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Editor's Notes

  1. Who I am, what this presentation is about. Next: iPhone.
  2. If you don’t sign (and, more specifically, follow Apple’s instructions to do so), you don’t get on the store. That’s it. Mention requirements here, analogue with name badge. Next: What’s going on?
  3. If you don’t sign (and, more specifically, follow Apple’s instructions to do so), you don’t get on the store. That’s it. Mention requirements here, analogue with name badge. Next: What’s going on?
  4. If you don’t sign (and, more specifically, follow Apple’s instructions to do so), you don’t get on the store. That’s it. Mention requirements here, analogue with name badge. Next: What’s going on?
  5. If you don’t sign (and, more specifically, follow Apple’s instructions to do so), you don’t get on the store. That’s it. Mention requirements here, analogue with name badge. Next: What’s going on?
  6. If you don’t sign (and, more specifically, follow Apple’s instructions to do so), you don’t get on the store. That’s it. Mention requirements here, analogue with name badge. Next: What’s going on?
  7. If you don’t sign (and, more specifically, follow Apple’s instructions to do so), you don’t get on the store. That’s it. Mention requirements here, analogue with name badge. Next: What’s going on?
  8. If you don’t sign (and, more specifically, follow Apple’s instructions to do so), you don’t get on the store. That’s it. Mention requirements here, analogue with name badge. Next: What’s going on?
  9. If you don’t sign (and, more specifically, follow Apple’s instructions to do so), you don’t get on the store. That’s it. Mention requirements here, analogue with name badge. Next: What’s going on?
  10. Rely on the fact that a signature can be generated with the private key (by decrypting the checksum), and verified with the public key (by encrypting the signature and comparing with the checksum). Then a certificate explains who the holder of the private key is. Next: what this means to an app
  11. Rely on the fact that a signature can be generated with the private key (by decrypting the checksum), and verified with the public key (by encrypting the signature and comparing with the checksum). Then a certificate explains who the holder of the private key is. Next: what this means to an app
  12. Rely on the fact that a signature can be generated with the private key (by decrypting the checksum), and verified with the public key (by encrypting the signature and comparing with the checksum). Then a certificate explains who the holder of the private key is. Next: what this means to an app
  13. Rely on the fact that a signature can be generated with the private key (by decrypting the checksum), and verified with the public key (by encrypting the signature and comparing with the checksum). Then a certificate explains who the holder of the private key is. Next: what this means to an app
  14. Rely on the fact that a signature can be generated with the private key (by decrypting the checksum), and verified with the public key (by encrypting the signature and comparing with the checksum). Then a certificate explains who the holder of the private key is. Next: what this means to an app
  15. Rely on the fact that a signature can be generated with the private key (by decrypting the checksum), and verified with the public key (by encrypting the signature and comparing with the checksum). Then a certificate explains who the holder of the private key is. Next: what this means to an app
  16. Rely on the fact that a signature can be generated with the private key (by decrypting the checksum), and verified with the public key (by encrypting the signature and comparing with the checksum). Then a certificate explains who the holder of the private key is. Next: what this means to an app
  17. Rely on the fact that a signature can be generated with the private key (by decrypting the checksum), and verified with the public key (by encrypting the signature and comparing with the checksum). Then a certificate explains who the holder of the private key is. Next: what this means to an app
  18. Rely on the fact that a signature can be generated with the private key (by decrypting the checksum), and verified with the public key (by encrypting the signature and comparing with the checksum). Then a certificate explains who the holder of the private key is. Next: what this means to an app
  19. Rely on the fact that a signature can be generated with the private key (by decrypting the checksum), and verified with the public key (by encrypting the signature and comparing with the checksum). Then a certificate explains who the holder of the private key is. Next: what this means to an app
  20. Rely on the fact that a signature can be generated with the private key (by decrypting the checksum), and verified with the public key (by encrypting the signature and comparing with the checksum). Then a certificate explains who the holder of the private key is. Next: what this means to an app
  21. Rely on the fact that a signature can be generated with the private key (by decrypting the checksum), and verified with the public key (by encrypting the signature and comparing with the checksum). Then a certificate explains who the holder of the private key is. Next: what this means to an app
  22. Rely on the fact that a signature can be generated with the private key (by decrypting the checksum), and verified with the public key (by encrypting the signature and comparing with the checksum). Then a certificate explains who the holder of the private key is. Next: what this means to an app
  23. Rely on the fact that a signature can be generated with the private key (by decrypting the checksum), and verified with the public key (by encrypting the signature and comparing with the checksum). Then a certificate explains who the holder of the private key is. Next: what this means to an app
  24. Rely on the fact that a signature can be generated with the private key (by decrypting the checksum), and verified with the public key (by encrypting the signature and comparing with the checksum). Then a certificate explains who the holder of the private key is. Next: what this means to an app
  25. Rely on the fact that a signature can be generated with the private key (by decrypting the checksum), and verified with the public key (by encrypting the signature and comparing with the checksum). Then a certificate explains who the holder of the private key is. Next: what this means to an app
  26. Rely on the fact that a signature can be generated with the private key (by decrypting the checksum), and verified with the public key (by encrypting the signature and comparing with the checksum). Then a certificate explains who the holder of the private key is. Next: what this means to an app
