Spear guidelines for IDPs

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Spear guidelines for Internally Displaced People

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Spear guidelines for IDPs

  1. 1. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 2/51Table of ContentsAcronyms and Abbreviations .............................................................................................3I. Executive Summary and Recommendations.............................................................4I.I Findings and Recommendations ...........................................................................................5I.II Background and Rationale for the Evaluation ....................................................................71. Project Design...............................................................................................................71.1 Support Project...............................................................................................................71.2 Assumptions...................................................................................................................91.3 Compatibility of Objectives.........................................................................................111.4 Lack of Strategic and Risk Management Plan.............................................................132. Project Implementation.............................................................................................152.1 Cooperation and Coordination.....................................................................................152.2 Quality and Appropriateness of Structures..................................................................152.3 Capacity Building ........................................................................................................163. Sustainability..............................................................................................................224. Revised Project Strategy ...........................................................................................255. Analysis for UNDP Project Involvement until 2008 ...............................................265.1 SWOT Analysis ...........................................................................................................265.2 Analysis of Technical Assistance ................................................................................276. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................307. Appendices......................................................................................................................31A. Evaluation Methodology.....................................................................................................31B. Interviews and Meetings .....................................................................................................32C. Documents...........................................................................................................................34D. Field Visits ..........................................................................................................................37E. Revised Results Framework................................................................................................43F. Revised Logframes ..............................................................................................................44G. Terms of Reference.............................................................................................................47
  2. 2. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 3/51Acronyms and AbbreviationsAMAO Area Mine Action OfficeDDG Danish Demining GroupDEX Direct Execution by the UNDP of a projectDMAO District Mine Action OfficeEC European CommissionEOD Explosive Ordnance DivisionFSD Swiss Foundation for Mine ActionGoSL Government of Sri LankaGA Government AgentHDU Humanitarian Demining UnitHSZ High Security Zone, area closed by Army for useIDP Internally Displaced PersonIMSMA Information Management System for Mine ActionLTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil EelamMAG Mines Advisory GroupMAP Mine Action Project, of the UNDPMMIPE Melinda Maragoda Institute for People‟s EmpowermentMRE Mine Risk EducationNEX National Execution of a UNDP projectNBD Nation Building and Development MinistryNGO Non-Government OrganizationNMAO National Mine Action OfficeNPA Norwegian People‟s AidNSCMA National Steering Committee on Mine ActionPCIS Post-Clearance Impact SurveyQA Quality Assurance monitoring processRMAO Regional Mine Action OfficeRONCO American commercial demining company, training SLA membersSLA Sri Lankan ArmySLNSMA Sri Lanka National Standards for Mine ActionTA Technical AdviserTIA Task Impact AssessmentUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNICEF United Nations Children‟s Emergency FindUXO Unexploded Ordnance
  3. 3. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 4/51I. Executive Summary and RecommendationsAfter more than two decades of conflict, the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and theLiberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) signed a ceasefire agreement in 2002 which led tohope of peace, stability, reconstruction and development. Humanitarian demining plays acritical role in the first phase of the rehabilitation effort, as donors and development agenciesrequire a certificate of clearance before agreeing to commence work on sectoral projects.Just as the laying of mines forewarns of conflict, demining can be the confirmation of a peaceprocess that will enable all sides in the conflict to create an equitable future. The UNDPinitiated this Project in support of the Government‟s Programme for Mine Action, in the hopethat it would return to productive use land currently suspected as contaminated by mines andUXO, and further the overall development aims of Sri Lanka.As this evaluation took place, the ceasefire agreement faced numerous violations whichraised the spectre of a return to renewed conflict. Demining activities were sporadicallydisrupted in the North and East due to strike days and random attacks which led developmentagencies to reassess their field presence. As some demining sites border high security zones,ongoing clearance depends upon stability in the area.Moreover, donors are concerned that increased conflict both between the Sri Lankan Army(SLA) and the LTTE and amongst Tamil factions could lead to further laying of mines alongthe defensive lines that divide these groups. Reports of the laying of new mines could not beconfirmed during our visit. Should that occur it is likely that international assistance for mineclearance would cease, as it did during other phases of renewed conflict.1Nonetheless, we gathered evidence of the value of UNDP‟s capacity building project andidentified ways in which it could continue to develop national and local capacity in a revisedformat. As the Government Programme has extended until 2008 its target for creating a Northand East free from the effect of mines, UNDP could also continue its activities until then.Indeed, it has undertaken to oversee a Technical Survey that will extend its currentcommitment until the end of 2006 for at least a year.However, as the primary aim of this support project was to build the capacity of the Ministryof Nation Building and Development through a National Steering Committee on Mine Action(NSCMA) and a National Mine Action Office (NMAO) to plan and manage mine clearanceactivities and provide standards and controls for doing so, much remains to be done. Inparticular, UNDP technical assistance has been focused in the North. The same supportservices need to be developed in the East and within a Mine Action Office in the Ministry.To develop a comprehensive approach, a joint view needs to be developed with the Ministryregarding the authority and required expertise of the UNDP Technical Advisers.In addition, the absence of a strategic plan that defines a precise and shared vision of how theProgramme will continue the monitoring activities of the Project when it finishes means thateven the UNDP Country Office is unsure of how roles are responsibilities should bedelineated.If UNDP is to continue providing capacity building support to the Mine Action Programme,it must have a more consistent and productive operating environment with the Ministry and astrategic plan, with clearly defined roles and responsibilities between NSCMA, an establishedNational Mine Action Office, the UNDP Mine Action Project (MAP), and the UNDPCountry Office. This is the only way for the Project to create a sustainable level of mineaction capacity throughout all of the affected regions.1During those times, demining was continued by the SLA and HDU.
  4. 4. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 5/51I.I Findings and RecommendationsRoles and responsibilitiesThe UNDP has succeeded in establishing this technical support project for capacity buildingof the Mine Action Programme of the Ministry of Nation Building and Development, and insupporting the establishment of NSCMA and National Standards. Its original scope foresawproviding technical support to develop mine clearance capacity throughout the mine-affectedareas of the North and East. Due to different views on the scope of the capacity building roleof the UNDP and its Technical Advisers there currently is little Project field presence in eastof Vavuniya.According to the National Standards for Mine Action in Sri Lanka, the Government shouldhave its own National Mine Action Office. The UNDP assisted in this role in the absence of aNational office. But as the UNDP prepares to finish its capacity building work and phase outthe Mine Action Project, the Government needs to set up and staff its own National MAO,within the Ministry and coordinating with NSCMA in order to continue oversight andcoordination of mine clearance activities.This is a DEX project and donors of the UNDP MAP insisted they would not fund theseactivities directly through the Ministry. Donors have reiterated that they support fundingthrough the UNDP project because it assures neutrality in execution in a conflict region andbetter access to all parties in the field. Furthermore, the UNDP‟s monitoring and reportingprocess meets their needs. We foresee this project remaining DEX until it ceases, at whichpoint the Ministry and NSCMA would take on decision-making for all of the mine actionfield offices.Given the revised final target date of the National Mine Action Strategy, UNDP technicalsupport through this Project will not extend beyond 2008, and so the UNDP would like toassure that the successes of the Mine Action office in Jaffna can be duplicated in offices inKilinochchi, Vavuniya and Trincomalee. It is only through this uniform coverage that theProject has the chance of creating sustainable capacity for regional Mine Action offices. TheUNDP Chief Technical Adviser to the Project, in consultation with the Government, shouldbe authorized to set up and staff field offices in an adequate manner, with capacity buildingactivities and staff training within his purview.To streamline day to day operations of Project activities, the UNDP Country Office, ProjectOffice, the Secretary and Adviser to NSCMA and the new director of the National MineAction Office should itemize and agree to the role and authority given to the Chief TechnicalAdviser of the UNDP Project, which is under DEX execution. This Memorandum ofAgreement should spell in detail what each party undertakes to do and how the parties willresolve future differences over activities. While it is important for the NSCMA to providegeneral direction to the Project as a support mechanism to Sri Lanka‟s National Mine ActionProgramme, the day to day management of operations should be left to UNDP, so that itfulfills its obligations. Donors want to be sure that UNDP is unhindered in executing theprojects they have funded.Strategic planning and staffing Not only does UNDP need a strategic plan for this Project, outlining the details andprocesses of its last two years of support, the Ministry also needs one, so that NSCMAand the National Mine Action Office can take over the activities of the Mine ActionProject, and assure ongoing quality assurance monitoring and database management. Themain issue to be planned is the transfer of skills and competencies from the UNDPProject to a national Mine Action Office. The Ministry may then want to draft a strategic
