, which they fear will create barriers to market collaboration to address violations of forest law and access for their forest products; such concerns have forest crime, in particular illegal logging, associated led to the development of strategies to limit link- illegal trade and corruption, and their negative effects ages between trade and environment law. At the same on the rule of law”. Tacconi et al. (2004:15) note that time, the lack of such linkages or hard forest law has “The conference established a regional task force to116 created an opening for voluntary eco-labelling and certification because they are potentially consistent with international trade rules (Bernstein and Hannah * The following three paragraphs draw on wording from 2008; Joshi 2004). Cashore et al. 2010. EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

7 EXAMINATION OF THE INFLUENCES...‘advance the objectives’ of the Declaration, and an ad- two domestic pieces of legislation, which were de-visory group of NGOs and industry was also formed veloped to meet existing international commitments,… The Indonesian Ministry of Forests and CIFOR are among the starkest examples of how hard lawvolunteered to undertake interim secretariat functions, can indeed shape domestic forest policy. What isand it seems possible that a permanent secretariat may important about these efforts is that developing coun-ultimately develop, should sufficient funding become tries such as Indonesia are fairly hospitable to themavailable.” A joint statement on FLEG by the govern- because they are aimed at ensuring that productsments of Indonesia and the Philippines in 2005 sup- produced in any particular country conforms to thatported increased attention to, and cooperation among, country’s domestic requirements. On the other hand,ITTO, G-8, ASEAN and other nations in promoting an international legal obligation would challenge,FLEG (Defensor and Fathoni 2005). rather than reinforce, the sovereignty of producer Recognising that the causes of corruption and countries.forest degradation were unlikely to be completely ASEAN has also been active in coordinatingaddressed through ASEAN cooperation, a range of and expanding commitments to promote SFM. Forinternational actors spearheaded by the European example, member countries committed, in 2007, toUnion (EU) turned to the markets pathway in an at- promoting C&I for SFM at the regional and nationaltempt to promote domestic good forest governance. levels, and to ensuring legality. These processes areEU FLEGT (Forest Law Enforcement, Governance the basis for region-wide reporting on SFM at theand Trade) initiatives use access to the lucrative EU national level, overseen by the ASEAN Secretariat,markets as an incentive to promote responsible gov- and they also provide for benchmarking. ASEANernance in exporting countries. The EU’s main inter- member states share good practices in forest policy,vention to promote these efforts has been in the form including through the exchange of experiences onof negotiations with individual exporting countries in NFPs (Goehler et al. 2009). In 2009, ASEAN nationsAfrica and Southeast Asia to create voluntary part- committed to a six-year plan to promote the Multi-nership agreements (VPAs) that, arguably, amount Sectoral Framework on Climate Change: Agricultureto de facto binding law. and Forestry Towards Food Security, which promotes The approach of the United States has been to coordination and cooperation in the region.promote domestic good forest governance in export- Regional agreements in Latin America have fol-ing countries by strengthening the implementation lowed similar dynamics. The 1978 Amazon Coopera-of its own international obligations regarding trade tion Treaty promotes “economic, social and environ-in illegal products. To do so it amended domestic mental cooperation” among the Amazon countries.legislation known as the Lacey Act – a longstanding Through the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organi-act prohibiting the trade of wildlife, fish and plants zation (ACTO) it attempts to coordinate economicthat have been illegally taken, transported or sold – development and environmental protection acrossto include timber products harvested illegally in any the entire Amazon Basin (McDermott et al. 2007).country. The EU has followed suit, developing its Progress has been described in terms of the “gradualown similar legislation.* The combination of these joint definition of approaches and policies for the Amazon” (Elias 2004:24); ACTO has not led to many concrete outputs as far as binding agreements and* The United States approach through the 2008 Lacey Act related cooperation and coordination on the region’samendments, which prohibit the importation of illegally forests (ibid.).sourced wood, is more bluntly unilateral, although the de- In contrast, The Central American Regionaltailed provisions may involve collaboration with exporting Convention for the Management and Conservationcountries. Under the amendments, importers are required to of Natural Forest Ecosystems and the Developmentdeclare the species and origin of harvest of all plants. Penalties of Forest Plantations (‘Central American Forestfor violations include the forfeiture of goods and vessels and Convention’) is “the only legally binding, regionalimprisonment. The approach has the advantage of putting the instrument focused exclusively on forests [and] es-responsibility for legality on importers, which eliminates the tablishes a relatively comprehensive legal, policy‘transshipment’ problem of the forest annex approach and the and institutional framework for the forests of Cen-need to target individual exporters. The European Commission tral America” (McDermott et al. 2007; Tarasofskyhas since developed a proposal for trade legislation – the due 1999). The Convention encourages the coordinationdiligence regulation (DDR) – with a similar goal of preventing of national-level forest policies and requires partiesthe import of illegal wood into the EU from all sources. Un- to establish mechanisms to control the illegal trade oflike the United States approach, however, the DDR requires flora, fauna, timber and other forest products. Amongonly “reasonable assurance” that wood products are legally other things it led Central American countries to take 117produced (Baumüller et al. 2009). Australia, Japan, and New a common position within CITES in support of theZealand have all signalled interest in pursuing similar legisla- inclusion of bigleaf mahogany in Appendix II (Mc-tion (McClanahan 2010). Dermott et al. 2007; Tarasofsky 1999).EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

7 EXAMINATION OF THE INFLUENCES... Taken together, these initiatives make inroads afforestation effort from 2002–2008 (Galupa et al. into the international trade of illegally logged tim- 2008). However, while there is interest in generating ber, but fall short of a comprehensive multilateral a supply of forest credits through such initiatives, prohibition (Lawson and MacFaul 2010). there are worries about demand, especially because Climate: The advent of REDD and REDD+ current interest is driven by upfront financing (e.g. policies* is increasingly seen as the most signifi- from the World Bank) and not financial returns from cant contemporary opportunity to entice developed investors. Indeed, afforestation credits issued under countries to commit the resources and technical as- the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) are not sistance needed for on-the-ground implementation tradable on the EU-ETS nor Canadian compliance of international forest policies. In particular, the markets. However, questions remain as to whether evolution towards REDD+ in international negotia- the compliance market for forest carbon credits will tions on climate change signals a move towards the survive and negotiations regarding REDD+ could consideration of a broader forest agenda. In addi- prove crucial in this regard. tion to the inclusion of a range of approaches to forest management, REDD+ envisages the use of the REDD mechanism to improve access by marginal- 7.4.2 International norms and ised communities to forest resources and to promote discourse indigenous rights. In anticipation of a future agreement, the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, negotiated at the 15th session Key developments of the Conference of the Parties to the United Na- tions Framework Convention on Climate Change, In academic debates on environmental, natural- established a Green Climate Fund to support REDD+ resource and forest governance a virtual consensus activities (Appleton et al. 2009). As part of these ef- has emerged that three procedural principles are fun- forts, developing countries were formally requested damental to good governance. They are inclusive- to identify drivers of deforestation; establish national ness (e.g. Belsky 2003; Contreras-Hermosilla et al. forest management systems; develop guidance for the 2008; Esty 2006; Ribot 1995; Tacconi et al. 2008; engagement of indigenous peoples and local com- World Resources Institute 2009), transparency (e.g. munities in monitoring and reporting; and develop Esty 2006; World Bank 2006) and accountability forest reference emission levels that take into account (e.g. Balboa 2009; Keohane and Nye 2003; Kop- historical data and adjust for national circumstances pell 2003, 2005). These principles reflect broader (Cashore et al. 2010). demands for the reform and improved accountability Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia and of international institutions (e.g. Held and Koenig- Vietnam are among the countries actively engaged in Archibugi 2005; Payne and Samhat 2004) as well climate-change schemes through United Nations-led as ‘stakeholder democracy’ that includes ‘collabo- initiatives or bilateral and multilateral agreements ration’ and true ‘deliberation’ among states, busi- related to forests. The rules have yet to be fully de- ness and civil society (Bäckstrand 2006; Vallejo and fined, but influence is already being felt. For ex- Hauselmann 2004). Such normative pressure reflects ample, Indonesia has, through its communication to more general trends in international environmental the Copenhagen Accord, committed to reducing its institutions, treaties and declaratory law, which, since greenhouse gas emissions by 26% against business- the 1972 Conference on the Human Environment in as-usual projections by 2020 (although this would Stockholm, have been promoting increased public amount to a 22% increase over 1990 emissions) participation and transparency at all levels of govern- mainly through REDD. Questions of implementa- ance (Bernstein 2005; Mori 2004). tion remain, however (Maryudi 2009). In advance of Equity is also emerging as a substantive global a formal agreement on REDD (or REDD+), a number norm with respect to resource governance (Aldy et of specific forest carbon offset projects have been al. 1999) and forest governance (Asch 1997; Corbera financed, including through the World Bank’s Bio- et al. 2007; Meller et al. 1996; Nhira et al. 1998; Carbon Fund (Carbon Finance Unit no date). Some Sarin 1995). Put simply, this norm demands con- such projects are at a significant scale: for example, sideration of whether “the costs and benefits of the two forest carbon offset project in Moldova represent proposed policy fall disproportionately on limited approximately 30 000 ha or half of the country’s total groups” (Tacconi et al. 2008). In the case of forests, a closely related phenomenon is a rising norm of granting greater access to forest resources to indigenous118 * REDD+ is an expanded concept of REDD that also en- and forest-dependent communities. compasses the carbon-sequestration roles of conservation, the Collectively, this wider group of norms can pro- sustainable management of forests and the enhancement of vide benchmarks to evaluate international proposals, forest carbon stocks in developing countries. or provide arguments in support or in opposition to EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

