Dynamic Planning for COIN in Afghanistan
Potential
                                                  Fractiousness
                                                ...
• An increase in Coalition funding will influence                                 Coalition
  economic investment and deve...
Coalition
                                                        Satisfaction with                     Funding
          ...
Coalition
                                                              Satisfaction with                               Fu...
Coalition
                                                                     An appropriate force mix, and correct opera...
Coalition
                                                                   Satisfaction with                            ...
Coalition
                                                                   Satisfaction with                            ...
Popular Support – Sympathizers and Active Supporters




                                                                 ...
Population Conditions, Beliefs, & Structures
                                                                Perceived Dam...
Population Conditions, Beliefs, & Structures




                                                                         ...
Insurgent Capacity, Outside Support/ Enablement of Insurgents, Narcotics


                                               ...
Insurgent Capacity, Outside Support/ Enablement of Insurgents, Narcotics


                                               ...
Infrastructure, Services, & Economy
Feedback Loop Examples:
1. Agricultural production and markets: Investment and spendin...
Infrastructure, Services, & Economy

                                                                                     ...
Governance – Central Government Development & Capacity; Engagement /
   Empowerment of Tribal Governance; Overall Governan...
Afghanistan Dynamic Planning
Afghanistan Dynamic Planning
Afghanistan Dynamic Planning
Afghanistan Dynamic Planning
Afghanistan Dynamic Planning
Afghanistan Dynamic Planning
Afghanistan Dynamic Planning
Afghanistan Dynamic Planning
Afghanistan Dynamic Planning
Afghanistan Dynamic Planning
Afghanistan Dynamic Planning
Afghanistan Dynamic Planning
Afghanistan Dynamic Planning
Afghanistan Dynamic Planning
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Afghanistan Dynamic Planning

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Afghanistan Dynamic Planning

  1. 1. Dynamic Planning for COIN in Afghanistan
  2. 2. Potential Fractiousness of Society Support for Neutral Support for HN Insurgency Populace Government COIN operations must accomplish three tasks simultaneously: • Influence insurgent-minded individuals to adopt a neutral disposition. • Influence neutral-minded individuals to adopt a supportive disposition. • Retain supportive individuals. These operations are conducted in an environment where tensions and hostilities between groups may destabilize a society and provide opportunities for insurgents • This environment may suggest courses of action aimed at reinforcing or widening seams
  3. 3. • An increase in Coalition funding will influence Coalition economic investment and development. Funding • A strengthened economy will influence movement from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups Economic toward the supportive group. Investment Potential Fractiousness Economic of Society Development Support for Neutral Support for HN Insurgency Populace Government
  4. 4. Coalition Satisfaction with Funding Breakdown of Essential Services Developing and Essential Services Restoring Essential Services Economic Expectations for Essential Essential Services Investment Services Time to Develop Essential Services Potential Fractiousness Economic of Society Development Support for Neutral Support for HN Insurgency Populace Government • An increase in Coalition funding will significantly impact the restoration of essential services. • Improvements in the provision of essential services will influence movement from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups toward the supportive group.
  5. 5. Coalition Satisfaction with Funding Breakdown of Essential Services Time to Develop Developing and Essential Services Governance Restoring Essential Services Economic Expectations for Essential Essential Services Investment Services Governance Time to Develop Essential Services Potential Psychological Operations Fractiousness Economic Effectiveness of Society Development Support for Neutral Support for HN Insurgency Populace Government Available Perceived Workforce Security External Material A government that is established, Support recognized, and that maintains a secure Insurgent Acts environment is in a position to of Violence • Send a positive, credible message of success to the populace. • Provide an environment that enhances stable employment of the workforce. • Persuade insurgents and neutrals to consider becoming supporters.
  6. 6. Coalition An appropriate force mix, and correct operational Satisfaction with Funding Breakdown of Essential Services Time to Develop tempo, timing, and synchronization will have very Governance Developing and Essential Services Restoring Essential significant impacts on Services Expectations for restoration of essential services. Economic • The Essential Essential Services Investment Services Governance • The populace’s perception of security. Time to Develop Essential Services Psychological Potential Government’s and COIN forces’ credibility in • The their communications efforts with the populace. Fractiousness Economic Operations Effectiveness of Society Development Impact of Support for Neutral Support for HN Illegitimate Actions Insurgency Populace Government Appropriate Mix of Effort and Use of Force Available Perceived Workforce Security Information Individual Competence, External Material Judgment, and Ability Support to Execute Time to Develop HN Insurgent Acts Security Forces Appropriate Strategic Emphasis of Violence Total Force Host Nation Insurgent to Force Density Security Forces Density Ratio Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures Coalition Force Host Nation Density Force Density
  7. 7. Coalition Satisfaction with Funding Breakdown of Essential Services Time to Develop Developing and Essential Services Governance Restoring Essential Services Economic Expectations for Essential Essential Services Investment Services Governance Time to Develop Essential Services Potential Psychological Operations Fractiousness Economic of Society Effectiveness Development Impact of Support for Neutral Support for HN Illegitimate Actions Insurgency Populace Government Appropriate Mix of Effort and Use of Force Available Perceived Workforce Security Information Individual Competence, External Material Judgment, and Ability Support to Execute Time to Develop HN Insurgent Acts Security Forces Appropriate Strategic Emphasis of Violence Total Force Host Nation Insurgent to Force Density Security Forces Density Ratio Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures Coalition Force Host Nation Density Force Density The Logical Lines of Operations from FM 3-24
  8. 8. Coalition Satisfaction with Funding Breakdown of Essential Services Time to Develop Developing and Essential Services Governance Restoring Essential Services Economic Expectations for Essential Essential Services Investment Services Governance Time to Develop Essential Services Potential Psychological Operations Fractiousness Economic Effectiveness of Society Development Impact of Support for Neutral Support for HN Illegitimate Actions Insurgency Populace Government Appropriate Mix of Effort and Use of Force Available Perceived Workforce Security Information Individual Competence, External Material Judgment, and Ability Support to Execute Time to Develop HN Insurgent Acts Security Forces Appropriate Strategic Emphasis of Violence Total Force Host Nation Insurgent to Force Density Security Forces Density Ratio Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures Coalition Force Host Nation Density Force Density The Basic Information Ops Loop
  9. 9. Popular Support – Sympathizers and Active Supporters Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Govt vs Insurgents Population Population Neutral/On Population Population Actively Sympathizing the Fence Sympathizing Actively Supporting w/ Gov’t w/ Insurgents Supporting Gov’t & SF Insurgency POPULAR Potential Attractiveness of Govt vs. SUPPORT Insurgent Path © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 9
  10. 10. Population Conditions, Beliefs, & Structures Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Insurgents Perceived Damages/Use Perception of Insurgent of Force by Gov’t and CF Strength and Intent Fear of Ins. Attack, Relative WOM Message Repercussions Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Perception of Gov’t Strength of Strength and Intent Religious Ability to Ideology & Tribal Reconcile Satisfaction w/ Gains Structures Religious in Security, Services & Ideology, Employment Cultural Erosion/ Tribal Displacement Structures w/ Visible Gains Expectations Gov’t Path In Security, for Security, Services & Services & Employment Employment Perceived Ethnic/Tribal Average Security Rivalry Connectedness of Population © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 10
  11. 11. Population Conditions, Beliefs, & Structures Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Perceived Relative Damages/Use Popular of Force by Support/ Gov t & Coalition Perception of /Tolerance Insurgent Govt vs Insurgents Strength & Intent POPULATION Population CONDITIONS Actively Supporting Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t Neutral/On the Fence Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF & BELIEFS Relative WOM Message Fear of Ins. Attack/ Insurgency Amplification Repercussions Gov’t vs Ins POPULAR POPULAR Potential Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Perception of Coalition Intent SUPPORT Insurgent Path & Commitment Perception Of Govt Strength Strength of & Intent Religious Ideology & Tribal Satisfaction Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to w/ Gains in Displacement Reconcile Security, Services Religious & Employment Visible Gains Ideology, In Security, Ethnic/Tribal Tribal Services & Rivalry Structures Employment w/ Gov’t Expectations Path for Security, Average Services, & Connectedness Employment Perceived of Population Security © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 11
  12. 12. Insurgent Capacity, Outside Support/ Enablement of Insurgents, Narcotics Outside Fear of Gov’t / Support / ANSF / Coalition Enablement Insurgent Insurgent Repercussions Havens / of Ins. Terrain Damages & Ability to 1 Advantage Casualties Operate Insurgent Coordination Insurgent Offensives & Among Ins Leadership Insurgent Territory Not Presence Factions Training, Skill Recruiting, Under Gov’t (Clear & Hold) & Exper Retention, Criminal/ Control 2 Manpower, Trafficking Ins Strategic Ins Provision Insurgent & ISR Capability & Comm/IO & Ties to of Gov’t & Capacity, Coercion Affiliation w/ Narcotics Services Priorities & Population & Other Funding & Effectiveness Material Ins Targeted Criminal Attacks on Funding Support to Likelihood Insurgents Narcotics & Progress/ of Crime/ Criminal Support for Gov’t Violence/ Activity Levels Ins Support for Payment Illegit Agric Production Trade & Feedback Loop Examples: Employment 1. Insurgent expansion: Insurgent factions with havens as base can expand their presence and influence, further increasing their operating base territory. (Permissive population contribution to Havens / Ability to Operate input from separate sector). 2. Alignment of criminal and insurgent interests: Weakly governed / policed Terrain territory may support insurgents, terrorists and criminals alike. Often interests Harshness align and lines blur with criminal activity and funding contributing to insurgent & Breadth operations and expansion, further increasing the weakly governed terrority and © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 12
  13. 13. Insurgent Capacity, Outside Support/ Enablement of Insurgents, Narcotics OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT Ins. Damages & Casualties Fear of FACTIONS Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Outside Havens / Ability to Support/ Operate Enablement of Ins. Ins. Coordination Offensives & Among Ins. Insurgent Territory Not Presence Factions Ins. Terrain Under Gov’t (Clear & Hold) Insurgent Advantage Control (Afghan Leadership, Recruiting, & Pakistan) Training, Skill Retention, & Experience Manpower Criminal/ Ins. Provision & ISR Trafficking Of Gov’t & Services Insurgent Capacity, INSURGENTS Ties to Capability & Coercion Perceived Priorities & Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Narcotics & Commun /IO Use of Force Other Criminal Ins. Targeted & Affiliation w/ Population by Ins. Attacks on Progress/ Funding Funding & Material Support to NARCOTICS Perceived Support Relative Insurgents Likelihood of Damages/Use for Gov’t Popular Crime/Violence of Force by Support/ /Ins. Support Gov t & Coalition Perception of /Tolerance for Payment Insurgent Govt vs Narcotics Insurgents & Criminal Strength & Intent Activity POPULATION POPULATION Population Population Levels Population Neutral/On Population CONDITIONS CONDITIONS Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Sympathizing w/ Gov’t the Fence Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Actively Supporting Insurgency IllegitAgric Relative WOM Fear of Ins. Production, & BELIEFS & BELIEFS Message Amplification Attack/ Repercussions Trade & Employment Gov’t vs Ins POPULAR POPULAR Potential Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Terrain Harshness Perception of Coalition Intent SUPPORT SUPPORT Insurgent Path & Breadth & Commitment Perception Of Gov t Strength Strength of & Intent Religious Ideology & Tribal Satisfaction Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to w/ Gains in Displacement Reconcile Security, Services Religious & Employment Visible Gains Ideology, In Security, Ethnic/Tribal Tribal Services & Rivalry Structures Employment w/ Gov’t Expectations Path for Security, Average Services, & Connectedness Employment of Population Perceived Security © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 13
  14. 14. Infrastructure, Services, & Economy Feedback Loop Examples: 1. Agricultural production and markets: Investment and spending enables agricultural production. Production can boost economic activity and trade which feeds back into private sector re-investment. (Public policy and investment in infrastructure, workforce, financial markets, etc helps start / maintain private sector momentum.) 2. Making legit agriculture more attractive: Improved legit agricultural opportunities may make illegit agricultural options less attractive which further increases legit agricultural production, trade, and markets. (Other inputs to decisions related to legit vs illegit from other sectors.) Legit Agric Production Fraction of Workforce and Agric. 2 Legit vs Illegit Private Sector Workforce Population Skill & Avail Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Infrastructure Civilian Legit vs Illegit Dev. Adequacy Legit Other Services Relative & Sustainment Production (SWET, Economic & Services Healthcare, Opportunity Non-Agric Education) 1 Ability to Move Private Sector Infr. Services, Econ, Legit Economic People & Capital Mgmt, Policy & Execution/ Activity, Trade & Goods Rapidly Investment & Perceived Fairness Employment Spending © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 14
  15. 15. Infrastructure, Services, & Economy OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT TO INSURGENT Ins. Damages & Casualties Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ FACTIONS FACTIONS Coalition Repercussions Outside Havens / Ability to Support/ Operate Enablement of Ins. Ins. Coordination Offensives & Among Ins. Insurgent Territory Not Presence Factions Ins. Terrain Under Gov’t (Clear & Hold) Insurgent Advantage Control (Afghan Leadership, Recruiting, & Pakistan) Training, Skill Retention, & Experience Manpower Criminal/ Ins. Provision & ISR Trafficking Of Gov’t & Services Insurgent Capacity, INSURGENTS Ties to Capability & Coercion Perceived Priorities & Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Narcotics & Commun/IO Use of Force Other Criminal Ins. Targeted & Affiliation w/ Population by Ins. Attacks on Progress/ Funding Funding & Material Support to NARCOTICS Perceived Support Relative Insurgents Likelihood of Damages/Use for Gov’t Popular Crime/Violence of Force by Support/ /Ins. Support Gov t & Coalition Perception of /Tolerance for Payment Insurgent Govt vs Narcotics Insurgents & Criminal Strength & Intent Activity POPULATION POPULATION Population Population Levels Population Neutral/On Population CONDITIONS CONDITIONS Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Sympathizing w/ Gov’t the Fence Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Actively Supporting Insurgency Illegit Agric Relative WOM Fear of Ins. Production, & BELIEFS & BELIEFS Message Amplification Attack/ Repercussions Trade & Employment Gov’t vs Ins POPULAR POPULAR Potential Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Terrain Harshness Perception of Coalition Intent SUPPORT SUPPORT Insurgent Path & Breadth & Commitment Perception Fraction of Of Gov t Workforce Strength And Agric. Strength of & Intent Legit vs Religious Legit Agric Illegit Ideology & Tribal Private Sector Production Satisfaction Workforce Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to w/ Gains in Infrastructure Displacement Reconcile Skill & Avail Security, Services Dev. Adequacy Population Religious & Employment Visible Gains & Sustainment Ideology, Basic Needs In Security, Service Levels Ethnic/Tribal Tribal Services & Rivalry Structures & Employment Employment w/ Gov’t Expectations Legit vs.Illegit Path Legit Other Civilian for Security, Production Services Relative Average Services, & & Services (SWET, Economic Connectedness Employment Non- Agric Healthcare, Opportunity of Population Perceived Security Education) INFRASTRUCTURE, Ability to Move People Private Sector Legit Economic Infr, Services, Econ. Policy & Execution SERVICES & Rapidly Capital Mgmt., & Goods Investment & Spending Activity, Trade & Employment /Perceived Fairness ECONOMY © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 15
  16. 16. Governance – Central Government Development & Capacity; Engagement / Empowerment of Tribal Governance; Overall Governance Capacity & Impacts Gov’t Security Policy Quality Relative & Investment Message Central Gov’t Institutional Quality & Execution Gov’t vs Ins Capacity Gov’t Gov’t / ANSF Funding Gov’t Training, Gov’t Integration of StratCom/IO Adequacy Mentoring, Gov’t Relative Vetting, and Workforce Local Tribal Message ’ Hiring Skill & Avail Structures Impact Gov’t vs Ins Transparency of Gov’t Professionalism, ’ Gov’t Processes & Investments Policy Quality & Fairness Overall Gov’t Reach, Execution, Gov’t/Contractor Recognition/ Capacity & Corruption & Engagement to Investment Tribal Favoritism Integrate Tribal Structures & Tax Beliefs Revenues Feedback Loop Example: Informal learning and mentoring: Formal training and vetting (enabled by institutional capacity) can improve and maintain Government workforce skill and professionalism. However, as you build a skilled, professional workforce base and culture, informal learning and expectations for behavior is also very powerful (and can contribute to institutional development as well…another key loop) © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 16

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