Your SlideShare is downloading. ×
Weapons Of Mass Destruction
Upcoming SlideShare
Loading in...5
×

Thanks for flagging this SlideShare!

Oops! An error has occurred.

×
Saving this for later? Get the SlideShare app to save on your phone or tablet. Read anywhere, anytime – even offline.
Text the download link to your phone
Standard text messaging rates apply

Weapons Of Mass Destruction

89,105
views

Published on

Weapons Of Mass Destruction

Weapons Of Mass Destruction


1 Comment
6 Likes
Statistics
Notes
No Downloads
Views
Total Views
89,105
On Slideshare
0
From Embeds
0
Number of Embeds
0
Actions
Shares
0
Downloads
732
Comments
1
Likes
6
Embeds 0
No embeds

Report content
Flagged as inappropriate Flag as inappropriate
Flag as inappropriate

Select your reason for flagging this presentation as inappropriate.

Cancel
No notes for slide

Transcript

  • 1. Weapons of Mass Destruction Volume I: Chemical and Biological Weapons
  • 2. Weapons of Mass Destruction An Encyclopedia of Worldwide Policy, Technology, and History Eric A. Croddy and James J. Wirtz, Editors Jeffrey A. Larsen, Managing Editor Foreword by David Kay Volume I: Chemical and Biological Weapons Eric A. Croddy, Editor Santa Barbara, California Denver, Colorado Oxford, England
  • 3. Copyright 2005 by Eric A. Croddy, James J. Wirtz, and Jeffrey A. Larsen All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Weapons of mass destruction : an encyclopedia of worldwide policy, technology, and history / Eric A. Croddy and James J. Wirtz, editors. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-85109-490-3 (hardback : alk. paper)—ISBN 1-85109-495-4 (e-book) 1. Weapons of mass destruction—Encyclopedias. I. Croddy, Eric, 1966– II. Wirtz, James J., 1958– U793.W427 2005 358'.3'03—dc22 2004024651 0807060510987654321 This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit abc-clio.com for details. ABC-CLIO, Inc. 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116–1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper. Manufactured in the United States of America
  • 4. Contents Weapons of Mass Destruction An Encyclopedia of Worldwide Policy, Technology, and History Volume I: Chemical and Biological Weapons Foreword, vii Preface: Weapons of Mass Destruction, ix Editors and Contributors, xiii A-to-Z List of Entries, Volumes I and II, xvii Introduction: Chemical and Biological Weapons, xxv Chronology: Chemical and Biological Weapons, xxxi Chemical and Biological Weapons, Entries A to Y, 1 Key Documents: Chemical and Biological Weapons, 341 Bibliography, 395 Index, 413 v
  • 5. Foreword David Kay Senior Research Analyst, Potomac Institute, The importance of this encyclopedia was under- Washington, D.C., and former Director, scored by the fact that virtually the only area of Iraq Survey Group (2003–2004) agreement in the 2004 U.S. presidential campaign between the two major candidates, President George W. Bush and Senator John F. Kerry, was that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses the most serious national security threat with made new classes of weapons possible. But scientific which the next president would have to deal. progress marches at a very fast rate, leaving behind While the prospect of chemical, biological, radi- old, but still dangerous, knowledge. For example, ological, or nuclear weapons falling into the hands the secrets regarding methods for enriching ura- of terrorists or regimes hostile to the United States nium were simply bought by the Iraqis from the and its friends is indeed a frightening prospect, how U.S. Government Printing Office. That office could many of us understand exactly what this means? not imagine that there was anything important in a When were such weapons first developed? Which 40-year-old project from the dawn of the U.S. nu- states and scientists are leading these developments? clear program. Have these weapons actually been used in the past? In another remarkable case, uranium enrichment How often and with what consequence—not only technology was stolen from a commercial company for the populations they were used against, but for in Holland by A. Q. Khan—a rather ordinary Pak- those that used them, as well? Do these weapons re- istani who went to Germany to earn an engineering ally give states a decisive edge over their adversaries? degree. Khan subsequently used this technology to How easy are they to develop and use? Does the ease develop Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and then sold the of development or use of such weapons by states, same technology to North Korea, Iran, and Libya. like North Korea, differ from the obstacles faced by The techniques of gene modification, which less than terrorist groups, like al-Qaeda? What are the tools 20 years ago were the stuff of Nobel prizes, are now available to the United States to halt the spread of routinely taught in American high schools and com- such weapons? Have we had any success in limiting munity colleges and have opened up whole new the spread of these weapons? Are there any protec- classes of biological weapons. As this study also tive measures that individuals can take to lessen makes clear, even the safe disposal of weapons of their vulnerability if such weapons are used? mass destruction following a state’s decision to aban- These are but a few of the questions that the au- don or limit their programs presents serious chal- thors of this authoritative two-volume study at- lenges of preventing the weapons and associated tempt to answer. This encyclopedia will have endur- technology from falling into the hands of terrorists. ing importance as states and societies attempt to The thousands of Soviet-era nuclear weapons and come to terms with the consequence of the collision the engineering talent that created them represent a of scientific progress with the failure to develop a re- clear and present danger with which the world has liable global security structure. The initial develop- not yet completely dealt. The readers of this work will ment of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, find numerous examples of the lowering of the bar- as this study makes clear, often involved scientific riers to the acquisition by states and terrorists of these and engineering breakthroughs of the highest most terrible of weapons. order. The paths to enriching uranium and geneti- But this study does not simply present the horrors cally modifying pathogens are but two examples of of a world filled with weapons of mass destruction. It such successes, scientific breakthroughs that have also catalogs and illuminates the various methods of vii
  • 6. viii FOREWORD attempting to control and constrain these weapons— the few efforts made in this regard, it is hard not to including treaties and agreements such as the Nuclear come away with a sense of dread for the future. Most Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons control efforts have been aimed at states, not at ter- Convention, as well as intrusive inspections, such as rorists operating outside of the control of states. the efforts of the United Nations to hunt such Hopefully students and policy makers using this weapons in Iraq after the first Gulf War. As will be book a few years hence will be able to record more clear to the reader, such endeavors have had both suc- progress toward meeting this new challenge. cesses and failures. Much remains to be done to en- The authors and editors have done an important sure that their effectiveness matches the problems service by pulling together such an illuminating posed by the proliferation of such weapons. The study at exactly the point when there is a broad po- largest gap in effective mechanisms of control and re- litical consensus of the importance of the problem. sponse to the acquisition of such weapons is with re- One can only hope that our citizens and our politi- gard to the efforts of terrorists groups to acquire the cal leaders take the time to explore the depth of in- means of mass murder. While these volumes identify formation presented here.
