[International law] - Strategic Mass KillingsPresentation Transcript
STRATEGIC MASS KILLINGS Bersini Diego Bodini Diego Fiocchetti Francesco Pugnetti Anna Università degli Studi di Parma Facoltà di Economia International Business and Development 13.04.2011
Identify the key variables and situations that make mass killings more likely to occur;
Distinguish the conditions under which mass killings and military conflict intensity reinforce each other from situations where they are substitute modes of strategic violence;
DEFINITION OF MASS KILLINGS “ Mass Killings are the killings of substantial numbers of human beings, when not in the course of military actions against the military forces of an avowed enemy, under the conditions of the essential defenselessness and helplessness of the victims”
BASIC EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Group size and power;
Ethnic fractionalization and polarization;
MODEL OF CIVIL WAR AND MASS KILLINGS
STAGES OF THE MODEL STAGE ONE Two groups ( i,j ) of population size (Ni,Nj); If group j is in power, group i will decide at the first stage; STAGE TWO The two groups select fighting efforts (D i ,D j ) STAGE THREE The victorious group sets rent-share of loosing group to minimum and decides on mass killings (if the group doesn't rebel...)
STEPS OF THE MODEL Population Size Output produced by labor Individual productivity determined by education and technology TOTAL OUTPUT
GOVERNMENT REVENUE Government revenue State's capacity * Output = Government taxes output at the rate t Exploitation/Exports of natural resources Individual productivity determined by education and technology
At the 3° stage, considering the “initial disposable income”, the victorious group decides the amount of mass killings and the share of government revenue. Numbers of members of the group to eliminate
INTERNAL CONSTRAINT EXTERNAL CONSTRAINT
Shadow of future rebellions;
The degree of commitment to the democracy;
International pressure for a “fair” treatment of the defeated group as an essential ingredient of democratization
The closeness of the distributional share to the population size of the losers .
The closer “lambda” is to unity, the closer the imposed distribution will be to fairness .
DETERMINATIONS OF MASS KILLINGS The winner has to select to maximize the future period playoff, assuming that: The maximum level of mass killings beyond which the international community would intervene and stop killings.
DIFFERENCESE BETWEEN AND 1. = based on the humanitarian objective of sparing the lives of non- combatant civilians; = politically motivated; 2 . = stopping the mass killings is done by military intervention (agreement of the international community); = the pressures for democratization are performed through international agencies (WB, IMF) 3. = the threat of international military intervention is activated while the armed conflict takes place; 4. = part of the post-conflict peace agreements;
Assuming E = 0 the highest payoff is obtained with no mass killings = 0 higher is Lambda it forces to give more resources to the defeated group With E=0 a decrease in N due to mass killings will cause a proportional decrease of the overall output
EFFECTS ON THE VARIATIONS OF THE VARIOUS KEY PARAMETERS ON THE WARFARE AND THE USE OF MASS KILLINGS 1 – Effects on changes in group sizes
This analysis brings the same results of the empirical observations:
The small group is not the only one doing mass killings
The small group has higher fighting activity in the battlefield
2 – State capacity and productivity In this case the implication that warfare effort will larger seems difficult to reconcile with empirical evidence .
3 – Natural Resources When a country becomes more resource rich government revenue is less dependent of the productive activity of its population. Higher E higher aggregate warfare effort conflict and mass killings This analysis seems to belong the same results of the empirical literature 4 – Limits to exploitation Higher “Lambda” tighter pressure for a fair tratement of the loosers. While a moderate pressure for fairness may be beneficial, a tight pressure may precipitate mass killings. In a NON democratic country had been in peace and is induced to commit democratization, the model predicts that the government could murder part of the opponent before starting the democratization process.
THE “SHADOW” OF MASS KILLINGS
If is lowered, i.e. if the threshold on mass killings before a foreign intervention is triggered is tightened.
The life tool of being defeated decreases because of a lower , the threatened group decreases its warfare effort.
Comparison between lower and higher
Reduction of would be preferred but:
Lower decreases the probability of winning for the minority group;
Leaders of the minority group do not accept a lower .
INTERVENTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
Table 1: COUNTRY LEVEL EVIDENCE – EMPIRICAL RESULTS
High GDP per capita
High ethnic polarization
High civil war incidence
Reduce the risk of mass killings Increase the risk of mass killings
The analysis focuses on current incidence without controlling for lagged incidence
Are used only a rather limited number of control variables. Are not a recent data
Little attention to the effect of natural resources on mass killings and displacements
Table 3: ETHNIC GROUP LEVEL EVIDENCE [MODEL ANALYSIS]
The table studies what kind of ethnic groups are victims of military massacres of civilians and of forced resettlements
To create the table are used 3 dataset:
MAR Minorities at risk
GREG Geo-referencing ot ethnic groups
PETRODATA Geo-Referenced Petroelum dataset
High in natural resources
Increase the risk
High in natural resources
Increase the risk
Mass Killing: Region characterized by low teta and high expected lambda
Mass Killings in conjuntion with intersate wars: not exist common pool of resources
Connection between mass killings and fighting efforts: remark 3
Variables that reduce massacres but increase incentive for fighting: productivity, state capacity, low lambda
Variables that increase scope for fighting and mass killings: natural resources