GRADE 7 MUN 2013The General Assembly Fourth CommitteeUnited Nations Security Council (UNSC)Study GuideAgenda 1: The Status of Taiwan
TABLEOFCONTENTSI.IntroductionII.The Conflict in Taiwana.Japanese Ruleb.228 Incidentc.Korean War and U.S. interventiond.Treaty of Peace with Japane.Treaty of TaipeiIII. Development since 2004 and future prospectsIV.Current SituationV..Possible military solutions and interventionVI.Questions a Resolution Must Answer
I. Introduction:Taiwan officially the Republic of China, is a state in East Asia. Originally based inmainland China, the Republic of China now governs the island of Taiwan (formerlyknown as Formosa), which makes up over 99% of its territory, as well as Penghu,Kinmen, Matsu, and other minor islands. The island of Taiwan was mainly inhabitedby Taiwanese aborigines until the Dutch period when Chinese began immigrating tothe island. The Qing Dynasty of China later conquered Taiwan in 1683. By the timeTaiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895, the majority of Taiwans inhabitants were HanChinese either by ancestry or by assimilation. The Republic of China (ROC) wasestablished in China in 1912. At the end of World War II in 1945, Japan surrenderedTaiwan to ROC military forces on behalf of the Allies. Following the Chinese civil war,the Communist Party of China took full control of mainland China and founded thePeoples Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. The ROC relocated its government toTaiwan, and its jurisdiction became limited to Taiwan and its surrounding islands. In1971, the PRC assumed Chinas seat at the United Nations, which the ROC originallyoccupied.International recognition of the ROC has gradually eroded as most countries switched
recognition to the PRC. Only 22 UN member states and the Holy See currently maintainformal diplomatic relations with the ROC, though it has informal ties with most otherstates via its representative offices.Constitutionally, the ROC government has claimed sovereignty over all of "China", in adefinition that includes mainland China and Outer Mongolia, as well as Taiwan, buthas not made retaking mainland China a political goal since1992. However, the governments stance on defining its political position largely dependson which political coalition is in charge meanwhile, the PRC also asserts itself to be thesole legal representation of China and claims Taiwan to be under its sovereignty, denyingthe status and existence of ROC as a sovereign state. The PRC has threatened the useof military force as a response to any formal declaration of Taiwanese independence,or if it deems peaceful reunification no longer possible. Relations between Taiwan andChina as well as issues of national identity within the country are important factors inTaiwanese politics and a cause of social and political division among political partiesand their respective supporters.II.The Conflict in Taiwan:The controversy regarding the political status of Taiwan (or "Taiwan Issue" asreferred to by the Communist Party ofChina)hinges on whether Taiwan, Penghu,Kinmen,and Matsu should remain effectively independent as territory of the Republicof China (ROC), become unified with the territories now governed by the PeoplesRepublic of China (PRC), or formally declare independence and become theRepublic of Taiwan; furthermore, on whether its existence and status as a state("country") is legitimate and recognized by the international community.A. 1895–1945 – Japanese ruleTreaty of ShimonosekiTaiwan (Formosa) including the Pescadores were permanently ceded by QingDynasty China to Imperial Japan via Articles 2b and 2c of the Treaty ofShimonoseki in 8 May 1895 in one of what the Chinese term as an unequal treaty.Kinmen and Matsu Islands on the coast of Fukien and the islands in the South ChinaSea currently administered by the Republic of China on Taiwan were not part of thecession.In 1895, subsequent to the Treaty of Shimonoseki, officials in Taiwan declaredindependence in the hope of returning the island to Qing rule. The Republic ofTaiwan (1895) collapsed after 12 days due to political infighting, but local leaderscontinued resistance in the hope of achieving self-rule. The incoming Japanese
crushed the islands independence bid in a five-month campaign.The Chinese Qing Dynasty was subsequently overthrown and replaced by theRepublic of China (ROC). Upon the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, theROC declared the Treaty of Shimonoseki void in its declaration of war on Japan. Thewar soon merged with World War II, and Japan was subsequently defeated in 1945 bythe Allied Powers, of which the ROC was a part.Potsdam Declaration and surrender of JapanThe United States entered the War in December 1941. Most military attacks againstJapanese installations and Japanese troops in Taiwan were conducted by United Statesmilitary forces. At the Cairo Conference, the U.S., United Kingdom, and the ROC agreedthat Taiwan was to be restored to the ROC after the war. This agreement wasenunciated in the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration, which outlined theterms of Japanese surrender, specified that the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall becarried out.When Japan unconditionally surrendered, it accepted in its Instrument of Surrenderthe terms of the Potsdam Declaration. Whether the sovereignty of Taiwan was formallytransferred or not at that time is disputed. Japanese troops in Taiwan were directed tosurrender to the representatives of the Supreme Allied Commander in the ChinaTheater, Chiang Kai-shek (i.e. the Republic of China military forces) on behalf ofthe Allies, according to the directions of General Douglas MacArthur, headof the United States Military Government, in General Order No. 1, which was issued2 September 1945. Chief Executive Chen Yi of Republic of China soon proclaimed"Taiwan Retrocession Day" on 25 October, 1945.B. 1947 – 228 IncidentWhen the 228 Incident erupted on February 28, 1947, the U.S. Consulate- General inTaipei prepared a report in early March, calling for an immediate intervention in thename of the U.S. or the United Nations. Based on the argument that the Japanesesurrender did not formally transfer sovereignty, Taiwan was still legally part of Japanand occupied by the United States (with administrative authority for theoccupation delegated to the Chinese Nationalists), and a direct intervention wasappropriate for a territory with such status. This proposed intervention, however, wasrejected by the U.S. State Department. In a news report on the aftermath of the228 Incident, some Taiwanese residents were reported to be talking of appealing tothe United Nations to put the island under an international mandate, sinceChinas possession of Taiwan had not been formalized by any international treaties by
that time and the island was therefore still under belligerent occupation. They latermade a demand for a treaty role to be represented at the forthcoming peaceconference on Japan, in the hope of requesting a plebiscite to determine the islandspolitical future.C. 1950–1953 – Korean War and U.S. interventionAt the start of 1950, U.S. President Harry S. Truman appeared to accept the idea thatsovereignty over Taiwan was already settled when the United States Departmentof State stated that "In keeping with these [Cairo and Potsdam] declarations, Formosawas surrendered to Generalissimo Chiang-Kai Shek, and for the past 4 years, the UnitedStates and Other Allied Powers have accepted the exercise of Chinese authority overthe Island." However, after the outbreak of the Korean War, Truman decided to"neutralize” Taiwan claiming that it could otherwise trigger another world war. In June1950, President Truman, who had previously given only passive support to Chiang Kai-shek and was prepared to see Taiwan fall into the hands of the Chinese Communists,vowed to stop the spread of communism and sent the U.S. Seventh Fleet into theTaiwan Strait to prevent the PRC from attacking Taiwan, but also to prevent the ROCfrom attacking mainland China. He then declared that "the determination of the futurestatus of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peacesettlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations." President Trumanlater reaffirmed the position "that all questions affecting Formosa be settled bypeaceful means as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations" in his specialmessage to the Congress in July 1950. The PRC denounced his moves as flagrantinterference in the internal affairs of China.On 8 September 1950, President Truman ordered John Foster Dulles, then ForeignPolicy Advisor to the U.S. Secretary of State, to carry out his decision on "neutralizing"Taiwan in drafting the Treaty of Peace with Japan (San Francisco Peace Treaty) of1951. According to George H. Kerrs memoir Formosa Betrayed, Dulles devised a planwhereby Japan would first merely renounce its sovereignty over Taiwan without arecipient country to allow the sovereignty over Taiwan to be determined together bythe United States, the United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and Republic of China onbehalf of other nations on the peace treaty. The question of Taiwan would be takeninto the United Nations (which the ROC was still part), if these four parties could notreach into an agreement within one year.D. 1952 – Treaty of Peace with Japan (San Francisco)When Japan regained sovereignty over itself in 1952 with the conclusion of the Treaty ofPeace with Japan (San Francisco Peace Treaty) with 48 nations, Japan renounced all
claims and title over Taiwan and the Pescadores. Many claim that Japanese sovereigntyonly terminated at that point. Notably absent at the peace conference was the ROCwhich was expelled from mainland China in December 1949 as a result of the ChineseCivil War and had retreated to Taiwan. The PRC, which was proclaimed 1 October 1949,was also not invited. The lack of invitation was probably due to the dispute over whichgovernment was the legitimate government of China (which both governmentsclaimed to be); however, Cold War considerations might have played a part as well.Some major governments represented in the San Francisco Conference, such as the UKand Soviet Union, had already established relations with the PRC, while others, such asthe U.S. and Japan, still held relations with the ROC.The UK at that time stated for the record that the San Francisco Peace Treaty "itselfdoes not determine the future of these islands," and therefore the UK, along withAustralia and New Zealand, was happy to sign the peace treaty. One of the majorreasons that the delegate from the Soviet Union gave for not signing the treaty wasthat: "The draft contains only a reference to the renunciation by Japan of its rights tothese territories [Taiwan] but intentionally omits any mention in the treaty couldbenefit from this treaty. China was not listed as one of the Allied Powers; however,article 21 still provided limited benefits from Articles 10 and 14(a) 2 for China. Japanscession of Taiwan is unusual in that no recipient of Taiwan was stated as part of Dullessplan of "neutralizing" Taiwan. The ROC protested its lack of invitation to the SanFrancisco Peace conference, to no avail.e. 1952 – Treaty of TaipeiSubsequently, the Treaty of Taipei was concluded between the ROC and Japan on28 April 1952 (effective 5 August), where Japan basically re-affirmed the terms of theSan Francisco Peace Treaty, and formalized the peace between the ROC and Japan. Italso nullified all previous treaties made between China and Japan, implicitly repealingthe Treaty of Shimonoseki. Article 10 of the treaty specifies:"For the purposes of the present Treaty, nationals of the Republic of China shall bedeemed to include all the inhabitants and former inhabitants of Taiwan (Formosa)and Penghu (the Pescadores) and their descendants who are of the Chinese nationalityin accordance with the laws and regulations which have been or may hereafter beenforced by the Republic of China in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores)."However, the ROC Minister of Foreign Affairs George Kung-chao Yeh told the LegislativeYuan after signing the treaty that: "The delicate international situation makes it that
they [Taiwan and Penghu] do not belong to us. Under present circumstances, Japan hasno right to transfer [Taiwan] to us; nor can we accept such a transfer from Japan even ifshe so wishes." In July 1971 the U.S. State Departments position was, and remains: "AsTaiwan and the Pescadores are not covered by any existing international disposition,sovereignty over the area is an unsettled question subject to future internationalresolution."III.Development since2004 and future prospectsJudicialOn October 24, 2006, Dr. Roger C. S. Lin led a group of Taiwanese residents, includingmembers of the Taiwan Nation Party, to file a Complaint for Declaratory Relief in theUnited States District Court for the District of Columbia. According to their lawyer, Mr.Charles Camp, "the Complaint asks the Court to declare whether the Taiwaneseplaintiffs, including members of the Taiwan Nation Party, have certain rights under theUnited States Constitution and other US laws". Their central argument is that, followingJapanese renunciation of all rights and claims to Taiwan, Taiwan came under U.S.jurisdiction based on it being the principal occupying power as designated in the Treatyof Peace with Japan and remains so to this day. This case was opposed by the UnitedStates government.The District Court agreed with United States government on March 18, 2008 and ruledthat the case presents a political question; as such, the court concluded that it had nojurisdiction to hear the matter and dismissed the complaint. This decision has beenappealed by plaintiffs and the appeals court unanimously upheld the district courtruling.The PRC and Taiwan have agreed to increase cooperation in the area of lawenforcement. Mainland police will begin staffing a liaison office in Taipei in 2010.PoliticalAlthough the situation is confusing, most observers believe that it is stable with enoughunderstandings and gentlemens agreements to keep things from breaking out intoopen warfare. The current controversy is over the term one China, as the PRC insiststhat the ROC must recognize this term to begin negotiations. Although theDemocratic Progressive Party has moderated its support for Taiwan independence,there is still insufficient support within that party for former President Chen Shui-bian toagree to one China. By contrast, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the People First Party (PFP)