  • 7. Preface: Weapons The term “weapon of mass destruction” (WMD) is of Mass Destruction a relatively modern expression. It was probably first used in print media following the interna- Eric A. Croddy and James J. Wirtz tional uproar over Germany’s aerial bombardment of the Basque city of Guernica in April 1937. (The latter event was famously depicted in Picasso’s painting Guernica y Luno.) Only a year before, an- never particularly enamored by chemical or biolog- other Axis power, Italy, had begun using mustard ical weapons and treated them as a deterrent to be and other chemical warfare (CW) agents in used in retaliation for the use of chemical or bio- Abyssinia (modern-day Ethiopia).1 During the logical weapons used by the opponent. By the early anxious years leading up World War II, WMD re- 1990s, the U.S. military had abandoned offensive ferred to the indiscriminate killing of civilians by use of these weapons, although it maintained a re- modern weaponry, especially aircraft. It also search and development program designed to pro- echoed the fear of chemical weapons that was un- duce effective equipment, procedures, medications, leashed by World War I, which had come to a con- and inoculations to defend against chemical and bi- clusion just a few years earlier. ological attack. Following the development of the atomic bomb Over the last decade, much has been written in 1945, the term “WMD” came to include nuclear about WMD. The meaning of the term itself is and eventually biological weapons. WMD was ap- somewhat controversial, although there is a formal, parently first used to describe nuclear warfare by legalistic definition. According to U.S. Code Title Soviet strategists. In 1956, during the 20th Commu- 50, “War and National Defense,” per the U.S. Con- nist Party Congress in Moscow, the Soviet Minister gress, the term “weapon of mass destruction”means of Defense—and “Hero of Stalingrad”—Marshal “any weapon or device that is intended, or has the Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov prophesied that capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to modern warfare “will be characterized by the mas- a significant number of people through the release, sive use of air forces, various rocket weapons and dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous various means of mass destruction such as atomic, chemicals or their precursors; a disease organism; thermonuclear, chemical and bacteriological radiation or radioactivity.”4 For its part, the U.S. De- weapons.”2 In that same year, the Hungarian Minis- partment of Defense has a similar characterization ter of Defense echoed Marshal Zhukov, stating that of WMD, although in addition it includes “...the “Under modern conditions, the decisive aspect of means to deliver [WMD].”5 So, what makes a operational planning is the use of nuclear and other weapon massively destructive? Is it the type of inju- weapons of mass destruction.”3 rious agents involved, namely radioactive, chemical, When the West learned of Zhukov’s speech, na- or biological, or is it that the attack itself produces tional security strategists in the United States and significant casualties or destruction? Also what elsewhere became quite concerned. By inference, would “significant” mean in this context: ten, a hun- they concluded that WMD—nuclear, biological, dred, or a thousand casualties? What if very few and chemical weapons—were an integral part of people are actually killed or hurt by at attack? In the Soviet military doctrine. Partly in response to latter respect, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investiga- Zhukov’s ministrations on WMD, the United States tion has a rather unique and somewhat satisfying reviewed its offensive chemical and biological interpretation of the term “WMD,” invoked when weapons program in 1958. The U.S. military was the U.S. government indicted Timothy McVeigh ix
  • 8. x PREFACE with using a WMD in his 1995 terrorist attack in ture and that civilized people everywhere reject the Oklahoma City. In this case, although the device use of chemical and biological weapons. Interna- used was a conventional bomb (employing ammo- tional law is replete with treaties, agreements, and nium nitrate-fuel oil explosive), “A weapon crosses regimes whose purpose is to proscribe the use of the WMD threshold when the consequences of its these weapons, or mitigate the consequences of any release overwhelm local responders.”6 such use. In particular, the world has successfully Some analysts, however, have suggested that kept nuclear weapons in reserve for almost sixty various technical hurdles prevent chemical and years as truly deterrent weapons of last resort. even biological weapons from causing casualties Our encyclopedia covers a wide range of topics, on a truly massive scale. Some point to the Aum some historical, some drawn from today’s headlines. Shinrikyo sarin attack on the Tokyo subway system We describe many of the pathogens, diseases, sub- on March 20, 1995, which resulted in eleven stances, and machines that can serve as weapons of deaths, as an example of the limits of WMD. They mass destruction, as well as their associated delivery note that high-explosives have been used with far systems. We also describe important events and in- greater lethal effects than sarin in the annals of dividuals that have been influential in the develop- modern terrorism. Others are increasingly con- ment of weapons of mass destruction and doctrines cerned about the destructive potential of even for their use (or control). We have encouraged our rudimentary weapons. Analysts today are worried, contributors to highlight ongoing controversies and for instance, that terrorists might try to employ ra- contemporary concerns about WMD and current diological dispersal devices or “dirty bombs.” international arms control and nonproliferation ef- These weapons do not detonate with a fission re- forts intended to reduce the threat they pose to action, but rather utilize conventional explosives to world peace and security. Even a work of this length, distribute radiological materials and contaminate however, cannot completely cover the history, sci- a given area. Few deaths are likely to result from the ence, and personal stories associated with a topic of effects of a dirty bomb, but the consequences—in this magnitude, so we have included abundant ref- terms of anxiety, clean-up, and the recognized abil- erences to help readers take those initial steps for ity of a terrorist to conduct the very act itself— further study of the topics we survey. would likely be far reaching. Acknowledgments About the Encyclopedia Our deepest debt is to the contributors who made The very presence of chemical, biological and nu- this volume a reality. Many of them joined the proj- clear weapons in international arsenals and the po- ect at its inauguration several years ago and have tential that they might fall into the hands of terror- waited a long time to see their