What Causes Armed Violence (OECD)

391 views
297 views

Published on

0 Comments
0 Likes
Statistics
Notes
  • Be the first to comment

  • Be the first to like this

No Downloads
Views
Total views
391
On SlideShare
0
From Embeds
0
Number of Embeds
0
Actions
Shares
0
Downloads
4
Comments
0
Likes
0
Embeds 0
No embeds

No notes for slide
  • Introduction Structure of the presentation: what is Armed Violence Reduction (AVR), why is it a problem, drivers, contexts, approaches, examples and what can be done Significant emerging trends that have brought this topic up on the policy agenda include: Conflict and crime are increasingly linked. Levels of armed violence are a severe challenge in many non-conflict countries. Increasing youth populations in the global South and the emergence of ungoverned urban spaces and youth gangs are a growing reality in many parts of the world. Alongside this, there are increasing links between local, national, regional and global security, for example through the trafficking of drugs, arms or people. Donors have given relatively little attention to these issues as compared to conflict or war. Compounding this, most donor organizations are set up to respond at national, not local or regional, levels. In addition to OECD work, a number of other policy documents reflect the relevance of this topic: The United Nations Secretary-General’s report on the links between armed violence and development to the General Assembly (2009) The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development (2006) and process, which now commits the 108 signatory States to achieve measurable reductions in armed violence. In addition, the Oslo commitments on Armed Violence and the MDG’s (2010) are supported by 61 states.
  • Definition Development practitioners understand armed violence as the use or threatened use of weapons to inflict injury, death or psychosocial harm, which undermines development. This perspective broadens our understanding beyond conflict alone to include situations of violent crime and interpersonal violence . In other words, armed violence occurs in multiple contexts – from societies ostensibly at peace, to populations stumbling into crisis, having been affected by war and now entering a recovery phase. Characteristics (1) Armed violence is often restricted to specific geographic areas of a region, country or municipality : While certain areas of a country or city may function normally, others can suffer from acute levels of armed violence. Peripheral, marginal and historically neglected regions such as border areas and city slums are often under-governed and vulnerable to the growth of informal and/or predatory power structures. Examples include the paramilitary-dominated areas of northern Colombia, rebel-held regions of Sri Lanka, southern Lebanon, militant-controlled neighborhoods of Mogadishu (Somalia) and the urban shantytowns of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paolo (Brazil). (2) Armed violence can exhibit regional and transnational dimensions : For example, it can rapidly spread across territorial borders, e.g. at the Kenyan-Ugandan border. Consider for instance also clashes between rival pastoralist groups or among criminal groups that traffic arms from country to country across the Horn of Africa. Meanwhile less visible, organised international criminal syndicates, diaspora groups and criminal gangs can also directly influence the localised dynamics of armed violence. (3) Armed violence is deeply gendered : Across all societies, young males are the most common perpetrators and victims of armed attacks. Although women, boys and girls suffer as direct victims, many more emerge as survivors of non-lethal attacks, caretakers of male victims and as new heads of households. Gender-based sexual violence is endemic in most war zones and perpetrators are seldom brought to justice. (4) Widespread armed violence constitutes a failure of public security : chronic levels of armed violence signal a fragile situation in which the state does not exercise a monopoly over the legitimate use of force in all its territory, or uses force excessively to quell dissent or crime. In such contexts, many civilians may feel better represented, serviced or protected by armed groups than by the public authorities. They may also have better economic opportunities and security through illicit markets than in the formal economy.
  • In conflict and non-conflict but high-crime/violence settings (1) The perspective on, and definition of, Armed Violence broadens our understanding beyond conflict alone to include situations of violent crime and interpersonal violence. In other words, armed violence occurs in multiple contexts – from societies at peace, to populations stumbling into crisis, having been affected by war and now entering a recovery phase. (2) The armed violence perspective signals a broader spectrum of countries, regions and communities whose security and development are under threat. It also draws attention to the new landscapes of insecurity – such as the melding of conflict and criminal violence and the growing challenges of urban-based violence and armed youth gangs. In so doing, it underscores how local-level manifestations of armed violence are increasingly shaped by regional and global influences and trends – such as the expansion of transnational crime and the growth in proportion of young, frequently unemployed populations in many developing countries.
