Describe Project Safe NeighborhoodsA nationwide commitment to reduce gun crime in AmericaA network of new and existing programs that target gun crimeAn opportunity to provide tools and resources at the local and national level to support the network’s effortsPSN focuses on: Violent organizations and offenders, especially armed career criminals; Illegal gun traffickers; and Brady denials/false statement cases2. Give the history of Project Safe NeighborhoodsOn May 14, 2001, President George W. Bush and Attorney General John Ashcroft unveiled “Project Safe Neighborhoods”, a new, comprehensive, strategic approach to gun law enforcement – an approach that targets gun crime and violent offenders in an effort to make our streets and communities safer. The Administration’s plan calls upon each US Attorney to implement this national initiative, working in partnership with communities and state and local law enforcement agencies. The plan envisions an invigorated enforcement effort that either builds on the successful programs already in place or, through new resources and tools, creates effective gun violence reduction programs.
1. Youth Violence Prevention and Intervention: An overview Chris Melde, Ph.D. School of Criminal Justice Michigan State University
2. Violence in Perspective The Long View of Crime National versus State and Local Trends Distribution of Risk  Not random Perceptual Indicators and Resulting Behaviors  Fear and Avoidance What makes youth violence unique?
3. Overall Violent Crime Rate (per 100,000): 1960 to 2010 UCR Violent Crime Rate 1960 to 2010 800 700 600 500Rate per 100,000 400 300 200 100 0
4. Murder Rate (per 100,000): 1960 to 2010 UCR Murder Rate: 1960 to 2010 12 10 8Rate per 100,000 6 4 2 0
5. Overall Violent Crime in Illinois: 2001 to 2010 UCR Data Overall Violent Crime in Illinois 1600 1400 1200 1000Rate per 100,000 State of Illinois 800 City A City B 600 City C City D 400 200 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
6. Overall Violent Crime in Select Illinois Cities (not named Chicago) Overall Violent Crime in Illinois by City: 2006 to 2010 UCR 1600 1400 1200 1000Rate per 100,000 800 600 400 200 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
7. Crime in the MediaMilwaukee posts 4th largest drop in crime12% decline in violence near top for big citiesFrom the June 8, 2005 editions of the Milwaukee Journal SentinelBy CHASE DAVIScdavis@journalsentinel.comViolent crime in Milwaukee plunged 12.3% last year, the fourth largest drop among thecountrys 33 largest cities, according to a new FBI report.More than 4,600 violent crimes - homicides, aggravated assaults, rapes and robberies -were reported in Milwaukee in 2004, down from nearly 5,300 in 2003, the FBI said.
8. Crime in the Media: One year later Sunday, Dec. 03, 2006 Middle America�s Crime Wave By Kathleen Kingsbury Its as if Milwaukee, Wis., had reverted to a state of lethal chaos. A Special Olympian is killed for his wallet as he waits for a bus. An 11-year-old girl is gang-raped by as many as 19 men. A woman is strangled, her body found burning in a city-owned garbage cart. Twenty- eight people are shot, four fatally, over a holiday weekend. These are the kinds of crimes American cities expected never to see in high numbers again. In the 1990s police departments nationwide began applying the so-called broken-windows theory: arrest the bad guys for minor offenses, and they wouldnt be around to commit more serious ones. This zero-tolerance approach--combined with more cops on the street to enforce it, a strong economy and a fortuitous demographic change that reduced the population of young men who typically cause the most trouble--lowered the rates of murder, robbery and rape for 10 consecutive years. Until last year. Not only did crime suddenly begin to rise in 2005, but the most violent crimes led the trend. Homicides shot up 3.4%. Robberies, 3.9%. Aggravated assaults, 1.8%. Hardest hit were not metropolises like New York City and Los Angeles but cities with populations between 400,000 and 1 million--such as Baltimore, Md.; Charlotte, N.C.; St. Louis, Mo.; and Oakland, Calif.--and this year looks to see similar rates of increase, if not worse. Few places have suffered more than Milwaukee. The homicide count for the city of 590,000 fell from 130 in 1996 to just 88 in 2004. But last year, according to FBI figures, Milwaukee saw the countrys largest jump in homicides--up 40%, to 121.