  5. 5. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 6/51plan of what demining needs remain (after the Technical Survey clarifies the issue) andwhat resources are necessary to accomplish that task. The success of the UNDP Support Project rests with the technical advisers (TA) it hasprovided and their ability to monitor the needs of mine clearance projects in the field. Inaddition, the UN affiliation enables international TAs to provide a critical protection rolefor local staff and international demining agencies as they work in a conflict region andcross defensive lines. The TAs have developed district mine action offices (DMAO) and trained local staff inquality assurance (QA) methodology, the accreditation process, monitoring of Mine RiskEducation (MRE), conducting Post-Clearance Impact Surveys (PCIS), and setting up theIMSMA database. Loss of qualified personnel with extensive knowledge of the projectand the field would undermine UNDP‟s ability to fulfill its project aims by 2008 As this project depends on the technical knowledge and experience developed in its fieldstaff, expansion of staff in order to provide thorough coverage in the North and East andretention of current staff should be the first consideration as the UNDP extends itsProject. Local staff should be given contracts of at least one year in order to offer themsome basic job security and prevent high staff turnover and the loss of institutionalknowledge. Should UNDP extend this Project for two more years, a strategic plan must considerwhat additional local staff should be recruited and trained now in order to leave behindsustainable mine action QA and monitoring units to cover the North and East. Currentstaffing is at a minimum level. In addition, the NMAO may ask UNDP to assist intraining their new staff. The Colombo office needs increased staffing to coordinate thelast main tasks of the Project: drafting a strategic plan, overseeing the Technical Survey,and preparing to handover responsibilities to a National Mine Action office.Mine Action Services The Mine Action Project Services of quality assurance, post-clearance impact surveysand accreditation need to be refined to assure maximum utility. Mine clearance agenciesthat fail the accreditation process should be suspended from mine clearance until theypass. The review/appeals process should be formalized. MRE could go through theaccreditation process, even if informally. The IMSMA reporting system could be maintained after the UNDP Project finishes,perhaps in the Survey Department, should the Ministry of NBD not be in a position tohouse the database. The Ministry now has its own reporting system, which has inherentinconsistencies according to NGOs who are represented in the statistics. The Ministry isnot using IMSMA in part due to the complexity of extracting information by untrainedusers. The UNDP Mine Action Project needs to review the options and include theIMSMA database in its strategic plan for handing over the project. However, to enhancethe effectiveness of ongoing capacity building in Mine Action coordination in Sri Lanka,a single, definitive data pool should be the source of mine action information in thecountry. Mine Risk Education and Victim Assistance programmes are coordinated throughUNICEF. Quality assurance monitoring indicated some gaps in these programmes.Coordination should be made with UNICEF to assess current needs and review how thecommunity will sustain these activities. Landmine Ban Advocacy in support of the Government of Sri Lanka signing the OttawaConvention and the LTTE signing the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment remains a goal
  6. 6. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 7/51of this Mine Action Project. Donors did indicate a reluctance to contribute more fundingfor mine clearance in Sri Lanka until these documents are signed, which may limitresources available for continued UNDP involvement.I.II Background and Rationale for the EvaluationIn an effort to support post-conflict reconstruction UNDP in 2002 undertook to support theMinistry of Nation Building and Development‟s Mine Action Programme,2promoting a saferenvironment for the people of the conflict affected areas; the revitalization of land for IDPresettlement; and to increase economic development that would provide sustainablelivelihoods. This was to be achieved through the establishment of national capacity to plan,manage, coordinate and execute mine action and related activities, and thus contribute to apositive mine action environment in Sri Lanka.UN Mine Action comprises five complementary groups of activities: Mine Risk Education,Humanitarian Mine Clearance, Survivor Assistance, Stockpile Destruction and Advocacy.Within the UN system, the UNDP assumed the responsibility for addressing thesocioeconomic consequences of landmines, developing countries‟ institutional capacities andsupporting integrated and sustainable programmes for mine action. The UNDP approachesthe landmine problem from a long-term development perspective and creates conditions for areturn to normal economic activity, reconstruction and development.The UNDP Support to Mine Action in Sri Lanka project‟s primary purpose is to assist thecountry to develop the capacities and skills required to manage its mine action programmewith minimal external support, and to ensure a high standard through quality control.As the 2006 project phase nears it close, the UNDP seeks to assess its impact on the nationalProgramme and whether it had met its objectives. As a result of this evaluation, UNDP willdecide whether its continued partnership with the Ministry of Nation Building andDevelopment (NBD) in demining is productive, and identify where it needs revision in orderto meet the Ministry‟s revised target date of 2008 for a country free of the effects of mines.1. Project Design1.1 Support ProjectThe “Support to Mine Action Programme” (MAP) is a directly executed (DEX) project ofUNDP that was initiated in 2002 but began in its current form in August 2003. The Projectwas designed as a coordination mechanism to directly support the National Mine ActionProgramme in Sri Lanka under the leadership of the National Steering Committee for MineAction (NSCMA), and to set up support in the field for mine clearance. It was intended tocontribute to increased livelihood opportunities in affected communities and aimed to supportsignificant progress towards Sri Lanka‟s stated goal of making the country free from theeffect of mines and UXO by the end of 2006.2Then called the Ministry of Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
  7. 7. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 8/51According to the foundation document3, results would be achieved through the followingactivities: Capacity building. Strengthen the national capacity to plan, manage and executehumanitarian mine action activities. Support to mine action operations. Provide support to mine action implementing agenciesto conduct mine action activities. Support to resource mobilization and advocacy. Continue and improve a partnership andresource mobilization strategy to support coordination of the implementation of the SriLankan Mine Action Programme and for mine action operations.The main primary results to be achieved by the UNDP Mine Action Project were:1) To further strengthen and develop management and technical capacity of Sri Lankathrough the established National Steering Committee for Mine Action to coordinate mineaction activities2) To improve the safety of the mine affected communities by reducing the landmine threatthrough supporting the implementation of an integrated programme including the use ofQuality Management practices3) To meet the needs of the mine and UXO incident survivors and to develop strategies fortheir socio-economic reintegrationThe project aimed to build the capacity of the Ministry and of district offices in severalaspects. The first was to have a central coordinating body, NSCMA, which would oversee thepolicy and coordination of all activities related to mine action and track the tasking andclearance activities of each demining agency in the field. The UNDP field offices would thendeal with developing the local skills to monitor demining activities and assure that agencieswere operating according to the national standards and that documentation of their work wasentered into the national database.In fact, the UNDP Mine Action Office has carried out some functions of the National MineAction Office (MAOSL). The National Mine Action Standards explain the division ofresponsibilities:“The NSCMA is responsible for ensuring the conditions which enable the effectivemanagement of national mine action projects. The NSCMA is ultimately responsible forpolicy oversight and coordination, advice and direction on operation including National SriLankan Mine Action Standards, Quality Assurance, Mine Risk Education and VictimsassistanceThe NSCMA is responsible for establishing and maintaining national standards, regulationsand procedures for the management of mine action operations. These national standards,regulations and procedures are consistent with IMAS, and other relevant national andinternational standards, regulations and requirements.In certain situations and at certain times it may be necessary and appropriate for the UnitedNations, or some other recognised international body, to assume some of the responsibilities,on behalf of the Government of Sri Lanka and to fulfil some of the functions of the nationalmine action office.3See Annex Documents
  8. 8. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 9/51The AMAO will continue to provide operational coordination such as establishing priorities,tasking, quality assurance and information management. Until the MAOSL is established,many of the functions traditionally performed by a ‘national mine action centre’ will beundertaken by the NSCMA acting on recommendations made by the Technical WorkingGroup (Chaired by the secretary of the NSCMA) which, in turn, receives recommendationsfrom a Field Working Group comprising of mine action operators and facilitated byUNDP. At the request of the Government, some functions currently are performed byUNDP in support of NSCMA and AMAO.” (Emphasis and italics added)The text continues by outlining the role of the national Mine Action Office, which the UNDPProject office currently supports:“The MAOSL, once established, will be responsible for;a) Policy implementationb) the co-ordination or planning of all mine action activities in their area of responsibility;c) the provision of technical advice to the NSCMA;d) the maintenance of mine action records and databases;e) (if delegated by the NSCMA), the accreditation and licensing of mine actionorganizations;f) the investigation of mine action related accidents and incidents; andg) Monitoring, evaluation and training recommendations.”Thus, the above activities of MAO-SL fall within the domain of the UNDP Project. Althoughthe Ministry has provided leadership and guidance, nominal efforts have been made totransfer some of these capacities, such as the IMSMA database, to the Ministry. It is now thetime for the Ministry to set up its own Mine Action office so that the handover process fromUNDP can begin.Overall, the activities of the UNDP seem well targeted in achieving the objectives of acapacity building support project to the national mine clearance Programme. It has achievedits aims to a remarkable degree, but still needs to focus on more uniform regional coverage,and the sustainability of capacity building of staff and quality assurance processes.While future staffing needs will depend on the pace of demining activity, the current workplans for Jaffna, Kilinochchi, and Vavuniya will require the input of a TA and expansion ofQA and PCIS teams. The territory covered by the Vavuniya office is too extensive, and someoperational tasks are not done, which is why original Project plans included a base inTrincomalee. It appears the Vavuniya office needs the supervision of a Technical Advisor toassure that the work gets done and staff are allocated in the most efficient way. Thus far, theEast is not well supported by a Mine Action Office. It needs a regional Mine Action Office.1.2 AssumptionsNSCMA CooperationAlthough the goals of the UNDP Project and the NSCMA are much the same, there weremiscalculations about the nature of the functional relationship between the UNDP MineAction Project and the Ministry, as well as the role of the UNDP Country Office. The mainproblem stems from limited delegation of adequate authority by the NSCMA to the Technical
  9. 9. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 10/51Advisers to oversee the technical operations. As a result, the field presence of the TAs islimited in many regions, resulting in uneven performance of the support offered.UNDP aims to accomplish a technical work in a manner that will give thorough and qualityfield support and build the capacity of offices to carry on the tasks after the Project ends. Theorganizational chart accompanying the Project document indicates the UNDP TechnicalAdviser playing a lowly role in the Mine Action Office.4Although the Ministry prefers alimited involvement of international advisors, it should be acknowledged that the TAs in factprovide input to NSCMA, GA, and MAO, ans support the main roles and processes of thosebodies in demining.While it is appreciated that the Ministry claimed ownership of the Mine Action Programme,it does need to acknowledge that partners providing technical assistance that will enable theProgramme to function independently should be allowed to carry out their tasks with thenecessary independence to provide effective technical support, with a minimum of ongoingconsultation. The UNDP Country Office is responsible for the Mine Action Project‟scontribution, and must safeguard that it is able to fulfill its donor mandate.Clearance Rates in a Conflict RegionThe Project made little allowance for disruptions due to renewed conflict. While mineclearance rates increased in large measure once the government programme became fullyfunctional in 2003, in 2005 its achievements peaked. It will be difficult to forecast mineclearance rates in this current period of unrest. Calculations thus far by the NSCMA areapparently based on the best clearance rates, although the most accessible minefields havealready been cleared. The more complex and unmapped ones remain, and the mined “highsecurity zones” (HSZ) in the North and East are inaccessible at least as long as the conflictcontinues. This makes calculation of an end state of mine clearance highly speculative.Indeed, statistics offered by the mine action offices in Jaffna and Vavuniya indicated that inJaffna only 20% of the suspect land had been cleared. In Vavuniya and the East it rangesfrom 2-10%. It is not clear what percentage of the uncleared land is high priority. Thetechnical survey that the Project will coordinate over the next year should reduce large areasof suspect land and make the extent of future mine clearance needs more evident.Although the UNDP MAP had originally envisaged assisting the NSCMA until the high aswell as medium-priority sites were cleared, it now seems that it may be handing overresponsibilities by the end of 2008 in line with the Government‟s revised focus and targetdate of clearance of high priority zones only. Due to the renewed state of conflict thatinterrupts clearance donor interest in this sector is also gradually decreasing. However, theUNDP Project was not intended to oversee the last mine cleared, but to build governmentcapacity to perform the task and to meet ongoing needs. This strategy means that the Projectdoes not need to be interrupted by an increase in conflict.As the Ministry points out, by 2008 it plans to have up to six hundred trained soldiers in itsown mine clearance team, as well as a potential pool of about a thousand other deminerstrained by the international demining agencies. As long as it now develops its own nationalMine Action Office with technically qualified local staff, the Ministry can be prepared to takeover from the UNDP MAP by the end of 2008. It can then reassess its human and financialresource base and priority demining list. The cost of demining will be much lower withoutthe costs of foreign agencies and their higher local staff salaries.4See UNDP Support to Mine Action in Sri Lanka, Annex
  10. 10. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 11/51System CapacityThere is an ongoing assumption that the provision of skills to local staff in mine action fieldoffices equips them to carry out independently the projects and processes established by theinternational technical adviser. There is little realization that it is often the very presence ofan impartial outsider that makes the process possible. We observed that the lack of such aperson in the leadership role led to adverse effects on team work, or slackness in operations.Examining in detail the system and social assumptions in place is as important as developingthe skills of individuals. Without a keen understanding of the limited capacity of the system,it will be hard for the individuals in the district mine action offices to sustain a high level offunctioning and quality assurance once the Technical Advisers leave.While the Jaffna office functions well with current staff levels and no changes arerecommended, the Kilinochchi and Vavuniya offices need more staff and technicalsupervision in order to meet the demands for the services and provide an adequately trainedpool of mine action officers to meet upcoming needs for the technical survey, ongoingdemining, and monitoring. In addition, the Colombo Mine Action Officer is busy respondingto urgent matters and lacks the time to tend to longer-term issues. Staffing issues should bereassessed, especially as building the capacity of the National Mine Action Office willrequire much planning and collaboration.The Technical Advisers can best decide if some field staff can be shared between offices.Right now Vavuniya staff cannot cope with the workload as well as travel to Mannar,Trincomalee and Batticaloa. Operational issues are left undone. It may be that the presenceof a Technical Adviser could help that office allocate its staff resources for better fieldcoverage, but more staff will be needed if the Project seeks to do its job well. Whenreviewing the anticipated workload to meet the priorities of 2006, the UNDP and Ministryagreed to have three Technical Advisers and 1 IMSMA international consultant and shouldproceed to filling the two vacancies that have developed since this decision was taken.There is some question as to how the system will be maintained once the internationaltechnical adviser is withdrawn.5Perhaps demining activities will be nearly completed and soa Mine Action Officer in the GA‟s office can coordinate ongoing activities, including QualityAssurance, MRE and IMSMA database management. Again, broader representationthroughout the affected regions would facilitate this transition to national control. In themeantime, short courses or short-term advisers could train the staff on some specific issuesthat could improve Programme technical capacity and performance.1.3 Compatibility of ObjectivesThis project had basic objectives related to capacity building for effective mine clearance andwas sought by the Ministry to help it coordinate demining activities in the field. Nonetheless,the Project‟s aim of building technical capacity was at times perceived as being incompetition with the NSCMA‟s leadership in the National Programme.The UNDP Project is directed mostly by Technical Advisers who provide expertise on allmine action related systems and processes that can make this project a success. The NSCMA,understandably concerned to keep control of the Project‟s contribution to the National5The staffing diagram as part of the original project document indicated a lowly position for the TechnicalAdviser. In practice, he provides critical technical input at the top of the chart to the head of NSCMA, the GAand the Mine Action Officer.
  11. 11. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 12/51Programme, has tended to become involved in project management and operational details.This relationship has not always yielded optimal delivery and efficiency of results.In fact, both the National Programme and UNDP Project share the same main end goals inmine action. The Technical Advisers have a good grasp of the needs of quality assurance inmine clearance operations. They also encourage members of their staff to develop their skillsand present their findings as part of a constructive team. To develop a comprehensiveapproach a joint view needs to be developed with the NCSMA (and the Ministry of NationBuilding and Development) on the authority and expertise of the UNDP Technical Advisorswho should assume the day to day management functions of the project under the overallstrategic guidance of the NCSMA.The Government is relying on outside expertise for a limited period. Until then, it requires aforeign field presence to assure completion of the Programme mission, especially in conflictareas. Now is the time to set up a National Mine Action Office with an Officer who can beginto observe and learn from the UNDP Project work in the field and be prepared to supervisethe field offices by the end of 2008.
  12. 12. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 13/511.4 Lack of Strategic and Risk Management PlanStrategic PlanThe Government of Sri Lanka has set out a strategy for mine action that provides a view of itsvision for a mine impact free Sri Lanka by 2008. Furthermore, much work has been done at adistrict level to establish a prioritization mechanism under the authority of the GovernmentAgents, and the relationship between implementing agents and the UNDP project areexceptionally good.However, the strategy does not provide a definition of „mine impact free‟6and there appearsto be a risk of a shortfall in achievement with an end date set at 2008, if current progress ratesare maintained. Some demining agencies interviewed considered this date a reasonable targetproviding the security situation does not further deteriorate and that access continues to begiven to minefield clearance tasks.There is no strategic plan that provides a quantitative assessment of the resources likely to beneeded to achieve the aims of the strategy. There is also no agreed exit strategy for UNDPand international involvement and little has been done by the UNDP MAP to assist with aquantitative risk management strategy. Such a strategic plan is necessary in order to mobilizesufficient human and financial resources in a timely manner.The UNDP MAP should, in line with its stated objectives, provide technical assistance in theproduction of such a plan for the Ministry and for the UNDP Project. The strategic planshould be crafted to make allowances for contingencies and would improve donor confidencein the planning process. It should include: The analysis of the capacity that should be left behind at the end of internationalintervention in mine action in Sri Lanka, for operation by Sri Lankan resources, in orderto identify the training or equipment that might be necessary in order to help establishsuch capacity. The high level of institutional development and education in Sri Lankasuggests that any such interventions are likely to be small or moderate as much humanand material infrastructure already exists. However, a National Mine Action Office in theMinistry must be established to oversee and maintain this process. A quantitative analysis of the resources necessary to achieve the “mine impact free”target set out in the national strategy. The definition used by the Project is when “themined areas are not having a negative socio-economic impact on communities, e.g. themines may be in remote, marked and unpopulated areas.”7In addition, MRE and markingsystems warn the public of uncleared minefields and UXO. It may be difficult to calculateprojected cost of demining as national deminers will cost far less than the internationalagencies, and INGOs may not remain or receive funding if the conflict escalates.Such a strategic plan will then help facilitate the generation of a suitable exit strategy for theUNDP as well as for the international implementing agencies and foreign donors. This might6“Impact free” could be defined as being the point where there is no economic demand for the land leftuncleared, and where all reasonable and practicable steps have also been taken to prevent casualties in theareas that remain contaminated. This definition has been adopted by the United States Department of State, oneof the largest donors to mine action in Sri Lanka. However, thus far, the “value” of the land in Sri Lanka hasbeen calculated for its importance to resettling communities, not for its economic productivity.7Murugathas, V, Guide for Technical Survey, p 6.
  13. 13. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 14/51facilitate resource mobilization for a variety of possible scenarios. Not only was a strategicplan listed in the original project Results Framework, it was also mentioned by the ProjectSteering Committee in September 2005 as a priority need.Risk ManagementThe security situation in Sri Lanka remains uncertain and has apparently deteriorated sincethe formulation of the National Strategy. As a result, the implementing NGOs are reportingproblems with gaining access to task sites. This could have an implication for future progressrates, as could the outbreak of war.There is one particular aspect of risk that is specific to the context in Sri Lanka. The mineaction project has been designed and implemented to operate under the current situation of“no war no peace” resulting from the 2002 peace accords. There are two significant risks tothe project that stem from this situation. Risk of destabilization through the collapse of current ceasefire agreement is felt to besignificant given the current situation. The implications for the mine action programinclude:o Loss of demining teams due to their recall to other dutieso Loss of donor support for mine clearance at a time of combato The risk of re-mining if full hostilities break out.There are some risk management strategies that UNDP could help prepare for in order tominimize the impact of such events. These would include:o Maintaining the current RMAO structure to ensure continuity once thesituation re-stabilizeso Providing a safe haven for the existing IMSMA recordso Preparing plans for a new impact survey to be conducted at the end of any newperiod of hostility to re-assess the contamination. The establishment of a lasting peace settlement would require a significant revision ofthe current clearance plans. Respondents from the Sri Lankan Army suggested that theywould need help from implementing NGOs to clear the high security zones so thatinhabitants could return. Risk to the public is low, however, as the HSZ would not bereleased until they were demined.
  14. 14. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 15/512. Project Implementation2.1 Cooperation and CoordinationThis Project achieves a high degree of coordination and cooperation with donors, governmentofficials, the military, implementing agencies and UN partners. Demining agencies train localdeminers to conduct mine clearance. They also undergo accreditation and quality assurancemonitoring. Government Agents oversee the district steering committee meetings that setpriorities for demining and confirm the task completion. UNICEF and local NGOs assist withMine Risk Education (MRE) activities and rehabilitation of landmine victims. Allimplementing partners submit their field data for the IMSMA database, and rely on MineAction Project maps in order to assess development options for cleared land.The prevailing differences in interpretation and approach between the Ministry of NationBuilding and Development and the Project need to be remedied if this Project is to completeits mission.One area of limited cooperation and coordination was the support offered to the Project bythe UNDP Country Office due to its own restricted capacity. The very technical nature of theProject has led the UNDP to delegate the main management responsibility to the Project. Theshortfall in human resources capacity seems to have been ameliorated in late 2005 and hasallowed for closer support on budgetary management and overall management guidance onthe side of the UNDP Country Office. It is recommended that UNDP Country Office staffincreases the frequency of field visits to strengthen their understanding on the issues affectingthe Project.In addition, the oversight and recommendations of the Project Steering Committee seem tolack a mechanism for implementation. Although many of their findings seek to assure theProject reaches its goals, the question remains as to who takes the ultimate decision indefining roles, responsibilities and strategy, and who enforces it.2.2 Quality and Appropriateness of StructuresThis project is executed through the DEX modality for reasons that continue to be relevant.First, UNDP brings neutrality to the Project, which works across lines of conflict to servemembers of each community. The international TAs working under a UN support projecthave increased leverage for protection of national mine action staff and have scope forbuilding trust and mediate between the different parties. In the light of the security situationwhich restricts the movements of the MAO teams and access across defensive lines, thisstrongly influences the overall success of the project. Second, the donors prefer to see theirfunds administered by UNDP as UNDP procedures on monitoring and financial reporting suittheir needs. Third, the administrative management of the Project might put a heavy burden onthe capacities of the NSCMA, if it were to be administered by their office.
  15. 15. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 16/512.3 Capacity BuildingNCSMAThe project began with the focus on building the capacity of the Ministry to coordinate mineclearance agencies through a National Steering Committee on Mine Action (NSCMA). Thisbody is composed of all key stakeholders in mine action, such as the UNDP, UNICEF,donors, clearance operators and other mine action organizations. The NSCMA is presidedover by the Ministry of NBD‟s Secretary and chaired by his Advisor, and meets every sixweeks to address issues in mine clearance that have occurred in the interim period.Meetings provide an opportunity for mine clearance agencies, donors, the Government, theSri Lankan Army, Tamil representatives and other interested parties to provide an update oftheir field work and to raise operational issues.The NSCMA does provide a formal occasion for demining agencies to meet and review theirprogress, and meetings are well attended. The Ministry also issues a Progress Report on MineClearance, and the Secretary and Advisor are genuinely interested in making NSCMA asuccess. However, in order to obtain a comprehensive picture on progress of mine clearance,various sources of information are required. The mission met with agency representatives inthe field and visited their demining sites.A key issue NCSMA needs to resolve is which reporting system the Ministry will adopt formine clearance activities. Currently it has its own system, while the UNDP Mine Actionoffices are using IMSMA. It may be that NSCMA leadership can attend a short course tolearn more about how to extract valuable data from IMSMA.Quality AssurancePerhaps the most critical technical function that the UNDP Project plays is in the introductionof the methodology that regulates mine clearance techniques and capabilities. Not only is itof vital importance that agencies be exposed to the varied forms of clearance and the benefitsof each. They need to follow an approved system of marking a site that will lead to safe andreliable mine clearance. Protective clothing, suitable working hours and break time, first aidequipment on site, and other issues are checked as part of the QA inspection process.MRE also undergoes QA visits. One such visit discovered that a local NGO implementingpartner had not carried out the family visits it claimed. As so much of MRE depends upon thehonest representation of activities, UNICEF then terminated the contract for services withthat agency.QA teams are one area where this project needs to expand. Three teams of eight persons nowserve the project with random field monitoring. Each field office will need a QA team. Thetraining in survey methodology and analysis will make the Mine Action staff more usefulover time, as aims and needs in mine action are reviewed.
  16. 16. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 17/51AccreditationThe accreditation process seeks to identify, through a realistic exercise, how mine clearanceagencies actually operate and whether their methods can be relied upon. Careless markingand clearance may lead the government and public to think that a patch of land is safe when itis not. Several mine agencies did not initially receive accreditation. They improved theirclearance and safety measures and today are respected for the services they perform.Much effort has gone into establishing an effective and credible accreditation process in SriLanka. The work undertaken to establish this process is commendable, and demonstratesalmost the ideal of capacity development, i.e. how UNDP technical assistance under theguidance and direction of the Ministry of Nation Building and Development has developed acapacity that is now overseen by a Sri Lankan institution (i.e. the SLA).It is unfortunate that such an effective development is slightly marred by the reported factthat one agency (MMIPE) has failed its accreditation but has been allowed to continueoperating. This has quality and liability implications for both the Programme and the UNDPMAP, as the ability of an agency that cannot pass the accreditation to produce clear groundmust be in doubt. The situation is somewhat ameliorated, as MMIPE are apparently not activeat the moment. Assistance should be offered to MMIPE to enable them to reach accreditationstandard and resume clearance operations. The appeals procedure for agencies that failaccreditation must be formalized.Prioritization and Post-Clearance Impact SurveysPrioritization of mine clearance sites in Jaffna and Vavuniya occurs through a highlyparticipatory process coordinated by the Government Agent. Sites are classified as high,medium and low risk, with high and medium-risk ones first tasked for clearance as areas withknown minefields that cannot be easily avoided. Low risk areas are those that would havelittle productive use, or are not readily accessible. One way to assess the prioritization processwould be to review how many accidents occurred in areas now classified as “low-risk”. Itappears that the prioritization process in government held areas is acceptable8, and thatinformal assessments of land use, value and accessibility are the deciding factors.The Government‟s goal is to clear most high and medium-risk sites, in order to eliminate theimpact of mines, if not their presence. The actual success of a mine clearance operation canbe measured in various ways:- the number of mines/UXO cleared(which is standard used by Halo Trust),- the amount of area cleared or released( the variance of which causes somediscrepancies in reporting),- the value to community life and resettlement- the economic value of the cleared land. 9Thus far, the government programme seems focused on assessing the first three, andGovernment Agents (GA) in the districts repeated that their primary interest in prioritizingmine clearance sites was the community life for resettlement of displaced persons (IDPs).Although a cursory review of the Post-Clearance Impact Surveys (PCIS) available at thisstage reveals that most demined sites list the vast number of direct and indirect beneficiariesas coming from clearance of roads, fields, schools, temples and electricity grids and not8Questions were raised about site selection in LTTE-controlled areas, especially the Vanni.9In this document, the term “cleared” refers to areas cleared of mines and UXO. In Sri Lanka the term “cleared”can also carry the political connotation of land freed of LTTE control and under the authority of the SLA.
  17. 17. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 18/51housing, we did see some evidence of resettlement.10The PCIS also indicate some plans ofgovernment and INGO assistance for housing development in support of IDP returns.According to the priorities confirmed by the Government Agents, more effort needs to bemade to assure that cleared land is actually able to be redeveloped for resettlement.11Consideration of the economic productivity of the land has been a factor in the areas wherefarmers and fishermen seek to resettle, as each wants to live in an area that also assures hislivelihood.Some revision needs to be made of the PCIS process to allow for a thoughtful analysis of thepractical effects of mine clearance. Norwegian People‟s Aid (NPA) uses a Task ImpactAssessment reporting format which provides a lot of useful socio-economic detail. Ideally,the impact assessment process would have uniform inputs and survey methods to enablebetter analysis of regional impact. And they would seek to identify what keeps formerinhabitants from returning to their land after it has been demined. Analysis of available datasuggests some factors, such as lack of livelihood or habituation to better facilities, but morethorough research needs to be done, especially to include those who have not returned.IMSMA and ReportingThis database set up by the Project not only collects information on mine clearance, but alsoon the monitoring of quality assurance visits as well as activities relating to Mine RiskEducation. As the Ministry has its own reporting system, there is some confusion over theongoing value of the database, as at this point in time, no one at the Ministry will be able tomaintain the system once the UNDP project ceases.Much work has been done to establish a credible and effective data collection system. TheMAO personnel are well trained in the issues of data collection and collation, andcomprehensive quality checking procedures are in place to minimize the risk of transcriptionerrors.IMSMA is not a particularly flexible geographic information system (GIS) but the ability ofthe UNDP MAP personnel to enter and recover data is commendable, even when comparedwith other systems. Furthermore, the close relations between the MAO and the implementingNGOs and the Army mean that the ability of the IMSMA staff to keep the data updated isparticularly good, with the cooperation of the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) being noteworthy.There are two problems with the current system:Technical problems with the base mapping that the GIS uses. The current base map is ascanned paper map and as a result this contributes to some positional errors of the data points.Improved digital maps are available from the Survey Department and cooperation with theSurvey Department could go some way to improving the positional accuracy of the mappingdata.Inability to analyze the raw data. IMSMA produces very accurate and verifiable numeric databut the personnel are currently limited in their ability to interpret and analyze the data to10This from the Jaffna Post Clearance Impact Assessments of 2005 and 2006. Unfortunately charts from thefirst year included beneficiaries of both resettlement and housing, while in the second year they were lumpedunder the single heading of “housing”, making it difficult to quantify real numbers or chart differences betweenthe years.11During our visit, the High Court issued a ruling that required the government either to release private landcurrently occupied as high security zones or to provide alternative lands for resettlement that would notcompromise original ownership rights. This identification of other sites in the heavily mined areas of the Northand East could require a reprioritization of current demining tasks.
  18. 18. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 19/51identify trends, spot systemic problems in mine action implementation and track theperformance of service providers against a quantified strategic plan. This is largely due to thelack of suitable technical advisers.Largely as a result of the problems in interpreting the data presented by IMSMA, the Ministryof Nation Building and Development has collected ad hoc progress reports fromimplementing agencies. These appear to use different reporting periods and do not haveaccess to the comprehensive data checking processes used in the IMSMA framework. As aresult, the two data sets are different and diverging.12This strains the credibility of thereporting process.It seems prudent that (a) only the IMSMA data set be used for reporting processes, but that(b) effort is also made to improve its ability to support a credible analysis of progress.It may be that IMSMA can be made more accessible to the Ministry with furtherdemonstrations of its content and utility, and how to extract desired data. When the UNDPsupport ends, IMSMA records would be available as an archive of the Project‟s activities.Ideally, they should be maintained in an ongoing system that could be of future use to landuse and survey departments of the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL), if not to the Ministry.2.3.1 Mine Clearance Technical OperationsDMAOThe second aim of the UNDP Project was to develop a support structure to assist mineclearance agencies in the field. These District Mine Action Offices serve the purpose ofbuilding local capacity to coordinate, assist and oversee demining activities, with an emphasison Quality Assurance, Accreditation, Post Clearance Impact Surveys and interpretative datafrom the IMSMA database. As mentioned above, current staffing levels allow for adequateperformance in the offices in Colombo and Jaffna. The presence of Technical Advisers meansthat staff are well supervised and their skills are continually developed.That is not the case with the offices in Kilinochchi and Vavuniya, where their resources arestretched to the limits and things are left undone. In Vavuniya, task files are not prepared forthe demining agencies and completion certificates are not issued in a timely fashion. Moresupervision would develop the competencies of the staff to match those of their counterpartsin Jaffna. The optimal resource needs of the offices in Kilinochchi and Vavuniya (and a newone in Trincomalee) must be assessed by a Technical Adviser.International Human ResourcesAlthough much local capacity has been developed, the UNDP MAP is weakest in its abilityto provide support in the higher analytical functions needed to make the project mosteffective. This is largely due to the small number of expatriate technical advisers (TA). It canbe desirable to avoid large numbers of expatriate technical advisers embedded incumbersome structures, as may be observed in some other mine action projects. However,inadequate staffing of the Project has impaired the ability of the remaining TA to providecapacity development assistance in better field coverage and comprehensive planning of allkey aspects of Project functions, the analysis of accident and post-clearance impact data,MRE statistics and IMSMA data.12Halo Trust reports distinguish between land that is cleared and land that is released, which is a much largerarea. This could explain part of the discrepancy from dual reporting systems.
  19. 19. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 20/51The increase in tension also makes the role of the UN expatriate personnel as independentand objective monitors of activity in the conflict areas even more important, and so the needfor TA presence in Kilinochchi should be addressed. The TA from Jaffna can spend moretime there and test the sustainability of the DMAO structure set up in Jaffna.Furthermore, the ability of the MAP to provide assistance in the East has been severelyconstrained by the reluctance of local staff to travel from Vavuniya. The vast field areacovered by the Vavuniya office should be split in order to allow the establishment of a newRMAO in Trincomalee that could also serve Batticaloa. In addition, the Vavuniya officeneeds more oversight and training from a short-term Technical Adviser. Such persons shouldonly be needed for a limited duration, depending on assessed needs in a strategic plan.Wherever possible, capacity development should be done on a project basis using short termconsultants, rather than longer term posts, to emphasize the transitory nature of the UNDPinvolvement. Some of this short-term capacity development might be found through SriLankan consultants.13In addition, the Survey Department could be asked for assistance inimproving some of the cartographic problems.MoraleAs has been mentioned above, much work has been undertaken to develop a successful localcapacity in the Project Office and the Mine Action field offices. However, the morale of thelocal staff is low and there is a considerable risk that the investment in human capital couldbe wasted if these trained people leave for other jobs. Recent salary increases have helpedredress the inequalities with other comparable international agency posts, but three issuesremain: Security. RMAO personnel find it hard, under the current security climate, to makejourneys that put them at risk, particularly when crossing between Government andLTTE areas. To a certain extent this problem is ameliorated by the presence of anexpatriate, but the journey times between Vavuniya and Trincomalee also add to thecoverage problem. It should be possible to divide the Vavuniya office in order to staff anew office to cover the eastern districts without needing to recruit large numbers ofadditional staff. Short-term contracts. The UNDP cannot offer contracts beyond the current project end(i.e. December 2006) until a new project document or an extension is agreed. Short-termcontracts, coupled with the general unsettlement of the times, may encourage the localpersonnel to leave for other, more stable employment. Staff should be offered annualcontracts. Uncertain relationship with the Ministry of Nation Building and Development. Theproblem appears to oscillate between two extremes: on occasion the Project hasunilaterally taken policy decisions that were felt to be in the purview of the Ministry,while at other times the Ministry involved itself in minor managerial decisions involvingtravel, staff training and recruitment. The Ministry has the authority devolving from thesovereign Government of Sri Lanka, while the Project is contractually liable to its donorsto achieve the results set out in its project document and funding agreements. Thisuncertainty impinges on staff morale as they are not sure who is responsible for whatdecisions. A clear re-definition of the functional relationship between the Ministry, theUNDP country office, and the MAP should help resolve these issues.13Grig.Gen. Chandrasiri and his consulting firm may be one source of suitable expertise.
  20. 20. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 21/51Staff morale is particularly critical in small project teams where the loss of even a fewindividuals has a serious effect on the available human capital. In such cases, there is a verystrong risk that the project could lose the capacity that has been developed.Capacity development is quite a fragile process linked to the working environment, thequality and amount of technical supervision, accessibility of supplies and transport to thefield, as well as security considerations in this conflict setting. Adequate staff support overtime is the best assurance of lasting impact.Technical SurveyThe UNDP Project has been funded by the EC to undertake a Technical Survey that wouldtake about a year in order to help reduce the amount of suspect land and provide a moreaccurate assessment of mine clearance needs.Recognizing that not all mines will be cleared and given the current rates of progress, justover half of the time taken to clear under 50% of the contaminated areas is available to clearthe remaining 50%, which underlines the fact that, assuming the same types of terrain and thesame clearance techniques, not all of the remaining land could be cleared by the end of 2008.The technical survey may be able to identify the boundaries of contaminated areas. However,the international mine action standard (IMAS) that covers technical survey is widely thoughtof as one of the weakest IMAS, in that it does not provide clear and comprehensiveguidelines of how technical surveys should be undertaken.The problem can be summarized thus: the boundaries of regular minefields that are mostsuitable for manual technical survey techniques are largely identified during the standardminefield planning processes, and the boundaries of irregular minefields – which are the onesthat potentially offer the most „reduction‟ - cannot be reliably identified by manualtechniques. Area reduction in such sparsely mined areas can only be suitably achieved by acombination of machines and dogs, both of which are still in comparatively short supply inSri Lanka.Economic scoping techniquesIt has been possible in other countries to identify the overall size of the landminecontamination problem in broad terms through the use of economic cost-benefit analysistechniques. This would allow planners to identify the amount of land that is worth clearing bycomparing the cost of clearance with the market value of the produce that could be grown onthat ground, measured over the lifespan of the landmine and UXO contamination andallowing for the effect of time on prices. Conducted with the technical survey, this woulddetermine the amount of land that needs to be cleared and allow a definitive estimate of theresources needed to achieve „impact free‟ by the end of 2008.2.3.2 Mine Risk Education and Victim AssistanceUNICEF is supporting the coordination of the MRE sector and the implementation ofprojects in the area of MRE and survivor assistance. It has a variety of local NGO partners ineach region that carry out mine and UXO awareness through a multi-faceted approachinvolving community mobilization, coverage through the school curriculum and mediacampaigns. Although mine accidents have fallen, it is difficult to assess the impact of MRE inaccident reduction because it is concomitant with mine clearance and reduced movements ofpopulation. Surveys of MRE participants can indicate that mine awareness education has hadan impact, which varies between regions.
  21. 21. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 22/51Current aims seek to focus on young men, who are the largest risk group. Fencing andmarking systems to alert returnees to the presence of minefields are also an ongoing need.While the largest number of entries in the Quality Assurance monitoring of IMSMA are fromMRE little is really known about how general public knowledge of mine and UXO risksaffects behavior. Informal demining of private land does occur14and may be the standardemployment for someone trained in demining. It would be interesting to investigate thecircumstances behind the hiring of private deminers.Victim assistance is complex because local NGOs cannot only assist those disabled becauseof landmines. The same psycho-social counseling, access to prostheses and mobility devices,as well as vocational training is meant to help all victims regain a normal life and livelihood.It would be useful to revisit victims and assess their current status and needs.As IMSMA data indicates a large number of victims due to “unknown” causes, it appearedthat they might have been engaged in illegal activities. But it seems that field staff might nothave spoken with the victim directly, but with his family, who did not know the details of thelandmine accident. This variance in survey methodology introduced avoidable distortions andshould be corrected through a reliance on the primary source when charting casualties.2.3.3 Landmine Ban AdvocacySupport for the signature of the Sri Lankan Government of the Ottawa Convention on thebanning of landmines and for the LTTE to sign the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment15continues. Many donors now state they will not contribute more funds for mine clearanceuntil the government signs the Convention.The Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies sponsored a conference in 2004 that addressedthe issue of the Landmine Ban, and a Landmine Action Day was held in April of this year.Parties involved with advocacy note that the Government has agreed to sign the Conventionif the LTTE agrees to sign the Geneva Call Deed, but the matter was meant to be pursuedthrough the Geneva talks which are on hold. Signing and ratifying the Convention still doesnot assure compliance, so the best formula for securing support for the ban is an effectivepeace process that restricts the need for mining.3. SustainabilityMine ClearanceIn the best case scenario, most of the high and medium priority sites would have beendemined by the new 2008 target date. An important factor to be determined in a strategic planis what level of mine clearance activity will be needed in a variety of contingencies. TheMinistry plans to make operational as civilian deminers a group of SLA members trained byRONCO. In a situation of conflict they may be needed by the Army. Deminers trained byINGOs will remain as a skilled workforce even if their agencies cease operations.Some local MAO staff indicated that they would seek to remain in their job even if theUNDP ceased to provide support and funding. Even though a government salary would becomparatively lower, staff were proud of their skills level and wanted to continue in a line ofwork that made them feel useful. This is probably also true of deminers.1614UNICEF, MRE Programme in Sri Lanka.15The parallel document for Non-State Actors.16According to UNICEF, there are private deminers earning a good income clearing land.
  22. 22. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 23/51Mine Action OfficesThe most important factor for sustainability of the UNDP capacity development in MineAction field offices is the successful establishment of a National Mine Action Office to takeover the UNDP technical and supervisory role. A technically qualified national Mine ActionOfficer should be able to oversee and maintain the structures the UNDP has established in thefield.As the UNDP builds the capacity of the Government to oversee all aspects of mine clearance,that capacity building function is likely to continue for the next two years, regardless of theconflict or clearance rates, in order to equip a sufficient number of staff in the skills thenational Mine Action Offices will need.Most mine action field offices are located on the compound of the Government Agent, sofacilities are available at little or no cost. At one point, junior civil servants in training weremeant to be available to the Mine Action Project offices. That option should be reviewedagain.By 2008, actual mine clearance activity could be low, either due to ongoing unrest makingsites inaccessible or to completion of the task. In either event, the NSCMA and its districtcounterparts will have to coordinate needs assessments. There should be ongoing qualityassurance visits as long as demining occurs. More teams should be trained in ImpactAssessments, Quality Assurance and Post-Clearance Impact Surveying.Database of defined and contaminated areasAs some areas potentially will remain contaminated, there needs to be a database of definedand contaminated areas. While UNDP-funded personnel are managing the IMSMA databasefor now, there is a need to identify a suitable home and budget to maintain this database at theend of the Project. Initial inquiries suggest that it could be possible to house the databasewithin the Survey Department, which is part of the Ministry of Lands and Agriculture.Otherwise it should be stored as an archive accessible to agencies interested in land use data.Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) capacityA sustainable EOD capacity is needed to deal with items of unexploded ordnance (UXO).The UXO problem in Sri Lanka is comparatively light and the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) hasundergone extensive training in mine action in a programme funded by the USA. It may bethat there is no need for additional investment for an EOD capacity, but this needs to beconfirmed.Community-based marking activitiesThere is a difference in the degree of mine contamination marking from region to region.This has been blamed on people stealing marking, and differences in population density,access to wood, and type of material used for marking may all be contributory factors. Insome parts of the country, marking fencing appears to be used successfully for otherpurposes, suggesting that communities that „own‟ the fencing may be less likely to steal it.The absence of mined area marking is known to contribute to the risk of mine casualties, andso, in order to reduce impact, research should be done on the viability of community-basedmarking activities.Mine Risk Education (MRE) capacityThere will be an ongoing need for targeted MRE activities in Sri Lanka to advise peopleabout the areas that will remain contaminated, and also to whom they should report any UXOthat they discover. Many agencies have been implementing MRE activities in Sri Lanka,coordinated by UNICEF on behalf of the government. However, UNICEF needs to develop
  23. 23. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 24/51an exit strategy for international involvement and a sustainable home for the residual MREactivity that will be needed.Mine Victim Assistance (MVA)The survivors of landmine and UXO explosions often require assistance for the rest of theirlives, given that prostheses wear out every two to three years. Work needs to be undertaken toensure that the existing MVA activities are fully incorporated into sustainable healthprograms in Sri Lanka.Protection RoleIt is unclear in a setting of continued conflict who will provide a protection role for field mineaction officers to enable them to travel and carry out their work. If their field activities areconstrained for too long - or in the event mine clearance is no longer needed - many wouldpresumably seek other work. It appears that the survey techniques, the analysis and reporting,the data entry and the team work would equip Mine Action Project staff well to transfer theirskills and experience to other employment possibilities. Other international agencies mayagree to play a protection role of Mine Action Project staff.
  24. 24. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 25/514. Revised Project StrategyShould the UNDP and Ministry of Nation Building and Development agree on the terms of acontinued role for the UNDP Project in its capacity building role for NSCMA and a NationalMine Action Office, there will be a few areas requiring UNDP technical input: Provide additional Field Technical Advisers to assure uniform coverage of Mine ActionProject services. Assist the new National Mine Action Officer (Ministry technical staffperson) in gaining knowledge of how the field offices work and the services they offer. Assist in the drafting of strategic plans for NSCMA, the national MAO and the fieldoffices to address ongoing demining issues after 2008 that will be sustainable with SriLankan government funding. Oversee the Technical Survey, which will help to determine the size and scope of theactivities necessary for demining agencies to achieve the mine impact free target, in orderto assist planning and resource mobilization. Train more QA teams and revise PCIS methodology to have greater utility as a planningtool for resettlement and development. Provide short-term training in support of project staff for targeted capacity developmentand management skills.Already discussed is the need for more international technical assistance through TechnicalAdvisers based in Kilinochchi (from Jaffna), Vavuniya (short term) and Trincomalee.Complaints from demining organizations about the lack of operational support from theVavuniya office for demining in the East indicate a need to improve services in those areas.The above activities should be detailed through a document outlining the roles andresponsibilities of the Mine Action Project in relation to NSCMA, the national MAO and theMinistry, with a clear delegation of authority, as well as a detailed strategic plan of theUNDPs objectives, inputs and project completion.It is the desire of UNDP to do the job well, with thorough coverage and sustainable results –for both structures and processes. This will be achieved through three activities:1. Development of a Strategic Plan that outlines UNDP activities in mine action andcapacity building until 2008 and a National Strategic Plan for how they will prepare for thetransition.2. Mine Clearance Support, technical survey and monitoring3. Capacity Building of National and field Mine Action Offices, through TechnicalAdvisers, short-term assistance, skills workshops and assessments of future needs
  25. 25. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 26/515. Analysis for UNDP Project Involvement until 20085.1 SWOT AnalysisStrengthsLandmines continue to have a significant impact on Sri Lanka. Several agencies havereported how their projects - particularly resettlement projects - are constrained by mines.UNDP involvement in mine action is therefore relevant in terms of these development goals.Sri Lanka has a national strategy with a projected end date of 2008 and a planned end state ofa mine impact free‟ Sri Lanka outside the high security zones. There is unanimous supportfor the extension of mine action effort beyond 2006; the dates suggested in the Sri Lankanstrategy (i.e. between 2007 and 2008) are considered reasonable estimates for high prioritysites.A great deal has been achieved: mine clearance capacity has been developed, standards aregenerally high and coordination, quality assurance, accident investigation and reportingmechanisms have also been established. The concept of operations followed by UNDP andthe assistance provided by the UNDP Mine Action Project (MAP) have been universallywelcomed by all stakeholders that have been interviewed, including the Government Agents,mine action implementing agencies, development agencies and donors.Sri Lanka has an effective educational system; the human resource pool is good and it ispossible to find highly educated personnel. As a result the input needed to establish trulysustainable elements for a national mine action program is comparatively small and easilyobtainable within the context of the planned extension of the program (and the MAP) to2008.WeaknessesA lot has been done; however the program faces a series of challenges - not least in theprovision of continued donor support - unless these challenges are addressed. A majoroversight has been the failure to build capacity at the central level in a national Mine Actionoffice.The MAP project is under staffed and as a result is unable to concentrate on providingappropriate strategic advice and project management skills as it is forced to use its availableresources to manage day to day activities. For example, although a national strategy existsthere is no strategic plan that sets out the resources necessary to achieve an undefined endstate of „mine impact free by 2008‟ and as yet no plan to achieve a sustainable capacity in theroles currently undertaken by the UNDP project that could operate after the end ofinternational funding.Many of the higher technical skills are not fully developed. While project staff are trained andable to carry out quality control/quality assurance tasks, they have limited skills in the higheranalytical processes that constitute quality management, post clearance impact survey andaccident investigation. Local staff morale is also low and many are considering seekingalternative employment. Such a loss of human capital could have a significant effect on thesuccess of the project in developing sustainable capacity.Opportunities
  26. 26. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 27/51The Project has the potential to assist Sri Lanka to address and overcome challenges and thushelp meet the goals set out in its strategy document. The development of a quantitativestrategic plan, including appropriate risk management and exit strategies, will help mobilizeresources and assist in the successful conclusion of international involvement in the SriLankan mine action program within the forecast end date of 2008. Donors have stated thatthey welcome continued UNDP involvement in this regard.A review of the institutional framework and the relationship between the Ministry of NationBuilding and Development (MNBD), the UNDP Country Office and the MAP should providethe opportunity to clarify a division of responsibilities and allow the Project to meet itsresponsibilities. This will include the creation of a National Mine Action Office to carry onthe Project role.ThreatsOf most concern is the security situation in Sri Lanka. This is clearly an external threat andcannot be controlled by the UNDP. However, the development of a risk management strategyas part of a strategic plan should also allow the Project to support the GovernmentProgramme in the event of significant changes to the current „no war no peace‟ situation.Furthermore, the ongoing role of the expatriate technical advisors within the MAP helpsprovide a guarantee of independence and protection to the local staff employed in sensitiveareas.The Project accomplishments in developing functional field capacity risk being lost if notechnical capacity is established in a national Mine Action Office to provide guidance,technical support and training and oversight.There is also the risk of loss of institutional memory and human capital due to staff turn-over.This situation needs to be addressed as a matter of priority as a loss of critical personnel inthe short term will seriously hamper the chances of the MAP achieving its full aims.5.2 Analysis of Technical AssistanceIt has been shown that the UNDP Mine Action Project has to assist in capacity building tasks,at the same time as being required to undertake independent monitoring. The project iscurrently under-staffed in terms of Technical Advisers (TA) and cannot fully manage anyexpansion of the project activities without abandoning other duties such as the training of theNational and regional Mine Action Office staff.A possible personnel structure to fulfill critical project functions until the end ofimplementation period could be as follows: One TA in Colombo to provide advice at a national level, to manage the capacitydevelopment and short term assistance projects, and assist in coordination in theestablishment of the national Mine Action Office. One TA in each region to assist with coordination at a local level, to provide independentmonitoring and provide training to RMAO staff. The geographic dispersion of theRMAO suggest that TA would be required in the following locations:o Jaffna/Kilinochchi with more time spent in Kilinochchi until its capacity isbuilt and to test the sustainability of the Jaffna office
  27. 27. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 28/51o Vavuniya, short-term, until the local capacity is built, especially in operationso Trincomalee, can help build capacity of Vavuniya, and the East One international IMSMA consultant based in Colombo to assist with specific tasksrelated to improved data collection and management, including mainstreaming onereporting system.These staff positions may be filled as in-kind contributions from donors. The Sri LankanArmy has been very satisfied by the contribution of the RONCO project manager, and itmight be possible to persuade the US Department of State to ask RONCO to extend thisperson‟s contract to take on one of these positions. Other donors might be willing to dolikewise and there are several sources of suitable personnel.5.2.1 Project planning and strategic adviceA priority is the drafting of a Strategic Plan for the UNDP Project and the NSCMA thatincludes the development of and handover to the National Mine Action Office, and thesustainable development of field offices and mobilization of resources to expand short-termactivities in support of project completion. This suggests that there is a full-time job for asenior technical planning adviser in Colombo until the end of the Project. This person wouldbe unavailable in this period to assist substantially in any of the field supervision tasks due toproject workload. Indeed, by the second half of 2008, the MAP should only need one adviserfor the entire project.5.2.2 Field technical adviceExpatriate technical assistance has developed the capacity of the regional offices to a highstandard. However, work needs to be undertaken to develop the higher analytical skills of theAMAO, and also to split the field coverage of the Vavuniya office to improve the quality ofservice provided to the Eastern provinces. This will need a short term surge of temporaryassistance. By 2007, it is forecast that field TAs should only need to provide part-timeassistance to each district, with the possible exception of Kilinochchi which may need a moreconstant monitoring presence.
  28. 28. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 29/515.2.3 Mechanisms for providing short term assistanceThere are a number of specialists to provide such short term assistance. These include: Use of personnel recruited by UNDP under a Special Services Agreement (SSA). Thismethod is comparatively quick and is easily administered by the UNDP Country Office. Use of personnel provided by donor funding. For example, the European Commission hasframework contracts specifically designed to allow the provision of such advice, such as“Lot 7” and “Lot13.” This has the advantage of being a separate funding stream, but thenegotiation of such processes can be comparatively slow when compared with the UNDP. Use of a local implementing partner to recruit and provide consultants. It may appropriateto subcontract the provision of consultants via a local partner, such as the newly-formeddemining NGO named “DASH.” The UNDP project staff could work with such animplementing partner to ensure that the correct caliber of personnel is selected. Thismethod is unlikely to be any cheaper than the SSA model, especially taking themanagement fee of the local agent into account, but it may be more politically expedientand thus reduce delays that are apparently caused by the approval process. Given theshort time frame of the project, being able to minimize such delays could be significant.5.2.4 Capacity development through short term skills workshopsMany of these could be dealt with in short term skills research missions and workshops. Theskills issues include: Development of an analytical approach to use of Post Clearance Impact Survey Data inrefining priority setting Potential for community based marking approaches to delineating hazardous areas thatwill be left uncleared in the immediate future Coordinated approach to setting GPS to ensure consistent readings Use of economic cost benefit analysis techniques to assess the size of the contaminationproblem
  29. 29. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 30/516. ConclusionThe year 2005 was the best on record for mine clearance in Sri Lanka. This year, 2006, maynot even reach the levels of 2003, which the UNDP project began. And yet, this is not areflection of the efficacy of either the Government‟s Programme or the UNDP‟s supportproject. At this uncertain stage in the political process, the UNDP should continue with itsTechnical Survey of suspected areas in order to assess the further need for demining. As thesurvey will take a year, it ensures an important role for the UNDP until the end of 2007.Whether mine clearance activity continues apace or not, a final capacity building effort willneed to be made in the last year of the project, in 2008. In the best case scenario, mineclearance activities will continue, the survey will clarify what remains to be done, and thenational and district mine action offices will have the capacity to carry on their monitoring,QA and PCIS work without the direct assistance of the UNDP and its Technical Advisers.Any future mine clearance, including the high risk areas as they are released, can be handledby the civilian deminers trained by each agency, the HDU and the SLA members trained byRONCO and intended to work for the Ministry of NBD as civilian deminers.To be determined is how the IMSMA database will be managed. For now, donors prefer theimpartiality of the UNDP in maintaining such sensitive information. In future, theGovernment survey department may want to incorporate its information into their land usedata.The key findings with regard to the future of the Project can be summarized as follows: Now that NSCMA is successfully functioning, the Project should encourage theMinistry to hire a technical officer to start up the national Mine Action office, so that theProject TAs can share with them the skills and management capacity building that theyperform in the field. This Office should be ready to take over by the end of 2008. Continue the project-based approach to leave behind a suitable capacity that thegovernment can sustain as it carries out residual functions after the „mine impact free‟ endstate is achieved. This means expansion of trained staff to provide full coverage of activitiesin areas of the North and East. Testing sustainability can be tried with the Jaffna office as thatTA spends more time in Kilinochchi. Assist demining agencies through a technical survey to assess remaining needs as theGovernment Programme moves towards a quantified end state acceptable to all stakeholders. Use short term technical assistance (in refinement of QA, PCIS, IMSMA) to providespecific skills inputs necessary to address particular shortfalls identified in the project. Fieldoffices in Kilinochchi and Trincomalee need most attention; the operations officer inVavuniya needs correction or replacement, along with short-term TA oversight for the entireoffice. However, all field offices will need some protection and intervention by internationalstaff who can act with neutrality and authority in difficult situations. Continue the role of independent monitoring, but at a size necessary to make thisprocess viable, using other sources of personnel apart from UNDP if necessary. Conduct appropriate risk management planning activities Reduce the project size at a rate commensurate with the remaining activity.
  30. 30. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 31/51The aim of this UNDP Project is to develop local and national capabilities to implement andmanage effective mine action activities that are targeted to the resettlement andreconstruction goals of the country. That requires a national Mine Action Office that canfunction with minimal external support. If it can achieve a consensus on these futureactivities with the Ministry and NSCMA, the UNDP should continue to support the mineaction program until 2008.7. AppendicesA. Evaluation MethodologyQualitative Methods Review of project documentation, including, quarterly reports and evaluations Review of mine clearance documentation, including contracts, report andprioritization and impact data Interviews with key informant members of the UNDP Mine Action Project, theUNDP Country Office, the Ministry of Nation Building and Development,Government Agents, donors. other UN and international agencies, and implementingpartners. Individual and group meetings with UNDP field office staff Semi-structured interviews with NGOs involved in project implementation Direct observation of projects Oral presentation of draft report to stakeholders for feedbackUNDP project documentation was extensive. Key informant interviews lasted about an hour.Field visits were generally made with the NGO implementing partner, who demonstratedtheir demining methodology and the variety of sites. At each visit to a UNDP field office andimplementing partner field site we were given a briefing on the scope of activities andproblems faced. The problems were noted and checked against other sites to identifyrecurring issues.As this evaluation took place in a time of renewed conflict and during breaks in the deminingcycle, some sites had suspended operations. Nonetheless, we were able to observe a varietyof different methods and terrains and compare the operations of different demining agencies.In order to triangulate data sources and assess the value of the UNDP support to demining,we spoke with other donors and international agencies. Members of the NGO or UN officeaccompanying me served as translator. UNDP program managers joined one field visit.A key limitation to the evaluation was lack of access to returnees and other beneficiaries,mostly because of time constraints. We did visit a Halo Trust site in Jaffna that was veryclose to a village and spoke with residents there, and we spoke with people at a WelfareCenter in Trincomalee who were soon to be resettled. As the evaluation focused on theUNDP Project and not the Government Programme, assessment of whether the prioritizationprocess tasked sites that provided the most benefit for resettlement was beyond the scope ofthis study.
  31. 31. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 32/51In meetings with the Government Agents, local NGO implementing partners andbeneficiaries, our National Consultant, Mr. Edward, served as out interpreter.Quantitative MethodsThe QA staff conducted some field PCIS interviews with beneficiaries seeking basicinformation about whether they had returned home or otherwise benefited from the deminingprocess, and their means of livelihood.It was difficult to draw patterns from these surveys as much of the information wasincomplete or filled out by a third party with limited knowledge. Many of the PCIS had beenfilled out with knowledge from the Divisional Secretary, which led to repetitive andincomplete answers. As this survey process is in its early stages, but due to be made in six-month intervals, much remains to be discovered about the direct and indirect benefits ofdemining.Time constraints prevented us from consulting IMSMA data on MRE, which constitutes thelargest number of entries in the system. We did find some records of QA visits to MREwhile in the field office of Vavuniya. Ironically, the MRE session visited while we werethere by a QA team was interrupted by SLA officers who asked for help with checking thenearby road for Claymore “mines”.B. Interviews and MeetingsUNDP Country OfficeMiguel Bermeo, United Nations Resident CoordinatorBeate Trankmann, Deputy Resident RepresentativeKerstin Eppert, Programme AnalystChip Bowness, Asia Region Land Mine Action AdviserNishanie Jayamaha, National Liaison Officer, UN Humanitarian Information CenterUNDP Mine Action OfficesTim Horner, Technical Advisor, ColomboKrishanti Weerakoon, Mine Action OfficerMing Yu Hah, Communications AdvisorVartharajah Murugathas, IMSMA OfficerDhanushka Jayamaha, IMSMA AssistantGraeme Abernethy, Technical Advisor, JaffnaElmo Anandarajah, Mine Action Officer, JaffnaS. Denison Latheeskaran, Operations Officer, JaffnaEzthileri Nadarajah, Operations Assistant, JaffnaM.L. Ketheeswaran, QA Team Leader, JaffnaBaktharishikesh, IMSMA, JaffnaJena, RMAO Director,KilinochchiGeorge Kumar, Mine Action Officer, VavuniyaGogulan Sewsnthinathan, IMSMA Assistant,VavuniyaM. Shiyam, PCIS, VavuniyaSingarayar Antony Reginols Vaz, QA Inspector, VavuniyaDamian Bonifass, QA Inspector, VavuniyaGovernment OfficialsM.S. Jayasinghe, Secretary, Ministry of Nation Building and Development, and Chairman ofNSCMA
  32. 32. UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka ProjectImpact and Performance Assessment, June 2006DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 33/51Dr. A.S. Kunasingham, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of NBD and Secretary of NSCMAJ.H.J. Jayamaha, Additional Director General, Dept. of External Resources, Ministry ofFinanceS.D. Ranasinghe, Deputy Director, Dept of External Resources, Ministry of Finance andPlanningBrigadier ADGA Jayawardane, RSP IG, Director Operations, Sri Lankan ArmyB.J.P.Mendis, Surveyor GeneralMrs. Shyamalie Perara, Superintendent of Surveys, GIS, Surveyor General‟s OfficeMr..Ganesh, Government Agenct, JaffnaMajor Pradeep, SLA, JaffnaLt. Indoka Athigoli, SLA, JaffnaT. Rasanayagam, Government Agent, KilinochchiS. Shanmugam, Government Agent, VavuniyaK.G. Leelananda, Government Agent,TrincomaleeDemining and Development AgenciesStephen Pritchard, Programme Manager, The HALO TrustDavid Elliott, Operations Manager, The HALO TrustMagnus Johansson, Technical Advisor, Danish Demining GroupN. Sivanathan, Administrative Secretary, Jaffna Jaipur CenterS. Sathiendra, Coord. RFA, Jaipur CenterS. Sri Shanmura ,MRE Coordinator, Sarvodaya, JaffnaS. Sritharan, Administrative Officer, Sarvodaya, JaffnaN.K. Kumar, Coordinator, White Pidgeon, JaffnaSithanparanathan, Family Rehabilitation Center, JaffnaMahen, Save the Children, JaffnaCharles Frisby, Project Manager, Norwegian People‟s Aid, KilinochchiLuke Atkinson, Programme Manager, Norwegian People‟s AidUthayan, DPS Room Manager, HDU, KilinochchiMaj. S.L. Parjapati, Sarvatra Technical ConsultantsBrig. S.S. Brar, Sarvatra Technical ConsultantsDaniel Jean, Programme Manager, Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)Fredrik Palsson, Chief of Party, RONCO Consulting CorporationBrig. Ananda Chandrasiri, Director, Delvon Assistance for Social Harmony (DASH)Lt. Col. Deepal Subasinghe, CEO, DELVON ComputersM.S. Ireneuss, Director, Secretariat for Immediate Humanitarian and RehabilitationNeeds in the North and East(SIHRN)V. Balakumaa, Planning and Development Secretariat, KilinochchiLaurence Christy, Director, Planning Division, Tamils Rehabilitation OrganisationS.C.S. Chithambaronathan, District Coordinator, Family Rehabilitation CentreAllen Jelich, Country Representative, Danish Refugee CouncilUN AgenciesEric Debert, Child Protection Officer-Mine Action, UNICEF ColomboS. Sivanesasingam, Project Assistant-Mine Action, UNICEF JaffnaJudith Bruno, UNICEF, JaffnaT. Umesh, Project Assistant-Mine Action, UNICEF KilinochchiHakim, UNICEF,VavuniyaAxel Bishop, Programme Officer, UNHCR Colombo(by phone)Edward Benson, Acting Head of Field Office, UNHCR JaffnaMarin Din Kajdomcaj, Head of Field Office, UNHCR KilinochchiMireille Girard, Head of Sub-Office, UNHCR VavuniyaIrene Flueckiger, Head of Sub Delegation, ICRC Jaffna

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