  • (1) Loss of life: Armed conflict and direct combat deaths appear to be on the decline in the 21st century (Human Security Report, 2006, 2008; CICS, 2005a; UNDP, 2005a). But the number of people killed and affected by armed violence is not . Approximately 740 000 people die as a result of armed violence each year. More than 490 000 of these deaths occur in countries not affected by conflict; they are instead due to homicide and interpersonal violence. Fewer than 55 000 of the total are direct casualties of war. (2) Armed violence impedes the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals . More than 20 of the world’s 34 poorest countries are affected by or emerging from armed conflict, most of them in Africa. Likewise, homicidal violence and violent crime are heavily concentrated in many lower- and middle-income countries. Even certain countries that appear to be making strong national progress on the MDGs can suffer from localised pockets of chronic armed violence. For example , while Brazil is well on its way to achieving its MDG targets for education, two-thirds of the residents of the violence-affected favelas do not possess primary school certification. (3) Armed violence exacts a major economic toll , particularly on the poor and vulnerable segments of society. War-affected countries often experience a reduction in the annual growth of their economies of 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) and low growth rates persist long after the shooting stops (Collier, 2007). The average cost of a civil war is estimated at approximately USD 65 billion dollars. Likewise, the global cost of homicidal violence to societies around the world is USD 95-160 billion a year (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008). As much as USD 400 billion is lost when considering lost productivity from lives prematurely cut short by violence. (4) Armed violence leads to the destruction of lives and property and also undermines local and foreign investment . It contributes to “unproductive” expenditures. Research suggests that developing countries may spend between 10-15% of their GDP on law enforcement, as compared to 5% in developed states (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008). The impacts of armed violence on national economies cannot be overstated. In Guatemala, for example , armed violence costs the equivalent of 7.3% of GDP in 2005, far outstripping spending on health or education (UNDP, 2006a). Likewise, if Jamaica and Haiti reduced their homicide rates to a level commensurate with Costa Rica, their respective annual growth rates could increase by an estimated 5.4% (World Bank and UNODC, 2007).
  • (1) Structural risk factors mainly refer to the consequences of the more durable characteristics of a negative environment for opportunities for development, wellbeing and income generation. For example, social, political and economic inequalities/ exclusion; systemic unemployment; economic deprivation or grievances; limited or non-existent opportunities; weak governance, public security failure, corruption, insufficient investment in social policies and programming; resource scarcity demographic youth bulges and unequal gender relations. (2) Proximate risk factors include sharp economic shocks; natural (and human-induced) disasters such as drought; easy access to alcohol, narcotics and small arms; and fresh exposure to past violence – whether this has occurred at the national, community or familial level. (3) The complexity and diversity of drivers of armed violence underline the need for multiple level, multiple sector and multiple stakeholder approaches, analysis and engagement. This should happen on the basis of proper context specific analysis using available data to establish a good understanding of the problem and an adequate baseline.
  • (1) Dili can today be considered a moderately ‘safe’ city. Yet, it is nevertheless affected by sporadic outbreaks of collective violence and routine interpersonal violence. The dynamics of urban violence are interconnected with rural - communal tensions. ‘Internal’ forms of neighbourhood and domestic violence are endemic. (2) In Timor-Leste, as in most countries plunged into civil war, memories run long and deep. The underlying grievances shaping the communal and gang violence that erupted in 2006 and 2007 remain. Both informal and focus group discussions with members of youth groups and MAGs suggest a readiness to resort to violence again if the corruption, incompetence, and brutality of public authorities and security services reaches unbearable levels. The likelihood of the recurrence of collective urban violence is fundamentally connected to the pervasive dysfunction of the security sector . (3) There are positive examples of efforts to remedy some of the enduring grievances that shape urban violence. Increased attention to land and property regulation, the expansion of opportunities for youth education and employment, and attempts to regulate the activities of MAGs are good examples. These reforms will, however, take time and require both trust and patience on the part of the general public. (4) The emergence of serious corruption into the political equation in Timor-Leste since 2008 coupled with 1) a government programme based on unsustainable entitlements, 2) ongoing impunity, 3) exploding urban unemployed youth, and 4) ongoing neglect of rural development suggests that, unless policy is radically rethought , Dili’s fragile gains could easily be reversed. Source: Muggah ed., Urban Violence in an Urban Village, Geneva Declaration, 2010