9. The Reality:Back to the 10-year average (20.1)
10. Distribution of RiskThe non-random nature of the distribution of violence risk.
11. Pin map of all homicides in Newark, NewJersey, 1982-2008
12. The spread of homicide risk inNewark, New Jersey, 1982-2008
13. Percent Black by Census Tract inNewark, New Jersey
14. Violent Victimization by Sex Overall Violent Victimization Rate (per 1,000) by Sex: NCVS 2009201918171615 Male Female1413121110 Male
15. Violent Victimization by Race Overall Violent Victimization Rate (per 1,000) by Race: NCVS 20094540353025 Total Violent Victimization201510 5 0 White Black Other Multi-Racial
16. Violent Victimization by Ethnicity Overall Violent Victimization Rate (per 1,000) by Ethnicity: NCVS 2009201918171615 Hispanic Non-Hispanic1413121110 Hispanic
17. Violent Victimization by Age-Group Total Violent Victimization rate (per 1,000) by Age: NCVS 2009403530252015 Total Violent Victimization10 5 0 12-15 16-19 20-24 25-34 35-49 50-64 65 and over
18. Focusing on Youth Violence Why?  Risk - Power Few  Because the public is especially concerned • Cycle of Juvenile Justice  Malleability/Potential for Change Focus on ages 12 to 24  While we often think of “youth” from a legalistic standpoint (i.e., under age 18), that is not a realistic representation.  Adolescence
19. The Cycle of Juvenile Justice The primary philosophy guiding the creation of the juvenile justice system was rehabilitation and reintegration.  Juveniles are not wholly responsible for their actions due to their maturity level.  There is time to reform their behavior, and create productive citizens. This philosophy is easy to convey when juvenile crime is not in the spotlight.
20. The Cycle of Juvenile Justice What happens when juvenile crime is perceived to be extraordinarily high? ◦ A large contingent of people lobby for harsher treatment of juvenile delinquents. ◦ The common sentiment: leniency “encourages juveniles to laugh at the system, to believe they will not be punished no matter what they do, and to feel free to commit more frequent and serious crimes” (Bernard, 1992, p. 37).
21. The Cycle of Juvenile Justice The Result  Lawmakers impose harsher penalties, including mandatory transfer to adult court for serious crimes, and extended sentences; a „get tough‟ on crime agenda. What typically happens to the perceived juvenile crime rate in the face of „get tough‟ policies?
22. The Cycle of Juvenile Justice Chasing our tails  Because our juvenile crime rate is, and always has been, relatively high compared with adults (with the exception of young adults 18-24), we change the system once again.  The juvenile justice philosophy returns to its‟ roots, by focusing on rehabilitation and reintegration.  The question isn‟t whether we‟ll have another moral panic, according to Bernard (1992), but rather when.
23. Significant Supreme Court Rulings Roper v. Simmons (2005)  No Juvenile Death Penalty  Juveniles fundamentally different than adults Graham v. Florida (2010)  Holding: Sentencing a juvenile to life in prison without parole for crimes other than murder violates the Eighth Amendment‟s ban on cruel and unusual• punishment.
24. Supreme Court: No more life sentencesfor juvenile killers Monday, June 25, 2012 The Supreme Court says its unconstitutional to sentence juveniles to life in prison without parole for murder, siding with the petitioner in case of Miller v. Alabama. The high court on Monday threw out Americans ability to send children to prison for the rest of their lives with no chance of ever getting out. The 5-4 decision is in line with others the court has made, including ruling out the death penalty for juveniles and life without parole for young people whose crimes did not involve killing.