work in print. It is im- ist organizations guarantees that weapons of mass possible for just three people to be experts on all of destruction will be of great policy, public, and schol- the subjects covered in this volume, and without the arly interest for years to come. We cannot resolve the hard work of our contributors, this encyclopedia debates prompted by WMD, but we hope that we would never have been completed. Thanks to our and our contributors can provide facts to help the research assistants, Abraham Denmark and Laura reader sort through the controversies that are likely Fontaine, who uncovered most of the key docu- to emerge in the years ahead. Much that is contained ments in both volumes and wrote a few entries for in these volumes is disturbing and even frightening; us, as well. We also want to express our appreciation it is impossible to write a cheery encyclopedia about to a senior government official who reviewed Vol- weapons whose primary purpose is to conduct ume II for accuracy and sensitive material. We owe postindustrial-scale mass murder. The sad truth of a special debt to Jeff Larsen, our managing editor, the matter is that chemical, biological, radiological, whose help was instrumental in the success of this and nuclear weapons reflect the willingness of hu- project. Not only did he provide editorial support to mans to go to great lengths to find increasingly both volumes, but he displayed a keen ability to deal lethal and destructive instruments of war and vio- with the publisher and our 95 contributors, keep lence. We are pleased to note, however, that much of track of timelines, requirements, and progress, and what is reported in these volumes is historical in na- gently push the two of us when we needed encour-
  • 9. PREFACE xi agement during this multiyear project that involved Frederick R. Sidell, Ernest T. Takafuji, and David over 500 separate parts. Finally, we also want to ex- R. Franz, eds., Textbook of Military Medicine, press our appreciation to Alicia Merritt, Martha Part I: Warfare, Weaponry, and the Casualty: Whitt, Giulia Rossi, and the behind-the-scenes Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological copyeditors at ABC-CLIO who worked tirelessly to Warfare (Washington, DC: Borden Institute, help get this manuscript into print. We discovered Walter Reed Army Medical Center, 1997), p. 54. 3. Quoted in the archives, “Report of Colonel- that nothing is a trivial matter when it comes to a General István Bata, Hungarian Minister of manuscript of this size. The commitment of our Defense, to Members of the HWP Central publisher to this topic, and the dedication of the Committee on the Conduct of the Staff- production staff at ABC-CLIO, greatly facilitated Command Exercise Held, 17 July 1956,” found at the completion of these volumes. the International Relations and Security We hope that this encyclopedia will help inform Network (Switzerland), documents collection, the public debate about weapons of mass destruc- http://www.isn.ethz.ch/ tion and international security policy, with the goal 4. Title 50, Chapter 40, Sec. 2302. of never again seeing such weapons used in anger. 5. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, DC: U.S. Notes Government Printing Office, 2001), p. 4. 1. Stanley D. Fair, “Mussolini’s Chemical War,” 6. U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), “The Army, January 1985, p. 52. FBI and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 4 2. Jeffery K. Smart, “History of Chemical and August 1999, http://norfolk.fbi.gov.wmd.htm Biological Warfare: An American Perspective,” in
  • 10. Editors Editors and ERIC A. CRODDY (EDITOR, VOLUME I, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS) Contributors Analyst with U.S. Pacific Command, Pearl Harbor, HI JAMES J. WIRTZ (EDITOR, VOLUME II, JEFFREY M. BALE NUCLEAR WEAPONS) Senior Research Associate, Monterey Institute Professor and Chair, Department of National of International Studies, Monterey, CA Security Affairs, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, and Senior Fellow, ZACH BECKER Center for International Security and Science Applications International Corporation, Cooperation, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA Arlington, VA JEFFREY A. LARSEN (MANAGING EDITOR, ANJALI BHATTACHARJEE VOLUMES I AND II) Research Associate, WMD Terrorism Project, Senior Policy Analyst, Science Applications Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey International Corporation and President, Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA Larsen Consulting Group, Colorado Springs, CO JENNIFER BROWER Science and Technology Policy Analyst, The Contributors RAND Corporation, Arlington, VA GARY ACKERMAN Deputy Director, Chemical and Biological WILLIAM D. CASEBEER Weapons Nonproliferation Program, Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Monterey Institute of International Studies, U.S. Air Force Academy, CO Monterey, CA KALPANA CHITTARANJAN JEFFREY A. ADAMS Research Fellow, Observer Research Senior Analyst, Analytic Services, Inc. (ANSER), Foundation, Chennai Chapter, Chennai, India Arlington, VA CLAY CHUN PETER ALMQUIST Chairman, Department of Distance Education, Bureau of Arms Control, U.S. Department of U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA State, Washington, DC WILLIAM S. CLARK ELIZABETH AYLOTT Defense Policy Analyst, Science Applications Plans and Policy Analyst, Science Applications International Corporation, Arlington, VA International Corporation, Ramstein Air Base, Germany CHRIS CRAIGE Graduate Student, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA xiii
  • 11. xiv EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS MALCOLM DAVIS ANDREA GABBITAS Lecturer, Defence Studies Department, King’s Graduate Student, Department of Political College London, London, UK Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA ABE DENMARK Graduate Student, Graduate School of SCOTT SIGMUND GARTNER International Studies, University of Denver, Associate Professor, Department of Political Denver, CO Science, University of California–Davis, Davis, CA JOHN W. DIETRICH MICHAEL GEORGE Assistant Professor, Bryant University, Policy Analyst, Science Applications Smithfield, RI International Corporation, Arlington, VA ANDREW M. DORMAN DON GILLICH Lecturer in Defence Studies, King’s College Nuclear Research and Operations Officer, U.S. London, London, UK Army, Colorado Springs, CO FRANNIE EDWARDS DAN GOODRICH Office of Emergency Services, San Jose, CA Public Health Department, Santa Clara, CA LAWRENCE R. FINK PHIL GRIMLEY Corporate Export Administration, International Professor of Pathology and Molecular Cell Legal Department, Science Applications Biology, F. Edward Herbert Medical School, International Corporation, Arlington, VA Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences, Bethesda, MD STEPHANIE FITZPATRICK Arms Control/Policy Analyst, Independent EUGENIA K. GUILMARTIN Consultant, Arlington, VA Assistant Professor, Department of Social Sciences, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY SCHUYLER FOERSTER President, World Affairs Council of Pittsburgh, JOHN HART Pittsburgh, PA Researcher, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Solna, Sweden LAURA FONTAINE Graduate Student, Graduate School of PETER HAYS International Studies, University of Denver, Executive Editor, Joint Force Quarterly, National Denver, CO Defense University, Washington, DC J. RUSS FORNEY JAMES JOYNER Associate Professor, Department of Chemistry Managing Editor, Strategic Insights, and Life Science, U.S. Military Academy, West Washington, DC Point, NY AARON KARP MARTIN FURMANSKI Professor, Old Dominion University, and Scientists Working Group on Biological and Assistant Professor, U.S. Joint Forces Staff Chemical Weapons, Center for Arms Control College, Norfolk, VA and Nonproliferation, Ventura, CA KERRY KARTCHNER Senior Advisor for Missile Defense Policy, U.S. State Department, Washington, DC
