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Afghanistan Dynamic Planning
 

Afghanistan Dynamic Planning

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    Afghanistan Dynamic Planning Afghanistan Dynamic Planning Presentation Transcript

    • Dynamic Planning for COIN in Afghanistan
    • Potential Fractiousness of Society Support for Neutral Support for HN Insurgency Populace Government COIN operations must accomplish three tasks simultaneously: • Influence insurgent-minded individuals to adopt a neutral disposition. • Influence neutral-minded individuals to adopt a supportive disposition. • Retain supportive individuals. These operations are conducted in an environment where tensions and hostilities between groups may destabilize a society and provide opportunities for insurgents • This environment may suggest courses of action aimed at reinforcing or widening seams
    • • An increase in Coalition funding will influence Coalition economic investment and development. Funding • A strengthened economy will influence movement from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups Economic toward the supportive group. Investment Potential Fractiousness Economic of Society Development Support for Neutral Support for HN Insurgency Populace Government
    • Coalition Satisfaction with Funding Breakdown of Essential Services Developing and Essential Services Restoring Essential Services Economic Expectations for Essential Essential Services Investment Services Time to Develop Essential Services Potential Fractiousness Economic of Society Development Support for Neutral Support for HN Insurgency Populace Government • An increase in Coalition funding will significantly impact the restoration of essential services. • Improvements in the provision of essential services will influence movement from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups toward the supportive group.
    • Coalition Satisfaction with Funding Breakdown of Essential Services Time to Develop Developing and Essential Services Governance Restoring Essential Services Economic Expectations for Essential Essential Services Investment Services Governance Time to Develop Essential Services Potential Psychological Operations Fractiousness Economic Effectiveness of Society Development Support for Neutral Support for HN Insurgency Populace Government Available Perceived Workforce Security External Material A government that is established, Support recognized, and that maintains a secure Insurgent Acts environment is in a position to of Violence • Send a positive, credible message of success to the populace. • Provide an environment that enhances stable employment of the workforce. • Persuade insurgents and neutrals to consider becoming supporters.
    • Coalition An appropriate force mix, and correct operational Satisfaction with Funding Breakdown of Essential Services Time to Develop tempo, timing, and synchronization will have very Governance Developing and Essential Services Restoring Essential significant impacts on Services Expectations for restoration of essential services. Economic • The Essential Essential Services Investment Services Governance • The populace’s perception of security. Time to Develop Essential Services Psychological Potential Government’s and COIN forces’ credibility in • The their communications efforts with the populace. Fractiousness Economic Operations Effectiveness of Society Development Impact of Support for Neutral Support for HN Illegitimate Actions Insurgency Populace Government Appropriate Mix of Effort and Use of Force Available Perceived Workforce Security Information Individual Competence, External Material Judgment, and Ability Support to Execute Time to Develop HN Insurgent Acts Security Forces Appropriate Strategic Emphasis of Violence Total Force Host Nation Insurgent to Force Density Security Forces Density Ratio Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures Coalition Force Host Nation Density Force Density
    • Coalition Satisfaction with Funding Breakdown of Essential Services Time to Develop Developing and Essential Services Governance Restoring Essential Services Economic Expectations for Essential Essential Services Investment Services Governance Time to Develop Essential Services Potential Psychological Operations Fractiousness Economic of Society Effectiveness Development Impact of Support for Neutral Support for HN Illegitimate Actions Insurgency Populace Government Appropriate Mix of Effort and Use of Force Available Perceived Workforce Security Information Individual Competence, External Material Judgment, and Ability Support to Execute Time to Develop HN Insurgent Acts Security Forces Appropriate Strategic Emphasis of Violence Total Force Host Nation Insurgent to Force Density Security Forces Density Ratio Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures Coalition Force Host Nation Density Force Density The Logical Lines of Operations from FM 3-24
    • Coalition Satisfaction with Funding Breakdown of Essential Services Time to Develop Developing and Essential Services Governance Restoring Essential Services Economic Expectations for Essential Essential Services Investment Services Governance Time to Develop Essential Services Potential Psychological Operations Fractiousness Economic Effectiveness of Society Development Impact of Support for Neutral Support for HN Illegitimate Actions Insurgency Populace Government Appropriate Mix of Effort and Use of Force Available Perceived Workforce Security Information Individual Competence, External Material Judgment, and Ability Support to Execute Time to Develop HN Insurgent Acts Security Forces Appropriate Strategic Emphasis of Violence Total Force Host Nation Insurgent to Force Density Security Forces Density Ratio Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures Coalition Force Host Nation Density Force Density The Basic Information Ops Loop
    • Popular Support – Sympathizers and Active Supporters Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Govt vs Insurgents Population Population Neutral/On Population Population Actively Sympathizing the Fence Sympathizing Actively Supporting w/ Gov’t w/ Insurgents Supporting Gov’t & SF Insurgency POPULAR Potential Attractiveness of Govt vs. SUPPORT Insurgent Path © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 9
    • Population Conditions, Beliefs, & Structures Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Insurgents Perceived Damages/Use Perception of Insurgent of Force by Gov’t and CF Strength and Intent Fear of Ins. Attack, Relative WOM Message Repercussions Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Perception of Gov’t Strength of Strength and Intent Religious Ability to Ideology & Tribal Reconcile Satisfaction w/ Gains Structures Religious in Security, Services & Ideology, Employment Cultural Erosion/ Tribal Displacement Structures w/ Visible Gains Expectations Gov’t Path In Security, for Security, Services & Services & Employment Employment Perceived Ethnic/Tribal Average Security Rivalry Connectedness of Population © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 10
    • Population Conditions, Beliefs, & Structures Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Perceived Relative Damages/Use Popular of Force by Support/ Gov t & Coalition Perception of /Tolerance Insurgent Govt vs Insurgents Strength & Intent POPULATION Population CONDITIONS Actively Supporting Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t Neutral/On the Fence Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF & BELIEFS Relative WOM Message Fear of Ins. Attack/ Insurgency Amplification Repercussions Gov’t vs Ins POPULAR POPULAR Potential Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Perception of Coalition Intent SUPPORT Insurgent Path & Commitment Perception Of Govt Strength Strength of & Intent Religious Ideology & Tribal Satisfaction Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to w/ Gains in Displacement Reconcile Security, Services Religious & Employment Visible Gains Ideology, In Security, Ethnic/Tribal Tribal Services & Rivalry Structures Employment w/ Gov’t Expectations Path for Security, Average Services, & Connectedness Employment Perceived of Population Security © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 11
    • Insurgent Capacity, Outside Support/ Enablement of Insurgents, Narcotics Outside Fear of Gov’t / Support / ANSF / Coalition Enablement Insurgent Insurgent Repercussions Havens / of Ins. Terrain Damages & Ability to 1 Advantage Casualties Operate Insurgent Coordination Insurgent Offensives & Among Ins Leadership Insurgent Territory Not Presence Factions Training, Skill Recruiting, Under Gov’t (Clear & Hold) & Exper Retention, Criminal/ Control 2 Manpower, Trafficking Ins Strategic Ins Provision Insurgent & ISR Capability & Comm/IO & Ties to of Gov’t & Capacity, Coercion Affiliation w/ Narcotics Services Priorities & Population & Other Funding & Effectiveness Material Ins Targeted Criminal Attacks on Funding Support to Likelihood Insurgents Narcotics & Progress/ of Crime/ Criminal Support for Gov’t Violence/ Activity Levels Ins Support for Payment Illegit Agric Production Trade & Feedback Loop Examples: Employment 1. Insurgent expansion: Insurgent factions with havens as base can expand their presence and influence, further increasing their operating base territory. (Permissive population contribution to Havens / Ability to Operate input from separate sector). 2. Alignment of criminal and insurgent interests: Weakly governed / policed Terrain territory may support insurgents, terrorists and criminals alike. Often interests Harshness align and lines blur with criminal activity and funding contributing to insurgent & Breadth operations and expansion, further increasing the weakly governed terrority and © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 12
    • Insurgent Capacity, Outside Support/ Enablement of Insurgents, Narcotics OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT Ins. Damages & Casualties Fear of FACTIONS Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Outside Havens / Ability to Support/ Operate Enablement of Ins. Ins. Coordination Offensives & Among Ins. Insurgent Territory Not Presence Factions Ins. Terrain Under Gov’t (Clear & Hold) Insurgent Advantage Control (Afghan Leadership, Recruiting, & Pakistan) Training, Skill Retention, & Experience Manpower Criminal/ Ins. Provision & ISR Trafficking Of Gov’t & Services Insurgent Capacity, INSURGENTS Ties to Capability & Coercion Perceived Priorities & Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Narcotics & Commun /IO Use of Force Other Criminal Ins. Targeted & Affiliation w/ Population by Ins. Attacks on Progress/ Funding Funding & Material Support to NARCOTICS Perceived Support Relative Insurgents Likelihood of Damages/Use for Gov’t Popular Crime/Violence of Force by Support/ /Ins. Support Gov t & Coalition Perception of /Tolerance for Payment Insurgent Govt vs Narcotics Insurgents & Criminal Strength & Intent Activity POPULATION POPULATION Population Population Levels Population Neutral/On Population CONDITIONS CONDITIONS Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Sympathizing w/ Gov’t the Fence Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Actively Supporting Insurgency IllegitAgric Relative WOM Fear of Ins. Production, & BELIEFS & BELIEFS Message Amplification Attack/ Repercussions Trade & Employment Gov’t vs Ins POPULAR POPULAR Potential Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Terrain Harshness Perception of Coalition Intent SUPPORT SUPPORT Insurgent Path & Breadth & Commitment Perception Of Gov t Strength Strength of & Intent Religious Ideology & Tribal Satisfaction Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to w/ Gains in Displacement Reconcile Security, Services Religious & Employment Visible Gains Ideology, In Security, Ethnic/Tribal Tribal Services & Rivalry Structures Employment w/ Gov’t Expectations Path for Security, Average Services, & Connectedness Employment of Population Perceived Security © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 13
    • Infrastructure, Services, & Economy Feedback Loop Examples: 1. Agricultural production and markets: Investment and spending enables agricultural production. Production can boost economic activity and trade which feeds back into private sector re-investment. (Public policy and investment in infrastructure, workforce, financial markets, etc helps start / maintain private sector momentum.) 2. Making legit agriculture more attractive: Improved legit agricultural opportunities may make illegit agricultural options less attractive which further increases legit agricultural production, trade, and markets. (Other inputs to decisions related to legit vs illegit from other sectors.) Legit Agric Production Fraction of Workforce and Agric. 2 Legit vs Illegit Private Sector Workforce Population Skill & Avail Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Infrastructure Civilian Legit vs Illegit Dev. Adequacy Legit Other Services Relative & Sustainment Production (SWET, Economic & Services Healthcare, Opportunity Non-Agric Education) 1 Ability to Move Private Sector Infr. Services, Econ, Legit Economic People & Capital Mgmt, Policy & Execution/ Activity, Trade & Goods Rapidly Investment & Perceived Fairness Employment Spending © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 14
    • Infrastructure, Services, & Economy OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT TO INSURGENT Ins. Damages & Casualties Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ FACTIONS FACTIONS Coalition Repercussions Outside Havens / Ability to Support/ Operate Enablement of Ins. Ins. Coordination Offensives & Among Ins. Insurgent Territory Not Presence Factions Ins. Terrain Under Gov’t (Clear & Hold) Insurgent Advantage Control (Afghan Leadership, Recruiting, & Pakistan) Training, Skill Retention, & Experience Manpower Criminal/ Ins. Provision & ISR Trafficking Of Gov’t & Services Insurgent Capacity, INSURGENTS Ties to Capability & Coercion Perceived Priorities & Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Narcotics & Commun/IO Use of Force Other Criminal Ins. Targeted & Affiliation w/ Population by Ins. Attacks on Progress/ Funding Funding & Material Support to NARCOTICS Perceived Support Relative Insurgents Likelihood of Damages/Use for Gov’t Popular Crime/Violence of Force by Support/ /Ins. Support Gov t & Coalition Perception of /Tolerance for Payment Insurgent Govt vs Narcotics Insurgents & Criminal Strength & Intent Activity POPULATION POPULATION Population Population Levels Population Neutral/On Population CONDITIONS CONDITIONS Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Sympathizing w/ Gov’t the Fence Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Actively Supporting Insurgency Illegit Agric Relative WOM Fear of Ins. Production, & BELIEFS & BELIEFS Message Amplification Attack/ Repercussions Trade & Employment Gov’t vs Ins POPULAR POPULAR Potential Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Terrain Harshness Perception of Coalition Intent SUPPORT SUPPORT Insurgent Path & Breadth & Commitment Perception Fraction of Of Gov t Workforce Strength And Agric. Strength of & Intent Legit vs Religious Legit Agric Illegit Ideology & Tribal Private Sector Production Satisfaction Workforce Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to w/ Gains in Infrastructure Displacement Reconcile Skill & Avail Security, Services Dev. Adequacy Population Religious & Employment Visible Gains & Sustainment Ideology, Basic Needs In Security, Service Levels Ethnic/Tribal Tribal Services & Rivalry Structures & Employment Employment w/ Gov’t Expectations Legit vs.Illegit Path Legit Other Civilian for Security, Production Services Relative Average Services, & & Services (SWET, Economic Connectedness Employment Non- Agric Healthcare, Opportunity of Population Perceived Security Education) INFRASTRUCTURE, Ability to Move People Private Sector Legit Economic Infr, Services, Econ. Policy & Execution SERVICES & Rapidly Capital Mgmt., & Goods Investment & Spending Activity, Trade & Employment /Perceived Fairness ECONOMY © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 15
    • Governance – Central Government Development & Capacity; Engagement / Empowerment of Tribal Governance; Overall Governance Capacity & Impacts Gov’t Security Policy Quality Relative & Investment Message Central Gov’t Institutional Quality & Execution Gov’t vs Ins Capacity Gov’t Gov’t / ANSF Funding Gov’t Training, Gov’t Integration of StratCom/IO Adequacy Mentoring, Gov’t Relative Vetting, and Workforce Local Tribal Message ’ Hiring Skill & Avail Structures Impact Gov’t vs Ins Transparency of Gov’t Professionalism, ’ Gov’t Processes & Investments Policy Quality & Fairness Overall Gov’t Reach, Execution, Gov’t/Contractor Recognition/ Capacity & Corruption & Engagement to Investment Tribal Favoritism Integrate Tribal Structures & Tax Beliefs Revenues Feedback Loop Example: Informal learning and mentoring: Formal training and vetting (enabled by institutional capacity) can improve and maintain Government workforce skill and professionalism. However, as you build a skilled, professional workforce base and culture, informal learning and expectations for behavior is also very powerful (and can contribute to institutional development as well…another key loop) © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 16
    • Governance – Central Government Development & Capacity; Engagement / Empowerment of Tribal Governance; Overall Governance Capacity & Impacts OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT TO INSURGENT Ins. Damages & Casualties Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ FACTIONS FACTIONS Coalition Repercussions Outside Havens / Ability to Support/ Operate Enablement of Ins. Ins. Coordination Offensives & Among Ins. Insurgent Territory Not Presence Factions Ins. Terrain Under Gov’t (Clear & Hold) Insurgent Advantage Control (Afghan Leadership, Recruiting, & Pakistan) Training, Skill Retention, & Experience Manpower Criminal/ Ins. Provision & ISR Trafficking Of Gov’t & Services Insurgent Capacity, INSURGENTS Ties to Capability & Coercion Perceived Priorities & Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Narcotics & Commun/IO Use of Force Other Criminal Ins. Targeted & Affiliation w/ Population by Ins. Attacks on Progress/ Funding Funding & Material Support to NARCOTICS Perceived Support Relative Insurgents Likelihood of Gov't Damages/Use for Gov’t Popular Crime/Violence Security of Force by Support/ /Ins. Support Policy Relative Gov t & Coalition Perception of /Tolerance for Payment Quality & Message Insurgent Govt vs Narcotics Investment Quality Insurgents & Criminal Strength & Gov’t ’ Ins. vs Intent Activity OVERALL Gov't/ANSF POPULATION POPULATION Population Population Levels Strategic Population Neutral/On Population Central Gov't Institutional & Execution GOVERNMENT Commun IO / CONDITIONS CONDITIONS Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Sympathizing w/ Gov’t the Fence Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Actively Supporting Insurgency Illegit Agric Fear of Ins. Production, Gov't Capacity CAPACITY Relative Message & BELIEFS & BELIEFS Relative WOM Message Amplification Attack/ Repercussions Trade & Employment Funding Adequacy Gov't Training Gov't Integration of Impact Gov’t vs Ins Gov’t vs Ins POPULAR POPULAR Potential Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Terrain Harshness Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Gov't Workforce Local Tribal Structures Perception of Coalition Intent SUPPORT SUPPORT Insurgent Path & Breadth Skill & Avail & Commitment Perception Fraction of Of Gov t Workforce Transparency Strength of Gov’t Gov't And Agric. Overall Gov't Strength of & Intent Legit vs Processes & Professionalism Reach, Investments Policy Quality Execution Religious Legit Agric Illegit & Fairness Capacity & Ideology & Production Tribal Private Sector Investment Satisfaction Workforce Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to w/ Gains in Infrastructure Displacement Reconcile Skill & Avail Security, Services Dev. Adequacy Gov't/ TRIBAL Recognition/ Engagement to Ethnic/Tribal Religious Ideology, Tribal & Employment Visible Gains In Security, & Sustainment Population Basic Needs Service Levels Contractor Services & Corruption & Tribal Favoritism GOVERNANCE Integrate Tribal Structures& Rivalry Structures w/ Gov’t Path Expectations Employment Legit Other Civilian & Employment Legit vs. Illegit Beliefs for Security, Production Services Relative Average Services, & & Services (SWET, Economic Tax Connectedness Employment Non- Agric Healthcare, Opportunity Revenues of Population Perceived Security Education) INFRASTRUCTURE, Ability to Move People Private Sector Capital Mgmt., Legit Economic Activity, Infr, Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness SERVICES & & SERVICES & Goods Rapidly Investment & Spending Trade & Employment ECONOMY ECONOMY © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 17
    • Coalition Resources, Actions, & Impacts and Homeland Support Coalition Coalition Knowledge & Coalition Adjustment Understanding COIN Support of Approach of Social Strategy & to Fit Afghan Structures Unity Duration of Coalition Operation Appropriate Coalition Balance of Avg COIN Coalition Dev. Effort & Force Experienc Ops-ANSF e & Skill Advisory & Coalition Coalition Aid Visibility to Execution Resource Population Capacity & Levels (Mil. & Western Priorities Civ. Forces Affiliation and Levels) Backlash Coalition Coalition Dev. Ops-Gov’t Coalition/Homeland StratComm/IO Advisory & Acceptance of US Gov’t Afghan Methods Support for Breadth of Aid Operation Coalition & Support US Domestic Perceived Cost/Benefit US Domestic/ & Support Int’l StratComm & Diplomacy Coalition Dev. Ops- Media Infrastructure, Sensationalism Services, Econ Bias Advisory & Aid Provide Humanitarian Relief © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 18
    • Coalition Resources, Actions, & Impacts and Homeland Support OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT TO INSURGENT Ins. Damages & Casualties Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ FACTIONS FACTIONS Coalition Coalition Repercussions Knowledge Outside Coalition Havens / Ability to Support/ & Underst Operate Enablement of Social COIN Structures Support of Ins. Strategy & Ins. Coordination Duration of Unity Coalition Offensives & Among Ins. Insurgent Operation Territory Not Presence Factions Ins. Terrain Adjustment Under Gov’t Insurgent Coalition of Approach (Clear & Hold) Leadership, Advantage Control (Afghan Recruiting, Appropriate to Fit Afghan & Pakistan) Training, Skill Retention, Balance of & Experience Manpower Criminal/ Effort & & ISR Trafficking Ins. Provision Force Coalition Of Gov’t & Services Insurgent Capacity, INSURGENTS Ties to Capability & Coercion Coalition Dev. Ops- Perceived Priorities & Coalition Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Narcotics & Avg COIN ANSF Other Criminal Experience Execution Advisory Commun/IO Use of Force Ins. Targeted & Skill Capacity & Priorities & Aid & Affiliation w/ Population by Ins. Attacks on Progress/ Funding Funding & Material Support to NARCOTICS Perceived Support Relative Insurgents Likelihood of COALITION Coalition Visibility to Population Gov't Security Policy Relative Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & Coalition for Gov’t Popular Support/ /Tolerance Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment Perception of CAPACITY & Resource Coalition Levels Strategic Coalition Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Quality & Investment Message Quality Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Insurgent Strength & Govt vs Insurgents Narcotics & Criminal (Mil. & Civ. Commun Gov’t Acceptance of Intent Activity PRIORITIES Forces, ./IO Advisory Afghan Methods POPULATION Levels Aid Levels) & Aid OVERALL OVERALL Gov't/ANSF Strategic POPULATION Population Population Neutral/On Population Population Central Gov't Institutional & Execution GOVERNMENT Commun/ IO CONDITIONS CONDITIONS Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Sympathizing w/ Gov’t the Fence Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Actively Supporting Insurgency Illegit Agric US Gov't Relative WOM Fear of Ins. Production, Support for Operation Gov't Capacity CAPACITY CAPACITY Relative Message & BELIEFS & BELIEFS Message Amplification Attack/ Repercussions Trade & Employment Breadth of Funding Adequacy Gov't Training Gov't Integration of Western Impact Gov’t vs Ins Gov’t vs Ins POPULAR POPULAR Potential Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Terrain Harshness US Domestic Coalition & Duration Perceived Cost/Benefit Support Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Gov't Workforce Local Tribal Structures Affiliation Backlash Perception of Coalition Intent SUPPORT SUPPORT Insurgent Path & Breadth of Operation & Support Skill & Avail & Commitment Perception Fraction of Of Gov t Workforce US Domestic/ Transparency Strength of Gov’t Gov't And Agric. Int'l Strategic Overall Gov't Strength of & Intent Legit vs Commun . Processes & Professionalism Reach, Illegit Investments Policy Quality Execution Religious Legit Agric & Diplomacy Ideology & COALITION Media & Fairness Capacity & Investment Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to Satisfaction w/ Gains in Infrastructure Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail Production Sensationalism DOMESTIC Bias TRIBAL Displacement Reconcile Religious Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment Population SUPPORT Gov't/ Contractor TRIBAL Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Ethnic/Tribal Ideology, Tribal Structures In Security, Services & Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Coalition Dev.Ops- Infrastructure, Corruption & Tribal Favoritism GOVERNANCE Tribal Structures& Beliefs Rivalry w/ Gov’t Path Expectations for Security, Employment Legit Other Production Civilian Services Legit vs. Illegit Relative Services, Average Services, & & Services (SWET, Economic Econ. Tax Connectedness Employment Non- Agric Healthcare, Opportunity Advisory Revenues of Population Perceived Security Education) & Aid INFRASTRUCTURE, Ability to Move People Private Sector Capital Mgmt., Legit Economic Activity, Provide Infr, Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness SERVICES & & SERVICES & Goods Rapidly Investment & Spending Trade & Employment Humanitarian Relief ECONOMY ECONOMY © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 19
    • ANSF Development, Capacity & Impacts – Tactical & Institutional ANSF & Coalition Counter Narcotics Damages/ ISR / Open /Crime Ops Casualties Source Ops Total Security Targeted Force Capacity Strikes & focus Sweep Ops ANSF Unit (Clear) ANSF & Leadership Policing & ANSF Unit Manpower & Tactical Security Capacity, Recruiting & Capacity Ops (Hold) 1 1 Priorities & Retention Effectiveness ANSF Avg ANSF ANSF Professionalism, Appropriate ANSF Training & Skill, Discipline Use of Force Institutional Mentoring & Morale & Execution 2 Capacity ANSF Corruption R.O.L. Policy, & Tribal Execution & ANSF Favoritism Perceived Funding Fairness Adequacy Feedback Loop Examples: 1. ANSF success and informal momentum: ANSF professionalism and skill contributes to tactical capacity which enables effective operations. Success and experience feeds back into professionalism, skill and morale which further reinforces both leadership & tactical capacity and recruiting / retention. 2. ANSF institutional capacity: Institutional capacity and processes enable manpower, formal training, logistics, planning & budgeting, etc that reinforce informal gains support ANSF capacity over time. © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 20
    • ANSF Development, Capacity & Impacts – Tactical & Institutional ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties OUTSIDE SUPPORT OUTSIDE SUPPORT ISR / Open Total ANSF Source Ops Security Force Targeted Strikes TOTO INSURGENT INSURGENT Counter Narcotics/ Crime Ops Capacity & TACTICAL ANSF Unit Focus Sweep Ops (Clear) Ins. Damages & Casualties Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition FACTIONS FACTIONS Coalition Leadership ANSF Policing & Repercussions Knowledge & Tactical Capacity, Security Ops Outside Coalition Capacity Priorities & (Hold) Havens / Ability to Support/ & Underst Operate Enablement of Social COIN Effectiveness Support ANSF of Ins. Structures Manpower Strategy & ANSF Avg. Ins. Coordination Duration of Unity Recruiting & Offensives & Among Ins. Insurgent Coalition Retention Professionalism Territory Not Operation Adjustment Skill, Discipline, Presence Factions Ins. Terrain Under Gov’t (Clear & Hold) Insurgent Advantage Coalition of Approach & Morale ANSF Control (Afghan Leadership, Recruiting, Appropriate to Fit Afghan Training, Skill Retention, Balance of Effort & ANSF ANSF Training & ANSF Appropriate Use of Force & Pakistan) Ins. Provision & Experience Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Force Institutional & Execution Coalition Capacity Mentoring INSTITUTIONAL ANSF Of Gov’t & Services Insurgent Capacity, INSURGENTS Ties to Capability & Coercion Coalition Dev. Ops- Perceived Priorities & Coalition Corruption & Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Narcotics & Avg COIN ANSF Tribal Other Criminal Experience Execution Advisory R.O.L. Policy, Commun/IO Use of Force Ins. Targeted & Skill Capacity & Priorities & Aid Favoritism Execution & Perceived & Affiliation w/ Population by Ins. Attacks on Progress/ Funding Funding & Material Support to NARCOTICS ANSF Fairness Perceived Support Likelihood of Relative Insurgents COALITION COALITION Coalition Population Funding Visibility to Adequacy Gov't Security Policy Relative Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & Coalition for Gov’t Popular Support/ /Tolerance Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment Perception of CAPACITY & CAPACITY & Resource Coalition Levels Strategic Coalition Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Quality & Investment Message Quality Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Insurgent Strength & Govt vs Insurgents Narcotics & Criminal (Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO Gov’t Acceptance of Intent Activity PRIORITIES PRIORITIES Forces, Advisory Afghan Methods POPULATION Levels Aid Levels) & Aid OVERALL OVERALL Gov't/ANSF Strategic POPULATION Population Population Neutral/On Population Population Central Gov't Institutional & Execution GOVERNMENT Commun/ IO CONDITIONS CONDITIONS Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Sympathizing w/ Gov’t the Fence Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Actively Supporting Insurgency Illegit Agric US Gov't Relative WOM Fear of Ins. Production, Support for Operation Gov't Capacity CAPACITY CAPACITY Relative Message & BELIEFS & BELIEFS Message Amplification Attack/ Repercussions Trade & Employment Breadth of Coalition & Funding Adequacy Gov't Training Gov't Integration of Western Impact Gov’t vs Ins Gov’t vs Ins POPULAR POPULAR Potential Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Terrain Harshness Duration US Domestic Perceived Cost/Benefit Support Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Gov't Workforce Local Tribal Structures Affiliation Backlash Perception of Coalition Intent SUPPORT SUPPORT Insurgent Path & Breadth of Operation & Support Skill & Avail & Commitment Perception Fraction of Of Gov t Workforce US Domestic/ Transparency Strength of Gov’t Gov't And Agric. Int'l Strategic Overall Gov't Strength of & Intent Legit vs Commun. Processes & Professionalism Reach, Illegit Investments Policy Quality Execution Religious Legit Agric & Diplomacy Ideology & Production Media COALITION Sensationalism & Fairness Capacity & Investment Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to Satisfaction w/ Gains in Infrastructure Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail Displacement Reconcile Bias DOMESTIC Gov't/ TRIBAL TRIBAL Recognition/ Engagement to Religious Ideology, Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment Population Basic Needs Tribal Service Levels SUPPORT Corruption & Contractor SUPPORT Tribal Favoritism Integrate Ethnic/Tribal Structures Services & & Employment Coalition Dev.Ops- Infrastructure, GOVERNANCE Tribal Structures& Beliefs Rivalry w/ Gov’t Path Expectations for Security, Employment Legit Other Production Civilian Services Legit vs. Illegit Relative Services, Average Services, & & Services (SWET, Economic Econ. Tax Connectedness Employment Non- Agric Healthcare, Opportunity Advisory Revenues of Population Perceived Security Education) & Aid INFRASTRUCTURE, Ability to Move People Private Sector Capital Mgmt., Legit Economic Activity, Provide Infr, Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness SERVICES & & SERVICES & Goods Rapidly Investment & Spending Trade & Employment Humanitarian Relief ECONOMY ECONOMY © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 21
    • Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics = Significant Delay Population/Popular Support Infrastructure, Economy, & Services Government Afghanistan Security Forces Insurgents Crime and Narcotics Coalition Forces & Actions Physical Environment ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties OUTSIDE SUPPORT ANSF ISR / Open Source Ops Total Security Targeted TO INSURGENT Counter Narcotics/ - Crime Ops Force Capacity & Strikes Ins. Damages FACTIONS TACTICAL ANSF Unit Focus Sweep Ops (Clear) & Casualties Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Coalition Leadership ANSF Policing & Repercussions & Tactical Capacity, Security Ops Outside Knowledge Havens / Ability to Support/ & Underst . Coalition Capacity Priorities & (Hold) ‘COIN Effectiveness Operate Enablement of Social ANSF of Ins. Structures Support ’ Strategy & Manpower Ins. Coordination Recruiting & ANSF Avg. Offensives & Among Ins. Duration of Unity Coalition Professionalism Insurgent Operation Retention Territory Not Presence Factions Ins. Terrain Adjustment Skill, Discipline, Under Gov’t Insurgent Coalition of Approach & Morale (Clear & Hold) Leadership, Advantage ANSF Control (Afghan Recruiting, Appropriate to Fit Afghan Training, Skill Retention, Balance of Effort & ANSF ANSF Training & ANSF Appropriate Use of Force & Pakistan) Ins. Provision & Experience Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Force Institutional & Execution Coalition Capacity Mentoring INSTITUTIONAL Of Gov’t & Services Insurgent Capacity, INSURGENTS Ties to Capability & Coercion Dev. Ops- ANSF Perceived Priorities & Coalition Corruption & Damages & Narcotics & Avg COIN Coalition ANSF Ins. Strategic Effectiveness Tribal Other Criminal Experience Execution Commun /IO Use of Force & Skill Capacity & Priorities Advisory & Aid Favoritism R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived & Affiliation w/ Population by Ins. Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Funding Funding & Material NARCOTICS Fairness Support to ANSF Perceived Support Relative Insurgents Likelihood of COALITION Coalition Funding Visibility to Adequacy Population Gov't Security Policy Relative Damages/Use of Force by Gov’ t & Coalition for Gov’t Popular Support/ /Tolerance Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment Perception of CAPACITY & Resource Coalition Levels Strategic Coalition Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Quality & Investment Message Quality Gov’t ’ Ins. vs Insurgent Strength & Gov vs ’t Insurgents Narcotics & Criminal Activity (Mil. & Civ. Commun Gov’t Acceptance of Intent PRIORITIES Forces, Aid Levels) ./IO Advisory Afghan Methods & Aid OVERALL POPULATION Levels Gov't/ANSF Population Central Gov't GOVERNMENT Strategic Commun / CONDITIONS Actively Supporting Population Sympathizing Neutral/On the Fence Population Sympathizing Population Actively Supporting US Gov't CENTRAL Institutional & Execution IO & BELIEFS Fear of Ins. Gov’t & SF w/ Gov’t w/ Insurgents Insurgency IllegitAgric Production, Support for Operation GOV’T Gov't Capacity CAPACITY Relative Message Relative WOM Message Amplification Attack/ Repercussions Trade & Employment Breadth of Funding Adequacy Gov't Training Gov't Integration of Impact Gov’t vs Ins Gov’t vs Ins POPULAR Potential Attractiveness of Gov vs. ’t Terrain Western Harshness US Domestic Coalition & Perceived Cost/Benefit Support Mentoring, Vetting, and Gov't Workforce Local Tribal Structures Affiliation Backlash Perception of Coalition Intent SUPPORT Insurgent Path & Breadth Duration of Operation Hiring & Support Skill & Avail & Commitment Perception Fraction of Of Gov’t Workforce US Domestic/ Transparency Strength of Gov’t Gov't And Agric. Int'l Strategic Overall Gov't Strength of & Intent Legit vs Commun . Processes & Professionalism Reach, Illegit Investments Policy Quality Execution Religious Legit Agric & Diplomacy Ideology & COALITION Media & Fairness Capacity & Investment Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to Satisfaction w/ Gains in Infrastructure Private Sector Production Workforce Skill & Avail Sensationalism DOMESTIC Bias TRIBAL Recognition/ Displacement Reconcile Religious Ideology, Security, Services Dev. Adequacy & Employment Visible Gains & Sustainment Population Basic Needs Gov't/ In Security, SUPPORT Coalition Contractor Corruption & Engagement to GOVERNANCE Ethnic/Tribal Integrate Tribal Rivalry Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Services & Employment Service Levels & Employment Dev.Ops- Tribal Favoritism Structures& Expectations Legit Other Civilian Legit vs.Illegit Path for Security, Relative Infrastructure, Beliefs Production Services Services, Average Services, & & Services (SWET, Economic Econ. Tax Connectedness Employment Non- Agric Healthcare, Opportunity Advisory Revenues Perceived of Population Security Education) & Aid INFRASTRUCTURE, Ability to Move People Private Sector Legit Economic Infr, Services, Econ. Policy & Execution SERVICES & Rapidly Capital Mgmt., & Goods Investment & Spending Activity, Trade & Employment Provide Humanitarian Relief /Perceived Fairness ECONOMY WORKING DRAFT – V3 © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 22
    • Key Feedback Loop: Securing and Empowering the Population ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties ISR / Open Source Ops Total Security Targeted Force Strikes 2 1 Capacity & Ins. Damages Fear of Focus Sweep Ops & Casualties (Clear) Gov’ t/ANSF/ ANSF Unit Coalition Leadership ANSF Policing & Repercussions & Tactical Capacity, Security Ops Outside Capacity Priorities & (Hold) Havens / Ability to Support/ Effectiveness Operate Enablement ANSF of Ins. Manpower Ins. Coordination Recruiting & ANSF Avg. Offensives & Among Ins. Coalition Retention Professionalism Territory Not Presence Factions Adjustment Skill, Discipline, Under Gov ’t Ins. of Approach & Morale (Clear & Hold) Leadership, ANSF Control (Afghan Training, Skill to Fit Afghan Appropriate & Pakistan) ANSF Use of Force & Experience ANSF Training & Ins. Provision Institutional & Mentoring Insurgent Execution Of Gov’t & Coalition Capacity Services Capacity, ANSF Perceived Priorities & Ties to Dev. Ops- Corruption & Narcotics & ANSF Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Tribal R.O.L. Policy, Commun/IO Use of Force Other Criminal Advisory Favoritism Ins. Targeted Funding & Aid Execution & & Affiliation w/ by Ins. Attacks on Perceived Population Progress/ ANSF Fairness Perceived Support Coalition Relative Funding Gov't Damages/Use for Gov ’t Popular Visibility to Adequacy Security of Force by Support/ Population Policy Relative Gov’ t & Coalition /Tolerance Quality & Perception of Gov’t vs alition Message Insurgent Investment Quality Insurgents Ops- Coalition/Homeland Strength & ov’t Acceptance of Gov’t ’vs Ins. Intent visory Afghan Methods Aid Fear is a key mechanism for insurgent factions to prevent the population from engaging and Gov't/ANSF supporting the Central Gov't actively Strategic Population Actively Population Sympathizing Neutral/On the Fence S Commun/ Supporting Government. Institutional & IO Gov’ t & SF w/ Gov’t w Execution Securing populated territory (clear and hold ops) can reduce Capacity Relative Relative WOM Message Fear of Ins. Attack/ t ng insurgent ability to target and intimidateMessagepopulation such the Impact Gov’t Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Repercussions Potential acy that Gov’t sympathizersofare willing to be vs Ins Gov't Integration active supporters. Attractiveness of Gov’t vs. • HUMINT: The population will beAffiliation willing to provide intel Gov't Training Western Mentoring, Vetting, and Gov't Local Tribal Structures more Perception of Insurgent Path Backlash if they Skill &not fear insurgent repercussions. Hiring do Avail Workforce Coalition Intent Perception sparency• ANA & ANP Development: ANSF recruiting and development & Commitment Of Gov’t Strength Gov’t cesses & isProfessionalism facilitated Reach,the expansion Strength of by of secure regions. (ANA and Gov't Overall Gov't & Intent Policy Quality Execution Religious stments ANP leaders, families, facilities, etc less likely to be targeted or & Fairness Capacity & Ideology & Tribal Private Satisfaction overrun. Investment Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to w/ Gains in Infrastructure Workf Skill & Displacement Reconcile Security Services Dev Adequacy © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 23
    • Key Feedback Loop: Government Engagement and Integration of Tribal Governance han Appropriate & Pakistan) Training, Skill Retention, ANSF Use of Force & Experience Manpower Criminal/ ANSF Training & Ins. Provision & ISR Trafficking Institutional & Mentoring Insurgent Capability & Execution Of Gov’t & tion Capacity Services Capacity, Coercion ANSF Perceived Priorities & Ties to Ops- Corruption & Narcotics & SF Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Tribal R.O.L. Policy, Commun/IO Use of Force Other Criminal sory Favoritism Ins. Targeted Funding Aid Execution & & Affiliation w/ by Ins. Attacks on Funding & Perceived Population Progress/ Material Fairness Support to Coalition Critical for the Government to recognize andPerceived the ANSF Funding Gov't make Damages/Use Support for Gov’t Relative Popular Insurgents Likelihood of Crime/Violence opulation effort toSecurity sibility to Adequacy engage existing tribal Relative Policy structures andForce by of Gov’ t & Coalition Support/ /Tolerance /Ins. Support for Payment Perception of Governance if they are to be accepted by the population. alition/Homeland Quality & Investment Message Quality Insurgent Strength & Gov’t vs Insurgents N & Acceptance of fghan Methods Ties to local governance can Gov’t ’vs Ins. gain popular support and Intent rapidly expand the Government’s overall capacity and Gov't/ANSF Population Population Population Neutral/On Population ‘reach’ which further increases their capacity and ability Central Gov't Strategic Commun/ Actively Supporting Sympathizing the Fence Sympathizing Actively Supporting Institutional & w/ Gov’t w/ Insurgents to engage the population. Execution IO Relative WOM Fear of Ins. Gov’t & SF Insurgency Illegit A Produc Capacity Attack/ Trad Relative Message Message Amplification Repercussions Employ Gov't Impact Gov’t Gov’t vs Ins Potential Integration of vs Ins Attractiveness Terrain Training Local Tribal Western of Gov’t vs. Harshness oring, Structures Affiliation Insurgent Path & Breadth g, and Gov't Backlash Perception of ring Workforce Coalition Intent Skill & Avail & Commitment Perception Fraction of Of Gov’t Workforce Strength And Agric. Gov't Overall Gov't Strength of & Intent Legit vs Professionalism Reach, Illegit Policy Quality Execution Religious Legit Agric & Fairness Capacity & Ideology & Production Tribal Private Sector Investment Satisfaction Workforce Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to w/ Gains in Infrastructure Displacement Reconcile Skill & Avail Security, Services Dev. Adequacy Population Religious & Employment Visible Gains & Sustainment Recognition/ Ideology, Basic Needs v't/ Engagement to In Security, Service Levels ractor Ethnic/Tribal Tribal Services & Integrate Structures & Employment ption & Tribal Rivalry Employment avoritism w/ Gov ’t Expectations Legit vs Structures& Path Legit Other Civilian Beliefs for Security, Production Services Rela Average Services, & & Services (SWET, Econo Tax Connectedness Employment Non- Agric Healthcare, Opport Revenues of Population Perceived Education) Security Ability to Move Private Sector Legit Economic People Capital Mgmt., Activity, Infr, Services, Econ. & Goods Investment & Trade & Policy & Execution Rapidly Spending Employment Provide /Perceived Fairness Humanitarian Relief © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 24
    • Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – SECURITY Population/Popular Support Infrastructure, Economy, & Services Government Afghanistan Security Forces Insurgents Crime and Narcotics Coalition Forces & Actions ANSF & Physical Environment Coalition Damages/ Casualties ISR / Open Source Ops Total Security Targeted Counter- Narcotics/ Force Strikes Crime Ops Capacity & Ins. Damages Fear of Focus Sweep Ops & Casualties (Clear) Gov’ t/ANSF/ ANSF Unit Coalition Coalition Leadership ANSF Policing & Repercussions & Tactical Capacity & Security Ops Outside Knowledge Havens / Ability to Support/ & Underst. Coalition Capacity Priorities (Hold) ‘ COIN Operate Enablement of Social ANSF of Ins. Structures Support’ Strategy & Manpower Ins. Coordination Recruiting & ANSF Avg. Offensives & Among Ins. Duration of Unity Coalition Professionalism Insurgent Operation Retention Territory Not Presence Factions Ins. Terrain Adjustment Skill, Discipline, Under Gov’t (Clear & Hold) Insurgent Coalition of Approach & Morale Leadership, Recruiting, Advantage Appropriate ANSF Control (Afghan Training, Skill to Fit Afghan Appropriate & Pakistan) Retention, Balance of ANSF Use of Force & Experience Manpower Criminal/ Effort & ANSF Training & & ISR Trafficking Force Institutional & Mentoring Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Insurgent Capability & Execution Services Capacity, Coercion Coalition Capacity ANSF Perceived Ties to Coalition Dev. Ops- Priorities & Narcotics & Coalition Corruption & Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Avg COIN ANSF Tribal Other Criminal Experience Execution Advisory R.O.L. Policy, Commun/IO Use of Force Ins. Targeted Capacity & Favoritism Execution & & Affiliation w/ by Ins. Funding Funding & & Skill & Aid Attacks on Material Priorities Perceived Population Progress/ Fairness Support to ANSF Perceived Support Relative Insurgents Likelihood of Coalition Funding Gov't Damages/Use for Gov’t Popular Active Ins. Visibility to Adequacy Security of Force by Support/ Support for Population Policy Relative Gov’ t & Coalition Tolerance Payment Quality & Perception of Gov’t vs Resource Coalition Coalition Message Insurgent Narcotics Levels Investment Quality Insurgents & Criminal Strategic Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Strength & (Military Commun./IO Gov’t Acceptance of Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Intent Activity Forces, Advisory Afghan Methods Levels Civilian & Aid Forces, Gov't/ANSF Population Population Aid Levels) Strategic Population Neutral/On Population Central Gov't Actively Sympathizing the Fence Sympathizing Actively Commun/ Supporting Supporting Institutional & IO w/ Gov’t w/ Insurgents Gov’ t & SF Insurgency Illegit Agric US Gov't Execution Fear of Ins. Production, Capacity Relative WOM Support for Relative Message Attack/ Trade & Operation Gov't Message Amplification Repercussions Employment Funding Impact Gov’t Gov’t vs Ins Potential Breadth of Adequacy Gov't vs Ins Attractiveness Terrain Gov't Training Integration of Western of Gov’t vs. Harshness US Domestic Coalition & Local Tribal Duration Support Mentoring, Affiliation Insurgent Path & Breadth of Perceived Vetting, and Gov't Structures Backlash Perception of Cost/Benefit Workforce Operation Hiring Coalition Intent & Support Skill & Avail & Commitment Perception Fraction of Of Gov’t Workforce US Domestic/ Transparency Strength of Gov’t Gov't And Agric. Int'l Strategic Overall Gov't Strength of & Intent Legit vs Commun. Processes & Professionalism Reach, Investments Policy Quality Religious Legit Agric Illegit & Diplomacy Execution Ideology & & Fairness Capacity & Private Sector Production Investment Tribal Satisfaction Media Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to Workforce Sensationalism w/ Gains in Infrastructure Skill & Avail Displacement Reconcile Security, Services Dev. Adequacy Bias Religious & Employment Visible Gains & Sustainment Population Recognition/ Ideology, Basic Needs Gov't/ Engagement to In Security, Service Levels Contractor Ethnic/Tribal Tribal Services & Integrate Structures & Employment Coalition Corruption & Tribal Rivalry Employment Tribal Favoritism w/ Gov’t Expectations Legit vs. Illegit Dev.Ops- Structures& Path Legit Other Civilian Infrastructure, Beliefs for Security, Production Services Relative Services, Average Services, & & Services (SWET, Economic Econ. Tax Connectedness Employment Non- Agric Healthcare, Opportunity Advisory Revenues of Population Perceived Security Education) & Aid Ability to Private Sector Move Capital Legit Economic People Management, Activity, Infr., Services, Econ. & Goods Investment & Trade & Policy & Execution Rapidly Spending Employment Provide /Perceived Fairness Humanitarian Relief WORKING DRAFT © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 26
    • Population/Popular Support Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – GOVERNANCE Infrastructure, Economy, & Services Government Afghanistan Security Forces Insurgents Crime and Narcotics Coalition Forces & Actions Physical Environment ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties ISR / Open Source Ops Total Security Targeted Counter- Narcotics/ Force Strikes Crime Ops Capacity & Ins. Damages Fear of Focus Sweep Ops & Casualties (Clear) Gov’ t/ANSF/ ANSF Unit Coalition Coalition Leadership ANSF Policing & Repercussions & Tactical Capacity & Security Ops Outside Knowledge Havens / Ability to Support/ & Underst. Coalition Capacity Priorities (Hold) ‘ COIN Operate Enablement of Social ANSF of Ins. Structures Support’ Strategy & Manpower Ins. Coordination Recruiting & ANSF Avg. Offensives & Among Ins. Duration of Unity Coalition Professionalism Insurgent Operation Retention Territory Not Presence Factions Ins. Terrain Adjustment Skill, Discipline, Under Gov’t Insurgent Coalition of Approach & Morale (Clear & Hold) Leadership, Advantage ANSF Control (Afghan Recruiting, Appropriate to Fit Afghan Appropriate & Pakistan) Training, Skill Retention, Balance of ANSF Use of Force & Experience Manpower Criminal/ Effort & ANSF Training & & ISR Trafficking Force Institutional & Mentoring Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Insurgent Capability & Execution Services Capacity, Coercion Coalition Capacity ANSF Ties to Coalition Dev. Ops- Perceived Priorities & Coalition Corruption & Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Narcotics & Avg COIN ANSF Tribal Other Criminal Experience Execution Advisory R.O.L. Policy, Commun/IO Use of Force Ins. Targeted Capacity & Favoritism Execution & & Affiliation w/ by Ins. Funding Funding & & Skill & Aid Attacks on Priorities Perceived Population Progress/ Material Fairness Support to ANSF Perceived Support Relative Insurgents Likelihood of Coalition Funding Gov't Damages/Use for Gov’t Popular Crime/Violence Visibility to Adequacy Security of Force by Support/ /Ins. Support Population Policy Relative Gov’ t & Coalition /Tolerance for Payment Quality & Perception of Gov’t vs Resource Coalition Coalition Message Insurgent Narcotics Investment Quality Insurgents & Criminal Levels Strategic Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Strength & (Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO Gov’t Acceptance of Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Intent Activity Forces, Advisory Afghan Methods Levels Aid Levels) & Aid Gov't/ANSF Population Neutral/On Population Strategic Population Population Actively Sympathizing the Fence Sympathizing Actively Central Gov't Commun/ Supporting Institutional & w/ Gov’t w/ Insurgents Supporting IO Gov’ t & SF Insurgency Illegit Agric US Gov't Execution Fear of Ins. Production, Capacity Relative WOM Support for Relative Message Attack/ Trade & Operation Gov't Message Amplification Repercussions Employment Funding Impact Gov’t Gov’t vs Ins Potential Breadth of Adequacy Gov't vs Ins Attractiveness Terrain Gov't Training Integration of Western of Gov’t vs. Harshness US Domestic Coalition & Local Tribal Duration Support Mentoring, Affiliation Insurgent Path & Breadth of Perceived Vetting, and Gov't Structures Backlash Perception of Cost/Benefit Workforce Operation Hiring Coalition Intent & Support Skill & Avail & Commitment Perception Fraction of Of Gov’t Workforce US Domestic/ Transparency Strength of Gov’t Gov't And Agric. Int'l Strategic Overall Gov't Strength of & Intent Legit vs Commun. Processes & Professionalism Reach, Illegit Investments Policy Quality Execution Religious Legit Agric & Diplomacy Ideology & & Fairness Capacity & Private Sector Production Investment Tribal Satisfaction Workforce Media Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to w/ Gains in Infrastructure Sensationalism Displacement Reconcile Skill & Avail Bias Security, Services Dev. Adequacy Population Religious & Employment Visible Gains & Sustainment Recognition/ Ideology, Basic Needs Gov't/ Engagement to Tribal In Security, Service Levels Contractor Integrate Ethnic/Tribal Services & & Employment Corruption & Rivalry Structures Employment Coalition Tribal w/ Gov’t Dev.Ops- Tribal Favoritism Structures& Path Expectations Legit Other Civilian Legit vs. Illegit Infrastructure, Beliefs for Security, Production Services Relative Services, Average Services, & & Services (SWET, Economic Econ. Tax Connectedness Employment Non- Agric Healthcare, Opportunity Advisory Revenues Perceived of Population Security Education) & Aid Ability to Private Sector Move Legit Economic People Capital Mgmt., Activity, Infr., Services, Econ. & Goods Investment & Trade & Policy & Execution Rapidly Spending Employment Provide /Perceived Fairness Humanitarian WORKING DRAFT Relief Reconciliation Effectiveness © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 27
    • Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – DEVELOPMENT Population/Popular Support Infrastructure, Economy, & Services Government Afghanistan Security Forces Insurgents Crime and Narcotics Coalition Forces & Actions Physical Environment ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties ISR / Open Source Ops Total Security Targeted Counter- Narcotics/ Force Strikes Crime Ops Capacity & Ins. Damages Fear of Focus Sweep Ops & Casualties (Clear) Gov’ t/ANSF/ ANSF Unit Coalition Coalition Leadership ANSF Policing & Repercussions & Tactical Capacity & Security Ops Outside Knowledge Havens / Ability to Support/ & Underst. Coalition Capacity Priorities (Hold) ‘ COIN Operate Enablement of Social ANSF of Ins. Structures Support’ Strategy & Manpower Ins. Coordination Recruiting & ANSF Avg. Offensives & Among Ins. Duration of Unity Coalition Professionalism Insurgent Operation Retention Territory Not Presence Factions Ins. Terrain Adjustment Skill, Discipline, Under Gov’t Insurgent Coalition of Approach & Morale (Clear & Hold) Leadership, Advantage ANSF Control (Afghan Recruiting, Appropriate to Fit Afghan Appropriate & Pakistan) Training, Skill Retention, Balance of ANSF Use of Force & Experience Manpower Criminal/ Effort & ANSF Training & & ISR Trafficking Force Institutional & Mentoring Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Insurgent Capability & Execution Services Capacity, Coercion Coalition Capacity ANSF Ties to Coalition Dev. Ops- Perceived Priorities & Coalition Corruption & Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Narcotics & Avg COIN ANSF Tribal Other Criminal Experience Execution Advisory R.O.L. Policy, Commun/IO Use of Force Ins. Targeted Capacity & Favoritism Execution & & Affiliation w/ by Ins. Funding Funding & & Skill & Aid Attacks on Priorities Perceived Population Progress/ Material Fairness Support to ANSF Perceived Support Relative Insurgents Likelihood of Coalition Funding Gov't Damages/Use for Gov’t Popular Crime/Violence Visibility to Adequacy Security of Force by Support/ /Ins. Support Population Policy Relative Gov’ t & Coalition /Tolerance for Payment Quality & Perception of Gov’t vs Resource Coalition Coalition Message Insurgent Narcotics Investment Quality Insurgents & Criminal Levels Strategic Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Strength & (Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO Gov’t Acceptance of Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Intent Activity Forces, Advisory Afghan Methods Levels Aid Levels) & Aid Gov't/ANSF Population Neutral/On Population Population Strategic Actively Population Central Gov't Sympathizing the Fence Sympathizing Actively Commun/ Supporting Supporting Institutional & IO w/ Gov’t w/ Insurgents Gov’ t & SF Insurgency Illegit Agric US Gov't Execution Fear of Ins. Production, Capacity Relative WOM Support for Relative Message Attack/ Trade & Operation Gov't Message Amplification Repercussions Employment Funding Impact Gov’t Gov’t vs Ins Potential Breadth of Adequacy Gov't vs Ins Attractiveness Terrain Gov't Training Integration of Western of Gov’t vs. Harshness US Domestic Coalition & Local Tribal Duration Support Mentoring, Affiliation Insurgent Path & Breadth of Perceived Vetting, and Gov't Structures Backlash Perception of Cost/Benefit Workforce Operation Hiring Coalition Intent & Support Skill & Avail & Commitment Perception Fraction of Of Gov’t Workforce US Domestic/ Transparency Strength of Gov’t Gov't And Agric. Int'l Strategic Overall Gov't Strength of & Intent Legit vs Commun. Processes & Professionalism Reach, Illegit Investments Policy Quality Execution Religious Legit Agric & Diplomacy Ideology & & Fairness Capacity & Private Sector Production Investment Tribal Satisfaction Media Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to Workforce Sensationalism w/ Gains in Infrastructure Skill & Avail Displacement Reconcile Security, Services Dev. Adequacy Bias Religious & Employment Visible Gains & Sustainment Population Recognition/ Ideology, Basic Needs Gov't/ Engagement to In Security, Service Levels Contractor Ethnic/Tribal Tribal Services & Integrate Structures & Employment Coalition Corruption & Tribal Rivalry Employment Tribal Favoritism w/ Gov’t Expectations Legit vs. Illegit Dev.Ops- Structures& Path Legit Other Civilian Infrastructure, Beliefs for Security, Production Services Relative Services, Average Services, & & Services (SWET, Economic Econ. Tax Connectedness Employment Non- Agric Healthcare, Opportunity Advisory Revenues Perceived of Population Security Education) & Aid Ability to Private Sector Move Legit Economic People Capital Mgmt., Activity, Infr., Services, Econ. & Goods Investment & Trade & Policy & Execution Rapidly Spending Employment Provide /Perceived Fairness Humanitarian Relief WORKING DRAFT © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 28
    • Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics Claim the Information Initiative: “Message” quality and availability impact who – Claim the Information Initiative is relatively more effective in influencing the population. Government message quality has been stronger relative to insurgent factions (who have typically not made the effort or been effective in aligning with civilian beliefs), but lack of progress has undermined message credibility. ANSF & Coalition Message availability is constrained by low “average connectedness” (rural Damages/ Casualties populations spread across harsh terrain, low literacy rates, limited radio) and ISR / Open Source Ops Total Security most message propagation / amplification is by word of mouth (WOM). WOM Targeted Counter- Narcotics/ Force Capacity & tends to Damages negative messages more strongly than positive, but also Ops Strikes Sweep Ops Ins. amplify Fear of Crime tends to Focus ANSF Unit be biased towards current sentiments. (Clear) & Casualties Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Coalition Leadership ANSF Policing & Repercussions & Tactical Capacity & Security Ops Outside Knowledge & Underst. Coalition ‘ COIN Capacity Priorities (Hold) “Western affiliation backlash” may undermineAbility to Enablement messages if they are Havens / Government Operate Support/ of Social Structures Support’ Strategy & ANSF Manpower ANSF Avg. seen as puppets who lack the strength to deliver progress or have taken an Ins. Coordination of Ins. Recruiting & Duration of Operation Unity Coalition Adjustment Retention Professionalism Skill, Discipline, overly Western Not Territory posture Under Gov’t Offensives & Presence Among Ins. Factions Ins. Insurgent Insurgent Terrain Coalition of Approach & Morale (Clear & Hold) Leadership, Advantage ANSF Control (Afghan Recruiting, Appropriate to Fit Afghan Appropriate & Pakistan) Training, Skill Retention, Balance of ANSF Use of Force & Experience Manpower Criminal/ Effort & ANSF Training & & ISR Trafficking Force Institutional & Mentoring Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Insurgent Capability & Execution Services Capacity, Coercion Coalition Capacity ANSF Perceived Ties to Coalition Dev. Ops- Priorities & Narcotics & Coalition ANSF Corruption & Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Avg COIN Tribal Other Criminal Experience Execution Advisory R.O.L. Policy, Commun/IO Use of Force Ins. Targeted Capacity & Favoritism Execution & & Affiliation w/ by Ins. Funding Funding & & Skill & Aid Attacks on Priorities Perceived Population Progress/ Material Fairness Support to ANSF Perceived Support Relative Insurgents Likelihood of Coalition Funding Gov't Damages/Use for Gov’t Popular Active Ins. Visibility to Adequacy Security of Force by Support/ Support for Population Policy Relative Gov’ t & Coalition Tolerance Payment Quality & Perception of Gov’t vs Resource Coalition Coalition Message Insurgent Narcotics Levels Investment Quality Insurgents & Criminal Strategic Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Strength & (Military Commun./IO Gov’t Acceptance of Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Intent Activity Forces, Advisory Afghan Methods Levels Civilian & Aid Forces, Gov't/ANSF Population Population Aid Levels) Strategic Population Neutral/On Population Actively Sympathizing the Fence Sympathizing Actively Central Gov't Commun/ Supporting Institutional & w/ Gov’t w/ Insurgents Supporting IO Gov’ t & SF Insurgency Illegit Agric US Gov't Execution Fear of Ins. Production, Capacity Relative WOM Support for Relative Message Attack/ Trade & Operation Gov't Message Amplification Repercussions Employment Funding Impact Gov’t Gov’t vs Ins Potential Breadth of Adequacy Gov't vs Ins Attractiveness Terrain Gov't Training Integration of Western of Gov’t vs. Harshness US Domestic Coalition & Local Tribal Duration Support Mentoring, Affiliation Insurgent Path & Breadth of Perceived Vetting, and Gov't Structures Backlash Perception of Cost/Benefit Workforce Operation Hiring Coalition Intent & Support Skill & Avail & Commitment Perception Fraction of Of Gov’t Workforce US Domestic/ Transparency Strength of Gov’t Gov't And Agric. Int'l Strategic Overall Gov't Strength of & Intent Legit vs Commun. Processes & Professionalism Reach, Investments Policy Quality Religious Legit Agric Illegit & Diplomacy Execution Ideology & & Fairness Capacity & Private Sector Production Investment Tribal Satisfaction Media Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to Workforce Sensationalism w/ Gains in Infrastructure Skill & Avail Displacement Reconcile Security, Services Dev. Adequacy Bias Religious & Employment Visible Gains & Sustainment Population Recognition/ Ideology, Basic Needs Gov't/ Engagement to In Security, Service Levels Contractor Ethnic/Tribal Tribal Services & Integrate Structures & Employment Coalition Corruption & Tribal Rivalry Employment Tribal Favoritism w/ Gov’t Expectations Legit vs. Illegit Dev.Ops- Structures& Path Legit Other Civilian Infrastructure, Beliefs for Security, Production Services Relative Services, Average Services, & & Services (SWET, Economic Econ. Tax Connectedness Employment Non- Agric Healthcare, Opportunity Advisory Revenues of Population Perceived Security Education) & Aid Ability to Private Sector Move Capital Legit Economic People Management, Activity, Infr., Services, Econ. & Goods Investment & Trade & Policy & Execution Rapidly Spending Employment Provide /Perceived Fairness Humanitarian Population/Popular Support Relief Infrastructure, Economy, & Services Government Afghanistan Security Forces Insurgents Crime and Narcotics Significant WORKING DRAFT Coalition Forces & Actions Physical Environment = Delay © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 29
    • Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – Claim the Information Initiative h & Morale ANSF Control (Afghan Leadership, n Appropriate & Pakistan) Training, Skill ANSF Use of Force & Experience ANSF Training & Ins. Provision Institutional & Mentoring Of Gov’t & Insurgent Execution Services Capacity, n Capacity ANSF Perceived Ties to s- Priorities & Narcotics & Corruption & Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Tribal R.O.L. Policy, Commun/IO Use of Force Other Criminal y Favoritism Ins. Targeted Funding Execution & & Affiliation w/ by Ins. Attacks on Fun Perceived Population Progress/ Ma Fairness Sup ANSF Perceived Support Relative Insu alition Funding Gov't Damages/Use for Gov’t Popular bility to Adequacy Security of Force by Support/ ulation Policy Relative Gov’ t & Coalition Tolerance Quality & Perception of Gov’t vs Message Insurgent Investment Quality Insurgents on/Homeland Strength & ceptance of Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Intent an Methods Gov't/ANSF Population Neutral/On Strategic Population Popu Central Gov't Actively Sympathizing the Fence Sympa Commun/ Supporting Institutional & IO w/ Gov’t w/ Insu Gov’ t & SF Execution Fear of Ins. Capacity Relative WOM Relative Message Attack/ Message Amplification Repercussions Impact Gov’t Gov’t vs Ins Potential Gov't vs Ins Attractiveness T ining Integration of Western of Gov’t vs. Local Tribal Ha ng, Affiliation Insurgent Path & and Gov't Structures Backlash Perception of g Workforce Coalition Intent Skill & Avail & Commitment Perception Of Gov’t Strength Gov't Overall Gov't Strength of & Intent Professionalism Reach, Religious Policy Quality & Fairness Execution Capacity & Ideology & Claim the Information Initiative: “Message” quality and Tribal Private Sector Investment Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to availability impact who is relatively more effective in influencing Satisfaction Workforce w/ Gains in Infrastructure Skill & Avail Displacement Reconcile the population. Government message quality has been Security, Services Dev. Adequacy Religious Recognition/ Ideology, strongerEmploymentto Visible Gains factions (who have typically not & relative insurgent & Sustainment Engagement to In Security, tor Integrate Ethnic/Tribal Tribal made the effort or been effective in aligning with civilian Services & on & Rivalry Structures Employment has undermined message oritism Tribal w/ Gov’t beliefs), but lack of progress Expectations Structures& Path Legit Other Civilia Beliefs credibility. for Security, Production Servic Average Services, & & Services (SWE Tax Connectedness Employment Message availability is constrained by low “average Healthc Non- Agric Revenues of Population Perceived Educat Security connectedness” (rural populations spread across harsh terrain, low literacy rates, limited radio) and most to Private Sector Ability message propagation Capital / amplification is by word of mouth (WOM). WOM tends to Move People Management, Infr., Services, Econ. negative messages more strongly than positive, but amplify & Goods Investment & Policy & Execution Spending /Perceivedalso tends to be biased towards current sentiments. Provide Rapidly Fairness Humanitarian Relief “Western affiliation backlash” may undermine Government messages if they are seen as puppets who lack the strength to deliver progress or have taken an overly Western posture © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 30
    • Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – Population Security p ANSF g p cal Capacity & Security Ops Outsid ty Priorities (Hold) Havens / Ability to Suppor Operate Enablem of Ins. ANSF Avg. Ins. Coordination Professionalism Offensives & Among Ins. Territory Not Presence Factions Ins. Skill, Discipline, Under Gov’t (Clear & Hold) & Morale ANSF Control (Afghan Leadership, Appropriate & Pakistan) Training, Skill Use of Force & Experience Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Insurgent Services Capacity, Ties to ANSF Perceived Priorities & Corruption & Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Narcotics & Tribal R.O.L. Policy, Commun/IO Use of Force Other Criminal Favoritism Ins. Targeted Funding Execution & & Affiliation w/ by Ins. Attacks on Perceived Population Progress/ Fairness Perceived Support for Gov’t Relative Damages/Use Popular ty of Force by Support/ y Relative Gov’ t & Coalition Perception of Tolerance & Message Insurgent Gov’t vs ent Quality Insurgents Strength & Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Intent Gov't/ANSF Population Neutral/On Strategic Actively Population Commun/ Sympathizing the Fence Supporting w/ Gov’t IO Gov’ t & SF Relative WOM Fear of Ins. Relative Message Attack/ Message Amplification Repercussions Impact Gov’t Gov’t vs Ins Potential Population Security: Security is a function of day to day conditions Gov't vs Ins Attractivenes and also perception of ‘who will win’tegrationlonger term: Western over of ocal Tribal of Gov’t vs. Insurgent Pa Structures Affiliation • Actual damages by both the Insurgents and ANSF /Backlash Coalition Perception of Coalition Intent forces impact perceived security. & Commitment Perception Of Gov’t • Insurgents rely targeted “attacks on progress”Strength of to generate fear Strength & Intent and intimidation to limit sympathizers moving towards active Religious Ideology & supporters. They often threaten or target civilian and security force Priv Tribal Satisfaction W individuals who are visibly supporting the government – the Cultural Erosion/ Structures fear this Ability to w/ Gains in Infrastructure Ski Displacement Reconcile Security, Services Dev. Adequacy generates is powerful in slowing or reversing positive momentum. Religious & Employment Visible Gains & Sustainment ecognition/ Ideology, • In addition to near term security concerns, the population is gagement to Ethnic/Tribal Tribal In Security, Services & assessing ‘who will win’ over the Integrate long term by comparing Tribal Rivalry Structures w/ Gov’t Employment perception of Insurgent strength to perception of Government tructures& Path Expectations Legit Other Beliefs for Security, Production strength and also considering perceived Coalition commitment. (A Average Services, & & Services Connectedness Employment key input to perceived strength is how much of the population lives of Population Perceived Non-Agric in region secured by the Government.) They will hesitate to actively Security support the government if they feel they will fail, particularly if they Ability to Private Se Capita have been witness to “clear and leave” operations. Move Managem People Investme I f S i E © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 31