  • Use of the lens as conceptual starting point for AVR programming The armed violence lens underscores the way violence transcends separate development sectors , and highlights the potential for cross-sector and integrated responses. Different elements and levels are often treated separately due to disconnected sector or thematic programming streams. The lens encourages development practitioners to think outside their particular programming mandates and to consider the entirety of the challenges at hand. It provides us with a basic conceptual starting point for programming. (1) People: A bottom-up perspective is central to designing strategies that build or reinforce the legitimacy and resilience of local capacities and, ultimately, state-society relationships. A starting point for any AVR intervention is to understand who is being affected by armed violence, where, when, how, and why. A critical question to guide interventions is: what is needed to make individuals and communities feel safe and secure in the particular contexts in which they live? The emphasis is on understanding how people define their security needs. (2) Perpetrators: The perpetrators of armed violence are heterogeneous. They consist of state and non-state security actors, groups of mainly predatory young men, and individuals involved in interpersonal and domestic violence. Most violence is committed by males. Understanding the motivations of perpetrators and the ways in which they are organised is essential for designing effective AVR interventions. For example , disaggregated demographic data (e.g. gender, age, and ethnicity) are required to effectively target initiatives. (3) Instruments: The instruments aspect of the lens focuses on the supply and availability of weapons and ammunition, together with the presence of explosive remnants of war in conflict and post-conflict contexts. The relatively widespread availability of weapons does not cause armed violence, but should be considered a risk factor. Analysis often draws attention to institutional weakness at the national level. Conventional approaches to addressing instruments have tended to limit their scope to technical arms control. (4) Institutions: The institutional dimension focuses on the rules of the game that emerge from formal laws, informal norms and practices, means of enforcement and organisational structures in a particular context. Both formal and informal institutions can make certain populations more vulnerable to armed violence, or function to reduce and prevent it. For instance , unequal norms in marriage laws, asset ownership and inheritance can expose women and children to increased victimisation. Context-specific cultural knowledge is essential.
  • Assessments Any AVR intervention ought to be premised on a solid evidence base and understanding of local and regional context. This requires carefully administered conflict and political economy analysis as well as survey and surveillance-based assessments in order to ensure that activities build on local perceptions and lived experiences, as well as relevant capacities and capabilities. In best case scenarios, affected communities may also participate in the elaboration of assessments, design and implementation of interventions and monitoring and evaluation of activities.
  • Three different types of programming can be distinguished: Direct programmes seek to address the instruments, actors and institutional environments enabling armed violence, Indirect programmes address “proximate” and “structural” risk factors giving rise to armed violence; and Broader development programming that do not have prevention and reduction of armed violence as a primary or even secondary objective, can nevertheless generate meaningful dividends.   These three categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Many cutting-edge AVRP programmes intentionally blur direct and indirect approaches – for example focusing simultaneously on reducing firearms availability and working with at-risk male youth while seeking to mitigate the likelihood of misuse through targeted employment schemes, after-school education programmes, psychological support and even family planning activities. This highlights a wide spectrum of possible programming entry-points . It also shows the wide range of disciplinary perspectives involved – be they public health and epidemiology, crime prevention and justice or conflict prevention and peacebuilding.  
  • The Boston Gun Project: A problem-oriented policing initiative addressing gun violence in Boston. The project created a working group, which consisted of law enforcement personnel, youth workers and researchers To analyze the underlying causes of the problem. Based on the analysis, they implemented Operation Ceasefire. Focusing on a small number of chronically offending gang-involved youth responsible for much of Boston's youth homicide problem. Police patrolled regularly to check that offenders on probation were in compliance with their probation orders. The project also established a coalition between the police and social workers to come up with effective measures to prevent gang violence. The total crime rate declined by 29%, and the rate of violent crime was lowered by 16%. (2) Community driven development in Port-au-Prince: Aiming to a) establish improved access to basic services and income generation opportunities to beneficiary community groups or associations; and (b) contribute to strengthen the social cohesion and capital in the targeted communities. The creation of development committees, made up of representatives from 138 community-based organizations from Cité-Soleil, and Bel-Air. Committee’s were able to successfully prioritize and allocate resources for the implementation of community subprojects Proposed and implemented by CBO members themselves through a participatory and inclusive process. Participation of local government authorities, which served to improve the relationship between local government and civil society, in terms of helping local government representatives to better understand and address their needs Successful in helping to create and strengthen social cohesion Source: (World Bank 2003)
  • Example: Education for Income Generation (EIG) in Nepal Since early 2008, USAID has funded a program in 15 districts of the mid-western region of Nepal aimed at mitigating conflict by training marginalized youth for employment. The program has four key objectives for targeted youth: 1) Improved literacy, life skills, and peace-building skills; 2) Increased vocational training and employment opportunities. 3) Increased rural income and agriculture productivity; and 4) Scholarships distributed. The 2009 annual review highlighted the following achievements and program impacts:   11,211 disadvantaged and conflict-affected youth graduated from a 9-month literacy and life skills course 2047 of the 3163 graduates of the vocational training programs secured employment (employed and self-employed) in non-agricultural trades, including many women working in a variety of trades including masonry, carpentry and wiring. Their income levels were above 2400 rupees per month for first 3-6 months 3,315 beneficiaries more than doubled their income by raising and selling high-value horticultural products, non-timber forest products, fish, goats and/or spices. Of 2,364 youth trained in agricultural enterprise, 1,744 beneficiaries increased their income by an average of US$250 by engaging in rural employment activities, mostly centered on the agricultural value chain. EIG worked with a network of partners to help marginalized youth leverage resources and benefits from other organizations in related activities such as WFP’s food-for work/cash-for-work program. 141 Dalit students received scholarships for higher secondary education. Most of these scholars will return to their communities and teach. Some have received scholarships toward other technical degrees. Source: Winrock International (2009)