  • 12. EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS xv MIKE KAUFHOLD CLAUDINE MCCARTHY Senior National Security Policy Analyst, Science National Association of County and City Health Applications International Corporation, San Officials, Washington, DC Antonio, TX JEFFREY D. MCCAUSLAND BRET KINMAN Director, Leadership in Conflict Initiative, Graduate Student, Department of National Dickinson College, Carlisle, PA Security Affairs, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA PATRICIA MCFATE Science Applications International Corporation, KIMBERLY L. KOSTEFF Santa Fe, NM Policy Analyst, Science Applications International Corporation, Arlington, VA ROB MELTON Assistant Professor of Military Strategic Studies, AMY E. KRAFFT 34th Education Group, U.S. Air Force Academy, Research Biologist, Department of Molecular CO Genetic Pathology, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, Rockville, MD BRIAN MORETTI Assistant Professor, Department of Physics, U.S. JENNIFER LASECKI Military Academy, West Point, NY Computer Sciences Corporation, Alexandria, VA JENNIFER HUNT MORSTEIN PETER LAVOY Senior Analyst, Science Applications Director, Center for Contemporary Conflict, International Corporation, McLean, VA U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA EDWARD P. NAESSENS, JR. SEAN LAWSON Associate Professor, Nuclear Engineering Graduate Student, Department of Science and Program Director, Department of Physics, U.S. Technology Studies, Rensselaer Polytechnic Military Academy, West Point, NY Institute, Troy, NY T. V. PAUL MICHAEL LIPSON James McGill Professor of International Assistant Professor, Department of Political Relations, McGill University, Montreal, Canada Science, Concordia University, Montreal, Canada ROY PETTIS Science Advisor to the Office of Strategic and BRIAN L’ITALIEN Theater Defenses, Bureau of Arms Control, U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC State Department, Washington, DC MORTEN BREMER MAERLI RICH PILCH Researcher, Norwegian Institute of International Scientist in Residence, Chemical and Biological Affairs, Oslo, Norway Nonproliferation Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of TOM MAHNKEN International Studies, Monterey, CA Professor of Strategy, Naval War College, Newport, RI ELIZABETH PRESCOTT International Institute for Strategic Studies, ROBERT MATHEWS Washington, DC Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law, University of Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
  • 13. xvi EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS BEVERLEY RIDER ROBERT SOBESKI Senior Scientist, Genencor International, Inc., Assistant Professor, Department of Physics, U.S. Palo Alto, CA Military Academy, West Point, NY GUY ROBERTS JOHN SPYKERMAN Principal Director, Negotiations Policy, Office of Foreign Affairs Officer, U.S. State Department, the Secretary of Defense, Washington DC Washington, DC J. SIMON ROFE TROY S. THOMAS Lecturer, Defence Studies Department, King’s Fellow, Center for Strategic Intelligence College London, London, UK Research, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC KEN ROGERS Professor of Political Science, Department of CHARLES L. THORNTON Social Sciences and Philosophy, Arkansas Tech Research Fellow, Center for International and University, Russellville, AR Security Studies, School of Public Policy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD STEVEN ROSENKRANTZ Foreign Affairs Officer, Office of Strategic and ROD THORNTON Theater Defenses, Bureau of Arms Control, U.S. Lecturer, Defence Studies Department, King’s State Department, Washington, DC College London, London, UK C. ROSS SCHMIDTLEIN ANTHONY TU Research Fellow, Department of Medical Department of Biochemistry and Molecular Physics, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Biology, Colorado State University, Ft Collins, CO Center, New York, NY PETER VALE GLEN M. SEGELL Nelson Mandela Professor of Politics, Rhodes Director, Institute of Security Policy, London, University, Grahamstown, South Africa UK GILLES VAN NEDERVEEN D. SHANNON SENTELL, JR. Independent Consultant, Fairfax, VA Assistant Professor, Department of Physics, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY MICHAEL WHEELER Senior Defense Analyst, Science Applications JACQUELINE SIMON International Corporation, McLean, VA Independent Consultant, Ottawa, Canada JOLIE WOOD JOSHUA SINAI Graduate Student, Department of Government, Analytic Services, Inc. (ANSER), Alexandria, VA University of Texas, Austin, TX STANLEY R. SLOAN JACK WOODALL Visiting Scholar, Middlebury College, and Visiting Professor, Department of Medical Director, Atlantic Community Initiative, Biochemistry, Federal University of Rio de Richmond, VT Janeiro, Brazil JAMES M. SMITH ROBERT WYMAN Director, USAF Institute for National Security Arms Control Operations Specialist, Science Studies, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Applications International Corporation, Springs, CO Arlington, VA
  • 14. Volume I: Chemical and Biological Weapons A to Z List of Entries, Aberdeen Proving Ground Abrin Volumes I and II Adamsite (DM, diphenylaminochlorarsine Aerosol Agent Orange Agroterrorism (Agricultural Biological Chemical and Biological Munitions and Military Warfare) Operations Al-Qaeda Chemical Warfare Al Shifa Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Amiton (VG) Chlamydia Psittaci (Psittacosis) Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil (ANFO) Chlorine Gas Anthrax Chloropicrin (PS, Trichloronitromethane) Aralsk Smallpox Outbreak Choking Agents (Asphyxiants) Arbusov Reaction Cholera (Vibrio cholerae) Arsenicals Conotoxin Atropine Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever Aum Shinrikyo Crop Dusters (Aerial Applicators) The Australia Group CS Cyclosarin (GF) Bari Incident Bhopal, India: Union Carbide Accident Decontamination Bigeye (BLU-80) Demilitarization of Chemical and Biological Binary Chemical Munitions Agents Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Dianisidine (BTWC) Difluor (DF, Difluoromethylphosphonate) Biological Terrorism: Early Warning via the Diisopropyl Fluorophosphate (DFP) Internet Dioxin Biological Warfare Diphosgene Biopreparat Dual-Use Bioregulators Dugway Proving Ground Bioterrorism Bleach EA2192 Blood Agents EMPTA (O-Ethyl Methylphosphonothioic Acid) Botulism (Botulinum Toxin) Enterovirus 70 Brucellosis (Brucella Bacterium) Equine Encephalitis (VEE, WEE, EEE) Ethiopia (Abyssinia) C-4 Explosives Carbamates Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Fentanyl (CDC) Fermenter Chemical Agent Monitor Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus xvii
  • 15. xviii A TO Z LIST OF ENTRIES Fort Detrick Oklahoma City Bombing Fuel-Air Explosive (FAE) Organophosphates Osama bin Laden Gas Gangrene Oximes Geneva Protocol Glanders (Burkholderia Mallei) Parasites—Fungal Gruinard Island Parathion (Methyl and Ethyl) G-Series Nerve Agents Perfluoroisobutylene (PFIB) Gulf War: Chemical and Biological Weapons Phosgene Gas (Carbonyl Chloride) Gulf War Syndrome Phosgene Oxime (CX, Dichloroform Oxime) Pine Bluff, Arkansas Hague Convention Plague Halabja Incident Plasticized Explosives Heartwater (Cowdria Ruminantium) Point Source Hemorrhagic Fevers Porton Down, United Kingdom Herbicides Precursors Protective Measures: Biological Weapons India: Chemical and Biological Weapons Protective Measures: Chemical Weapons Programs Psychoincapacitants Inversion Pyridostigmine Bromide Iran: Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs Iran-Iraq War Q-Fever Iraq: Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs QL Japan and WMD Ricin Johnston Atoll Rift Valley Fever Riot Control Agents Kaffa, Siege of Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever Korean War Russia: Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs Late Blight of Potato Fungus (Phytophthora Infestans) Sabotage Libya and WMD Salmonella Line Source Sarin Livens Projector Semtex Lyophilization Shikhany Simulants Marburg Virus Sino-Japanese War Melioidosis Skatole Microencapsulation Smallpox Mustard (Sulfur and Nitrogen) Soman Mycotoxins South Africa: Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs Napalm South Korea: Chemical and Biological Weapons Nerve Agents Programs Newcastle Disease Spore Newport Facility, Indiana Stabilizers North Korea: Chemical and Biological Weapons Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B Programs Stepnogorsk Novichok Sverdlovsk Anthrax Accident
  • 16. A TO Z LIST OF ENTRIES xix Syria: Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs Acheson-Lililenthal Report Actinides Tabun Airborne Alert Terrorism with CBRN Weapons Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty Thickeners Antinuclear Movement TNT Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Weapons Tobacco Mosaic Virus Arms Control Tooele, Utah Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Toxins (Natural) Arms Race Toxoids and Antitoxins Assured Destruction Tularemia Atomic Energy Act Tuberculosis (TB, Mycobacterium Tuberculosis) Atomic Energy Commission Typhus (Rickettsia Prowazekii) Atomic Mass/Number/Weight Atoms for Peace Unit 731 United Kingdom: Chemical and Biological Backpack Nuclear Weapons Weapons Programs Balance of Terror United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) United Nations Special Commission on Iraq Ballistic Missiles (UNSCOM) Baruch Plan United States: Chemical and Biological Weapons Bikini Island Programs Bombers, Russian and Chinese Nuclear-Capable Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Bombers, U.S. Nuclear-Capable Boost-Phase Intercept Vaccines Bottom-Up Review V-Agents Brilliant Eyes Vector Brinkmanship VECTOR: State Research Center of Virology and British Nuclear Forces and Doctrine Biotechnology Broken Arrow, Bent Spear Vesicants Vietnam War Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) Reactor Vincennite (Hydrogen Cyanide) The Catholic Church and Nuclear War Chelyabinsk-40 Weteye Bomb Chernobyl World Trade Center Attack (1993) Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado World War I Chicken, Game of World War II: Biological Weapons Chinese Nuclear Forces and Doctrine World War II: Chemical Weapons City Avoidance Wushe Incident Civil Defense Cold Launch Xylyl Bromide Cold War Collateral Damage Yellow Rain Command and Control Yemen Committee on the Present Danger Ypres Compellence Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Volume II: Nuclear Weapons Conference on Disarmament Accidental Nuclear War Conference on Security and Cooperation in Accuracy Europe (CSCE)
  • 17. xx A TO Z LIST OF ENTRIES Confidence- and Security-Building Measures Equivalent Megaton (CSBMs) Escalation Containment Essential Equivalence Cooperative Threat Reduction (The Nunn-Lugar European Atomic Energy Community Program) (EURATOM) Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Extended Deterrence Controls (COCOM) Correlation of Forces Failsafe Counterforce Targeting Fallout Countermeasures Fast Breeder Reactors Counterproliferation Fat Man Countervailing Strategy Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Countervalue Targeting Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Coupling Firebreaks Credibility First Strike Crisis Stability Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) Critical Nuclear Weapons Design Information Fission Weapons (CNWDI) Flexible Response Criticality and Critical Mass The Football Cruise Missiles Forward-Based Systems Cuban Missile Crisis Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) Fratricide Damage Limitation French Nuclear Forces and Doctrine Data Exchanges Fuel Fabrication The Day After Fusion Dealerting Decapitation G8 Global Partnership Program Declared Facility Gaither Commission Report Decoys Game Theory Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Gas-Graphite Reactors Dense Pack Geiger Counter Department of Defense (DOD) Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) Department of Energy (DOE) Graphite Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Gravity Bombs Depleted Uranium (U-238) Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) Deployment Ground Zero Depressed Trajectory Gun-Type Devices Détente Deterrence Half-Life Deuterium Hanford, Washington Disarmament Hard and Deeply Buried Targets Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line Harmel Report Downloading Heavy Bombers Dual-Track Decision Heavy ICBMs Heavy Water Early Warning Hedge Emergency Action Message (EAM) Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Enola Gay Hiroshima Enrichment Horizontal Escalation Entry into Force Hot Line Agreements
