Fatal Footprint: The global Human Impact on Clustermunition
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Fatal Footprint: The global Human Impact on Clustermunition Fatal Footprint: The global Human Impact on Clustermunition Document Transcript

  • Fatal Footprint:The Global Human Impactof Cluster Munitions Preliminary Report, November 2006 Handicap International
  • Table of ContentsTable of Contents 2 Conclusion 41 LESSON 1:Acknowledgments 5 Data Collection, the Devil is in the Detail 41 LESSON 2:Abbreviations and Acronyms 6 Cluster Munitions Cause DisproportionateIntroduction 7 Long-Term Civilian Harm 42 LESSON 3:Methodology and Research Team 9 Cluster Submunitions Casualties are Young Males at Work 43Focus: Southeast Asia 11 LESSON 4: Immediate and Comprehensive Clearance CAMBODIA 11 Reduces Civilian Casualties 43 LAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 13 VIETNAM 15 TablesFocus: Africa 17 TABLE 1: Confirmed Cluster Submunitions CHAD 17 Casualties in Affected Countries 44 ERITREA 18 TABLE 2: Status of Casualty Data Collection ETHIOPIA 18 in Cluster Submunitions Affected Countries 45 SIERRA LEONE 19 SUDAN 19 Selected Biography 46Focus: Southeast Europe 21 Notes 48 ALBANIA 21 BOSNIA and HERZEGOVINA 22 CROATIA 22 KOSOVO 23 MONTENEGRO 26 SERBIA 26Focus:Commonwealth of Independent States 27 CHECHNYA/RUSSIAN FEDERATION 27 TAJIKISTAN 27Focus: Greater Middle East andNorth Africa Region 29 AFGHANISTAN 29 IRAQ 31 KUWAIT 34 LEBANON 34 SAUDI ARABIA 38 SYRIA 38 WESTERN SAHARA/MOROCCO 38 Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munition / 3
  • Acknowledgments his preliminary report was conducted, Action Center (CROMAC), Clear PathT written and produced by Handicap International, with the financial supportof the Government of Norway. International (CPI), HIB-Cambodia, Julien Temple, Reuben Nogueria-McCarthy and Edith Karam from UNICEF, the Iraqi Health and Social Care Organization (IHSCO), John C. Brown from Handicap International (HI) would like to VVAF Iraq, Landmine Action UK (LMA UK), theexpress its appreciation to the many mine Landmine Resource Center staff (LMRC), theaction organizations, organizations working National Demining Office (NDO) and the UNwith people with disabilities, disabled people’s Mine Action Coordination Center for Southorganizations and the other individuals and Lebanon (MACC-SL) in Lebanon, Mines Advisoryorganizations that provided information, time, Group Iraq (MAG), the National Authority forresources and expertise for this study. Prosthetics and Orthotics (NAPO) and the UN HI owes special thanks to the cluster sub- Mine Action Office in Sudan (UNMAO), themunitions and other mine/ERW survivors, fami- National Demining Office in Chad (HCND), thelies and communities who shared their experi- Office of the Kosovo Protection Corpsence. Coordinator (OKPCC) EOD Management Unit, Rosy Cave at the United Nations Institute for The team values the support of the Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), Steve Goose,International Campaign to Ban Mark Hiznay and Bonnie Docherty at HumanLandmines/Landmine Monitor and the Cluster Rights Watch (HRW), UN Mission in EthiopiaMunition Coalition networks. and Eritrea Mine Action Coordination Centre It would also like to thank the following (UNMEE MACC) and Zamanuddin Noori andorganizations and individuals for their assis- Olivier Moeckli of the International Committeetance: Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE), of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Afghanistan, as wellAndrew Wells-Dang and Catholic Relief Services as several people who provided anonymous(CRS) Vietnam, Cambodia Mine UXO Victim information.Information System (CMVIS), Croatian Mine Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munition / 5
  • Abbreviations and AcronymsAMAE Albanian Mine Action Executive MAC-MACC Mine Action Center/Mine ActionAO Aviatsionnaya Oskolochnyang Cell - Mine Action Coordination (Aviation Fragmentation) CentreARCS Afghan Red Crescent Society MAG Mines Advisory GroupBHMAC Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine MCC Mennonite Central Committee Action Center MRE Mine Risk EducationBLU Bomb Live Unit NATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationCBU Cluster Bomb Unit NDO National Demining OfficeCBR Community-Based Rehabilitation NGO Non-Governmental OrganizationCCW Convention on Certain NMAA National Mine Action Authority Conventional Weapons NRA National Regulatory AuthorityCEM Combined Effects Munition OKPCC Office of Kosovo Protection CorpsCMC Cluster Munition Coalition CoordinatorCMVIS Cambodia Mine UXO Victim PTAB Protivotankovaya Aviatsionnaya Information System Bomba (Anti-tank Aviation Bomb)CPI Clear Path International TMAC Tajik Mine Action CellCROMAC Croatian Mine Action Center UN United NationsDispenser Container or bomb from which UNDP United Nations Development submunitions are ejected ProgrammeDPICM Dual-Purpose Improved UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund Conventional Munitions UNIDIR United Nations Institute forEOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal Disarmament ResearchERW Explosive Remnants of War UNMACA UN Mine Action Center forFootprint Extent of surface area covered by a Afghanistan cluster munitions strike UNMIK United Nations Mission in KosovoGICHD Geneva International Centre for UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Humanitarian Demining ServicesHI Handicap International UNMAO United Nations Mine Action OfficeHRW Human Rights Watch UNMEE United Nations Mission in EthiopiaICBL International Campaign to Ban and Eritrea Landmines UXO Unexploded OrdnanceICRC International Committee of the VVAF Vietnam Veterans of America Red Cross FoundationIDP Internally Displaced PersonIHSCO Iraqi Health and Social Care OrganizationIMSMA Information Management System for Mine ActionKISR Kuwait Institute for Scientific ResearchLMA UK Landmine Action UKLIS Landmine Impact Survey 6 / Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions
  • IntroductionT he July-August 2006 Lebanon conflict to ensure success, creating wider and overlap- drew widespread attention to the long- ping contamination. Within the footprint, sub- term impact of cluster munitions on civil- munitions indiscriminately kill and injure mili-ian populations. Calls for a ban of this indis- tary targets and civilians.criminate weapon are becoming louder. Onecountry – Belgium – has already taken this step, Even when accepting the low official failureadopting legislation supported by Handicap rates of optimal test conditions, large numbersInternational, and initiatives are underway in at of submunitions fail to explode upon impact. Inleast eight other countries. reality, failure rates are often significantly high- er due to soil and weather conditions, as well asAs in the case of Lebanon, previous usage of incorrect delivery and frequent malfunctioningcluster munitions has sparked eloquent verbal of self-destruct and self-neutralization mecha-condemnations and has been at the forefront of nisms, as was seen in Lebanon. Consequently,intermittent international interest and activism a fatal footprint remains until all deadly debrissince the first extensive utilization in South- is cleared and the actual strike is only the start-east Asia in the 1960-70s. Since then – like the ing point of the long-lasting harm the weaponitems themselves – the issue of cluster muni- can cause.tions and their impact lay largely dormant untilthe outbreak of the Balkan and Gulf conflicts. Yet, unlike the initial blasts, the effects of unex-However, for more than 30 years, states failed ploded submunitions do seem more discrimi-to address the lasting humanitarian impact of nate; affecting many more civilians than mili-cluster munitions. tary personnel, killing and injuring children at play, families returning after war and youngMore than half a century has passed since the men and women in the course of their dailydesign and first use of cluster munitions. lives, as well as those clearing failed submuni-Ensuing decades have seen both the number of tions and peacekeepers.casualties mount, and the use of these muni-tions proliferate. Spreading through new con- Unlike many instances of production, stockpil-flicts to destroy lives, disrupt communities, and ing and combat use, the human impact duringdeny vulnerable populations’ access to and after the conflict have not been routinelyresources needed for economic recovery, clus- recorded nor publicized. As a result, the fullter munitions simultaneously assure both a scope of the problem is largely unknown andcostly and lethal legacy of war for post-conflict undervalued.generations. Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact ofCluster munitions are imprecise weapons, Cluster Munitions is an unprecedented prelimi-designed to strike a greater surface area than nary effort to document the impact of clustermany other conventional weapons by dispers- munitions on the lives of people in 23 countriesing smaller yet highly lethal explosive submuni- and areas that are not internationally recog-tions. The cluster submunitions scattered on nized, which are confirmed to be affected bythe surface create a ‘footprint’. The footprint of cluster munitions. Despite its preliminary char-a single cluster munitions strike is often hun- acter, this report is the first comprehensivedreds of meters wide, and more than 1,000 sub- study systematically analyzing the impact ofmunitions can be dispensed at a time. cluster munitions on civilian populationsOftentimes, targets are struck more than once through casualty data. It utilizes the limited Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munition / 7
  • information available on casualties of clustersubmunitions to track the human impact fromthe initial cluster munitions strikes, over theshort-term post-strike emergency phase, to thepost-conflict period, which can affect the livesof individuals, families and communities forgenerations. By identifying which peoplebecome casualties, when, how and why, theresearch goes beyond simply assessingwhether cluster munitions are indiscriminateand excessively injurious.Fatal Footprint is part of an ongoing project thatseeks to improve understanding of the impactof cluster munitions by documenting short-,mid- and long-term casualties, cumulativeeffects of disability, mortality and resourcedenial on families and communities. It also pro-vides insight into the items and activities pos-ing the greatest threats in affected areas. Thiswork has been made possible with the supportof the Government of Norway, which has alsotaken a lead and pledged to work towards aninternational ban on cluster bombs.At the international level, the Third ReviewConference of the Convention on Prohibitions orRestrictions on the Use of Certain ConventionalWeapons, to be held from 6 to 17 November2006, provides a unique opportunity forMember States to acknowledge and tackle thelasting human impact of cluster munitions andhasten the establishment of a legally bindinginstrument on these weapons. Brussels, 2 November 2006 8 / Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions
  • Methodology and Research Team ResearchTteam andicap International has utilized its field Initial inquiries clearly indicated the needH and research experience in the area of victim assistance and data collection to provide a better understanding of theconsequences of cluster munitions use on peo- to analyze data of all casualties caused by clus- ter submunitions, including both those people killed and injured as a result of cluster muni- tions strikes and people involved in incidentsple in 23 contaminated countries and areas not resulting from submunitions as remnants ofinternationally recognized. war. The report takes a regional approach, The study outline and preparations start-comprising individual country profiles, while ed in April 2006 and the research resulting intaking into account both the wider regional and this preliminary report was conducted fromhistorical context and country-specific charac- mid-July to mid-October 2006 by a team ofteristics of cluster munitions used. A few researchers, information providers and expertsselected cases of cluster munitions use and with experience in mine action, mine victimsubsequent human impact have been elaborat- assistance, data collection and post-conflicted for their relevance with regard to the scale of societies. A final report is scheduled to appearcontamination, historical and contemporary in 2007 as part of a larger project.significance, as well as various ways of dealingwith and recording post-strike impact. The Initially, background information on clus-research has been divided into five regions: ter munitions use, technical specifications, asAfrica, the Commonwealth of Independent well as existing published information on clus-States, the Greater Middle East and North Africa ter submunitions casualties was compiled inRegion, Southeast Asia, and Southeastern one place and studied. Following that, a broadEurope. Three countries in the Southeast Asia range of research methods, including analysisregion, three countries in the Greater Middle of publications, email, telephone and face-to-East and North Africa Region, and Kosovo were face interviews (at international forums) werechosen as key cases for their geographical, his- used. A data gathering and management sys-torical and contamination diversity and paral- tem was developed to store, streamline andlels. correlate casualty data, strike data and techni- Each country profile contains a short cal specifications. In addition, a field trip tobackground section explaining cluster muni- Lebanon was undertaken from 30 August to 10tions use and contamination to describe the September in order to conduct first-handpotential extent of unexploded cluster submu- research. Information from anterior field tripsnitions pollution. Secondly, the availability and to, among others, Cambodia (April 2006),completeness of casualty data and injury sur- Kosovo (October 2005), and Afghanistanveillance mechanisms are assessed in order to (August 2006) was also included. One teamdefine the scope of underreporting. Thirdly, member is based in Vietnam and experienceavailable casualty data are presented and ana- and resources within the Cluster Munitionlyzed to the fullest extent possible to draw a Coalition and the International Campaign tocasualty profile to be used in assistance plan- Ban Landmines were employed.ning and to be taken into account when consid- Tailor-made queries were drawn up for rel-ering the unwanted effects of cluster munitions evant experts and information providers sup-use. A selection of survivor testimonies is plying both casualty data and correlating strikeincluded to show the human face of cluster sub- data. The results of these enquiries, as well asmunitions casualties. other responses, were compiled, standardized, Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munition / 9
  • crosschecked and analyzed. Where necessary, Research Teamqueries were refined and missing data was pur- • Habbouba Aoun (Coordinator, Landminesued by consulting known sources to obtain the Resource Center, Balamand University,most complete information possible. The study Beirut, Lebanon) was co-researcher for theemployed quantitative analysis of the statistical Lebanon country profile and facilitated thedata available from existing data collection sys- field mission to Lebanon.tems. The researchers extracted information on • Stan Brabant (Head, Policy Unit, Handicapspecific numbers of casualties, age, gender, International, Brussels, Belgium) assisted ingroups most at risk, time, location, activity and many aspects of the report’s production andnature of the incident, for each country profile. development, and together with Katleen The study aims to detail the human impact Maes and Hugh Hosman developed theand the scope of the problem to increase the vision of the study and defined the researchpossibilities for improved, more effective and methodology.varied assistance for the victims, i.e. the affect- • Patricia Campbell (Victim Assistanceed individual, his or her family and affected Specialist, HI-Landmine Monitor, Maputo,communities. Handicap International sections, Mozambique) conducted backgroundin partnership with other civil society groups in research on various countries and issues.relevant European and cluster munitions-affect-ed countries, will disseminate the Fatal • Hugh Hosman (Data ManagementFootprint study to provide systematic informa- Specialist, HI, Hue, Vietnam) conductedtion and to support others in preventing similar research on Southeast Asia, theincident from occurring in the future. Commonwealth of Independent States, sev- eral Balkan countries and was in charge of By looking at data collection mechanisms data management, as well as study concep-and examining the degree to which they are tion.systematic and effective and how comprehen-sive the resulting data is, Fatal Footprint identi- • Katleen Maes (Victim Assistancefied areas where information collection and Coordinator, HI, Brussels) conducteddatabase resources are in need of support. research on Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon and was in charge of general coordination and final editing of the report, as well as At the preliminary report stage, the Fatal study conception.Footprint study has already compiled the most • Loren Persi (Specialist Researcher, HI,comprehensive publicly available data on Prague, Czech Republic) conducted researchcasualties of cluster submunitions. But the on Kosovo, Africa and several countries inauthors acknowledge required information is the Greater Middle East and North Africamissing. They call on relevant sources to pro- Region.vide casualty and strike data in their posses-sion so that the humanitarian needs generated • Yolande Hoornaert and Hildegardeby cluster munitions can be addressed more Vansintjan (HI Communications Departmentadequately. and Policy Unit) facilitated the printing and distribution process. 10 / Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions
  • Focus: Southeast Asia The Second Indochina War, which began resulting in an estimated post-strike contam-in Vietnam, was characterized by high levels of ination of 1.92 to 5.77 million submunitions.US aerial bombardment, which spread to theneighboring countries of Cambodia and the Lao Use Background and ContaminationPeople’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR).Subsequently, all three countries face varying The US used cluster munitions indegrees of post-conflict cluster submunitions Cambodia from 1969-1973 in an attempt tocasualties and contamination. interdict the flow of supplies on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, as well as Vietnamese regular and irregu- lar forces operating from eastern Cambodia.1 The number of cluster munitions strikes is esti- mated at 17,235.2 Air-delivered submunitionsCAMBODIA used include: BLU-3, 18, 24/66, 26/36/59, 49, Confirmed Casualties: 1998 – 2006 61, 63/86, and 77, and M28. Of an estimated total of 19.23 million submunitions dispensed, Total Strike Post- Post- the BLU-26 was the most common at nearly 54 Strike Conflict percent (10.37 million units), followed by the Grand Total 120 N/A N/A 120 BLU-24 at 20 percent (3.93 million units) and Injured 91 91 the BLU-61 and 63 at 17 percent (3.3 million Killed 29 29 units)3. Unknown Status 0 0 Submunitions manufacturers of the peri- Man 43 43 od estimated a 10 percent failure rate, “but it is Woman 12 12 now generally agreed that the actual rate was Boy 56 56 approximately 30 percent because the ord- Girl 9 9 nance was often not dropped in accordance with manufacturers’ specifications.”4 Accepting Military 0 0 a low failure rate of 10 percent, at least 1.92 mil- Deminer 0 0 lion submunitions became ERW. However, Unknown 0 0 using the higher rate of 30 percent, initial con- Dominant Activity Handling submunitions (70) tamination could be as high as 5.77 million sub- Dominant Location Livelihood areas (67) munitions. In optimal condition testing at Nellis Air Force Base in 1966, BLU-26 submunitions had a 26 percent failure rate after deployment.5Key Findings But given tree canopy and soil conditions in• Differentiation of ERW type casualties, eastern Cambodia, the failure rate was likely at including those caused by cluster submuni- least 30 percent resulting in 3.11 million unex- tions, started in September 2006. The exer- ploded BLU-26s. cise has, so far, confirmed 120 cluster sub- munitions casualties (29 killed and 91 Data Collection injured). Data collection is considered nearly com-• The total number of cluster submunitions plete in Cambodia and the Cambodia Mine UXO casualties is unknown, as complete informa- Victim Information System (CMVIS) is the defin- tion on strike, post-strike and post-conflict itive source of landmine/ERW casualty data,6 casualties is not available. containing records on over 62,556 casualties• From 1969-1973 the United States used a collected through the Cambodian Red Cross wide range of BLU cluster submunitions network and mine action operators.7 Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munition / 11
  • In 2005, CMVIS developed a new data col- to 24, encountered a submunition in a rice lection form for differentiating ERW types, paddy: the girl was killed and the rest were including cluster submunitions, among land- injured. mine/ERW casualties. In September 2006, a final review process of the new form was under- Conflict/Post-Conflict Comparison way to expand the differentiation process All confirmed submunitions casualties through training of data collection imple- reported are post-conflict: while specific infor- menters.8 mation on civilian and military casualties during the conflict is not available, estimates range Casualties and Analysis9 from as low as 30,000 to as high as 500,000 A CMVIS pilot project resulted in detailed Cambodians killed during the US bombing cam- records for 120 cluster submunitions casualties paigns: how many of these were due to cluster in 64 incidents: 29 killed and 91 injured in 18 munitions will likely never be known.11 provinces of Cambodia10 and dated from 1998 to© Handicap International 2006. Analysis of available data shows that Comparison with Post-Conflict Casualties males are most at risk: 83 percent (99 casual- Attributed to Mines and ERW ties) were male; men accounted for 36 percent (43: 16 killed and 27 injured) and boys under 18 There was insufficient data with differenti- for 47 percent (56: 10 killed and 46 injured), ation of ERW item type to permit extensive com- respectively, of all cluster submunitions casual- parison of trends among landmine and cluster ties. Boys were 86 percent of child casualties; submunitions casualties. However, a random only nine were girls (one killed and eight sample of 120 landmine casualties showed a injured). Twelve casualties were women (two total of 104 incidents, as opposed to 64 for clus- killed and 10 injured). ter submunitions.12 Further analysis of the sam- ple showed that only 42.5 percent of casualties On average 1.8 persons were involved per (51) occurred in livelihood areas and seven per- incident. However, 18 percent of total incidents cent (eight) in villages. Handling a landmine involved three or more people and accounted accounted for only nine percent (11) of land- for 39 percent of total cluster submunitions mine casualties. On average 1.2 people were casualties. involved per incident. Only three percent The most common incident activity was (three) of total landmine incidents involved handling submunitions at 58 percent of all three or more people, and these accounted for casualties (70), followed by “doing nothing” at only nine percent (11) of landmine casualties. 26 percent (31), and then livelihood activities at 13 percent (16). The most common incident locations were livelihood areas (such as rice fields and forests, etc.) at 56 percent (67), in vil- Life Experience lages at 25 percent (30), and along roads at In 2005, Choen Ha and two other boys 12.5 percent (15). Handling cluster submuni- were playing near their village in Kampong tions in livelihood areas accounted for 37 per- Speu province when they found four steel cent (44) of all reported casualties. The worst balls. Each took a turn throwing them, of these incidents occurred on 1 April 2003, in playing ‘marbles’. They did not know that the village of Chuuk (Krouch Chhmar District, the balls were BLU-63s, or that they were Kampong Cham province), when two men, two dangerous. When the third boy’s turn women, a boy, and a girl, ranging in age from 17 came, he struck his mark and one of the items exploded. One boy died of massive abdominal injuries from the shrapnel, while the two other boys were injured. Ha was 17 at the time of the incident near Rol An Beng village and did not finish school. To pay for medical treatment his family spent their entire life savings. There are eight in his family and Ha is the third of six children (four boys and two girls): they are all “angry against the Americans” and during the interview © Handicap International called for clearance, destruction of stock- piles, and a ban on the production of clus- ter munitions.13 12 / Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions
  • LAO PEOPLE’S likely 30 percent failure rate. Cluster submuni- tions accounted for 46 percent (319,379 items)DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC of all ERW located and destroyed by UXO Lao from 1996 to December 2005.20 Confirmed Casualties: 1973 – 2006 In August and September 1995, a US mili- Total Strike Post- Post- tary team visited Lao to examine demining/ Strike Conflict ERW clearance options and made the following Grand Total 4,813 N/A N/A 4,813 assessment: “Submunitions consist of three Injured 2,165 2,165 types: impact fused, time delay fused, and anti- Killed 2,521 2,521 disturbance fused… [b]ecause there is no way Unknown Status 127 127 to determine the type of fuse… they must all be Man 2,257 2,257 treated as anti-disturbance devices. US doc- Woman 470 470 trine considers all areas littered with submuni- tions… as minefields.”21 Boy 1,654 1,654 Girl 275 275 Military 0 0 Data Collection Deminer 0 0 Data collection is incomplete, since Lao Unknown 157 157 has no nationwide data collection or injury sur- veillance system. However, the National Dominant Livelihood (2,674), tampering Activities (809), playing with ERW (571) Regulatory Authority (NRA) has as part of its mandate to develop and maintain a national Dominant Livelihood areas (2,761), Locations in villages (1,188) casualty surveillance system and has begun the process.22 The Handicap International (HI) impactKey Findings survey and UXO Lao are the primary sources of• Forty-two percent of incidents involve sub- ERW casualty data and together provided indi- munitions, leading to at least 4,813 con- vidual records on 11,410 post-conflict casual- firmed cluster submunitions casualties. ties. Within this total, the HI survey data holds 10,639 detailed records, and an additional• All recorded casualties are civilians – with 57 1,279 who were not interviewed for a total of percent resulting from livelihood activities. 11,918 reported casualties.23 UXO Lao, which• From 1964-1973 the United States used a receives reports of new casualties but does not wide range of BLU submunitions resulting in actively collect data, has records on 870 an estimated contamination of 20.9 to 62.6 mine/ERW casualties (260 killed and 610 million submunitions. injured) from 1999 to December 2005,24 though records for only 771 detailed records were avail-Use Background and Contamination able. Cluster munitions were used in vast quan- All data sources in Lao differentiate ERWtities by the US from 1964 to 1973 in an attempt item types: for example, in the HI survey thereto interdict the flow of supplies on the Ho Chi were only 12 percent of items reported asMinh Trail in southern Lao, and in support of ‘unknown’ and the UXO Lao data generallyRoyal Lao Government military campaigns in specifies the BLU type encountered.the north, during the conflict with Vietnam.14Air-delivered submunitions used include: BLU- Casualties and Analysis3, 7, 18, 24/66, 26/36/59, 42/54, 43, 44, 45, 61,63, 66, 73, and Mk 118.15 The most common In total, 4,813 cluster submunitions casu-submunitions encountered are the BLU-3, 24, alties were reported from 1973 to 2006: 2,52126, 42, 61, and 63.16 Of the approximately killed, 2,165 injured, and 127 whose status was208.75 million submunitions dispensed, the unknown.25 This is 42 percent of the total 11,410BLU-26 was the most common at 76 percent casualties with detailed records. Therefore,(158.79 million units), followed by the Mk 118 at based on the extrapolation of an average rate ofsix percent (13.18 million).18 42 percent cluster submunitions casualties among the 1,279 reported casualties lacking Accepting low and high failure rates of 10 detailed records, there are likely at least 537and 30 percent, respectively, between 20.9 and additional cluster submunitions casualties.62.6 million cluster submunitions became ERW. This leads to an estimated total of 5,350 clusterWith a failure rate of 26 percent in optimal con- submunitions casualties.dition testing,19 there were at least 41.3 millionunexploded BLU-26s alone remaining at the Analysis of available data for 4,656 clusterend of the war, and 47.6 million given a more submunitions casualties (excluding 157 casual- Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munition / 13
  • ties for whom not all the required details were are estimated from 200 to 400, so it is likely recorded) shows that males are most at risk and that between 80 (at 42 percent) and 200 (at 51 accounted for 84 percent (3,911) of all cluster percent) per year are cluster submunitions submunitions casualties, with men represent- casualties.30 ing 48 percent (2,257) and boys 36 percent In the HI national survey, 49 percent of (1,654), respectively. Boys make up nearly 86 10,639 casualties with detailed records indicat- percent of child casualties (1,929). Women ed that more than one person was involved in accounted for 10 percent (470) and girls for six the incident (5,168). Cluster submunitions percent (275) of the total. accounted for 43 percent (2,229) of multiple The most common incident activities were casualty incidents, with all other ERW combined related to livelihood (digging, planting, harvest- at 47 percent (2,442), and mines at 10 percent© Handicap International ing, collecting forest products and cooking) at (497).31 57 percent (2,674), followed by tampering at 17 Cluster submunitions alone accounted for percent (809), and then playing with ERW at 12 40 percent (1,815) of 4,525 of those injured, and percent (571). By far the most common activi- led to the greatest proportion of multiple ties for both women and girls were livelihood injuries amongst all other casualties, with 64 areas, accounting for 71 percent (532) of a total percent (706) of 1,109 total multiple injuries. 745 female casualties; females make up 20 per- Among all survivors, 68 percent (3,060) had cent of casualties engaging in livelihood activi- amputations and three percent (143) were mul- ties. tiple amputees: cluster submunitions survivors were 40 percent (1,211) of amputees and 43 per- Locations where incidents were most like- cent (61) of multiple amputees.32 ly to occur were livelihood areas (rice fields, forests, streams, etc.) at 59 percent (2,761) and villages at 26 percent (1,188) of casualties.26 Again, by far the most common incident loca- Life Experience tion for females were livelihood areas, account- In 2003, Dam was injured near his home in ing for 57 percent (423) of all female casualties. Phalanexay district when he found and Approximately 39 percent (1,801) of cluster sub- played with a BLU-63 submunition. His munitions casualties occurred in livelihood injuries were typical of many such inci- areas and involved livelihood activities, while dents – massive abdominal trauma, tampering in livelihood areas constituted nine shrapnel wounds, as well as a leg and an percent (430) of total casualties and playing arm broken by the blast. Evacuated to with ERW four percent (209). Savannakhet he received initial treatment, and after two days seemed stable: howev- Comparison with Casualties due to er, his condition deteriorated as infection Mines/Other ERW set in. The family had no money to pay for treatment so HI decided to evacuate Dam When unknown or unidentified ERW casu- to Thailand. His father recalled that when alties are included, cluster submunitions casu- the boy was ferried across the river he alties averaged 44 percent of all casualties for thought he would never see his son alive the period 1973-1996,27 which was as much as again. all other ERW and mines together (12 percent unknown). From 1999-2005, this was an aver- Nearly 12 now, Dam was revisited by HI age of 42 percent, but in the first four months of staff in September 2006. When ques-© Handicap International 2006, it peaked to 72 percent of all recorded tioned directly about what happened he casualties.28 did not reply. His father explained that Dam does not remember the event itself – When the item type is known or differenti- instead he has recurring nightmares of the ated in data collection, cluster submunitions explosion. But he went on to say that he casualties made up at least 51 percent of casu- had returned to school and is doing well. alties between 1999 and 2006, similar to some One thing Dam did have to say was that he other affected countries in the region.29 tries to avoid ERW, but they are every- With high number of incidents involving where in the fields near the village.33 livelihood activities that disturb soil or vegeta- tion, in combination with (disturbance fuzed) munitions that have become increasingly unstable over the decades, cluster submuni- tions are the likely cause of a similar proportion of incidents where the device type is unknown. According to the NRA, annual ERW casualties 14 / Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions
  • VIETNAM was dropped on Lao, for an estimated 70.9 mil- lion.38 Accepting a low failure rate of 10 percent, Confirmed Casualties: 1973 – 2006 more than seven million submunitions became Total Strike Post- Post- ERW; however, using the higher rate of 30 per- Strike Conflict cent, initial contamination could have been 21.2 Grand Total 1,275 N/A N/A 1,275 million submunitions.39 Injured 557 557 Killed 278 278 Data Collection Unknown Status 440 440 Casualty data collection is incomplete, as Man 391 391 Vietnam has no national data collection or Woman 104 104 injury surveillance system.40 Project RENEW and Boy 278 278 Clear Path International (CPI) are the primary Girl 56 56 operational sources collecting ERW casualty data. CPI has shared its new casualty data with Military 5 5 RENEW, whose database contains records of Deminer 1 1 casualties in Quang Tri province from 1975 to Unknown 440 440 2006. However, detailed full province data was Dominant Livelihood (596) unavailable from RENEW due to a database Activities update in progress.41 In both the RENEW and Dominant Livelihood areas (602) CPI data, ERW type is differentiated if known. Location A survey was conducted in A Luoi district of Thua-Thien Hue province in 2001, which dif- ferentiated ERW types.42 In 2005, the first phaseKey Findings of a national landmine/UXO impact survey was• Total post-conflict submunitions casualties conducted in three provinces, but it is not are estimated at 34,550 to 52,350 – 1,275 known what level of detail was collected and are confirmed. the November 2005 summary report did not dif-• The vast majority of casualties are civilians ferentiate casualties per device type.43 Catholic doing livelihood activities – at least 50 per- Relief Services (CRS) conducted an MRE base- cent of incidents where the device is known line study, including casualty data in three dis- were caused by submunitions. tricts and one municipality of Quang Tri in mid- 2006.44• From 1965-1973, the United States used a wide range of BLU submunitions with an esti- mated contamination of between seven and Casualties and Analysis45 21.2 million. In total, 1,275 cluster submunitions casu- alties were recorded from 1973 to 2006: 278Use Background and Contamination killed, 557 injured, and 440 with unknown sta- Cluster munitions were used by the US tus. At least one was military clearance person-from 1965-1973 during the conflict in Vietnam. nel.46Fifty-five out of 64 provinces were struck with An analysis of available data for 835 clus-cluster munitions and a number of cities were ter submunitions casualties (excluding 440targeted, including Hai Phong, Hai Duong, unknown status casualties) shows that malesHanoi, Ho Chi Minh, and Hue.34 Air-delivered are most at risk at 81 percent (675) of all clusterdevice types used include: BLU-3, 24/66, submunitions casualties. Adult men accounted26/36/59, 32, 42/54, 43/44, 59, 61, 63/86, 77, for 48 percent (397) and boys 33 percent (278),and 87.35 Artillery-delivered cluster munitions respectively, of all reported casualties. Boyswere also used in three provinces.36 represented 82 percent of 334 child casualties. US military records show that the level of Women accounted for 12 percent (104) and girlsall air-delivered munitions in the A Luoi district for seven percent (56) of the total.of Hue province peaked in 1972 to approximate- The vast majority of casualties, i.e. 71 per-ly 120,000, which is nearly half of all ordnance cent (596), occurred during livelihood activities,dropped between 1965 and 1973 and about followed by playing at six percent (48) and col-three times the rate of 1971. Cluster munitions lecting war waste at five percent (39).also accounted for nearly half of the total muni- Livelihood activities caused 79 percent of alltions dropped on the district in the final year of female casualties (126).the war.37 Incidents in livelihood areas (rice fields, In total, 413,130 tons of submunitions grazing areas, forests, and streams) accountedwere dispensed in Vietnam, 34 percent of what for 72 percent (602) of casualties and incidents Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munition / 15
  • Conflict/Post-Conflict Comparison Given the estimate of nearly four million Vietnamese civilians and 1.5 million military personnel killed during 30 years of conflict,50 and nearly a decade of use of cluster munitions in 55 of 64 provinces, a significant portion of those casualties were certainly caused by clus- ter submunitions. However, the extent of these casualties will likely never be known. Life Experience51© Clear Path International Ho Van Lai was injured in a cluster submu- nitions incident in August 2000, which killed two cousins and slightly wounded a sibling. The boys were playing among the pine trees near their homes, where the vil- lage children often play, when they found within villages accounted for 12 percent (99). what looked like a small metal ball in the More than three quarter of female casualties sandy soil – a ball which exploded min- (122) occurred in livelihood areas. utes later as they were kicking it back and forth. Nearly 40 percent (329) of all cluster sub- munitions casualties reported that they were Lai was blinded in one eye and lost partial involved in an incident causing multiple casual- vision in the other. He lost a leg, part of ties. the remaining foot, one hand and the thumb of the other, and was terribly Comparison with Post-Conflict Casualties scarred by the blast. After his initial recov- Attributed to Mines and ERW ery, he faced three surgical revisions to be fitted for prosthetics, spending months in Submunitions caused 33 percent (1,275) recovery and rehabilitation. As with many of all recorded landmine/ERW casualties young boys, playing football was Lai’s (3,914), and accounted for 50 percent where the passion, and something he thought he item was known in available data from 1973 to would never be able to do again. 2006 for Vietnam. Between 2003 and 2005, the Eventually he returned to school and rate of casualties known to be caused by cluster some three years later was again seen submunitions was 55 percent. This corresponds playing football. closely with the rate of cluster submunitions casualties among ERW casualties generally in both Lao and Tajikistan.47 Therefore, it is likely that cluster submunitions cause a similar pro- portion of incidents where the device type is unknown. According to estimates provided by the Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs there were 104,701 civilian landmine/ERW casualties between 1975 and 2000, 38,849 peo- ple were killed and 65,852 injured.48 If cluster submunitions casualties constituted 33 to 50 percent of total recorded casualties, they could account for an estimated 34,550 to 52,350 civil- ian casualties between 1975 and 2000. Without nationwide data collection, insuf- ficient data exists to establish a reliable annual landmine/ERW casualty rate, but estimates indicate that there are between 1,200 and 3,000 © Clear Path International each year.49 Taking the low estimate into account, this could mean there are between 396 and 600 cluster munitions casualties annu- ally in Vietnam. 16 / Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions
  • Focus: Africa Cluster munitions use in Africa demon- destruction of only 157 submunitions. This isstrates that even limited use of the weapon can approximately 0.01 percent of the total ofhave a significant human impact. However, the 158,034 ERW cleared between September 2000extent of the threat of unexploded submuni- and March 2006.59tions has not been assessed and improved datacollection is needed to asses the humanitarianimpact and long-term needs of survivors. Data CollectionCHAD There is no comprehensive data collectionKey Findings mechanism in Chad. HCND reports of ERW casualties are not differentiated by type of ord-• Several locations in Chad are contaminated nance; even the distinction between mine and with cluster munitions. ERW incidents may not always be clearly• The absence of complete casualty data and recorded.60 Fatal casualties often go unreported data differentiated by item type impedes and accurate reporting of new casualties is assessment of the human impact of cluster affected by limited access to incident loca- submunitions. tions.61 The LIS for Chad did not adequately dif- ferentiate between casualties of mines andUse Background and Contamination ERW62 and no differentiation for casualties of cluster submunitions was made. Cluster munitions were used in Chad bythe Libyan army after the departure of its troopsfrom the country in mid-1987.52 The 2002Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) reports 92 sites Casualties and Analysiswith cluster munitions contamination.53Submunitions and/or their containers have HCND is not able to estimate the numberbeen found in several areas of the following of casualties related to cluster submunitionsregions of Chad: the Borkou Ennedi Tibesti due to a lack of clear incident reporting.63 The(BET) region (northeastern Chad), the Biltine International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)region (northeastern Chad), and east of does not know of cluster submunitions casual-N’Djamena.54 ties, and is not in a position to provide informa- tion about some of the areas affected by cluster Two types of submunitions have been munitions.64 Mines Advisory Group (MAG) doesfound, both of former Soviet Union (USSR) man- not have knowledge of casualties due to clusterufacture: PTAB-2.5 antivehicle submunitions submunitions in Chad.65and AO-1SCh antipersonnel submunitions.55There have also been reports of French use of Of the 339 casualties of mines and ERWcluster munitions in Chad.56 However, as of 3 recorded in the LIS, 330, or 97 percent, wereOctober 2006, mine clearance operators have civilian. The most common activity type duringnot found evidence of unexploded French sub- incidents recorded in the LIS was tampering,munitions.57 representing 121 casualties, or 36 percent, the In Chad, mines and other ERW seem to next most common activity was herding, 73pose a graver danger than unexploded submu- people, or 22 percent.66 The LIS data show thatnitions. The National High Commission for many casualties sustained injuries to the upperDemining (Haut Commissariat National de body, and state that this is predominantlyDéminage, HCND)58 recorded clearance and caused by tampering with ERW.67, Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munition / 17
  • ERITREA One child was killed during the cluster munitions strike on the Korokon IDP camp inKey Findings May 2000. The low level of casualties during• Cluster submunitions casualties have been the strike has been attributed to the high failure reported as the immediate result of at least rate of the submunitions, subsequently result- two strikes, and as a result of post-strike ing in extensive ERW contamination.76 Many of contamination. the unexploded submunitions found at Korokon failed to arm correctly, which may have also• The limited casualty data collection mecha- resulted in them being less sensitive to han- nism does not include specific reference to dling. cluster submunitions casualties. The May 2000 cluster munitions strike on Asmara airport facilities reportedly resulted inUse Background and Contamination at least two civilians injured during the strike, Ethiopian forces used cluster munitions in as the intended targets were not hit. 77Eritrea during the Badme border area conflict, By August 2000, UNMEE MACC receivedwhich started in 1998.68 On 9 May 2000, the reports of three children killed in separate inci-Korokon internally displaced persons’ (IDP) dents in the BL755-contaminated area nearcamp was bombed with UK-manufactured Korokon.78 Also in 2000, a 16-year-old boy wasBL755 cluster munitions each containing 147 killed attempting to open a BL755 submunitionsubmunitions. Soviet-designed PTAB and AO-1 with a stone.79 HALO Trust found some 20type submunitions were also found in the BL755 submunitions collected by children at aBadme area.69 Contamination from unexploded nearby site. Some of the children had beencluster submunitions was reported in the using the copper cone of the submunitions’Korokon IDP camp in Gash Barka, as well as at explosive charge to make bells. Other risk-tak-an IDP camp in Adi Bare in Shambiko, both in ing behavior included adults moving unexplod-Sector West of the Temporary Security Zone ed submunitions to prevent children from play-(TSZ).70 ing with them.80 In May 2000, the Ethiopian airforce report- In January 2006, two boys were killed andedly hit the military and civilian airports in one injured while tampering with ERW near theAsmara with rockets and cluster munitions.71 village of Ksad Ekka. Preliminary investigationAccording to an Eritrean Ministry of Foreign by UNMEE determined that the device wasAffairs press release, the bombing of the airport either a grenade or a submunition.81facilities and a nearby soap factory missed theintended targets.72 It has also been alleged thatthe Eritrean ports of Massawa and Assab on theRed Sea coast were struck with cluster muni- ETHIOPIAtions in the same period.73 Key Findings • One cluster munitions strike reportedlyData Collection caused more than 200 casualties in Ethiopia, but the scope of the problem is unknown due The Mine Action Coordination Centre to the lack of an adequate casualty data(MACC) of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and mechanism.Eritrea (UNMEE) collects casualty data in the • Use of cluster munitions and subsequentTSZ. The information is entered into IMSMA but submunitions contamination has not beendoes not provide a breakdown according to recorded or differentiated by mine actiondevice type beyond mine and ERW, making it actors or in the Landmine Impact Survey.difficult to identify cluster submunitions inci-dents. This lack of detail in reporting isbelieved to be exacerbated by the limited tech- Use Background and Contaminationnical knowledge of investigators and The Eritrean army used cluster munitionsreporters.74 Casualty data in the TSZ is primari- against Ethiopia during the Badme border con-ly reported by military observers, UNMEE MACC flict that began in 1998. On 5 June of that year,staff, ICRC, and NGO workers.75 Eritrea launched air-delivered Cluster munitions targeting the Mekele airport runway. At least two cluster munitions struck a school and a res-Casualties and Analysis idential area in Mekele instead. The Eritrea The total number of cluster submunitions Ethiopia Claims Commission in The Haguecasualties is unknown, but recorded casualties found that the cluster munitions strike resultedinclude at least seven people killed and three in civilian “deaths, wounds and suffering.”82 Itinjured: eight of them were children. was reported that submunitions pose “at least 18 / Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions
  • some extent” of a threat on the Ethiopian side Use Background and Contaminationof the TSZ.83 However, the UNMEE MACC has not Cluster munitions were reportedly used infound evidence of submunitions during land- Sierra Leone by Nigerian forces undertaking anmine/ERW clearance. The UNDP remarked that Economic Community of West African Statesthe nationwide LIS undertaken in 2003-2004 Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) intervention mis-did not report unexploded submunitions found sion after a military coup in May 1997. On 11as ERW. Moreover, the UNDP in Ethiopia is not December 1997, three cluster munitions wereaware of cluster weapons being used in allegedly dropped in Kenema, 240 kilometresEthiopia or by Ethiopia.84 However, the Survey from Freetown.89 According to 1997 mediaAction Centre (SAC) – responsible for the LIS – reports, two cluster munitions also struckindicated that the reason for not having infor- Lokosama, near Port Loko in September 1997.mation on cluster munitions contamination in This was denied by ECOMOG.90 In October 1997,Ethiopia is because, at the time of the LIS, clus- Sierra Leone Armed Forces personnel accusedter munitions were not considered to be a con- Nigerian military pilots of using cluster bombscern. According to SAC, the LIS could, if asked on civilian targets in Freetown.91 It has beenand needed, distinguish casualties from cluster reported that French-manufactured Belugamunitions, as well as other ERW and land- cluster submunitions were collected in armsmines.85 hand-ins in Sierra Leone.92 British-manufac- tured BL755 munitions also appear to have been found near Freetown.93Data Collection There is no nationwide casualty data col- Data Collectionlection mechanism in Ethiopia. Existing data There is no systematic ERW casualty datacollection is not coordinated nor is it clear collection in Sierra Leone.94which organization has the mandate to collectdata. It was reported that, in 2005 and 2006,the Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO) was Casualties and Analysisnot able to collect casualty data due to a lack of The cluster munitions strike by thepolitical will, coordination and funding issues. Nigerian ECOMOG mission in Kenema resultedInformation contained in IMSMA at EMAO is not in 28 casualties; 10 people were killed and 18accessible. Various operators handed responsi- injured.95 No further details regarding addition-bility of casualty data collection to the local al strike or post-conflict cluster submunitionsBureaus of Labor and Social Affairs (BoLSA). casualties are available and no ERW incidentsHowever, these have not been able to generate causing casualties have been recorded sincedata and it is unclear if data is collected.86 the end of the civil war in 2002.96 This is partly due to the non-existence of a data collection mechanism.Casualties and Analysis Cluster munitions targeting the Mekeleairport instead struck the Ayder school and sur- SUDANrounding neighborhood, resulting in a total of238 civilian casualties: 53 killed (including 12 Key Findingschildren) and 185 injured (including 42 chil- • At least 36 cluster submunitions casualtiesdren).87 Additionally, cluster munitions used on have been reported, of which several11 June 1998 in Adigrat are reported to have occurred during cluster munitions strikes inkilled four and injured 30.88 civilian areas. The number of post-strike casualties is • Data collection is not comprehensive andunknown due to inadequate data collection and due to limited differentiation only 23 post-a lack of information on cluster munitions con- conflict casualties of cluster submunitionstamination, which impede a full grasp of the were recorded in IMSMA.scope of the problem. Use Background and Contamination Sudanese government forces used cluster munitions against the Sudan People’sSIERRA LEONE Liberation Movement /Army (SPLM/A) in south-Key Findings ern Sudan between 1995 and 2000.97 Cluster munitions strikes were mostly conducted by• There are at least 28 reported cluster submu- aerial bombing.98 The Sudanese government nitions casualties in Sierra Leone. reportedly used cluster munitions, amongst Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munition / 19
  • other weapons, specifically against non-military A national census has been mandatedtargets, including hospitals and IDP camps.99 under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of Numerous cluster munitions strikes were 2005, and is scheduled for 2007.108 The censusidentified between 1995 and 2000, including is expected to include questions regarding peo-five cluster munitions dropped on cultivated ple with disabilities and thus increase knowl-land surrounding Chukudum on 20 April 1995; edge of mine/ERW casualties. Additionally,at least 16 cluster munitions dropped in UNMAO plans to initiate a casualty data surveyChukudum on 17 June 1996; at least seven loca- as a part of a US$1.7 million project funded bytions struck in Bahr al-Ghazal province in early the UN Trust for Human Security.109 The NationalFebruary 1998; Koba and Lomon in the Nuba Authority for Prosthetics and Orthotics (NAPO)Mountains attacked on 3 August 1998; one has the capacity to collect data on cluster sub-cluster munition dropped on Yei Hospital on 28 munitions casualties through the patient files inSeptember 1998; Nimule struck on 30 its ICRC-supported database.110September 1998; 24 cluster munitions droppedin Akak on 16 May 1999; two cluster munitions Casualties and Analysisdropped on Kajo Keji Hospital and Médecins There are at least 36 cluster submunitionssans Frontières (MSF) in Kajo Keji on 20 June casualties in Sudan, including 16 killed and 201999.100 In late April or early May 2000, govern- injured. At least six were children. UNMAO hasment troops reportedly used cluster munitions recorded 23 post-strike cluster submunitionsaround the town of Bentiu.101 casualties, nine people were killed and 14 The Government of Sudan reportedly used injured; 19 were males and four females. Of theChilean-manufactured CB-130, CB-500 or CB- 10 casualties whose ages were recorded two250-K cluster munitions, containing PM-1 CEM were children. The ages ranged from 10 to 32,combined effects submunitions.102 In 1996, the average age being 21. Activity at the time ofHALO Trust identified submunitions found at the incident was recorded for twelve casualties:Chukudum as possible Soviet-manufactured four activities were military; three were tendingPTAB-1.5 and Chilean-designed PM-1 type sub- animals; three traveling; and one farming.111munitions.103 Cluster submunitions and/or dis- Most casualties occurred in Kordofan (13) andpensers have been found in Bahr al-Ghazal, Bahr al-Ghazal (five).112 In 2005, UNMAO record-Kordofan, Equatoria, Blue Nile and Upper Nile ed one submunition incident but the number ofprovinces.104 casualties was not known.113 Additionally, a 15- year-old girl was killed and another injured inData Collection May 1996 when neighbors were burning sub- munitions from the Chukudum strike.114 No comprehensive countrywide casualtydata collection system exists in Sudan. The UN Numerous casualties have been reportedMine Action Office (UNMAO) maintains casualty during strikes. However, there are some casesdata in IMSMA;105 a limited number of entries where more than one type of weapon may havespecify cluster submunitions as the cause of been used, including in Labone IDP camp inthe incident. The South Sudan Regional Mine 1997, as well as in Adet and Thiet in 1998.115 FiveAction Center does not have detailed casualty people were killed and three injured due to sub-information, particularly regarding cluster sub- munitions in the Nuba Mountains in Augustmunitions causalities.106 Local actors also gath- 1998, and one person was injured in Yei hospi-er casualty data. However, many of these are tal in September 1998. In May 1999, one childnot entered into the IMSMA database as the was killed and one injured during a strike ininformation is incomplete.107 Akak (Bahr al-Ghazal).116 20 / Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions
  • Focus: Southeast Europe Cluster munitions were used in the Balkan Executive (AMAE) stated that 13 areas along theregion in conflicts resulting from the breakup of Kosovo-Albanian border have been identified asYugoslavia. The largest numbers of known contaminated with submunitions.124 Failurecasualties in Kosovo were a consequence of rates for NATO-used munitions were estimatedunexploded submunitions scattered in the tens at between 20 and 25 percent, whereas 30 toof thousands by NATO bombing. Children were 35 percent of submunitions used by non-NATOthose killed and injured the most by the attrac- forces failed.125tive, but deadly submunitions. Data CollectionALBANIA AMAE coordinates and conducts completeKey Findings nationwide casualty data collection, which is• The total number of cluster submunitions stored in the IMSMA database at its regional casualties is 56: 10 killed and 46 injured office in Kukës. Data is collected by AMAE nearly all caused by KB-1 and BLU-97 submu- through its mine risk education (MRE) and com- nitions. munity-based rehabilitation (CBR) programs, as• Cluster munitions were used by NATO and well as its operational partners, primarily the Serbian forces along the Albania-Kosovo bor- Kukës-based NGO Victims of Mines and der. Weapons Association (VMA-Kukesi). In January 2006, AMAE completed identification of 467 previously unknown ERW casualties in theUse Background and Contamination “hotspots” in central Albania by collecting Cluster munitions were used in 1999 dur- IMSMA incident and needs assessmenting the Kosovo conflict by both the North reports.126Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Serbianforces: BLU-97, M118, BL755, KB-1 and KB-2(Yugoslav) submunitions were reported.117 Casualties and Analysis127Additionally, at least two artillery-delivered Between 1999 and 2006, 56 cluster muni-cluster munitions strikes were confirmed by the tions casualties occurred in 35 incidents andOrganization for Security and Cooperation in one accident, including 10 people killed (nineEurope (OSCE) in the Tropoja region.118 males and one female) and 46 injured (41 NATO executed six strikes along the males, and five females). On 24 May 2004, aKosovo-Albania border, allegedly against KB-1 submunition detonated during a trainingSerbian military positions.119 Non-NATO cluster session for technical survey project personnel:munitions strikes occurred further into Albania two people were killed and 18 injured in theand included 13 April 1999, when two cluster accident.128 On average 1.7 persons weremunitions struck the small border village of involved per incident,129 and the mortality rateZogaj in the context of other shelling;120 on 15 was nearly twice that of landmine casualties.130April, five Serbian rocket-fired 262 mm cluster All but three of the reported submunitionsmunitions fell on fields near the hamlet of casualties were civilian: the United NationsKolsh, near the city of Kukës;121 on April 21, Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)Russian-made cluster munitions were fired into identified two. Additionally, a policeman wasAlbania near Krume.122 killed in the area of Kolsh when he picked up an Immediate surface clearance by the unexploded submunition after the 15 April 1999Albanian Armed Forces located and destroyed strike.131 Additionally, it is unknown whether KLA2,759 unexploded submunitions: 97.5 percent casualties, if there were any, are included inwere KB-1s.123 The Albanian Mine Action AMAE records or recorded as such.132 Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munition / 21
  • All but two casualties occurred post-con- casualties was not made available. The BHMACflict. During the strike on Kolsh on 15 April 1999 database contains records on casualties occur-a young goatherd was injured.133 ring during and after the conflict, but it is not Submunitions casualties reported by known whether submunitions are differentiatedAMAE involved either KB-1 (24, with two killed, from other devices.13822 injured) or BLU-97 (four killed) submuni-tions, while two other casualties resulted from Casualties and Analysisunidentified submunitions. The total number of submunitions casual- ties in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not known, as available data is very limited. There have been Life experience nine confirmed casualties between 1992-2006, including seven killed and two injured. In September 2001, 13-year-old Gazmir was playing with some friends near his The cluster munitions strike on a refugee house in Krume, in the Kukës prefecture. camp south of Tuzla killed seven and dozens Finding an interesting object, the children more were reportedly injured. BHMAC identi- began to play with it. When the KB-1 sub- fied only two deminers injured in separate acci- munition exploded Gazmir’s eyes were dents with KB-1 cluster submunitions in 2002: injured to the extent he was declared one in Vogos´ a and one in Gornji Vakuf. c legally blind. Before the incident Gazmir According to BHMAC, both accidents were had been one of the top students in his caused by breach of procedure.139 class, though afterward his studies became unsatisfactory. Aside from his ini- CROATIA tial treatment, Gazmir has received sup- Key Findings port for a private tutor, along with English and computer skills lessons.134 • Cluster munitions were used on several occa- sions by forces of the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) and KB-1 submunitions caused all reported casualties.BOSNIA and HERZEGOVINA • There are 277 confirmed cluster submuni-Key Findings tions casualties, including 258 killed, 17• Nine cluster submunitions casualties are injured, and two unknown – two strikes on confirmed and dozens unconfirmed. The Zagreb accounted for 243 of these. total number of cluster submunitions casual- ties are unknown due to inadequate data col- Use Background and Contamination lection. Cluster munitions were used on several• NATO and internal factions used cluster occasions by forces of the self-proclaimed munitions. Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) between 1991 and 1995, most notably on 2 and 3 May 1995 when Orkan M-87 multiple rocket launchersUse Background and Contamination were used to hit civilian targets in Zagreb, NATO and internal factions used cluster which caused the majority of reported casual-munitions during the conflict from 1992 to 1995. ties.140Some examples of use include: Orkan M-87multiple rocket launcher firing on the town of Data CollectionLivno and airplanes from a Krajina Serb-held The Croatian Mine Action Center (CRO-area in Croatia bombing the UN safe area of MAC) and Croatian Mine Victims AssociationBihaç with cluster munitions.135 Bosnian Serbs (CMVA) conduct nearly complete nationwidestruck a refugee camp south of Tuzla with clus- data collection since 1991 and 1990 respective-ter munitions. Bosnian Serbs claimed that NATO ly. However, only 50 percent of the CROMACstrikes also hit civilian targets in Banja Luka.136 casualties registered have complete details.141The Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center Casualties from cluster submunitions are differ-(BHMAC) data does not confirm alleged casual- entiated from casualties caused by otherties from these strikes.137 devices, but the total number of cluster submu- nitions casualties is unknown since few conflictData Collection casualties were recorded. Incomplete nationwide casualty data iscollected by BHMAC. Additionally, due to the Casualties and Analysisunification and verification of all operator data- Between 1993 and July 2005, 277 clusterbases, detailed information on landmine/ERW submunitions casualties have been confirmed, 22 / Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions
  • including 258 killed, 17 injured, and two whose KOSOVO145status was unrecorded. The May 1995 strikeson Zagreb accounted for 243 (88 percent) of Confirmed Casualties: 1999 – 2005reported casualties: including seven people Total Strike Post- Post-killed and 236 injured in the two-day period, Strike Conflictfive were killed and 186 injured the first day, two Grand Total 164 N/A 147 15killed and 50 injured the second.142 Injured 103 96 7 Analysis of limited CROMAC data for 34 Killed 59 51 8cluster submunitions casualties, including 10 Unknown Status 2 unknownkilled, 22 injured and two unknown, shows that97 percent were civilians. Males accounted for Man 50 39 1182 percent of all casualties. Boys account for 43 Woman 3 3 0percent of the male casualties and the highest Boy 83 81 2risk activity for boys was playing (29 percent). Girl 1 1 0CROMAC recorded two men and a woman Military 7 7 0injured during strikes on 1 January and 1 Deminer 15 13 2September 1993, in Zaton and Gospic, respec- Unknown 5 unknown 3 unknowntively. Dominant By-standing/passing by (40) From 1 January to 14 July 1993, there were Activities12 male casualties from 11 post-strike incidents, Dominant Dakovica (29)including five killed and seven injured in Zadar, LocationMuc, Sibenik and Sukosan. In 1994, one six-year-old boy was killed. In 1995, there were ninecasualties from four incidents: one man was Key Findingskilled and eight people were injured, including • Cluster munitions used by NATO.a woman, a girl, three boys, and three men. • At least 164 casualties of cluster submuni- The remaining nine casualties (three tions recorded in Kosovo; the majority werekilled, four injured, and two unknown) occurred children.in the post-conflict period between 1996 and2005. One deminer was killed clearing submu- • Sixty percent of cluster submunitions inci-nitions at a hospital in Zagreb. On average dents involved two or more people.about 1.5 people were involved per incident.KB-1 submunitions have caused all known casu- Use Background and Contaminationalties reported by CROMAC.143 The vast majority of cluster munitions con- tamination in Kosovo is the result of use by NATO forces against the Federal Republic of Life Experience Yugoslavia during ‘Operation Allied Force’ from Ivan Mikulcic was 56 years old when the March to June 1999. The United States and the village of Pleso, some 500 metres from the Netherlands used CBU-87 cluster munitions Zagreb airport, was shelled with cluster each containing 202 BLU-97 combined effects munitions: “On that day, the 2nd of May, submunitions. Some CBU-99 and CBU-100 1995, I was at my home at Pleso... On that munitions were also used. The United Kingdom morning at around 10.00, shelling started, used about 500 RBL755 munitions, each con- and an unexploded cluster bomb of the taining 147 dual-purpose antivehicle and Orkan type landed in my yard about 8 antipersonnel blast and fragmentation submu- metres away from me… Some of the nitions.146 bomblets of the bomb remained unex- In 1999, NATO informed the United ploded, but there was one that exploded Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Mine Action some 4 metres behind my back, injuring Coordination Centre (MACC) that 1,392 cluster me and damaging my home.... At that munitions containing 289,536 submunitions point, I was on my way to the shelter and I were targeted at 333 strike locations in only managed to get hold of the doorknob Kosovo.147 However, research suggests NATO when I felt this very sharp pain in my back. forces dropped more than 2,000 cluster muni- And to this day I’ve been carrying three tions containing approximately 380,000 sub- pieces of shrapnel in my back… the physi- munitions.148 The credibility of the strike data cian… told me that they were thus placed NATO provided some ten months after the end that they would cause more damage by of the conflict seemed questionable due to taking them out than by leaving them “glaring inaccuracies,”149 and the problem there.” 144 appears to be wider than initially reported.150 Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munition / 23