25. The Cycle of Juvenile Justice Back to Prevention and Intervention Prevention programs have a long, but not so glorious, history.  Most prevention programs do not “work.” • “But if it helps just one child” • Difficult for any single program to produce change. On average, schools provide roughly 14 different delinquency prevention programs in any given year.  Schools provide ready access to youth  Progression: Didactic models to skill development
26. Why Get Involved in School-Based Prevention?The Risks and Rewards of School-Based Programs
27. NCVS Youth Violence Data (ages 12-18): 1992 to 2010 Youth Violence at School vs. Away from School (per 1,000) 80 70 60 50Rate per 1,000 Non-School Serious 40 Non-school total School Serious 30 School total 20 10 0 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
28. Adolescent Fear of Crime by Location: 1995-2009 Percentage of students age 12-18 who reported being afraid of attack or harm, by location, 1995-2009 14 12 10Percent of students 8 Total At School 6 Total Away from School 4 2 0 1995 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
29. Student Avoidance Behaviors Avoidance Behaviors by Students at School (percent of students): NCVS 10 9 8 7Percent of students 6 Total Avoided School activities 5 Any activities Any class 4 Stayed home from school 3 Avoided one or more places in school 2 1 0 1995 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
30. Popular School-Based Programs Olweus Bully Prevention  Blueprints Program  http://www.stopbullying.gov/laws/index.html • Page with information on Illinois State Laws on Bullying Gang Resistance Education and Training (G.R.E.A.T.)  National Evaluation (2006-2012)  Slight reduction in gang membership  Improved attitudes about the police  More negative views about gangs Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE)  Has not worked • possible negative effects for low risk, positive effects for high risk youth.  New iteration of the program
31. Risks of School-Based Programs Iatrogenic Effects  Mixing high and low risk youth in programs has been associated with more anti-social behavior on the part of youth considered to be at low-risk. • Evidence of this in community and correctional setting as well (Hennigan and Maxson, 2012; Dodge et al., 2006). Priorities of the School  Education versus Prevention • Especially in high risk schools  Long-term commitments are difficult
32. Module 2: Community InterventionsBackground on Research PartnershipsEvidence of Impact 32
33. Continuum of Promising Practices for Comprehensive Gang Intervention SUPPRESSION SOCIAL SERVICE DETERRENCE CAGI INFORMALBoston Ceasefire “Spergel Model” Chicago Ceasefire“Pulling Levers” “Violence Interrupters”
34. Traditional Research Model Researchers were outsiders in problem-solving process  Not involved in problem identification  Observers, not participants, in program development and implementation  Involved only as independent evaluators of impact • What went wrong? (i.e., the complainers) – You should have done x, y, and z. 34
35. Action Research Model Active, ongoing partnership between researchers and practitioner agencies Use research process to help solve local problems  Data collection to identify and understand problems  Strategic analysis to develop targeted interventions  Program monitoring and feedback for refinement  Assessment of impact 35
36. Data-Driven Problem Analysis Gather data on the selected crime problem, including its sources, victims, offenders, and settings Analyze the data to identify specific aspects and components of the problem 36
37. Focused Interventions andLinking to Evidence-Based PracticeResearch facilitates: Developing focused interventions aimed at reducing the specific sources and components of the crime problem Implementing these focused intervention strategies utilizing the resources and expertise of the working group partners Basing interventions on “best” practices and “promising” strategies 37
38. Monitoring, Feedback, and Evaluation Monitor the implementation of the interventions Provide constant assessment and feedback on the conduct and effects of the interventions Modify and refine the interventions based on feedback assessments Evaluate the impacts of the interventions on the service delivery system and on the targeted crime problem 38
39. Background on Research PartnershipsEvolution from Boston Ceasefire (The Boston Miracle) Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI) Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) Drug Market Initiative (DMI) Smart Policing and Intelligence Led Policing 39
40. Boston Ceasefire FoundationTwo Aspects to Boston Ceasefire Focused deterrence, “pulling levers” strategy Systematic problem solving process  Multi-agency working group  Problem solving model  Police-researcher partnership 40
41. Boston Ceasefire: Focus on Youth Violence Small Proportion Strategies Youths focused onProblem Analysis Involved street gangs those at highest and crews risk for violence 41
42. Intelligence Led Problem Solving Problem Analysis Assessment Violence Strategy and Feedback Problem Implemen- tation 42
43. Evidence of Impact: Boston Ceasefire Two one-half years without youth homicide Homicides decreased 63% Calls for Service decreased 32% Gun assaults decreased 25% 43
