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Flifgt Safety Middle East 2010 Presentation

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Aviation Safety: Implementation, Regulation,Training

Aviation Safety: Implementation, Regulation,Training

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  • ATCOs – Air Traffic ControllersLack of Communication & Surveillance example is the empty Quarter
  • SEASR is the European initiative for a single Sky in Europe.
  • The growth plan of the operators in the region, Emirates, Qatar and Etihad put massive stress on the airspace and the related service providers. Already nowadays, considering that we are not even halfway to the projected growth path, we can see operational restrictions, which force us to decelerate. One example is the lateral separation within the region, which is different from FIR to FIR. Over BAH and UAE airspace the lateral separation is 5 NM. Coming to MCT airspace is is 20 NM and once reaching BOM FIR, airplanes are flying 80 NM apart from each other. This puts a lot of limitations on the airline operation.Restrictions in flow rate for departures from Abu Dhabi via LABRI already cause significant delays to our operator during the evening and morning peak departure periods.
  • ATCOs – Air Traffic ControllersLack of Communication & Surveillance example is the empty Quarter
  • SEASR is the European initiative for a single Sky in Europe.
  • ATCOs – Air Traffic ControllersLack of Communication & Surveillance example is the empty Quarter
  • DC 3I would like to start the presentation with a short interactive quiz, can you identify this aircraft?
  • Caravelle (circa 1975)
  • Lineage 1000
  • B 737
  • Airbus A 319 CJ
  • This same automation and avionics systems has brought training issues where the pilots may have difficulties staying “in the loop” when automation behaves in an unexpected way Modern aircraft are highly sophisticated, high levels of computerization, autopilots, avionics. Why do we still train using the requirement of 1945? 
  • For decades, the content of flight crew training programs has remained unchanged according to regulation whilst aircraft design and reliability have evolved dramatically.Within the JAR world boxes have to be ticked on the generic check form without really considering the specific requirements of the aircraft being flown.(I understand the FAA world is essentially the same) Certainly for recurrent training this severely limits the time available to look at not regulatory training.
  • Improve effectiveness of qualification schemes by developing and introducing - Evidencebased trainingA team lead by IATA has been tasked to examine the whole spectrum of training and report back. The team initially limited the research to aircraft with a min of 40 seats.
  • Today, as part of the Evidence Based Training program, a very large group of operators and training providers are sharing flight safety data with a view to determine what is relevant to training generally and for individual aircraft types. The aim is to determine where we should focus training to achieve maximum benefit.Modern aircraft have the capability to record huge amounts of data, in the case of the new Airbus A 320 family aircraft up to 7000 parameters can be recorded every one or two 2 seconds depending on the FDR standard. This recording can be used to analyze flights after the event for safety analysis.  Many other sources of data are available to analyze aircraft operations and help define training requirements.If the new training procedures are adopted they will most probably be applied to all aircraft types.
  • In 2005, ICAO adopted an international standard for the collection and analysis of flightdata. Today, the industry has a wealth of safety related evidence at its disposal, fromaccident and incident reports, LOSA, safety auditing and Flight Data Monitoringprogrammes. By analyzing this data, we have an opportunity to gather evidence for flight crew training, by weighing risks and looking at those situations, which are more likely to happen.In this presentation data comes from many different aircraft types, data is systematically de-identified and the actual operator or aircraft type is not known to this presenter.
  • I would like to look at 2 examples where evidence is beginning to call into question our established views. One significant training issue which has been identified as a major risk factor in modern aircraft is the go-around. This issue have been chosen because it is representative of most modern aircraft rather than being related to any specific type. We all know that a stabilized approach is better than an unstable approach and there is certainly no suggestion of changing this basic training philosophy. However after analyzing 1,000,000+ flights the data shows that the probability of a heavy landing or runway overrun is not significantly improved by making a stable approach.
  • From the LOSA data base.Pilots are not executing go-arounds from unstable approachesWhen a go-around is executed it is invariably flown poorly, with all engines operating and from a height above D/H
  • The unexpected go around Of the unstable approaches analyzed a very small percentage resulted in a go around, of the go-around’s performed many were considered to be worse than the potential landing had it been allowed to continue. If all pilots fly stable approaches from now we will not stop heavy landings or runway overruns.  This is not the expected result.It would seem that pilots are quite good at salvaging a landing from an unstable approach but not very good at performing a go-around which we thought we had been training for.We must use this information very carefully as the subsequent events after a stable and unstable approach are different. We need to look further at what and how we do thing to establish why this should be.
  • We generally train for an approach to limits with a go-around, many training captains feel that a go-around significantly above minimums can be more challenging, yet we have a time constraint in training this in favor of the check item requirement.
  • Airbus recommends the use of auto pilot for engine out and NPA’s, allowing pilots maximum opportunity to monitor the flight path.The check requirement is a manual approach to D/H with an engine out followed by a manual go-around.
  • “A threat connected to poor visibility on take off, where I have to intervene for a safe outcome, may happen every 3-5 years. Safety would be compromised if I would not been trained. Training for this event has an significant effect.”
  • Transcript

    • 1.
    • 2. André AuerChairman of the Conference
    • 3. Michael ConstantinidesDeputy Chairman of FSF/SE.Europe-M.East-Cyprus
    • 4. William VossCEO of Flight Safety Foundation
    • 5. CatalinRaduPresident of ECAC
    • 6. Mr. Raymond BenjaminSecretary General of ICAO
    • 7. Christos PetrouConference Coordinator and CEO of FSF/SE.Europe-M.East-Cyprus
    • 8.
    • 9.
    • 10. What are the different models in regulating safety?
      1st SESSION
      Chair: William Voss, CEO of FSFSupport: I. Papadopoulos
    • 11. Patrick GoudouExecutive Director of EASA
      EASAs approach to regulate safety
    • 12. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE "Aviation Safety: Implementation, Regulation, Training"
      EASA perspective
      Flight Safety Cyprus, Middle East, S.E Europe
      Nicosia HILTON- Cyprus27-28 April 2011
    • 13. Cyprus 2011
      13
      What are the different models in regulating safety ?
      • Introduction
      • 14. Systematic safety
      • 15. Compliance based / Prescriptive regulation
      • 16. Objective based regulation
      • 17. Performance based regulation
      • 18. The way forward
      • 19. The EASP
    • The EU/EASA system
      • EASA is supporting the EU Commission in its legislative and monitoring roles
      • 20. EASA exercises independent executive role as certifying authority for certain tasks
      • 21. EASA+ National Aviation Authorities together are covering all certification needs for the whole EU/EASA civil aviation system
      • 22. A clear separation of certification tasks between EASA and National Aviation Authorities has been defined
      3
      Cyprus 2011
    • 23. The EU/EASA system
      • Fundamental pillar of the system is the mutual immediate recognition in all Member States of any certificate issued either by EASA or by a National Aviation Authority
      • 24. The system includes nowadays all 27 EU Member States + 4 EFTA States (Norway, Iceland, Lichtenstein and Switzerland)
      • 25. 7 Western Balkan countries are in the process of joining the system
      15
      Cyprus 2011
    • 26. Cyprus 2011
      16
      Advantages of an Agency
      Legally binding rules
      Higher common safety standards
      “level playing field”
      Type-certificates valid across EU
      One European Counterpart to the FAA
    • 27. Cyprus 2011
      17
      Systematic safety
      Total system approach is based on the fact that the aviation system components – products, operators, crews, aerodromes, ATM, ANS, on the ground or in the air - are part of a single network
    • 28. Cyprus 2011
      18
      Compliance based / Prescriptive regulation
      Binding standards set. Inspections check.
      Pro – easy to understand
      Con – absolute and inflexible
      Example: EU OPS 1.125
      Documents to be carried
      (a) An operator shall ensure that the following documents or copies thereof are carried on each flight:…
    • 29. 09/05/2011
      Cyprus 2011
      19
      Objective based regulation
      Objective, goal or target is set. Advisory material provided. Demonstrations needed.
      Pro – greater flexibility
      Con – continued achievement not guaranteed
      Example: CS 25.1309
      (b) The aeroplane systems and associated components, considered separately and in relation to other systems, must be designed so that -
      (1) Any catastrophic failure condition
      (i) is extremely improbable; ……………
    • 30. 09/05/2011
      Cyprus 2011
      20
      Performance based regulation
      A measurable level of performance is regularly reviewed. Performance is established, maintained or improved.
      Pro – continuous monitoring and more transparency
      Con - requires intelligent definition and application
      Example: Commission Regulation (EU) 691/2010 on the performance scheme for air navigation services and network functions defines safety key performance indicators
    • 31. Cyprus 2011
      21
      The way forward
      Need for change
      Growth
      Dynamic industry
      Complexity and interconnection
      Lessons learned from safety data analysis
      Some prescription will remain
      Objectives good for design requirements
    • 32. Cyprus 2011
      22
      The way forward
      Safety Management implementation means:
      Identifying hazards
      Managing risks
      Performance goals and indicators
      Continuous monitoring
      Meeting the challenges of the future
    • 33. 24-25/03/2011
      ICAO-COPAC International Safety Seminar
      23
      Definitions
      Strategy
      The European Safety Strategy is a set of policies and objectives which are laid down by the European Commission
      Programme
      The European Aviation Safety Programme is an integrated set of regulations and activities aimed at improving safety
      Plan
      The European Aviation Safety Plan is a high level safety issues assessment and related action plan
      The Plan is a key element of the EASP
    • 34. ICAO-COPAC International Safety Seminar
      24
      European Aviation Safety Advisory Committee (EASAC)
      Operational since October 2009
      Advisory role
      Main objectives:
      Contribute to the development of the Strategy (with EC)
      Propose a Safety Programme
      Propose and update a Safety Plan
      Comprised of Commission, NAAs, Industry and Agency representatives
    • 35. Cyprus 2011
      25
      The EASP manual
      Describes the EU Aviation Safety System and Safety Management System
      Describes how to build a European Aviation Safety Plan
      Three complementary functions:
      Rulemaking
      Oversight
      Safety assurance and promotion
    • 36. Cyprus 2011
      26
      The European Aviation Safety Plan
      Deals with high level and European wide safety concerns
      Bottom-up approach
      Proposes organisational and technical actions
      Coordinated with MS SSP
      Updated every year
    • 37.
    • 38. Vince GalottiDeputy Director Air Navigation Bureau of ICAO
      The ICAO way to regulate safety
    • 39. ICAO’s Safety Framework and future activities related to “Regulation”
      Vince GalottiDeputy Director, Safety Standardization & Infrastructure
      Air Navigation Bureau, ICAO
      Nicosia, 27 and 28 April 2011
    • 40. 30
      Introduction
      Standards
      ICAO Safety Framework
      Specific operational safety targets by ICAO
      Targeting our safety resources
      Summary
    • 41. Chicago Convention
      Article 37 – Adoption of international Standards and Procedures
      Each Contracting State undertakes to collaborate in securing the highest practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, Standards, procedures and organization in relation to aircraft, personnel, airways and auxiliary services in all matters in which such uniformity will facilitate and improve air navigation.
    • 42. Annexes to the Convention
      Standards and Recommended Practices
      Any specification for physical characteristics, configuration, material, performance, personnel or procedure, the uniform application of which is recognized as necessary/desirable for the safety or regularity of international air navigation.