  • Key points from the executive summary of the AVR mapping study: (1) There is considerable variation in the types of violence addressed by AVRP interventions : AVRP activities are not restricted to preventing and reducing violence associated with armed conflict or crime alone. Overall, the global mapping registered more than 20 separate categories of armed violence in which actors were involved with some interventions focused on more types of violence than others. This is suggestive of both the dynamic nature of armed violence in low- and medium-income countries, but also the diverse range of programming options on the ground. From a practitioner perspective, the mapping underlines the importance of adopting AVRP interventions that are multi-sector, multi-level and based on multiple partnerships.   (2) The ‘armed violence’ label is not always recognized nor uniformly applied by practitioners in low- and medium-income settings : Alternative framings of direct and indirect AVRP interventions range from “public” and “citizen security” and “crime prevention” to “conflict prevention”, “peace-building”, “pacification” and “community policing”. This diversity is to be encouraged since it speaks to local histories, cultures, and social realities. Multilateral and bilateral policy makers and practitioners must be attentive to different local framings and discourses. Rather than pushing the label, a key priority will be ensuring that key stakeholders adopt shared problem analysis and framing of responses to armed violence.   (3) There is a considerable overlap between “direct” and “indirect” AVRP programming : Most organizations invested in AVRP claim to be pursuing predominantly “indirect” programming focused on mitigating proximate and structural risk factors through, for example, education, employment and targeted development programming at at-risk groups. A smaller proportion claimed to be addressing the instruments, actors or enabling institutions of armed violence “directly” via legislative initiatives to regulate and control firearms, working with gangs and collecting weapons and from former combatants and civilians. Many organizations blend the two programming approaches. From a practitioner perspective, it is important to consider investing in efforts that promote security and broader developmental outcomes seeing the two as mutually reinforcing.   (4) The global AVRP agenda is biased in favour of actions endorsed and supported by international agencies and national governments: A review of existing inventories of violence prevention and reduction activities reinforces the (incorrect) perception that most activity is supported by international actors, public authorities, and non-governmental organizations, or taking place in upper-income settings. This persistent bias underlines a gap in the identification, analysis and evaluation of cross-border, sub-national, metropolitan, community-based and grass-roots activities, especially in lower- and medium-income contexts. Development practitioners should actively seek to counter this bias by mapping out and investing in, for instance, sub-national, community based actors with a proven track record in lower and middle-income settings.   (5) Multilateral and bilateral supported AVRP programmes appear to be most common in low-income post-conflict contexts while national public authority-led and NGO-efforts are more frequent in medium-income crime-affected settings: The report detects a higher prevalence of international and donor government agencies operating in “post-conflict” settings as compared to other non-war environments. An important exception appears to be the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) which has supported integrated citizen security approaches in countries affected by endemic homicide rates and a high incidence of victimization, but not necessarily armed conflict. Development practitioners can usefully expand their portfolio of AVRP intervention strategies by drawing on experiences in a wide variety of settings – from conflict to non-conflict.   (6) Backstopping recent high-level engagement with armed violence amongst multilateral and bilateral donors is at least two decades of relevant AVRP programming experience in the settings under review: There is nothing inherently new about addressing AVRP as part of wider development aid programmes. Although not necessarily described as armed violence prevention or reduction per se, a vast array of interventions has emphasized conflict prevention, peacebuilding and wider security and safety priorities since the early 1990s. From practitioner perspective, a more explicit focus on AVRP in existing peacebuilding and statebuilding strategies could produce significant returns in local safety and security. Moreover, the combination of direct and indirect AVRP interventions at various levels focusing on the instruments and perpetrators of armed violence and the broader enabling environment could also generate important outcomes.   (7)There appears to be an important increase in AVRP programming since the mid-2000s : All six of the countries reviewed as part of this study detected a quantitative increase in AVRP activities over the past decade. Approximately two thirds of all armed violence prevention and reduction activities reviewed in Brazil were concentrated between 2005 and 2010. Likewise, in Burundi, Colombia, Liberia, and Timor-Leste, nearly all registered initiatives were initiated after 2005. Not only does this assessment highlight the importance of peace negotiations and agreements as important entry-points for AVRP, it highlights the significant growth in this area over the past decade.