44. Evidence of Impact: SACSITen city initiative SACSI cities experience a significant decline in violent crime when compared to non-SACSI cities Indianapolis showed a decrease in homicide and gun assaults of 35-40% 44
45. Reducing Homicide Risk: Indianapolis Homicide victimization risk by Group per 10,000 residents 152.1 160 140 112.9 120 100 80 66.4 60 45.6 40 26.1 14.8 14.9 18.2 11.5 20 5.1 2.2 4.5 3.5 2.6 0 All 15-24 year Young white Young white Young black Young black Young black All other victims old victims female victims male victims female victims male victims male victims in five hotspots Pre-IVRP Post-IVRP 45
46. Boston and Indianapolis as Examples Research identified the highest risk individuals, groups, and contexts Hard work by task force partners (criminal justice officials, social services, community groups) then focused strategies on highest risk 46
47. Findings from Boston and SACSISuccesses resulted in development and incorporation of strategic problem solving model in a series of major DOJ initiatives since 2001 Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative (CAGI) Drug Market Initiative (DMI) Smart Policing Initiative (SPI) 47
48. Project Safe Neighborhoods Nation-wide DOJ program intended to reduce gun crime in America 94 separate programs, one for each US Attorney Office in the 50 states and territories Based on the Action Research/Strategic Problem- Solving Model Funding provided for a local research partner to work with each PSN task force 48
49. PSN Impact – Stage OneSeries of site specific case studies Ten tests of impact on gun crime  Case studies Reductions in gun crime in all ten sites  Impact in two of these studies was equivocal 49
50. Summary of Case StudiesProject Exile Strategic Problem Solving• Montgomery • Lowell• Mobile • Omaha • Greensboro • Winston-Salem • Chicago (Papachristos et al.) • Stockton (Braga) • St. Louis – (significant but also drop in comparison sites) • Raleigh – (reduction but not significant) 50
51. Summary of Case Studies Sites chosen because of evidence that PSN was implemented in rigorous fashion Thus, results not generalizable but suggest that PSN may have an impact where effectively implemented 51
52. PSN Impact – Stage Two Assess impact of PSN in all U.S. cities with populations of 100,000+ Trend in violent crime 2000-01 compared to 2002-06 Compare PSN target cities with non-target cities Compare cities by level of PSN implementation dosage 52
53. Measuring Implementation Step One – composite measure  Research integration  Partnerships  Federal prosecution Step Two – focus on level of federal prosecution  per capita and level increase 53
54. Step One PSN target cities in high implementation districts experienced significant declines in violent crime in comparison to cities in low implementation districts and non-target cities 54
55. Step Two -Violent Crime Trends in PSN Target Cities by Federal Prosecution Level 1150 1100 Medium ProsecutionViolent Crime Rate per 100,000 Population 1050 1000 Low Prosecution 950 900 High Prosecution 850 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 High prosecution sites (n = 26) Medium prosecution sites (n = 29) Low prosecution sites (n = 27) 55
56. Violent Crime Trends in Non-PSN Sites by Federal Prosecution Level 800 Medium Prosecution 750Violent Crime Rate per 100,000 Population 700 Low Prosecution 650 600 550 500 High Prosecution 450 400 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 High prosecution sites (n = 90) Medium prosecution sites (n = 42) Low prosecution sites (n = 38) 56
58. What‟s in a Name?Being a target city and having a higher level of dosage was significantly related to a reduction in violent crime controlling for: Concentrated disadvantage Population density Police resources Correctional population 58 Source: Journal of Quantitative Criminology (2010) 26:165-190.
59. Drug Market Intervention (DMI)The problem of open air drug markets
60. Drug Market Intervention (DMI) Same principles and strategies applied to open, overt drug markets Four Goals  Eliminate the open-air drug market  Return the neighborhood to the residents  Reduce crime and disorder  Improve the public’s safety as well as their quality of life 60
61. Drug Market Intervention SitesEarly “Adopter” Cities BJA DMI Training CitiesHigh Point, NC Baltimore, MD Memphis, TNWinston-Salem, NC Chicago, IL Middletown, OHRaleigh, NC Cook County, IL Milwaukee, WIProvidence, RI Durham, NC Montgomery County, MDRockford, IL Flint, MI New Haven, CTHempstead, NY Gary, IN New Orleans, LANashville, TN Guntersville, AL Peoria, ILBerlin, MD Indianapolis, IN Roanoke, VA Jacksonville, FL Ocala, FL Jefferson Parish, LA Seattle, WA Lansing, MI 61
62. High PointImpact on crime in the target areaOffense Type Offenses Per Offenses Per Percent ARIMA Models Month - Pre Month – Post Change (significance)Violent 1.83 1.27 -30.6% <.10Property 9.24 8.54 -7.5% NSNuisance/Drug 2.67 1.81 -32.2% <.10 62
63. Rockford, ILTarget Area 12 month comparison pre- HGLM Comparison to Trend in and post-DMI Remainder of CityNon-violent crime -24% <.10Violent crime -14% NS Non-Violent Crime Rate Per 1,000 Residents201510 5 0 Target Area Remainder of City 63 Source: Corsaro, Brunson, and McGarrell. Forthcoming. Crime and Delinquency.
