Sti Policy Rationales


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Sti Policy Rationales

  1. 1. STI policy rationales. Part I : paradigms Laurent Bach [email_address] BETA, university Strasbourg Pecs Session / Week 2 - July 2007
  2. 2. STI policy rationales. Part I : paradigms Pecs Session / Week 2 - July 2007 <ul><li>The basics : simple rationales for STI policy </li></ul><ul><li>The &quot;traditional&quot; opposition between paradigms </li></ul><ul><li>Towards a &quot;rationale mix&quot; framework for policy processes in reality </li></ul>
  3. 3. Public research infrastructure (universities, research centers, …) research activities incentives for researchers Technology procurement policy Purchase/pioneer use by public entities (administrations, organisms, public companies, Support to cooperation between firms and public research &quot;valorization&quot; - Tech transfers joint research activities Support to cooperation between firms Funding of S, T & I activities grants loans at preferential rate reimboursable advance (conditionned to success) loans garantee equity fundings/seed, risk capital export credits
  4. 4. Tax system research tax credit tax relief for technology-related purchase income tax on funds providers (business angels, foundations…) <ul><li>Legal and regulation aspects </li></ul><ul><li>IPR </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Norms, technical reglementations </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Reglementation on foreign trade (techno transfer, barriers,…) </li></ul></ul></ul>Competences building (higher) education system Diffusion of scientific and technical information libraries, data base, info network Standard, plateforms, common langage Supporting infrastructures technical, legal, management …assistance and services scientific/technical facilities
  5. 5. LEVEL OF INTERVENTION • up-stream = science / downstream = innovation • innovation in general / specific innovation • target population • creation / optimisation - adaptation - diffusion RULES • creation or not of dedicated body • criteria and modalities of selection of beneficiaries • interactions between managing bodies and beneficiaries • interactions between beneficiaries (cooperation) • funding schemes • IPR / diffusion of outcomes … Organisation, rules, modalities … = &quot; institutionnal arrangement &quot; + Sectoral policies : education, industry, regional, competition… Entrepreneuriship &quot;climate&quot; (public administrative streamline-simplication, awards, labor market, etc) Promotion of social consensus supporting science and technology +
  6. 6. Long history, recent emphasis (WW II, 80/90s) Many different tools and combination of tools (cf Georghiou-Edler tab) Fashion aspects, policy imitation and diffusion Multiple stakeholders Multiple decision levels <ul><li>A lot of typologies : </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Mission - diffusion, Vertical - horizontal, </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Supply side - Demand side, etc </li></ul></ul>NEED OF THEORETICAL BACKGROUND : IDENTIFICATION OF RATIONALES , which to some extent are common to the &quot;S&quot;, the &quot;T&quot; and the &quot;I&quot; dimensions of policy Science - Technology - Innovation Policies :
  7. 7. • Independance, security, prestige • Growth / industrial development through competitivity • Social development (education, health, jobs, Quality of Life,...) • Scientific progress per se « Simple » rationales for State intervention in Science, Technology and Innovation ( Pavitt - Walker) 1. The basics : simple rationales for STI policy - I
  8. 8. « Simple » standard Economic rationales for S-T-I policy Investment in S-T&I : • High cost • Long term rentability, if any • Uncertain rentability => Lack of incentives for private investment : investment/rentability profile does not fit the « normal » private investment/rentability profile (simpliest formulation of &quot;market failure&quot; argument, see below)
  9. 9. Source : Philippe Bourgeois DGE/SPIC
  10. 10. Theoretical foundations Main features « Failures » justifying State intervention Consequences of these failures Basic principles for State intervention (Tools / instruments) Neo-classical / standard framework (NC) vs Evolutionist structuralist framework (ES) • Detailed analysis of two paradigms • Attempts to identify causal beliefs including : 2. The &quot;traditional&quot; opposition between paradigms
  11. 11. Standard / Neo-classical framework : theoretical foundations - 1 Neo-classical / main stream economics + Theory of incentives : information asymetries + optimal contracts Transaction cost theory : governance cost + « at the fronteer » : (1) New growth theory (ROMER, LUCAS, AGHION, …) : Endogeneisation of S&T Importance of supply of knowledge (human capital, education, RD, infrastructure…) as a source of growth But focus on information, incentives, « mechanical » aspects => real departure from standard approach ?
  12. 12. <ul><li>(New) Economics of science (DAVID, DASGUPTA,…) : </li></ul><ul><li>• inherent and specific properties of the information </li></ul><ul><li>• new line between S-related and T-related activities and outputs : </li></ul><ul><li>- the practices of diffusion associated with incentive schemes </li></ul><ul><li>- the choice of the optimal level of codification (cf reward system) </li></ul><ul><li>- the higher uncertainty in the production and use of scientific results </li></ul><ul><li>- the fact that results from basic research are considered mainly as a information input for applied research (more generic usefulness) </li></ul><ul><li>- higher indivisibilities in science production </li></ul><ul><li>=> possible background for distinction between S and T and I policies </li></ul><ul><li>But : </li></ul><ul><li>=> Real departure from standard approach ? (incentives…) </li></ul><ul><li>=> Distinction S vs T still relevant ? (universities' patent vs firms' publications…) </li></ul>Standard / Neo-classical framework : theoretical foundations - 2
  13. 13. <ul><li>Comprehensive and extremely coherent « paradigm » </li></ul><ul><li>Market : unique mode of coordination and of selection </li></ul><ul><li>State is « outside » </li></ul><ul><li>Equilibrium </li></ul><ul><li>Static analysis </li></ul><ul><li>Optimizing rationality </li></ul><ul><li>Input - output perspective / linear model of innovation </li></ul><ul><li>Central focus : optimal allocation of resources </li></ul><ul><li>Normative reference : welfare/Pareto analysis </li></ul><ul><li>Research (S,T,I) as production of output = information </li></ul><ul><li>+ information as an input for downstream activities </li></ul>Standard / Neo-classical framework : main features
  14. 14. Standard / Neo-classical framework : Knowledge (scientific, technological, product-embedded etc) + production of knowledge + use of knowledge exhibit some characteristics not fitting with &quot;ideal&quot; characteritics => market/price mechanisms cannot work = market failures => consequences for social optimality => basic principles for public intervention
  15. 15. • Imperfect information (information paradox) • Non-rivalry and non- excludability => problem of property right • Low cost of REproduction • Indivisibilities, long term • Lack of information on results, use and demand => high risk • Long term rentability • High cost • Problem of appropriability of S&T “ products” and of gains from innovation => knowledge externalities => market externalities => network externalities Reducing uncertainty (environment, S, D) Substituting to the market (S and D sides) (sharing risk and cost) Allowing for internalizing externalities (property rights, cooperation) Standard / Neo-classical framework : market failures, consequences and principles for policy action
  16. 16. Evolutionary theory : focus on evolution of technology, firms, industries, etc diversity generation / reproduction / selection processes Systemic / Network approaches (N/L SI, clusters, etc) : focus on coordination, complementarities, variety of institutions Knowledge-based economics : focus on knowledge creation, sharing, processing, access, diffusion, etc / cognitive processes Evolutionist structuralist framework : theoretical foundations Different approaches from different disciplines (mono or multi-disciplinary) with common features and specific focus
  17. 17. <ul><li>Variety of modes of coordination and of selection </li></ul><ul><li>State is part of the game </li></ul><ul><li>No equilibrium </li></ul><ul><li>Dynamic analysis / Path dependancy </li></ul><ul><li>Other forms of rationality </li></ul><ul><li>Inter-active model of innovation </li></ul><ul><li>Central focus : creation of resources </li></ul><ul><li>+ knowledge (≠ information) = fundamental </li></ul><ul><li>resource </li></ul><ul><li>Unclear normative reference : </li></ul><ul><li>« adequate » system, processes, cognitive </li></ul><ul><li>capacities ? environment ensuring « good </li></ul><ul><li>trajectories » / « good paradigm » ? </li></ul><ul><li>• Knowledge coming from anywhere in the system (not only Research) </li></ul>Evolutionist structuralist framework : main features NC framework <ul><li>Market : unique mode of </li></ul><ul><li>coordination and of selection </li></ul><ul><li>State is « outside » </li></ul><ul><li>Equilibrium </li></ul><ul><li>Static analysis </li></ul><ul><li>Optimizing rationality </li></ul><ul><li>Input - output perspective / </li></ul><ul><li>linear model of innovation </li></ul><ul><li>Central focus : optimal allocation </li></ul><ul><li>of resources </li></ul><ul><li>Normative reference : </li></ul><ul><li>welfare/Pareto analysis </li></ul><ul><li>Research (S,T,I) as production </li></ul><ul><li>of output = information </li></ul><ul><li>+ information as an input </li></ul><ul><li>for downstream activities </li></ul>
  18. 18. • misallocation of resources and cognitive attention between exploration and exploitation • inadequate selection processes • systemic/institutional failures : coordination, complementarities, lack of institutions, speed of adjustment between institutions and S&T... • knowledge creation, processing, distribution failures : codification, circulation, emitting/ absorptive / articulation capacity, structure of knowledge... • lack of diversity • “ negative” lock-in • difficulty for paradigmatic changes • knowledge, social, institutional..”gaps” Evolutionist structuralist framework : learning/system failures, consequences and principles for policy action Not so coherent : Cognitive capacity of actors : development, orientation, adequate conditions of use...
  19. 19. Common ? Normative reference ? State &quot;a priori&quot; in/out of system ? Specific ? Specific ? Reducing uncertainty (environment, S, D) Substituting to the market (S and D sides) (sharing risk and cost) Allowing for internalization of externalities (property rights, cooperation) Cognitive capacity of actors : development, Orientation, adequate conditions of use... ES framework NC framework Tools / instruments Optimal allocation by market (or pseudo-market) mechanisms Social optimality Diversity, selection, cohesion « good » trajectories « good » transition between paradigms No Yes Out In
  20. 20. Failures and rationales for policy action
  21. 21. Table 1.3 : Policy tools and instruments in the two dominant paradigms STI tools re-interpreted
  22. 22. <ul><li>• The theoretical foundations of the NAT/LOCAL SYSTEM OF INNOVATION approach may be more clearly identified </li></ul><ul><li>=> see DIMETIC courses on N(R)SI </li></ul><ul><li>• The specificities of KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMICS should be precised </li></ul><ul><li>=> see Cohendet & Meyer-Krahmer, Amin & Cohendet papers </li></ul><ul><li>The recent development of NGT - type of models as regards NC or ES perspectives should be clarified </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>=> see other DIMETIC courses (?) </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>• PAST IDEAS & APPROACHES (ie pre-V. Bush) should be better covered ? </li></ul><ul><li>• The THEORY OF REGULATION should be better taken into account ? </li></ul><ul><li>=> both not treated here </li></ul>Beyond this NC / EC opposition - 1 : need to complement the picture ?
  23. 23. Different rationales adressing different dimensions ? ex extented from A. BONACCORSI : Beyond this NC / EC opposition - 2 need to mix approaches ? (a) Incentives : neoclassical theory of market failure (b) Factors of production : endogenous growth (c) Processes and coordination : neo-institutional and evolutionary (d) Learning : knowledge-based economics
  24. 24. <ul><li>Tools which aim at fostering cooperation between actors : </li></ul><ul><li>sharing/complementarity of costs, risks, information, joint creation of / distribution of knowledge ? </li></ul><ul><li>Public research : </li></ul><ul><ul><li>beyond « pure public good argument » ? </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Patents : Protection/diffusion dilemna, signaling, intangible base for cooperation ? </li></ul>Different (mix of ?) rationales underlying one given tool/instrument Beyond this NC / EC opposition - 3 need to mix approaches ?
  25. 25. <ul><li>Knowledge as information + appropriability pb </li></ul><ul><li>Patents = appropriability means, strong property right=> to enhance individual motives (individual inventor), </li></ul><ul><li>BUT should favour global knowledge production </li></ul><ul><li>+ appropriability / diffusion (+ cumulativeness) dilemna </li></ul><ul><li>=> Various length and scope of patent </li></ul>Patent in NC revisited approach : The case of patent : NC vs K.O. framework (based on [COHENDET-MEYER-KRAHMER, 2004 - PENIN, 2004])
  26. 26. <ul><li>Patents = appropriability + other dimensions : </li></ul><ul><ul><li>negotiation role (bargaining power) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>first step for cooperation/knowledge exchange (balance of power between members of network) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Signalling/disclosure device/reputation </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Example: communities (free-software) produce semi-public goods (common but not available to all) </li></ul>Patent in Knowedge-based approach (1) :
  27. 27. <ul><li>the key role of institutional settings (IS=norms, rules, standard) </li></ul><ul><li>IS govern incentives to produce and diffuse knowledge </li></ul><ul><li>IS shape the codification processes and thus the costs of transfering knowledge (science vs. industry) </li></ul><ul><li>=> If incentives to build knowledge in a community are strong, then appropriation is marginal </li></ul>Reconsidering incentives (ex. free software) : Patent in Knowedge-based approach (2) :
  28. 28. <ul><li>Is patent still a valid policy tool ? </li></ul><ul><li>new dimensions of patents <=> new uses made by firms => new «K.O. failures» ? does patent help to overcome those «K.O. failures »? If yes, is it an appropriate tool? (ex. : too expensive as a tool to foster cooperation!) </li></ul><ul><li>Patents hamper diffusion (traditional view), BUT also the production of knowledge (ex: IPR on software; IPR on fragments of gene before identification of product => no product => go beyond cumulativeness of information : importance of common cognitive platforms). </li></ul>Patent in Knowedge-based approach (3) :
  29. 29. <ul><li>cooperative agreement /funding / IPR : </li></ul><ul><li>NC : same failure adressed ? too many failure remedies ? (ex ante vs ex post reward vs patent ?; limit fundings to transaction/cooperation costs ?...) </li></ul><ul><li>policy oriented towards SME : </li></ul><ul><li>Are supposed SME specificities grounded in rationales ? </li></ul><ul><li>the renewal of Demand side policy (cf Georghiou-Edler paper) </li></ul>Mixing tools/instruments and mixing rationales ? Beyond this NC / EC opposition - 4 : need to mix approaches ?
  30. 30. More on the &quot;I&quot; side Return of Demand Side policy in the policy arena (EU, UK), while still present in US and Japan Definition : All public measures to induce innovation and/or speed up diffusion of innnovations through increasing the demand for innovations, defining new functional requirement for products and services or better articulates demand The case of Demand side policy : mix of rationales, mix of tools
  31. 31. <ul><li>Mix of rationales : </li></ul><ul><li>Lack of incentives on demand side => fundings (NC) </li></ul><ul><li>Asymetries of information, transaction costs => increase and diffusion of info (NC) </li></ul><ul><li>Demand is often &quot;local&quot; and should be at least partly &quot;locally&quot; answered : </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>heterogeneity, path dependancy, idosyncracy etc </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>local Innov System, spillovers, etc </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>user-producer interactions, &quot;lead&quot; user, etc </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>=> System and cognitive failures </li></ul><ul><li>&quot;Good directions&quot; towards orienting innovation processes </li></ul><ul><li>=> Selection failures </li></ul><ul><li>Demand and Knowledge base should be aligned </li></ul><ul><li>=> System and cognitive failures (standards, etc) </li></ul><ul><li>Inter- gvtal department strategies and coordinations </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>=> System failures </li></ul></ul></ul>
  32. 32. Mix of STI policy tools: Basis = public procurement policies (general vs strategic, direct vs catalytic, commercial vs pre-commercial) Combined with supply side fundings - technology plateforms … Policy mixes : Improvement of public services and policies : better answers to societal need through innovation = sustainable devlopment, health, etc backed up by STI policy
  33. 33. <ul><li>ST&I vs competition policy (monopoly, cartels, public aids, public procurement…) </li></ul><ul><li>ST&I vs education policy (Univ.-PROs, longlife training…) </li></ul><ul><li>ST&I and environmental/sustainable dvpt oriented policy </li></ul><ul><li>ST&I and … </li></ul>policy boundaries, overlaps, complementarity : Beyond this NC / EC opposition - 5 : need to mix public policies ?
  34. 34. Interaction between two types of rationales in the policy design, making and implementation processes Production policy rationales Governance policy rationales 3. Towards a « rationale mix » framework for policy processes in reality (from EPOM / Prime NoE project )
  35. 35. Interaction between two types of rationales : 1. “ Production policy rationales &quot;, i.e. causal beliefs, about the production of knowledge and set-up of policy instruments; providing a theoretical framework for understanding knowledge creation and justifying public intervention (failure argument) and the type of policy proposed <=> what was covered in first part of lecture Economics - Sociology of science &quot;neo-classical paradigm&quot; vs “evolutionist structuralist approach” (Lundvall & Borras 1997; Bach & Matt, 2005 …)
  36. 36. <ul><li>Traditional paradigm (V. Bush) </li></ul><ul><li>Focus on fundamental research, Justification of public research : defense, prestige, general welfare, knowledge per se + « pure public good » </li></ul><ul><li>Neo-classical / market paradigm (Arrow + Dasgupta-David) </li></ul><ul><li>Distinction between fundamental research (open science, knowledge as public good) and technology (property right, Knowledge as private good) + competition / incentives / flexibility of resources / cost-cutting; Justification of public intervention : market failures </li></ul>
  37. 37. <ul><li>System / Network paradigm (Lundvall, Nelson, CSI…) </li></ul><ul><li>Importance of the complementarity of /the links between multiple actors : coordination, alignement of objectives and resources…; Justification of public intervention : system failure </li></ul><ul><li>Evolutionary approach (Nelson & Winter, Dosi, Metcalfe…) </li></ul><ul><li>focus on the generation (mutations), distribution (diversity) and diffusion (transmission) of changes + fitness and co-evolution as compared to the environment (selection mechanisms). Justification of public intervention : diversity generation, selection. </li></ul><ul><li>Knowledge-based approach (Cohendet Meyer-Krahmer) </li></ul><ul><li>Knowledge as collectively produced, shared, distributed + multi-dimensional knowledge with tacit dimension + importance of learning processes; Justification of public intervention : learning (cognitive) failures </li></ul>
  38. 38. <ul><li>Strong connexions to sociology of science ( Benner and Biegelbauer in EPOM [2005]) : </li></ul><ul><li>the simplest linear model, distinguishing Research and Economy, then enhanced by the Mertonian tradition; </li></ul><ul><li>standard linear model of innovation, with sequential (technology push or demand pull) link, and clear distribution of roles between actors along the steps of the model; </li></ul><ul><li>the interactive model stream, including Gibbons mode 2, Triple Helix and the like; </li></ul><ul><li>the constructivist approaches. </li></ul>
  39. 39. <ul><ul><ul><li>Interaction between the actors – the Triple Helix </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>(Loet Leydedorff Henry Etzkowitz) </li></ul></ul></ul>Research Politics Business Researchers who are prepared to exploit their knowledge. Universities that profile their education and research. Legislators who influence the conditions under which companies and researchers are working. Politicians who allocate resources for research and development. Local authorities and county councils who set out to facilitate the establishment of new companies and make their local areas pleasant places to live. Entrepreneurs who recognize the value of new knowledge. Managers who can identify market requirements and have the courage to invest their resources. Investors who are prepared to wait for a return on their investments. Adapted from M. Benner [2005] Separate institutions / intermediaries - Modes of direct communications - Mixed roles
  40. 40. Interaction between two types of rationales : 2. “ Governance policy rationales ”, reflecting the governance paradigms ruling state intervention in general; not policy sector specific but have encompassing validity; they often correspond to political traditions and culture Political science - Public management
  41. 41. <ul><li>Centralism / technocratic model </li></ul><ul><li>Centralization of decision processes </li></ul><ul><li>Highly professionalized civil servant </li></ul><ul><li>Command & Control model </li></ul><ul><li>strong hypothesis on the capacity of State in terms of access to information, processing of information and action </li></ul><ul><li>Network State model </li></ul><ul><li>with a focus on coordination role, decentralisation, enablement skills, public/private cooperation, self-regulatory approach </li></ul>
  42. 42. <ul><li>New Public Management model </li></ul><ul><li>Clear policy target/goals </li></ul><ul><li>Clear budget </li></ul><ul><li>Systematic performance analysis </li></ul><ul><li>Clear and explicit decision processes </li></ul><ul><li>Decentralized multi-level model : </li></ul><ul><li>multiple centers of decision with budget, staff…(not necessarily hierarchical) </li></ul><ul><li>Decentralized multi-space model : </li></ul><ul><li>multiple and heterogeneous public & scientific interest groups (public opinion, consumers, patients, NGO,…) </li></ul>
  43. 43. Incl. Monitoring and evaluation tools (+ &quot;no instrument&quot;) Production Rationales Governance Policy Rationales Policy tools Implementation Policy-design & making Policy Design & making frame Policy- design & making
  44. 44. <ul><li>Public influence and the business point of view </li></ul><ul><li>&quot;Fertile soil&quot;, i.e. background and receptivity of policy makers (political preferences, culture, education,…) => selective attention and cognitive choices of policy makers </li></ul><ul><li>Turnover of political personal and of technocrats </li></ul><ul><li>Policy entrepreneurs </li></ul><ul><li>Boundary institutions </li></ul><ul><li>Examples, images and stylised facts (&quot;prototype embodying knowledge&quot;) </li></ul><ul><li>Reports and other white papers </li></ul><ul><li>&quot;Tactical interests&quot; </li></ul><ul><li>Policy-making procedure and its &quot;hidden side&quot; </li></ul><ul><li>Competing rationales in government </li></ul>Policy design/making frame
  45. 45. Not static / sequential / &quot;once and for all&quot; <ul><li>Dynamics : </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Path-dependancy </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Learning and feed-back loops </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Continuous (minor) changes </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Major revisions triggered by : </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>inefficiency observed in the system </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>major changes in ideology or rationales </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>diffusion of ideas (« emulation », benchmarking) </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>pressure related to external shocks or the public </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>=> time matching between policy cycle / ideas cycle (windows of opportunity </li></ul></ul>
  46. 46. mix mix mix mix dynamic coherence co-evolution Production Rationales Governance Policy Rationales Policy-design & making Policy tools Implementation mix mix
  47. 47. Production Rationale Governance Rationale Research & Innovation modes Towards « archetypal » mixes ? 3 coherent models Neo-classical / market New Public Management ideal model 2 Standard linear model Merton Knowledge-based System / Network Network State Decentralized multi-space ideal model 2 Evolutionism Decentralized multi-level Interactive model / Gibbons mode 2 Triple Helix Constructivism Traditional Centralism / technocratic ideal model 1 Simpliest linear model Research / Economy Command&Control
  48. 48. <ul><li>the &quot;fertile soil&quot; of policy makers : </li></ul><ul><ul><li>not educated in research world/universities but from Grandes Ecoles (engineering, management or public administration) + educational background of administrative staff : engineering, political science, law >> economics and management </li></ul></ul><ul><li>image, stylised facts : </li></ul><ul><ul><li>influence of Silicon Vallley, US universities' IP policy, industrial districts, etc ; myth of European paradox; myth of &quot;concentration of means&quot; </li></ul></ul>Policy-design/making frame …some aspects The case of the French STI policy : a specific policy frame ?
