Multi-Organizational Confluence Sample

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Multi-Organizational Confluence Sample

  1. 1. CREATING AND IMPLEMENTING A CLEAR MODEL OF MULTI- ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLUENCE AS SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY IN AMERICA POST 9/11. Investigating Metropolitan Philadelphia Security Policy as Ideal or Problematic. By GORDON STUART RHOADS Submitted toThe Faculty of the School of Politics, International Relations & Philosophy at Keele University. 2009 Gordon Stuart Rhoads 1
  2. 2. To my patient, loving, and wise mother. I thank her endlessly and every day for the support, advice, and most importantly the unconditional friendship. 2
  3. 3. “Do I understand you,” I said, “and is your meaning that you teach the art of politics,and that you promise to make men good citizens?” “That Socrates, is exactly the professionwhich I make.” “Then,” I said, “you do indeed possess anoble art, if there is no mistake about this,for I will freely confess to you, Protagoras,that I have a doubt whether this art is capableof being taught.” —THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 3
  4. 4. Table of Contents Abstract Acknowledgements Figures and Tables1. Introduction i.i Multi-Organizational Confluence & Security2. Theoretical Background: Security Policy & Organizations 2.1 Copenhagen School, Poststructuralism, and Multi-organizational Confluence 2.2 Identifying Security Actors and Referent Objects 2.3 Conclusion3. Multi-Organizational Confluence 3.1 Creation: Reactionary Response to Terror & Resulting New Policy 3.2 Implementation: The Multi-Organizational Response to Terror 3.3 Multi-Organizational Success & Failure; Consequences of Post 9/11 Policy 3.4 Identifying Responsibility Among New Multi-Organizational Limitations4. The Philadelphia Critique: Localized Response to Post 9/11 Policy 4.1 Metropolitan Security Objectives vs. Federal & State Policy 4.2 Prevention: Overcoming Multi-Organizational Challenges 4.3 The Political Agenda Impact on Real Securitization 4.4 Challenging Uncertainty: Multi-Organizational Security Confluence 4.5 Conclusion5. Conclusion Bibliography Appendix Vitai.i Multi-Organizational Confluence & Security 4
  5. 5. The term “multi-organizational confluence” identifies the actors and referentobjects involved in the creation and operation of security policy in the United Statespost 9/11. To conceptualize, explain, and implement a new concept, one mustendeavor to understand the breadth of an existing problem. Multi-Organizationalconfluence addresses a particular challenge to Critical Security Studies theory. Astheorists build a framework, most notably the recent Copenhagen School of Security,a problem arises. In the process of building structure, referent objects aremarginalized. This is intentional, as it is helpful when clarifying theory, yetproblematic in practice. After the terrorist attacks on New York City, WashingtonD.C. and Pennsylvania, the federal government of the United States drafted andpassed anti-terrorism policy that has forever changed the political landscape ofterrorism prevention. The application of sectors, and applying theory is notimmediately evident in the structure of the Department of Homeland Security. As aconsequence of continual perceived threats after the 11th of September 2001, electedrepresentatives in the securitization theory’s political sector have implementedsweeping changes to existing law, created new policy such as the Patriot Act andcreated a vast and unorganized hierarchy of individuals and organizations responsiblefor keeping the United States isolated from future terrorist threats—as a result of whatone may describe as alarmist and reactionary governing. The larger question at handis whether the role of a large umbrella organization—such as the Department ofHomeland Security—better implements antiterrorism measures than individualorganizations without central governance. This study focuses on the interplay of political security policy andsecuritization theory in the United States post 9/11. Chapter 2 will identify thetheoretical analysis of security from the Copenhagen School, and will comparesecuritization theory to the analysis of contemporary security policy analysts andpolitical scientists. Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde note that the “North AmericanSocietal Sector” within the security framework in Security A New Framework ForAnalysis “…is an interesting and intriguing case in the societal sector and is oftenignored in regional security analysis.”1 This analysis prompts further investigationinto what this study identifies as multi-organizational confluence. Variousgovernment and private organizations in the United States (and abroad) have mergedunder the umbrella of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and are forced tooperate in a model of cooperation as a result of post 9/11 policy initiatives. The goalhere is to identify the impact of such intended cooperation on a regional level, e.g.Metropolitan Philadelphia. The organizations once focused on independentsecuritization among each of the various security sectors (military, environmental,economic, societal, and political) including the FBI, NSA, CIA, and FDA now—post9/11—intend to operate with joint resources and information. Chapter 2 discusses thevarious sectors involved in regional securitization in a theoretical context andidentifies the referent objects for social securitization. Collective Security is not the same as multi-organizational confluence. In1991 Ken Booth noted in New Thinking About Strategy and International Securitythat security issues has become increasingly common issues, “The security challengesmost nations face are not as immediately catastrophic as those confronted by the1 Buzan, Barry, Waever & Wilde. 1998. Security; A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder, Colorado:Lynne Rienner p. 129 5