64. Nashville, TN Target Surrounding City Wide ARIMA Area Area ModelsDrug Equipment -39.5% -52.1% -9.3% <.05Narcotics Violations -49.7% -51.0% 5.5% <.05Violent Crimes -23.6% -24.0% -7.4% <.15Property Crimes -28.4% -25.6% -7.0% <.05Call for Police Service -26.1% -6.2% -5.9% <.15The remainder of city either experienced no decline or an increase in these offenses. 64 Source: Corsaro, Brunson, McGarrell, (2010) Evaluation Review, 34, 6:513-548.
65. Summary Strongest evidence in terms of reducing drug related crime Interviews with residents in three sites indicate:  Neighborhood perceived as much safer and better place to live  Appreciation for police 65
66. Implications Appears to be promising approach to addressing open-air drug markets Change in trajectory of neighborhood  Neighborhood begins to look like “normal neighborhood” 66
67. Promising Practices Some combination of…  focused deterrence  communication  data-driven problem solving  and linkage to opportunities, …appears promising in reducing gun crime 67
68. “There is strong research evidence that the more focused and specific the strategies of the police, the more they are tailored to the problems they seek to address, the more effective the police will be in controlling crime and disorder.” 68 Source: National Academy of Sciences, Fairness & Effectiveness in Policing (2004: 5)
69. 15 Years of Suggestive Evidence on Reducing Gun Crime Directed Police Project Exile Strategic Problem Equivocal Evidence Patrol Solving Kansas City Richmond Boston St. Louis Indianapolis Montgomery Indianapolis Durham Pittsburgh Mobile Los Angeles Stockton LowellPre-PSN Omaha Greensboro Winston-Salem Chicago Mixed Model (Combination of Above Strategies) PSN National Assessment (all cities over 100,000 population) 69
70. Common Ingredients Focused enforcement, focused deterrence Systematic problem solving process  Multi-agency working group  Problem solving model  Police-researcher partnership 70
71. An Evaluation of the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative (CAGI) Edmund McGarrell, Ph.D. Michigan State University Chris Melde, Ph.D. TimothyBynum, Ph.D.Michigan State University Michigan StateUniversity Nicholas Corsaro, Ph.D. University of Cincinnati
72. Disclaimer This project was supported by Award #2007-IJ-CX-0035 awarded by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions, findings and conclusions are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Justice.
73. Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative What is the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative?  Project Safe Neighborhoods(94 US Attorney’s Offices)  Spergel/OJJDP Comprehensive Model A lesson in paradigm shifts and paradigm clashes.  Successes and failures of CAGI WWTJDILTP41? (Klein or Maxson, ? through Davidson (MSU), ?)  Painful lessons learned from Ignaz Semmelweis and Dan Ariely
74. Stopping the Cycle of Gang Violence Youth Exposed to Incarceration/ Violence Re-entry Involvement with Getting into Guns, Violence, Gangs Drugs
75. Continuum of Promising Practices for Comprehensive Gang Intervention SUPPRESSION SOCIAL SERVICE DETERRENCE CAGI INFORMALBoston Ceasefire “Spergel Model” Chicago Ceasefire“Pulling Levers” “Violence Interrupters”
76. Components of the Spergel Model The Comprehensive Community-Wide Gang Program Model  1) Community Mobilization • Development of a community-wide working group  2) Social Intervention • Street workers that mentor youth. Bridge to institutions.  3) Opportunity Provision • Employment, education, service  4) Organizational Change • Policies and practices routinely fail “at-risk” youth  5) Suppression • Specialized gang units, intensive probation, prosecution
77. CAGI Details: Funding Areas 1) Enforcement and Prosecution ($1 million)  Collaboration of local and federal law enforcement • Intelligence sharing and case coordination  Collaboration of local and federal prosecution 2) Prevention and Intervention ($1 million)  The prevention and intervention strategy provides gang focused programming to youth at high risk for gang involvement 3) Prisoner Reentry ($500,000)  The prisoner reentry strategy provides mentoring, social services, and treatment to gang-involved offenders returning to “the” community from prison.