  49. 49. <ul><li>Reports/white papers : </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Guillaume Report by a high level civil servant (1999 law on Innovation), Beffa report by a private sector executive (AII), Blanc report by a member of the Parliament (Pôles de Compétitivité) </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Policy entrepreneurs : </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Nano-cluster in Grenoble ( Delemarle-Laredo 2005 ). </li></ul></ul><ul><li>boundary institutions : </li></ul><ul><ul><li>ANRT and Futuris </li></ul></ul><ul><li>External constraints : </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Maastricht public budget/debt criteria </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Lisbon 3% RD target </li></ul></ul>Policy-design/making frame …some aspects +implementation frame…
  50. 50. <ul><li>« Before » : cf above + French &quot;Colberstism&quot; tradition / centralism : large programs (space, defense, nuclear, telecom, railways, energy…) - large firms - large public labs = &quot;mission policy&quot; ( cf Ergas classification) </li></ul><ul><li>University-PROs links </li></ul><ul><li>Slight decrease of mission policy (decreasing funds, privatisation, split of some labs…) </li></ul><ul><li>Growing support to SMEs </li></ul><ul><li>Growing support to collaborations and networks in RD and innovation </li></ul><ul><li>Organisation of Techno Transfers for public research </li></ul><ul><li>Growing importance of other decision levels (EC, regions…) </li></ul><ul><li>Slow development of evaluation culture and organisation (contracts between actors and State, various commissions and expert groups…) </li></ul>Evolution of the French STI policy (80s-90s): Some of the main features
  51. 51. <ul><li>Clear but not fully departure from Traditional / Centralism-technocratic model = surrender of Colbertism (LAREDO-MUSTAR 2002) </li></ul><ul><li>Reluctance to fully adopt Market / New Public Management model </li></ul><ul><li>Growing and explicit importance of part of the Network-system / decentralized multi-level model </li></ul><ul><li>Emergence of Multi-level paradigm and of multi-space paradigm </li></ul>Evolution of the French STI policy (80s-90s): A specific mix of rationales ?
  52. 52. The case of the French STI policy : conflicting rationales ? Market Concentration of means Network/system Multi-level multi-actors, multi-programs Production rationales Governance rationales Centralism- Technocracy Traditional Functionalism=different orga. (research, HE, elite formation etc) Inertia, complexity of structures Reinforced by lack of strategic piloting Piling-up structures Top-down approach
  53. 53. The case of the French STI policy : conflicting rationales ? NPM Growing evaluation requirements Network/system Multi-levels Multi-programs <ul><li>Inertia for high share / flexibility for small share of activity, but : large number of small projects (day-to-day ,« free » research), high transaction costs, uncertainty </li></ul><ul><li>Lack of attractivity for researchers </li></ul>Reinforced by lack of funds ! Traditional High % of Funds to Large Tech Prog Permanent funds to Science Production rationales Governance rationales Centralism- Technocracy Civil staff / permanent staff cost Discretionary decision (Stop & Go) Bureaucratic Control Lack of mgt skills Lack of autonomy Market Competition-based programs, flexibility Multi-steps along linear model Market/short term orientation
  54. 54. <ul><li>Development of “competition-based programmes” </li></ul><ul><ul><li>PROs, Ministry funds, new Agencies (ANR National Research Agency + AII Agency for Industrial Innovation) </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Strenghtening of Science-Industry relations and &quot;valorisation&quot; of public research </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Law 1999 (public research) => Law 2006 : approx. 2/3 of “new” funds, reorientation of existing funds, almost all new instruments </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Concentration of ressources on local (regional) basis </li></ul><ul><ul><li>&quot;Pôles de Compétitivité&quot; : public-driven clusters </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>New structures for research </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Growing role of performance indicators </li></ul>2004-2006 Reforms and &quot;Loi sur la Recherche&quot; 2006: Some of the main features
  55. 55. <ul><li>Return of centralism-technocratic model </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Top-down approach </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Lack of independance of new born agencies </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Weak concertation with stakeholders (despite discourse…) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Multiplication of structures and legal status : new &quot;animals&quot; = independance at high level / merged at local level </li></ul></ul><ul><li>But confirmed decline of Traditional approach towards basic research </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Low increase of funds </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Refusal of any &quot;blank checque&quot; to research labs </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Confirmed increasing influence of market - NPM tandem </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Clear preeminence of project-based fundings (almost 100% of &quot;new funds&quot;) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Flexibility, short term commitment </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Application of the New Budgeting law : development of indicators </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Growing and explicit importance of part of the Network/Systemic : </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Regional Clusters </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Science-Industry as Target nb 1 </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Governemental evolutionary approach ? </li></ul><ul><ul><li>mutations (new bodies), new selection mechanisms => survival of fittest, but cost of change ! </li></ul></ul>2004-2006 Reforms and &quot;Loi sur la Recherche&quot; 2006: A specific mix of rationales ?