  • Illustrative examples taken from the AVR mapping study: For each country additional examples of promising AVR practice are available. In addition, Timor-Leste and South Africa have also been investigated as part of the mapping study. For these countries examples of promising practice are also available. Brazil 1. Fica Vivo (Stay Alive) Administered by the Centro de Estudos de Criminalidade e Segurança Pública (CRISP) da UFMG, the programme ‘Fica Vivo’ (Stay Alive) is a homicide reduction initiative. The intervention seeks to alter the risks facing young people (15-29) and improve the quality of life in “at-risk” communities in order to minimize the likelihood of violence. It features a systematic tracking intervention designed to assist specific youth through recreation and cultural events. Initiated in Minas Gerais in 2003 as a collaboration of the state government, state prosecutors, mayor offices and CRISP, the initiative is administered by 27 community centres in metropolitan areas. Following an estimated 50 per cent reduction in homicide in targeted regions, Fica Vivo is today widely touted as a best case study.   2. Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (Pacification Police Unit) Implemented by the state government, state public security secretary and increasingly private business, the Pacifying Police Unit (UPP) is a law enforcement programme active in the state of Rio de Janeiro since 2008. The UPP seeks to reclaim territory – particularly shanty-town neighbourhoods controlled by narco-traffickers and private militia. It combines intensive policing and improvements in service delivery to better meet the needs of locals. In this way, UPP seeks to enhance state legitimacy and inhibit overt forms of criminality. The UPP also features a preventive approach focusing on 13-24 year olds and aims to reverse attitudes toward military police. Areas “pacified” are entitled to social assistance (under the Social Assistance Secretary) which is heavily monitored. In targeted areas violent crime has dropped dramatically and property values have increased. Moreover, there are plans to extend the initiative to other areas of Brazil. Burundi 3. Mine Advisory Group (MAG) MAG began its work in Burundi in 2007, primarily focused on managing mines and weapons stockpiles and partnering closely with the government of Burundi. After creating and providing continuing support for the Weapons Destruction Workshop in Bujumbura where over 8,000 weapons have been destroyed to date, MAG worked directly with the national army to destroy 312 MANPADS and obsolete ammunition. It is currently implementing a comprehensive Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM) project with the national police (PNB) to destroy unsecured small arms and light weapons stockpiles held at police stations as a result of civilian disarmament throughout the country, improve the security of police armouries and to provide armourers with training. A similar project is being developed for the army for future implementation. The governmental commission charged with civilian disarmament and control of firearms proliferation, CDCPA, is supported by MAG through the temporary storage and destruction of small arms and light weapons collected through disarmament efforts. MAG provides largely quantitative M&E, however, their work with police armourers has also provided a qualitative element to their programmes that is normally unavailable.   4. Studio Ijambo, Search for Common Ground The Search for Common Ground began working in Burundi in the mid-1990s and focused on conflict transformation and with the idea that ‘dialogue is the future’ in a country in which the lack of communication and understanding between the two main ethnic groups, the Tutsi and the Hutu, had generated extreme violence. Studio Ijambo, the main tool launched in 1995, is a radio-production studio that was the first independent media voice in Burundi. The production team of journalists is ethnically balanced and well-trained in responsible journalism. Studio Ijambo has been instrumental in creating a level of transparency in the country that did not exist prior to its emergence. Their programmes include news, debates and discussions on key controversial issues, a very popular soap opera series that is often used to impart important information in a more palatable vehicle for example information about HIV/AIDS and other issues confronting Burundians, and various weekly programmes and spots that are broadcasted on other radio stations. Studio Ijambo programmes give voice to all of the different perspectives involved in conflicts large and small throughout the country, attempting to give a primary focus to uniting issues rather than divisive issues. Training workshops provide radio professionals with technical training for radio on current quality equipment, production training on the creation of ‘entertaining, transformative programmes’ and in-depth journalist training especially relating to conflict-sensitive reporting. There is now a thriving independent radio broadcasting community in Burundi, many having received their start from Studio Ijambo.” Colombia   5. Jóvenes a lo Bien ‘ Jóvenes a lo Bien’ is an ongoing programme designed by the National Police Force and the Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje (SENA) which began in 2008 when 25 young people belonging to the ‘Los Gallinos’ and ‘Los Plumitas’ gangs voluntarily disarmed in two neighbourhoods in Baranquilla. This programme has since been replicated within the municipalities and departments of Antioquia, Risaralda, Atlántico, Caldas, Meta, Cundinamarca, Santander and Tolima. Each of these local governments has been the major funding body within each project, according to local government agenda. The aim of this programme is to reduce the phenomenon of juvenile and gang violence in major cities, predominantly through disarmament, negotiation tables, and business-sponsored vocational study schemes. The strategies targeting people within this specific intervention were implemented through ‘negotiation tables’. These tables aim to define the necessary commitments of those key community members who could collaborate in order to successfully achieve the project’s objectives. The programme aimed to involve specific institutions including the National Police Force, SENA and various private sector businesses, which worked jointly in the particular stages of the project. Furthermore, community action councils were invited to collaborate within the programme’s development process.   6. Golazo Project ‘Golazo’ was implemented in 2009 by the Carvajal Foundation and financed by Cadbury Adams and the Corporation for Popular Recreation. It is planned to run for two years, and specifically targets the Commune 18 and El Retiro areas of Cali, where more than 40 per cent of citizens are under 20. for  a diagnosis undertaken as part of the initiative found that this group faced low post-secondary school education, low levels of family income and very few recreational options. These factors in turn facilitate the induction of numerous children and youths into local gangs. Thus, the ‘Golazo’ initiative has been implemented in the most at-risk areas, with the objective of strengthening social development and preventing violence through the promotion of sporting activities. Children and youth have been encouraged to participate in a range of different after-school activities and at the same time their parents were invited to come and support their offspring. This intervention has offered the possibility of physical exercise as a constructive way to use spare time and included the observation of parent-child relationships, establishing whether violence within the family is present. Liberia   7. Emergency Employment Programme (United Nations Missions in Liberia, UNMIL) The UNMIL-led ‘Emergency Employment’ programme, consisting of three separate projects, ran between 2006 and 2009, It was designed to reintegrate thousands of war-affected persons by providing employment as an alternative to war economy functions, with the overall goal of sustaining the peace process in Liberia. The labour-intensive projects consisted of rehabilitation of public road infrastructures in four counties, namely Nimba, Grand Gedeh, River Gee and Lofa. The programme contributed over 18,000 short-term jobs (representing some 450,000 working days). The programme’s goals were to reduce the number of challenges to state authority and reduce the effectiveness of residual former chains of militia command in areas assessed to be particularly vulnerable and prone to instability, by providing semi-skilled jobs in areas of high unemployment in combination with peace building activities. Crucially, the programme was constructed on the back of careful assessment and analysis prior to starting up of projects, to ensure that its design supported its stated objectives; it was also subjected to an intensive external evaluation upon completion. An independent evaluation of the programme highlighted the majority view among respondents that a shortage of semi-skilled jobs was a major cause of crime in communities and ultimately a national security threat.   A concern remains that short-term employment interventions such as this one need to be complemented by the creation and expansion of more sustained employment opportunities
  • The ‘’explosions’’ indicate where evidence as highlighted by the mapping study does not seem to be in line with established principles for good programming. The mapping study does not contain information that speaks to the other building blocks for effective interventions . The ‘’engagement in multiple sectors’’ explosion needs to be qualified by stating this pertains to direct-indirect AVR interventions. The former are much more prevalent whilst comprehensive approaches that sequence direct AVR interventions with medium- and longer-terms indirect components are likely to be more conductive to success .
  • The different websites contain further information and materials.