  6. 6. adversaries of the Cold War, but they are interconnected, a matter of life and death,and their overcoming requires international cooperation on an unprecedented scale.Common threats demand to be met by common strategies.”2 The common strategiesBooth recognizes are of international cooperation, rather than individual domesticpolicy responses. Chapter 3 explores the history of securitization on organizationallevels rather than international collectivity, and identifies the evolution of securityorganizations (anti-terrorism agents) within a regional context. The central theme ofChapter 3 identifies the organizational response to terrorism, focusing on theAmerican Department of Homeland Security (DHS). “Homeland Security” as definedby the Department of Homeland Security National Strategy published in 2002 is, “aconcerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduceAmerica’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover fromattacks that do occur.”3 The development of such an organization within the UnitedStates is the response to failures of international and domestic collective-securitymeasures prior to September 11, 2001. “Collective security can usefully represent something more than the archetype of frustrated idealism in international affairs. It is best to think of it as a strategy that uses collective self-regulation for the purpose of generating more internal security benefits…”4 The deleterious terrorist attacks of 2001 delivered a weakening blow to theUnited States defense infrastructure, thus focusing American security policy onisolationism and internal organizational restructuring, as the development of theDepartment of Homeland Security exemplifies. Mohammad Ayoob notes that, “theprimary security concerns of weak states are ‘internal in character’ and arecharacteristic of ‘the early stages of state making.”5 The United States governmentexperienced such a vulnerable position on the 11th of September 2001 and arguablyfocused inward through the creation and development of Homeland Security. “The suicidal assassins of September 11, 2001 did not ‘attack America,’ as political leaders and news media in the United States have tried to maintain; they attacked American foreign policy. Employing the strategy of the weak, they killed innocent bystanders, whose innocence is, of course, no different from that of the civilians killed by American bombs in Iraq, Serbia, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. It was probably the most striking instance in the history of international relations of the use of political terrorism to influence events.”62 Booth, Ken. 1991. New Thinking About Strategy and International Security. London: Harper CollinsAcademics p.3413 National Strategy for Homeland Security: July 2002, by the Office of Homeland Security, Publishedpaperback by Diane Pub Co (November 2003) Accessed May 4th 2008 online at: <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_hls.pdf4 Downs, George W. & Iida, Keisuke. 1994. “Assessing the Theoretical Case AgainstCollective Security.” In Collective Security Beyond the Cold War: (Pew Studies in Economicsand Security), ed. by George W. Downs, et al. Michigan: University of Michigan Press. p.355 Ayoob, Mohammad. 1997. “Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective,” in Critical SecurityStudies: Concepts and Cases, eds. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams. Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press. p 121 6
  7. 7. Theoretical Background: Security Policy & Organizations2.1 Copenhagen School, Poststructuralism, and Multi-organizational Confluence Notably, the new concept of multi-organizational confluence diverges fromtraditional critical security studies and security theory. The theory of Securitizationand the Copenhagen School attempt to justify that security is reserved for designatedreferent objects and remains divorced from securitization actors, which (or whom)implement actual securitization. Multi-organizational confluence as security policyattempts to merge politicized bureaucracies, current policy, and individual securityneeds into a clear model that isn’t “top-down”, rather, modeled from center—out. KenBooth’s Theory of World Security elaborates on the Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde’sSecurity: A New Framework for Analysis, “From the beginning of the academic study of international politics, the concept of security has focused on sovereign states, military power, and the preservation of international order. Security studies therefore derived from a combination of Anglo-American, statist, militarized, masculinized, ‘top- down’, methodologically positivist and philosophically realist thinking, all shaped by the experiences and memories of the interwar years and the Second World War, and the perceived necessities of the Cold War. Critical security studies, as it developed through the 1990’s, sought to investigate what security might mean in theory and practice from perspectives on global and local politics that start from very different political, methodological, and philosophical standpoints. CSS is a body of knowledge about security in world politics; it is not a theory of security as such, telling us (like realism) who are the key actors, and what are the most rational strategies.”7 There is a distinctive difference in the application of theory in security policy.Securitization theory illustrates a model for indentifying the players involved indefining security implications. Alan Collins draws a line, “On both sides, it isessential to the particular nature of security theory that there is a distinct category of‘policy knowledge’ that functions as expertise supporting policy—a form ofknowledge that security theory in the US wants to assist while security theory inEurope (to draw the contrast sharply) treats it as a main empirical source for criticalanalysis.”8Figure 2.1 “The position of security theory North America and Europe”6 Johnson, Chalmers. 