7 EXAMINATION OF THE INFLUENCES...them. For example, both Kaimowitz (2003, 2005) and The most prominent example of norm diffusionSeymour (2008) argue that inattention to indigenous is SFM, which is now supported in virtually everyand impoverished forest-dependent communities in country in which forests play a key role. Most coun-efforts to promote FLEG and REDD could uninten- tries also now have official goals addressing indig-tionally favour large corporations and powerful elites enous rights and resources in forest governance. Inat the expense of poverty alleviation and community Canada, for example, international norms reinforcedevelopment. Concerns that this could induce politi- support to expand the role of indigenous peoples.cal instability have led to wide-ranging support for in forest management. Implementing these normsthe procedural principles of inclusiveness, transpar- remains a challenge, however. As one Canadian studyency and accountability and the norms of equity and finds, “Aboriginal people generally perceive that for-access in transnational corporations and conservation est management is meeting their expectations relatedgroups alike (The Forests Dialogue 2008). to Environmental Values and SFM better than it is Arguably, the combination of these procedural meeting their expectations related to Aboriginal andand substantive norms is one reason for the recent Treaty Rights, Participatory Decision-Making, andemergence of the principle of subsidiarity, in which Economic Opportunities and Development” (Kantdecentralisation is the default mechanism for pro- and Brubacher 2008: 389).moting the fair and just allocation of forest rights Domestic and global policy agendas now alsoand resources to forest-dependent communities and reflect the strengthening norm against illegal logging.indigenous peoples (Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Oram Environmental NGOs and international organisationsand Doane 2005; Ribot 2008). Finally we note a nor- such as the World Bank (World Bank 2006) havemative trend, at least since UNCED, towards a view been especially active in promoting efforts againstthat environmental protection should be compatible illegal logging, as a reaction to the lack of success ofwith the liberal economic agendas promoted by many other strategies aimed at encouraging SFM.governments, international organisations and mar- Tenure reforms and community involvement inket players. This favours market-based policies and forest management and governance pursued throughinstruments, public–private partnerships, privatisa- various schemes (e.g. forest land allocation, jointtion, open markets and free trade (Bernstein 2001; forest management, co-management, community/Humphreys 2008). social forestry and regional forest agreements) re- With respect to forest management in particular, flect the procedural norms noted above. Householdsthe dominant discourse is the promotion of SFM (see and community groups are also being provided withChapter 4; Singer 2008). Wang (2004: 211) refers to greater access to forest resources. For example, LaoSFM as a concept with “one hundred faces” because PDR and Viet Nam are in the process of allocatingof the many conflicting interests involved in forest forest lands to local communities and householdsmanagement (Schanz 2004). Nevertheless SFM can (Hodgdon 2008). In Viet Nam, communities arebe characterised as the suite of practices aimed at recognised as legal entities eligible to participate inensuring that the goods and services derived from forest land allocation on the basis of the 2003 landforests to meet present-day needs while at the same law, which also marked the expansion of commu-time securing their continued availability and con- nity participation in forestry in the country (Nguyentribution to long-term development. In its broadest et al. 2008a, 2008b). In Thailand, the Communitysense, the concept encompasses the administrative, Forestry Bill was finally passed in 2007 after yearslegal, technical, economic, social and environmental of prevarication in parliament (Ongprasert 2008).aspects of the conservation and use of forests. It im- This bill defines the areas in which communitiesplies varying degrees of deliberate human interven- can be located and the types of forest-managementtion, ranging from actions aimed at safeguarding and activities allowed.maintaining forest ecosystems and their functions Community forestry attracted national attentionto those that favour specific socially or economi- in Indonesia when the Ministry of Forestry launchedcally valuable species or groups of species for the its Hutan Kemasyarakatan (‘Community Forestry’)improved production of goods and services. programme in 2007. The aim of this programme was to give local communities greater access to forests and to provide them with long-term rights;Impacts on domestic policymaking as of October 2010 these efforts had led to increased community management but not ownership rights.Existing scholarship has shown that international Community forestry has also advanced in the Philip-norms have played a role in mobilising certain do- pines over the last 40 years, although recent changesmestic interests over others and shaping problem def- towards larger-scale forestry reveals the fragility of 119inition and agenda setting (Keck and Sikkink 1998). this effort (Oberndorf 2008).Less work has been done on the exact mechanisms In Africa, Eba’a Atyi et al. (2008: 24) found thatthrough which norm diffusion occurs. “all of the Central African countries have embarkedEMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

