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E hi l H ki dEthical Hacking and
Countermeasures
V i 6Version 6
Module XLVIIIModule XLVIII
Corporate Espionage by
InsidersInsiders
News
EC-Council
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Source: http://business.timesonline.co.uk/
News
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Source: http://blogs.barrons.com/
Module Objective
This module will familiarize you with:
Corporate Espionage
Information Corporate Spies Seekp p
Different Categories of Insider Threat
Driving Force behind Insider AttackDriving Force behind Insider Attack
Common Attacks carried out by Insiders
Techniques Used for Corporate Espionage
Tools
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Countermeasures
Module Flow
Corporate Espionage
Common Attacks
carried out by Insiders
Information
Corporate Spies Seek
Techniques Used for
Corporate Espionage
Different Categories of
Insider Threat
Tools
Driving Force behind
Insider Attack
Countermeasures
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Introduction To Corporate
EspionageEspionage
"Espionage is the use of illegal means
h f “to gather information“
Source: www.scip.org
Term ‘Corporate espionage’ is used to
describe espionage conducted for
commercial purposes on companiescommercial purposes on companies,
governments, and to determine the
activities of competitors
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Information Corporate Spies Seek
Marketing and new product plans
Source code
Corporate strategies
Target markets and prospect information
Usual business methods
Product designs, research, and costs
Alliance and contract arrangements: delivery, pricing, and terms
Customer and supplier information
Staffing, operations, and wage/salary
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Credit records or credit union account information
Insider Threat
The Insider Threat to critical infrastructure is an
individual with the access and/or inside knowledge of a
company, organization, or enterprise that would allow
them to exploit the vulnerabilities of that entity’s security,p y y,
systems, services, products, or facilities with the intent to
cause harm
- National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC)
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Different Categories of Insider
ThreatThreat
Pure Insider
• An employee with all the rights and access
associated with being employed by the company
Pure Insider
associated with being employed by the company
• Elevated pure insider is an insider who has
additional privileged access such as, administrator
access
Insider Associate
• People with limited authorized access are called
Insider Associate
• Contractors, guards, and cleaning and plant services
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, g , g p
all comes under this category
Different Categories of Insider
Threat (cont’d)Threat (cont d)
Insider Affiliate
• Insider affiliates do not have direct access to the
organization but illegally use the employee’s
Insider Affiliate
organization but illegally use the employee s
credentials to gain access
• An insider affiliate is a spouse, friend, or even
client of an employee
Outside Affiliates
• They are non-trusted outsiders who use open
access to gain access to an organization’s
resources
• The best way of outside affiliate is accessing
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• The best way of outside affiliate is accessing
unprotected wireless points
Privileged Access
Insiders enjoy two critical links
in security
Trust of the employerp y
Access to Facilities
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Driving Force behind Insider
AttackAttack
Work related grievance
Financial gainFinancial gain
Challenge
Curiosity
Spy ( Corporate Espionage)
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Common Attacks carried out by
InsidersInsiders
Sabotage of information/systems
Theft of information/computing assets
Injecting bad code
VirusesViruses
Installation of unauthorized
software/hardwaresoftware/hardware
Manipulation of Protocol/OS Design Flaws
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Social engineering
Techniques Used for Corporate
EspionageEspionage
Social Engineering
• Social engineering is defined as a non-technical kind of
intrusion that relies heavily on human interaction and
often in ol es tricking other people to break normaloften involves tricking other people to break normal
security procedures