  • In 2001, failure rates of BLU-97 submuni- The original data appears to have containedtions were estimated at some seven percent, information on name, status, place, age, gen-and RBL755 submunitions at about 11 per- der, activity, marking, contact information, andcent.151 The manufacturer assessed the failure often a brief note regarding the incident. Therate of RBL755 submunitions at five percent.152 database also contained some records of peo-At a failure rate of five percent, about 14,500 to ple involved in an incident who escaped injury.19,000 submunitions would have remainedunexploded. Clearance data indicates that at least Casualties and Analysis16418,318 cluster submunitions have been The casualty data possessed by OKPCCdestroyed in the period June 1999-2005,153 and EOD shows 164 civilian casualties of clusterthe MACC has estimated that more than 20,000 submunitions in Kosovo from June 1999 tounexploded submunitions remained after the 2006. The total casualties are likely to be signif-war.154 All known strike areas were cleared to icantly higher, as the number of casualties dur-international standards by 2002.155 However, ing strikes is not known and casualty dataUNMIK continued to find submunitions in areas might have been lost. Military, deminers andnot considered affected in 1999-2001 and by the some civilian clearance casualties are probablyend of 2005, 12 areas contaminated with sub- not included in these totals.165munitions still required clearance.156 This seemsto suggest either that the failure rate of the sub- As the conflict ended, cluster submuni-munitions was higher than the official esti- tions caused “considerable casualties amongstmates or that more submunitions were used, the rapidly returning civilian population”166 andconsidering that the submunitions cleared by at least 45 people were killed and 106 injuredKFOR EOD units and those destroyed by between 1999 and 2001. Incidents “generallyYugoslav forces during the conflict are not involved groups of younger people, often withincluded in these totals.157 The unexploded sub- very tragic results.”167 Analysis of data from themunitions were in a highly sensitive state, and first months after the strikes corroborates this:could explode as a result of being moved or 81 casualties were boys under 18, compared topicked up.158 62 adults. Only four female casualties of cluster submunitions were recorded in the post-strike It has been alleged that the Federal period, three of them adults in a single civilianRepublic of Yugoslavia Air Force used BL755 clearance accident. It seems likely that clustercluster munitions in the Kosovo conflict but submunitions incidents were unreported duringnumbers used are not known.159 the emergency post-strike phase, 1999-2001, due to data collection challenges and imprecise attribution of devices responsible. For example,Data Collection among the 54 casualties of unknown devices Between 1999 and 2001, the ICRC was the from June 1999 to November 2000, one incidentlead agency for data collection on mine/ERW stands out as having similar characteristics toincidents and collected the vast majority of the many submunition incidents: an incident incluster submunitions casualty data stored by April 2000 injured four boys aged 10 to 14 andthe MACC in the IMSMA system. The MACC and two women in their early 20s in their homepartners analyzed and verified data for 1999- when one of the boys brought back an object2001, and included a comprehensive casualty from the field looking “like a tin of Coca Cola” –and incident recording system that allowed a description often used for BLU-97 submuni-data to be overlaid on maps depicting geo- tions.168graphic features and contaminated areas.160 All of the 10 casualties recorded in the Since 2002, the Institute of Public Health post-conflict period from 2002 to 2006 were(IPH) within the Ministry of Health, Environment males.and Spatial Planning has been responsible for The average age of all known civilian clus-investigating and recording all incidents involv- ter submunitions casualties in Kosovo is 19.ing mines, submunitions and ERW in Kosovo Individual cluster submunitions incidents areand shares data with the UNMIK Office of the often responsible for causing multiple civilianKosovo Protection Corps Coordinator (OKPCC) casualties. Over 60 percent of all submunitionsEOD Management Section.161 However, the orig- incidents resulted in two or more casualties, theinal MACC records could not be accessed after average casualty rate per incident being 2.7.transfer to the IPH,162 and maintenance of the At 25 percent, the most common activity at thedatabase was a concern.163 As a result, only time of the incident was passing or standingbasic total figures from the period based on nearby (40 people). Other activities include,UNMIK MACC monthly summaries are available. tampering 16 percent (25), tending animals 14 24 / Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions
  • percent (23), and playing and recreation nine reportedly assisting at the time; three were alsopercent (14); other/unknown accounted for 14 killed and another two were injured.176 Nopercent (23). Yugoslav/Serb forces have been identified as Cluster munitions casualties have been casualties of submunition contamination inrecorded in 20 municipalities, with most casual- Kosovo. The majority of incidents involvingties recorded in Dakovica (29). Five other clearance/EOD and the military occurredmunicipalities recorded over 10 casualties between June and September 1999.each: Kosovska Mitrovica (14), Urosevac (13)Kacanik (15), Podujevo (12) and Prizren (12). Life Experience177Comparison with Post-Conflict Casualties In August, 1999, about three months afterAttributed to Mines and ERW the NATO cluster munition strikes, Adnan’s family went to swim in a small Cluster submunitions were responsible for lake a few kilometers from their village. At31 percent of total recorded casualties between the time, Adnan was almost seven years1999-2005, while mines caused 52, other ERW old. On the bank of the lake Adnan found16 percent and one percent was unknown. a yellow metal can. He did not know thatHowever, submunitions were responsible for 49 the object was an unexploded BLU-97percent of deaths, compared to 34 percent from cluster submunition. Adnan brought themines and 17 percent by other ERW. Between object back to his family.June 1999 and May 2001, cluster submunitionscaused 84 percent of total ERW casualties.169 In Adnan’s older brother, Gazmend (17 yearsthe period from 2002 to 2006, this declined to old) was holding the submunition when it14 percent of ERW casualties due to clearance fell to the ground and exploded. Theefforts. explosion killed both Gazmend and their father. Adnan sustained injuries to his left arm and leg and was taken to the closestConflict/Post-Conflict hospital. All confirmed casualties reported in the Adnan’s sister, Sanije (14) later returned tooriginal MACC database occurred as a result of the site to collect family belongings, whichunexploded munitions after NATO bombing had been left behind. While at the site,between March and June 1999.170 Seven inci- Sanije stepped on a cluster munition anddents of NATO cluster bomb strikes resulting in was killed.civilian casualties in the (former) Federal Adnan received medical care for twoRepublic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, have months after the incident. He had lost a lotbeen substantiated, and an additional five pos- of blood and suffered from anemia. Due tosible incidents are unconfirmed. It is believed the injuries to Adnan’s left arm he isthat 90 to 150 civilians have been killed during unable to lift heavy objects. Adnan couldcluster munitions strikes.171 Human Rights not return to school until late JanuaryWatch (HRW) identified at least 12 people killed 2000. By the age of 13, Adnan had lostand a further 50 injured during NATO cluster interest in school, his grades were suffer-munitions strikes in Kosovo. However, many ofthe incidents were not independently verified.172Therefore, they are not included in the casualtystatistics of this study. Seven casualties from atampering incident with an unexploded submu-nition during the conflict period have beenincluded in the post-strike data. All casualtieswere boys from the same family aged two to 16:five were killed and two injured.173Civilian/Military Comparison A total of 22 casualties were likely to havebeen involved in clearance activities or weremilitary personnel, accounting for 13 percent ofcasualties. Some accidents include clearanceby former KLA and foreign peacekeepers.174 Two © Robin CollinsBritish KFOR soldiers were killed while clearingsubmunitions.175 Former KLA soldiers were Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munition / 25
  • Use Background and Contamination NATO used cluster munitions in Serbia during the military intervention in 1999. Submunitions used during the NATO air cam- paign in Yugoslavia from March to June 1999 include: RBL755, BLU-97 and Mk 118 Rockeye.182© Robin Collins Yugoslav factions used KB-1, and KB-2,183 but it is unknown if these are contaminating Serbian territory. In early 2006, six main areas of Serbia remained contaminated with cluster submuni- ing and he was expected to drop out alto- tions: Nis, Kraljevo, Kursumlija, Sjenica, Mount gether. Kopaonik and Vladimirci.184 Adnan’s older sister, Ymrije, cares for both Adnan and their mother, who was severe- Data Collection ly traumatized. The family of three now Casualty data collection and registration live on a pension of just 62 euro a month. of landmine/ERW survivors in Serbia is not comprehensive.185 Press reports and ICRC records provide very limited information regard- MONTENEGRO ing strike, post-strike and post-conflict casual- Key Findings ties. • Cluster munitions used by NATO. • At least one civilian was killed and another Casualties and Analysis three injured by cluster submunitions. The total number of submunitions casual- ties in Serbia is not known and casualty statis- Use Background and Contamination tics from the Serbian Mine Action Center were not made available. NATO forces used cluster munitions against targets of the (former) Federal Republic Between 1999 and August 2005, 45 casu- of Yugoslavia during the 1999 Kosovo conflict. alties have been reported, including 15 killed On 28 April 1999, NATO planes struck the and 30 injured, two of which were clearance Golubovci military airport south of Podgorica in personnel. All but three casualties occurred Montenegro with cluster munitions.178 during the NATO strike on an airfield in the city of Nis on 7 May 1999, which also hit the nearby hospital and residential areas; the strike killed Data Collection 14 and injured 28.186 On 9 October 2000, an There is no comprehensive data on ERW Army pyro-technician was seriously injured casualties in Montenegro.179 while defuzing six submunitions, losing both legs and hands, and his sight and hearing were Casualties and Analysis permanently impaired.187 A deminer was injured while clearing submunitions from a factory in The strike on the Golubovci airport in Nis in August 2005.188 Montenegro caused four civilian casualties, one killed and at least three injured.180 A 61-year-old The ICRC recorded six civilian casualties woman was killed in a village near the airport as from unexploded submunitions in Serbia and a submunition hit her head as she was running Montenegro between 1999 and 2002.189 from the village.181 However, insufficient information is available to verify if these are included in the statistics No post-conflict casualties are known. above. SERBIA Life Experience Key Findings “Vladimir Jovanovic, a 72-year-old Serb, • Cluster munitions used by NATO and possi- was injured in the 1999 cluster bomb bly by Yugoslav forces. attack on his home city of Nis, Serbia. He • Total number of cluster submunitions casual- died on April 4, 2000, some eleven ties is unknown, 45 casualties were record- months later, while working in his yard ed, including 15 killed and 30 injured, most with a shovel, an unexploded cluster resulting from the NATO strike on the city of bomblet from the same attack took his Nis. life.”190 26 / Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions
  • Focus: Commonwealth of Commonwedalth of Independent States The Russian Federation has made exten- Data Collectionsive use of cluster munitions in Chechnya and, Documenting the human impact of clusterto a lesser extent, in Tajikistan. Allegedly, Tajik munitions is difficult due to episodic conflict.and Chechen factions have used cluster muni- UNICEF, through its partner Voice of thetions as well. In Chechnya, civilian targets were Mountains, is the primary source of informationoften deliberately hit, but the full scope of the on mine/ERW casualties in Chechnya.195problem is unknown due to a lack of informa- However, UNICEF does not differentiate clustertion. submunitions casualties from other ERW casu- alties.196 There have been numerous mediaCHECHNYA/ reports of significant civilian casualties due to use in populated areas.RUSSIAN FEDERATION Casualties and Analysis197Key Findings The total number of submunitions casual-• Cluster munitions were used extensively by ties in Chechnya is not known. However, at least Russian Federation forces, often directly 624 casualties were identified: 305 killed and against civilian targets. Chechen use has 319 injured. In the worst strike incident report- also been alleged. ed, Russian aircraft struck a public market,• The total number of cluster submunitions inflicting 246 civilian casualties: 60 were killed casualties in Chechnya is not known but and 186 injured. there are at least 624 reported casualties, The worst post-strike incident involved at including 305 killed and 319 injured. least 24 people, where seven were killed and at least 15 children injured.Use Background and Contamination This number is believed to be significantly lower than actual casualties owing to the lack of Cluster munitions have been used exten- data collection, the intensity of bombardment,sively by Russian Federation forces in and the episodic nature of the conflict inChechnya, both during the 1994-1996 war and Chechnya.again during the recurrence of hostilities start-ing in September 1999. Chechen use has alsobeen alleged. Civilian targets, such as publicmarkets, were struck on several occasions. Anda HALO demining team got hit.191 The entire TAJIKISTANarray of cluster munitions in the Russian arse- Key Findingsnal has been deployed in Chechnya and types • A total of 48 cluster submunitions casualtiesused include: AO-2.5 and AO-1SCh, ODS-OS, were confirmed, all of which were caused byOFAB-2.5, PTAB-1/M, PTAB-2.5/M, and ShOAB- AO-2.5 submunitions; this is nearly 55 per-0.5 bomblets.192 cent of all recorded ERW casualties. Specific information regarding the fullextent of contamination is not available, as“…no comprehensive surveys have been done Use Background and Contaminationto document unexploded cluster munitions…”193 In the period 1992-1997, cluster munitionsHowever, HALO encountered unexploded sub- were used in Tajikistan by unknown forces dur-munitions in Chechnya between 1997 and 1999, ing the civil war,198 reportedly delivered by heli-including the AO-2.5RT.194 copter and rocket. As recently as 2000, there Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munition / 27
  • were reportedly instances of use along the bor- Casualty Data Analysisder with Afghanistan.199 The total number of submunitions casual- The Russian-manufactured RBK series ties in Tajikistan is not known. TMAC reported(250, 275, and 500) and KMG-U cluster muni- 48 confirmed cluster submunitions casualties,tions were used in Tajikistan, and their submu- including 30 killed and 18 injured as of 26nitions payloads include: AO-2.5 and AO-1SCh, September 2006. All reported submunitionsODS-OS, OFAB-2.5, PTAB-1/M, PTAB-2.5/M, casualties were caused by AO-2.5 bomblets.203and ShOAB-0.5 bomblets.200 The Tajik Mine Cluster submunitions casualties accounted forAction Cell (TMAC) reported that it has cleared 54.5 percent of all (80) ERW casualties reportedAO-2.5 (422), and ShOAB-0.5 (21) submunitions by TMAC. This casualty rate is similar to that infrom ‘mined areas’.201 Lao PDR and Vietnam where the ERW type is known.204 The mortality rate for submunitionsData Collection casualties in Tajikistan is 62.5 percent and is likely due to incidents occurring in remote loca- Data collection is conducted by TMAC tions where emergency transport is not avail-through the Red Cross Society of Tajikistan and able.205is considered incomplete, though efforts wereunderway in 2006 to integrate all sources ofcasualty information into IMSMA. Informationspecifically regarding strike and post-strikecasualties was not available.160 28 / Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions
  • Focus: Greater Middle East and North Africa RegionThe greater Middle East region has seen some • Projected average casualty rate is 25 to 30of the most extensive use of cluster munitions casualties per year.– in Iraq – as well as the most recent use ofthese weapons in Lebanon. In several coun- Use Background and Contaminationtries in the region, cluster munitions have beenused at various points in time, resulting in Cluster munitions were used during theoverlapping contamination. This, as well as Soviet invasion (1979-1989), the civil war (1992-hampered clearance due to the security situa- 1996), Taliban regime (1996-2001) and US offen-tion in a couple of countries, exacerbated sive (2001-2002). Though unconfirmed whichcasualty rates and it is likely that this trend will types of cluster munitions the Soviets used, thecontinue for the foreseeable future. most commonly deployed canister was RBK- 500, which can carry the following submuni- tions: OFAB-50UD, AO-2.5RTM, OAB-2.5RT, BetAB or improved BetAB-M, PTAB, and PTAB-AFGHANISTAN 1M.206 In 1995, the Afghan government claimed Confirmed Casualties: 1980 – 1 July 2006 that Russian forces bombed the city of Taloquan and surrounding areas with cluster bombs.207 Total Strike Post- Post- Taliban and Northern Alliance forces mainly Strike Conflict used surface-delivered cluster munitions, fired Grand Total 701 216 71 414 from BM-21 122 mm multiple rocket launch- Injured 550 167 53 330 ers.208 Killed 150 49 18 83 During the offensive against the Taliban Unknown Status 1 0 0 1 between 7 October 2001 and 18 March 2002, Man 305 93 28 184 the United States mainly used air-delivered Woman 49 14 6 29 cluster munitions: CBU-87 combined effects Boy 224 77 29 118 munitions and CBU-103 with wind corrected Girl 31 7 2 22 munitions dispenser kits. Each of these muni- tions contain 202 BLU-97s. These types of Military 82 25 6 51 munitions are used for large or moving targets, Deminer 10 0 0 10 but this makes them dangerous in populated Unknown 0 0 0 0 areas, to which the Taliban targets were often Dominant Farming/Tending animals (284) close.209 Activities In 232 strikes, the US dropped approxi- Dominant Herat (103) mately 1,228 cluster munitions containing Location 248,056 submunitions.210 BLU-97 submunitions have an official failure rate of seven percent.211 However, based on its clearance records the UNKey Findings estimates that approximately 40,000 submuni-• Cluster munitions were used by the Soviet tions (16 percent) did not explode.212 Union, the Taliban, the Northern Alliance and United States troops between 1980 and 2002. Data Collection• Until 1 July 2006, 701 casualties were record- Information on cluster submunitions casu- ed, but the majority of pre-2001 casualties alties is collected as part of both the are unrecorded. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munition / 29
  • Casualties and Analysis215 In total, the ICRC collected information on 701 submunitions casualties occurring between 1980 and July 2006 in Afghanistan, including 150 people killed, 550 injured, and one unknown. The vast majority of casualties were male: 57 percent (397) were men and 32 per- cent (224) were boys under 18. Girls under 18 made up four percent of casualties (31) and women seven percent (49). Nearly half of the casualties between 1980 and 2006 occurred while carrying out livelihood activities: tending animals (149 or 21 percent), farming (135 or 19 percent) and collecting wood/food/hunting (56 or eight percent). Boys under 18 accounted for 52 percent (77) of the casualties tending animals. Boys and girls© John Rodsted under 18 accounted for 84 percent (or 56) of 67 casualties occurring while playing; they also make up 48 percent of 42 tampering casualties. and UN Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan Two boys were injured due to military activity. (UNMACA) databases. The ICRC started data Incidental passing by (59) and traveling (55) collection in 1998 and is the principal source of account for 16 percent of casualties. ERW casualty data, providing the UNMACA with Only 18 casualties, including seven dem- about 95 percent of its information on new iner casualties, occurred in marked areas; this casualties. The ICRC carries out community- equals less than three percent of casualties. based data gathering in all mine-affected areas Most people sustained multiple all-body via the Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS). injuries and 49 people (partially) lost their eye- UNMACA started data collection in 1988 and sight: at least 273 people needed an amputa- records data in the IMSMA-format. It is antici- tion, often of multiple limbs. Seven percent of pated that the ICRC/ARSC data collection casualties (46) had received mine risk educa- capacity will be handed over to UNMACA and tion, only one of them got injured while tamper- integrated into one database by 2007.212 ing with submunitions. The Italian NGO Emergency also collects Conflict/Post-Conflict casualty data via its three surgical centers, which is not integrated in the ICRC or UNMACA A total of 121 casualties (17 percent) due database. These centers distinguish between to cluster submunitions were recorded as mine and ERW casualties, but do not differenti- occurring during the six-month strike period ate cluster submunitions casualties.214 However, between October 2001 and March 2002. While it as Emergency Hospital in Kabul is the main is not possible to state with absolute certainty referral hospital for serious trauma, it is likely that these were due to new cluster munitions that submunitions casualties are treated here. use, the location of the incidents in correlation with known strikes, media articles, and case studies seems to suggest this is likely for most The collection of comprehensive landmine incidents.216 Due to incomplete data collection, casualty data in Afghanistan remains problem- only 95 casualties were recorded as occurring atic, due in part to communication constraints during the Soviet invasion. and the time needed to centralize information. In 1998, ICRC data collection only covered a Casualty rates were low in the immediate small part of the country, but as of 2006, it has aftermath (12 months) of the Soviet invasion a presence in all provinces. However, it is still and the US strikes; 71 casualties or 10 percent, believed that some of the casualties who die possibly because many people sought refuge in before reaching medical assistance are not neighboring countries or in Kabul. recorded. It is, therefore, likely that, due to the Most of the recorded casualties are post- generally higher mortality rate for cluster sub- conflict casualties, at 414 or 59 percent; 321 munitions casualties, a significant number of occurred 12 months or more after the end of the these casualties were not recorded in earlier Soviet invasion and 93 after US cluster muni- years. tions strikes. Post-conflict cluster submunitions 30 / Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions
  • casualties remain relatively constant in both IRAQ219cases. The recent return of refugees could con-tribute to the relatively consistent level of post- Total Confirmed Casualtiesconflict casualties. The post-conflict average for 1991 – 2006: 2,060nearly 12 years after the Soviet invasion was 27 Confirmed Casualtiescasualties per year, but there has been a slight March 2003 – May 2006increase in the annual average to nearly 29casualties per year in the post-conflict period Total Strike Post- Post-after the US invasion. Experts confirm the Strike Conflictapparent trend that there will be 25-30 new Total 1,018 720 202 96submunitions casualties per year, mostly due to Injured 801 613 131 57old Soviet contamination, but also due to newer Killed 200 90 71 39US munitions, which have not yet been Unknown Status 17 17 0 0cleared.217 Man 336 324 11 1 Woman 87 84 3 0Civilian/Military Comparison Boy 119 108 11 0 Only 35 casualties (seven percent) of 464 Girl 59 56 3 0cluster submunitions casualties recorded Military 6 0 6 0between 1998 and 2006 were military (includ- Deminer 0 0 0 0ing military deminers). Only four military casu- Unknown 411 148 168 95alties occurred during the six months of the USoffensive when the majority of cluster muni- Dominant Accidental passing by/ Activities livelihood actvitiestions were used: in comparison, at least 117civilian casualties occurred in the same period Dominant Near home(7 October 2001-18 March 2002). Location Between 1980 and 1997, 53 of 237 casual- Key Findingsties (22 percent) were military (including mili- • Cluster munitions were used during the Iran-tary deminers), including one 14-year-old and a Iraq war, 1991 Gulf War, subsequent Coalition12-year-old; 18 military casualties occurred dur- Forces operations and the 2003 war and itsing the conflict between 1980 and 1989. aftermath. • At least 2,060 cluster submunitions casual- ties were recorded, estimated casualties Life Experience (from various sources) are 5,500 to 6,000. Afghanistan, 2002: Three Afghan boys • Limited casualty data is available due to were photographed at a huge ammunition insecurity, a lack of political will, and the wasteland near Bagram Air Base in absence of a comprehensive data manage- Afghanistan. Several days after this photo ment system. was taken, these three boys were killed, apparently trying to scavenge valuable metal from the ammunitions dump.218 Use Background and Contamination Analysis of MRE data collection in Iraq reportedly revealed cluster submunitions casu- alties as early as 1985:220 frequent Iraqi use of 155-mm artillery projectiles could corroborate this.221 During Operation Desert Storm from 17 January to 27 February 1991, the US forces used at least 47,167 air-delivered cluster munitions containing more than 13 million submunitions: BLU-61/63, 97, BLU APAM, as well as Rockeyes. An estimated 2.6 to 5.9 million submunitions did not hit the intended target.222 Additionally, an estimated 30 million sea-launched (with cruise missiles) or artillery-delivered DPICM submunitions were used.223 More than 11 million submunitions were delivered by multiple- launch rocket systems (MLRS) such as the © John Rodsted M26.224 On 21 February 1991 alone, 220,248 M77 submunitions were fired from MLRS M270 Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munition / 31