7 EXAMINATION OF THE INFLUENCES... on a revision of their forest laws in order to make long-term intensified timber production; it corrected them compatible with the needs of sustainable for- many of the deficiencies of the old regime by drawing est resources management”. Cameroon led the cur- on insights obtained from international debates and rent wave of forest law revisions when it adopted from the Bolivian experience (Smith et al. 2006). In a new forest law early in 1994 and enacted imple- Brazil, the dramatic increase in international inter- mentation decrees in 1995 and 1996; this initiative est in the Amazon and the growing influence of the “inspired” the whole sub-region (Karsenty 2006). international environmental movement, which began Equatorial Guinea reformed its forest law in 1997, in the 1990s, played a significant role in the country’s the Republic of the Congo in 2000, Gabon in 2001, environmental and forest policy reforms (Banarjee the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2002 and et al. 2009; Bauch et al. 2009). the Central African Republic in 2008. These reforms The normative pull from UNCED that – despite introduced new obligations (Eba’a Atyi et al. 2008), no binding agreement – urged the establishment of the most important of which are: the requirement to NFPs helps explain post-UNCED developments in manage production forests based on (sustainable) many European countries. In Norway, for example, forest management plans; the need for the greater UNCED, and especially the Convention on Biologi- participation of local people in forest resource man- cal Diversity, laid the normative groundwork for in- agement, decentralisation and benefit-sharing; spe- creased awareness and concern over the protection cific conservation objectives to be achieved across of old-growth forests and biodiversity (Gulbrandsen national territories; and the requirement to reduce 2003). the negative impacts of resource extraction on forest There is also evidence that global norms may ecosystems through the implementation of regula- shape the regulatory practices of developing coun- tions and guidelines. In all Central African countries. In a review of forest practices regulations in 24 tries the reforms related to the participation of local countries, McDermott et al. (2009) find that identical people, decentralisation and benefit-sharing involve rules for riparian buffer zone protection have been the inclusion of the concepts of community forests, developed in a host of countries with widely varied decentralised communal forests, municipal forests ecological systems (e.g. tropical, temperate and bore- and forest revenue distribution to local government al) and management requirements. They hypothesise entities. In addition to legislation specific to the that “mimetic isomorphism” – in which international management of forest and wildlife resources, most norms find their way into precise and specific policy countries in Central Africa have adopted laws on regulations – may explain such convergence. broader environmental protection. Arguably, norms of subsidiarity and greater local The raising of awareness and reporting of corrup- control also account for the growing acceptance of tion in the sub-region by international NGOs such small and medium-sized forest enterprises (SMFEs), as Transparency International, Global Witness and which are currently being upheld by civil society as Resource Extraction Monitoring have also been key potential instruments of social change and equity. In drivers. Governments in the sub-region wanting to particular, SMFEs and community forest enterprises improve their reputations at the international level are seen as appropriate vehicles for lifting forestare working with NGOs on initiatives such as inde- dependent communities in developing economies pendent forest monitoring. The results, in practice, out of poverty because they provide meaningful are muted, however, because such initiatives focus employment and serve growing domestic markets mainly on the formal forest industry, which is usu- with value-added goods, and they do so in an ecologi- ally the smallest part of the sector. Moreover, the cally sustainable manner (Molnar et al. 2010). This is influence of international normative discourse may particularly true in countries where forest lands are be limited in countries where there is widespread held publicly and where the socio-economic benefits poverty. In such cases, short-term measures to en- of the dominant mode of business practice – large- sure subsistence may demand a higher priority on scale, concession-based forestry – is increasingly both ethical and sustainability grounds. Caution is being called into question (Kozak 2009). NGOs are therefore warranted in attributing too much power to responding by crafting interventions such as capac- norms and discourse. The pressure of economic need ity-building in business management and market remains an important determinant of policy. promotion that help to provide the enabling condi- International normative discourse on forests has tions in which smaller-scale enterprises will thrive. been influential in Latin America. In Costa Rica, However, there remains a paucity of data surround- for example, the 1996 forest law (Law No. 7575) ing the extent of employment and wealth generated “emphasized a market-friendly approach to forest- by SMFEs and further work is needed, especially120 ry with a heavy dose of measures drawn from the in developing regions where informal forest-based international conservation paradigm” (Silva et al. economies are commonplace (Kozak 2007). 2002). In Peru, the 2003 forest law introduced radical changes that signalled the government’s interest in EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

7 EXAMINATION OF THE INFLUENCES...7.4.3 Markets mostly targeting the clearcutting of old-growth forests, in two of the province’s largest markets, EuropeKey developments and the United States.* The provincial government responded in two ways: it announced that it was inFour key trends demark efforts along the markets the process of reforming its rules governing forestpathway over the last 30 years. First, a range of practices; and it lobbied European countries to coun-environmental NGOs, largely located in developed ter transnational criticisms. There is direct evidencecountries, championed boycotts and/or targeting that the boycotts had an effect: British Columbia’scampaigns that engaged the purchasers of timber Premier Mike Harcourt acknowledged that the lossproducts originating in tropical (and, in the case of of markets motivated him to support policy changeCanada, temperate) timber-producing countries. Sec- and mobilised domestic interests for policy change,ond, international agencies such as the World Bank although it also coincided with his own domestichave used a ‘carrot’ approach to convince govern- reform agenda (Bernstein and Cashore 2000). Aments to adopt domestic policy reforms ranging from subsequent market-based campaign that focused onthe removal of protectionist policies (designed to British Columbia’s Great Bear Rainforest resultedpromote employment in the domestic forest sector) in a collaborative agreement between First Nations,to efforts to eliminate corruption. Third, coalitions forest companies, environmental groups and theof environmental NGOs, social activists and the pri- provincial government to preserve vast tracts ofvate sector have created market-driven certification old-growth forests and to engage in collaborativesystems with which to promote responsible business research into responsible harvesting practices inpractices, effectively bypassing domestic regulatory high-conservation-value forests (Natural Resourcesand land-use policies. Fourth, even larger coalitions Defense Council 2001; Sierra Club of British Co-of companies, activists, governments and aid agen- lumbia 2004).cies have coalesced around market incentives to pro- More recently, boycott and divestment campaignsmote baseline ‘legality verification’ as a means for targeted boreal forest conservation (Scher 2008).reinforcing domestic sovereignty. Covering 566 million hectares, Canada’s boreal forests account for a quarter of all forest remaining globally and form a unique and productive mosaicImpacts on domestic policymaking of interconnected habitats that include forests, lakes, river valleys, wetlands and peat lands, as well as tun-Boycott/targeting campaigns: Transnational envi- dra in its northern reaches. The United States-basedronmental advocacy groups have been successful Pew Charitable Trusts established the Internationalin creating negative impressions of tropical timber Boreal Conservation Campaign to serve as an um-products (Klassen 2003). They appeal to consumers brella organisation for the domestic and internationalto boycott timber from particular species or places, environmental NGO constituents of a new borealor that has been harvested in ways deemed unsus- coalition (Scher 2008). Two of these organisationstainable, as part of a moral responsibility to alleviate – the Canadian Boreal Initiative and the Boreal Song-forest destruction. bird Initiative – were also funded by Pew Charitable While it is difficult to tease out the effects of boy- Trusts. The coalition travelled the markets pathwaycotts from other market-based approaches or path- to bring attention to the plans of the forest, miningways, market pressure from boycotts has coincided and oil industries to conduct commercial activitieswith the adoption, by governments, of forest policy in much of the boreal forests. Simultaneously, it en-responses aimed at safeguarding export-oriented gaged in coalition-building along the direct accessforest industries. Wong (1998), for example, found pathway.that ‘no-buy’ pleas helped to reduce timber exports A range of domestic policy reforms consistentfrom Indonesia to Japan and subsequently helped with the campaign’s objectives have been undertakenaccount for certain Indonesian domestic forest policy since the launch of the campaign. Between 1999responses. For example, the government reviewed and 2005, 26.5 million hectares of the boreal foreststhe performance of logging companies and withdrew were placed under strict protection and an additionaltheir concessions if their forest operations were be- 12.1 million hectares were placed under interim orlow a certain standard (Dauvergne 1997). imminent protection (IBCC 2007). In November of Boycotts have also extended to developed coun- 2007, Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced thetries with temperate forests, most notably Canada, protection of a further 10.3 million hectares in thewhere boycotts were used in British Columbia in theearly 1990s (Bernstein and Cashore 2000) and in 121boreal forests in the last decade. In British Columbia * The United States accounted for 59% of British Columbia’sa coalition of foreign and domestic environmental forest products export market, the European Union 11% andgroups launched a successful boycott campaign, Japan 21% (Natural Resources Canada 1998)EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