2004. Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire New York :Henry Holt & Company. p.xv-xvi7 Booth, Ken. 2007. Theory of World Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press p.298 Collins, Alan. 2007. Contemporary Security Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press p.398 7
  8. 8. “Critics of current policy in the US will aim to obtain a policy change bypresenting theoretical generalizations based on empirical data that give scientificcredentials to a different policy as more likely to achieve the aims aspired to.”9 The subjects seeking security within a state or organization are not dependentupon classification within the framework of non-politicized, politicized, orsecuritized. As a response to terrorism, for example, all “actors” have a seat at thetable thus seeking to prevent threats and actively resolve to respond accordingly.Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde created sectors which, theoretically, the ‘subject’ ofsecurity should fit nicely. In theory this classification is justified, but lacks practicalitywhen designing security policy. It should be clear from this point on that the theoryand practice of security policy are not one in the same. Designing a framework foranalyzing security theory is not the foundation of implementation, and should not beapplied as such. The security challenges post 9/11 confronting the United States on the socialand regional levels has been met with political securitization methodology which—inthe context of multi-organizational confluence—is summarized as within theframework of the Copenhagen School as one identifies the organizational actorsinvolved. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde explain “Securitization” as, “…a more extreme version of politicization. In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from nonpoliticized (meaning the state does not deal with it and is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations, or more rarely, some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure).”10Figure 2.2 : Securitization9 Collins, Alan. 2007. Contemporary Security Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press p.39810 Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security; A New Framework for Analysis.Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner. p.23-24 8
  9. 9. Booth notes that Buzan made it clear in People, States, and Fear that, “If amultisectoral approach to security was to be fully meaningful, referent objects otherthan the state had to be allowed into the picture.”11 Multi-organizational confluencemoves to remove the barriers and limitations of classifying referent objects intosectors, thus allowing a broader interplay within the discourse. Buzan illustrates theneed to broaden the approach and create multiple sectors (military, environment,economic, society, and political) yet limits the need for security application(securitization) based on factors in relation to politics within the security framework,and the referent object’s relationship with the state. This point is affirmed by theBuzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, “On the other hand, threats do not need to be attributedto the same categories as those the other side acted with reference to. Actual eventsare likely to be varied and complex, requiring a pragmatic approach that allows us tofind the specific units of the case.”122.2 Identifying Security Actors and Referent Objects Returning to the theory of securitization, the attempt to define specific referentobjects creates a problem. The subject of Multi-organizational Confluence as securitypolicy is not the referent object, or the individual. The subject is what may be definedas the security ‘actors’ or simply security organizations. Multi-organizationalConfluence is meant to inspire policy that will guide organizations charged withcreating and implementing security measures when facing a perceived threat. KenBooth describes the discourse as near contentious, but reminds us of RBJ Walker’sconclusion on the subject of security. That is security form whom or what. “For thosethat are identified as implicit or explicit, pre-defined or argued-out, the question ofwhat is real in relation to security depends upon the answer to the prior question,‘what is the referent?’ (in other words, ‘Whom or what is to be secured?’). R.B.J.Walker put the issue neatly when he wrote, “The subject of security is the subject ofsecurity.”13 It is not legitimacy or a claim to security that must be established or provenwhen security, the idea of protection, and establishing a defense against chaos orterror are responsibilities of those who wish to enjoy its benefits or comfort. Buzan,11 Booth, Ken. ibid p.16212 Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis.Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner. p.4413 Booth, Ken. ibid p.184 9