78. Participating CAGI Sites Original Six (2006)  Cleveland (OH-ND)  Dallas/Fort Worth (TX-ND)  Los Angeles (CA-CD)  Milwaukee (WI-ED)  Pennsylvania Corridor (PA-ED)  Tampa (FL-MD) Subsequent Four (2007)  Indianapolis (IN-SD)  Oklahoma City (OK-ED)  Rochester (NY-WD)  Raleigh/Durham (NC-ED and NC-MD) Final Two (2008)  Chicago (IL-ND)  Detroit (MI-ED)
79. Average Violent Crime Trends between 2002-2009(Violent Crime Rate per 100,000)
80. Law Enforcement Results Process Evaluation Results suggest that law enforcement was quick to implement, and included 5 sites that engaged in policing strategies highly consistent with the model.  Data Driven  Targeted  Solid Cases No usable gang data in 10 of 12 sites. No overall program effect on violent crime.  Coefficient in the right direction, not significant
81. Law Enforcement Implementation Ranking and Changes inViolent Crime (High Imp. = 15% reduction in violent crime)
82. Reentry? The reentry component of the intervention was not suitable for an outcome analysis.  Poor planning led to the inability to identify and serve the intended population. • Six sites did not become “operational” until 2009 or after. • Only 5 sites met targeted number of clients. Program assumed inmates would return to original neighborhood, which was not realized.  No data driven planning; based on perception A common complaint was that the program did not always deliver on promises.  Economic collapse and job market in 2008.
83. Prevention and Intervention Weed and Seed Philosophy Identifying those most at-risk for gang membership and violence.  Gang members, while a small fraction of the population, account for roughly 50 to 75 percent of violent crime in some U.S. locations. Just target the bad apples (simple right?)  How do we identify them?  Who do we ask?  Where do we get our information? Extant research suggested problems in targeting the correct population.
84. A Unique Opportunity: Cleveland, OH• African American Male School Dropout Rate = 75% • Overall graduation rate = 43% • School District wanted to know the needs of students.• Cleveland awarded grant to implement CAGI • Wanted a standardized instrument to help identify youth most at-risk for gang membership.• The Global Risk Assessment Device (GRAD) (Gavazzi et al., 2003) – 1) Those targeted as part of the CAGI (n = 146) – 2) A general sample of African American males attending public high school (n = 1,438)
85. Risk Domains• Four Risk Domains were evaluated across the two samples: – Disrupted Family Processes (17 items) – Sub-Domains: Conflict; Parental Tiptoeing; Hardship – Mental Health (26 items) – Sub-Domains: Internalizing; Externalizing; ADHD – Educational Risks (12 items) – Sub-Domains: Disruptive Classroom Behavior; Threats to Educational Progress; Learning Difficulties – Delinquent Peers (sub-scale) (3 items) • Associate with Gangs, Involved with Gangs, Delinquent Friends
86. Hypothesis• Those targeted as part of the CAGI will report more risk than the non-targeted general school- based sample in each domain. – The targeted sample was suppose to represent the youth most at-risk of gang membership from high gang areas. – The non-targeted sample represents African American males attending public high schools across the city.
87. Sample Description CAGI Sample  146 African American males  Ages 14 to 17 (mean = 15.9, s.d. = .9) General School-Based Sample  1,438 African American males  Ages 14 to 17 (mean = 15.5, s.d. = .8)
88. Results Red = CAGI Blue = School Level of Risk by Domain and Target Group 13.56* 10.83 6.66* 5.61 5.25 5.12 2.03 2.33* Education Family Mental Health Peer Group
89. WWTJDILTP41? (Klein or Maxson, ?) Common Hurdles to Program Fidelity 1) The idea that “something is better than nothing.”  Reality: Half-hearted implementation of programs designed for high-risk youth fair no better than no implementation at all (Kovaleski et. al., 1999). 2) Insufficient “buy in” on the part of program providers.  Effect: Program providers deviate from the plan; implementation slippage leads to little dosage (Ruiz- Primo, 2005).
90. Painful Lesson from Ignaz and Ariely 3) “Buy in” is simply  4) Must be easily not enough. integrated into routine!  Many people bought in to  “What about us?” CAGI  Working with high risk Ignaz Semmelweis, M.D. youth is difficult. (1818 – 1865)  Dan Ariely, Ph.D.  A simple solution  (Duke University)
91. Paradigm Shifts and Paradigm Clashes RISK NEED Law enforcement  Social service have an easier time providers view the implementing risk world differently. focused interventions.  Identify subjects in  It is how they view the need, and do their world; it is what they best to remedy those do. needs.  Many youth are in Implementation of need, but few youth data driven programs are at risk. is now commonplace.
92. Not Implemented As Intended LawEnforcement Prevention/Intervention Re-entry
93. The State of the Spergel Model When done with sufficient fidelity, the program appears to reduce violence. The ability of jurisdictions to implement, let alone sustain, such a model is severely limited.
94. Chicago Ceasefire:Too Big to Fail?Understanding the spread of a “popular”violence intervention
95. The Origins of Chicago CeasefireHow it worksUnderstanding Violence as a “Behavior”  How do we learn behavior?  Unconscious imitation/modeling  Social Pressure  Symbolic Interactionism (“Looking Glass Self”)  “Fear of being called chicken is almost certainly the leading cause of death and injury from youth violence in the United States” (Zimring, 1998: 80).  Shame vs. Guilt (Code of the Street, Made in America)Understanding Violence as an “Epidemic”  If violence acts like an epidemic, why not treat it as an epidemic?
96. Stopping Epidemics Public Health Model of Intervention  1. Interrupt Transmission • Limit Transmissibility  2. Who is most “at-risk” for infection? • Target the risks and needs associated with high risk people. – Clean needle program in emergency rooms. – Free condoms at health clinics.  3. Change group norms? • Much the same as smoking, condom use, seat belts etc. – Every needle pack comes with literature on the effects of drugs on the body.
97. Violence Interrupters“Carefully” chosen interventionists  Why do they have to be “carefully” chosen?  Potential Political FalloutHow did they find their clients?  Past programs that have tried to target “at-risk” youth have failed to garner the correct clientele.  Why?  How did Chicago Ceasefire try to overcome this deficiency?
98. Outreach Workers Behavior change in the long-term  Violence interrupters and the outreach staff were not one in the same. Modeling Service referral Ongoing guidance
99. Change Group Norms Multiple Messengers; Same Message How did Ceasefire Chicago deliver a unified message?  What were their tactics?
100. Science Necessitates Replication Wilson and Chermak (2011)  Both professors at Michigan State University Evaluation: One Vision One Life Program  Pittsburgh, PA  Community-based intervention in the mold of Ceasefire Chicago • Utilized Violence Interrupters • Utilized Outreach Workers • DID NOT utilize police to the same extent as Chicago – No legal deterrent message from police or prosecutors.
101. Results of the EvaluationNo impact on homicide in target neighborhoods, relative to comparison communities.Aggravated assault and gun assault rates increased in the target neighborhoods relative to comparison neighborhoods.There was evidence of a “spillover” effect of the program on adjacent neighborhoods.  Neighborhoods around Southside experienced increases in aggravated and gun assaults.
102. What does this mean?Regression Effect in Chicago?How do we promote informal social control?  How can we coerce residents to take control of their neighborhood?How can we document the “work” of the violence interrupters?  Needed for replicationGang Cohesion and Violence  External (real or perceived) pressure creates cohesion.
103. Violence Interruptersare NOT NEW Tita and Papachristos (2010) reviewed these efforts in Chicago, Boston, and LA in the 1960s, wherein they were found to have no, or even iatrogenic, effects.  Sounds familiar Other replications of Chicago Ceasefire have had mixed findings as well.  Baltimore, MD- Mixed  Newark, NJ- No effects
104. Is Chicago Ceasefire“Too Big to Fail?”Science and Policy move at different speeds.  Chicago Ceasefire started over a decade ago.  Policymakers wanted results quickly  Without scientific outcome analyses, they based decisions on word of mouth “success” stories.Breaking down the evaluation of Skogan.  Network data suggested two (3?) of seven target neighborhoods had evidence of success.  Papachristos (2011)  Hot Spot analyses found three successful neighborhoods.  Block and Block mapping analysis (Papachristos, 2011)
105. Is Chicago Ceasefire“Too Big to Fail?”If we are treating homicide like an epidemic (i.e., a public health model), why not treat the results the same way?  If HIV treatment was found to increase HIV cases in some places, would we continue to fund such programs?  If cancer treatment was found to increase cancer cases in some places, would we continue to fund such programs?Ceasefire is being replicated in numerous places, with more trainings being requested.
106. Resources for Identifying What Works, andWhat Does Not Office of Justice Programs: Crime Solutions  http://www.crimesolutions.gov/default.aspx Blueprint Series: University of Colorado  http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/blueprints/ Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP)  http://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/Default.aspx