7 EXAMINATION OF THE INFLUENCES... Northwest Territories. In July 2008, Ontario Premier cy efforts draws on examples of well-intentioned Dalton McGuinty pledged to protect half of Ontario’s efforts by the World Bank to promote improved for- northern boreal forest from resource extraction, an est governance in developing countries. However, area amounting to roughly 26 million hectares, which these examples should be understood in the wider is larger than the land area of the United Kingdom context of the increasingly active role of the World (Boyle 2008; Pala 2010). Soon thereafter, Quebec Bank in environmental policy generally, and forest Premier Jean Charest also announced that half of policy in particular. Quebec’s northern forest would be protected from Given its financial resources, political backing development and resource extraction. These two and expert-driven policies, the World Bank often recent announcements in Ontario and Quebec con- takes a lead role among international agencies, and stitute two of the largest conservation actions in the it has also been at the forefront of promoting neo- history of North America. They push the total area liberal environmental policies. It first explicitly artic- of the boreal forests brought under permanent or in- ulated this view of the environment in the 1992 World terim protection since the inception of the campaign Development Report, which promoted the view that to 23% of the total area (IBCC 2008); an additional economic growth without environmental deteriora- 8% of the area was already under protection. tion could be achieved through market liberalisa- In May 2010 the campaign led to the signing of tion, private property rights and the use of market yet another historic agreement. The Forest Products instruments to change environmentally damaging be- Association of Canada, a trade association that repre- haviour –what it called ‘win–win’ solutions (World sents the majority of logging companies in Canada, Bank 1992). Since then, however, the World Bank announced the biggest forest-conservation deal in has tempered this view with an emphasis on good history. Each of the 21 members of the Association governance and other evolving policies, sometimes will set aside for protection slightly less than half in response to criticisms from members and envi- of the land for which they hold leases across seven ronmental NGOs (Park 2007). The examples below provinces; in aggregate, this amounts to more than focus only on the World Bank’s significant, although 30 million hectares of Canadian boreal forest. In ad- often short-lived, impacts, and sometimes those of dition, Association members have pledged to manage the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in pressuring the remainder of their leases to protect ecologically countries to undertake specific policy reforms. and culturally significant sites and to have their com- In Indonesia, the World Bank insisted that the mercial operations certified by the FSC. In return, country remove its restrictions on raw log exports nine environmental NGOs, including Greenpeace (Goodland and Daly 1996); officials at both the and The Nature Conservancy, have pledged a mora- World Bank and the IMF reasoned that this would torium on market campaigns against the products of promote economic growth and therefore alleviate Association members. poverty (Barr 2001). Recognising the importance Despite these successes, research has shown that, of both the rule of law and development to the al- overall, targeting and boycotts, especially when used leviation of poverty, the World Bank also promoted as the primary source of leverage, have had very un- decentralisation, believing that it would permit even success. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, for forest-dependent peoples to share in the prosper- example, transnational actors attempted to use global ity that economic growth promised. The Bank also markets to force policy responses in Latin America undertook a broader effort to promote SFM in In- and other tropical forested regions by threatening donesia by financing several forest-sector projects boycotts of tropical timber. These attempts largely (Dauvergne 2001) and promoted the rationalisation failed, however, due in part to their “limited latitude of the domestic regime to improve the sustainabil- for action” within the international trade regime and ity of forest operations and processing industries. the subsequent threat of trade sanctions from pro- The effort involved three main strategies: improved ducer countries (Bass and Guéneau 2005: 8). Without enforcement of the silvicultural system; increased direct evidence from political leaders, too, it is dif- capture of timber rent; and improved efficiency of ficult to know if boycotts are necessary or sufficient logging operations, processing industries and mar- for policy change, since policy change that appears keting (Barr 2001). Initially the Government of In- to be in response to a boycott may actually be the donesia attempted to minimise the involvement of result of domestic dynamics or action taken along the World Bank in the sector (Gautam et al. 2000), other pathways, which often coincide with market but it became more favourably disposed towards its campaigns. The agreement between the Forest Prod- involvement in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial ucts Association of Canada and environmental NGOs crisis. A bail-out agreement with the IMF required122 described above is an example of change via a direct the government to adopt the World Bank’s forest access pathway, with the threat of boycotts (the mar- policy strategies (Barr 2001; Dauvergne 2001). kets pathway) providing considerable Also in Southeast Asia, the World Bank promoted Single-agency efforts: Our review of single-agen- greater access and resource rights in the Philippines EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

7 EXAMINATION OF THE INFLUENCES...and Cambodia. In both countries the hypothesis driv- world’s forests, poverty alleviation, indigenous rightsing these efforts was that the greater integration of and community participation. This normative under-forests into the local economies of rural communi- pinning may explain the longstanding World Bankties would create greater local commitment to forest support for FSC-style certification, which representsconservation and SFM. an opportunity to support socially and environmen- In Central Africa, the World Bank has used its tally responsible practices in ways that are consistentstructural adjustment programmes and Heavily with the World Bank’s broader neo-liberal goals.Indebted Poor Countries initiative during times of The FSC developed ten (abstract) principles thateconomic hardship to influence forest policymaking. set the goals of responsible forest management, withFor example, Karsenty (2006) argues that it is not concrete criteria detailing policy objectives. Thesecoincidental that Cameroon became the first country principles and criteria are both prescriptive andin the sub-region to adopt a new forestry code and wide-ranging; they address a host of natural resourceto undergo a structural adjustment programme. The management challenges, including biodiversity, localWorld Bank economists who piloted forest-sector water pollution and wildlife protection, as well asreforms in Cameroon acknowledge that: “The eco- community rights and worker protection (Meidingernomic crisis gave the World Bank and the IMF an 2003).* Specific policy prescriptions are to be devel-opportunity to introduce and support far reaching oped through national or sub-national multi-stake-reforms in the forest sector ... The forest sector was a holder bodies charged with incorporating ecologicalfocal point of three successive adjustment programs and social knowledge into those prescriptions. For... : the Economic Recovery Credit of 1994 and the certification, the FSC also requires third-party com-second and the third Structural Adjustment Credits” pliance audits of operators. If successful in their bid(Topa et al. 2009: 23). The Bank built a broad coali- to receive certification, operators are awarded withtion of donors and influential international NGOs an eco-label with which to promote their corporate(e.g. the World Wide Fund for Nature – WWF, the image and to meet demand along the supply chainWildlife Conservation Society, the World Resources for certified products.Institute, the International Union for Conservation of While many companies and forest industries ini-Nature and the Last Great Ape Organization). It also tially baulked at the idea of outside scrutiny of theirpresented the reforms as a set of conditionalities to forest practices, two discernible trends had emergedbe met by the government in order to gain access to by the mid 2000s. First, most industrialised countriesinternational financial support. The Government of in North America and Europe came to embrace third-Cameroon responded by adopting all the proposed party certification; many supported FSC competitorsreforms at the regulatory and institutional levels. that emerged in the 1990s, the standards of whichHowever, the results have been unconvincing in some are generally more flexible than those of the FSC.areas – such as community forestry, where “generat- In addition, because these competitor schemes wereing significant income from community forests has initiated by forest-owner and/or forest-industry as-proven difficult” (Topa et al. 2009: 106). sociations, their governance structures have tended to Certification: Certification is a global-supply- downplay the role of environmental groups. Instead,chain-focused institution that may be characterised they give a greater role to producers and to non-as an example of non-state, market-driven global environmental stakeholders and conservation groupsgovernance. The concept was first raised at the in- that are closer to the centre of the political spectrum;ternational level by NGOs in 1989 in the context of partly as a result, such schemes are more limited inITTO (Elliott 2000; Gale 1998). At first it was met scope than the FSC. This pleases some forest owners,with resistance from tropical producer countries; who feel that FSC requirements are too cumbersomethus, ITTO decided not to endorse any particular and/or too expensive for current markets. Recently,certification system (although it did provide exper- most of the non-FSC schemes have come under thetise and resources to member countries that wished umbrella of the Programme for the Endorsementto pursue certification of their own accord). This, of Forest Certification (PEFC) (Humphreys 2006;combined with a general frustration of many of the Vallejo and Hauselmann 2001).world’s leading environmental groups over the fail-ure of intergovernmental efforts to achieve a bindingglobal forest convention, led WWF to spearhead a * The ten FSC principles are: (1) compliance with laws, inter-coalition of environmental, social and business ac- national agreements, and FSC principles; (2) tenure and usetivists to establish the FSC in 1993 (Humphreys rights and responsibilities; (3) indigenous people’s rights; (4)2006). community relations and worker’s rights; (5) multiple benefits The development of certification systems tapped from the forest; (6) environmental impact and biodiversity 123into emerging normative support for win–win so- conservation; (7) management plans; (8) monitoring and as-lutions by simultaneously championing markets, sessment; (9) maintenance of high conservation value forests;the amelioration of environmental functions in the and (10) plantations.EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