      The case of Annexes 1, 2 and 8
    • 43. Annexes to the Convention
    • 44. A More Strategic Approach
      • ICAO Safety Framework
      Policy & Standardization
      • GASP Update
      Safety Monitoring
      • CMA
      Safety Analysis
      • Today’s discussion
      Implementation
      • Annual Safety Report
      34
    • 45. Priorities
      • ICAO’s Safety Analysis Methodology
      Leading to Prioritization of Resources
      Leading to Tailored Action Plans
      Leading to Measurable Results
      35
    • 46. Applying the fundamentalsof Safety Management
      #1:LEI and Accident rates are highly correlated
      #2:The Traffic is a factor of Risk
      #3:The Traffic growth is a factor of Risk
      The number of Accidents is not included in the Safety index process as an direct input
      For a given LEI, the higher the Traffic, the higher the Risk
      For a given LEI, the higher the Traffic growth, the higher the Risk
      36
    • 47. Worldwide distribution
      < 7 000 departures
      > 300 000 departures
      7 000 – 50 000
      50 000 – 300 000
      < 7 000 departures
      7 000 – 50 000
      50 000 – 300 000
      > 300 000 departures
      LEI
      2009 Departures per States
      37
    • 48. Tailoring Each State’s Action Plan
      Short-List
      WHO
      Prioritize the needs of each State
      according to its “profile”
       Strategic resolution of safety deficiencies
      HOW
      Decrease the LEI
      WHAT
      38
    • 49. Where is the Risk? Import / Export
      Distribution for the Worldwide Short List
      Importers
      AGA/ANS
      Mix
      Exporters
      OPS/AIR/PEL
      39
    • 50. 40
      Action Plan
      Tailored Action Plan
      Prioritization of Resources
      Tailored Action Plans
      Improve LEIs and safety oversight
      Infrastructure
      Air Navigation Deficiencies
      Training
      Leading to Measurable Results
    • 51. 41
      Extended Diversion Time Operations
      Safety Benefits:
      Current operators and new entrants will operate at same level of safety
      Amendment developed based on Industry Best Practices
      Outlines new EDTO requirements to include requirements for aeroplanes with more than 2 turbine engines
      Requirements for twin engine aeroplanes remain the same
      No change for the vast majority of current long-range operators
      Status:
      Consultation with States and Int. Organizations in progress
      Applicability for Standards anticipated - Nov 2012
    • 52. 42
      Fuel Carriage Requirements
      Benefits:
      Improve efficiency and reduce emissions safely
      New and updated provisions to address:
      Fuel planning and alternate aerodrome criteria
      Clearly define prescriptive requirements
      Introduce performance based alternatives
      Fuel advisory and emergency broadcasts
      Comprehensive guidance material in “Fuel Planning” Manual
      Status:
      Undergoing ANC preliminary review
      Consultation with States and Int. Organizations early April 2011
      Applicability for Standards anticipated - Nov 2012
    • 53. 43
      Fuel Contamination
      Accident recommendation for ICAO to consider developing global standards and/or procedures on aviation fuel quality control
      Operators already have requirements to ensure fuel is delivered in accordance with acceptable quality control procedures
      Annex 6
      Doc 8335, Manual of Procedures for Operations Inspection, Certification and Continued Surveillance
      ICAO airport-related manuals address aircraft fuel from perspectives of safety & design of fuel facilities
      Aviation fuel quality control not specifically covered in guidance material
      Procedures would apply to one of many services available at aerodrome
      New guidance material
      IATA to develop procedures for airport operators and fuel services
      ICAO wants to work in partnership with IATA on issue
    • 54. PBN Partnership Programme (2 Year)
      Work area 1 – ATM Operational Implementation: Direct technical assistance to States, service provider, regulators and airlines:
      Airspace concept workshops (5)
      Provide Airspace expertise to PBN Go-teams (6)
      Implementation of Continuous Descent Operations (CDO) Workshops (6)
      Work area 2 – Development of ICAO documentation: Supporting implementation:
      Assist development and maintenance of PBN navigation specifications
      Assist Development of new performance based approach classification,
      Development and execution of PBN operational approval courses (including train the trainers)
      Expectations:
      Enable States to carry out their PBN implementation efforts
      This implementation will potentially save 108 million tonnes of CO2 over the next 2 years, through 22 RNAV routes, 54 SID/STAR RNP approaches and 25 CDOs
      Focus on removing roadblocks to operational deployment, concentrated on Operational Approval Process, Airspace Concept Development and Training
      44
    • 55. PBN Manual Amendment
      Final draft expected to be available on ICAONET by October 2011
      Currently includes:
      Improved implementation guidance (incl. Ops approval guidance)
      RF turn capability for all RNP operations
      Nav. spec for GPS-equipped GA community that currently cannot get approval under existing nav specs
      RNP 0.3 for helicopter operations
      User input & airline support remains critically important
      45
    • 56. 46
      AOC Database Rollout
      Develop on-line registry of AOC & Ops-Specs
      Benefit international commercial aviation
      Data collected to conform to content required by Annex 6
      Collaborative effort between ICAO, IATA and CAUC
      Improve on-line information available to States
      Provide transparency as to the validity and currency of AOCs
    • 57. 47
      AOC Database Rollout
      Letter of Intent signed in May 2010
      Prototype delivered by CAUC in July 2010
      Complete development in China (CAUC) by 09/2011
      Transfer, load and test application in ICAO by 10/2011
      Send SL notifying States of the availability of the registry 11/2011
    • 58. 48
      International Volcanic Ash Task Force
      Objective:
      Develop a global safety risk management framework that will make it possible to determine the safe levels of operation in airspace contaminated by volcanic ash
      Further develop the International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW) through SARPs and guidance
      Test the effectiveness of regional ATM volcanic ash contingency plans
      Current activity:
      International Volcanic Ash Task Force (IVATF)
      International Airways Volcano Watch Operations Group (IAVWOPSG)
      Regional Volcanic Ash Exercises Steering Groups (e.g. EUR/NAT)
      Next steps:
      EUR/NAT Exercise VOLCEX11/01 – 13 & 14 April 2011
      IVATF/2, Montreal – 11 to 15 July 2011
      IAVWOPSG/6, Dakar – 19 to 23 September 2011
      Establishment of Challenge Team – Fall 2011
    • 59. 49
      Sharing of Safety Information
      Global Safety Information Exchange (GSIE):
      To establish procedures for sharing aviation safety information among key players in civil aviation community
      MOU on GSIE signed on 28 Sep 2010 between:
    • 60. 50
      Sharing of Safety Information
      MOU mandated establishment of steering group involving all participants
      First steering group meeting - Dec 2010
      Next meeting on 27 May 11 to:
      Establish terms of reference for GSIE
      Establish mechanisms for information sharing
      Discuss inclusion of additional partners
    • 61. 51
      Fatigue Risk Management Systems
      Fatigue Management SARPs to include:
      Mandatory FTL regulations (as current)
      Optional FRMS regulations (proposed)
      Effective FRMS standards anticipated (Oct 2011)
      Detailed guidance material for operators & regulators (Mar 2011)
      FRMS Symposium & Forum (30 Aug – 2 Sept, 2011)
      Thanks to IATA for collaboration and partnership on this issue
    • 62. Upper Age Limits for Pilots
      Current Standard requires that if the Pilot-In-Command is 60-64 years, other pilot must be under 60
      Restriction probably has little impact on flight safety… necessary to get change agreed by Council in 2006: 27 voted in favour – 24 required
      ICAO proposes review but data to support change is not available
      Timeline for review:
      Feb 2011: Letter to IATA requesting research documenting performance levels in different age groups, including comparison of 60-64 year olds and younger pilots
      Dec 2011: SL requesting views of States/Organizations
      In response to SL, IATA refers to research results
      June 2012: Initial Review by ANC of new proposal
      Sept 2012: Final Review by ANC
      March 2013: Adoption by Council
      Nov 2013: Applicability date
      52
    • 63. 53
      Next Generation of Aviation Professionals
      ICAO launched NGAP initiatives in 2010:
      Established NGAP Task Force
      Held 1st NGAP Symposium (March 2010)
      HLSC and A/37 recommended that States should support work of the NGAP initiatives
      One of NGAP main task is outreach
      ICAO will hold regional conferences
    • 64. 54
    • 65.
    • 66. H. ChaoukDirector General of Lebanese CAA
      Safety Regulation  in the Middle East
      Need of interoperability with Europe?
    • 67. Aviation Challenges and recommendations
      Safety Regulation  in the Middle East Interoperability with Europe
      Dr. Hamdi ChaoukDirector General of Civil AviationLebanon
    • 68.
    • 69. Passenger Traffic Growths (2008-2010)
    • 70. World Hull Loss / million sectorsWestern built jet hull losses
    • 71. Jet Hull Loss Rates (2005-2010)
    • 72. World jet Hull Loss Rate (1998-2010)
    • 73. Regional Problems
      Africa
      high accident rate – labor problems – infrastructure
      problems - liberalization and privatization difficulties.
      Middle East
      Lack of growth management – Inefficiency – poor
      vision for the planned US$38 billion investment.
      Russia and CIS
      Safety concerns – business practice not in line with Global standards.
    • 74. Regional Problems
      Europe
      Lack of delivery – micro-management – congestion.
      United States
      Adverse effects due to domestic politics – Weak leadership.
      Asia Pacific
      Lack of harmonization – Lack of regional aviation
      organization. Lack of managing huge growth.
    • 75. Aviation Challenges in the Middle East
      • Lack of clear vision & cooperation (regulators, operators).
      • 76. Inefficient Governments Aviation Systems (autonomy, monopoly..)
      • 77. Lack of Harmonized Laws, Decrees, Regulations and Policies.
      • 78. Lack of compatibility in Agreements (bilateral, multilateral,
      plulateral ..Onelateral ?).
      • Market forces & competition (regular, charter, low cost, alliance, ...).
      • 79. Regulators (vs.) Airlines & Airport Authorities relationships.
      • 80. Political instability, security concerns, military conflicts.
    • . Quality Management Deficiencies in safety and
      security. . Airline Diversifications and lack of regional
      coordination.. Lack of cooperation between regional Safety
      organizations.
      . Unjustified and uncoordinated aviation taxes and
      surcharges.
      . Unfair government subsidies and dumping of prices.
      Aviation Challenges in the Middle East
    • 81. Improved Regulation via Efficient Restructuring
      ROADMAP for RESTRUCTURING
    • 82. Aviation Strategy
    • 83. Efficient Regulation Via Efficient Restructuring
    • 84. Efficient Regulation Via Efficient Restructuring
    • 85. Lebanon Experience in LiberalizationThe turnaround after 2001
    • 86. BRHI Airport and MEA Growths
    • 87. Interoperability with Europe
      * Euro-Med Program
      * EMAC
      * Common Aviation Area
      * Largest Percentage of traffic flow
      * Largest number of airlines crossing borders
      * Fully mature and stable regulatory structure
      * The EU and EASA status
      * The status of the Arab League and ACAC
    • 88. Interoperability with Europe
      * Cost Efficiency in safety and security
      * Harmonization of regulations and standards
      * Eurocontrol and Arab Control
      * Enhanced security system
      * Reduction in congestion over Europe
      * Common Trainings and Standards
      * Better environmental conditions
    • 89. THE END
      Thank you
    • 90.
    • 91. FAA’s view on regulating aviation safety:
      The need for closer regional cooperation
      Roy D.BarnettSenior FAA Representative,ME. Office,US,Embassy, Abu Dhabi,UAE
    • 92. 78
      Federal Aviation
      Administration
      FAA Safety Oversight & Rulemaking Overview
      Cyprus Safety Conference Nicosia
      April 2011
      Roy D. Barnett
      Senior FAA Representative, Middle East
      Office of Policy, International and Environment
    • 93. Overview
      • FAA’s international profile.
      • 94. Regulating aviation safety: FAA international oversight
      responsibilities.
      • Foreign carrier inspection programs.
      • 95. Requirements for foreign aircraft flying into US airspace.
      • 96. An overview of FAA rulemaking responsibilities.
      • 97. Challenges ahead: Need for closer regional cooperation
    • FAA’s International Program
      FAA Senior Representative Offices: Abu Dhabi, Moscow, Dakar, Brussels, London, Paris, Singapore, Tokyo, New Delhi, Beijing, Panama City, Brasilia, Miami and Washington, D.C.
      Flight Standards-- International Field Offices (IFOs)-- International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) Program
      Aircraft Certification
      -- Overseas offices: Brussels, Singapore, Beijing
      Air Traffic: Brussels, Singapore
      Extensive Collaboration with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)-- US Mission
    • 98. Flight Standards’ International Field OfficesGeographic Areas of Responsibility
      Anchorage IFO – Russia, CIS States and Northwest Canada
      San Francisco IFO – Asia/Pacific & Australia (129 Issuance) & Repair Station audits in South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and the Pacific Islands
      Miami IFO – South America and the Caribbean
      Dallas IFO – Mexico and Central America
      Singapore IFO - Repair Station Audits in Asia/Pacific (except those
      noted above)
      Frankfurt IFO - Africa, Europe & Middle East
      New York IFU- (Canada, Part 129 Issuance, issuance of Ops Specs etc.)
      Website: http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/field_offices/ifo/
    • 99. FAA Safety Oversight Responsibilities
      • Review the ability of a carrier’s civil aviation authority to meet international safety standards under Flight Standards’ International Aviation Safety Assessment Program (IASA).
      • 100. Support and participate in the continued safety review programs of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the development of related TRAINAIR program materials.
      • 101. Perform ramp inspections of non-U.S. air carriers that conduct scheduled operations to the United States.
      • 102. Take immediate action to resolve safety issues that arise during foreign air carrier ramp inspection activity, or that take place only on a limited basis in most countries.
    • FAA Foreign Carrier Inspection Program
      • The primary purpose for surveillance of non-U.S. air carriers is to ensure that the carrier is operating safely and in accordance with its operations specifications.
      • 103. Air carriers must adhere to all parts of their operations specifications, applicable Federal Aviation Regulations, and applicable ICAO Annexes.
      • 104. (Over 440,000 Part 129 foreign carrier flights conducted each year in the United States.)
    • Foreign Air Carrier Responsibilities
      • The foreign air carrier is responsible for providing manuals or written instructions, training, supervision or oversight, and auditing of all contracted operations. Primary areas include (but are not limited to):
      • 105. Cargo Build Up / Cargo Loading
      • 106. Deicing
      • 107. Ground Handling / Ground Servicing
      • 108. Fueling
      • 109. Aircraft Maintenance
    • Air Carrier Ramp Inspections
      • Aviation safety inspectors conduct surveillance of each foreign air carrier and its aircraft and operations.
      • 110. Surveillance of a foreign air carrier is conducted at any time on U.S. soil, and inspections are conducted on a routine or recurring basis.
      • 111. If a foreign air carrier experiences a series of accidents, incidents, violations, or complaints (that relate to safety), the district office holding the foreign air carrier’s operations specifications shall initiate surveillance as necessary to resolve any safety deficiencies. (Article 16 - Chicago Convention)
    • John F. Kennedy International Airport
      Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport
      Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport
      Logan International Airport
      Philadelphia International Airport
      .
      .
      .
      .
      .
      .
      .
      O’Hare International Airport
      .
      .
      San Francisco International Airport
      Denver International Airport
      .
      Newark Liberty International Airport
      .
      McCarran International Airport
      .
      HonoluluInternational Airport
      Charlotte-Douglas International Airport
      .
      Washington Dulles International Airport
      .
      .
      Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport
      .
      Los Angeles International Airport
      Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport
      .
      .
      George Bush Intercontinental Airport
      Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood
      International Airport
      Orlando International Airport
      .
      .
      Miami International Airport
      86
    • 112. Air Carrier Ramp Inspections
      • Issues identified are raised first with the subject carrier
      • 113. Results are shared with the FAA office that is responsible for the oversight of the foreign carriers operations specifications
      • 114. Repeated instances of non-compliance may warrant additional surveillance
    • Air Carrier Ramp Inspections
      • Results of the ramp inspection are recorded in the FAA monitoring/tracking system
      • 115. International standards are the primary elements for the inspection activity
      • 116. Repeated issues with several carriers of the same State may indicate a lack of oversight by the civil aviation authority
      • 117. Such indications may result in an assessment
    • Safety Oversight
      Required Surveillance Work Programs
      Work programs and goals are assigned to each FAA region,
      and to individual inspectors. These inspections may include:
      • Ramp and Cargo Inspection
      • 118. Crew License Verification
      • 119. Aircraft Records Review
      • 120. Deicing Surveillance
    • Safety Oversight
      Compliance and Enforcement
      Investigation - serious safety issues or unresolved problems may
      lead to a formal investigation and could result in legal
      enforcement action being taken against an individual and/or the
      air carrier. Ten days are allowed for a response from the receipt of the
      letter to respond to the allegation.
      • Types of Enforcement Action Include:
      • 121. No Action
      • 122. Letter of Correction (company)
      • 123. Letter of Warning (individual)
      • 124. Civil Penalty
      • 125. Suspension/Revocation of Operations Specifications, in part or in whole
    • Aircraft flying into US Airspace
      The following safety prerequisites must be met:
      • A successful International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) audit of the carrier’s civil aviation authority.
      • 126. The foreign air carrier must have an air operating certificate (AOC) issued by the State of the Operator.
      • 127. The foreign air carrier must have approval from the State of the Operator to provide flights to the United States.
    • Approval to Fly to the United StatesU.S. Government Agencies Involved
      Department of Transportation (DOT): issues economic authority (after air services agreement fully completed with carrier’s government by U.S. State Department)
      Federal Aviation Administration (FAA): safety oversight (issuance of operations specifications, surveillance, and the IASA Program)
      Transportation Security Administration (TSA): conducts airport security review (if needed), and works with carrier on security requirements
      Customs & Border Protection (CBP): establishes passenger data program with carrier, allowing for transportation of people into the United States.
    • 128. International Aviation Safety Assessment Program (IASA)
      The FAA established the IASA program through public policy and legislative action in August 1992.
      The assessment program focuses on the ability of the civil aviation authority (not the individual air carrier’s ability) to adhere to international standards.
    • 129. FAA *IASA Oversight Critical Elements
      Necessary sequence of oversight elements:
      1 - National Law
      2 - National Regulations
      3 - CAA Structure
      4 - Inspector guidance
      5 - Qualified personnel
      6 - Certification activities
      7 - On-going surveillance/validation
      8 - Resolution of Safety Issues
      • *International Aviation Safety Assessment Program
    • IASA Periodic Validation
      • The FAA may re-evaluate any country with carriers having authority to codeshare or operate to the U.S. when there is reason to question whether a country is in compliance and is discharging its international aviation safety obligations.
      • 130. Currently, a risk assessment tool is used to assess when a country should be reassessed under the IASA program.
    • Positive Change
      • As a result of the IASA Program, there has been a tangible improvement in the level of aviation safety oversight in many countries.
      • 131. These improvements will normally result in changes to both a country’s foreign and domestic aviation operations.
      • 132. FAA continues to support the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) safety programs and related activities.
    • FAA’s Rulemaking Process
      Goal: Improve development of FAA regulations by involving interested members of the public early in process.
      The FAA’s Office of Rulemaking manages the agency’s rulemaking program, in partnership with the Office of the Chief Counsel and the Office of Aviation Policy and Plans.
      The goals and performance targets for rulemaking projects are based on the FAA’s Flight Plan.
    • 133. Rulemaking Drivers
      • The decision to conduct rulemaking can originate from:
      Legislative mandates
      NTSB recommendations
      Changes to international standards [ICAO]
      Internal analyses resulting from inspections, audits, accident/ incident investigations, research, etc.
      Desire to leverage safety/capacity benefits of new aviation/avionics technologies
      Agreement to harmonize internationally [e.g., EASA, Canada];
      Changing Administrations
      Environmental factors
      Petitions for rulemaking or for exemption; or
      World events.
    • 134. How are Priorities Set?
      • The Rulemaking Steering Committee establishes the FAA’s rulemaking priorities.
      • 135. The Rulemaking Steering Committee is composed of:
      The Associate and Assistant Administrators with rulemaking responsibility.
      Representatives of the Office of General Counsel’s Regulations Division and the Office of Aviation Policy and Plan’s Regulatory Analysis Division.
      A representative of the Department of Transportation’s Office of General Counsel.
      Meets semi-annually.
      Sets the regulatory strategic vision for the FAA.
    • 136. How are Priorities Managed?
      • The FAA Rulemaking Management Council manages the FAA’s rulemaking priorities.
      • 137. The Council is composed of:
      The Director of the Office of Rulemaking
      The Assistant Chief Counsel, Regulations Division
      The Director of the Office of Aviation Policy and Plans, and
      Directors from all program offices are engaged in rulemaking.
      • The Council:
      Meets six times a year.
      Ensures that rulemaking projects are aligned with FAA priorities.
      Approves rulemaking projects for further action.
      Assigns rulemaking priorities.
      Designates rulemaking teams.
      Approves rulemaking schedules.
      Reports to the Rulemaking Steering Committee.
    • 138. Challenges: Need for closer regional cooperation
      Need to do more sharing data: PTRS,VIS,IASDEX.
      Joint analysis and discussion of pre-cursors of what actions needed to address potential risks. RASG, Regional Aviation Safety Roadmaps.
      Requirement for transparency of safety data, coupled with adequate protection.
      Need for establishment of a “just safety culture”.
      Move toward predictive rather than reactive data.
      Challenge of assisting States to bring safety levels up.
    • 139. Conclusion
      FAA’s Active International Presence Includes:
      Senior Representatives based outside the United States
      Extensive Safety Oversight of non-U.S. Air Carriers
      International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) Program
      Aircraft Certification
      Air Traffic Coordination
      Collaboration with ICAO
    • 140. Questions?
    • 141.
    • 142. EugenyShaposhnikovChairman of Flight Safety International-Russia
      Safety Regulation in Russia:
      Challenges and opportunities
    • 143. The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)
      The FSFI input into flightsafety in
      the Russian Federation:
      history, challenges and
      achievements
      Cyprus, Nicosia
      April 27-28, 2011
    • 144. 107
      The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)
      The Flight Safety Foundation Internationalis one of the seniorpublic organizations in Russia establishedin Mach, 1989 at the time of the Soviet Union
      It means that presently we are 22 years old
    • 145. 108
      The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)
      The FSFI Management:
      Eugeny Shaposhnikov BoG Chairman
      Ivan Mashkivsky BoG Honorary Chairman
      John Enders Honorary President
    • 146. 109
      The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)
      Presently, the FSFI Corporate Members represent civil and military aviation from Russia and other countries, including:
    • 110
      The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)
      The FSFI purposes and goals:
      Flight safety enhancement in the Russianaviation community is the prime goal of our Organization
      FSFI actively participatesin the Industry committeesand working groupsof the State Duma (Parliament), Interagency Civil AviationCommittee, Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC), Transport Ministry of the Russian Federation, closely cooperates with other public organizations in Russia and international organizationsin order todevelop and implementboth national and international best practices in the field of flight safety.
      The proposals put forward by the FSFIhave been taken into account in the process of drafting Air Code of the Russian Federation, Rules and Regulations pertaining to flight Safety.
    • 152. 111
      The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)
      An example of lawmaking process:
      In order to introduce changes into the Air Code of the Russian Federation (Articles 27 and 29 pertaining to State Oversightin Civil Aviation) it was necessary to change 4 Government Regulationsandsome Ordersof Transport Ministry – altogether to tackle 9 hurdles.
    • 153. 112
      The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)
      Aviation Rulemaking Hierarhy in the Russian Federation
      Laws
      Constitution
      Federal Constitutional Laws
      Federal Laws
      Codes of the Russian Federation
      Laws of Constituent Territories of the Russian Federation
      By-Laws
      President Orders
      Local Normative Acts
      Government Regulations
      Acts of Federal Government Powers
    • 154. 113
      The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)
      The FSFI activities:
      Promotion of national and international best practices
      Twice a month the FSFI disseminates between the Corporate Members on-line information (more than 500 issues over these years)on accidents and incidentsin Russia and the CIS Member States;
      We regularly translate into Russiantopical informationon flight safety from western periodicals(USA, including the FSF documents,UK,Canada, European Union, as well as materials provided by Boeing and Airbus).
    • 155. 114
      The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)
      The FSFI activities:
      Promotion of national and international best practices
      Another important instrument in this area:
      Every year in close cooperation with international organizations and in order to implement new safety requirements into Russian airlines and other organizations practice (including SMS requirements and Global Aviation Safety Roadmap provisions) we are holdingat least 1 international workshop on flight safety problems which are of great concern at ICAO, international aviation community and Russian aviation stakeholders.
      With reference to these events we would like you to pay attention to the following:
    • 156. 115
      The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)
      The FSFI Workshops
      Russia, Moscow, April 8-9, 2010
      International Workshop Safety Culture and Reporting SystemRussia, Moscow, April 14-15, 2009
      International Workshop Global Aviation Safety Roadmap and RussiaRussia, Moscow, April 10-11, 2008 International Workshop SMS in Civil Aviation and Preparation for USOAPAzerbaijan, Baku, September 12 – 13, 2007 International Workshop ALAR Tool KitRussia, Moscow May 31 – June 1, 2007International Workshop ICAO Language Proficiency Requirements: Progress Report?Russia, Moscow, June 1-2, 2006
      International Workshop ICAO Language Proficiency Requirements: Are you Ready?Russia, Moscow, November 7-10, 200558th FSF International Air Safety Seminar (IASS)
    • 157. 116
      The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)
      The FSFI Workshops
      Russia, Moscow, June 9-10, 2005International Workshop Air Navigation Information Today and TomorrowRussia, Moscow, June 9-10, 2004International Workshop Accident Prevention: Learning from Each OtherRussia, Moscow, July 29-30,2003International Workshop Approach and Landing Accident Reduction (ALAR Tool Kit)Russia, Magadan, July 24-25, 2002
      CNS/ATM, Russia, ХХI CenturyRussia, Tyumen,2001International Workshop Civil Aviation Flight Safety Strategy in XXI Century
      On May, 12-13, 2011 in Moscow we are planning to hold International Workshop Flight Safety: Machine – Human – Environment, 2011
    • 158. 117
      The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)
      The FSFI Awards:
      1. Outstanding Achievements in the Field of Flight Safety Award
      2. Outstanding Contribution to Enhancement of Flight Safety after the Name of M. P. Simonov, Sukhoi General Designer Award
      3. Outstanding Achievements in the Field of Air Traffic Management Safety Award
      4. Heroism, Courage and Resourcefulness Award
      5. Contributions to Appreciation of Flight Safety’s Importance by Journalists Award.
      6. Flight Safety Foundation International Certificate of Achievements
    • 159. 118
      The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)
    • 160. 119
      The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)
      Thus, Flight Safety Foundation International making the most of above mentioned resources, closely cooperating with Russian Federation regulators and international organizations, is striving to achieve acceptable level of safety stipulated by the ICAO documents.
      Some of these results may be seen on the following slides:
    • 161. 120
      The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)
      ICAO Regulations Non-Compliance Worldwide
    • 162. 121
      The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)
      Accident Rate: Present and Forecast per 100 000 hours of flight time
    • 163. 122
      Civil Aviation Risk Rate According toSAFA
      The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)
    • 164. 123
      The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)
      FSFI has been closely cooperating with Russian aviation authorities for more than 20 years in many areas, including development of aviation safety regulations.
      While tackling problems related to ICAO regulations compliance, the FSFI strives for taking into accountlong-term problems; the most pressing of themis to turn Russia into acompetentand active member of the International Aviation Community.
      Our participation in this Conference – isanotherstep in this direction.
    • 165. 124
      The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)
      Thank you
    • 166.
    • 167.
    • 168. Challenges in implementing safety regulations
      2nd SESSION
      Chair:Mr. Ulrich Schulte-Strathaus, Secretary General
      of the Association of European Airlines ( AEA)Support: A. Georgiou – Head of Safety, Cyprus Airways
    • 169. C. RaduPresident of ECAC and Director General of Romanian CAA
      The experience of Romania
    • 170. Challenges in implementing safety regulationsSSP -The experience of Romania
      Catalin RADU – Director General of Civil Aviation - ROMANIA
      129
    • 171. Framework regulations
      • International level (ICAO SARPs):
      • 172. The establishment of a State Safety Programme (SSP):
      for Annexes 1, 6, 8, 11, 13, 14;
      • European regulations requirements:
      • 173. The establishment of a State Management System (SMS):
      (EU OPS: implementation by the AOC holders, EC 2096:
      implementation by the ATS);
      • Regional level:
      • 174. The European Aviation Safety Programme (EASP) build a
      bridge at regional level to the ICAO’s requirements for SSPs
      130
    • 175. Framework regulations - Challenges
      • National regulations framework need to be implemented and harmonised with the regional requirements;
      • 176. The Gap analysis is a very useful tool when starts the implementation.
      131
    • 177. Setting the scene
      • Identifying the managing bodies within the national organisational context (two main separate bodies involved: the National CAA and the Investigation Body);
      • 178. Establish the placeholder of the SSP (the National CAA);
      • 179. Nominating the Accountable manager ;
      • 180. Establish SSP Safety Board and SSP Safety Committee;
      • 181. Start the training for personnel involved in the implementation at very early stages.
      132
    • 182. Setting the scene - Challenges
      • The Accountable manager need to have full authority on human resources and on major financial issues;
      • 183. Allocation of resources need to be planned well in advance and is based of the commitement and awarness of the accountable manager.
      133
    • 184. Sharing safety information
      • Aerodrome operators, air navigation service providers, design organisations, manufacturers, maintenance organisations, air operators, training providers, and aviation personnel need to report on daily basis through the activities they carry out;
      • 185. Where possible, automated systems need to be implemented to monitor daily operational activities ;
      • 186. Automated systems of safety data collection and processing need to be installed.
      134
    • 187. Sharing safety informations - Challenges
      • Effective hazard reporting and communication system – non blaiming culture;
      • 188. The establishment of provisions for the protection of safety data collection and processing systems.
      135
    • 189. Effective implementation
      • Establish performance based KPIs in agreement with the stakeholders capabilities and operations;
      • 190. Establish ALoS at national level;
      • 191. Establish the enforcement policy with the conditions and circumstances under which to deal with safety deviations .
      136
    • 192. Effective implementation - Challenges
      • Different KPIs based on the different nature of the operations for the same type of stakeholders (Comercial vs. Aerial work operators, ANSP vs. AFIS operators);
      • 193. Shifting from reactive system to performance based analysis;
      • 194. Computing capabilities and automated tools are needed.
      137
    • 195. SSP Implementation - Romanian experience
      High level Conference held in Bucharest initiated the activities on the implementation of SSP
      In co-operation with ICAO, RoCAA provided training courses (SSP and SMS implementation course) for their own personnel and for aviation staff working in various domains (february and march 2009);
      First working group for the SSP implementations was established (Decision of the RoCAA Director no. D226 / 18.03.2009);
      First draft of the draft gap analysis and preliminary SSP implementation planning (july 2009);
      Nomination of the RoCAA General Director as SSP National Coordinator (july 2009);
      RoCAA starting discution with MTI/DGAC and with accident investigation agency for SSPSafety Board and SSPSafety Committee componence;
      An SSP implementation training course was delivered to members of the SSP Safety Board and SSP Safety Committee in co-operation with ICAO;
      138
    • 196. SSP Implementation - Romanian experience
      The “Romanian SSP gap analysis” was revised, finalised and approved;
      In order to gain experience and share information several aviation specialists participated to “SSP/SMS implementation” workshop for CERG States held in Bratislava (organised in cooperation with ICAO);
      The “Romanian State Safety Programme”currently in draft under internal revision;
      The Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure order will be developed to approve The “Romanian State Safety Programme”;
      139
    • 197. Thank you !
      140
    • 198.
    • 199. Erik Merckxformer Deputy Director of Safety,EUROCONTROL
      Pioneers on ATM Safety Regulation
    • 200. Pioneers on European ATM Safety Regulation Dr.Erik MerckxNicosia, Cyprus27 April 2011
    • 201. Contents
      • History of ATM Safety Legislation
      • 202. European Regulation on Accident and Incident reporting
      • 203. Pioneers on ATM Safety Regulation: ESARRs
      • 204. ESARRs transposed in European Community Law
      • 205. Community Regulation in 2010 and beyond
      • Annex 1 – Personnel Licensing
      • 206. Annex 11 – Air Traffic Services
      • 207. Annex 13 – Accident/incident Investigation
      • 208. PANS-ATM – Doc 4444
      • 209. SES 1 and 2
      • 210. Separation
      Service Provision / Regulation
      • Transposition of ESSARs
      in EU Law
      of competencies
      to:
      History of ATM Safety Regulation
      European Commission
      EUROCONTROL
      ICAO
      EASA
      1947
      2000
      2004
      2009
    • 219. implementation of
      central database
      • EC 1330/2007
      • 232. Dissemination of
      information
      • EC 2003/42
      • 233. Mandatory reporting of incidents
      • 234. EC collects the data in a central database (ECCAIRS)
      • 235. States and International bodies have access
      European Regulation on Accident / Incident Reporting
      European Commission
      European Commission
      EUROCONTROL
      European Commission
      ICAO
      1947
      1994
      2000
      2003
      2007
    • 236. Pioneers on ATM Safety Regulation: ESARRs
      Risk Assessment New Systems
      Recruitment/
      Selection
      Procedures Operational Processes
      Incident Reporting
      Safety Surveys and Follow-up
      Risk Assessment New ATC Procedures
      Training
      Incident Investigation
      Interfaces ATS and CNS
      Competency
      Checks
      Lessons Learnt
      CNS Maintenance Procedures
      Risk Assessment Airspace Changes
      Refresher/
      Advanced Training
      Risk Assessment Software Changes
      Emergency Procedures
      ESARR 3
      All elements of the SMS described in policies, well documented, communicated, updated, data recorded
    • 237. Pioneers on ATM Safety Regulation: ESARRs
      Risk Assessment New Systems
      Recruitment/
      Selection
      Procedures Operational Processes
      Incident Reporting
      Safety Surveys and Follow-up
      Risk Assessment New ATC Procedures
      Training
      Incident Investigation
      Interfaces ATS and CNS
      Competency
      Checks
      Lessons Learnt
      CNS Maintenance Procedures
      Risk Assessment Airspace Changes
      Refresher/
      Advanced Training
      Risk Assessment Software Changes
      Emergency Procedures
      ESARR 5
      All elements of the SMS described in policies, well documented, communicated, updated, data recorded
    • 238. Pioneers on ATM Safety Regulation: ESARRs
      Risk Assessment New Systems
      Recruitment/
      Selection
      Procedures Operational Processes
      Incident Reporting
      Safety Surveys and Follow-up
      Risk Assessment New ATC Procedures
      Training
      Incident Investigation
      Interfaces ATS and CNS
      Competency
      Checks
      Lessons Learnt
      CNS Maintenance Procedures
      Risk Assessment Airspace Changes
      Refresher/
      Advanced Training
      Risk Assessment Software Changes
      Emergency Procedures
      ESARR 4
      All elements of the SMS described in policies, well documented, communicated, updated, data recorded
    • 239. Pioneers on ATM Safety Regulation: ESARRs
      Risk Assessment New Systems
      Recruitment/
      Selection
      Procedures Operational Processes
      Incident Reporting
      Safety Surveys and Follow-up
      Risk Assessment New ATC Procedures
      Training
      Incident Investigation
      Interfaces ATS and CNS
      Competency
      Checks
      Lessons Learnt
      CNS Maintenance Procedures
      Risk Assessment Airspace Changes
      Refresher/
      Advanced Training
      Risk Assessment Software Changes
      Emergency Procedures
      ESARR 2
      All elements of the SMS described in policies, well documented, communicated, updated, data recorded
    • 240. Pioneers on ATM Safety Regulation: ESARRs
      ESARR 1
      Safety Oversight by the National Supervisory Authority of the ANSP
    • 241. Transposition of ESARRs in European Community Law
    • 242. Community Legislation in 2010 and beyond (1)
      • SES II puts emphasis on Safety in 3 areas:
      As part of the new European Performance Framework (EC 691/2010)
      The Network Management Function
      The extended role of EASA
    • 243. Community Legislation in 2010 and beyond (2)
      • Safety as a Key Performance Indicator in the Implementing Rule on the Performance Framework (EC 691/2010):
      The effectiveness of safety management as measured by a “safety maturity” indicator
      The application of a uniform measurement of the severity of incidents by means of the Risk Analysis Tool
      Evidence that Just Culture is being applied
    • 244. 95 % of
      IFR traffic
      Safety Maturity in Air Traffic Management
    • 245. Future: Consolidation of Regulations
      SMS - Airports
      ?
      SMS - Military
      ?
      ?
      SMS - ANSPs
      ?
      ?
      SMS - Airlines
      ?
      SMS - Suppliers
      Aircraft
      Avionics
      Ground Equipm.
    • 246.
    • 247. Fred Van der Meer CEO of HERMES Airports
      Is there a need to regulate Airport Safety?
    • 248. AVIATION SAFETY CONFERENCENicosia, 27 – 28 April 2011 Is there a need to regulateAIRPORT SAFETY ?
      Questions by Fred van der Meer
      CEO of Hermes Airports Ltd
    • 249. Could you accept the following DEFINITIONS?
      Regulate is to control and/or supervise an activity by means of rules and regulations
      An airport is a location where aircraft take off and land
      Safety is the perception of being safe from harm or danger
      Need to Regulate Airport Safety?
    • 250. Need to Regulate Airport Safety?
      Who is the AUDIENCE?
      European Union
      Politicians / Public
      Government / Government Agencies
      Airlines and Airline Organisations
      Air traffic Control and ATC organisations
      Airport Organisations
      Airport Operators
    • 251. Is there a common UNDERSTANDING?
      Airport activities / facilities
      What safety / security are we talking about
      Objective – preventive, harm mitigation, identification of liability
      Type and level of regulations
      Need to Regulate Airport Safety?
    • 252. What do we HAVE and what are we
      CURRENTLY DOING?
      FAA
      ICAO
      EU directives
      National laws and regulations
      Need to Regulate Airport Safety?
    • 253. Alternative QUESTIONS
      Are we happy with what we have and what we
      are doing?
      IF NOT
      Is there a need for more regulations
      or for less regulations?
      or do we need different regulations ?
      Need to Regulate Airport Safety?
    • 254. Before we START shouldn’t we AGREE on
      Organisational level to issue regulations?
      Activities and facilities to be regulated?
      Risk appetite?
      Need to Regulate Airport Safety?
    • 255. Critical Question:
      Are we as professionals able to be
      innovative enough to improve on
      what we have or should we get OUTSIDE help?
      Need to Regulate Airport Safety?
    • 256. .......perhaps .......
      let’s think about it and remember that
      the benefit to some must be larger than the cost to others
      Need to Regulate Airport Safety?
    • 257.
    • 258. Richard HillCEO  ETIHAD Airlines
      The view of an airline / ETIHAD’s
      Challenges to safety regulation
    • 259.
    • 260. Implementing Safety Regulations
      the Operator’s perspective
      Captain Richard Hill, Chief Operations Officer
    • 261. The starting point
      Understanding and accepting the need for change:
      Clearly communicated
      Risk based
      Demonstrable safety benefit
      Realistic timescale
      Applicable to all (level playing field)
    • 262. Harmonisation
      ICAO SARPs
      IATA IOSA
      EASA EU OPS
      LOCAL REGULATION
    • 263. Consultation
      NPA, NPRM, RIA
      Notice period
      Opportunity to influence outcome
      Commercial impact
      Cost vs benefit
    • 264. Education
      Risk assessment
      Safety case
      Additional Means of Compliance
      Clearly written background material
      Point of contact within the regulator with experience
    • 265. Implementation
      Timescale
      Interpretation
      Consistency between regulators
      Consistency between FOIs
    • 266. Etihad case study:
      Implementing a Safety Management System
      The challenges:
      Time
      Regulation
      Guidance
      Resources
      Experience
      Requirement for an EHSMS regulated by a different Authority
    • 267. Issues to resolve
      Culture
      Resources
      Commitment of ALL levels of management and employees
      Defining Safety Performance Indicators and Goals
    • 268. What worked for us?
      Taskforce
    • 269. What worked for us?
      Facilitators / Safety Business Partners
    • 270. What worked for us?
      Training Concept:
      1 day
      Higher Management
      3 days
      Management and Key Staff
      2 – 4 hours
      Operational Staff
      1 hour
      All Staff (ESMS)
    • 271. What worked for us?
      Enhanced Meeting Culture – Internal:
      Safety Action Groups
      Postholder Meeting
      Safety & Quality Review Board
    • 272. What worked for us?
      Enhanced Meeting Culture – External:
    • Achievements
      SMS Manual accepted by regulator without findings
      SAGs as ‘Centers of Gravity’ for Safety Issues
      Improved Safety Reporting: Increase in numbers and quality
      Decrease in severity of occurrences across the board
      Safety Promotion / Events
    • 278. The outcome
      Successful SMS implementation
      Improved safety communication
      Greater safety awareness
      Lower risk – greater efficiency
      Continued safe flight operations
    • 279. Lessons learnt
      Communication
      Regulatory expertise
      Regulators set the standard
      Consultation
      Consistency
    • 280. ευχαριστώ πολύ!
      Thank you!
    • 281.
    • 282. Nicolas LyrakidesFormer Executive Vice-President for Europe of IFATCA
      Regulating  ATM Safety / The view of ATCOs
    • 283. FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION/ SOUTH EAST EUROPE- M. EAST – CYPRUSAVIATION SAFETY: REGULATING, IMPLEMENTING, TRAININGNicosia, 27-28 April 2011
      “Regulating ATM Safety/
      The view of ATCOs"
      Nicolas Y. LYRAKIDES
      -Supervisor Air Traffic Controller
      -Transport & Communications Counsellor of Cyprus in EU
      -IFATCA ex-EVP EUROPE, 2002-2006
      190
    • 284. Aviation Safety Statements
      Air transport is one of the safest modes of travel. It is also the fastest growing.
      (4.1 accidents/million departures)
      Safety -cannot be compromised and must be enhanced with increased traffic levels.
      Aviation accidents rarely result from a single failure but rather from a combination of events.
      Safety can never be taken for granted - constant effort is needed to maintain its high level in the changing operational and economic context of the global air transport industry.
      The main purpose of ATM services is to ensure that airplanes depart, fly and land safely, at a reasonable cost.
    • 285. OVERVIEW
      Introduction /Aviation Safety Statements
      Global ATM Safety Regulation- Current situation/ IFATCA Policy
      Safety Regulation Approaches
      General View- Trends inAir Traffic Management
      Major Aviation Stakeholders
      European ATM Regulation/ATCOs perspective
      Think Performance Regulation in ATM- Case Study: EUROPE
      1st pillar- Regulating performance
      SES Safety PIs- ATCOS views, suggestions
      Safety Culture/Just Culture
      Budapest Conference- 3-4 March 2011
      4th pillar- Human factor
      Concluding remarks
      192
    • 286. Global ATM Safety Regulation- Current situation
      3 basic layers of safety regulation:
      1. International (Global) regulatory arrangements and
      requirements, established and promulgated by ICAO
      (SARPS, Safety Management, USOAP)
      2. Regional regulatory arrangements and requirements
      (EU, EASA, SES II)
      3. National regulatory arrangements and requirements
      (flexibility,inconsistency)
      193
      ICAO
      ATCOS (IFATCA) believe that: safety standards must be
      clearly defined at an international level (ICAO) and must
      be adopted on a regional basis.
    • 287. Global ATM Safety Regulation-IFATCA POLICY
      194
      IFATCA supports the ultimate objective of achieving global harmonization in safety regulation.
      IFATCA believes that sufficient resources should be directed towards establishing robust and independent safety regulation at national, regional and global levels to encompass ATM equipment, procedures and personnel.
    • 288. Safety Regulation Approaches
      195
      Objective
      eg. ICAO requirements for Safety Management
      Prescriptive
      Technical systems (eg. data link)
      Flexible solutions but inconsistency in implementation
    • 289. General View- Trends inAir Traffic Management
      196
      move from:
      Government managed public service
      Commercialized- privatized environment
      ATCOS believe that :Safety is the absolute priority and that it takes precedence over
      every aspect of the current and future ATM system.
    • 290. 197
      MAJOR AVIATION STAKEHOLDERS
      AERONAUTICS
      INDUSTRY
      REGULATORS/
      AUTHORITIES
      ICAO
      EC/EASA
      EUROCONTROL
      AIRCRAFT
      OPERATORS
      ANSPs
      MILITARY
      AVIATION
      STAKEHOLDERS
      AIRPORTS
      safety is the top priority for all aviation actors worldwide
      STAFF
      ATCOS
      PILOTS
      ELECTRONIC
      OTHERS
      +IFATCA
      CIVIL AIRSPACE
      USERS
      PASSENGERS
      MEDIA
      EDUCATION
      WORLD
      ENVIRONMENTALISTS
    • 291. IFATCA is a major stakeholder in the ATM system and is committed to the inclusion of the controllers' viewpoint in all future developments of the ATM system. IFATCA also recognizes the importance of all parties working together to achieve the common objective of increasing capacity without compromising safety standards.
      198
      MAJOR AVIATION STAKEHOLDERS
    • 292. European ATM Regulation
      ATM safety regulation has been developed considerably in the last 10 years.
      EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirements
      (ESARRS) ………framework for ATM SAFETY
      EC Single European Sky legislation
      ..aiming at harmonizing the arrangements across Europe and requiring the establishment of national safety regulatory bodies:
      National Supervisory Authorities (NSAs)
      199
    • 293. Think Performance Regulation in ATM- Case Study: EUROPESES II- Single European Sky – 5 pillarsRegulation (EC) No 1070/2009 – Improvement of the performance and sustainability of the European aviation system
      200
      improving safety by a factor of 10
      691/2010
    • 294. SES II- Single EuropeanSky-ATCOs’ perspective
      The view of IFATCA and the ATCOS family, is that the extension of EASA competency to ANS and Airports will reinforce the regulation, oversight and monitoring of ANS safety, and has a central role in the proposed approach to safety performance under the performance scheme.
      IFATCA has embraced the work EASA is carrying out and wishes to have robust and relevant rulemaking and regulation, which should be less influenced by political interest, but be more respectful of the EU rules and regulations for EASA .
      ATCOS believe that the technology pillar, SESAR, will definitely give new advanced tools to ATCOs, that will provide the new generation of ATM technologies and procedures. The new SESAR operational concept aims at moving from today's airspace based trajectories to the time based operations ("4-D trajectories").
      201
    • 295. Regulation (EC) No 1070/2009 – Improvement of the performance and sustainability of the European aviation system
      The Member States, acting in accordance with their national legislation, shall establish consultation mechanisms for appropriate involvement of stakeholders, including professional staff representative bodies, in the implementation of the single European sky.
      Major principle: The human factor plays a key role in ensuring the change process
      202
    • 296. 1st pillar- Regulating performance Scheme
      Main features:
      Definition of Key Performance Areas (KPAs)- (safety, capacity, environment, cost-efficiency)
      Definition of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)
      Defn of pan-european targets associated with the KPIs
      Requirement to produce national (or FAB) Performance Plans (PP) – NSAs obligation
      Adoption of binding PP by MS and acceptance by EC
      Introduction of reference periods (RPS) to assess and review results
      Setting up of alert thresholds and
      Sanctions if targets are not met
      203
      RP1:2012-14
      RP2:2015-19
    • 297. …../…1st pillar- Regulating performance Scheme
      Key Performance Areas (KPAs)- Safety
      204
    • 298. …../…1st pillar- Regulating performance Scheme
      Key Performance Areas (KPAs)- Safety
      17 out of 29 states participating in the SES Regulation (27 EU MS plus Norway, Switzerland), have indicated that they will participate to the Safety KPA by setting some national targets.
      The so-called E3 (Eurocontrol, European Union and EASA) have worked to publish some metrics for KPIs for Safety. The future IR will take the form of an amendment of Regulation 691/2010.
      The ICAO State Safety Programme and SMS framework will be used to draft the proposal.
      205
    • 299. …../…1st pillar- Regulating performance Scheme
      ……./…Key Performance Areas (KPAs)- Safety
      The SMS will be complemented by Management Objectives of ICAO.
      The EC distinguish between the Service Provision Level and the State Management Level. The State’s level assessment will be verified by EASA standardisation inspections.
      Occurrence Severity Classification: Just Culture will be measured (including the lack of Just Culture).
      Concept document will be presented in a stakeholder workshop for NSAs on 13 May and wider stakeholder workshop on 17 June.
      Adoption in SSC 44 on 28 September 2011.
      206
    • 300. SES Safety Performance Indicators – ATCOS’ views
      IFATCA does understand the necessity for government to act as a control mechanism of commercialized ANSPs.
      But are these PIs a true measurement of the ATM system from the ATCO's perspective? Arguably not.
      Many factors beyond the control of any individual ATCO, or ATC Centre, that will influence the outcome of these measurements:
      equipment capability,
      capacity and serviceability,
      military activity,
      traffic priorities,
      resourcing, training,
      airspace design, and
      over-demand etc.
      Different results if measured at a system level, national level, district level or unit / facility level.
      ATCOs must be extremely careful where these results are broken down further to sector, console or individual ATCO level.
      207
    • 301. …/..SES Safety Performance Indicators – ATCOS’ views
      "quantitative" rather than "qualitative“ PIs
      "Safety" PIs tend to measure:
      rates of occurrences per distance flown or
      numbers of flights per volume etc.
      They measure "reported events" after the fact.
      But :
      do they measure "preventative" actions by the ATCO's?
      Can they measure professionalism, caution and separation assurance?
      Whilst the PIs may "infer" the success of these factors by low occurrence rates,
      are these successes then reflected "negatively" in the "efficiency", "accessibility "and "cost effectiveness" PIs?
      208
    • 302. SES Safety Performance Indicators – ATCOS’ views/ suggestions
      IFATCA concludes that PIs should not be read as being totally indicative of ATC performance from an individual, sector or unit perspective. Indeed most of the PIs as currently used have little direct relevance to the operational ATCO.
      So far, IFATCA is not aware of PIs that accurately measure
      the operational performance of an ANSP, although such PIs
      have been suggested for development.
      Concerning safety issues, these could include:
      number of occurrence reports received vs. investigated;
      number of recommendations from investigations made/accepted/implemented; etc.
      209
    • 303. SES Safety Performance Indicators – IFATCA policy
      Global metrics for the performance of the ATM System be developed through ICAO processes as soon as possible.
       Controller expertise must be used:
      in the establishment and settings of metrics that measure the performance of the ATM System
      in establishing and reviewing models used for determining performance of the ATM System to ensure that the models accurately reflect how the ATM system functions.
       in the interpretation of data used to assess the performance of the Air Traffic Management System to ensure that data is not misleading because it is incomplete or incorrectly applied.
      Important that Member Association’s of IFATCA:
      can understand the logic, the targets and the possible impact of these new features in their daily operational work.
      should get involved in the consultation process with regard to the target setting process which is currently ongoing.
      210
    • 304. The “Just culture” concept
      One of the objectives of a “just culture” environment is to institutionalise the improved collaboration between aviation safety and judicial authorities.
      The following description of “just culture” has been developed in Europe:
      A culture in which front line operators or others (pilots,
      air traffic controllers, electronic engineers, etc.) are not
      punished for actions, omissions or decisions taken by
      them that are commensurate with their experience and
      training, but where gross negligence, wilful violations
      and destructive acts are not tolerated”
      “Just Culture” is supported by ICAO (Safety Culture), EUROCONTROL, EU, STAFF ORGANISATIONS, etc.
      DO NOT SHOOT THE MESSENGER
      211
    • 305. Budapest Conference- 3-4 March 2011 Implementing SES- The Human Factor
      VP S Kallas: “ATM needs to go beyond just the control of aircraft… the social dialogue is being modernized through the establishment by the Cion of a dedicated group of experts to bring the “human factor” to life!!!! …..Here is one idea to start off the reflection: is it possible that we think already of setting up some ad hoc arrangements to improve mobility of controllers?
      P Griffiths-PRB: “Human factor pillar must address social dialogue, which is expressing discontent and a break down in service. Change management cannot be done at the expense of a vital section of the community. However, I will make this clear from the start, it does not mean paying these sections that hold the community to ransom more it means making sure that they are involved and buy into the change management programmes”
      212
    • 306. Budapest Conference- 3-4 March 2011 Implementing SES- The Human Factor
      Many view the voiced concerns of controllers as being
      barriers to progress. This view point is unfounded as
      controllers accept the fact that the advanced technologies
      can bring benefits to the way that they control air traffic
      and they are positive in change management programs,
      as long as
      these advances take place in a co-operative manner
      in the form of consultation with the end users who have
      the operational knowledge with which to turn these
      capabilities of technology into a service.
      213
    • 307. …../…Budapest Conference- 3-4 March 2011 Implementing SES- The Human Factor
      P Goudou-EASA: “…Human Factor is a key element of the safety of the European system. We have to raise safety awareness and make sure that the European pilots and Controllers are properly and regularly trained to avoid any mistakes having a possible fatal outcome.
      D McMillan- EUROCONTROL: Regulation should not be a system of restrictions….but rather it should be the heart of driving forward improvements-making them happen. It should be a help, not a hindrance. It needs to be fit for purpose.
      214
      ATCOS:
      WE FULLY SUPPORT THIS STATEMENT
    • 308. 4th pillar SES II- Human factor
      The Human factor plays a KEY ROLE in ensuring the change process in ATM
      Human role
      -Crucial
      -Core
      -Training
      -Investment
      Mobility
      -no force mobility
      -No social dumping
      Just culture
      Social dialogue and expert group
      215
      Need for all ACTORS to work together in a holistic approach, in order to achieve tangible, effective and realistic results for the benefit of Air Transport Industry around the world
    • 309. Concluding remarks
      Human factor: to be integrated everywhere
      Cooperation is the way forward
      Keep the human in the core of the system
      Social dialogue is the pivotal tool
      SES implementation needs the staff support
      Safety & just culture:
      work in progress
      216
      Cion revision of Dir. 2003/42/EC on occurrence reporting- end 2011
      Flash 1
    • 310. TRUE STATEMENTS ON ATCOS……few of many more!!!
      217
      -We hold more lives in our hands in one average shift than a medical doctor does in his whole career
      -We can’t imagine doing any other work
      -Everything we say is recorded
      -We aren't allowed to make mistakes
      -We are always in control
      -We control everything in our environment
      -Our spouses will never understand us or understand what we do
      -We all have crash dreams, rather nightmares
      -We will control traffic even in our sleep
      -No, you can not imagine the stress we have when on the board
      -We work in the middle of the night and on Christmas, on Easter and on weekends and on birthday anniversaries of our beloved ones
      Despite all these, we take extreme pride in the quality of our work and we are all VERY PROUD of the profession we serve with loyalty and care for the utmost SAFETY!
    • 311. Thank you
      for your attention!
      Nicolas Y. LYRAKIDES
      -Supervisor Air Traffic Controller
      -Transport & Communications Counsellor of Cyprus in EU
      -IFATCA ex-EVP EUROPE, 2002-2006
      nlyrakides@mfa.gov.cy
      zxnlyr@cytanet.com.cy
      218
    • 312.
    • 313. Thursday, 28 April 2011
      3rd Session
      How can training assist in implementing safety regulations?
      Chair: Erik Merckx, former Deputy Director
      for Safety, EUROCONTROLSupport:SarantisPoulimenakos-ICAO Expert
    • 314. Vince GalottiDeputy Director Air Navigation Bureau of ICAO
      The new ICAO Training Policy
    • 315. ICAO CIVIL AVIATION TRAINING POLICY AND PROGRAMMESVince Galotti Deputy Director Air Navigation Bureau, ICAO
      Nicosia, 28 April 2011
    • 316. Outline
      Current situation
      ICAO Civil Aviation Training Policy
      ICAO Training Programmes
      TRAINAIR PLUS
      Endorsement Programme
      223
    • 317. Current situation
      224
    • 318. Current situation
      States need assistance to identify where to go for training
      Training plans not established
      Tasks and functions not clearly identified and established
      Training provided does not necessarily relate to the skills development
      Abuse of ICAO logo and name
      225
    • 319. Current situation
      ICAO solution
      ICAO Civil Aviation Training Policy
      ICAO Training Programmes
      226
    • 320. ICAO Civil Aviation Training Policy
      Published to all States Electronic Bulletin:
      EB 40/2010
      Defines ICAO role in the provision of aviation safety training
      Addresses both safety and security related training
      Requires formal endorsement
      TRAINRO/2
      227
    • 321. ICAO Civil Aviation Training Policy
      Scope:
      applicable to all training provided by ICAO Bureaus, Regional Offices and training organizations issuing a certificate of completion or a certificate of achievement with an ICAO logo.
      TRAINRO/2
      228
    • 322. ICAO Training Programmes
      ICAO role:
      Establish a global quality training system ensuring that training prepared and provided are competency based and comply with ICAO provisions
      ICAO is not looking to compete with training providers
      It is recognized that some training can only be developed and conducted by ICAO (Ex: roll-out plans)
      TRAINRO/2
      229
    • 323. ICAO Training Programmes
      3 main programmes:
      TRAINAIR PLUS
      Endorsement of training courses and programmes
      Assistance to States and industry by developing specific safety-related courses
      TRAINRO/2
      230
    • 324. 231
      TRAINAIR PLUS
      Support NGAP initiatives
      Requires a prior assessment of the training centre
      Allow sharing of training materials between members
      Require training materials to be developed with the same standard:
      All Standards Training Packages (STPS) are competency-based
    • 325. 232
      TRAINAIR PLUS
      EB 45/2010
      Redefine the programme:
      Self-sustained
      Categories of members
      Revised assessment methodology
      Revised requirements for members (development of STPs, fees, exchange of STPs)
    • 326. 233
      TRAINAIR PLUS
    • 327. 234
      TRAINAIR PLUS
      With respect to training associated to the TRAINAIR PLUS Programme, ICAO launched a comprehensive training programme addressing the main posts:
      Course Developers (the 1st course started on 25 April in Incheon, Republic of Korea, we have an other one in May in cooperation with JAA TO, and others later this year).
      Instructors; and
      Training Managers.
    • 328. Endorsement Programme
      Procedures being finalized by ICAO;
      ICAO will endorse at request of training organizations:
      Courses developed by ICAO and conducted by training organizations;
      Courses developed by training organizations.
      Not exclusively for The TRAINAIR PLUSMembers or Associate
    • 329. ICAO Training courses
      In order to assist States in areas not addressed by training institutions ICAO is also developing and conducting some limited training courses:
      Dangerous Goods and use of Technical Instructions;
      SMS and SSP;
      USOAP audit courses for prospective auditors, subject mater experts, States employees (e-Learning);
      Courses related to roll-out plans;
      Seminar/workshops.
    • 330. Thank you
    • 331.
    • 332. Mike HoldomCEO Olympic Air
      Training needs of an Airline
    • 333. How can training assist in implementing safety regulations?
      Captain Mike HoltomFRAeS Olympic Air
      Flight Safety Foundation Conference April 2011
      240
    • 334. 241
    • 335. 242
    • 336. 243
    • 337. 244
      Code-shares
    • 338. 245
      Domestic Network
      Skiathos

      ● Ikaria
      ●Leros
      Naxos


      Paros
      ●Kalymnos
      ●Astypalea
      Kithira ●
      Kastelorizo >>
      ● Karpathos
      Kasos●
      ●Sitia
    • 339. 246
      Start-up Challenges
    • 247
      Operational Challenges – Mt Eyjafjallajökull
      15th April
    • 345. 248
      Operational Challenges – Winter 2010
    • 346. 249
      Operational Challenges
      D0101/11 NOTAMR D0047/11
      Q) LGGG/QFWAS/IV/M /A /000/999/3657N02656E005
      A) LGKY B) 1103311425 C) 1104302359
      E) LGKY:ANEMOMETER RWY10 OUT OF SERVICE.
      CREATED: 31 Mar 2011 14:26:00 SOURCE: LGGGYNYX
      800 feet
    • 347. 250
      Operational Challenges
      • R/W dimensions: 800 m x 25 m
      • 348. 1.77° downhill slope
      D0084/11 NOTAMR D0083/11 Q) LGGG/QFMLT/IV/BO /A /000/999/3700N02507E005
      LGPA B) 1103251530 C) 1104252359
      E) ANEMOMETER RWY 17 OUT OF SERVICE.
      CREATED: 24 Mar 2011 07:06:00 SOURCE: LGGGYNYX
    • 349. 251
      Operational Challenges
      • 35 foot engine-out obstacle clearance is a reality
      • 350. Relevant at 5 points climbing up the valley
      • 351. Performance ignores downdrafts
      • 352. Regulations allow LPC/OPC on the aircraft – but no engine cut.
      • 353. Solution: a simulator is now used.
      • 354. No-one is adequately trained to clear obstacles by 35 feet.
      • 355. Solution: This runway is no longer used for take-off by OA.
    • 252
      Operational Challenges
      Consider left engine failure at V1
      and a wind from the right.
      • Regulations allow LPC/OPC on the aircraft – but no engine cut.
      • 356. Solution: a simulator is now used; captain-only take-off.
    • 253
      Other Challenges – Merger on/off/maybe
    • 357. 254
      Compensations
      • Helpful regulator
      • 358. No pilot union
      • 359. Breadth of management experience
      • 360. Brand loyalty
      • Safety, Security & Quality Board met every week for 1st year
      • 361. Risk Assessment of all Cat C airfields (mostly DHC-8-100 operations)
      • 362. FDM for all a/c including those below 27,000 kg
      • 363. FDM rigorously applied – feedback to training
      • 364. IOSA 2 months after starting operations
      • 365. LOSA commenced 6 months after starting operations
      • 366. External CRMI training course
      • 367. 2 standby a/c for increased dispatch reliability
      • 368. FlyBe contract (4 a/c for 14 mths) plus ongoing contracted pilots
      • 369. Accessible Accountable Manager
      • 370. Full-time safety office presence
      • 371. Sound Operating Philosophy
      • 372. Hard-line risk assessments and investigations
      • 373. Good prioritisation (resources appropriate to risk)
      • 374. Kenyon International full service (Platinum)
      255
      Proactive Measures
    • 375. 256
      Proactive Measures – Rigorous FDM
      Every monthly report requires responses from chief pilots and training post-holder:
      What actions are being taken to reduce the rates further?
      Responses are scrutinised by the Accountable Manager.
    • 376. 257
      SMS Safety Training
      9.2.1 An Operator-Organization shall, as part of its safety promotion activities, develop and maintain a safety training programme that ensures that personnel are trained and competent to perform the SMS duties.
      9.2.2 The scope of the safety training shall be appropriate to the individual’s involvement in the SMS.
      9.2.3 The Accountable Executive shall receive safety awareness training regarding:
      9.2.3.1 Safety policy and objectives;
      9.2.3.2 SMS roles and responsibilities;
      9.2.3.3 SMS standards; and
      9.2.3.4 Safety assurance.
    • 377. 258
      Training Needs Analysis
      For illustrative purposes only
    • 378. 259
      Training Needs Analysis
      For illustrative purposes only
    • 379. 260
      Training Needs Analysis
      For illustrative purposes only
    • 380. 261
      Conclusions
      It is unwise to assume that managers (in all aspects of aviation) have the required management and organisation skills to implement safety regulations.
      The skill-set should be defined and a level of competency should be trained and checked periodically, in the same way that pilots have to demonstrate their skills.
      Only the Accountable Manager and Post-holders have to be acceptable to the national CAA, and that is through a subjective assessment.
      The more senior the position and the greater the power and influence, the more important the requirement for training and control.
    • 381. 262
      How can training assist in implementing safety regulations?
      In-house training is preferable (whether private enterprise, national, international) to keep it focused on relevant issues, e.g. assessments of actual risks.
      Training and competency checks for management skills (again, whether private enterprise, national, international) , i.e. for organisational management skills as well as safety management.
      Gradual evolution from the top down, that embraces appropriate industry expertise, rather than quick-fix or commercially-driven approaches.
      262
    • 382. Training Needs of an Airline
      Thank you
      Captain Mike HoltomFRAeS
      Olympic Air
      263
    • 383.
    • 384. J. Jonker Director of the JAA Training Organisation
      How JAA TO  is supporting safety initiatives
    • 385.
    • 386.
    • 387.
    • 388.
    • 389.
    • 390.
    • 391.
    • 392.
    • 393.
    • 394.
    • 395.
    • 396.
    • 397.
    • 398.
    • 399.
    • 400.
    • 401.
    • 402.
    • 403. Robin PurseyAirbus 
      Evidence Based Training
    • 404. Evidence Based Training
      FSF Nicosia April 2011
      Flight Safety Foundation April 2011
      Presented by
      Name Captain Robin Pursey
      JobTitle Chief Pilot Airbus Corporate Jets
    • 405. DC 3
    • 406. Caravelle
    • 407. Lineage 1000
    • 408. Boeing 737
    • 409. Airbus A 319 CJ
    • 410. What do these aircraft have in common?
      Only the pilot training program
      Are we really training pilots to fly modern aircraft?
    • 411. Training by regulation
      • By regulation, flight crew training and checking is based on events, which may be highly improbable in modern aeroplanes.
      • 412. Training programmes are consequently saturated with items that may not necessarily mitigate the real risks or enhance safety in modern air transport operations.
    • Training by regulation
      • By regulation, flight crew training and checking is based on events, which may be highly improbable in modern aeroplanes.
      • 413. Training programmes are consequently saturated with items that may not necessarily mitigate the real risks or enhance safety in modern air transport operations.
      • 414. Is it more appropriate to train effective and efficient use of modern avionics in place of handling exercises which may be benign on some modern aircraft types?
    • Training by regulation
    • Page 295
      Hull Loss rate – 4Q 2010
      4th generation:
      1st generation:
      2nd generation:
      3rd generation:
      Early jet
      2nd jet generation
      Glass-cockpit
      Nav display
      FMS
      FBW
      Flight Envelope
      Protection
      Hull Loss
      per million departures
      1st generation
      All aircraft
      2nd generation
      4th generation
      3rd generation
      Years Of Operation
      Sources: Ascend, Airbus
    • 426. 26/09/08
      EASA Briefing - Training For Safety
      296
      Relative Importance of contributing factors in fatal accidents(Source: Civil Aviation Safety Data, 1989-2003)
    • 427. 2008 ITQI Training and Qualification Initiative
      Use menu "View - Header & Footer" for Presentation title - Siglum - Reference
      Page 297
      • Safety initiative to enhance andharmonize airline training standards.
      • 428. Developed by industry stakeholdersunder the umbrella of IATA.
      • 429. Three main elements:
      • 430. Pilot Selection
      • 431. Evidence Based Training
      • 432. Simulator Standards
    • 23/09/10
      298
      ITQI – IATA Training and Qualification Initiative
      The Working Group
    • 433. Collection of evidence
      DATA
      Data Sources:
      • LOSA(Line Operation Safety Audit)- provide direction and focus for the entire study.
      (University of Texas program)
      • AQP (Advanced Qualification Program) ATQP
      • 434. CAST(Commercial Aviation Safety Team)– US cooperative government-industry initiative
       
      • FDM (Flight Data Monitoring) (FOQA, FDA, FODA etc.)
      • 435. STEADES (Safety Trend Evaluation, Analysis & Data Exchange System) - IATA accident survey data base
    • Example:
      The
      Go-Around
      Paradox
      300
      EBT
    • 436. LOSA: Line Operation Safety Audit
      4% of all approaches were unstable
      97% of unstable approaches are continued to landing
      10% result in abnormal landings
      Only 3% of unstable approaches lead to a Go-Around
      When a GA occurs – it is almost always poorly performed
      Usually a surprise to the crew
      Very rarely occurs at (the briefed) missed approach height.
      ITQI
      slide301
    • 437. Flight data study:
      Over 1 million flights analyzed
      3.5% of approaches are unstable (35,000)
      Only 1.4% of them lead to a Go-Around (490)
      ITQI
      slide 302
      • Looked for Landings with High Risk events
      • 438. Unstable 8.0% (80,000)
      • 439. Stable 6.2% (62,000)
      • 440. This was not the expected result
    • Sample size > 300 go-arounds
      EBT
      303
      Industry study on Go-Arounds
    • 441. AQP data:
      An AQP data study shows that almost twice as many pilot failed to reach the company standard in missed approach maneuver as opposed to the V1 cut.
      ITQI
      slide 304
    • 442. Example II:
      Flight Deck
      Automation
      305
      EBT
    • 443. Automation
      Automation – probably the most important change in the cockpit in the last 30 years.
      Improvement
      E.g. Recent study by a large airline showed better performance when using automation for maneuvers such as go-around’s, single-engine flight and NPAs
      ITQI
      slide306
    • 444. Automation challenges
      LOSA
      28% of flights have an Automation error
      Little to no dialogue between the pilots during most of the errors  Monitoring/Cross-Checking
      There are often misunderstandings of autopilot modes.
      Automation skills erode faster than manual handling skills
      Flight Crews are becoming more reluctant to revert to manual flying when automation is inappropriate or fails [IATA Accident study, 2009]
      ITQI
      slide307
    • 445. 26/09/08
      EASA Briefing - Training For Safety
      308
      Conclusions
      Risk of doing nothing
      Complacency with reliable technology
      Devalued and ineffective training programmes
      No impact on Accident rates
      Benefits of Evidence Based Training
      Evidence based programmes adapted by fleet and operation
      Greater focus on normal operations
      Greater emphasis on human performance
      Encourage “out of the box” thinking with developed methodologies to manage risk
    • 446. Conclusions
      This type of analytical approach will allow non technical skills to be trained in a more appropriate environment, not necessarily the Level D FFS.
    • 447. 310
      Gaining the Evidence – Intuitive Risk Analysis
    • 448. Conclusions
      Contacts
      Captain Michael Varney Project Leader - Evidence Based TrainingIATA Training and Qualification Initiative
      mvarneyebt@gmail.com
      Phil Barriball from FSI represents business aircraft operators in Europe
      Phil.Barriball@FlightSafety.com
      Intuitive Risk Analysis
      Captain Christian Norden
      christian.norden@airbus.com
    • 449. Thank you
      Questions
    • 450.
    • 451. Training in the field of Air Navigation Services
      A. Skoniezki Head of EUROCONTROL Institute of Air Navigation Services
    • 452. EUROCONTROLTraining in the field of Air Navigation ServicesSafety Conference 27 – 28 April 2011Nicosia, Cyprus
      Alexander Skoniezki
      Head of Institute of Air Navigation Services & Training Division, EUROCONTROL Directorate Network Management
    • 453. Safety Conference Nicosia , 27-28 April 2011
      316
      How can training assist in implementing safety regulations in European ATM?
      Presentation items
      Institute’s Mission
      Safety Management Training
      Safety Regulatory Training
      Future Safety Training
      Summary
    • 454. Safety Conference Nicosia , 27-28 April 2011
      317
      Institute Mission
      To provide education, transfer of knowledge, awareness and communication to ATS Organisations and ATM Regulators in Member States of EUROCONTROL based on expressed stakeholder needs.
      To support the implementation of the Single European Sky, SESAR and ATM Regulation as required.
      To work in partnership with stakeholders to improve ATM Training in Europe.
      The Institute is an integral part of the Agency’s Directorate Network Management (DNM) as its Training Division and a recognised Centre of Excellence for the development, delivery and improvement of ATM Training expertise in Europe.
    • 455. Safety Conference Nicosia , 27-28 April 2011
      318
      DNM Training Division at IANS in Luxemburg
      is an important element
      to keep Pan-European ATM Network operations
      safe, efficient and highly competent
      For ANSPs and FABs
      ensure knowledge and competence
      to meet
      ATM performance targets
      through common training products
      For Regulators and States
      ensure knowledge and competence
      to regulate and oversee
      ATM through common training products
    • 456. Safety Conference Nicosia , 27-28 April 2011
      319
      ATM TrainingWork Programme 2011
      Network Operations Training Programme
      Flight Efficiency Training Programme
      CNS and ATC Deployment Coordination Training support
      Safety Management Training Programme
      Regulatory Training Programme
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      Safety Management Training Portfolio
      Awareness courses
      E-Learning - Introduction to Safety Management Systems
      Describes the principles of Safety Management
      Safety Management System in ATM
      Practical implementation of an SMS to improve awareness of safety roles and responsibilities
      Safety Assessment Methodology
      Principal stages undertaken during a system safety assessment and the connection with a SMS
      Average duration of each course: 4.5 days.
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      Safety Management Training Portfolio
      Specialist Courses
      Human Factors for Safety Actors
      Fundamentals of HF - designed for a wide audience
      ATM Occurrence Investigation
      Gathering of facts, analysis, conclusions and recommendations
      Investigation Tools
      TOKAI - Tool kit to support the complete investigation process
      Safety Survey
      The role of surveys: survey model, process, methods and techniques
      Safety Assessment for Practitioners
      Practical exercises to understand how to demonstrate the safety of changes and services complemented by a Software Safety and Safety Case Course.
      Average duration of each course: 4.5 days.
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      SMS E-LEARNING
      Intro-Module
      Safety Assessment
      (Level 1)
      SMS
      Human
      Factors
      Survey
      Safety Assessment
      (Level 2)
      AOI
      Tools
      Safety
      Case
      Software
      Safety Management Training 2011
      Awareness Courses
      Specialist Courses
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      Course Delivery Format
      COACHING
      ON-SITE
      CLASSROOM / REGIONAL
      Tailor-made Courses
      On-Request Courses
      Public Courses
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      Safety Management Training - Statistics
      Safety Management Training delivered by the Institute since 1998
      Safety Management Training portfolio responds to user needs expressed by EUROCONTROL Safety Team complementary to the Safety Programmes (ESP and ESP+) and in support to safety regulatory requirements for ANSPs.
      Currently about 45 Safety Management courses delivered per year
      More than 700 requests for safety management course participation per year
      Safety Training currently represents about 35% of the entire Institute training portfolio
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      Safety Regulatory Training - NSA Training Initiative
      Directed to the National Supervisory Authorities / Competent Authorities
      In support to Safety Regulation (SRC, EASA)
      Specialist training package to support the Member states’ requirement to “ensure specific training for those involved in safety oversight activities within their structure”(Article 11b Commission Regulation (EC) 1315/2007).
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      NSA Training Initiative
      Core NSA Tasks (mandatory)
      Introduction to Single European Sky
      The Role of the NSA
      Audit Techniques And Practice
      Specialist Function Courses (mandatory 3 out of 4 modules)
      Oversight of Occurrence Reporting and Investigation Arrangements
      Oversight of Safety Management Arrangements
      Oversight of Competence Arrangements for ATM Staff
      Oversight of Safety-related Changes to ATM Systems
      Time to complete 6 modules with work commitments – approx 2.5 years
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      NSA Training Initiative
      Introduction to
      Single European Sky
      • 2.5 year program
      • 465. Modular courses
      • 466. Examined
      • 467. Endorsed by the Safety Regulation Commission
      • 468. In support of Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1315/2007
      Role of the NSA
      NSA Audit Techniques
      And Practice
      NSA Oversight ofOccurrence Reporting andInvestigation Arrangements
      NSA Oversight ofCompetence Arrangementsfor ATM Staff
      NSA Oversight ofSafety ManagementArrangements
      NSA Oversight ofSafety-related Changesto an ATM System
      Average duration of each course module: 4.5 days
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      NSA Training Initiative - Statistics
      NSA Training Initiative launched in January 2009
      Currently more than 500 requests for NSA course participation per year…
      ... of which 150+ participants enrolled for the complete NSA TI 6 course module programme
      So far 11 participants graduated (certificate of achievement received)- this number will now increase rapidly
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      Future Safety Training Courses (2012+)
      Safety Management
      Investigation Techniques and Tools (EC Regulation 996/2010)
      Just Culture (new)
      Safety Performance Indicators (new)
      Safety Regulation
      Interoperability (EC Regulation 552/2004) (new)
      Safety Performance Monitoring (new)
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      Summary
      About 35% of the Institute’s Training activities focus on ATM Safety (SMS and Safety Regulation)
      Ca. 1100+ participants apply for safety training courses per year
      Training audience: ANSP staff and Regulators (NSAs)
      Institute sets Training standards for safety related tasks in ATM:
      Common Core Content Training exists for ATCOs and ATSEPs
      Common Core Content Training for Regulatory Oversight (NEW?)
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      More Information on Safety Training at the Institute
      EUROCONTROL Website:
      http://www.eurocontrol.int/articles/training-institute-ians
      Or at:
      Course Reservation Office
      EUROCONTROL Institute of Air Navigation Services
      12, rue Antoine de Saint-Exupery
      L-1432 Luxembourg
      LUXEMBOURG
      ians.reservation@eurocontrol.int
      Tel. +352 43.60.61.205