  • What Causes Armed Violence (OECD)

    1. 1. Armed Violence Reduction International Network on Conflict and Fragility November, 2010
    2. 2. What is Armed Violence? DEFINITION Armed violence includes the use or threatened use of weapons to inflict injury, death or psychosocial harm which undermines development Armed violence includes the use or threatened use of weapons to inflict injury, death or psychosocial harm which undermines development Restricted to specific geographic areas Restricted to specific geographic areas Regional and transnational dimensions Regional and transnational dimensions Deeply gendered: men are main victims and perpetrators Deeply gendered: men are main victims and perpetrators Failure of public security, signals fragility Failure of public security, signals fragility Violence and crime in Kingston, Ciudad Juarez, Rio de Janeiro and Dili Violence and crime in Kingston, Ciudad Juarez, Rio de Janeiro and Dili • Linkage with organized crime • Border area issues (e.g. Kenya-Uganda) • Linkage with organized crime • Border area issues (e.g. Kenya-Uganda) Yet women suffer particularly from sexual and domestic violence Yet women suffer particularly from sexual and domestic violence Ungoverned spaces and conflicts in Darfur, Eastern DRC and Somaliland Ungoverned spaces and conflicts in Darfur, Eastern DRC and Somaliland CHARACTERISTICS EXAMPLES Conflict settings Non-conflict, high-crime settings
    3. 3. Where Does Armed Violence Occur?  Summary points Armed violence occurs in a variety of settings - from conflict, to non- conflict but crime- affected contexts. It hinders development at every stage Source: ODI, 2009
    4. 4. Ca. 740,000 lives are lost to armed violence (p.a.), 55,0000 of which due to conflict Why is Armed Violence a Problem? • Most conflicts occur in fragile states. No fragile state is set to achieve a single MDG • High crime-high violence areas in Middle Income Countries often have pockets of exclusion from basic services like health, safety and education • Conflict reduces GDP with ca. 2% p.a. • The average cost of a civil war is ca. $ 65 bn • The global cost of homicidal violence is ca. $ 95-160 billion p.a. Developing countries may spend between 10-15% of their GDP on law enforcement (5% in developed states )
    5. 5. What Causes Armed Violence? Summary points The causes of armed violence are extremely varied. The context is the starting point and integrated approaches are vital STRUCTURAL RISK FACTORS PROXIMATE RISK FACTORS
    6. 6. CAUSES Five variables shaping the character and outcomes of urban violence in Dili: Source: Muggah ed., Urban Violence in an Urban Village, Geneva Declaration, 2010 ISSUE Dili: four waves of urban violence since independence, causing hundreds of deaths. This followed a history of armed violence, mainly in the service of oppression since the early 19th century. The result has been a culture of impunity in ‘urban village’ Dili - a set of interconnected villages that are extensions of rural communities, and their grievances. Example: What Does Armed Violence Look Like?
    7. 7. How Can Armed Violence Be Addressed? Applying an AVR lens: a basic starting point for programming LINKAGES WITH STATEBUILDING & SECURITY SECTOR REFORM LINKAGES WITH CRIMINAL JUSTICE, RECONCILIATION, MEDIATION LINKAGES WITH SMALL ARMS CONTROL Source: OECD, Armed Violence Reduction, 2009
    8. 8. Assessing and Understanding the Problem • Programming is most effective when it has a solid evidence base, including good diagnostics of when, where, why and by whom violence is perpetrated. Data sources, methods and approaches matter. • Programs must be designed on the basis of verified assumptions about the drivers and triggers for violence. • It pays to take time to foster a participatory decision-making process. Bring communities together to identify development goals, define priorities, and implement small pilot projects. • Assess the security needs of different social groups in order to best meet those needs (e.g. youth, men, women, ethnic groups) • Assess whether the target community is “ready” for intervention? If sufficient capacity doesn’t exist, or security is too fragile, an intervention can put potential beneficiaries at more risk.