7 EXAMINATION OF THE INFLUENCES... Figure 7.1 Forest certification by region (PEFC = Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification schemes; CSA = CSA International;ATFS = American Tree Farm System; SFI = Sus- tainable Forestry Initiative; FSC = Forest Stewardship Council). Graph compiled by Ben Blom. Sources: ATFS 2004; FAO 2005; FSC 2010; PEFC 2009; SFI 2010. Despite individual cases of success, aggregate access to FSC markets in return for a commitment data reveal that, after more than a decade, less than from companies to become certified. It has developed 5% of the global area of certified forests is found in the Forest Market Linking Program to provide as- the tropics, initially the target of many proponents of surances of legality to buyers. In Indonesia, the TFT certification (Eba’a Atyi and Simula 2002). In fact, assists companies who wish to establish chain-of- much of the support for FSC and PEFC certification custody systems in support of specific market re- (and most of the certified forest – see Figure 7.1) is quirements. in North America and Europe, where policy enforce- Transnational actors have also used the markets ment is already relatively strong (Esty and Porter pathway to support consumer–producer networks for 2002) and where, at least on public lands, policies are sustainable timber products and forest certification quite prescriptive Widespread support in developing throughout the region. In particular, WWF facili- countries in general, and in the tropics in particular, tates trade linkages between companies committed continues to be elusive. to achieving and supporting responsible forestry Hence, one of the key issues for generating through its Global Forest Trade Network (GFTN) broader support for certification in developing coun- programme. Such linkages have been established tries has been whether and when private institutions in Mesoamerica, the Caribbean, Bolivia, Brazil and might be able to adapt and respond to new challenges Peru. in ways that either bypass or intersect with intergov- Legality verification: More recently, focus has ernmental and domestic efforts. shifted from certification to promoting baseline gov- One of the first responses to uneven support for ernance through the verification of legality – in many certification was to provide additional incentives to ways reinforcing sovereignty rather than bypassing companies in the tropics, who face greater obstacles it, as certification has attempted to do. Here, we dis- in adopting policies consistent with certification than cuss how three pathways towards policy change have their competitors in developed countries. Numer- intersected to produce innovative effects. ous players have emerged that provide assistance by As Tacconi (2007) notes, NGOs such as the En-124 linking responsible timber producers and consumers vironmental Investigation Agency, The Nature Con- and by providing support for the verification of legal- servancy and WWF attempted to use the foreign- ity and/or sustainability. For example, the Tropical market dependence of the Indonesian forest sector Forest Trust TFT) works with and gives companies to bring about change to policies concerning illegal EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

7 EXAMINATION OF THE INFLUENCES...logging; they sought to organise boycotts of Indo- was the first complete agreement in Southeast Asianesian timber products in Europe and to influence framed within a TLAS. As Maryudi (2009) explains,markets in China and Japan. Our above discussion the Indonesian TLAS (Standar Verifikasi Legalitason the international rules pathway discussed how Kayu – SVLK) was submitted to the Ministry ofdomestic legislation in the EU and the United States Forestry in 2008 following five years of negotia-has increased the international obligations of both by tion under the auspices of the UK–Indonesia Forestrequiring greater efforts to reduce imports of illegal Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT)wood. This has had the effect of enhancing market Action Plan. The lengthy process was due in part topressure, potentially setting the stage for improving debates about whether the agreement would merelydomestic public policy efforts in developing coun- cover the distribution and trade of timber productstries, which has, in turn, facilitated the direct access or also broader forest management questions suchpathway. Hence, understanding how the market path- as planning, implementation and harvesting. Anotherway might intersect with efforts undertaken along key point of contention, which may reflect differ-other pathways is important to producing effective ing competing interests domestically, was that EUand enduring results. negotiators requested that the third-party verifiers To be sure not all of these intersecting pathways of legality be mutually agreed. The Government ofproduces uniform results across time or space. The Indonesia acceded to this request in August 2009,EU’s efforts on illegal logging a decade ago can be paving the way for a formal agreement.seen as a reaction to the market pressure exerted by Similar results have occurred in Africa, where theNGOs but these efforts stand in contrast to the limited dependence of the timber sector on EU markets haspublic policy impact that similar market campaigns been a catalyst for governments, including Ghanahave had in Japan and China. Likewise, public policy and the Republic of the Congo, to engage in negotia-responses in Indonesia to EU market pressure were tions with the EU on VPAs.‘paper’ edicts only. They included Presidential In- These approaches are not a panacea to prob-struction Number 5 Concerning Eliminating Illegal lems of forest governance, and their impacts on theLogging and the Illegal Timber Trade in the Leuser ground remain to be seen. There are also some in-Ecosystem and Tanjung Puting National Park, issued dications that gains from curtailing illegal loggingon 19 April 2001; and the Statement of the President may be countered by increases in unsustainable legalof the Republic of Indonesia on Repressive Measures logging(Lawson and MacFaul 2010). Nevertheless,Against Illegal Logging, issued on 24 April 2001 the combination of the markets, international rules(Currey 2001; Tacconi 2007). and market access pathways appear to hold promise However, ongoing market pressure to institution- in ways that a single pathway may not. It is for thisalise market incentives led the EU and the United reason that Maryudi (2009: 11) argues that the ap-States to develop formal policies to weed out ille- proval of the SVLK and the signing of the VPA ingal logging. As discussed above, this included the Indonesia appear “to hold potential for working innegotiation (in the case of the EU) of VPAs with tandem with local institutions, to develop a durableindividual countries and the passing of legislation and effective institution for reducing illegal logging(in the case of both the United States and the EU) in the country”.that requires importers to show due care in ensur- Corporate social responsibility: Worldwideing that they are not importing illegal timber. These there is an undeniable trend towards the adoption,developments have led to the emergence of legality by companies of corporate responsibility (CR) prac-verification, in which third-party auditors assess for- tices, motivated by ‘soft’ economic pulls such asest practices to determine whether they meet base- the benefits that can accrue to companies that areline legality requirements. Products that meet those seen as responsible stewards. In the forest sector,requirements obtain a label that importers can use much of this is a logical extension of forest certi-as evidence that they have shown due care in avoid- fication; nevertheless, the range of CR practices ising the importation of illegally obtained products. now quite diverse (Vidal and Kozak 2008b). ForestEven the more formal VPAs have provisions for companies in Africa and Latin America are adoptingthe third-party, non-governmental auditing of for- practices related to health, education, training andest practices to verify that companies and govern- community development; Asian companies are morements are meeting their commitments. The process concerned with emissions control, energy efficiency,is framed within a ‘timber legality assurance system’ and recycling; and North American and European(TLAS) that includes a clear definition of legality, companies are concentrating on SFM (Vidal andverification, independent monitoring, the issuing of Kozak 2008a).licenses, and chain-of-custody control (Lawson and The reasons underlying the adoption of CR prac- 125MacFaul 2010). tices by forest companies are also diverse, but they The VPA between Indonesia and the EU (Colches- generally seem to revolve around legitimisation andter 2006), while an understandably cautious process, improved transparency. The aims are to address in-EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

7 EXAMINATION OF THE INFLUENCES... creasingly rigorous societal expectations regarding across coalitions; and assisting governments in en- the stewardship of forest resources; demonstrate a forcing or implementing domestic policy commit- commitment to sustainability; and, ultimately, main- ments by providing technical expertise, resources tain market share (Jenkins and Smith 1999; Panwar and incentives. et al. 2006). The multi-dimensional nature of the The evidence below both reinforces and requires phenomenon speaks to the need to disentangle the an expansion of the analysis of this pathway by Bern- market benefits from the normative constructs inher- stein and Cashore (2000). It confirms the attention of ent in the national and company-level environments the original analysis to the role of outside actors in (Vidal and Kozak 2008a). changing domestic policy networks, but adds to it an emphasis on how policy learning can shape domestic politics in unintended ways (Howlett and Ramesh 7.4.4 Direct access to the domestic 2002, 2003; Howlett and Rayner 2006). policy process Impacts on domestic policymaking Key developments Domestic civil society: One of the most intriguing Although perhaps the least studied of the four pathways in which non-domestic organisations affect ways, the direct access of international forest institu- domestic policy is the use of resources from foun- tions and organisations to domestic policy processes dations, environmental NGOs, companies and gov- has arguably had the biggest impact on domestic ernment agencies to leverage or grant more resources policymaking. Direct access captures those processes and staff for existing domestic organisations and/or in which non-domestic financial resources, techni- to create new domestic organisations or coalitions cal knowledge, expertise, training and learning can (Balboa 2009). For example, foundations and en- dramatically shape domestic politics. It works by vironmental NGOs in the United States influenced mobilising societal interests, generating new co- Canadian forest policy in this way, beginning in the alitions or confronting existing ones, and provid- 1980s. Working first in British Columbia and then ing resources for effective and enduring impacts expanding to include the Canadian boreal forests, on domestic governance and policy networks. As these groups combined market-based and direct ac- Singer’s (2008) assessment of the impacts of the cess approaches. The latter included the granting international forest regime in Cameroon, Indonesia of financial resources to environmental NGOs and and Brazil finds, “What makes the strength of the marginalised groups, including First Nation groups, IFR[international forest regime], therefore, is not its which provided them with the staff, time and exper- formal framework or the official negotiations … but tise to become active in the domestic policymaking rather its informal aspects. In particular, principles process. While it is difficult to tease out the causal and policy networks … have transcended spheres impacts of the direct access pathway compared to and contributed to shaping Brazilian, Cameroonian the markets pathway, it seems likely that the direct and Indonesian FRPs [forest-related policies], and access approach increased both the pace and scale vice-versa” (Singer 2008:363). Similarly, informal of forest policy reforms (Scher 2008). policy networks, such as ASEAN’s regional knowl- Direct access strategies have been pursued in de- edge networks, seem to be particularly effective in veloping countries, especially in Southeast Asia. In Asia because of “a cultural aversion to formal insti- Indonesia, a range of non-domestic groups took ad- tutional arrangements and a reflection of an Asian vantage of the fall of the Suharto regime to strengthen style of governance and diplomacy” (Nesadurai and civil society with a view to fostering new ideas and Stone 2000). Unquestionably, a range of internation- interests within domestic policymaking (Okamoto al aid agencies, institutions, NGOs and educational 2001). For example, organisations such as The Na- institutions have travelled this pathway in the last ture Conservancy successfully became involved in 20 years under the auspices of ‘capacity building’, policy networks, partly because of the fragmentation which often works to reinforce, rather than to directly of authority that followed the decentralisation of the challenge, domestic sovereign authority. government administration (Barr et al. 2006). The enormity of this effort and its impacts means A number of donor agencies, including the UK that we can only summarise a few examples through Department for International Development and Nor- which the direct access pathway has shaped and in- way’s Partnerships, as well as transnational environ- fluenced domestic forest governance. It has done so mental NGOs, have actively sought to promote social126 by providing resources to civil-society organisations, and environmental values in forest management in thus changing the relative influence of different ac- Indonesia. Initially, the focus was on forest prac- tors and domestic policy networks; fostering and tices; illegal logging; democratic decision-making nurturing domestic governance learning networks and forest governance; poverty alleviation among EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

7 EXAMINATION OF THE INFLUENCES...forest dwellers; resolving tenurial problems; and in- illegal logging, including spot checks, helicoptercreasing local forest management. Recently, many surveillance, regular training programmes for offic-donors have begun to focus on climate-change miti- ers and public awareness campaigns. In Indonesia,gation and adaptation. the Ministry of Forestry has increased the number of There is strong evidence that the direct access forest guards, trained them to prevent illegal loggingpathway helped environmental NGOs and interests and, following civil-society demands, enacted thein Indonesia to implant strong environmental and Anti-Money Laundering Act (in 2002) and ratifiedsocial protections within the new Indonesian forest the United Nations Convention against Corruptionlaw. Non-domestic organisations sought alliances (in 2006).with local counterparts, research institutions and The direct access pathway has a longer historyuniversities. The Center for International Forestry in Africa than in Southeast Asia. It was not untilResearch and the country’s two leading forest uni- the early 1990s, however, that forest-focused inter-versities (Bogor Agricultural University and Univer- national organisations began to target forest policysitas Gadjah Mada) remain the most prominent focal there, as illustrated by developments in the Centralpoints, providing science-based policy inputs. African forest sector. Until the late 1980s, most do- However, the ongoing and dynamic nature of nor projects, including those of the Canadian Interna-these efforts in Indonesia, and the broader market tional Development Agency (CIDA), focused on fieldforces of economic globalisation, which have re- practices, experiments and inventories. Beginning insulted in the significant conversion of natural forests the 1990s, however, CIDA’s approach in Cameroonto plantations, mean that this direct access pathway moved towards engagement with the central foresthas had mixed results. There have been significant administration. It created an advisory office adjacentchallenges in implementing the new forest law, in- to the office of the National Director of Forests andcluding the fragmentation of authority. Thus, even if included in its desired outputs key elements of the le-the involvement of non-domestic actors has helped to gal and institutional forest management framework.influence domestic policy networks, they do not ap- During the first phase of the project, from 1992 topear to have had a discernible impact on the ground. 1995, Cameroon adopted a new forest law and cre-The private sector remains highly influential, and ated a zoning (land-use) plan for its southern rain-disentangling the interests of business and govern- forests. CIDA’s success in influencing Cameroon’sment is often difficult. Domestic challenges in the forest policymaking process served as an exampleimplementation of new laws, and the short attention to other donors. By 2000, the minister responsiblespans of international donors – who move quickly for forests and wildlife had technical advisors orfrom one instrument (such as forest certification) to advisory teams from France, Germany, the UK andthe next (such as REDD) – have placed sometimes Canada. Currently, all ministers dealing with forestsconfusing and conflicting demands on government in Central Africa have access to permanent techni-policymakers. Perhaps in part for these reasons, in- cal advisors or advisory projects funded by donorternational NGOs such as The Nature Conservancy countries. The aim is always to institutionalise newlythat have partnered with domestic organisations in introduced forest management approaches throughIndonesia appear to have made more headway in laws, regulations or official guidelines adopted fol-influencing local-level governments* than in either lowing policymaking processes. As a result, Singermaking changes to land-use policies or influencing (2009:357) found that travelling this pathway led tonational-level policies. “a new network … which has determined the main The dominant strategy among environmental direction of Cameroonian [forest resources policy]NGOs is to travel simultaneously on the direct ac- in the last decade.”cess pathway and the markets pathway. For instance, International NGOs also became active. For ex-WWF created a Southeast Asia focus NGO –Traffic ample, WWF has engaged with the Government of– to partner with domestic organisations, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo to enforcegovernment agencies, to help reduce illegal logging policies within forest concessions. The project ad-in the region. dresses the implementation of the forest administra- In contrast to initiatives with a broader focus on tion’s official guidelines governing concession for-SFM, direct access initiatives on the verification of est management. It also reinforces the internationallegality appear to be gaining in strength and impact. norms and discourse pathway because it incorporatesIn Peninsular Malaysia, for example, the govern- internationally recognised forest management normsment has instituted a number of measures to curb such as the African Timber Organization/ITTO principles, C&I for the sustainable management of Afri- can natural tropical forests and some aspects of the 127* The Nature Conservancy has been active in the Berau Dis- FSC principles and criteria.trict, East Kalimantan, collaborating with the district govern- Direct access strategies have also been under-ment in developing REDD activities. taken by more radical international NGOs advocatingEMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