Dumpster Diving
D t di i i l ki f t i l '• Dumpster diving is looking for treasure in someone else's
trash. (A dumpster is a large trash container.) In the world
of information technology, dumpster diving is a technique
used to retrieve information that could be used to carry
out an attack on a computer network
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out an attack on a computer network
Techniques Used for Corporate
Espionage (cont’d)Espionage (cont d)
Information extraction
• The information can be extracted through:
• Hidden files
• Removable media
Wi l filt ti• Wireless exfiltration
• Laptops
• PDAs/Blackberrys
Network leakage
• The network traffic that are allowed in an organization is
Web and email
• Insiders can use these techniques to disclose the
organization’s information
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g
Techniques Used for Corporate
Espionage (cont’d)Espionage (cont d)
CryptographyCryptography
• Cryptography garbles a message in such a way that its
meaning is concealed
• It starts off with a plaintext message and then anIt starts off with a plaintext message and then an
encryption algorithm is used to garble a message which
creates cipher text
Steganography
• Steganography is data hiding and is meant to conceal• Steganography is data hiding, and is meant to conceal
the true meaning of a message
• It is referred to as a secret communication and covert
communication
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Techniques Used for Corporate
Espionage (cont’d)Espionage (cont d)
Malicious attacksMalicious attacks
• Malicious attacks are used to gain additional access or elevated
privileges
• These attacks usually involve running exploit code against a system• These attacks usually involve running exploit code against a system
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Process of Hacking
Gathers Information
of Target Organization
Scans the target
network for Vulnerabilities
Exploits Known
Vulnerabilities to
breach defense
1 2 3
Hacker following
the 7 habits to
attack the
mechanisms
attack the
target organization
Breaks NetworkE l i S6 Plants
4 Breaks Network
Defense using
exploits for known
vulnerabilities
Exploits System
Resources
56 Malicious
programs for
backdoor
access
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Clears
Evidence by
erasing tracks
7
Process of Hacking (cont’d)
Network Defense Mechanisms
Target Organization’s
Internal Network
Internet
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8
Launches an attack
from the Organization’s
Internal Network
Case Study : Disgruntled System
AdministratorAdministrator
A system administrator, angered by his diminished
role in a thriving defense manufacturing firm whoserole in a thriving defense manufacturing firm whose
computer network he alone had developed and
managed, centralized the software that supported the
company’s manufacturing processes on a single
d th i ti id t d k i t i iserver, and then intimidated a coworker into giving
him the only backup tapes for that software.
Following the system administrator’s termination for
inappropriate and abusive treatment of hisinappropriate and abusive treatment of his
coworkers, a logic bomb previously planted by the
insider detonated, deleting the only remaining copy
of the critical software from the company’s server.
The company estimated the cost of damage in excess
of $10 million, which led to the layoff of some 80
employees.
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Source: U.S Secret Service and CERT Coordination Center/SEI
Insider Threat Study: Computer System Sabotage in Critical Infrastructure Sectors
Former Forbes Employee Pleads
GuiltyGuilty
In 1997, George Parente was arrested for causing five
network servers at the publishing company Forbes, Inc.,
to crash Parente was a former Forbes computerto crash. Parente was a former Forbes computer
technician who had been terminated from temporary
employment.
In what appears to have been a vengeful act against thepp o b g g
company and his supervisors, Parente dialed into the
Forbes computer system from his residence and gained
access through a co-worker's log-in and password. Once
li h d fi f th i ht F b tonline, he caused five of the eight Forbes computer
network servers to crash, and erased all of the server
volume on each of the affected servers. No data could be
restored.
Parente's sabotage resulted in a two day shut down in
Forbes' New York operations with losses exceeding
$100,000.