  10. 10. Wæver & Jaap de Wilde claim that their referent objects must participate, thusmaking a claim to their right to exist. They wrote, “Referent objects must establishsecurity legitimacy in terms of a claim to survival”14 To conclude, one can study security discourse to learn what referent objects are appealed to an can study outcomes to see which hold security legitimacy so an appeal to their necessary survival is able to mobilize support. Traditionally, the middle level has been the most fruitful generator of referent objects, but lately more has been heard about system- and micro- level possibilities (Rothschild 1995). Bureaucracies, political regimes, and firms seldom hold this sense of guaranteed survival and thus are not usually classed as referent objects. Logically, they could try to establish a claim to survival and thus to security legitimacy, but empirically this is not usually possible. In practice, security is not totally subjective. There are socially defined limits to what can and cannot be securitized, although those limits can be changed. This means security analysis is interested mainly in successful instances of securitization—the cases in which other people follow the securitizing lead, creating a social, intersubjective constitution of a referent object on a mass scale. Unsuccessful or partially successful attempts at securitization are interesting primarily for the insights they offer into the stability of social attitudes toward security legitimacy, the process by which those attitudes are maintained or changed, and the possible future direction of security politics. In these larger patterns, desecuritization is at least as interesting as securitization, but the successful acts of securitization take a central place because they constitute the currently valid specific meaning of security.15 “A securitizing actor is someone, or a group who performs the security speech act. Common players in this role are political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups. These actors are not usually the referent objects for security, because only rarely can they speak security through reference to the need to defend their own survival. Their argument will normally be that it is necessary to defend the security of the state, nation, civilization, or some other larger community, principle, or system. Only occasionally will actors such as governments or firms be able to speak successfully of security on their own behalf. The notion of an “actor” is in itself problematic. To say precisely who or what acts is always tricky, because one can disaggregate any collective into subunits and on down to individuals and say, ‘It is not really ‘the state’ that acts but some particular department—or in the last instance individuals.’ But to disaggregate everything into individuals is not very helpful, because much of social life is understandable only when collectivities are seen as more than the sum of their “members” and are treated as social realities (methodological collectivism).”162.3 Conclusion The creation and implementation of multi-organizational confluence, or anyconceptual model dealing with policy procedure, relies on a firm understanding ofsecurity theory. Critical Security Studies seeks to explain the foundation of oursecurity dependence and answer the all evasive for whom and why questions. TheCopenhagen school, particularly Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, attempt to justify theapplication of security within a particular framework. International Relations as a14 Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde ibid p. 3915 Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde ibid p. 3916 Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis.Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner. p.40 10
  11. 11. school of thought has no definitive answer as to what “is” Global Security. GlobalSecurity is not as clear as globalization, this ‘understanding’ of expandingcommunication and mobility with fewer barriers such as geography and language.Global Security seemingly builds more barriers as theorists create new frameworks,themselves new barriers or conceptual challenges for the conception, implementation,and success of ‘common’ security goals. Few theorists within the selection of contemporary security theory literatureattempt to create a final product or a security goal. It’s plausible that perhaps doing sowould seem like attempting Utopia. Der Derian suggests that we take anotherapproach and reexamine the dialogue. “What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is, other than us? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret—and possibly construct through the reinterpretation—a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities.”17 Multi-organizational Confluence responds and at least attempts to model areaction-structure with the goal of implementing a clear security ideal. The multiorganizational security goals for policy and real security outcomes will be explainedlater, but the purely theoretical goal of Multi-organizational Confluence isregionalized peace through strong and defined interactions among organizations.Defining security within the theoretical, thus attempting to apply to policy andorganizational implementation requires a more definitive explanation of security.Affirming the pursuit of a genealogical understanding, Michael Dillon explains that,“Pursuing such a genealogical line of enquiry would have the virtue of enabling us tosee that security is employable in any and every circumstance, and is invested with aplurality of meanings. I would reveal the extent, too, of the work that security does forand imposes on us…”18 “…the genealogy of the discourse shows clear lines of continuity with earlier responses by American governments to national crises and security threats. For example, the current Bush-initiated ‘war on terrorism’ follows closely the discursive form of the preceding ‘wars on terrorism’ declared by the Reagan and Clinton administrations. In succession, each president discursively constructed terrorism as the greatest threat to American and international security…”19 What seems to be the agreed upon notion from the majority of political-security scholars from Machiavelli to RBJ Walker is that violence is simply a fact oflife. We must deal with violence as inevitable. Richard Devetak summarizes17 Der Derian, James. 2009. Critical Practices of International Relations: Selected Essays. New York :Taylor & Francis p.15118 Dillon, Michael. 1996. Politics of Security; Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought.London: Routledge p.1519 Jackson, Richard. 2005. Writing the War on Terrorism; Language, Politics and Counterterrorism.Manchester: Manchester University Press p.155 11
  12. 12. Campbell and Dillon’s 1993 Political Subject of Violence theory that violenceessentially creates a role for government. “The paradox here is that violence is bothpoison and cure.”20 At the onset, this project was to shed light on the city andmetropolitan region of Philadelphia, and regions within the United States of America,post 11 September 2001, ignored by the Department of Homeland Security. Whenanswering the question, ‘why deny organizations the resources they need to providecitizens with security?’ it was apparent that within the discourse, securitizationtheorists first define their security referent object. It was simple. Security Actors, theorganizations responsible for creating and implementing ‘security’ and the referentobject; the individual, organization, or other with security needs. Unfortunately, within the collection of contemporary international relationstheory and specifically, security studies, the “security actor” can be anyone from theindividual citizen / non-citizen on the street to Osama Bin Laden, to society itself.Instead of assigning responsibility for the security needs of the referent object, aspointed out throughout the study, one may find instead, examples of attemptedjustification for accepting a threshold of violence. The representation of the interplayof violence, politics, and security is cyclical, therefore representing a violent historicalcycle. Multi-organizational Confluence is a policy management theory fororganizations to cope with violence beyond the acceptable threshold. This attempt tocounter the cycle of violence with a cycle of policy, management, and thereprevention, illustrates a similar reaction to violence beyond the acceptable threshold,yet does so in a more mirrored, and therefore, congruent as an effort to break a cycle.Organizational structures created in response to violence beyond the threshold arethus top-down power hierarchies. An example of this reactionary construct is theorganizational model of the super-organization called the Department of HomelandSecurity.http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/DHS_OrgChart.pdf20 Devetak, Richard. 2005. “Postmodernism” In Theories of International Relations eds. Scott Burchill& Andrew Linklater, et al. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 172 12
  13. 13. The conceptual model of multi-organizational confluence is cyclical instructure. Rather than a top-down power structure, the model of this conceptual policyinitiative is a center-out concept. Rather a traditional top-down model, one that isreactionary in nature, a new attempted policy structure that is cyclical is designed toreact and respond to threats from every angle . Conceptualizing new security theory orpolicy models and attempting to illustrate concepts is justifiable and necessary, as themotivation behind Multi-organizational Confluence is a need to preserve andcontinually demonstrate the physical security needs of individuals rather thantheoretical sectors. This approach is not ‘monosectoral’ 21 as securitization theorywould like to classify, rather, the model itself is more comparable to the so-calledsynthesis that exists ‘between’ the sectors. It is not collective security as such, ratherideal security for all. Without classification between various sectors such as political,military, societal, and economic, it is sweeping in scope, simple in design, andideological in nature. “At its core, security studies is an effort to integrate domesticlevel variables with those of the international system in order to create a synthesis toexplain the defense and security activities of actors.”22 Securitization theory attemptsto solve global problems by distinguishing sectors, and applying unique pressureseach sector will handle. Securitization theory assumes that the arguments for continuing to focus onregional security issues are ‘polemical’.23 The preservation of ideal security is seenthroughout our modern western structures. Our participation in western nations existsas various applications of security practices are implemented as normative functionsof our societies. Security as a function of maintaining control over and preserving thevalues held most important to businesses that maintain networks of data, individualswho assess a risk to their own safety often times take measures to increase security byimplementing technological advances or in some cases armed protection, the financialinstitutions must seek to maintain security both protecting assets including realproperty as well as manage the security of physical and electronic data. Governmentscreate and manage strategic institutions that serve to prevent security threats as wellas adapt to the needs of the government as threats to state security occur both withinborders and abroad. The risks to states are always a future concern, and it serves anation with a strong interest in preserving its existence to develop methods ofmaintaining security as desired or required to maintain stability. Militaries, policeforces, private firms, and individuals themselves take steps to function in this systemwhile maintaining their desired state-of-security or the state-of-security as required ofthem.Multi-Organizational Confluence3.1 Creation: Reactionary Response to Terror & Resulting New Policy21 See chapter 8, explanation of ‘other’ security theory, and how sectors are related to each other withinthe framework i.e. ‘synthesized’. Found in Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security:A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.22 Lansford, Tom. Robert J. Pauley Jr., and Jack Covarrubias. 2006. To Protect and Defend: USHomeland Security Policy. Burlington: Ashgate. p.1323 Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis.Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner. p.163 13
  14. 14. University of Pittsburgh Professor B. Guy Peters postulates that the creation ofthe Department of Homeland Security as a response to terrorism is a reactionaryconstruct which theoretically creates a weakness in terrorism prevention. He writes: “Organizational failures, individual and collective, were significant factors in the success of the terrorists in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania; better organizational design must therefore be a part of the response. But there is unfortunately no certain technology for the design of effective organizations, whether in the public or private sectors. The Department of Homeland Security follows a well-worn path toward the creation of megadepartments, but there may be no reason to expect that the experience in this case will be any more positive than in previous efforts.”24 Peter’s observation only two years after the 9/11 attacks, warns that creatingan organization such as the Department of Homeland Security may not be anappropriate response to the threat of future terrorist attacks. Implementing multi-organizational confluence as security policy on the federal level may adversely impactonce independent organizations that played essential roles in securitization among thevarious sectors of security analysis. With little time and a mandate to respond after theterrorist attacks of 9/11, the American Government did not enjoy the luxury of timeand diligence. Theory and policymaking take patience. The most sweeping change topolicy in America took place over the course of two months and the result iscontentious. On one hand the new Department of Homeland Security has thwarteddomestic terrorist attacks, or at least imposes deterrence, yet became an essentialelement in carrying out policy and measures that ultimately endangered Americaninterests. “Backed by virtually unlimited American public support and the substantialsupport from both traditional allies and previous great power rivals, the BushAdministration quickly set upon the most far-reaching transformation of Americansecurity policy… and launched an essentially open-ended ‘global war on terrorism.”25 “We divide our national interests into three categories: vital, important, and humanitarian. Vital interests are those directly connected to the survival, safety, and the vitality of our nation. Among these are the physical security of our territory and that of our allies, the safety of our citizens both and home and abroad, protection against WMD proliferation, the economic well-being of our society, and the protection of our critical infrastructures—including energy, banking and finance, telecommunications, transportation, water systems, vital human services, and government services—from disruption intended to cripple their operation. We will do what we must to defend these interests. This may involve the use of military force, including unilateral action, where deemed necessary or appropriate. The second category, important national interests affects our national well being or that of the world in which we live. Principally, this may include developments in regions where America holds a significant economic or political stake, issues with significant global environment impact,24 Peter’s B. Guy. 2002. “Are We Safer Today? Organizational Responses to Terrorism” in The Politicsof Terror: the U.S. Response to 9/11 ed. Crotty, William. 2004. Boston: Northeastern University Pressp.24925 Deudney, Daniel H. 2006. Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to theGlobal Village. Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate. p.260 14
  15. 15. infrastructure disruptions that destabilize but do not cripple smooth economic activity, and crises that could cause destabilizing economic turmoil or humanitarian movement. Examples of when we have acted to protect important national interests include our successful efforts to end the brutal conflict and restore peace in Kosovo, or our assistance to our Asian and pacific allies and friends in support of the restoration of order and transition to nationhood in East Timor. The third category is humanitarian and other longer-term interests. Examples include reacting to natural and manmade disasters; acting to halt gross violations of human rights; supporting emerging democracies; encouraging adherence to the role of law and civilian control of the military; conducting Joint Recovery Operations worldwide to account for our country’s war dead; promoting sustainable development and environmental protection; or facilitating humanitarian demining.”26 United States, White House. 2000. A National Security Strategy for a Global Age. Washington D.C.: GPO. p.9 Lansford, Tom. Robert J. Pauley Jr., and Jack Covarrubias. 2006. To Protect and Defend: US Homeland Security Policy. Burlington: Ashgate. pp. 23-243.2 Implementation: The Multi-Organizational Response to Terror “National security should not be idealized. It works to silence opposition and has given power holders many opportunities to exploit “threats” for domestic purposes, to claim a right to handle something with less democratic control and constraint. Our belief, therefore, is not “the more security the better.” Basically, security should be seen as a negative, as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics. Ideally, politics should be able to unfold according to routine procedures without this extraordinary elevation of specific “threats” to a prepolitical immediacy. In some cases securitization of issues is unavoidable, as when states are faced with an implacable or barbarian aggressor. Because of its prioritizing imperative, securitization also has tactical attractions—for example, as a way to obtain sufficient attention for environmental problems. But desecuritization is the optimal long-range option, since it means not to have issues phrased as “threats against which we have countermeasures” but to move them out of this threat-defense sequence and into the ordinary public sphere. (Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.) p.29 “The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.26 United States, White House. 2000. A National Security Strategy for a Global Age. Washington D.C.:GPO. p.9 Lansford, Tom. Robert J. Pauley Jr., and Jack Covarrubias. 2006. To Protect and Defend: USHomeland Security Policy. Burlington: Ashgate. pp. 23-24 15
  16. 16. The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression. Yet in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world’s most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather. We will always proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our actions. To support preemptive options, we will: • build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities to provide timely, accurate information on threats, wherever they may emerge; • coordinate closely with allies to form a common assessment of the most dangers threats; • and continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results. The purpose of our actions will always be to eliminate a specific threat to the United States or our allies and friends. The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just.”27The Philadelphia Critique: Localized Response to Post 9/11 Policy4.1 Metropolitan Security Objectives vs. Federal & State Policy The role of responsibility for the implementation of security policy falls on thereferent object; the individual. Without the individual or referent object’s demand forsecurity, there would exist no responsibility or reaction, therefore no implementation.States demand information that will prevent instances that would threaten the securityof infrastructure including: commerce, government operation abilities,communication, healthcare providers, and many more areas of essential services.There is an abundance of text within international relations and political sciencetheory that address the management of security within specialized practices. Therealso exists the substantial amount of new literature that proposes innovations to theapplication of security. The fear of terrorism has prompted an explosion of demandfor protection, isolation of threats, and a visible force for effectual deterrence. As a response to the fear of terrorism, officials across various levels ofAmerican government have worked to implement new security policy as well asdevelop a surge of antiterrorism measures in every American center of population.According to the US Census Bureau, Metropolitan Philadelphia is America’s 5thmost populated area of the United States.28 Concerning antiterrorism policy andPhiladelphia, this dissertation will address the dangers surrounding security policyand political motive. Amanda Terkel, a New York Times contributor andManaging Editor for The Progress Report and Thinkprogress.org revealed in a27 United States. 2002. White House. National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington D.C.:Office of the Press Secretary, September 17, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss5.html> AccessedDecember 13, 2008.28 The United States Census Bureau defines a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) as a Core BasedStatistical Area having at least one urbanized area of 50,000 or more population, plus adjacent territorythat has a high degree of social and economic integration with the core as measured by commuting ties.See http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/bulletins/fy05/b05-02.html accessed October 13, 2008. 16
  17. 17. September 22nd 2005 post to ThinkProgress.org that Philadelphia’s requested sixmillion dollars for first-response equipment was denied the city, but much smallercities received their requested funds. Why is it that Philadelphia was deniedemergency first-response equipment funding, but a combined $10,290,140.00went to cities such as Grand Forks North Dakota, Bismarck North Dakota,Davenport Iowa, Pocatello Idaho, and Las Cruces New Mexico? This dissertation will explore the scope of the greater conflict among thevarious federal, state, local, and privately held interests involved in security policyand antiterrorism practices. Since September 11th 2001 local governments,including the City of Philadelphia, continue to draft and implement security policywhile attempting to prevent future catastrophes. Philadelphia has experiencedparticularly complicated challenges to overcoming security challenges as itcontends with the involvement of officials from the U.S. Department of JusticeOffice of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) along with otherFederal agencies such as the FBI, NSA, CIA, and DHS29. Ultimately, is terrorismprevention affected negatively by the constant interplay of the previouslymentioned politicized government agencies? Charles Brennan was the former Deputy Commissioner for Scientific andTechnology Services with the Philadelphia Police Department after September11th 2001. Mr. Brennan directed the Philadelphia Police Department’s response toterrorism threats after 9/11 and the July 7 London bombings. He was particularlydisturbed by the Department of Justice decision to direct emergency responsefunding to other cities commenting to Amanda Terkel that, “We thought after thesubway bombings in London, someone would see that it would make sense for thefifth-largest city in the United States to have first responders who were able tocommunicate underground.” (Terkel, Amanda: “Philadelphia Denied Funds toFight Terrorism” Sep 22, 2005) This dissertation attempts to answer the following question, “Does thecontinued expansion of security policy and antiterrorism regulatory organizationsresult in a metropolitan Philadelphia more or less equipped to deter terrorism orrespond to catastrophic terrorist-related events?” In other words, the dissertationquestions whether a new model of security and counterterrorism policy is ideal forPhiladelphia, a city overwhelmed with challenges that inhibit many efforts tosecuritize the city after the 11th of September 2001, focusing specifically on theconflicting policies and regulations of federal, state, and local governmentagencies. One may contend that the expansion of security organizations andgovernmental policies create confusion, thus inhibiting efficient terrorism29 The FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation is the primary investigative arm of the United StatesDepartment of Justice (DOJ).The NSA National Security Agency/Central Security Service is a cryptologic intelligence agency of theUnited States government.The CIA Central Intelligence Agency is a civilian intelligence agency of the US Government focusedon collecting and analyzing information about foreign governments, corporations, and persons in orderto advise public policymakers.The DHS commonly known as "Homeland Security" is a department of the US Government primarilyresponsible for protecting the territory of the U.S. from terrorist attacks and responding to naturaldisasters. 17
  18. 18. prevention. It is also important to point out that the American War On Terrorrequires contributions of manpower, intelligence, funding, technology, andproperty. Any contribution to the War On Terror from residents of metropolitanPhiladelphia does not guarantee a direct return of actual security for thepopulation of metropolitan Philadelphia. However, the previously mentionedcontributions from the taxpayers of Philadelphia ultimately contribute to anationwide effort to combat terrorism, which theoretically protect everyone. Although the dissertation seeks to study metropolitan Philadelphia, by default,the dissertation will address security problems facing millions of people in arelatively small region of the United States. The metropolitan regions of NewYork City and Washington D.C., immediately adjacent to the north and south ofPhiladelphia, manage many similar security concerns and share equally worrisomesecurity problems such as antiterrorism prevention and inadequate intelligence.The central theme throughout the dissertation will recognize the interplay ofpolitical and judicial regulations, often with vague guidelines about specificjurisdiction and responsibility related to security prevention or catastrophicresponse. Philadelphia will be compared to other American cities as thedissertation seeks to draw parallels with challenges other American citiesexperience. The goal is to address the larger impact of expanding regulation enforced bymultiple levels of government oversight. Examples of these levels of governmentthat influence security policy include federal agencies: (FBI, NSA, CIA, FDA,Homeland Security), state government agencies: (National Guard, congressionaldistricts, county regulation, police, etc.), local government agencies:(Municipalities, Police, Public Works), and the Judiciary (Federal, State,Appellate, and Trial Courts). This list of agencies is just a small sample of themost involved political or judicial related challenges any independent or universalsecurity policy will have to overcome. The dissertation will not ignore the risk involved in implementing any plan toconstruct universal policy regarding security. Recognizing that National securityrisks may not be of consequence to residents of Philadelphia, may converselyassume that not all Philadelphia security threats are of concern to federal or stategovernment interests. Hypothetically, a possible result of attempting toconsolidate security agencies could result in the redistribution of oversight, andcentral regulatory control. Metropolitan Philadelphia, when examined independentof its northern and southern neighbors is an excellent case study of security policycomplexities imposed on an average American metropolitan area. 18

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