7 EXAMINATION OF THE INFLUENCES... the banning of industrial timber harvesting in the International assistance agencies such as USAID, Congo Basin. These NGOs develop networks of lo- FAO and the World Bank, along with international cal NGOs that relay their opinions during domestic environmental NGOs, contributed to the dialogue by stakeholder consultation processes. For example, an providing funding, technical information and advice open letter to the minister in charge of forests in the to decision-makers (Pavez and Bojanic 1998). Democratic Republic of the Congo was published In Peru, the government’s interest in improved in April 2008 requesting a “moratorium on new in- forest practices shifted in 2002–03 with the imple- dustrial logging titles” in the country. A group of mentation of the new forest law. With the support of international NGOs – Greenpeace, Global Witness (principally Dutch) development agencies, the then and the Rainforest Foundation – signed the letter Minister of Agriculture brought together a coalition along with a representative of a network of ten lo- of government forest officials and non-government cal NGOs. Similarly, the German-based Rettet den forest stakeholders (Smith et al. 2006). The combined Regenwald organised national NGOs in Gabon to weight of this coalition was able to counteract those oppose, in 1996, the first FSC certificate granted opposed to the new law. The coalition built on and in the sub-region (to the logging company Leroy expanded a round-table of stakeholders to develop Gabon). The certificate was later withdrawn (Eba’a a consensus on the implementation of the new law, Atyi 2006). and presented its feedback and recommendations to Fostering learning across coalitions: An under- the government (Smith et al. 2006). explored impact of international forest governance Regional-level strategies to foster learning, such arrangement is their role in fostering learning across as ‘capacity development’ for knowledge transfer domestic coalitions. For example, the C&I processes and mutual learning processes among peer coun- dominant in the 1990s focused NGOs, governments tries (e.g. Goehler et al. 2009; Goehler and Schwaab and industry organisations on ‘how things work’, 2009), are also being promoted by development which led to a realisation of the importance of col- agencies (Ferroni 2001). In a seven-year regional laborative learning, especially on such complex is- program with ASEAN, for example, GTZ provided sues as forest management. Likewise, development advisory services and financial resources to both for- assistance agencies that support FLEG processes fre- mal intergovernmental bodies, such as the ASEAN quently foster learning among disparate stakehold- Senior Officials on Forestry, and the more informal ers. For example, German Technical Cooperation ASEAN regional knowledge networks. Focused dis- (GTZ) has started to provide funds to numerous local cussions on specific policy interventions were led agencies, including the Indonesian Forest Agency, by the ASEAN Working Group on a Pan ASEAN to carry out research on the impacts of conventional Timber Certification Initiative. These helped to fos- logging as well as trials on reduced impact logging. ter agreement by all ten ASEAN member states on It also provides technical assistance to improve the a regional guideline for phased approaches to for- standard of operations. Another international body, est certification and on the ASEAN C&I for timber the Tropical Forest Foundation, helped to provide the legality (Hinrichs 2009). The EU, GTZ and USAID Government of Indonesia with a scientifically sound supported the working group with technical expertise foundation for reduced impact logging, leading to the and financial resources. development of guidelines for better forest practices In 2008 ASEAN established regional knowledge (Klassen 2003). networks on FLEG and forests and climate change, In Latin America, transnational actors and in- with the primary motive of better informing decision- ternational institutions have influenced and in some makers through policy-oriented research as a precon- cases directly accessed domestic forest policymaking dition for effective policy implementation (ASEAN processes, largely through the provision of resources, 2008, 2009). GTZ played an initiating role, advised knowledge, training and finance. In Costa Rica in the on network management and, together with AusAID mid 1990s, for example, the United States Agency for and the World Bank, provided financial resources International Development (USAID) strengthened for network activities. The regional knowledge net- the historically poorly organized private forestry sec- work on FLEG organised a learning process in which tor with organizational knowhow and funding, es- countries shared their professional views, developed tablishing the Costa Rican Forestry Chamber (CCF). collective wisdom on FLEG, and shared experiences The CCF became the main advocate for the timber about the successes and failures of FLEG policies industry and was a significant stakeholder in the de- (Pescott et al. 2010). velopment of the 1996 forest law (Law No. 7575) It is difficult to establish a cause-and-effect link (ibid.). In Bolivia, one of the key factors in reform between these processes and subsequent change, or128 was the emergence of political conditions that were to attribute such change to specific capacity-building favourable to democratic participation. As a result, an activities. An evaluation by the World Bank assessed intensive dialogue on forest-sector issues took place the majority of its regional programs as effective with the engagement of many stakeholder groups. and suggested that “even stronger results could be EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

7 EXAMINATION OF THE INFLUENCES...achieved if support for regional programs were better the potential to, ‘ratchet up’ policies and behav-developed as an international aid practice” (World iours. The literature on the globalisation of theBank 2007b). In a similar vein, Birdsall (2004) ar- forest sector is relatively well developed, and thegues that regional public goods in developing coun- literature on forest governance and the politicaltries, such as forests, are under-funded despite their economy intuitively recognises that the globalisa-potentially high rates of return compared to tradi- tion/internationalisation relationship is complex;tional country-focused investments. nevertheless, few studies address this interaction Recognition of the importance of understanding explicitly. The next step is to explore the con-the impacts of single policy interventions on different ditions under which these counteracting effectspathways is illustrated by the influence of the FLEGT ratchet down standards and lesson enforcement,process in Central Africa. While drawing on the mar- provide incentives for illegal practices, or pro-kets pathway for economic incentives, these efforts duce effects that are beneficial to environmentalhave also led to considerable direct access interven- quality. There is no consensus in the literaturetions such as capacity building and coordination. In on which of the four internationalisation path-preparation for VPAs, for example, the Republic of ways are likely to be most successful. There is athe Congo, Cameroon, Central African Republic and tendency in the literature to move away from aGabon all initiated efforts to permit independent ob- focus on international rules towards market-basedservers to monitor their forest operations. Subse- interventions, but this trend appears to stem morequently, NGOs working to promote transparency, from an analysis of actual policy instruments thansuch as Global Witness and Resource Extraction from a systemic comparison of the countervailingMonitoring, became involved in forest monitoring effects of each pathway or their interactions with– a sovereign state activity – and their monitoring globalisation.reports were disseminated widely. Cameroon and 3) While we know a great deal about activities alongthe Republic of the Congo have also worked with each of the pathways, there is still a significantthe World Resources Institute to develop interactive gap in knowledge of causality. In other words,forest atlases showing forest concessions, which have very little of the literature explicitly explores thebeen made available publicly. In the Democratic conditions under which activities or institutionsRepublic of the Congo, the development of a legal along particular pathways will have their desiredframework for forest management and the conver- effects.sion of former logging titles to concessions havebeen done with notable transparency. At each stage In the remainder of this section, we work inductivelyof the process the forest administration has worked from our review to offer preliminary propositionsconsistently with national and international NGOs, for addressing areas identified above where moreas well as with technical international donors and work is needed.private-sector partners (Eba’a Atyi et al. 2008). While some of the propositions made below were anticipated in the Bernstein and Cashore (2000) study around which this review was organised, recent7.5 Findings and conclusions research and evidence suggests important modifications.The following three broad conclusions emerge fromour review: Pathway 1: international rules1) Domestic effects cannot be studied simply by looking at the international rules pathway, even International agreements affect domestic policy to if one takes into account the fragmentation and the extent that they create binding obligations on institutional complexity of forest governance states through international law. This proposition that arises due to the lack of a comprehensive reflects a standard view of how international law international forest regime. The literature shows works. We saw evidence of it in the case of the United significant effects along the three other pathways. States–Peru Trade Promotion Agreement and in ex- Broadly speaking, the direct access pathway amples from CITES. This proposition is a baseline, shows the most widespread effects, both directly however, in the sense that the large literature on and through interactions with activities along compliance and effectiveness suggests that imple- other pathways. mentation and compliance are dependent on a range2) Globalisation does not always lead to downward of further conditions. Notably, owing to the lack of 129 pressure on environmental and social standards. international forest-focused hard law, non-forest- Its interaction with internationalisation, as defined focused hard-law instruments, and some soft-law here, can push in ways that either do, or hold instruments, are having a much greater effect thanEMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

7 EXAMINATION OF THE INFLUENCES... one might expect. There is little research, however, lated policies, the changing positions of government, on why some instruments have had greater – or have and the dominant ideologies or cultural discourse and the potential to have greater – impacts than others. practices – better account for the success of trans- It is therefore difficult to draw firm conclusions on national campaigns for change. It is also clear from whether particular initiatives – such as REDD+ – are evidence that the learning gained through United likely to have a greater policy impact than existing Nations conferences and processes as well as through instruments. participation in other international organisations has Transnational and/or domestic coalitions for played a role in the dissemination of forest-related change can activate rules in cases of non-compli- international norms and that governments have taken ance. Rules can be become a resource on which their cues from these processes. transnational and/or coalitions of domestic actors Dominant norms agreed to in international fo- can draw when governments do not comply, although rums and promoted by powerful independent observ- the ability to mobilise may vary between domestic ers such as the World Bank are likely to be drawn settings. When mobilisation is possible, groups can upon by governments facing external pressures to publicise non-compliance, pressure governments to change policies. live up to their commitments, and press governments Strategies for change based on international to launch disputes against other countries that do not norms and discourse depend on the moral vulnera- fulfil their obligations. bility of the target state. They also depend on the abil- For countries dependent on trade or foreign capi- ity to engage other states and actors in placing the tal under conditions of increasing globalisation, fear issue on the global agenda, whether by reformulating of losing market share and investor confidence acts current norms and ideas or by introducing new ones. as an added incentive to comply with international Cases in most regions suggest that targeting on moral rules. Again, the United States–Peru Trade Promo- grounds has been an effective strategy, although it tion Agreement provides good initial evidence for is unclear whether this has resulted in long-term, or this proposition, since the promise of market access, the institutionalisation of, policy change. and the threat posed to it by illegal logging, provided a strong incentive for Peru to sign the deal. Similar dynamics underlie FLEGT agreements. It is also notable, however, that many of the reforms necessary Pathway 3: markets for the United States–Peru Trade Promotion Agree- ment were already under way before the agreement Relative dependence on foreign markets and the was struck and could be linked to other pathways success of transnational actors in convincing con- and to domestic pressure. sumers to exercise consumer preferences are key Agreements on international rules with strong determinants of policy influence. Boycott strategies compliance mechanisms are more likely when such give the appearance of short-term success, but long- agreements reflect rules or processes already under term efforts require more enduring forms of non-state way domestically owing to interaction with other authority, such as certification. pathways. Of all the trade agreements between the Hence, the durability of policy responses is con- United States and Latin American countries, the only ditioned upon maintaining transnational pressure. one with strict rules on forests involves Peru, which All things being equal, if pressure is not maintained had initiated reforms in the early 2000s in advance then ‘downward’ measures in response to globalisa- of the treaty. tion are likely. Normative changes in response to such pressures alone are unlikely. In almost all cases, significant Pathway 2: international norms and institutionalisation of change that reflected new discourse forest-related norms has resulted from pressures or activities along a number of pathways and not from boycotts alone. While much of the literature suggests that international norms and discourse have significant influence, little of it addresses why or how particular discourses or norms have been internalised into policy and behaviour. Therefore, the propositions below are suggestive, drawing as much on the theory-based130 literature as on examples in forestry. For example, they are consistent with Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) argument that ‘dynamic’ factors in domestic politics – such as how proposals for change ‘fit’ with other re- EMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

7 EXAMINATION OF THE INFLUENCES...Pathway 4: direct access to Acknowledgementsthe domestic policy process The authors thank Tina Dietrich, Erica Pohnan and Ben Blom for invaluable research assistance, ToddOur review generally found three ways in which the Sigaty for input into the understanding of forest pol-international forest regime influences the domestic icy dynamics in Southeast Asia. We are also gratefulpolicy process through the direct access pathway. to Pia Katila for substantive comments and edits,One was through the provision of financial resources Jeremy Rayner for wonderful effort in chairing thisto assist existing civil-society organisations or to help international panel, Alexandar Buck for his positivecreate new organisations. These efforts can help shift and purposeful support, and the entire IUFRO sup-the balance of power in domestic policy processes port team.and provide access to often marginalised or disem-powered organisations, such as indigenous groups,forest-dependent communities and environmental ReferencesNGOs. However, broader questions of democracy,transparency, openness and accountability are pre- Acharya, Amitav. 2004. How ideas spread: Whose norms matter?requisites for the successful use of this strategy. Norm localization and institutional change in Asian regionalism. International Organization 58(2): 239–275.Meeting such preconditions may take time, since Agrawal, Arun, and Jesse Ribot. 1999. Accountability in De-they are not sector-specific. centralization: A Framework with South Asian and African We uncovered two other strategies that were not Cases. Journal of Developing Areas 33: 473–502.envisioned by Bernstein and Cashore (2000). Direct Alba, Audomaro, ed. 2008. 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8 Conclusions Coordinating lead author: Jeremy Rayner Lead authors: Hans Hoogeveen, Kathleen McNutt and Patrick Verkooijen Contributing author: Christoph Wildburger8.1 Introduction will increase the pressure on forest lands worldwide, especially if agricultural productivity is not increasedInternational forest governance today is complex, (FAO 2009). Under a ‘business as usual’ scenario it isfragmented and producing mixed results. On the one estimated that around 60% of tropical forest could behand, there is increasing awareness of the threats to at risk of deforestation over the long term (Terrestrialforests and numerous efforts have emerged at all lev- Carbon Group 2009). International forest governanceels that attempt to address these threats. Sustainable arrangements that continue to support the implemen-forest management has maintained a place on the tation of sustainable forest management are an im-international agenda since the United Nations Con- portant part – but only a part – of the larger picture.ference on Environment and Development (UNCED) Improvements in agriculture productivity and morewas held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The Non Legally sophisticated land-use management systems thatBinding Instrument on All Types of Forests has been account for the cumulative impacts of all uses arestruck. The many other elements of the international also important and must somehow be accommodatedforest governance architecture continue to proclaim within the larger governance arrangements.the critical importance of forests and the international Some have argued that nothing less than a para-community spends billions of dollars annually on digm shift in the way land is used and commoditiesregional, national and local programmes for sustain- are produced will address these challenges. Interna-able forest management. Nevertheless, the world is tional forest governance has certainly shifted overstill losing an estimated 13 million hectares of forest time to address emerging priorities, many of whichper year; this is only the most obvious symptom of have been hailed as this elusive new paradigm. Suchthe fact that, not withstanding the growth of aware- priorities have shaped – and reshaped – the view ofness and initiatives, international forest governance forest policy, changing it variously from a ‘commod-is struggling to meet a number of significant con- ity issue’ to, among others, a ‘biodiversity issue’, atemporary challenges. sustainable development issue’ and ‘a human rights This report has argued that instead of asking how issue’. As a result, international forest governanceinternational forest governance can be restructured is now connected with human well being, both forinto a simplified top-down regime, reformers should forest and non-forest dwellers; international trade;embrace complexity as a necessary feature of gov- human health; economic growth and development;ernance arrangements. Actors must be prepared to natural resources and ecosystem health; and humanlive with a certain degree of fragmentation as the security (Chapter 2).price for maintaining complexity and coverage. The But this re-shaping has not been transformative.task of governance reform is to ensure the develop- The older paradigms have not disappeared, oftenment of more synergistic and cooperative relation- because they provide benefits for and are supportedships between the components of the governance by powerful interests (chapters 3 and 5). Instead, thearrangements even as the challenges become more new goals and priorities, and the instruments asso-urgent and intense. ciated with them, have been stacked on top of each First among these challenges is the demand for other in a process known as layering. With layeringagricultural commodities and timber, which will comes drift, in which goals and instruments designedcontinue to increase as the world population grows for earlier and different contexts are allowed to sur- 137and becomes wealthier. By 2050 the world popula- vive unmodified in the new era, with increasinglytion will be 9 billion; feeding them in the face of unpredictable but usually sub-optimal consequenc-climate change and economic and financial crises es (Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Streek and ThelenEMBRACING COMPLEXITY – MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL FOREST GOVERNANCE

8 CONCLUSIONS 2005). Layering and drift are among the most com- and Verkooijen 2010). High-level negotiations have mon causes of fragmentation (Chapter 6). a central place in international forest governance, For this reason, despite the many serious chal- not least because they allow the development of the lenges facing international forest governance, this norms and values that provide the ‘compass’ for gov- report does not call for another paradigm shift, which ernance – that is, the direction in which the actors would simply add another layer to the existing gov- agree to move. However, the hopeless attempt to ernance arrangements. It is certainly important to compel movement in a desired direc

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