    9. 9. Direct and Indirect Programming ARMED VIOLENCE … e.g. large scale urban renewal schemes … e.g. employment schemes targeted at youth-at-risk … e.g. firearms control legislation
    10. 10. Examples: Armed Violence in Urban Areas Urban centers are home to half the world’s population. They are expected to absorb almost all new population growth over the next 25 years Urban centers are home to half the world’s population. They are expected to absorb almost all new population growth over the next 25 years Indirect interventions •Early childhood and parental programs •Conditional cash transfer programs for at risk groups •Urban upgrading •Targeted area-based employment schemes •Youth development and after school activities Indirect interventions •Early childhood and parental programs •Conditional cash transfer programs for at risk groups •Urban upgrading •Targeted area-based employment schemes •Youth development and after school activities Direct interventions •Hot spots and early warning response •Community policing •Community arbitration •Anti-gang strategies and mentorship •Arms collection, control and stockpile programs •Victim assistance activities Direct interventions •Hot spots and early warning response •Community policing •Community arbitration •Anti-gang strategies and mentorship •Arms collection, control and stockpile programs •Victim assistance activities Today’s cities – especially those that are growing very quickly - experience a convergence of factors that put them at risk for destabilizing levels of violence if they are not appropriately addressed Today’s cities – especially those that are growing very quickly - experience a convergence of factors that put them at risk for destabilizing levels of violence if they are not appropriately addressed Informed by a high quality and ongoing evidence base: e.g. in Latin America Municipal Crime and Violence Observatories are key sources for collecting data on people, perpetrators, instruments and institutions affected by armed violence
    11. 11. Examples: Boston and Port-au-Prince Source: World Bank, 2003; Muggah and Moestue, Social Integration Ergo Stabilization , 2010
    12. 12. Youth & Violence: A Nepali Example Program: Education and Income Generation in Nepal •A program targeting 15 districts to promote training for at-risk youth, employment and mitigate conflict. Key objectives: •Improved literacy, skills development and dispute resolution •Enhanced vocational training and employment opportunities •Increased rural income and agricultural productivity •Distribution of scholarships to incentive further learning General lessons •Avoid a narrow focus on repressive responses •Tailor development interventions to target "at- risk" groups •Adopt a comprehensive approach to youth violence reduction •Involve youth directly in all aspects of design, implementation and evaluation of interventions •Look for opportunities to address issues of youth exclusion via existing programs
    13. 13. The Global Panorama: Mapping Armed Violence Reduction Headline messages The mapping study underlines the need to: •Adopt AVR interventions that are multi-sector, multi-level and based on multiple partnerships •Be attentive to different local framings and discourses (AVR is not a common term) •Invest in direct and indirect AVR programming to optimize effect •Engage much more with sub-national, community based actors with a proven track record •Include a more explicit AVR focus in existing peacebuilding and statebuilding strategies for significant returns in local safety and security Headline messages The mapping study underlines the need to: •Adopt AVR interventions that are multi-sector, multi-level and based on multiple partnerships •Be attentive to different local framings and discourses (AVR is not a common term) •Invest in direct and indirect AVR programming to optimize effect •Engage much more with sub-national, community based actors with a proven track record •Include a more explicit AVR focus in existing peacebuilding and statebuilding strategies for significant returns in local safety and security Some key facts •The most common categories of armed violence addressed by all interventions are youth, domestic, interpersonal, urban and sexual violence •Considerably more AVR programs are classified as “indirect” than “direct” – an imbalance seems to exist •Most AVRP programmes featured a three year time horizon •Most direct AVR interventions targeted a combination of instruments and perpetrators or associated institutions (no clear trend) •Direct programming tended to be sensitive to sex and gender-related issues Some key facts •The most common categories of armed violence addressed by all interventions are youth, domestic, interpersonal, urban and sexual violence •Considerably more AVR programs are classified as “indirect” than “direct” – an imbalance seems to exist •Most AVRP programmes featured a three year time horizon •Most direct AVR interventions targeted a combination of instruments and perpetrators or associated institutions (no clear trend) •Direct programming tended to be sensitive to sex and gender-related issues AVR mapping study An inventory of AVR experience in six settings (Brazil, Burundi, Colombia, Liberia, South Africa, and Timor-Leste) with 570 initiatives AVR mapping study An inventory of AVR experience in six settings (Brazil, Burundi, Colombia, Liberia, South Africa, and Timor-Leste) with 570 initiatives Source: OECD and UNDP AVR mapping study, Small Arms Survey, 2010
    14. 14. Promising AVR practice Cases are… • Underway > 2 years • Have a monitoring & evaluation system • Are multi-sector and multi-dimensional • Include direct AVR programming • Contain information on outcomes
    15. 15. What can be done to reduce Armed Violence? Evidence suggests that effective interventions require: Evidence highlighted by the mapping study not in line with programming principles
    16. 16. For more information, visit: www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/sps www.genevadeclaration.org www.smallarmssurvey.org Thank you

    ×