Williing to come over to Haq’s side and bring several military divisions in Kabul with himSaid “everyone supported his plan in Khost, Paktia and PaktikaTold me “The taliban killed him so fast because they were scared he was going to start a revolution”- ie the Taliban knew Haq and perceived him a ‘threat’ but ironically in Washington and London, the west did not see this.
Presentation gcsp lucy morgan edwards
Where we are today• Exit strategy predicated on build up of ANSF by 2014, multiple strands of ‘talks’ with Taliban / incoherence of objectives• Contestation over the ‘narrative’ of the war, Eg. Including ‘transition’, ‘talks’ and ‘exit’. But also due to ‘agenda’ of establishment news outlets especially in the UK (eg. Radio 4 Today Programme).• Expensive ‘high tech’ military solutions to a political problem??. ie how to drive a wedge between the population and the insurgency when the population IS the insurgency.• UK spend will be at least £40 billion on post 2001 Afghan War. US spend is $100 billion per year• civil war (on several levels) / end of Karzai regime when west pulls out extremely likely. Eg. Afghan PSC’s (militias) funded by the west contribute to the proliferation of ‘fronts’• The Pakistan and regional question (again, battle of the narrative over ‘talks’ and ‘who’ to be the benefactor of the western pullout). Eg recent RUSI ‘versus’ NWSC report
How we got to this point. The ‘Strategy’ 2001/2 to Present• OEF and NATO (ISAF - initially restricted to cities).• The Bonn Framework – ‘intended to initiate a political process’ – but leaving out much of local leadership esp. the majority Pashtun who occupy tribal belt where insurgency is based.• Bombing campaign and CIA / Mi6 reversion to their ref. points of the 1980s Soviet jihad – mostly Pakistani ISI and Northern Alliance strongmen (cash, impunity and backing one side against another in ongoing civil war).• NA strongmen take ‘power ministries’ in Kabul with legitimacy of the IC added at the 2002 Emergency LoyaJirga.• Knock on effect = Pashtun alienation, impunity, corruption, blurring between state and criminal networks, clientelism.• No utilisation of ‘Transitional Justice’ as in Balkans or Sierra Leone etc instead unindicted ‘criminals’ become partners of IC• For more detail – see ‘State-building in Afghanistan: a case showing the limits?’ in the International Review of the Red Cross Vol 92, No. 880, Dec, 2010).
What was the ‘alternative’ Afghan strategy (pre and post 9/11)?• The Rome Process – tribal leaders coalesce around ex King – for 2 yrs prior to 9/11• An ‘Internal Solution’ based on Pact Making• Ex King as central figurehead - idea of ‘national unity’• Aimed to exploit fact Taliban were a stratified entity• Abdul Haq as commander with historic legitimacy• Required no bombing. Why?• Characteristics included: - Agreements between tribal leaders, and Haq’s former soviet era commanders, many of whom were embedded in the military axis of Taliban regime - A Recognition that many T were not of same ideology as Al Qa’eda).
Mullah Khaksar, ex Taliban deputy Interior Minister
Lessons for Policymakers (including Arab Spring)• Understand the importance of hybridised governance mechanisms in tribal societies.• (ie not necessarily only a Westphalian nation state is required to stabilise the world order, nor is it appropriate to such contexts)• Sometimes ‘Internal’ solutions work best• Work also from periphery rather than the ‘centre’• Support justice and accountability• Think long term• military ‘solutions’ should be limited to Peace Keeping