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Parente pleaded guilty to one count of violating
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Title 18 U.S.C. 1030
Source:
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/v
atis.htm
Former Employees Abet Stealing
Trade SecretsTrade Secrets
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Source: http://www.usdoj.gov/
California Man Sentenced For
HackingHacking
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Source: http://www.usdoj.gov/
Federal Employee Sentenced for
HackingHacking
Source: http://www.usdoj.gov/
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Facts
I t l b h
Viruses/Worms outbreaks 21%
Internal breaches
included:
• Viruses/Worms outbreaks – 21%
• Wireless network breach – 1%
• Loss of customer data/privacy
issues – 12%
l f l f d l• Internal financial fraud involving
information systems – 18%
• Theft or leakage of intellectual
property (e.g. customer leakage)
– 10%
• Accidental instances – 18%
• Other form of internal breach –
12%
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• Do not know – 5%
Source: Deloitte, 2007 Global Security Survey
Key Findings from U.S Secret Service and
CERT Coordination Center/SEI study on
Insider ThreatInsider Threat
A negative work-related event triggered most insiders’ actionsA negative work related event triggered most insiders actions
The most frequently reported motive was revengeThe most frequently reported motive was revenge
The majority of insiders planned their activities in advanceThe majority of insiders planned their activities in advance
R t d t t th j it f th tt kRemote access was used to carry out the majority of the attacks
Insiders exploited systemic vulnerabilities in applications processes and/or
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Insiders exploited systemic vulnerabilities in applications, processes, and/or
procedures, but relatively sophisticated attack tools were also employed
Key Findings from U.S Secret Service and
CERT Coordination Center/SEI study on
Insider Threat (cont’d)Insider Threat (cont’d)
The majority of insiders compromised computer accounts, created
h i d b kd d h d i h i kunauthorized backdoor accounts, or used shared accounts in their attacks
The majority of attacks took place outside normal working hoursThe majority of attacks took place outside normal working hours
The majority of the insider attacks were only detected once there was a
noticeable irregularity in the information system or a system becamenoticeable irregularity in the information system or a system became
unavailable
The majority of attacks were accomplished using company’s computerj y p g p y p
equipment
In addition to harming the organizations, the insiders caused harm to specific
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In addition to harming the organizations, the insiders caused harm to specific
individuals
ToolsTools
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NetVizor
NetVizor is a powerful network surveillance tool that allows toNetVizor is a powerful network surveillance tool, that allows to
monitor the entire network from one centralized location
It enables to track workstations and individual users who may use
multiple PCs on a network
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NetVizor: Screenshot
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Privatefirewall w/Pest Patrol
Privatefirewall is a Personal Firewall and Intrusion DetectionPrivatefirewall is a Personal Firewall and Intrusion Detection
Application that eliminates unauthorized access to the PC
It provides solid protection "out of the box" while allowing advanced
users to create custom configurations
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Privatefirewall w/Pest Patrol:
ScreenshotScreenshot
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Countermeasures
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Best Practices against Insider
ThreatThreat
Monitor employee’s behavior
Monitor computer systems used by employees
Disable remote access
Make sure that unnecessary account privileges are not allotted to
normal users
Disable USB drives in your network
Enforce a security policy which addresses all your concerns
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Physical security check should not be ignored
Best Practices against Insider
Threat (cont’d)Threat (cont d)
Verify the background of new employees
Cross-shred all paper documents before trashing them
Secure all dumpsters and post ‘NO TRESPASSING’ signs
Conduct security awareness training programs for all employees
l lregularly
Place locks on computer cases to prevent hardware tampering
Lock the wire closets, server rooms, phone closets, and other sensitive
equipments
Never leave a voice mail message or e-mail broadcast message that gives
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g g g
an exact business itinerary
Countermeasures
Understanding and PrioritizingUnderstanding and Prioritizing
Critical Assets
• Determine the criteria that is used to determine
the value as monetary worth, future benefit to
the company, and competitive advantage
• According to the criteria determined score all• According to the criteria determined, score all
assets of the organization and prioritize them
• List all the critical assets across the organization
which needs to be properly protected
• Understand the likely attack points by analyzing
the threats to the organization
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Countermeasures (cont’d)
Defining Acceptable Level of Loss
• The possibility for loss is all around and risk management
will determine what efforts should be focused on by an
organization and what can be ignored
g p
organization and what can be ignored