  • 18. A TO Z LIST OF ENTRIES xxi Hydrogen Bomb Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX) Implementation Mobile ICBMs Implosion Devices Moratorium Improvised Nuclear Devices Moscow Antiballistic Missile System Inadvertent Escalation Multilateral Nuclear Force Indian Nuclear Weapons Program Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle Inertial Navigation and Missile Guidance (MIRV) Institute for Advanced Study Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nagasaki Iranian Nuclear Weapons Program National Command Authority Iraqi Nuclear Forces and Doctrine National Emergency Airborne Command Post Isotopes (NEACP) Israeli Nuclear Weapons Capabilities and Doctrine National Strategic Target List National Technical Means Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Negative Security Assurances (NSAs) Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Neutron Bomb (Enhanced Radiation Weapon) Korean Peninsula Neutrons Nevada Test Site Kiloton New Look Kwajalein Atoll Nike Zeus No First Use Launch on Warning/Launch under Attack Non–Nuclear Weapons States Launchers Nonproliferation Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory North American Aerospace Defense Command Light-Water Reactors (NORAD) Limited Nuclear War North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program Lithium Nuclear Binding Energy Little Boy Nuclear Emergency Search Teams (NESTs) Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces Nuclear Fuel Cycle Los Alamos National Laboratory Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) Nuclear Planning Group Nuclear Posture Review Maneuvering Reentry Vehicle (MARV) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Manhattan Project Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs) Massive Retaliation Nuclear Suppliers Group Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles Nuclear Taboo Megaton Nuclear Test Ban Megawatt Nuclear Warhead Storage and Transportation Midgetman ICBMs Security (Russia) Military Technical Revolution (Revolution in Nuclear Weapons Effects Military Affairs) Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZs) Minimum Deterrence Nuclear Weapons States Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) Nuclear Winter Minuteman ICBM Missile Defense Oak Ridge National Laboratory Missile Gap On the Beach
  • 19. xxii A TO Z LIST OF ENTRIES One-Point Detonation/One-Point Safe Research Reactors On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) Restricted Data (RD) Open Skies Treaty Reykjavik Summit Outer Space Treaty Ride Out Overhead Surveillance Rocky Flats, Colorado Roentgen Equivalent Man (Rem) Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Program Rumsfeld Commission Pantex Facility, Texas Russian Nuclear Forces and Doctrine Parity Payload Safeguard Antiballistic Missile (ABM) System Peaceful Coexistence Safeguards Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Sandia National Laboratories Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) Savannah River Site, South Carolina Peacekeeper Missile Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs) Penetration Aids Second Strike Permissive Action Link (PAL) Selective Options Pershing II Sentinel Antiballistic Missile System Phased-Array Antenna Short-Range Attack Missiles (SRAM) Pit Shrouding Plutonium Silo Basing Polaris SLBMs/SSBNs Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) Portsmouth Enrichment Facility Skybolt Poseidon SLBMs/SSBNs South African Nuclear Weapons Program Post-Attack Command and Control System South Korean Nuclear Weapons Program (PACCS) Space-Based Infrared Radar System (SBIRS) Preemptive Attack Spartan Missile Presidential Nuclear Initiatives Sprint Missile Pressurized-Water Reactors (PWRs) Sputnik Preventive War Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) Primary Stage Stealth Bomber (B-2 Spirit) Proliferation Stockpile Stewardship Program Proliferation Security Initiative Strategic Air Command (SAC) and Strategic Pugwash Conferences Command (STRATCOM) Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I and SALT Quadrennial Defense Review II) Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) Radiation Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) Radiation Absorbed Dose (Rad) Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Radiological Dispersal Device Strategic Defenses The RAND Corporation Strategic Forces Rapacki Plan Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) Ratification Strategic Rocket Forces Reactor Operations Submarines, Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Reasonable Sufficiency (SSBNs) Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) Reconnaissance Satellites Sufficiency Red Mercury Superiority Reentry Vehicles Surety Reliability Surprise Attack Conference Reprocessing Surveillance
  • 20. A TO Z LIST OF ENTRIES xxiii Survivability Unilateral Initiative United Nations Special Commission on Iraq Tactical Nuclear Weapons (UNSCOM) Telemetry United States Air Force Terminal Phase United States Army Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) United States Navy Theater Missile Defense United States Nuclear Forces and Doctrine Thermonuclear Bomb Uranium Three Mile Island Three-Plus-Three Program Verification Threshold States Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) Warfighting Strategy Tinian Warhead Titan ICBMs Warsaw Pact Tous Asimuts Wassenaar Arrangement Transporter-Erector-Launcher Weapons-Grade Material Triad Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Trident Trinity Site, New Mexico X-Ray Laser Tritium Two-Man Rule Yield U-2 Zangger Committee Underground Testing Zone of Peace
  • 21. Introduction: Chemical and In the United States, there are various legal and Biological Weapons academic definitions of weapons of mass destruc- Eric A. Croddy tion (WMD), although not everyone may agree on any of them. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) defines WMD as, “Weapons that are capa- ble of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers Army Marshal Georgi Konstantinovich Zhukov. In of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be fact, it was this speech that highlighted for U.S. pol- high explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, icy makers the real or perceived threat from the So- and radiological weapons, but exclude the means viet Union, particularly in terms of the latter’s pre- of transporting or propelling the weapon where sumed arsenal of chemical and biological such means is a separable and divisible part of the weaponry. As such, Zhukov’s speech invigorated weapon.”1 United States Cold War research into WMD, in- According to the DOD, conventional explosives cluding biological weaponry.4 During the Cold War, also can be considered WMD. And this is reason- the United States—and, to a much greater extent, able, especially when one considers the cumulative the Soviet Union—amassed large chemical and bi- number of deaths caused by gunpowder since its in- ological weapons stockpiles. The threat posed by vention in the tenth century and by nitroglycerine these stockpiles has diminished greatly since the since its invention in the nineteenth century.2 But crumbling of the Berlin wall. the underlying assumption of what makes a Regional threats posed by state-funded mili- weapon massively destructive is the idea that these taries from chemical and biological weapons also weapons can cause simultaneous mass casualties. have declined. By the end of 2003, the U.S. govern- Nuclear weapons (dealt with separately in Volume ment had admitted that there was little evidence II) are an obvious category of WMD, but radiolog- that Iraq had possessed large chemical or biological ical weapons (such as so-called dirty bombs are less weapon stockpiles after the mid-1990s. This has likely to cause mass injury or death (see Radiologi- since led both the United States and British govern- cal Dispersal Device in volume II).3 ments to begin inquiries into the faulty prewar in- Highly toxic chemical compounds—the nerve telligence on Iraq that was in large part the basis for agents being prime candidates—could comprise justifying Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003.5 WMD, for example, if delivered effectively against Other regional threats, however, still remain. an urban target. Biological agents—that is, Among these, states such as Syria and North Korea pathogens and toxins derived from plants or ani- are suspected of possessing chemical and biological mals—might also constitute WMD if delivered effi- weapons. Their bellicose posture regarding their ciently. When compared to conventional and chem- immediate neighbors and regional rivals, as well as ical weapons, biological agents have the greatest their possession of long-range delivery systems potential to cause mass casualties, and, theoretically, (such as Scud missiles), make these threats impossi- theirs could easily exceed the casualties caused by ble to ignore. By contrast, Libyan leader Mohamar the largest nuclear weapon. Qaddafi stated in early 2004 that he would re- In terms of referring to nuclear, chemical—and nounce the possession of WMD, which demon- by inference, biological—weapons, the term strates how quickly the threat of weapons of mass “weapons of mass destruction” first came into use destruction seems to rise and fall on the global in 1956 when it was used in a speech by Soviet Red agenda. xxv
  • 22. xxvi INTRODUCTION Individuals and terrorist organizations also are of chemical or biological warfare. In an excellent in- reportedly interested in using chemical or biological troduction to chemical weapons, a short book pub- agents in their operations. A salient example was a lished by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army dis- statement by a self-proclaimed spokesman for the cusses a case of CW (chemical warfare) from terrorist organization al-Qaeda, who said in June China’s early history: In the Zuochuan, it is written 2002, “We have the right to kill 4 million Ameri- that in the sixth century to about the fifth century cans—2 million of them children—and to exile B.C.E., “An official of the noble princes of the Xia, twice as many and wound and cripple hundreds of came from the Jin to attack the [forces of] Qin, and thousands. Furthermore, it is our right to fight them poisoned the Jing River, killing more than a division with chemical and biological weapons, so as to af- of men.” Another case is cited: “In the year 1000 flict them with the fatal maladies that have afflicted [C.E.], there was one named Tangfu, who made poi- the Muslims because of the [Americans’] chemical son fire grenades and gave them to the Chao court and biological weapons.”6 of the Song dynasty. The poisonous smoke ball, It is not clear as of this writing whether any indi- containing arsenic oxide (As2O3) and a type of poi- viduals or groups will be able to carry out an attack son derived from crotonaldehyde (see the Arsenicals using chemical or biological warfare agents, at least listing), looked a bit like a precursor to a chemical in a manner that could cause more deaths than the gas grenade. After alighting, this weapon would September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade issue forth smoke to poison the enemy and thus Center (2,749 dead) and the Pentagon (184 dead). weaken their ability to fight.”8 In 2001, the biological agent that causes anthrax These same authors also point out that this is a killed five people when an unknown actor or group far cry from what one expects in modern times, for mailed Bacillus anthracis spores through the U.S. back then chemical warfare “was just in its infancy, postal system. On February 3, 2004, envelopes con- and not only were its methods crude but its utility in taining ricin toxin were discovered at the office of actually killing people was limited. Because of this, the U.S. Senate majority leader and at a mail sorting chemical weapons were regarded as a method to facility for the White House. These incidents involv- generally assist in conducting warfare, and at the ing ricin resulted in no injuries, but justifiably time did not draw any particular attention. Coming caused much concern. into the recent era, as the developments in technol- ogy continued, chemical weapons then really began A Brief History of WMD to demonstrate their real menace.”9 The historical record shows that mass poisonings Another premodern military tactic that is often and the occasional plot to spread disease among described as a form of BW (biological warfare) is armies and civilian populations go back many cen- the siege of Kaffa (1346 C.E.), in modern Feodosia, turies.7 Still, chemical and biological warfare Ukraine. During a campaign by Mongol forces to (CBW)—sometimes referred to in military parlance defeat a heavily defended city of mostly Genoese as “bugs and gas”—is essentially a modern phe- merchants, bubonic plague struck the area: “The nomenon. It is modern in the sense that the science Tartars died as soon as the signs of disease appeared and industry required to produce these types of on their bodies: swellings in the armpit or groin WMD have only existed since the early 1900s. How- caused by coagulating humors, followed by a putrid ever, there may indeed have been designs to use fever. The dying Tartars, stunned and stupefied by chemical or biological agents as a means of warfare the immensity of the disaster brought about by the (or possibly terrorism) before the Industrial Revolu- disease, and realizing that they had no hope of es- tion. Before the late nineteenth century (the time of cape, lost interest in the siege. But they ordered Louis Pasteur and many developments in chem- corpses to be placed in catapults and lobbed into the istry), however, the requisite scientific knowledge city in the hope that the intolerable stench would and engineering capacity were insufficient to bring kill everyone inside. . . .”10 We note here that any such ideas to fruition. Obviously, this is no “stench” was considered in the pre-germ theory era longer the case. to be responsible for disease. Thus, miasmas, “nox- Many books and articles that discuss CBW often ious effluvia,” or “corrupt vapors” (febres pestilen- introduce the subject by bringing up past examples tiales) were synonymous with the spread of deadly
  • 23. INTRODUCTION xxvii epidemics—plague (causative organism: Yersinia however, that horrific BW experiments were con- pestis) being among the most notorious.11 ducted upon Chinese civilians and prisoners of The suggestion later made by historians that the war.12 It is possible that some Allied soldiers, includ- Mongols were in fact able to spread bubonic ing American and British personnel, were experi- plague by hurling disease-ridden corpses over the mented upon by Ishii Shiro (see the Sino-Japanese fortress walls is an intriguing one. During the four- War listing) and his scientists, but this has not been teenth century, however, a germ theory of disease confirmed. Apart from the East Asian theater of op- did not exist. How would the people of that era erations, however, no offensive use of CBW was have known exactly how the disease could spread? conducted in World War II. Suggestions that the So- What they could not have known is that bubonic viet Red Army used tularemia (caused by the bac- plague is spread by fleas, which collect the bacteria terium Francisella tularensis) against invading Nazi Yersinia pestis (the causative organism of plague) forces at the Stalingrad front are not supported by through feeding upon infected rats. Fleas do not the available evidence.13 German and Allied military linger near the body once the temperature of the scientists did pursue the manufacture of CW agents host (be it rodent or human) cools following in very large quantities, but these never were used in death, making it rather unlikely that the cadavers conflict. would have done much to spread the plague. In the In the Korean War (1950–1953), Chinese offi- end, it was not the use of projectile cadavers, but cials, during armistice negotiations, accused the more likely the exceptionally large rat population United States of using biological weapons. Although around the Black Sea that led to a pandemic there is evidence that at least some of the commu- throughout the region (and indeed much of Eu- nist Chinese leaders truly believed the allegations rope). One could probably conclude, however, that concerning BW in Korea14, there is no evidence that the Mongols did have the intent to spread disease the U.S. military used chemical or biological among their enemy, and at least in this respect they weapons during the conflict.15 conducted an early form of BW. During the Cold War, chemical agents became even deadlier. The United States and the Soviet CBW in the Modern Era Union stockpiled the German G-series nerve agents The stunningly high rate of casualties that occurred (sarin and soman), as well as the newer V-agents. in World War I had much do with the machine gun Perhaps more dangerous was the development of and rapid-fire artillery, but it also was caused in weaponized biological agents. The United States large part by the great number of men that were and its allies during World War II had pursued a brought to the battlefields. World War I marks the rudimentary offensive and defensive BW program. emergence of “gas warfare:” the use of chlorine, Later, work continued using a variety of infectious phosgene, and other toxic chemicals. For the most agents, including the causative organisms of an- part, these were used in vain attempts to achieve a thrax, tularemia, and less deadly—but highly effi- breakthrough against well-defended armies in cient—microbes such as Venezuelan equine en- trenches. Later, chemical warfare agents such as sul- cephalitis. fur mustard entered the scene when previous com- The controversy over the potential use of CBW pounds were found to be less effective on the battle- grew increasingly protracted during the Vietnam field. Unlike chemicals used during the early stages War, particularly when the U.S. military used herbi- of the conflict, mustard is not gaseous, but an oily cides (such as Agent Orange) against Viet Cong- liquid. It did not kill large numbers of troops, but it controlled areas. In a variety of instances, riot con- caused debilitating injury by irritating the skin, eyes, trol agents (RCAs or tear gas) were used against the and upper airways. First used in 1917, it was re- Viet Cong and Viet Minh regular army. Although sponsible for the most injuries caused by chemical such forms of weaponry were not intended to cause weapons during World War I. death, their use in an unpopular war heightened the Japan conducted CBW against China from 1937 sensitivity of the U.S. government to public percep- to 1945. It is unknown whether the use of chemicals tions of its CBW policies. As a consequence of Viet- against Chinese soldiers gave the Japanese army a nam and high-profile incidents involving nerve significant advantage on the battlefield. It is certain, agents at storage facilities in Utah and Okinawa,
  • 24. xxviii INTRODUCTION President Richard Nixon ended most U.S. chemical tended level of death and destruction, but it caused and biological programs in 1969. significant structural damage. Yousef reportedly When President Nixon renounced offensive BW considered the use of cyanide—a toxic “blood and the United States stopped the production of bi- agent”—during the 1993 bombing. However, tech- ological weapons, the Soviet Union was only getting nical difficulties and other unknown factors pre- started. In 1979, a mysterious outbreak of anthrax in vented Yousef from designing such a device.18 Sverdlovsk, Siberia (now Yekaterinberg) was sus- There was another “wake-up call” to the threat of pected by Western intelligence to have been caused WMD, this time in Tokyo, Japan, when a guru by a BW-related accident. (After many years of de- named Shoko Asahara instructed followers to use nials, Russia admitted in the 1990s that the nerve agents (sarin) against his real or perceived en- Sverdlovsk outbreak was caused by Soviet military emies. In 1995, Shoko Asahara’s cult (Aum Shin- work with BW agents.) By the late 1980s, the Soviet rikyo) struck at the Tokyo authorities by releasing a BW apparatus (Biopreparat) had assembled the nerve agent on the subway system. The death toll world’s largest infrastructure devoted to the devel- was 12, with thousands injured. The end result of opment of biological weapons. The Soviet arsenal the Tokyo subway attack was less than many experts included the standard agents, anthrax, tularemia, expected from a WMD attack. Still, it made a and a particularly virulent form of plague. But it tremendous impact, not only on Japanese society had also weaponized smallpox, placing it in a liquid but also on how governments around the world form to be delivered by intercontinental ballistic reevaluated the CBW terrorist threat. missiles.16 Boris Yeltsin formally ended the program Improvised devices made by Palestinian terror- in 1992.17 ists using toxic chemicals have been a particular Iraq had already used large amounts of chemical concern to Israel. But death and injury caused by (but not biological) weapons against Iranian troops shrapnel (ball bearings, na