  27. Rely on the fact that a signature can be generated with the private key (by decrypting the checksum), and verified with the public key (by encrypting the signature and comparing with the checksum). Then a certificate explains who the holder of the private key is. Next: what this means to an app
  28. Rely on the fact that a signature can be generated with the private key (by decrypting the checksum), and verified with the public key (by encrypting the signature and comparing with the checksum). Then a certificate explains who the holder of the private key is. Next: what this means to an app
  29. Rely on the fact that a signature can be generated with the private key (by decrypting the checksum), and verified with the public key (by encrypting the signature and comparing with the checksum). Then a certificate explains who the holder of the private key is. Next: what this means to an app
  30. Rely on the fact that a signature can be generated with the private key (by decrypting the checksum), and verified with the public key (by encrypting the signature and comparing with the checksum). Then a certificate explains who the holder of the private key is. Next: what this means to an app
  31. Rely on the fact that a signature can be generated with the private key (by decrypting the checksum), and verified with the public key (by encrypting the signature and comparing with the checksum). Then a certificate explains who the holder of the private key is. Next: what this means to an app
  32. Rely on the fact that a signature can be generated with the private key (by decrypting the checksum), and verified with the public key (by encrypting the signature and comparing with the checksum). Then a certificate explains who the holder of the private key is. Next: what this means to an app
  33. Rely on the fact that a signature can be generated with the private key (by decrypting the checksum), and verified with the public key (by encrypting the signature and comparing with the checksum). Then a certificate explains who the holder of the private key is. Next: what this means to an app
  34. Rely on the fact that a signature can be generated with the private key (by decrypting the checksum), and verified with the public key (by encrypting the signature and comparing with the checksum). Then a certificate explains who the holder of the private key is. Next: what this means to an app
  35. Rely on the fact that a signature can be generated with the private key (by decrypting the checksum), and verified with the public key (by encrypting the signature and comparing with the checksum). Then a certificate explains who the holder of the private key is. Next: what this means to an app
  36. Rely on the fact that a signature can be generated with the private key (by decrypting the checksum), and verified with the public key (by encrypting the signature and comparing with the checksum). Then a certificate explains who the holder of the private key is. Next: what this means to an app
  37. Rely on the fact that a signature can be generated with the private key (by decrypting the checksum), and verified with the public key (by encrypting the signature and comparing with the checksum). Then a certificate explains who the holder of the private key is. Next: what this means to an app
  38. Rely on the fact that a signature can be generated with the private key (by decrypting the checksum), and verified with the public key (by encrypting the signature and comparing with the checksum). Then a certificate explains who the holder of the private key is. Next: what this means to an app
  39. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  40. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  41. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  42. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  43. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  44. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  45. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  46. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  47. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  48. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  49. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  50. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  51. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  52. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  53. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  54. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  55. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  56. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  57. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  58. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  59. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  60. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  61. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  62. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  63. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  64. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  65. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  66. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  67. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  68. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  69. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  70. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  71. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  72. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  73. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  74. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  75. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  76. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  77. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  78. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  79. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  80. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  81. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  82. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  83. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  84. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  85. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  86. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  87. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  88. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  89. After these slides, explain the dynamic validity of the application. Next: how does this work? Demo of making a signature, viewing the requirement, changing the requirement, breaking the signature.
  90. After the demo, we’re on to why. view reqs: codesign -d -r- change req: codesign -s "NSConference Demo" -f -r="designated => anchor apple" Code Signature.app/
  91. Keychain: mention the legacy code path thing. Firewall Parental Controls Wolf Rentzsch: remind people of dynamic updating Plug-ins Launchd (go into SMJobBless demo)
  92. Keychain: mention the legacy code path thing. Firewall Parental Controls Wolf Rentzsch: remind people of dynamic updating Plug-ins Launchd (go into SMJobBless demo)
  93. Keychain: mention the legacy code path thing. Firewall Parental Controls Wolf Rentzsch: remind people of dynamic updating Plug-ins Launchd (go into SMJobBless demo)
  94. Keychain: mention the legacy code path thing. Firewall Parental Controls Wolf Rentzsch: remind people of dynamic updating Plug-ins Launchd (go into SMJobBless demo)
  95. Keychain: mention the legacy code path thing. Firewall Parental Controls Wolf Rentzsch: remind people of dynamic updating Plug-ins Launchd (go into SMJobBless demo)
  96. Keychain: mention the legacy code path thing. Firewall Parental Controls Wolf Rentzsch: remind people of dynamic updating Plug-ins Launchd (go into SMJobBless demo)
  97. Keychain: mention the legacy code path thing. Firewall Parental Controls Wolf Rentzsch: remind people of dynamic updating Plug-ins Launchd (go into SMJobBless demo)
  98. Keychain: mention the legacy code path thing. Firewall Parental Controls Wolf Rentzsch: remind people of dynamic updating Plug-ins Launchd (go into SMJobBless demo)
  99. Keychain: mention the legacy code path thing. Firewall Parental Controls Wolf Rentzsch: remind people of dynamic updating Plug-ins Launchd (go into SMJobBless demo)
  100. Keychain: mention the legacy code path thing. Firewall Parental Controls Wolf Rentzsch: remind people of dynamic updating Plug-ins Launchd (go into SMJobBless demo)
  101. Keychain: mention the legacy code path thing. Firewall Parental Controls Wolf Rentzsch: remind people of dynamic updating Plug-ins Launchd (go into SMJobBless demo)
  102. Keychain: mention the legacy code path thing. Firewall Parental Controls Wolf Rentzsch: remind people of dynamic updating Plug-ins Launchd (go into SMJobBless demo)
  103. Go into the demo from here. Point: you’re associating the helper with the app through their identities, so that the privileged tool can only be installed by its app, and the app can only install its helper. Avoids the problems with AEWP(), and avoids a custom install phase.
  104. Go into the demo from here. Point: you’re associating the helper with the app through their identities, so that the privileged tool can only be installed by its app, and the app can only install its helper. Avoids the problems with AEWP(), and avoids a custom install phase.
  105. Go into the demo from here. Point: you’re associating the helper with the app through their identities, so that the privileged tool can only be installed by its app, and the app can only install its helper. Avoids the problems with AEWP(), and avoids a custom install phase.
  106. Go into the demo from here. Point: you’re associating the helper with the app through their identities, so that the privileged tool can only be installed by its app, and the app can only install its helper. Avoids the problems with AEWP(), and avoids a custom install phase.
  107. Go into the demo from here. Point: you’re associating the helper with the app through their identities, so that the privileged tool can only be installed by its app, and the app can only install its helper. Avoids the problems with AEWP(), and avoids a custom install phase.
  108. Go into the demo from here. Point: you’re associating the helper with the app through their identities, so that the privileged tool can only be installed by its app, and the app can only install its helper. Avoids the problems with AEWP(), and avoids a custom install phase.
  109. Go into the demo from here. Point: you’re associating the helper with the app through their identities, so that the privileged tool can only be installed by its app, and the app can only install its helper. Avoids the problems with AEWP(), and avoids a custom install phase.
  110. After the demo, we move on to problems.
  111. Won’t stop crackers Won’t tell you whether to trust a vendor
  112. Won’t stop crackers Won’t tell you whether to trust a vendor
  113. Demo sig viewer. Next: Q/A
  114. After this demo, it’s just the Q+A.