B A401 Intel  Corporation Part3
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  • 1. Intel Product Line and Situation in Late 1984
  • 2. Intel Product Line and Situation in Late 1984
    • By the end of 1984, logic product were the dominant source of Intel’s revenue.
    • The 80186 and 80286 were tremendously successful.
    • IBM PC purchased microprocessors either from Intel .
  • 3. Intel Product Line and Situation in Late 1984
    • The only serious 16-bit architectural
    • competitor was Motorola.
    • Intel had developed a microcontroller
    • which integrated logic and memory to
    • provide one-chip computer which
    • were used to control everything
    • from house fans to complex satellites.
  • 4. Intel Product Line and Situation in Late 1984
    • Late 1985 was the successor to the 80268, the 32-bit 80386 microprocessor.
    • Motorola had developed a strong 32-bit product, the 68020,and was
    • already in the marketplace
    • winning designs.
  • 5. Intel Product Line and Situation in Late 1984
    • The 80386 was scheduled to be one of the
    • first product made with the new
    • complementary MOS (CMOS) process.
  • 6. Intel Product Line and Situation in Late 1984
    • In 1984, the Livermore group was developing two distinct processes for SRAM and microprocessor.
    • The high-volume SRAM segment demanded a new four-transistor cell design and process. By contrast, the high-speed SRAM and the new 80386 microprocessor both demand six-transistor CMOS design.
  • 7. Intel Product Line and Situation in Late 1984
    • The high-volume SRAM process required a complex polysilicon resistor technology.
    • Eventually,they decided to drop the polysilicon resistor process and go with six-transitor (focus on 386).
  • 8. Intel Product Line and Situation in Late 1984
    • Development the 386 with a double
    • metalization process while as the same
    • time to reducing line widths to 1.5µm
    • (from 2µm) and implementing the CMOS process.
  • 9. Intel Product Line and Situation in Late 1984
    • Market and technology development which may have contributed to the loss of a competitive SRAM product.
    • SRAM received less attention for high-quality designer.
    • They had a strong position in high-speed SRAM but they give it up without really making a conscious decision.
  • 10. Intel Product Line and Situation in Late 1984
    • The end of 1984 represented the same
    • 30% of revenue that MSO had represented
    • in 1973.
    • While a great deal of system business
    • comprised development products aimed at
    • microprocessor and microcontroller users.
  • 11. Manufacturing and Process Fungibility
  • 12. Manufacturing and Process Fungibility
    • Intel took great pain to standartlize each facility as it expanded its manufacturing base
    • Each Intel chip would
    • “ look and taste” the same
    • no matter which facility produced it
  • 13. Manufacturing and Process Fungibility
    • As larger-diameter silicon wafers became available,Intel developed a process on one line and then transferred the technology to its other facility.
    • By 1984,Intel had seven fab in the united States.Due to more stringent manufacturing standard, the cost of a fab area had risen dramatically since the 1970s.
  • 14. Manufacturing and Process Fungibility
    • Around the time they were deciding to put up a fab in Israel or Japan
    • - Israel had tremendous government subsidies and good labor market.
    • - Japan have a tapped the expertise
    • of Japanese DRAM technology
    • development,silicon maker and
    • the infrastructure support.
  • 15. Manufacturing and Process Fungibility
    • There are three main process areas : fabrication,assembly and test.
    • Fabrication is usually the bottleneck in times of tight capacity. – the good one was allocation.
    • The finance group thought of DRAM as a “low ROI,high beta” product line.
  • 16. Environmental Forces
  • 17. Environmental Forces - Competitors -
    • 1.U.S. full line digital design and supply houses
    • - Motorola: produced DRAM,
    • microcontroller and microprocessor
    • - National Semiconductor
    • - Texas Instrument : microprocessor
  • 18. Environmental Forces - Competitors -
    • 2. AMD
    • 3. Japan- Hitachi, Fujitsu, NEC, Toshiba
    • - DRAM SRAM and EPROM. Served second source to U.S. microprocessor microcontroller suppliers
  • 19. DRAM Situation in 1984 Loss of Leadership Position
  • 20. DRAM Situation in 1984 Loss of Leadership Position
    • By the end of 1984,Intel had lost significant market share in DRAM.The first real difficulties had come with the 64K generation.
    • Ron Whittier said that 64K version,
    • the memory cell size was reduced,
    • but the actual die size still had to be increased significantly.
  • 21. DRAM Situation in 1984 Loss of Leadership Position
    • The DRAM group calculated that the
    • required die size would be too big.The 64K
    • DRAM would be too slow to be acceptable,
    • In order to boost yield,the group decided to
    • build in redundancy at the chip level.
  • 22. DRAM Situation in 1984 Loss of Leadership Position
    • Redundancy – Intel added an extra column of memory elements so that in the event of a process-induced defect,the auxiliary column could be activated.There was a physical switch, or “fuse” built into each column which could be address by the tester machinery.
  • 23. DRAM Situation in 1984 Loss of Leadership Position
    • TI ,engineers had concluded redundancy would not be economical and
    • had deferred the discussion
    • until the next generation.
  • 24. Attempts to Regain Leadership Position
  • 25. Attempts to Regain Leadership Position
    • NMOS to CMOS
    • - CMOS circuit was more complex
    • - used in laptop
    • Intel produced CMOS 64K and 256K DRAM in a niche strategy.
  • 26. Attempts to Regain Leadership Position
    • In1983
    • Demand was in an upswing,and Intel seemed to have a techonology strategy which could lead to dominance in the 1-meg DRAM.
  • 27. Attempts to Regain Leadership Position
    • In 1984
    • CMOS DRAM price at about one and a half to two times the prevailing NMOS price.
    • Niche strategy : differentiate the product from other offering, and sell it on features.
  • 28. Attempts to Regain Leadership Position
    • The price of NMOS DRAMs fell by 40% from
    • May to August 1984.
    • By late 1984 Intel was down to less than 4%
    • of the 256K market and had lost its position
    • entirely in 64K DRAMs.
  • 29. Attempts to Regain Leadership Position
    • In the future
    • The 1-meg DRAM will be a technically
    • outstanding product, at least one and a half
    • to two years ahead any competition.
    • A technology transfer deal should with
    • a Korean chip manufacturer.
    • New competitor
  • 30. Option for DRAM
  • 31. Option for DRAM
    • 1. drop it all together.
    • 2. stay on the business as a niche player.
    • 3. license the technology to another company
    • 4. invest in DRAM capability at the 1-meg level and commit to a low-margin business.
  • 32. Option for DRAM
    • We have been trying to find a clever way
    • to stay in this business without betting
    • everything we have, but maybe there
    • is none.