appear willing to agree to some variation of one China, and observers believed theposition of the PRC was designed to sideline Chen until the 2004 presidential electionwhere it was hoped that someone who was more supportive of Chinese reunificationwould come to power. Partly to counter this, Chen Shui-bian announced in July 2002that if the PRC does not respond to Taiwans goodwill, Taiwan may "go on its own ...road."With Chens re-election in 2004, Beijings prospects for a speedier resolution weredampened, though they seemed strengthened again following the Pan-Bluemajority in the 2004 legislative elections. However, public opinion in Taiwan reactedunfavorably towards the anti-secession law passed by the PRC in March2005. Following two high profile visits by KMT and PFP party leaders to the PRC, thebalance of public opinion appears to be ambiguous, with the Pan-Green Coalitiongaining a majority in the 2005 National Assembly elections, but the Pan- Blue Coalitionscoring a landslide victory in the 2005 municipal elections.Legislative elections were held in Taiwan on January 12, 2008. The results gave theKuomintang and the Pan-Blue Coalition an absolute majority (86 of the 113 seats) inthe legislature, handing a heavy defeat to President Chen Shui- bians DemocraticProgressive Party, which won the remaining 27 seats. The junior partner in the Pan-Green Coalition, the Taiwan Solidarity Union, won no seats.The election for the 12th President of ROC was held on March 22,2008. Kuomintang candidate Ma Ying-jeou won, with 58% of the vote, ending eightyears of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leadership. Along with the 2008 legislativeelection, Mas landslide victory brought the Kuomintang back to power in Taiwan. Thisnew political situation has led to a decrease of tension between both sides of theTaiwan Strait and the increase of cross-strait relations, making a declaration ofindependence, or war, something unlikely.Taiwans Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and its Chinese counterpart – theAssociation for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait(ARATS) signed four agreements inTaipei on November 4, 2008. Both SEF and ARATS have agreed to address direct sealinks, daily charter flights, direct postal service and food safety.Public opinionPublic opinion in Taiwan regarding relations with the PRC is notoriously difficult togauge, as poll results tend to be extremely sensitive to how the questions are phrasedand what options are given, and there is a tendency by all political parties to spin theresults to support their point of view.
According to a November 2005 poll from the Mainland Affairs Council, 37.7% of peopleliving in the ROC favor maintaining the status quo until a decision can be made in thefuture, 18.4% favors maintaining the status quo indefinitely, 14% favors maintainingthe status quo until eventual independence, 12% favors maintaining the status quountil eventual reunification, 10.3% favors independence as soon as possible, and 2.1%favors reunification as soon as possible. According to the same poll, 78.3% areopposed to the "One Country, Two Systems" model, which was used for Hong Kong andMacau, while 10.4% is in favor.According to a June 2008 poll from a Taiwanese mainstream media TVBS, 58% of peopleliving in Taiwan favor maintaining the status quo, 19% favors independence, and 8%favors unification. According to the same poll, if status quo is not an option and theones who were surveyed must choose between "Independence" or "Unification",65% are in favor of independence while 19% would opt for unification. The same pollalso reveals that, in terms of self-identity, when the respondents are not told that aTaiwanese can also be a Chinese, 68% of the respondents identify themselves as"Taiwanese" while 18% would call themselves "Chinese". However, when therespondents are told that duo identity is an option, 45% of the respondents identifythemselves as "Taiwanese only", 4% of the respondents call themselves "Chinese only"while 45% of the respondents call themselves "both Taiwanese as well as Chinese".Furthermore, when it comes to preference in which national identity to be used ininternational organizations, 54% of people in the survey indicated that they prefer"Taiwan" and only 25% of the people voted for "Chinese Taipei".According to an October 2008 poll from the Mainland Affairs Council, on the question ofTaiwans status, 36.17% of respondents favor maintaining the status quo until a decisioncan be made in the future, 25.53% favors maintaining the status quo indefinitely,12.49% favors maintaining the status quo until eventual independence, 4.44% favorsmaintaining the status quo until eventual reunification, 14.80% favors independence assoon as possible, and 1.76% favors reunification as soon as possible. In the same poll, onthe question of the PRC governments attitude towards the ROC government, 64.85% ofthe respondents consider the PRC government hostile or very hostile, 24.89 consider thePRC government friendly or very friendly, while 10.27% did not express an opinion. Onthe question of the PRC governments attitude towards the people in Taiwan, 45.98% ofthe respondents consider the PRC government hostile or very hostile, 39.6% considerthe PRC government friendly or very friendly, while 14.43% did not express an opinion.May 2009 Taiwans (Republic of China) Department of the Interior published a surveyexamining whether people in Taiwan see themselves as Taiwanese, Chinese or both.64.6% see themselves as Taiwanese, 11.5% as Chinese, 18.1% as both and 5.8% were
unsure.According to a December 2009 poll from a Taiwanese mainstream media TVBS, if statusquo is not an option and the ones who were surveyed must choose between"Independence" or "Unification", 68% are in favor of independence while 13% wouldopt for unification.IV.Current SituationChanging Taiwan’s status with respect to the ROC constitutionFrom the perspective of the ROC constitution, which the mainstream political partiessuch as the KMT and DPP currently respect and recognize, changing the ROC’sgoverning status or completely clarifying Taiwan’s political status would at best requireamending the ROC constitution. In other words, if reunification supporters wanted toreunify Taiwan with mainland China in such a way that would effectively abolish theROC or affect the ROC’s sovereignty, or if independence supporters wanted toabolish the ROC and establish a Republic of Taiwan, they would also need to amend orabolish the ROC constitution and redraft a new constitution. Passing an amendmentrequires an unusually broad political consensus, which includes approval from three-quarters of a quorum of members of the Legislative Yuan. This quorum requires at leastthree-quarters of all members of the Legislature. After passing the legislature, theamendments need ratification from at least fifty percent of all eligible voters ofthe ROC, irrespective of voter turnout.Given these harsh constitutional requirements, neither the pan-greens nor pan- bluescan unilaterally change Taiwan’s political and legal status with respect to the ROC’sconstitution. However, extreme Taiwan independence supporters view the ROC’sconstitution as illegal and therefore believe that amendments to the ROC constitutionare an invalid way to change Taiwan’s political status.V.Possible military solutions and interventionUntil 1979, both sides intended to resolve the conflict militarily. Intermittent clashesoccurred throughout the 1950s and 1960s, with escalations comprising the First andSecond Taiwan Strait crises. In 1979, with the U.S. change of diplomatic recognition tothe PRC, the ROC lost its ally needed to "recover the mainland." Meanwhile, the PRCsdesire to be accepted in the international community led it to promote peacefulunification under what would later be termed "one country, two systems", rather thanto "liberate Taiwan" and to make Taiwan a Special Administrative RegionPRCs condition on military intervention
Notwithstanding, the PRC government has issued triggers for an immediate war withTaiwan, most notably via its controversial Anti-Secession Law of 2005. These conditionsare:If events occur leading to the "separation" of Taiwan from China in any name, orIf a major event occurs which would lead to Taiwans "separation" fromChina, orIf all possibility of peaceful unification is lost.It has been interpreted that these criteria encompass the scenario of Taiwandeveloping nuclear weapons. Much saber-rattling by the PRC has been done over this,with Jiang Zemin, after assuming the mantle of the Chairman of the Central MilitaryCommission, becoming a leading voice.The third condition has especially caused a stir in Taiwan as the term"indefinitely" is open to interpretation. It has also been viewed by some as meaningthat preserving the ambiguous status quo is not acceptable to the PRC, although thePRC stated on many occasions that there is no explicit timetable for reunification.Concern over a formal declaration of de jure Taiwan independence is a strong impetusfor the military buildup between Taiwan and mainland China. The former US Bushadministration publicly declared that given the status quo, it would not aid Taiwan if itwere to declare independence unilaterally.According the US Department of Defense report "Military and Security DevelopmentsInvolving the People’s Republic of China 2011" conditions that mainland China haswarned may cause the use of force have varied. They have included "a formaldeclaration of Taiwan independence; undeﬁned moves “toward independence”;foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs; indeﬁnite delays in the resumption ofcross-Strait dialogue on uniﬁcation; Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons; and,internal unrest on Taiwan. Article 8 of the March 2005 “Anti-Secession Law” statesBeijing would resort to “non- peaceful means” if “secessionist forces . . . cause the fact ofTaiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession”occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reuniﬁcation” are exhausted".According to President Chen Shui-bian who was President of the Republic of Chinabetween 2000 and 2008, China accelerated the deployment of missiles against Taiwanup to 120 a year (May 2007), bringing the total arsenal to 706 ballistic missiles capableof being fitted with nuclear warheads that are aimed at Taiwan. Some believe that theirdeployment is a political tool on the part of the PRC to increase political pressure onTaiwan to abandon unilateral moves toward formal independence, at least for the time
being, although the PRC government never declares such deployment publicly.Legislative elections were held in Taiwan on January 12, 2008. The results gavethe Kuomintang and the Pan-Blue Coalition a supermajority (86 of the 113 seats) in thelegislature, handing a heavy defeat to President Chen Shui-bians DemocraticProgressive Party, which won the remaining 27 seats only. The junior partner in thePan-Green Coalition, the Taiwan Solidarity Union, won no seats. The election for the12th-term President and Vice-President of the Republic of China was held in theRepublic of China (Taiwan) on Saturday, March 22, 2008. Kuomintang nominee MaYing- jeou won, with 58% of the vote, ending eight years of Democratic ProgressiveParty (DPP) presidential power. Along with the 2008 legislative election, Mas landslidevictory brought the Kuomintang back to power in Taiwan.Balance of powerThe possibility of war, the close geographical proximity of ROC-controlled Taiwan andPRC-controlled mainland China, and the resulting flare-ups that occur every few years,conspire to make this one of the most watched focal points in the Pacific. Both sideshave chosen to have a strong naval presence. However, naval strategies between bothpowers greatly shifted in the 1980s and 1990s, while the ROC assumed a moredefensive attitude by building and buying frigates and missile destroyers, and thePRC a more aggressive posture by developing long- range cruise missiles andsupersonic surface-to-surface missiles.Although the Peoples Liberation Army Air Force is considered large, most of its fleetconsists of older generation J-7 fighters (localized MiG-21s and Mig-21BIs), raisingdoubts over the PLAAFs ability to control Taiwans airspace in the event of a conflict.Since mid-1990s PRC has been purchasing, and later localizing, SU-27 based fighters.These Russian fighters, as well as their Chinese J11A variants, are currently over 170in number, and have increased the effectiveness of PLAAFs Beyond Visual Range(BVR) capabilities. The introduction of 60 new- generation J10A fighters is anticipatedto increase the PLAAFs firepower. PRCs acquisition of Russian Su30MKKs furtherenhanced the PLAAFs air-to- ground support ability. The ROCs air force, on the otherhand, relies on Taiwans second generation fighters, consisting of 150 US-built F-16Fighting Falcons, approximately 60 French-built Mirage 2000-5s, and approximately130 locally developed IDFs (Indigenous Defense Fighters). All of these ROC fighter jetsare able to conduct BVR combat missions with BVR missiles, but the level oftechnology in mainland Chinese fighters is catching up. Also the United States DefenseIntelligence Agency has reported that few of Taiwans 400 total fighters areoperationally capable.
In 2003, the ROC purchased four missile destroyers—the former USS Kidd class, andexpressed a strong interest in the Arleigh Burkeclass. But with the growth of the PRCnavy and air force, some doubt that the ROC could withstand a determined invasionattempt from mainland China in the future. These concerns have led to a view incertain quarters that Taiwanese independence, if it is to be implemented, should beattempted as early as possible, while the ROC still has the capacity to defend itself in anall-out military conflict. Over the past three decades, estimates of how long the ROCcan withstand a full-scale invasion from across the Strait without any outside help havedecreased from three months to only six days. Given such estimates, the US Navyhas continued practicing "surging" its carrier groups, giving it the experiencenecessary to respond quickly to an attack on Taiwan. The US also collects data onthe PRC’s military deployments, through the use of spy satellites, for example. As earlysurveillance may effectively identify PRCs massive military movement, which mayimply PRCs preparation for a military assault against Taiwan.However, numerous reports issued by the PRC, ROC and US militaries make mutuallywild contradictory statements about the possible defense of Taiwan.Naturally, war contingencies are not being planned in a vacuum. In 1979, the UnitedStates Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, a law generally interpreted asmandating U.S. defense of Taiwan in the event of an attack from the Chinese Mainland(the Act is applied to Taiwan and Penghu, but not to Jinmen or Matsu). The UnitedStates maintains the worlds largest permanent fleet in the Pacific Region near Taiwan.The Seventh Fleet, operating primarily out of various bases in Japan, is a powerfulnaval contingent built upon the worlds only permanently forward-deployed aircraftcarrier USS George Washington (CVN-73). Although the stated purpose of the fleet isnot Taiwanese defense, it can be safely assumed from past actions that are one of thereasons why the fleet is stationed in those waters.Starting in 2000, Japan renewed its defense obligations with the US andembarked on a rearmament program, partly in response to fears that Taiwan might beinvaded. Some analysts believed that the PRC could launch preemptive strikes onmilitary bases in Japan to deter US and Japanese forces from coming to the ROCs aid.Japanese strategic planners also see an independent Taiwan as vital, not onlybecause the ROC controls valuable shipping routes, but also because its capture byPRC would make Japan more vulnerable. During World War II, the US invaded thePhilippines, but another viable target to enable direct attacks on Japan would havebeen Taiwan (then known as Formosa). However, critics of the preemptive striketheory assert that the PRC would be loath to give Japan and the US such an excuse to
intervene.The United States Department of Defense in a 2011 report stated that theprimary mission of the PRC military is a possible military conflict with Taiwan, includingalso possible US military assistance. Although the risk of a crisis in the short-term is low,in the absence of new political developments, Taiwan will likely dominate futuremilitary modernization and planning. However, also other priorities are becomingincreasingly prominent and possible due to increasing military resources. Many ofmainland Chinas most advanced military systems are stationed in areas oppositeTaiwan. The rapid military modernization is continually changing the militarybalance of power towards mainland China.A 2008 report by the RAND Corporation analyzing a theoretical 2020 attack bymainland China on Taiwan suggested that the US would likely not be able to defendTaiwan. Cruise missile developments may enable China to partially or completelydestroy or make inoperative US aircraft carriers and bases in the Western Pacific.New Chinese radars will likely be able to detect US stealth aircraft and China isacquiring stealthy and more effective aircraft. The reliability of US beyond-visual-rangemissiles as a mean to achieve air superiority is questionable and largely unproven.VI.Questions a Resolution Must Answer1. What measures should be taken in order to solve the Taiwan dispute?2. Are the solutions provided by the military apt for resolving thedispute in Taiwan?3. Is PRC’s condition on military intervention justified?4. Resolutions must include past UN resolutions that have been passedregarding the issue.5. Resolutions must include as many as measures as possible that could beused to stop the conflict and provide aid to the most affected.6. Resolutions must include possible legal sanctions or any type ofinternational actions that could occur7. Resolutions must look to the future and attempt to prevent situations likethis from occurring elsewhere.