  • launchers.225 UK troops used 100 JP-233, eight security situation, a lack of funds and capacityBL755 and 385 CBU-87 cluster munitions;226 at the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA),resulting in at least 103,446 BLU-97 submuni- which is responsible for casualty data collec-tions delivered. It is not known how many tion, and the larger political context in Iraq. InBeluga cluster munitions French troops used. the northern parts of Iraq, the regional mine Cluster munitions were used to attack action offices, MAG, and other service providersmobile SCUD missile launchers, tank and vehi- collect casualty data, but do not distinguishcle columns, and dual use targets in urban cluster submunitions casualties from otherareas. As a result, unexploded submunitions ERW casualties.were found on roads, bridges and civilian infra- The Iraq Landmine Impact Survey (ILIS)structure. The failure rate was increased due to differentiated cluster submunitions casualtiesthe height the cluster bombs were dropped in a limited number of southern and centralfrom and the soft soil conditions; up to one- areas of Iraq.third reportedly did not explode.227 When taking The Iraqi Health and Social Carethe official five percent failure rate,228 a total of Organization (IHSCO) set up a war victim sur-more than two million submunitions would veillance system in mid-2004. Since early 2006,have failed to explode. restrospective data collection focused on Since the 1998 Operation Desert Fox, Joint mine/ERW casualties occurring after MarchStand Off Weapons containing BLU-97 submu- 2003 in six governorates (Baghdad, Karbala, al-nitions have been used, also in the no-fly zones, Muthanna, Babel, Thi Qar and Diyala). It differ-resulting in some of the most recent contamina- entiates cluster submunitions casualties. As oftion in the northern part of the country.229 August 2006, operations are on hold due to During the 2003 conflict, the US forces security reasons.238used a minimum of 10,782 artillery-delivered In addition, the federal and regionalcluster munitions containing between 1.7 and Ministries of Health register war-injured withtwo million submunitions;230 including M42, disabilities but this does not distinguish theM46 and M77 types. Analysis of strikes identi- device that caused the injury and includes peo-fied by Human Rights Watch and analysis of ple injured by IEDs and bullets.239 In 2003, CIVICCBU231 data for 1,555 strikes in 767 locations, collected information on civilian war victimsindicates that Coalition Forces dropped at least that includes a number of cluster submunitions2,477 air-delivered cluster munitions between casualties.240 Prior to 2003, UNOPS and MAG20 March and 9 April 2003. At least 385,062 collected casualty data in Northern Iraq. InBLU-97, 44,954 Mk 118, 880 BLU-108, and 2001, the ICRC reportedly collected data on10,290 RBL755 submunitions were delivered: mine and ERW casualties in southern Iraq.241these total 441,186 submunitions, or 27,574 However, this information was not made avail-items per day for 16 days.232 able. In Basra, southern Iraq, the UN set up a casualty monitoring system to remedy the lack Between 1 May 2003 and 1 August 2006, of data collection. This system was never oper-the US dropped 63 CBU-87 bombs, containing a ationalized due to the 2003 war.total of 12,726 CBU-97 bomblets.233 BLU-97 submunitions have an estimated Casualties and Analysisfour to six percent failure rate; M77 submuni-tions have a five to 23 percent estimated failure Data compiled from various sources doesrate;234 M42 and M46 DPICM submunitions have not indicate the scope of the problem, nor doesan average failure rate of 14 percent.235 it allow in-depth crosschecking and the creation of a casualty profile for risk education and sur- In the northern parts of Iraq, MAG cleared vivor assistance purposes. However, the limited205 sites, mostly in Erbil (90) and Kirkuk (96) data available indicates that the number ofcontaining mainly BLU-97s but also KB-1s.236 casualties due to cluster submunitions is vastly underreported.Data Collection At least 2,060 people were confirmed Sources of information on cluster submu- casualties of cluster submunitions betweennitions casualties are fragmented and incom- 1991 and 2006, including 733 killed, 1,310plete. During the 2003 conflict and its after- injured and 17 unknown. Among these casual-math, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) ties were at least 255 children.strongly discouraged casualty data collection, These totals should be considered incom-especially in relation to cluster submunitions.237 plete as they do not include any estimates or As of September 2006, there was no data data that could not be cross-referenced in ordercollection mechanism for new mine/ERW/IED to avoid duplication. Analysis of media andcasualties in Iraq. This was largely due to the research documents including casualty esti- 32 / Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions
  • mates would indicate that there were at least The Iraq Landmine Impact Survey record-5,500-6,000 casualties due to failed cluster ed 95 recent casualties due to cluster munitionssubmunitions in Iraq between 1991 and 2006. until April 2006.249 It noted that in the south- central parts of Iraq (Karbala, Najaf;March 2003 – September 2006 Qadissiyah, Wassit and al-Hilla), cluster muni- tions were “the most important cause of death Analysis of Human Rights Watch data indi- and injury.” These governorates “have the high-cates that there were at least 695 casualties of est rates of victimization… due to the new con-cluster munitions between March and tamination from the most recent war”250 andSeptember 2003, including 84 killed, 594 cluster submunitions casualties account for 77injured and the status of 17 is unknown. At least percent of recent casualties. In Najaf, 83 per-157 of the casualties were children.242 This total cent of recent casualties were due to clusterdoes not include estimates and casualties munitions, in Karbala 81 percent, in al-Hilla 80where the cause of injury was not confirmed to percent, in Qadissiyah 72 percent and in Wassitbe due to cluster munitions. As a result, this 67 percent. In comparison, in the four southerndoes not include 635 civilian casualties (254 governorates (Basra, Thi Qar, Messan and al-killed and 381 injured) in al-Najaf, which are Muthanna), submunitions accounted for onlyreportedly mostly due to cluster munitions.243 nine percent of recent casualties. These figuresHuman Rights Watch estimates the total num- are incomplete as only a limited number of com-ber of casualties due to cluster munitions to be munities were visited due to security reasons.over 1,000.244 However, UNICEF estimated that The list of civilian casualties compiled bymore than 1,000 children had been killed or CIVIC and the Iraqi Body Count (IBC) databaseinjured “by weapons such as cluster bombs.”245 includes at least 25 fatal casualties (12 men, Handicap International identified an addi- one woman, seven boys and five girls) due totional nine child casualties occurring in April cluster munitions between March and April2003, including three killed and six injured, all 2003. One additional cluster submunitionsbut one were boys.246 casualty is recorded in the IBC database as Spanish peace brigade members recorded occurring on 19 March 2006.251 However, thenine people killed (including one woman) and Iraq Body Count estimated in May 2003 that36 injured (five women, two boys, one girl and 200 to 372 civilians were killed by failed clustertwo men) in al-Rashid and Yusifia (Baghdad) submunitions, including at least 147 post-con-during cluster munitions strikes on 25 and 26 flict.252March, and 3 April 2003. They also recorded fivemen and a child injured by cluster munitions in Pre-2003 Casualties due to Clusteral-Dora on 2 April.247 Submunitions Analysis of Iraqi Health and Social Care Up to August 1991, 168 Iraqis were report-Organization (IHSCO) data recorded between ed killed and 440 injured due to cluster submu-March and June 2006 indicates that 148 of 193 nitions.253 More than 4,000 civilians have beencasualties (77 percent) are due to cluster muni- killed or injured by failed cluster submunitionstions (compared to 26 antipersonnel mine casu- since the end of the 1991 Gulf War.354 Up toalties), including 40 killed and 108 injured. The February 1993, at least 1,600 people werevast majority of cluster submunitions casual- killed, including 400 Iraqi civilians, and 2,500ties, i.e. 83 percent were male (123). Children injured due to submunitions.255accounted for 57 casualties, and the age group The media reported on various incidents,between 11 and 20 is the largest with 43 casual- including an eight-year-old boy killed and his sis-ties. In line with casualty profiles of other clus- ter injured by an unexploded cluster submuni-ter contaminated countries, it is very likely that tion at a family picnic in 1993. In 1994, an unex-the overwhelming majority of these are male. ploded submunition killed a 13-year-old boy andNearly half of the casualties occurred while car- his 11-year-old sister. In 1997, a farmer was killedrying out livelihood activities (48 percent): working his field in Qadissiyah governorate; onefarming (29 percent or 43 casualties), herding other person was injured in the incident.256 In(18 percent or 26); and collecting water/ May 2000, three Iraqi children between 13 and 16wood/herbs (one percent, two). Self-clearance were killed, and one injured by an unexplodedcaused five casualties, military activity and col- bomblet. Also in 2000, three children werelecting scrap metal one casualty each. Of total injured in a rural area near Mosul.257 In Februarycasualties, 92 people (62 percent) did not know 2001, a boy was killed by a cluster bomblet inthe area was dangerous, but 34 (23 percent) Karbala province, six children were injured in anknowingly went into a dangerous area for eco- incident in the southern city of Basra, and twonomic reasons. Most casualties occurred in boys were injured by a cluster submunition whileKarbala (57) and Babylon (32).248 tending sheep in western Iraq.258 Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munition / 33
  • During the 1991 Gulf War, at least 80 US Casualty data collected by KISR from govern-casualties, including 25 killed, were attributed ment hospitals includes: gender, age, national-to unexploded submunitions.259 More than 100 ity, residence, occupation of the casualties,EOD experts are reported to have died during date and location of the incident, type of injury,clearance activities in the aftermath of the war, hospital name and treatment. However, clusterincluding one Egyptian Brigadier General.260 submunitions were not differentiated in allDue to the high failure rate of artillery-delivered cases.270 Funding constraints have preventedsubmunitions, the US military post-conflict KISR from updating the database since 2001.271casualty rate became so serious that it resultedin a Congressional investigation.261 Casualties and Analysis Estimates by the Kuwaiti Defense MinistryKUWAIT and the US Army’s National Ground IntelligenceKey Findings Center analysts indicate that more than 4,000• Cluster submunitions from the 1991 Gulf War civilians were killed or injured by cluster sub- caused up to 4,000 casualties until 2003; but munitions since the end of the 1991 Gulf War, casualties in Kuwait declined as of 1995. including at least 1,200 Kuwaiti civilians killed• The total number of cluster submunitions in the first two years after the war.272 casualties in Kuwait is not known due to a KISR recorded 1,652 war casualties in lack of up-to-date data collection. Kuwait between 1991 and 1992. Between 1991 Nevertheless, submunitions continue to and 2001, ERW caused 175 (seven percent) of cause casualties. the 2,386 war injuries and 119 (28 percent) of the 421 deaths recorded.273 According to KuwaitiUse Background and Contamination medical personnel, approximately 60 percent of those injured by ERW were children under 16.374 The United States, the United Kingdom Eighty-four people were killed and 200 injuredand France used cluster munitions in Kuwait during the ERW clearance operations induring the Gulf War in January and February Kuwait.2751991.262 The following cluster munitions andtheir submunitions contributed to the ERW Submunition incidents continue to beproblem in Kuwait: US-manufactured CBU-52 reported: in 2000, a BLU-97 injured three peo-cluster munitions (BLU-61 submunitions), CBU- ple and a Rockeye submunition killed one per-58 (BLU-63), CBU-59 (BLU-77), CBU-71 (BLU- son.276 In 2005, a soldier was injured by a clus-86), CBU-87 (BLU-97), Mk 20 Rockeye (M118), ter submunition during clearance activity inM483 and M864 projectiles (M42 & M46 northwest Kuwait.277 On 1 May 2006, a truckDPICM), MLRS M270 (M77 DPICM); BL755 of UK transporting cleared cluster and other muni-manufacture203 and French-made BL-66 Beluga tions exploded in Kuwait, injuring two people.278(GR-66-EG).264 According to the US GeneralAccounting Office, unexploded submunitionscreated “de facto minefields, or ‘dudfields’” in LEBANONsome battle areas of Kuwait.265 Between 1991 Confirmed Casualties 1975 – 9 October 2006and 2001, more than 1.6 million ERW and mineswere cleared, reducing the long-term impact of Total Strike Post- Post-unexploded submunitions,266 and resulting in a Strike Conflictdrop in casualties by 1995.267 However, by 2002, Grand Total 494 53 176 265annual clearance still unearthed more than Injured 376 35 141 2002,400 submunitions, an amount similar to the Killed 118 18 35 65previous year.268 In February 2006, two cluster Unknown Status 0 0 0 0munitions were found during road construction Man 276 31 72 173in northern Kuwait, and there were unofficial Woman 46 6 13 27reports that cluster munitions were discoverednear a military airbase and in an industrial Boy 92 10 31 51area.269 Girl 22 6 7 9 Military 15 0 10 5Data Collection Deminer 4 0 4 0 Unknown 39 0 39 0 The Kuwait Institute for ScientificResearch (KISR) collected the most comprehen- Dominant Near house (108)/ agriculture Activities (73)/playing (59)sive information on civilian war casualties. InJanuary 2001, KISR established a casualty data- Dominant Near house (108) Locationbase for the period August 1990-January 2001. 34 / Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions
  • Key Findings estimate the failure rate of the BLU-63 at 80• At least four million submunitions were percent on average and the failure rate of the delivered in July-August 2006. M-series at 25 percent on average in the Nabatiyyah area. They did not locate cluster• After 14 August 2006, 142 casualties were munitions strikes above the 703° line on the recorded and prior to 12 July 2006, 338 were United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon recorded. (UNIFIL) map.288• The average pre-2006 conflict casualty rate Various explanations were given for the was 2 per year but the average post-2006 increased cluster munitions use in the last days conflict rate is 2.5 per day. before the ceasefire, such as the failure to destroy mobile rocket launchers with precisionUse Background and Contamination weapons and the change in command from an Israel has used cluster munitions in air force commander to an infantry general – theLebanon in 1978, 1982, 1996, December 2005279 latter for whom cluster munitions would be aand July-August 2006. The most used types are, more operational weapon of choice.289 Otherprior to 2006: BLU-18Bs, BLU-26B, BLU-63, Mk experts stated that the strike patterns suggest118, M42 and M43.280 Israel discontinued the use of cluster munitions as flank protection,use of cluster munitions for several years after especially in the Marjayoun valley, which is sur-1982, when the Reagan administration rounded by the worst-contaminated areas.announced in July of that year that it would pro- However, the bombing was done in such a wayhibit new exports of cluster munitions to Israel, that two layers of submunitions were dropped:as Israel may have violated its 1952 Mutual one layer before more powerful precision muni-Defense Assistance Agreement with the United tions destroyed the target, leading to clusterStates prohibiting use of cluster munitions in munitions in the rubble; and one after destruc-civilian areas, such as Fakhani, Sabra, Shatila, tion, resulting in cluster munitions on top of theBurj al-Barajneh, Haret Hreik, and Dahya sub- rubble.290urbs of Beirut.281 Hezbollah use of a small number of (KB-1) In the 2006 conflict, air-delivered BLU-63 cluster munitions has been alleged.291(mainly produced in 1973), artillery-deliveredM42, M46, M77 and M85, both the Israeli copy Data Collectionof the M42 and a newer model with a self-neu- The Lebanon Mine Resource Centertralisation and a self-destruct mechanism were (LMRC) at the Faculty of Health Sciences of theused. In addition, Chinese-produced MZD-2282 University of Balamand maintains a mine casu-and a Chinese-manufactured KB-2 were report- alty database, providing both the Nationaledly found.283 The media reported an army com- Demining Office (NDO) and MACC-SL, withmander stating that Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) casualty data for their IMSMA databases.had launched 1,800 M26 rockets, which, IMSMA is synchronized at the NDO. LMRC con-together, contain 1.59 million M77 submuni- tinuously updates its database by visiting newtions. This number does not include other casualties and verifying and re-surveying previ-ground-delivered or air-delivered cluster muni- ously recorded casualties and affected commu-tions. The UN found an emerging failure rate of nities.approximately 40 percent,284 which is higherthan the official failure rate of between five and During the 12 July-14 August conflict, the23 percent.285 Lebanese Red Cross collected data on its inter- ventions, including medical information. The Media reports also stated that the IDF information is broken down so that the weapon-fired approximately 160,000 artillery projectiles injured can be extracted.292 However, this infor-of which 20 percent are assumed to be cluster mation was not made available.munitions. This would mean an additional 2.8million cluster submunitions were delivered.286 Since the 2006 ceasefire, UN communityOverlapping cluster munitions footprints, clear- liaison officers and EOD teams at MACC-SLance of certain visible cluster munitions dis- record casualty data when they come across itturbing the footprints, and incomplete survey- during their activities. However, the collecteding make it impossible to estimate a total num- IMSMA forms contain only the minimum neces-ber of cluster munitions delivered, as well as an sary information (such as name, date, location,overall failure rate. However, the UN Mine killed/injured), pending re-surveying and verifi-Action Coordination Center in South Lebanon cation after the emergency phase. Unconfirmed(MACC-SL) estimates the failure rates between cluster munitions casualties are also recorded32 and 40 percent overall.287 This would mean pending verification.293that 1.28 to 1.6 million unexploded submuni- LMRC data collection and MRE teams, astions remained on the ground. MAG experts well as NDO teams collect casualty information. Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munition / 35
  • © Handicap International imately 100,000 civilians were unable to leave and a minority chose to stay behind to protect their property.300 Between 12 July and 14 August, the Lebanese Red Cross recorded 285 people killed and 886 injured.301 The information is broken down so that the weapon-injured can be extracted. This information was not made available. There are several confirmed and uncon- firmed instances of cluster submunitions casu- alties. On 19 July 2006, one person was killed and 12 injured during a strike using artillery- fired cluster munitions in Blida; casualties In addition, the national media report exten- included five girls and two boys under 18, four sively on new casualties, including those in the women and two men.302 news bars on TV. On 18 and 21 July, two children were However, experts state that a significant reportedly killed in a cluster munitions explo- number of casualties could go unreported.294 sion in Naqoura.303 Casualties are only reported from accessible areas,295 which have electricity and means of Members of the Cluster Munition Coalition communicating, but “As of September 5, 2006, (CMC) have records of at least four fatal civilian nearly 80 percent of the villages in the South casualties, including two children, due to were still without electricity or water.”296 UNIFIL bombing during the conflict in Yaroun. However, medics have also treated cluster munitions it is unclear whether the casualties were direct- casualties, which are said not to be included in ly inflicted by cluster munitions. One elderly IMSMA.297 man reported by the CMC died as a result of a cluster munitions strike in Beit Yahoun on 10 It is also understood that most Hezbollah August 2006.304 casualties due to cluster submunitions during and after the conflict are not included in the Ragheb Harb Hospital run by the Iranian databases, and that those included are not Red Crescent in Nabatiyyah, reported that it recorded as such.298 received 10 to 15 casualties with injuries consis- tent with cluster submunitions in the last four Casualties and Analysis days of the conflict.305 Villagers in Ayn Baal vil- lage (Tyre) stated that up to six children As of 9 October 2006, there are at least between one and 13 years of age died as a 494 recorded cluster munitions casualties in result of cluster munitions strikes on day 13 and Lebanon, including 118 killed and 376 injured. 14 of the conflict. This happened along the road Children make up 23 percent of casualties, but linking Ataroun and Tyre.306 No additional evi- most of them, 92, are boys (19 percent of the dence corroborates these statements. total). A total of 338 casualties were recorded prior to 12 July 2006 and 156 casualties were recorded between 12 July and 9 October 2006. Post-Strike (14 August – 9 October) These recorded totals do not include up to 30 unconfirmed cluster munitions casualties Analysis of the LMRC database indicates occurring during or shortly after the 2006 con- that there were at least 142 casualties, includ- flict or people treated by the UNIFIL battalions ing 21 killed and 121 injured to 9 October 2006. (up to 145 people).299 Nor does it include Analysis is available of 107 detailed and verified Hezbollah casualties due to cluster submuni- records. The majority of casualties were male: tions, as this information was not obtained. 65 percent men (70) and 21 percent boys under 18 years of age (23); four casualties were girls (four percent) and six women (six percent); four Post 12 July 2006 percent were unknown. Most casualties (50) During the Conflict (12 July – 14 August) occurred near or in the house, 15 occurred while Cluster munitions were used throughout farming, 10 while shepherding. Eight casualties the conflict, but 90 percent seem to have been occurred while playing with the submunition, used in the last 72 hours. As most people left seven of them were children; another eight South Lebanon prior to 10 August, this casualties occurred during clearance activities undoubtedly reduced the number of civilian (including four military casualties). At least one casualties during the conflict. However, approx- person was a Syrian citizen. 36 / Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions
  • Most casualties occurred in Nabatiyyah, Comparison with Post-Conflict Casualties Bint Jbeil, and Tyre. Thirteen casualties Attributed to Mines and ERW occurred on the first day of the ceasefire (14 As of September 2006, the database con- August 2006), and 11 on 18 August. In the first tained records of 3,457 casualties (929 killed month after the ceasefire, casualties average and 2,528 injured). Before 12 July 2006, cluster just over three per day, after that the average munitions casualties constituted nearly 11 per- daily casualty rate went down to just over two. cent of casualties; as of 9 October, this is over There were additional unconfirmed 13 percent. Other ERW constitute 20 percent of reports of one Hezbollah militant killed in casualties. Yohmour and two injured in the greater Nabatiyyah area while carrying out clearance activities in the aftermath of the conflict. It was Life Experience added that Hezbollah cleared many submuni- tions but “at a great cost.”307 Salima (left) is a mother of five, three daughters and two sons, of whom two are disabled – Ali (23) and Maryam (42) – and Casualties Prior to 12 July 2006 still live with her. During the recent con- The LMRC recorded 338 cluster munitions flict, eight suspected Hizbollah militants casualties between 1975 and 2005, including were living in a neighbor’s house and the 95 killed and 243 injured. Most of these casual- neighborhood was repeatedly hit with ties occurred in West Bekaa, Nabatiyyah and cluster munitions so the family took Hassabiyyah. Twenty-three percent of casual- refuge in Salima’s parents’ house until the ties were children (80), but 65 of 95 fatal casu- ceasefire. While walking home with her alties were children – 52 of them boys. The main father and the children, Salima noticed activities at the time of the incident were agri- destruction everywhere, as well as several culture (58) and activities near the house (58). submunitions with ribbons. Salima’s Only five men were recorded as military casual- father carefully moved one submunition ties. off the road with his foot so that his grand- There were are on average two or three children would not step on it. When they new casualties per year due to cluster muni- arrived at the house, Maryam and Ali wait- tions strikes before 2006. This rate is predicted ed outside while Salima and her father to remain stable, as many markings have disap- proceeded to enter the house. Salima peared or deteriorated over time, whereas moved the big stones by hand and swept clearance activities are limited. However, it is the small rubble away with a broom. All of likely that some casualties in the Western a sudden, she felt something strange, but Bekaa area and border areas remain unrecord- did not hear an explosion. She had hit a ed.308 submunition with her broom. Salima sus- In 2005- 2006, there were several cluster tained shrapnel injuries in her head, one munitions incidents due to munitions delivered on her forehead, and severe shrapnel in late 2005. However, no casualties were injuries on her chest, thighs, and waist. reported.309 She has undergone several operations and still needs regular treatment. Salima, who worked in tobacco and has a small olive grove, may never be able to work again. The olive grove and the gar- den around the house are still off-limits because there are more submunitions scattered there, and all the olives will be lost unless the family engages in risk-tak- ing behavior in order to harvest the crop. Ali, in the meantime, is traumatized by the events and ever since he heard the ‘boom’ and then his mother screaming, he has cut himself off from society and only identifies with the cartoons on TV, something he did not do before the incident.310© Handicap International Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munition / 37
  • NGOs and health posts in mine/ERW-affected areas report casualties to the local governorate authorities for pension and compensation pur- poses. The local authorities do not keep a cen- tral database.315 It is not known if casualties due to cluster submunitions are differentiated. Casualties and Analysis Due to the non-existence of a data man- agement system, the number of casualties of cluster submunitions, as well as mines and © Handicap International other ERW, is unknown. One incident resulting in at least one Austrian medic of the international peacekeep- ing force killed, was attributed to a cluster sub- munition having come loose from a hillside in the Golan Heights area due to melting snow.316SAUDI ARABIAUse Background and Contamination Cluster munitions were used by the US WESTERN SAHARA/ MOROCCOagainst Iraqi forces in the 1991 Gulf War in Rasal-Khafji (northern Saudia Arabia) during the Key Findings‘Battle of Khafji’, from 29 January to 2 February • There have been at least two civilian cluster1991.311 ERW is found in the northern border submunitions casualties in Western Sahara.areas of Saudi Arabia, which are sparsely inhab- • Due to limited and inconsistent reporting,ited.312 the total number of cluster submunitions casualties is not known; developments inData Collection and Casualties data collection, combined with survey work, There is no known war casualty data col- could improve knowledge about cluster sub-lection mechanism in Saudi Arabia and there munitions casualties.are no reported casualties due to cluster sub-munitions. Due to contamination being in Use Background and Contaminationsparsely populated areas, it is likely that thehuman impact is not significant. Nevertheless, Cluster munitions were used in Westerndue to the remote and inhospitable environ- Sahara317 between 1975 and 1991 by the Royalment it is possible that casualties go unreport- Moroccan Army, when it fought the Polisarioed. Front intermittently.318 The 1991 ceasefire result- ed in a territory divided by 2,400 kilometers of defensive earthen walls – known as berms – between Polisario and Morocco and an exten-SYRIA sive mine/ERW problem, with approximatelyKey Findings 10,000 Saharawi nomads living in affected areas on either side of the berms.319• The number of cluster munitions casualties in Syria is not known, but at least one foreign Submunitions used include US-manufac- peacekeeper was killed. tured artillery-delivered M42.320 The full extent of cluster munitions contamination in Western Sahara in not known, but LandmineUse Background and Contamination Action UK has reported significant pollution Israel used cluster munitions in the Golan by air-dropped or ground-delivered clusterHeights area during the October 1973-May 1974 munitions.321war and remaining contamination is reported.313 The UN Mission for a Referendum inIsrael also reportedly used air-delivered cluster Western Sahara (MINURSO) indicates that clus-munitions against non-state armed group train- ter submunitions are scattered in the areas ofing camps near Damascus in 1973.314 Mehaires, Tifariti and Bir Lahlou, where the Moroccan Army conducted offensive operationsData collection in August and September 1991.322 There is no casualty data collection mech- Submunitions, other ERW, and mine contamina-anism in Syria but, in an ad hoc manner, local tion is mainly concentrated in Polisario-con- 38 / Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions
  • trolled Western Sahara, but areas under In November 2005, the SaharawiMoroccan control are also affected.323 Campaign to Ban Landmines conducted a casu- alty survey in the four main refugee camps, butData Collection they could not provide the information, as the casualty form did not differentiate submuni- There is no comprehensive casualty data tions. However, this could be recorded in thecollection system in Western Sahara. MINURSO general remarks.328has maintained some casualty data. However,its archived records are not comprehensive andare difficult to access due to a lack of system- Casualties and Analysisatized and standardized record keeping, a lack In 1998, one cluster submunitions incidentof verification mechanisms, as well as time con- resulted in two fatal casualties.329 MINURSOstraints.324 MINURSO recorded incidents but did recorded two cluster submunitions incidentsnot always record casualty specifications for out of a total of 39 mine and ERW incidents fromthese incidents.325 Data is stored in IMSMA, but 1992 to 2000. The number of casualties as atraining of MINURSO, Landmine Action UK and result of these two submunitions incidents isPolisario data collectors is needed to optimize not known. In comparison, four incidents due todata management between the parties.326 At the antipersonnel mines and 16 incidents due toend of 2006, Landmine Action UK was sched- unidentified ERW (41 percent) were reported inuled to undertake casualty data collection in the same period.330Western Sahara in the course of a survey andclearance project.327 Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munition / 39
  • 40 / Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions
  • Conclusion Cluster munitions, developed and first Despite limited data, a few lessons can beused during the Second World War by the drawn from the overwhelming similaritiesSoviet Union and Germany respectively, exhibited by various countries affected by clus-emerged as a tool of modern warfare in ter munitions, which will continue to pose a sig-Southeast Asia between 1964 and 1973. Since nificant, lasting and non-discriminatory threat.then, hundreds of millions, perhaps billions, ofthese munitions have been used in at least 23countries or areas that are not internationally LESSON 1:recognized, and their use has been alleged in Data Collection, the Devil is in the Detailseveral other places. Nearly all data collection mechanisms lack Exactly how many cluster submunitions lie the capacity to carry out prospective, proactivedormant, no one can say. data collection and only record casualties that Exactly how many cluster submunitions are brought to their attention, rather thancasualties there are, no one can say either. actively seeking out new casualties. In most countries, these mechanisms are not nation- Nevertheless, Fatal Footprint compiled wide and contain insufficient detail. The mainstatistical evidence of at least 11,044 recorded problem is that they do not differentiateand confirmed cluster submunitions casualties. between types of ERW or have only startedThis does not include extrapolations or esti- doing so recently. But often personal details,mates, which could be as high as 100,000 clus- the number of casualties involved in an incidentter submunitions casualties. This number is sig- and injury types are missing. Various data setsnificant, and higher than anticipated at the out- also exhibit a lack of common terminology forset of this study, given that: device, activity, and location types, standard- • cluster munitions have been used in only ized methodology, and categories of informa- 23 countries/areas (compared to more tion collected, as well as quality control and than 90 mine-affected countries and mine verification mechanisms. casualties in 125 countries) Additional issues impacting data collec- • data collection, as well as information pro- tion are that many casualties or their communi- vided is limited and often incomplete ties do not know exactly what type of device This study marks a watershed. It is the caused the incident, data collectors might notfirst time that all available casualty data has have the expertise to deduce this type of infor-been compiled in one document. Nevertheless, mation and casualty databases or injury sur-the authors acknowledge that much informa- veillance mechanisms are not linked to strike ortion remains missing, was pieced together from mine-use data. Consequently, a large percent-various public sources, or was not made avail- age of casualties are recorded as caused by anable. It is apparent that users of cluster muni- unknown device or an erroneous device istions rarely provided information on casualties, inserted.be it their own or other casualties (civilian or Analysis shows that only 17 percent (four)military) – even though it is alleged that, in of cluster munitions-affected countries or areasmany cases, this type of information was have near complete data collection, 61 percentrecorded. (14) have limited or episodic data collection and As a result, many casualties were not 22 percent (five) have no data collection sys-counted and it is unlikely that they will ever be. tem. Only 13 percent (three) possessed orThis means that the full scope of the problem shared data on conflict casualties and 43 per-will probably never be known. cent (10) differentiated to some extent between Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munition / 41
  • cluster submunitions and other ERW. An over- munitions are wide-surface weapons contami-whelming majority, i.e. 91 percent (10,097), of nating more than the military target; they wereall confirmed submunitions casualties occurred used in indiscriminately high quantities, as inwhere there is limited or no data collection. Lao; they were often used near civilian areas, as Complete information on cluster submuni- in Afghanistan; and they sometimes explicitlytions casualties for the three stages (strike, targeted civilian targets, as in Chechnya.post-strike, and post-conflict) at which cluster Additionally, in the post-strike and post-munitions pose a threat is impossible to obtain. conflict period, unexploded submunitionsIn most cases, the nature of conflict and its cause a lasting threat. Due to their instability inimmediate aftermath do not lend themselves to comparison with other ERW types, failed sub-effective data collection. Very little information munitions dominate among new incidents inis available about casualties during strikes, post-conflict situations, regardless of how limit-unless they are widely reported in the media. ed their use. In parts of Southeast Asia, clusterFrom existing data, it is often impossible to submunitions continue to cause nearly half ofascertain whether a casualty occurred during a the recorded casualties more than threestrike or due to a failed submunition shortly decades after their use, which is more than allafterward. Little effort is undertaken to improve other known item types combined. Failed sub-information on strike and post-strike casualties munitions used in the 1980s continue to causeretroactively. Even in countries where data col- casualties at a steady rate in Afghanistan andlection is considered complete, such as Lebanon.Lebanon, information about casualties duringstrikes is scarce and it is believed that post- In some areas of Iraq, cluster submuni-strike casualties are underreported. tions casualties represent between 75 and 80 Similarly, not all casualties are recorded, percent of all casualties. While in Tajikistan sub-such as internally displaced people or refugees, munitions casualties were only a small percent-but also insurgent, militant, and military casual- age of all casualties, they were 55 percent ofties are not included in many databases. ERW casualties.Sometimes this information is recorded but notmade publicly available, possibly also to down- In all instances of systematic cluster muni-play the impact of cluster munitions on one’s tions use, failure rates of manufacturers areown troops. considerably lower than the experience of clear- ance operators or known and estimated levels While the military casualty figures are of contamination. In some cases, submunitionsdoubtless significantly underreported, civilian with an unacceptably high failure rate are used.casualties were found to be vastly underreport- It was known from the outset that the mosted in most high-use locations, namely: widely used submunition in the Southeast AsiaAfghanistan, Cambodia, Chechnya, Iraq, Lao conflict, the BLU-26, had a failure rate of 26 per-PDR and Vietnam. cent under optimal test conditions. One of the Planning of appropriate and comprehen- cluster submunitions in the Israeli stockpilesive survivor assistance and MRE activities is used in Lebanon in 2006 is of the same type andinhibited by lack of sufficient data. age as those delivered more than three decades ago in Southeast Asia: the US-manufactured BLU-63. This submunition’s failure rate hasLESSON 2: been far above the manufacturer specificationsCluster Munitions Cause Disproportionate – as high as 80 percent by some estimates.Long-Term Civilian Harm The recent Israeli use of cluster munitions Nearly all recorded cluster submunitions in Lebanon, with the majority of submunitionscasualties are civilian, i.e. 98 percent. Only 124 delivered when the user knew the conflict wasmilitary and 59 demining casualties have been about to end, pointedly parallels a scenerecorded. Additionally, cluster submunitions decades previous when US strikes escalatedincidents involve more people at a time, are near the end of the Second Indochina War. Themore fatal and result in more multiple injuries US continued sporadic use of cluster munitionsthan mines and other ERW. In countries where after the end of both the 1991 and 2003 wars inmine casualties are relatively few and ERW Iraq.casualties are many, cluster munitions kill andinjure more people than any other ERW device Military personnel from user countriestype. consider any post-cluster munitions strike envi- Even limited information on casualties ronment a minefield, and the claim of dispro-during strikes indicates that many cluster sub- portionate risk and harm posed to civilians ismunitions casualties were civilians. Cluster unquestionable. 42 / Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions
  • LESSON 3: LESSON 4:Cluster Submunitions Casualties are Immediate and Comprehensive ClearanceYoung Males at Work Reduces Civilian Casualties Not only are civilians most at risk, but the The experiences of Afghanistan,vast majority of civilian casualties occur while Cambodia, Iraq, Lao PDR, and Vietnam speakpeople carry on their normal, daily livelihood volumes: extensive cluster munitions use gen-activities in their usual and accustomed places. erally and failed submunitions particularly poseIn Lao, almost three quarter of casualties a volatile and generational threat to civiliansoccurred while farming, tending animals, and where clearance efforts are delayed. Immediateother livelihood activities in fields, rice paddies, identification and clearance of submunitionsor in the village. In Lebanon, both before and contamination is the only way to minimize post-after July 2006, most casualties occurred near conflict casualties, as was shown in Kosovo andthe home, while people were inspecting conflict after the US offensive in Afghanistan. Indamage, trying to salvage crops, or just walking Lebanon, it is acknowledged that emergencyaround. clearance is the only way to halt the daily casu- Males represent 84 percent of casualties, alty occurrence. However, when failed submuni-and constitute a similar percentage of casual- tions are cleared rapidly, new use will con-ties carrying out livelihood activities. However, tribute to and exacerbate the existing problemunder-18s represent a significant number of until the last submunitions are cleared.these male casualties at approximately 40 per- A full reckoning of casualties from bothcent.330 In many cases, for example in Kosovo submunitions strikes and subsequent contami-and Cambodia, boys are the largest casualty nation is likely impossible, but a consistentlygroup; in other cases, such as Vietnam, they are disproportionate pattern of harm to civiliansa close second. Boys constitute the vast major- has been demonstrated from even this prelimi-ity of child casualties – averaging between 85 nary study. From Southeast Asia to Afghanistan,and 90 percent. The majority of male child casu- Iraq, Chechnya, Lebanon, and other places,alties occur while carrying out livelihood activi- reports of cluster munitions either targeted atties, mostly tending animals. In Afghanistan, or inadvertently used against civilians haveboys represent more than half of the casualties continued, as do the reports of failed submuni-tending animals, for example. tions and their impact on communities – the A small percentage (around 10 percent) of number of casualties grows daily. Time and timecasualties occur while tampering or playing again, this fatal footprint determines the fate ofwith cluster submunitions. Again, boys make individuals and communities, often decadesup the majority of these casualties. after the initial conflict. The number of casualties that occurewhile carrying out livelihood activities showsthe direct economic impact on cluster muni-tions-contaminated communities and coun-tries. In many of these countries, men are thetraditional breadwinners, and since adult malesand boys represent the majority of casualtiesthe socio-economic loss for both the immediateterm and distant future cannot be underesti-mated. The significant number of child casualtiesalso requires adjusted survivor assistance pro-grams. Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munition / 43
  • TABLE 1:44 Confirmed Cluster Submunitions Casualties in Affected Countries Confirmed Cluster Submunitions Total Injured Killed Unknown Status Man Woman Boy Girl Military Deminer Unknown Casualties 11,044 5,581 3,830 1,633 3,694 780 2,524 458 124 59 3,405 Afghanistan 701 550 150 1 305 49 224 31 82 10 0 Albania 56 46 10 0 21 5 1 1 3 20 5 Bosnia-Herzegovina 9 2 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 7 Cambodia 120 91 29 0 43 12 56 9 0 0 0 Chad N/A Croatia 277 258 17 2 10 3 12 1 1 4 246 Chechnya 624 319 305 0 4 0 1 1 0 0 618 Eritrea 10 7 3 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 6 Ethiopia 272 215 57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 272 Iraq 2,060 801 200 1,059 336 87 119 59 6 0 1,453 Kosovo 164 103 59 2 50 3 83 1 7 15 5/ Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions Kuwait 5 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 Lao PDR 4,813 2,165 2,521 127 2,257 470 1,654 275 0 0 157 Lebanon 494 376 118 0 276 46 92 22 15 4 39 Montenegro 4 1 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 Saudi Arabia N/A Serbia 45 30 15 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 42 Sierra Leone 28 18 10 28 Sudan 36 20 16 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 30 Syria 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 Tajikistan 48 18 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 48 Vietnam 1,275 557 278 440 391 104 278 56 5 1 440 Western Sahara 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
  • TABLE 2: Status of Casualty Data Collection in Cluster Submunitions Affected Countries Status of Casualty Data Complete Data Data Collection Limited or Episodic No Data Collection Data on Conflict Differentiate Collection Collection System Data Collection System Casualties ERW Type Total 4 18 14 5 3 10 Afghanistan o o o o Albania o o o Bosnia-Herzegovina* o o o Cambodia o o Chad o o Croatia o o o Chechnya o o Eritrea o o Ethiopia o o Iraq o o o Kosovo* o o o Kuwait o Lao PDR o o o Lebanon o o o o Montenegro o Saudi Arabia o Serbia* o o Sierra Leone o Sudan o o o Syria oFatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munition / Tajikistan o o o45 Vietnam o o o Western Sahara o o *Was not able to provide data during the research period
  • Selected Bibliography10-80 Committee, Hue Health Department, and Human Rights Watch, Cluster Bombs inHatfield Consultants Limited, A Luoi Thua-Thien Afghanistan: A Human Rights WatchHue, Living with UXO: Results of the Survey of Backgrounder, October 2001.UXO Impacts on Socio-Economic and HumanHealth in A Luoi Valley, Thua Thien Hue Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in theProvince, 2001. NATO Air Campaign, Vol. 12, No. 1 (D), February 2000.John Borrie, Explosive remnants of war: Globalsurvey, Landmine Action, London, June 2003. Human Rights Watch, Ticking Time Bombs: NATOs Use of Cluster Munitions in Yugoslavia,Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Report on Vol. 11, No. 6 (D), June 1999.Baseline Survey in Dong Ha, Cam Lo, Dakrongand Huong Hoa Districts, Hanoi, September Iraq Landmine Impact Survey, The Causes of2006. Death and Injury in Iraq due to ERW, Iraq, 18 May 2006.Rosy Cave, Anthea Lawson and Andrew Sherriff,Cluster Munitions in Albania and Lao PDR: The International Campaign to Ban Landmines,Humanitarian and Socio-Economic Impact, UNI- Landmine Monitor Report 2006: Toward a Mine-DIR, Geneva, September 2006. Free World, Mines Action Canada, Canada, September 2006.Handicap International, Les systèmes d’armes àsous-munitions, Etat des lieux, Lyon, August International Committee of the Red Cross,2003. Cluster Bombs and Landmines in Kosovo: Explosive Remnants of War, Geneva, AugustHandicap International, Living with UXO, 2000 (Revised June 2001).National Survey on the Socio-Economic Impactof UXO in Lao PDR (Final Report), Vientiane- Franklin Lamb, “Israel’s Gift to Lebanon,” in ABrussels, 1997. Quarter Century of Israel’s Use of American Weapons in Lebanon (1978-2006), SeptemberHuman Rights Watch, Essential Elements for 2006.Reducing the Civilian Harm of ClusterMunitions: Examples of Policy and Practice, Landmine Action UK, Explosive remnants ofAugust 2006. war: Unexploded ordnance and post-conflict communities, London, March 2002.Human Rights Watch, Overview of a Dirty DozenCluster Munitions, Washington, D.C., August Rae McGrath, Cluster Bombs: The Military2006. Effectiveness and Impact on Civilians of Cluster Munitions, UK Working Group on Landmines,Human Rights Watch, Off Target: The Conduct of Calvert’s Press, London, August 2000the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq, US,2003. Titus Peachey and Virgil Wiebe, Cluster Bombs Appendix 1: Laos, Mennonite CentralHuman Rights Watch, Fatally Flawed: Cluster Committee, November 2000.Bombs and Their Use by the United States inAfghanistan, Washington, D.C., December Titus Peachey and Virgil Wiebe, Clusters of2002. Death, Mennonite Central Committee, 2000. 46 / Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions
  • Brian Rappert and Richard Moyes, Failure toProtect: A case for the prohibition of clustermunitions, LMA UK, London, September 2006.William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixonand the destruction of Cambodia, CooperSquare Press, 25 October 2002 (revised edi-tion).Survey Action Center and HandicapInternational, Landmine Impact Survey:Republic of Chad, Washington, D.C., 2000.Swedish Committee for Afghanistan andSwedish Peace and Arbitration Society, Clustermunitions in Afghanistan – implications forinternational action and regulation, Stockholm,April 2006.Virgil Wiebe, “Footprints of Death: ClusterBombs as Indiscriminate Weapons UnderInternational Humanitarian Law,” MichiganJournal of International Law, Vol. 22, No. 1, Fall2000, pp. 142-149.Virgil Wiebe, Cluster Bomb Use in theYugoslavia/Kosovo War, MCC, 1999.Virgil Wiebe and Titus Peachey, Drop Today, KillTomorrow: Cluster Munitions as Inhumane andIndiscriminate Weapons, MCC, December 1997(revised June 1999). Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munition / 47
  • Notes1 National Defense University, “19. Operation Plan Penh, 4 September 2006. El Paso,” http://www.ndu.edu/inss/; BBC, “War 9 Unless otherwise stated, casualty analysis is and Protest - the US in Vietnam (1969 - 1970),” based on 120 individual records provided by Kao both accessed 3 October 2006; William Vannarin, CMVIS-HI, Phnom Penh, 14 September Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the 2006. destruction of Cambodia, Cooper Square Press, 10 The provinces with the most cluster submuni- 25 October 2002 (revised edition).2 tions casualties are also the four provinces with Landmine Action UK, Explosive remnants of war: the most ERW incidents in comparison with mine Unexploded ordnance and post-conflict commu- incidents and account for 48 percent of submu- nities, London, March 2002, pp. 48-49 (here- nitions casualties: Kampong Cham (18), Kandal inafter LMA UK, Explosive remnants of war): (14), Kracheh (14), and Stueng Traeng (12). “The GeoSpatial International Cambodia 11 William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon National Level One Survey Project … has evi- dence of at least 17,235 United States cluster and the destruction of Cambodia, Cooper bomb attack sites – although the actual number Square Press, 25 October 2002 (revised edition). of bombs dropped on each of these target sites 12 CMVIS complete data was filtered for mine inci- is not known.” dents only and for 120 casualties spread across3 Analysis of US strike data for Cambodia. Air- the same 18 provinces and in the same propor- delivered antipersonnel and antivehicle mines tions as the cluster submunitions casualties. were excluded from this total, as were all fuel air 13 Interview conducted by Vao Kannarin, CMVIS-HI, explosives, smoke, incendiary, and chemical and Stan Brabant, Head, Policy Unit, Handicap munitions classified as BLU; see Andreas International, Kampong Speu, 5 April 2006, pho- Parsch, U.S. Military Aviation Designation tos taken by the authors. Systems: Directory of U.S. Military Rockets and 14 Titus Peachey and Virgil Wiebe, Cluster Bombs Missiles, Non-U.S. Military Aircraft and Missile Designation Systems, http://www.designation- Appendix 1: Laos, November 2000, systems.net, accessed 4 September 2006. http://www.mcc.org/clusterbomb, accessed 84 March 2006. Titus Peachey and Virgil Wiebe, Cluster Bombs 15 Handicap International, Living with UXO, Appendix 1: Laos, Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), November 2000, National Survey on the Socio-Economic Impact http://www.mcc.org/clusterbomb/, accessed 8 of UXO in Lao PDR (Final Report), Vientiane- March 2006; UXO Lao, “Lao UXO Workplan Brussels, 1997, p. 77 (Hereinafter HI, Living with 1999,” Vientiane, 1999, p. 3. UXO); US Air Force CBU strike data summary5 (hereinafter USAF data summary) for Lao PDR Rae McGrath, Cluster Bombs: The Military based on UXO Lao records and summarized by Effectiveness and Impact on Civilians of Cluster Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Munitions, UK Working Group on Landmines, Demining (GICHD), September 2006. This infor- Calvert’s Press, London, August 2000, p. 16 mation was provided anonymously, 22 (hereinafter McGrath, Military Effectiveness). September 2006.6 International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 16 HI, Living with UXO, p. 77. Landmine Monitor Report 2006: Toward a Mine- 17 Analysis of USAF data summary: air-delivered Free World, Mines Action Canada, Canada, September 2006, pp. 264-266 (hereinafter antipersonnel and antivehicle mines and Landmine Monitor Report 2006). minelets were excluded from this total, as were7 all fuel air explosives, smoke, incendiary, and Casualty data provided by Kao Vannarin, Project chemical munitions classified as BLU. Advisor, CMVIS-Handicap International (HI), 18 Analysis of USAF data summary. Phnom Penh, 14 September 2006.8 19 McGrath, Military Effectiveness, p. 31. Email from Kao Vannarin, CMVIS-HI, Phnom 48 / Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions
  • 20 UXO Lao, Programme Progress Report 2005: Hatfield Consultants Limited, A Luoi Thua-Thien [Draft] Summary of the 2005 UXO Lao Annual Hue, Living with UXO: Results of the Survey of Report, Vientiane, 2006, p. 6 (hereinafter UXO UXO Impacts on Socio-Economic and Human Lao, Progress Report 2005). Health in A Luoi Valley, Thua Thien Hue Province,21 2001, Appendix A7, Chapter 2, pp. 24-27 (here- Titus Peachey and Virgil Wiebe, Cluster Bombs inafter A Luoi Survey). Appendix 1: Laos, November 2000, p. 8, 36 BOMICEN/VVAF ordnance data. The provinces http://www.mcc.org/clusterbomb/, accessed 8 March 2006. in descending order are: Quang Binh, Thua-22 Thien Hue and Quang Nam. Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 983. 37 A Luoi Survey, Appendix A4, Chapter 1, p. 1;23 HI, Living with UXO, p. 24. The actual data set Hatfield Consultants Limited and 10-80 holds 10,639 records, though the final report Committee, Development of Methodologies and indicates 10,649. Technology for Supporting Clearance of24 UXO Lao, Progress Report 2005, p. 6. Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance in Viet25 Nam, January 2003, Chapter 6, p. 5. Analysis and total confirmed cluster submuni- 38 This estimate is based on the ratio of the submu- tions casualties are based on HI, Living with UXO survey data. This dataset was most used nitions types dropped in Lao. because of its completeness of information and 39 BOMICEN/VVAF ordnance data. the greater period of time it covers. Additional 40 Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 1171-1172. records were provided by UXO Lao for the years 1999-2003, and 2005-May 2006 (hereinafter, 41 Email from Hoang Nam, Coordinator, Project “UXO Lao” data); summarized UXO Lao data for RENEW, Dong Ha, 25 August 2006. 2004 was drawn from, Rosy Cave, Anthea 42 A Luoi Survey, Appendix A7, Chapter 2, pp. 24- Lawson and Andrew Sherriff, Cluster Munitions in Albania and Lao PDR: The Humanitarian and 27. Socio-Economic Impact, UNIDIR, Geneva, 43 BOMICEN/VVAF, “Survey Analysis Results, September 2006, pp. 27-30. Together, these Unexploded Ordnance and Landmine Impact data sets cover the period 1973 – May 2006, with Assessment and Technical Survey Report, Phase detailed records of 11,410 total landmine/ERW 1,” Hanoi, 14 October 2005, pp. 7, 13 casualties. 44 Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Report on26 Analysis of HI, Living with UXO and “UXO Lao” Baseline Survey in Dong Ha, Cam Lo, Dakrong data. and Huong Hoa Districts, Hanoi, September27 HI, Living with UXO, p. 28. 2006 and data used for the MRE baseline study28 in Quang Tri province sent by Andrew-Wells NRA, “Activities & News,” Dang, Deputy Representative, CRS, 26 http://www.nra.gov.la/#, accessed 5 October September 2006. 2006. The NRA site, new in September 2006, 45 Unless otherwise stated casualty data analysis mentions that “[t]his year there has been a marked increase in casualties, related directly to is based on: Clear Path International (CPI) data the increased value of scrap metal and the con- sent by Tran Hong Chi, Program Coordinator, CPI, sequent hunting for and salvaging of UXO.” 17 April 2006, and Catholic Relief Services data29 for the MRE baseline study in Quang Tri province “UXO Lao” data; see also the Tajikistan and sent by Andrew-Wells Dang, CRS, 26 September Vietnam reports. 2006. Combined the data sets provide detailed30 NRA, “Activities & News,” records for 2,826 landmine/ERW casualties, http://www.nra.gov.la/#, accessed 5 October including 835 cluster submunition casualties. 2006. Additionally, 440 cluster munitions casualties31 (out of 1,088) from the A Luoi survey are also Analysis of HI, Living with UXO data. included in the totals. But they are classified as32 Analysis of HI, Living with UXO data. unknown status since detailed records were not33 provided. See, A Luoi Survey, Appendix A7, Case study and photos provided by Yvon Le Chapter 2, pp. 28-29, 34-35. Chevanton, HI, Vientiane, September 2006. 46 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 1122-1123.34 Technology Center for Bomb and Mine 47 See the Lao PDR and Tajikistan profiles in this Disposal/Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (BOMICEN/VVAF) administrative study. query of US ordnance records for tonnage deliv- 48 Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 929. ered originally provided to Landmine Monitor Researcher Andrew Wells-Dang, dated 4 May 49 Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 1171-1172. 2004 (hereinafter BOMICEN/VVAF ordnance 50 Vietnam War, “Vietnam War Casualties,” data). The top 10 strike locations in descending http://www.vietnam-war.info/, accessed 10 rank order, are: Quang Binh, Binh Phuoc, Quang September 2006: “The Hanoi government Tri, Binh Dinh, Ha Tinh, Quang Nam, Thua-Thien revealed on April 4 that the true civilian casual- Hue, Quang Ngai, Tay Ninh, and Kon Tum. ties of the Vietnam War were 2,000,000 in the35 10-80 Committee, Hue Health Department, and north, and 2,000,000 in the south. Military Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munition / 49
  • casualties were 1.1 million killed and 600,000 69 LMA UK, Explosive remnants of war, pp. 50-53. wounded…,” 70 Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 250.51 Clear Path International (CPI): Assisting 71 David Gough, “Ethiopian planes bomb Eritrean Landmine Survivors, their Families and their capital as refugee crisis grows,” The Guardian Communities, Personal Stories, Ho Van Lai, (Asmara), 30 May 2000, http://www.clearpathinternational.org/, http://www.guardian.co.uk/, accessed on 5 accessed 27 September 2006. Photo courtesy October 2006. of CPI: additional information not found in Lai’s online case study provided by the author. 72 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Eritrea, “Press52 Release: Ethiopia Bombs Asmara Airport,” Email from Michel Destemberg, Chief Technical Asmara, 29 May 2000, http://www.dehai.org/, Advisor/Programme Manager, UNOPS/HCND, accessed on 5 October 2006. N’Djamena, 1 September 2006. 73 McGrath, Military Effectiveness, p. 41.53 The Survey Action Center and Handicap International, Landmine Impact Survey: 74 Email from Tedla Gebrehiwot, MRE Republic of Chad, Washington, 2000, p. 59 Coordinator/Supervisor, UNMEE MACC, Asmara, (hereinafter Chad LIS). 8 September 2006.54 75 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 418-419. Email from Michel Destemberg, UNOPS/HCND, N’Djamena, 1 September 2006. 76 LMA UK, Explosive remnants of war, pp. 50-51.55 Emails from Michel Destemberg, UNOPS/HCND, 77 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Eritrea, “Press N’Djamena, 1 September 2006; Titus Peachey Release: Ethiopia Bombs Asmara Airport,” and Virgil Wiebe, Clusters of Death, “Chapter 2: Asmara, 29 May 2000, http://www.dehai.org/, Cluster Munitions in the Russian Arsenal,” accessed on 5 October 2006. Mennonite Central Committee, 2000, 78 UNMEE MACC, UNMEE Mine Action http://www.mcc.org/clusterbombs/, accessed 7 September 2006 (hereinafter Peachey and Coordination Centre Sitrep, Asmara, 14 Wiebe, Clusters of Death). December 2000, p. 1.56 79 LMA UK, Explosive remnants of war, p. 53. Handicap International, Where Are Cluster Bombs Used? www.handicap- 80 Ibid., pp. 51-52. international.org.uk, accessed 24 August 2006; 81 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 419. Human Rights Watch (HRW), Essential Elements for Reducing the Civilian Harm of Cluster 82 Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Munitions: Examples of Policy and Practice, Award-Central Front-Ethiopia’s Claim 2 between August 2006, p. 1 (hereinafter HRW, Essential The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and Elements). The State of Eritrea, The Hague, 28 April 2004,57 Email from Didier Léonard, Program Manager, pp. 24-28 and pp. 30-31. MAG, N’Djamena, 31 August 2006. 83 Borrie, Global survey, p. 17.58 HCND: Haut Commissariat National de 84 Email from Scott Pilkington, Senior Technical Déminage (National High Commission for Advisor UN Mine Action Advisory Team, UNDP, Demining). Addis Ababa, 12 September 2006.59 Emails from Michel Destemberg, UNOPS/HCND, 85 Email from Mike Kendellen, Director for Survey, N’Djamena, 1 September 2006 and 3 October SAC, Washington, 29 September 2006. 2006. 86 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 436-438.60 Telephone interview with Michel Destemberg, 87 Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial UNOPS/HCND, N’Djamena, 2 October 2006. Award-Central Front-Ethiopia’s Claim 2 between61 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 283. The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and62 John Borrie, Explosive remnants of war: Global The State of Eritrea, The Hague, 28 April 2004, survey, Landmine Action, London, June 2003, p. pp. 24-28. 17 (Borrie, Global survey). 88 Embassy of The Federal Democratic Republic of63 Email from Michel Destemberg, UNOPS/HCND, Ethiopia in London, “Ethiopia and Eritrea Border N’Djamena, 1 September 2006. Conflict,” http://www.ethioembassy.org.uk/, accessed 12 September 2006.64 Telephone interview with Thomas Merkelbach, 89 McGrath, Military Effectiveness, p. 41; “ECOMOG Head of Delegation, ICRC, N’Djamena, 7 September 2006. air raid,” IRIN (Sierra Leone), 12 December 1997, available at University of Pennsylvania, African65 Email from Didier Léonard, MAG, N’Djamena, 31 Studies Center August 2006. www.africa.upenn.edu/Newsletters/, accessed66 25 August 2006. Chad LIS, p. 33. 90 “ECOMOG shells Port Loko and coastal areas,”67 Chad LIS, p. 7. IRIN, 4 October 1997, available at University of68 McGrath, Military Effectiveness, p. 41. Pennsylvania, African Studies Center, 50 / Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions
  • www.africa.upenn.edu/Newsletters/, accessed 4: Cluster Munition Use in Sudan.” 25 August 2006. 115 HRW, “Government Bombing of Relief Sites and91 Sierra Leone Web, News Archives, October 1997, Other Security Risks,” Famine In Sudan, 1998: http://www.sierra-leone.org/, accessed 25 The Human Rights Causes, 8 February 1999, August 2006. http://www.hrw.org/reports/, accessed 692 October 2006. Eric G. Berman, Re-Armament in Sierra Leone: One Year After the Lomé Peace Agreement, 116 Peachey and Wiebe Clusters of Death, “Chapter Occasional Paper No. 1, Small Arms Survey, 4: Cluster Munition Use in Sudan;” McGrath, Geneva, December 2000, p. 25; Control Arms, Military Effectiveness, p. 39. The call for tough arms controls: voices from 117 Interview with Arben Braha, Director, and Veri Sierra Leone, Oxfam, Amnesty International, and Dogjani, MRE-VA Officer, AMAE, Geneva, 18 the International Action Network on Small Arms September 2006; Virgil Wiebe and Titus (IANSA), January 2006, p. 12, available at Peachey, Drop Today, Kill Tomorrow: Cluster www.controlarms.org, accessed 7 September Munitions as Inhumane and Indiscriminate 2006. Weapons, MCC, December 1997 (revised June93 McGrath, Military Effectiveness, p. 41. 1999), p. 5, http://www.mcc.org/cluster-94 Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 145. bombs/, accessed 5 October 2006 (hereinafter Wiebe and Peachey, Kill Tomorrow).95 McGrath, Military Effectiveness, p. 41. 118 Virgil Wiebe, Cluster Bomb Use in the96 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 650. Yugoslavia/Kosovo War, MCC, 1999,97 Peachey and Wiebe, Clusters of Death, “Chapter http://www.mcc.org/clusterbombs/, accessed 4: Cluster Munition Use in Sudan.” 30 September 2006 (hereinafter Wiebe, Yugoslavia).98 Ibid. 119 Rosy Cave, Anthea Lawson and Andrew Sherriff,99 McGrath, Military Effectiveness, p. 38. Cluster Munitions in Albania and Lao PDR: The100 McGrath, Military Effectiveness, p. 39; Peachey Humanitarian and Socio-Economic Impact, UNI- and Wiebe, Clusters of Death, “Chapter 4: DIR, Geneva, September 2006, p. 9 (hereinafter Cluster Munition Use in Sudan.” UNIDIR, Cluster Munitions in Albania).101 120 Wiebe, Yugoslavia. McGrath, Military Effectiveness, p. 39; Peachey and Wiebe, Clusters of Death, “Chapter 4: 121 Wiebe, Yugoslavia. Cluster Munition Use in Sudan.” 122 Ibid.102 McGrath, Military Effectiveness, p. 38. 123 Interview with Arben Braha and Veri Dogjani,103 Ibid., p. 39; Peachey and Wiebe, Clusters of AMAE, Geneva, 18 September 2006; UNIDIR, Death, “Chapter 4: Cluster Munition Use in Cluster Munitions in Albania, p. 11. Sudan.”. 124 Interview with Arben Braha and Veri Dogjani,104 Email from Mohammad Kabir, Information AMAE, Geneva, 18 September 2006. Management Officer, UNMAO, Khartoum, 16 125 UNIDIR, Cluster Munitions in Albania, p. 10. September 2006.105 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 674-676. 126 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 135-136.106 Email from Bojan Vukovic, MRE/VA Coordinator, 127 Unless otherwise stated analysis of casualty South Sudan Regional Mine Action Center, Juba, data provided via email by Arben Braha, 4 September 2006. Director, AMAE, 15 September 2006.107 Landmine Monitor Report 2005, pp. 543-545. 128 UNIDIR, Cluster Munitions in Albania, pp. 10-11;108 Wiebe, Yugoslavia. USAID, “U.S. Census Bureau Supports the Southern Sudan Center for Statistics and 129 The training incident accounts for 36 percent of Evaluation,” 2006, all incidents, excepting this incident, the casual- http://africastories.usaid.gov/, accessed 5 ty rate would be at 1.2 persons per incident. October 2006. 130 UNIDIR, Cluster Munitions in Albania, p. 11.109 Email from Yousif Mohamed Osman, Training 131 Wiebe, Yugoslavia. Director, NAPO, Khartoum, 4 September 2006. 132 UNIDIR, Cluster Munitions in Albania, p. 8.110 Interview with Yousif Mohamed Osman, NAPO, Geneva, 20 September 2006. 133 Wiebe, Yugoslavia.111 Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 134 Case study provided by Arben Braha, Director, Khartoum, 8 October 2006. AMAE, Tirana, 15 September 2006. At the112 Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, request of AMAE, the name given is fictional to Khartoum, 16 September 2006. protect the privacy of the boy.113 135 Roger Cohen, “NATO, Expanding Bosnia Role, Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 543-545. Strikes a Serbian base in Croatia,” New York114 Peachey and Wiebe, Clusters of Death, “Chapter Times (New York), 22 November, 1994; Michael Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munition / 51
  • Beale, Bombs Over Bosnia: The Role Of Airpower 149 Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 958. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Maxwell Air Force Base, 150 GICHD and UNDP, “Case of Kosovo,” A Study of Alabama, June 1996, Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action, http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/beale.htm, Geneva, March 2001, p. 25. accessed 6 October 2006. 151 Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 952.136 Wiebe and Peachey, Kill Tomorrow, p. 5. 152 United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Questions137 BHMAC data consisted of summary reports prior 59 and 60. RBL755, Select Committee on Public to June 2005, which did not offer details on con- Accounts Minutes of Evidence, APPENDIX 1, flict or post-conflict mine/ERW casualties. Supplementary memorandum submitted by the138 Email from Dejan Babalj, Project Development Ministry of Defence (PAC 00-01/170), 30 January Officer, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 18 September 2006; 2001, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/, Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 222-223. accessed 29 September 2006.139 Email from Dejan Babalj, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 18 153 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1152. September 2006; Wiebe and Peachey, Kill 154 HRW, Cluster Bombs in Afghanistan. Tomorrow, p. 5. 155 “UN set to transfer demining activities to Kosovo140 Brian Rappert and Richard Moyes, Failure to authorities,” ReliefWeb, 14 December 2001, Protect: A case for the prohibition of cluster http://www.reliefweb.int/, accessed 29 munitions, LMA UK, London, September 2006, p. September 2006. 8 (hereinafter Rappert and Moyes, Failure to pro- tect); Wiebe and Peachey, Kill Tomorrow, p. 5. 156 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 1147-1148.141 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 367-368. 157 Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 952.142 Rappert and Moyes, Failure to Protect, p. 8; 158 Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 952. Wiebe and Peachey, Kill Tomorrow, p. 5; Wiebe, 159 Landmine Action UK, Actiongroup Mine.de and Yugoslavia. Mines Action Canada, Explosive Remnants of143 Analysis of data provided via email by Ljiljana War and Mines other than Anti-Personnel Mines: Calic-Zmiric, Mine Risk Education and Victim Global survey 2003–2004, Landmine Action UK, Assistance Advisor, CROMAC, 4 September London, March 2005, p. 98. 2006, and of casualties cited in Rappert and 160 GICHD and UNDP, “Case of Kosovo,” A Study of Moyes, Failure to Protect, p. 8. Unless otherwise Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action, stated all casualty analysis based on these Geneva, March 2001, pp. 105-106; Landmine sources. Monitor Report 2001, p. 968.144 The International Criminal Tribunal for The 161 UNMIK MACC, Monthly Summaries 1 June 1999 – Former Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-95-11 The 30 November 2000; Landmine Monitor Report Prosecutor Of The Tribunal Against Milan Martic, 2005, p. 962. http://www.un.org/icty/, accessed 7 October 2006. 162 Telephone interview with Bajram Krasniqi,145 OKPCC EOD Management, Pristina, 29 The tabular information is a composite of data September 2006. provided by email from Bajram Krasniqi, Public Information Assistant, OKPCC EOD 163 Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1211. Management, Pristina, 1 September 2006; 164 The tabular information is a composite of data OKPCC EOD, “Incidents of Cluster Munition in provided by email from Bajram Krasniqi, OKPCC Kosovo 1999-2001 & 2001-2005,” provided by EOD Management, Pristina, 1 September 2006; Thomas Nash, Coordinator, Cluster Munition OKPCC EOD, “Incidents of Cluster Munition in Coalition (CMC), London, 21 September 2006; Kosovo 1999-2001 & 2001-2005,” provided by and data originally from UNMIK MACC Database Thomas Nash, CMC, London, 21 September 1999-2001 provided by email from Richard 2006; and data originally from UNMIK MACC Moyes, Policy and Research Manager, LMA UK, Database 1999-2001 provided by email from London, 21 September 2006. Unless stated oth- Richard Moyes, LMA UK, London, 21 September erwise, casualty analysis is based on these 2006. Unless stated otherwise, casualty analy- sources. sis is based on these sources.146 HRW, Cluster Bombs in Afghanistan: A Human 165 Email from Bajram Krasniqi, OKPCC, UNMIK, Rights Watch Backgrounder, October 2001, EOD Management, Pristina, 3 October 2006. www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/, accessed Detailed records of 154 casualties were not 22 September 2006 (hereinafter HRW, Cluster available at OKPCC EOD. Bombs in Afghanistan); HI, Cluster Munitions 166 The Praxis Group, Ltd., Willing to Listen: An Systems: Situation and Inventory, Lyon, August 2003, p. 14. Evaluation of the United Nations Mine Action147 Programme In Kosovo 1999-2001, Riverside, ICRC, Cluster Bombs and Landmines in Kosovo: Geneva, 12 February 2002, p. 100. Explosive Remnants of War, Geneva, August 167 UNMIK MACC, UNMIK Mine Action Coordination 2000 (Revised June 2001), p. 6.148 Centre Quarterly Report 1 June – 30 September Rappert and Moyes, Failure to Protect, p. 11. 2000, Skopje & Pristina, 2000, p. 4. 52 / Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions
  • 168 United Nations-Islamabad: “UXO Blues: 189 CMC, Clusters Profile: Serbia and Montenegro, Photographs by Luke Powell,” Situation in and h t t p : / / w w w. s t o p c l u s t e r m u n i t i o n s . o rg / , around Afghanistan, http://www.un.org.pk/, accessed 6 October 2005. accessed 3 October 2006. 190 Virgil Wiebe, “Footprints of Death: Cluster169 LMA UK, Explosive remnants of war, p. 8. Bombs as Indiscriminate Weapons Under170 International Humanitarian Law,” Michigan Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 968. Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, No. 1, Fall171 HRW, “Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air 2000, pp. 142-149 (hereinafter Wiebe, Campaign,” A Human Rights Watch Report, Vol. “Footprints”). 12. No. 1 (D), February 2000, p. 8 (hereinafter 191 Wiebe, “Footprints,” pp. 142-149; Peachey and HRW, “Civilian Deaths”); Human Rights Watch, Wiebe, Clusters of Death, “Chapter 3: Cluster Cluster Bombs: Memorandum for CCW Munitions Use by Russian Federation Forces in Delegates, 16 December 1999, Chechnya;” Wiebe and Peachey, Kill Tomorrow. http://www.hrw.org/arms/memo-cluster.htm, 192 HRW, Overview of a Dirty Dozen Cluster accessed 25 September 2006.172 Munitions, Washington, D.C., August 2006 HRW, “Civilian Deaths,” Appendix A: Incidents (hereinafter HRW, Dirty Dozen). Involving Civilian Deaths in Operation Allied 193 Peachey and Wiebe, Clusters of Death, “Chapter Force.173 3: Cluster Munitions Use by Russian Federation Wiebe, Yugoslavia. Forces in Chechnya.”174 John Borrie, Global survey, p.13; LMA UK, 194 Peachey and Wiebe, Clusters of Death, “Chapter Unexploded Ordnance and Post-conflict 3: Cluster Munitions Use by Russian Federation Communities, London, 2002, p. 13. Forces in Chechnya.”175 Mark Tran, “Soldiers were killed by NATO 195 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 1142-1143. bombs,” Guardian Unlimited, 22 June 1999, http://www.guardian.co.uk/, accessed 7 196 Analysis of casualty data provided by Zaur September 2006. Tsitsaev, Programme Assistant, Child176 Protection/Mine Action, UNICEF North “UK Nato bomb caused Gurkha deaths,” BBC Caucasus, Nazran, 19 September 2006. (UK), 22 June 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/; CNN, “Officials: Peacekeepers killed while clear- 197 Analysis of casualty reports contained in: Wiebe, ing NATO bombs from village,” 22 June 1999, “Footprints;” Peachey and Wiebe, Clusters of CNN (Pristina), http://www.cnn.com/, both Death, “Chapter 3: Cluster Munitions Use by accessed 7 September 2006. Russian Federation Forces in Chechnya;” Wiebe177 Testimony collected by HI in 2005. and Peachey, Kill Tomorrow, p. 5. 198 HRW, Essential Elements, August 2006.178 Select Committee on Defence, Fourteenth Report, Annex B, available at http://www.publi- 199 CMC, Stop Cluster Munitions, Clusters cations.parliament.uk/, accessed 6 October Profile: Tajikistan, http://www.stopclustermuni- 2006. tions.org/, accessed 25 September 2006.179 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 644. 200 HRW, Dirty Dozen.180 HRW, “Civilian Deaths,” Appendix A: Incidents 201 Email from Reykhan Muminova, Victim Involving Civilian Deaths in Operation Allied Assistance Officer, TMAC, Dushanbe, 26 Force. September 2006.181 Wiebe, Yugoslavia. 202 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 699; email182 from Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, Dushanbe, 26 HRW, Cluster Bombs in Afghanistan, pp. 4-5. September 2006.183 CMC, Clusters Profile: Serbia and Montenegro, 203 Email from Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, h t t p : / / w w w. s t o p c l u s t e r m u n i t i o n s . o rg / , Dushanbe, 26 September 2006. accessed 6 October 2005. 204 See the Lao PDR and Vietnam reports for details.184 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 637. 205 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 700-701.185 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 644. 206 Greg Goebel, “Dumb Bombs and Smart186 HRW, Ticking Time Bombs: NATO’s Use of Cluster Munitions,” 1 November 2004, http://www.vec- Munitions in Yugoslavia, Vol. 11, No. 6 (D), June torsite.net/twbomb2.html, accessed 19 1999, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nato2/, September 2006. accessed 4 September 2006; Steve Goose, “Cluster munitions: Towards a global solution,” 207 Wiebe and Peachey, Kill Tomorrow, p. 8. Human Rights Watch World Report 2004, New 208 HRW, Cluster Bombs in Afghanistan, p. 2. York, 2004, http://hrw.org/wr2k4/12.htm, accessed 5 October 2006. 209 HRW, Fatally Flawed: Cluster Bombs and Their187 Use by the United States in Afghanistan, Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 927. Washington, D.C., December 2002, p. 21 (here-188 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 643. inafter HRW, Fatally Flawed). Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munition / 53
  • 210 Bonnie Docherty, “The Legality of U.S. Cluster Submunitions, GAO/NSIAD-93-212, August Munition Use; Civilian Casualties During and 1993, p. 4. After Attack,” at the Cluster Bombs – The Case of 228 Ibid. Afghanistan International Seminar, Stockholm, 229 Emails from mine action operators in northern Sweden, 5 May 2006.211 Iraq (MAG-VVAF) September 2006. HRW, Cluster Bomblets Litter Afghanistan, New 230 HRW, Off Target: The Conduct of the War and York, 16 November 2001, http://hrw.org/eng- lish/docs/, accessed 19 September 2006. Civilian Casualties in Iraq, US, 2003, p. 80 (here-212 inafter HRW, Off Target). Swedish Committee for Afghanistan and 231 Human Rights Watch and Handicap International Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society, Cluster munitions in Afghanistan – implications for analysis of US strike data identified the units international action and regulation, Stockholm, used as CBU-87, 99, 103, 105, AGM-154, BGM- April 2006, p. 44. 109, and RBL-755. Data summary available213 upon request. Interview with Zamanuddin Noori, Mine Action 232 HRW, Off Target, p. 56. Programme Manager, ICRC, Kabul, 8 August 2006. 233 Information provided to Titus Peachey,214 Email from Alessandro Greblo, Human Mennonite Central Committee, by Resources Coordinator, Emergency, Milan, 1 June Department of the Air Force, 2006. 20th Fighter Wing, Shaw Air Force Base, South215 Carolina, Letter dated: 23 August, 2006, Signed Unless stated otherwise: analysis of ICRC casu- by Mary F. Huff, Base Freedom of Information Act alty data sent by Zamanuddin Noori, ICRC, Mg. Kabul, 4 September 2006. 234 HRW, Dirty Dozen.216 HRW, Fatally Flawed; see also MCC for casualties 235 HRW, “Four of Concern.” reported in the media, http://www.mcc.org/clusterbomb/afghanistan/ 236 Information provided by Nabaz Tahir Abdulla, index.html. IMSMA Manager, MAG, Erbil, 24 September217 Interview with Zamanuddin Noori, ICRC, Kabul, 8 2006. August 2006. 237 Emails from Iraqi and international sources, both218 Photo by John Rodsted, Afghanistan, 2002. governmental and nongovernmental, during219 August 2005, reaffirmed in August-September Analysis of casualty data provided by HRW, 2006. IHSCO, CIVIC, ILIS, Spanish Brigade against the 238 Email from Ahmed al-Zubaidi, Director, IHSCO, War, Iraqi Body Count, HI and media reports. Only casualty data that allowed detailed analy- Baghdad, 23 August 2006. sis for crosschecking purposes was included in 239 Email from Muna Saffar, Advisor, VVAF, Baghdad, the casualty table. Other estimates and figures 16 May 2006. are mentioned but not included in the totals. 240 Email from Marla Ruzicka, Founder, CIVIC, 28220 Interview with previous technical advisor of August 2004. IHSCO, Geneva, 17 September 2006. 241 Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 1008.221 Interview with Salomon Schreuder, Senior Mine 242 HRW, Off Target, pp. 56-61, pp. 85-92, pp. 105- Action Advisor, UNDP-Iraq, Geneva, 20 September 2006. 110, pp. 128-132 and hospital records sent by222 Bonnie Docherty, Researcher, Human Rights McGrath, Military Effectiveness, p. 33. Watch, New York, 1 September 2006.223 HRW, “Four U.S. Cluster Munitions of Concern,” 243 HRW, Off Target, p. 130. Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper: Cluster Munitions a Foreseeable Hazard 244 HRW, U.S.: Minimize Civilian casualties in Iraq, in Iraq, March 2003, New York, 17 March 2006. http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/ 245 UNICEF, Press Release: In Iraq, unexploded (hereinafter, HRW, “Four of Concern”). munitions become child’s play,” Geneva, 17 July224 HI, Les systèmes d’armes à sous-munitions, Etat 2003. des lieux, Lyon, August 2003, p. 43. 246 HI, Les systèmes d’armes à sous-munitions, Etat225 McGrath, Military Effectiveness, p. 36. des lieux, Lyon, August 2003, p. 43.226 Ibid., p. 34. 247 Group of Members of the Spanish Brigade227 Against the War, Evaluation of the Attacks on the HRW, U.S. Cluster Bombs for Turkey, Vol. 6, No. Civilian Population of Baghdad Carried out by 19, December 1994, the Governments of the United States of http://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/turkey2/, America, The United Kingdom and Allied (hereinafter HRW, Bombs for Turkey); U.S. Countries Between 20 March and 15 April 2003, Congress, General Accounting Office (GAO), 26 April 2003, pp. 10-11, pp. 17-18. Operation Desert Storm: Casualties Caused by Improper Handling of Unexploded U.S. 248 Emails from Ahmed al-Zubaidi, Director, IHSCO, 54 / Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions
  • Baghdad, 16 September 2006 and 1 October over ordnance,” The Environmentalist, Volume 2006. 19, Number 4, the Netherlands, December 1999,249 pp. 361-368. Recent casualties are those occurring in the 24 months prior to the date of the survey. In total, 268 HRW, Persian Gulf: U.S. Cluster Bomb Duds A 13 of 18 governorates were surveyed, data col- Threat: Warning Against Use of Cluster Bombs in lection in Salah al-Din (Tikrit) is ongoing and full Iraq, Washington, 18 March 2003, available at data of Tameem (Kirkuk) and Wasit has not been http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/03/18/usint released. 5409.htm, accessed 25 September 2006.250 ILIS, “The Causes of Death and Injury in Iraq due 269 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 964. to ERW,” pp. 1-2; provided by John C. Brown, Iraq 270 Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 1017-1018. Country Team Leader, VVAF, Iraq, 18 May 2006. 271 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 996.251 CIVIC and Iraqi Body Count, “Named and identi- fied victims of the war in Iraq: a memorial,” 272 HRW, Ticking Time Bombs: NATO’s Use of Cluster February 2006, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/. Munitions in Yugoslavia, Vol. 11, No.6 (D), June252 1999, available at Iraqi Body Count, How Many Civilians were http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nato2/, Killed by Cluster Bombs? 6 May 2003, accessed 4 September 2006. http://www.iraqbodycount.org/. 273 Information provided in an email by Rafaat253 “Iraq Says Bombs Left Over From Gulf War Kill Misak, KISR, Kuwait, 28 August 2006. 168 Civilians,” Reuters, 7 Augustus 1991. 274 HRW, NATO’s use of cluster254 HRW, Persian Gulf: U.S. Cluster Bomb Duds a munitions in Yugoslavia, Threat, Washington, 18 March 2003. www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/clus0511.htm,255 HRW, Bombs for Turkey. accessed 25 August 2006.256 Peachey and Wiebe, Clusters of Death. 275 Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 894.257 McGrath, Military Effectiveness, p. 40. 276 Email from Rafaat Misak, KISR, Kuwait, 28258 August 2006. Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 672. 277 Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 781.259 HRW, “Four of Concern.” 278 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 965.260 “Growing Death Toll in EOD Operations,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 20, 1992, p. 1061. 279 “Lebanon finds 25 cluster bombs: army,” Xinhua261 (Beirut), 17 December 2005. HRW, Bombs for Turkey. 280 Franklin Lamb, “Israel’s Gift to Lebanon,”262 HRW, Cluster Munitions: Measures to Prevent in A Quarter Century of Israel’s Use ERW and to Protect Civilian Populations, of American Weapons in Lebanon (1978-2006), Memorandum to Delegates to the Convention on September 2006, http://www.ifamerican- Certain Conventional Weapons Group of sknew.org/cur_sit/clusterbombs.html (here- Governmental Experts on Explosive Remnants of inafter Lamb, “Israel’s Gift”). War, Geneva, 10-14 March 2003, http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/clus- 281 Ibid. ter031003.htm, accessed 25 September 2006. 282 Presentation by Thomas Nash, CMC, Geneva, 21263 HRW, Dirty Dozen. September 2006.264 283 Interview with Andrew Gleeson, Programme Email from Rafaat Misak, Landmine Monitor Researcher, KISR, Kuwait, 28 August 2006; HRW, Manager- Technical Operations Manager, MAG, Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper: Cluster Nabatiyyah, 5 September 2006. Munitions a Foreseeable Hazard in Iraq, March 284 Presentation by Christopher Clark, Operations 2003, available at www.hrw.org/back- Manager, MACC-SL, Geneva, 19 September grounder/arms/cluster031803.htm, accessed 2006. 25 August 2006. 285 HRW, Dirty Dozen.265 United States General Accounting Office, “Appendix III: U.S. Gulf War Casualties by 286 Presentation by Christopher Clark, MACC-SL, Service,” GAO-02-1003: Military Operations: Geneva, 19 September 2006. Information on U.S. Use of Land Mines in the 287 Interview with Lt. Col. Hassan Fakeeh, Lebanese Persian Gulf War, September 2002, p. 3 and p. Armed Forces Representative, MACC-SL, Tyre, 8 32. September 2006.266 HRW, Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper: 288 Interview with Andrew Gleeson, MAG, Cluster Munitions a Foreseeable Hazard in Iraq, Nabatiyyah, 5 September 2006. March 2003, available at www.hrw.org/back- grounder/arms/cluster031803.htm, accessed 289 Interview with Christopher Clark, MACC-SL, 25 August 2006. Geneva, 19 September 2006.267 Ali Muhammad Khuraibe, “Nine years after the 290 Interview with Andrew Gleeson, MAG, invasion of Kuwait: the impacts of the Iraqi left- Nabatiyyah, 5 September 2006. Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munition / 55
  • 291 Interview with Georges Kettaneh, National Programme Officer, UNICEF, Damascus, 11 Director of First Aid Teams & Emergency September, 2006; telephone interview with Dr. Services, Lebanese Red Cross, Beirut, 4 Helmut Friza, Health Attaché, Austrian September 2006. Permanent Mission to the United Nations,292 Geneva, 25 September 2006. Interview with Lt. Col. Hassan Fakeeh, MACC-SL, 313 HRW, Essential Elements. Tyre, 8 September 2006.293 314 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1097-1098. Interviews with Sean Sutton, Overseas Information Manager, MAG, Geneva, 21 315 Telephone interview with Dr. Helmut Friza, September 2006 and with Christopher Clark, Austrian Permanent Mission to the United MACC-SL, Geneva, 19 September 2006. Nations, Geneva, 25 September 2006.294 Interview with Jihad Samhat, Quality Assurance 316 The sovereignty of the Western Sahara remains Officer (MDD), MACC-SL, Tyre, 8 September the subject of a dispute between the govern- 2006. ment of Morocco and the Polisario Front. The295 Lamb, “Israel’s Gift.” Polisario’s Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic is not universally recognized and had no official296 Ibid. representation in the UN.297 Observations made during research field mis- 317 HRW, Essential Elements. Polisario is the sion to Lebanon from 31 August to 10 September acronym for Frente Popular de Liberación de 2006. Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro (Popular Front for298 Lamb, “Israel’s Gift.” the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro).299 HRW, Fatal Strikes: Israel’s Indiscriminate 318 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1196. Attacks against Civilians in Lebanon, Vol. 18 No. 3 (E), August 2006, p.6; see also Letter to 319 Rappert and Moyes, Failure to Protect, p. 7. National Security Advisor Hadley on Requested 320 U.S. Cluster Munition Transfer to Israel, Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1197. Washington, 11 August 2006, 321 MINSURIO, “Mines and UXOs,” http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/08/11/israb http://www.minurso.unlb.org/mines.htm, 13972.htm. accessed 7 September 2006.300 Interview with Georges Kettaneh, Lebanese Red 322 Borrie, Global survey, p. 63; MINSURIO, “Mines Cross, Beirut, 4 September 2006. and UXOs,”301 HRW, Israeli Cluster Munitions Hit Civilians in http://www.minurso.unlb.org/mines.htm, Lebanon, Beirut, 24 July 2006, accessed 7 September 2006. http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/07/24/isrl- 323 Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 1063-1064; pa13798.htm. Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1199-1200;302 Lamb, “Israel’s Gift.” email from Enrico Magnani, (then) Information Officer/IMSMA Focal Point, MINURSO,303 Interview with Thomas Nash, CMC, Geneva, 21 Laayoune, 7 September 2005. September 2006. One included in total. 324 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1200.304 Interview with Adel Maksoudi, Vice-President, 325 Telephone interview with Charlotte McAulay, Ragheb Harb Hospital, Nabatiyyah, 6 September Western Sahara Desk Officer, LMA UK, London, 4 2006. Not included in total. October 2006.305 Interviews in Ain Baal, 8 September 2006. Not 326 Telephone interview with Charlotte McAulay, LMA included in total. UK, London, 4 October 2006; Landmine Monitor306 Interview with Sean Sutton, MAG, Geneva, 21 Report 2006, p. 1200. September 2006. 327 Saharawi Campaign to Ban Landmines casualty307 Interview with Nasser Aboulteif, Director, Vision data collection form provided by Boybat Association, West Bekaa, 7 September 2006. Abdelhay Cheich, Coordinator, Saharawi308 Campaign to Ban Landmines, Tindouf, 21 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 875. September 2006.309 Testimony collected by Handicap International, 328 United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Yohmour, Lebanon, 6 September 2006. Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning310 James Titus, The Battle Of Khafji: An Overview Western Sahara, (S/1998/316),” 13 April 1998, p. And Preliminary Analysis, Airpower Research 3. Institute, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 329 Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 1063-1064; September 1996, p. 25; Carlyle Murphy and Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 1241-1242. Molly Moore, “Attacks at Saudi Border Kill 12 330 These are percentages for casualties whose gen- U.S. Marines,” Washington Post, 31 January 1991; Page A01. der details and age are known, excluding 3,405311 ‘unknowns’. Borrie, Global survey, p. 72.312 Telephone interview with Marc Lucet, 56 / Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions