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Hadoop Security Preview from Yahoo!, presented at the Hadoop Bay Area User Group, March 24th

Hadoop Security Preview from Yahoo!, presented at the Hadoop Bay Area User Group, March 24th

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Hadoop Security Preview Hadoop Security Preview Presentation Transcript

  • Preview of Hadoop Security Owen O’Malley Yahoo Hadoop Development [email_address]
  • Problem
    • Primary Goal: Keep Data in HDFS Secure from unauthorized access!
    • Corollary: All HDFS clients must be authenticated to ensure they are the user they claim to be.
    • Since Map/Reduce runs applications as the user, it must authenticate users.
    • Since servers (HDFS, Map/Reduce) are entrusted with user credentials, they must also be authenticated.
    • Kerberos will be the underlying authentication system.
    • Must be able to configure security on or off.
  • Adding Security to a Large Project
  • Security Development Team
    • Boris Shkolnik
    • Devaraj Das
    • Jakob Homan
    • Owen O’Malley
    • Kan Zhang
    • Jitendra Nath Pandey
    • With Paranoid assistance from:
        • Ram Marti
  • Security Threats in Hadoop
    • User to Service Authentication
      • No User Authentication on NameNode or JobTracker
        • Client code supplies user and group names
      • No User Authorization on DataNode – Fixed in 0.21
        • Users can read/write any block
      • No User Authorization on JobTracker
        • Users can modify or kill other user’s jobs
        • Users can modify the persistent state of JobTracker
    • Service to Service Authentication
      • No Authentication of DataNodes and TaskTrackers
        • Users can start fake DataNodes and TaskTrackers
    • No Encryption on Wire or Disk
  • Definitions
    • Authentication – Ensuring the user is who they claim to be.
      • We have a very poor job of this currently
      • We need it on both RPC and Web UI.
    • Authorization – Ensuring the user can only do things that they are allowed to do.
      • HDFS does this already via owners, groups and permissions
      • Map/Reduce does not do this
  • Using Kerberos and Single Signon
    • Kerberos allows user to sign in once to obtain Ticket Granting Tickets (TGT)
        • kinit – get a new Kerberos ticket
        • klist – list your Kerberos tickets
        • kdestroy – destroy your Kerberos ticket
        • TGT’s last for 10 hours, renewable for 7 days by default
      • PAM on Linux and Solaris can automatically do kinit for you
        • Still needs your password
      • Once you have a TGT Hadoop commands work like before
        • hadoop fs –ls /
        • hadoop jar wordcount.jar in-dir out-dir
  • Kerberos Dataflow
  • API Changes
    • Very Minimal API Changes!
    • UserGroupInformation *completely* changed.
    • MapReduce added Authorization
    • Jobs now have a Credentials object that can store secrets. (available from JobConf and JobContext)
    • Automatically get tokens for HDFS systems
    • Primary HDFS, File{In,Out}putFormat, and DistCp
    • Can set mapreduce.job.hdfs-servers
    • Set ACL’s via mapreduce.job.acl-{view,modify}-job
    Yahoo! Template 3, Confidential
  • Other MapReduce Security Changes
    • MapReduce System directory was 777 but now 700.
    • Tasks run as user instead of TaskTracker user.
    • Task directories were globally visible and now 700.
    • Distributed Cache is now secure
    • Shared (original is world readable) is shared by everyone’s jobs.
    • Private (original is not world readable) is shared by user’s jobs.
  • Web UIs
    • Hadoop and especially MapReduce make heavy use of the Web UIs.
    • These need to be authenticated also…
    • We will make it pluggable, but include a login module that uses the Kerberos username and password.
    • Even better is if someone makes a SPNEGO filter for Jetty that uses the Kerberos tickets from the browser.
    • All of the servlets will use the authenticated username and enforce permissions appropriately.
  • Proxy-Users
    • Some services must access HDFS and MapReduce as other users
    • HDFS and MapReduce allow users to create configuration entries to define:
    • Who the proxy service can impersonate
    • Which hosts they can impersonate from
    • hadoop.proxyuser.superguy.groups=goodguys
    • hadoop.proxyuser.superguy.hosts=secretbase
  • Remaining Security Issues
    • We are not encrypting on the wire.
        • It will be possible within the framework, but not in 0.22.
    • We are not encrypting on disk.
        • For either HDFS or MapReduce.
    • Encryption is expensive in terms of CPU and IO speed.
    • Our current threat model is that the attacker has access to a user account, but not root or physical access.
        • They can’t sniff the packets on the network.