• Cost-benefit analysis is a typical method of determining
acceptable level of risk
• The two methods to deal with potential loss are:p
prevention and detection
Loss
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Countermeasures (cont’d)
C t lli A
• Controlling the access of the employees according to
Controlling Access
the requirement of their job
• The best way for securing an organization’s critical
information is by using Principle of Least Privilege
• Principle states that you give someone the leastp y g
amount of access they require for their job
• Encrypt the most critical data
• Never store sensitive information of the business on
the networked computerthe networked computer
• Store confidential data on a stand alone computer
which has no connection to other computers and the
telephone line
• Regularly change the password of confidential files
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• Regularly change the password of confidential files
Countermeasures (cont’d)
Bait: Honeypots and Honeytokens
• Catching the insiders when they are stealing
the information is called honeypots and
honeytokens
yp y
honeytokens
• Honeypots and Honeytokens are traps which
are set at the system level and file level
respectively
h k l k• Honeypot on the network looks attractive to
attackers and lures them in
• It is used when someone wanders around the
network looking for something of interestnetwork looking for something of interest
• Honeytoken is done at a directory or file level
instead of the entire system
• Display an attractive file on a legitimate server
d h i id
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used to trap the insider
Countermeasures (cont’d)
Mole detection
• In this, a piece of data is given to a person and if
that information makes its way to the public
Mole detection
that information makes its way to the public
domain, then there is a mole
• It can be used to figure out who is leaking
information to the public or to another entity
Profiling
• It controls and detects the insiders by
understanding behavioral patterns
• The two types of profiling are individual and group
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• The two types of profiling are individual and group
profiling
Countermeasures (cont’d)
Monitoring
• Watching the behavior by inspecting the information
• It provides a starting point for profiling
Monitoring
• It provides a starting point for profiling
• The types of monitoring that can be performed are:
• Application-specific
• Problem-specific• Problem specific
• Full monitoring
• Trend analysis
• Probationaryy
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Countermeasures (cont’d)
Si t A l i
• It is an effective measure for controlling insider threat or
li i i i
Signature Analysis
any malicious activity
• It is also called as pattern analysis because it looks for a
pattern that is indicative of a problem or issue
It t h l k tt k d th tt k hi h• It catches only known attacks and the attacks which
occurs same way all the time
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Summary
Term ‘Corporate espionage’ is used to describe espionage conducted for
commercial purposes on companies governments and to determine thecommercial purposes on companies, governments, and to determine the
activities of competitors
People with limited authorized access is called Insider AssociatePeople with limited authorized access is called Insider Associate
Inside s can se Web and email to disclose the o gani ation’s info mationInsiders can use Web and email to disclose the organization’s information
C t h bl i h th t it i i l dCryptography garbles a message in such a way that its meaning is concealed
M k th t t i il t ll tt d t l
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Make sure that unnecessary account privileges are not allotted to normal users
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Ce hv6 module 48 corporate espionage by insiders

  • 1. E hi l H ki dEthical Hacking and Countermeasures V i 6Version 6 Module XLVIIIModule XLVIII Corporate Espionage by InsidersInsiders
  • 2. News EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited Source: http://business.timesonline.co.uk/
  • 3. News EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited Source: http://blogs.barrons.com/
  • 4. Module Objective This module will familiarize you with: Corporate Espionage Information Corporate Spies Seekp p Different Categories of Insider Threat Driving Force behind Insider AttackDriving Force behind Insider Attack Common Attacks carried out by Insiders Techniques Used for Corporate Espionage Tools EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited Countermeasures
  • 5. Module Flow Corporate Espionage Common Attacks carried out by Insiders Information Corporate Spies Seek Techniques Used for Corporate Espionage Different Categories of Insider Threat Tools Driving Force behind Insider Attack Countermeasures EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited
  • 6. Introduction To Corporate EspionageEspionage "Espionage is the use of illegal means h f “to gather information“ Source: www.scip.org Term ‘Corporate espionage’ is used to describe espionage conducted for commercial purposes on companiescommercial purposes on companies, governments, and to determine the activities of competitors EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited
  • 7. Information Corporate Spies Seek Marketing and new product plans Source code Corporate strategies Target markets and prospect information Usual business methods Product designs, research, and costs Alliance and contract arrangements: delivery, pricing, and terms Customer and supplier information Staffing, operations, and wage/salary EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited Credit records or credit union account information
  • 8. Insider Threat The Insider Threat to critical infrastructure is an individual with the access and/or inside knowledge of a company, organization, or enterprise that would allow them to exploit the vulnerabilities of that entity’s security,p y y, systems, services, products, or facilities with the intent to cause harm - National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited
  • 9. Different Categories of Insider ThreatThreat Pure Insider • An employee with all the rights and access associated with being employed by the company Pure Insider associated with being employed by the company • Elevated pure insider is an insider who has additional privileged access such as, administrator access Insider Associate • People with limited authorized access are called Insider Associate • Contractors, guards, and cleaning and plant services EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited , g , g p all comes under this category
  • 10. Different Categories of Insider Threat (cont’d)Threat (cont d) Insider Affiliate • Insider affiliates do not have direct access to the organization but illegally use the employee’s Insider Affiliate organization but illegally use the employee s credentials to gain access • An insider affiliate is a spouse, friend, or even client of an employee Outside Affiliates • They are non-trusted outsiders who use open access to gain access to an organization’s resources • The best way of outside affiliate is accessing EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited • The best way of outside affiliate is accessing unprotected wireless points
  • 11. Privileged Access Insiders enjoy two critical links in security Trust of the employerp y Access to Facilities EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited
  • 12. Driving Force behind Insider AttackAttack Work related grievance Financial gainFinancial gain Challenge Curiosity Spy ( Corporate Espionage) EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited
  • 13. Common Attacks carried out by InsidersInsiders Sabotage of information/systems Theft of information/computing assets Injecting bad code VirusesViruses Installation of unauthorized software/hardwaresoftware/hardware Manipulation of Protocol/OS Design Flaws EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited Social engineering
  • 14. Techniques Used for Corporate EspionageEspionage Social Engineering • Social engineering is defined as a non-technical kind of intrusion that relies heavily on human interaction and often in ol es tricking other people to break normaloften involves tricking other people to break normal security procedures Dumpster Diving D t di i i l ki f t i l '• Dumpster diving is looking for treasure in someone else's trash. (A dumpster is a large trash container.) In the world of information technology, dumpster diving is a technique used to retrieve information that could be used to carry out an attack on a computer network EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited out an attack on a computer network
  • 15. Techniques Used for Corporate Espionage (cont’d)Espionage (cont d) Information extraction • The information can be extracted through: • Hidden files • Removable media Wi l filt ti• Wireless exfiltration • Laptops • PDAs/Blackberrys Network leakage • The network traffic that are allowed in an organization is Web and email • Insiders can use these techniques to disclose the organization’s information EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited g
  • 16. Techniques Used for Corporate Espionage (cont’d)Espionage (cont d) CryptographyCryptography • Cryptography garbles a message in such a way that its meaning is concealed • It starts off with a plaintext message and then anIt starts off with a plaintext message and then an encryption algorithm is used to garble a message which creates cipher text Steganography • Steganography is data hiding and is meant to conceal• Steganography is data hiding, and is meant to conceal the true meaning of a message • It is referred to as a secret communication and covert communication EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited
  • 17. Techniques Used for Corporate Espionage (cont’d)Espionage (cont d) Malicious attacksMalicious attacks • Malicious attacks are used to gain additional access or elevated privileges • These attacks usually involve running exploit code against a system• These attacks usually involve running exploit code against a system EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited
  • 18. Process of Hacking Gathers Information of Target Organization Scans the target network for Vulnerabilities Exploits Known Vulnerabilities to breach defense 1 2 3 Hacker following the 7 habits to attack the mechanisms attack the target organization Breaks NetworkE l i S6 Plants 4 Breaks Network Defense using exploits for known vulnerabilities Exploits System Resources 56 Malicious programs for backdoor access EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited Clears Evidence by erasing tracks 7
  • 19. Process of Hacking (cont’d) Network Defense Mechanisms Target Organization’s Internal Network Internet EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited 8 Launches an attack from the Organization’s Internal Network
  • 20. Case Study : Disgruntled System AdministratorAdministrator A system administrator, angered by his diminished role in a thriving defense manufacturing firm whoserole in a thriving defense manufacturing firm whose computer network he alone had developed and managed, centralized the software that supported the company’s manufacturing processes on a single d th i ti id t d k i t i iserver, and then intimidated a coworker into giving him the only backup tapes for that software. Following the system administrator’s termination for inappropriate and abusive treatment of hisinappropriate and abusive treatment of his coworkers, a logic bomb previously planted by the insider detonated, deleting the only remaining copy of the critical software from the company’s server. The company estimated the cost of damage in excess of $10 million, which led to the layoff of some 80 employees. EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited Source: U.S Secret Service and CERT Coordination Center/SEI Insider Threat Study: Computer System Sabotage in Critical Infrastructure Sectors
  • 21. Former Forbes Employee Pleads GuiltyGuilty In 1997, George Parente was arrested for causing five network servers at the publishing company Forbes, Inc., to crash Parente was a former Forbes computerto crash. Parente was a former Forbes computer technician who had been terminated from temporary employment. In what appears to have been a vengeful act against thepp o b g g company and his supervisors, Parente dialed into the Forbes computer system from his residence and gained access through a co-worker's log-in and password. Once li h d fi f th i ht F b tonline, he caused five of the eight Forbes computer network servers to crash, and erased all of the server volume on each of the affected servers. No data could be restored. Parente's sabotage resulted in a two day shut down in Forbes' New York operations with losses exceeding $100,000. EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited Parente pleaded guilty to one count of violating Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Title 18 U.S.C. 1030 Source: http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/v atis.htm
  • 22. Former Employees Abet Stealing Trade SecretsTrade Secrets EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited Source: http://www.usdoj.gov/
  • 23. California Man Sentenced For HackingHacking EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited Source: http://www.usdoj.gov/
  • 24. Federal Employee Sentenced for HackingHacking Source: http://www.usdoj.gov/ EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited
  • 25. Facts I t l b h Viruses/Worms outbreaks 21% Internal breaches included: • Viruses/Worms outbreaks – 21% • Wireless network breach – 1% • Loss of customer data/privacy issues – 12% l f l f d l• Internal financial fraud involving information systems – 18% • Theft or leakage of intellectual property (e.g. customer leakage) – 10% • Accidental instances – 18% • Other form of internal breach – 12% EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited • Do not know – 5% Source: Deloitte, 2007 Global Security Survey
  • 26. Key Findings from U.S Secret Service and CERT Coordination Center/SEI study on Insider ThreatInsider Threat A negative work-related event triggered most insiders’ actionsA negative work related event triggered most insiders actions The most frequently reported motive was revengeThe most frequently reported motive was revenge The majority of insiders planned their activities in advanceThe majority of insiders planned their activities in advance R t d t t th j it f th tt kRemote access was used to carry out the majority of the attacks Insiders exploited systemic vulnerabilities in applications processes and/or EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited Insiders exploited systemic vulnerabilities in applications, processes, and/or procedures, but relatively sophisticated attack tools were also employed
  • 27. Key Findings from U.S Secret Service and CERT Coordination Center/SEI study on Insider Threat (cont’d)Insider Threat (cont’d) The majority of insiders compromised computer accounts, created h i d b kd d h d i h i kunauthorized backdoor accounts, or used shared accounts in their attacks The majority of attacks took place outside normal working hoursThe majority of attacks took place outside normal working hours The majority of the insider attacks were only detected once there was a noticeable irregularity in the information system or a system becamenoticeable irregularity in the information system or a system became unavailable The majority of attacks were accomplished using company’s computerj y p g p y p equipment In addition to harming the organizations, the insiders caused harm to specific EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited In addition to harming the organizations, the insiders caused harm to specific individuals
  • 28. ToolsTools EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited
  • 29. NetVizor NetVizor is a powerful network surveillance tool that allows toNetVizor is a powerful network surveillance tool, that allows to monitor the entire network from one centralized location It enables to track workstations and individual users who may use multiple PCs on a network EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited
  • 30. NetVizor: Screenshot EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited
  • 31. Privatefirewall w/Pest Patrol Privatefirewall is a Personal Firewall and Intrusion DetectionPrivatefirewall is a Personal Firewall and Intrusion Detection Application that eliminates unauthorized access to the PC It provides solid protection "out of the box" while allowing advanced users to create custom configurations EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited
  • 32. Privatefirewall w/Pest Patrol: ScreenshotScreenshot EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited
  • 33. Countermeasures EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited
  • 34. Best Practices against Insider ThreatThreat Monitor employee’s behavior Monitor computer systems used by employees Disable remote access Make sure that unnecessary account privileges are not allotted to normal users Disable USB drives in your network Enforce a security policy which addresses all your concerns EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited Physical security check should not be ignored
  • 35. Best Practices against Insider Threat (cont’d)Threat (cont d) Verify the background of new employees Cross-shred all paper documents before trashing them Secure all dumpsters and post ‘NO TRESPASSING’ signs Conduct security awareness training programs for all employees l lregularly Place locks on computer cases to prevent hardware tampering Lock the wire closets, server rooms, phone closets, and other sensitive equipments Never leave a voice mail message or e-mail broadcast message that gives EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited g g g an exact business itinerary
  • 36. Countermeasures Understanding and PrioritizingUnderstanding and Prioritizing Critical Assets • Determine the criteria that is used to determine the value as monetary worth, future benefit to the company, and competitive advantage • According to the criteria determined score all• According to the criteria determined, score all assets of the organization and prioritize them • List all the critical assets across the organization which needs to be properly protected • Understand the likely attack points by analyzing the threats to the organization EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited
  • 37. Countermeasures (cont’d) Defining Acceptable Level of Loss • The possibility for loss is all around and risk management will determine what efforts should be focused on by an organization and what can be ignored g p organization and what can be ignored • Cost-benefit analysis is a typical method of determining acceptable level of risk • The two methods to deal with potential loss are:p prevention and detection Loss EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited
  • 38. Countermeasures (cont’d) C t lli A • Controlling the access of the employees according to Controlling Access the requirement of their job • The best way for securing an organization’s critical information is by using Principle of Least Privilege • Principle states that you give someone the leastp y g amount of access they require for their job • Encrypt the most critical data • Never store sensitive information of the business on the networked computerthe networked computer • Store confidential data on a stand alone computer which has no connection to other computers and the telephone line • Regularly change the password of confidential files EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited • Regularly change the password of confidential files
  • 39. Countermeasures (cont’d) Bait: Honeypots and Honeytokens • Catching the insiders when they are stealing the information is called honeypots and honeytokens yp y honeytokens • Honeypots and Honeytokens are traps which are set at the system level and file level respectively h k l k• Honeypot on the network looks attractive to attackers and lures them in • It is used when someone wanders around the network looking for something of interestnetwork looking for something of interest • Honeytoken is done at a directory or file level instead of the entire system • Display an attractive file on a legitimate server d h i id EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited used to trap the insider
  • 40. Countermeasures (cont’d) Mole detection • In this, a piece of data is given to a person and if that information makes its way to the public Mole detection that information makes its way to the public domain, then there is a mole • It can be used to figure out who is leaking information to the public or to another entity Profiling • It controls and detects the insiders by understanding behavioral patterns • The two types of profiling are individual and group EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited • The two types of profiling are individual and group profiling
  • 41. Countermeasures (cont’d) Monitoring • Watching the behavior by inspecting the information • It provides a starting point for profiling Monitoring • It provides a starting point for profiling • The types of monitoring that can be performed are: • Application-specific • Problem-specific• Problem specific • Full monitoring • Trend analysis • Probationaryy EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited
  • 42. Countermeasures (cont’d) Si t A l i • It is an effective measure for controlling insider threat or li i i i Signature Analysis any malicious activity • It is also called as pattern analysis because it looks for a pattern that is indicative of a problem or issue It t h l k tt k d th tt k hi h• It catches only known attacks and the attacks which occurs same way all the time EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited
  • 43. Summary Term ‘Corporate espionage’ is used to describe espionage conducted for commercial purposes on companies governments and to determine thecommercial purposes on companies, governments, and to determine the activities of competitors People with limited authorized access is called Insider AssociatePeople with limited authorized access is called Insider Associate Inside s can se Web and email to disclose the o gani ation’s info mationInsiders can use Web and email to disclose the organization’s information C t h bl i h th t it i i l dCryptography garbles a message in such a way that its meaning is concealed M k th t t i il t ll tt d t l EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited Make sure that unnecessary account privileges are not allotted to normal users
  • 44. EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited
  • 45. EC-Council Copyright © by EC-Council All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibited