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  • There are unique characteristics to a crisis response – which one initially experiences as “chaos”.To address those characteristics you have to have methods and means that facilitate solutions that support complex decision-making - through acquiring, using, and integrating meaningful information to restore order and minimize the events consequences.
  • Large-Scale Responses are a chaos event - cha·os (ks) – according to the on-line Free Dictionary: n.1. A condition or place of great disorder or confusion.2. A disorderly mass; a jumble: The desk was a chaos of papers and unopened letters.3. often Chaos The disordered state of unformed matter and infinite space supposed in some cosmogonic views to have existed before the ordered universe.4. Mathematics A dynamical system that has a sensitive dependence on its initial conditions.5. Obsolete An abyss; a chasm.[Middle English, formless primordial space, from Latin, from Greek khaos.]cha·otic (-tk) adj.cha·oti·cal·ly adv.So here’s how I think of tackling chaos – and here’s how I will share with you information and opportunities as we all think about or prepare for the next set of unfortunate circumstances that result in a large-scale response which by its very nature, is ‘chaotic’…..(the adjective)Large –Scale responses have the same characteristics as ‘crisis emergencies’ – as distinguished from ‘routine emergencies’ – some of the best work being done in this area is by Howitt and Leonard and the people at NPLI/Harvard….I will talk about some of their notions, shameless suggest you read their work on it in ‘managing crises, responses to large-scale emergencies. That is because before we can talk about large-scale response, we have to break it down to it’s unique elements….once we do that, we can design for complex and layered decision-making, all of which relies heavily on generating meaningful information and requires understanding the stakeholders’ needs – the last area is where social media can be best used to accelerate the return to order or adapt to a new normal.Photo is from the 26th floor of the World Financial Center on 13 Sept looking down on GZ.
  • Large-Scale Responses are a chaos event - cha·os (ks) – according to the on-line Free Dictionary: n.1. A condition or place of great disorder or confusion.2. A disorderly mass; a jumble: The desk was a chaos of papers and unopened letters.3. often Chaos The disordered state of unformed matter and infinite space supposed in some cosmogonic views to have existed before the ordered universe.4. Mathematics A dynamical system that has a sensitive dependence on its initial conditions.5. Obsolete An abyss; a chasm.[Middle English, formless primordial space, from Latin, from Greek khaos.]cha·otic (-tk) adj.cha·oti·cal·ly adv.So here’s how I think of tackling chaos – and here’s how I will share with you information and opportunities as we all think about or prepare for the next set of unfortunate circumstances that result in a large-scale response which by its very nature, is ‘chaotic’…..(the adjective)Large –Scale responses have the same characteristics as ‘crisis emergencies’ – as distinguished from ‘routine emergencies’ – some of the best work being done in this area is by Howitt and Leonard and the people at NPLI/Harvard….I will talk about some of their notions, shameless suggest you read their work on it in “Managing Crises, Responses to Large-Scale Emergencies”. That is because before we can talk about large-scale response, we have to break it down to it’s unique elements….once we do that, we can design for complex and layered decision-making, all of which relies heavily on generating meaningful information and requires understanding the stakeholders’ needs – the last area is where social media can be best used to accelerate the return to order or adapt to a new normal.Photo is from the 26th floor of the World Financial Center on 13 Sept looking down on GZ.
  • Howitt and Leonard from NPLI Harvard evaluated 15 case studies and define emergencies as Crisis emergencies (Mode C) and Routine Emergencies (Mode R)…..The first notion I want to put in front of you gets us thinking about what we mean by a large scale response – it’s a loose term – and there’s two ways to think about it – One is just plain large…and the other focus more on Crisis complexity – when I use large-scale response I use it as it applies to a response with significant complexity – one which ArnHowitt and Herman ‘Dutch’ Leonard have described as a “mode C” or “Crisis Emergency.Routine emergencies on the other hand – have some resemblance to a script or prior incident for those who are experienced in disaster response – it still takes expertise, but Mode C goes beyond what even those who are the most seasoned and experienced in response would expect – there are significant earthquakes, tornadoes, floods – any one of which is significant, with loss of life, and devastation of lives and livelihoods –even on a large-scale where resources are stretched thin, conditions are difficult, and support and sustainment a struggle. In Mode C : not even the experts have dealt with them or “seen it before” – and those who are amazing in handling a difficult Mode R response may actually not be suited for the Mode C crisis where innovation, and a high-degree of adaptability, and even a different leadership style where individuals are more able to deal with uncertainty, and standard organizational response constructs need to be modified to meet the unique needs of the situation .“Organizations that perform well in a routine emergency environment are based on well-defined, well-developed, and ingrained expertise about he nature of emergencies of this type, on the knowledge of how to handle them, and on the skills necessary to deploy that knowledge. This expertise is at once substantive, procedural, and organizational. It gets even more complicated when crises ‘emerge’ from some seemingly ‘normal’ (though not desired) sets of circumstances – the severe acute respiratory system (SARS) incident that really challenged Canada in particular is an example – hard to distinguish form a normal ‘bad’ state of the flu, to a unique situation requiring a different set of tools.
  • Most incidents fall within the routine – police, fire and ems calls…even most oil spills and hazardous substance releases. Of the approx 10,000 fires that the Forest Service deals with in a typical year, over 95% are controlled at the initial attack level.Most are handled in the ‘stem’ of the planning p – handled by experienced responders with standard internal practices and procedures. This has degrees: with experienced incident commanders, even a pretty challenging initial response of some scale can be resolved in the ‘initial response’. As complexity increases: multi-entities engaged that require coordination, multiple skill sets required beyond span and control of normal municipality service, challenging operational situation, additional layers of involvement (city, state, federal, private sector), responses that exceed scope of the initial response organization, or extended impact to other domains (modes of transportation, municipalities) – the more complexity the more coordination and “deliberateness” required. If there are incidents within a ‘planned event’ structure then a more complex system is already in place – even then, incidents can be resolved without needing to evoke all the elements of the events pre-staged response and planning entity.And there are many examples, which response professionals know all to well, that start as routine and ‘small-scale’ but either reveal themselves to be more complex, or by the nature of the incident evolve to become more complex. Let’s look at a couple of examples an use them to start to talk about complex responses, and ultimately the role of harnessing and distributing information.
  • For Crisis emergencies, three key elements need to be more deliberately integrated into the response for mitigating the consequences of crisis emergencies:Understanding the attributes of Large-Scale response particularly focusing on novelty, complexity, distributed consequences, and then just a mention of just not having enough of the right kinds of things – either they don’t exist, or there are not enough.Howitt and Leonard of Harvard’s National Preparedness Leadership Initiative – talk about large-scale emergencies in perhaps the clearest terms – they differ from ‘routine emergencies’ in their novelty, which means they will not be familiar to even those with response experience – think Anthrax, think WTC, think DWH with the uncontrolled release at depths never experienced…complexity, where the variables are appearing in sequences or a manner that compounds the situation…and distributed consequences, where the effects of the incident are felt across numerous areas, domains, industries, and impacted communities. Regardless of the novelty, complexity, distributed consequences, or insufficient quantities of specialized equipment, it is essential to GASP – Get a System In Place Quickly – one that the response community knows – the National Incident Command System – it will not prove in itself to be sufficient – but it is necessary. Additional functional elements and systems need to be considered to augment it in the case of responses requiring, layered complex decision-making.Sustainably staff it – DWH responsewas impacted tremendously by slow recognition that this incident required massive influx’s of capable individuals for an extended period of time – initially, first few days, the never-fail blowout preventer – didn’t – but it did fail and it was underneath a burning/highly unstable damaged rig, that collapsed, and leaked oil at an unprecedented depth. Those in the New Orleans response new what was going on but getting national level and international level support (BP), and enough individuals with unique skills for this degree of novelty and complexity – was challenging. It was viewed as a ‘regional’ issue but ultimately required every piece of boom that could possibly be identified and shipped, often with Governor’s of other states objecting to being ‘stripped’ of their line of defense for potential crises. Ultimately, the President himself had to order the CG to triple the number of Coast Guard personnel responding – which forced ships to change schedules, units to operate below sustainable levels, and senior level decisions on highest levels of risk tolerance with respect to the other safety missions around the country – the entire CG was stripped of people and equipment – ship schedules and cycles dramatically altered – we were on a wartime footing – wrt the CG internal ops. Other smaller critical response agencies, such as NOAA who provide extraordinary technical expertise, were equally impacted. The National Incident Command structure was put in place, and national level interagency coordination and direct engagement by the Congress and the White House was required on a continuous basis. Similarly, the responsible party, BP, had to recognize they couldn’t ‘delegate’ this to the local BP office – and had to engage with all the corporate tools (claims, legal, technical, operational, fiduciary) that could be brought to bear from throughout their international organization, and then some.In another example, anthrax did not just hit capitol hill, it hit x locations in the united states via 5 letters that cross-contaminated unrelated mail throughout the mail system as well as postal sorting equipment in multiple locations For WTC – the entire city, and every first responder who ever lived, wanted to be there to help – keeping people away (safe) was the challenge.NIMS has proven
  • More complex incidents move to the Stem and a Planning needs to move ahead of operations (doing) – what are your objectives for any given period, how are you organized for sustaining (resources, tempo, schedules) – moves the response to a process that has some ‘predictability’, where resources can be brought in with a deliberate purpose, people can take shifts, the right equipment ordered, information passed on deliberate cycles, and key decision-makers can align. Until planning gets ahead of operations, you are truly in chaos. NIMS gets you there – but for the truly complex, it is not enough…and then there are the game-changers….which have additional layers of complexity. When the unthinkable (not necessarily unimagined) can happenLook at what this means with respect to information and decision-making through the lenses of actual incidents. These are events that resulted in radical changes in response on a national and international scale.Anyone ever hear of Hurricane Pam?... Levee weakness identified just prior to Hurricane Katrina in Hurricane ‘Pam’ Exercise Scenario – the ‘too hard’ problem was not able to be addressed and levee failure difficult to imagine…yet some key lessons learned from the exercise were able to be incorporated and as tragic as it was, quick implementation of those lessons prevented worse outcomes.More notably, Hurricane Katrina – spawned the NRF – substantive changes were made in the role, capabilities, and functions of FEMA – its limitations at the time were as much an artifact of the 9-11 incident – and the standup of DHS with turbulence and unresolved organizational alignment, normal for any ‘company’ that is under a significant merger – unresolved and contentious issues on Administration roles, decision-making, and distribution of functions and responsibilities – DHS took 28 separate agencies under its roof – it was a merger, acquisition, start-up, and …. All at once. In 2005, DHS was two years old – amazing progress had been made but the work was challenging – one of the most contentious items at the time was integrating FEMA and the discussion of roles and responsibilities – dedicated field personnel did their best….Fran Townsend discusses this in her report to the President “The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina – Lessons Learned” dated Feb 20069-11 – spawned DHSAnthrax Attacks using the US Postal Service as a Weapons Delivery System – changed our entire sense of vulnerability.And Deepwater Horizon altered our societal risk equation when industrial operations began to be conducted in unprecedented environments and the new notions of technological fallibility and regulatory limits – forcing a new look at a 40 year old law and the defining regulation in oil, chemical, and hazardous substances response – the National Contingency Plan. It spawned a substantive evolution of the role of the National Incident Commander, and forced a relook at how a national level response brokering finite resources, manages a complex distributed structure of response management across multiple independent jurisdictions – five states (with Republican governors working with a Democratic administration), xx parishes and county-like municipalities – numerous adaptations developed that are now being worked to codify and capture. As former Assistant Secretary for State and Local at DHS, Juliette Kayyem, put it in a Boston Globe editorial, ‘there were two different responses; one operational and one political. The ground rules that had guided oil-spill response for two decades were exposed as politically infeasible – even though it was those ground rules that guided the entire response from start to finish.’ In over 35 years of the NCP governing response, this incident proved the most challenging under the current law and regulatory system – and the response system, training, and preparation – currently in place.Game-Changer: Attribute to Mary Landry, who used the term in the context of DWH, and Juliette Kayyam who popularized it in a Boston Globe op-ed… “There is a game-changer”. - the blowout preventer, the 100-percent foolproof device to shut off the oil from the undersea well – had, well, failed.
  • The United States Congress chartered the FIRESCOPE project in 1972 and directed the Forest Service to assist the Southern California fire agencies in a program to review research, development and applications. The original acronym stood for FIrefighting Resources of Southern California Organized for Potential Emergencies. The initial focus was directed toward the annual wildland fire problem.• INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM (ICS) for improving incident management.• MULTI-AGENCY COORDINATION SYSTEM (MACS) for improving multi-agency coordination for major or multiple incidents. Day to day program management.The program's foundation revolved around (1) improving fireground operations, (2) increasing the effectiveness of fire protection agencies, and (3) improving multi-agency coordination. NIMSallows you to orient is a notion presented in Chief Cynthia Renaud’s recent piece in the Journal of Homeland Security, “The Missing Piece of NIMS: Teaching Incident Commanders How to Function in the Edge of Chaos”…in the June 2012 edition.As a side note: she observes that in order to move a situation out of chaos you need a way to make sense of it – Western thinkers focus on finding the answer to a problem. Eastern thinkers focus on identifying and defining the question.I have observed another differentiated approach unique to the cultural orientation of agencies and organizaitons - associated with their relative framework for ‘bias for action’. (actual examples stated) In general, one agency evaluates an operational option and questions, “does the book say I can do it” while another posits “does the book say I can’t do it”. While NIMS does not normalize this difference in response operations, I have observed that it serves to move different organizational response cultures closer to the ‘middle’ when operating together. It also helps leadership understand how to manage certain inherent tensions as complex response unfolds.
  • There are different types of differentiating crisis emergencies, Capitol Hill Anthrax response is an example of novel circumstanceswhich created a high degree of complexity…and required adapted structures – in this case the Postal Service established a unified incident command and the predesignated FOSC (EPA) supported them. On Capitol Hill, the EPA supported the Capitol Police Board who was the leadership of the response – with an appointed IC and Deputy IC….House Sargeantat Arms, Senate Sargeantat Arms, Cap Hill Police Chief, and Architect of the Capitol….used an effective preexisting decision-making body, with an IC support structure, where EPA worked within the National Contingency Plan framework role of FOSC for fiduciary obligations managed within it – collaboratively. A lot of adaptations – necessary to preserve continuity of government – keep capitol hill operating, preserve continuity of government and, and manage an amazingly unique situation. It required adjusted structures, built substantively on known frameworks…and it worked – while revealing challenges never before encountered in response operations (examples cited).
  • When there is no playbook – create one by building on what you do have and know: EPAand National Strike Force had been building a body of capability through remediation of abandoned and biologically contaminated tanneries in upstate NY and other locations – entry, decon, mitigation, sampling, etc.. In these cases, you show up and you are already behind…experience allows you to adapt faster and gives you a mental map and set of experiences from which you can then adapt the response of these circumstances. Experience matters, in leadership and at the tactical level. You ‘know’ more than you initially think – requires seeking solutions from other disciplines.Medical community had decon methods that could be adapted, USAMRID had sampling protocols – it became an issue of throughput and scale but the methods were there.Honor and be guided by the fundamentals (examples cited).Experienced response professionals know when there are ‘differences’ from the norm – strong leaders in this discipline then focus on managing the differences (examples cited).
  • When there is no playbook – build on the framework you have and adapt….
  • Another situation that characterizes a Crisis Emergency is ‘unprecedented consequences’ – a scale that people just can’t imagine….in this case The World Trade Center attack on Ground Zero – which itself was in the context as one of three locations attacked. In this case, again there is no script – unique skills are required to even ‘begin’ to address the complexity of this crisis response – in this case, the galvanizing effect that help take everyone out of shock, was leadership and the senior most elected leader of our government, rolling up his sleeves and doing something we think of when we recall ‘winston Churchill’s war efforts’….at that moment, it was not politics…The collective emotional tide turned when President Bush – impromptu – picked up the bullhorn and addressed the workers at ground zero – “I can hear you - and those who did this will soon hear from all of us”. In a sea of emotional confusion – he gave everyone a common purpose – we will not be defeated, we will find those who did it, we will punish them, and we will be the ‘victors’.Ground Zero experiences verbally cited.
  • An Exercise Scenario held a few months before Hurricane Katrina had included a catastrophic levee failure into the scenario – Hurricane Pam – only recourse was early and complete evacuation – NOLA and Louisiannaissued evac order 24 hrs ahead but were unable to get the most compromised members of society to safety – over 2000 individuals died – mostly those who were elderly, medically compromised, and low income without transportation capabilities. More would have perished had lessons from the exercise scenario not been incorporated.US came very close to exercising the only federal option at the time for federal govt usurping state role and authorities – the Insurrection Act.Historical context important to remember in evaluating this event: federal role was limited to support to the state, when asked, with very defined and deliberate mechanisms – FEMA also had been absorbed only 2 years earlier into DHS – FEMA no longer an independent agency reporting directly to the WH, DH structure called for FEMA to share its role of preparedness with DHS Staff elements – long-time FEMA career employees quit – FEMA leadership resisting transition actively – FEMA was in the area ready to assist in the provide what the state asks – State leadership and City leadership were overwhelmed and circumstances exceeded their ability to handle, unprecedented scope exceeded their experience base –impacted area responders were themselves victims – a perceived leadership vacuum at state and local level. Nascent and newly forming Principle Federal Officer and NIC concept had been discussed but not fully integrated into response system, doctrine, and training – DHS secretary and WH accelerated its implementation - used it to regain control of the response from outside the region – ADM Allen picked as the NIC (was Chief of Staff for the CG at the time – known for a bias for action, leadership in the face of operational complexity, and strong communication skills – ability to lead locally and nationally, and collaborate with elected leaders). Fundamentally, neither the pre-DHS or the post-DHS FEMA , were designed or prepared for this scenario. It drove a complete reengineering of national level preparedness – a retrospective from then to now is outside the scope of this discussion but it was not just FEMA that required redesigned, but the entire system needed to be overhauled including support mechanisms, authorities, cultural priorities, functions, legislation, tools, etc – work the White House would lead in its post-Katrina assessment and actions.The response was especially challenging in that there was an enormous information void – filled initially only by CG helicopter provided imagery of hoists and news helos and national guard helos of flooded cities. Sparse status reporting, and state and local senior leadership that many viewed as inadequate to manage a crisis of this magnitude.
  • FEMA took a hit but almost half of FEMA positions were unfilled – an enormous vacancy rate following the standup of DHS and the move of FEMA from a direct report to the WH to one of 22 federal agencies moved into the new DHS – employees voted with their feet – in 2005 fema had only 2500 employees. One study describes it at the time as a ‘turbulent drama of bureaucratic displacement and discontent”. The NRP adopted only 6 months earlier (Dec 04) – adopted new term incident of national significance – not clear how an INS was declared – and once invoked set in motion ‘complex array’ of incident management activities – DHS homeland security ops center, Fema NRC responsible for coordination, incident info sharing, op planning, and deployment of fed resources…interagency incident mgmt group , senior fed departmentiand agency officials expected to provide strategic incident management planning and coordination – a lot of demand for info – little commonality on important info prioritization– highly reactive vs proactive/could not get out ‘in front’ of info – JFO at field level was to coordinate fed assistance…add to this new and unfamiliar structure and the mysterious PFO role that few understood and had never been actually invoked prior to this…..FEMA set up by law as a ‘assist by request’ via 15 ESFs vsproactive partner – laborious process of linear progression to get to ‘fed assistance’ – intended to honor soverientyof local and states who do not ‘report’ to the fed. No governor reports to the president – assumes a strong state leadership team with some crisis experience– Louisianna was not viewed as such at the time…contrast that with Florida and Govbush who was viewed as a strong and disciplined leader in crisis and was directly engaged in the command post with his key Emergency Management professionals…such as craigfugate who was his emergency mgr at the time.Even without Pam, state federal and local officilas had other plans they turned to.Issue was contention between city and state, state and fed, and lack of leadership capable of managing crisis at the city and state level.Plans heavily depended on evacuation – with parishes taking responsibiilty for each of their areas for coordinating evacuation…Terry Ebbert, city’s director of hs “we always knew we did not have the means to evacuate the city”…the response plan depended on prevention…The "Hurricane Pam" simulation, the week-long exercise outsourced to FEMA contractors in July 2004, "brought sustained winds of 120 mph, up to 20 inches of rain in parts of southeast Louisiana and storm surge that topped levees in the New Orleans area. More than one million residents evacuated and Hurricane Pam destroyed 500,000-600,000 buildings." [1][2]"Pam's mock damage, spread over 13 Louisiana parishes, was extensive. Phone and sewer services were knocked out, chemical plants flooded. About 200 miles of road lay under at least 10 feet of water. About 175,000 people were injured, 200,000 became sick, and more than 60,000 were killed ... About 1,000 shelters would be needed for evacuees. The shelters would need to stay open 100 days, but state resources could only keep them stocked for five days at most. ... With many residents stranded by floodwaters, boats would be needed for about 20,000 rescues. Helicopters would be needed for 1,000 more rescues." And a "catastrophic flood ... would leave swaths of southeast Louisiana uninhabitable for more than a year." [3][4]The last "Hurricane Pam" training exercise was completed August 24, 2005, less than a week before Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, Penny Brown Roberts reported September 12, 2005, in The Advocate."'It's eerie how close it is,'" said MadhuBeriwal, founder, president, and CEO of Innovative Emergency Management Inc., comparing "Hurricane Pam" to Hurricane Katrina. IEM "led a team of three firms"--URS Group, Inc. and Dewberry--"that created the simulation, working under contract for the Federal Emergency Management Agency." [5]The report produced following "Hurricane Pam" was "designed to be the first step toward producing a comprehensive hurricane response plan, jointly approved and implemented by federal, state and city officials," the Associated Press reported September 9, 2005. "But a lack of funding prohibited planners from quickly following up on the 2004 simulation. ... 'Money was not available to do the follow-up'," then FEMA director Michael D. Brown said.State health officials said the exercise had helpedthem better prepare for evacuation of hospital patientsand special needs people.23 Since Pam was a catastrophichurricane with flooding of New Orleans, it requiredthem to consider the issue of evacuating New Orleanshospitals and the Superdome’s special needs shelter.24Subsequent to the exercise, medical officials held planningsessions focused on post-landfall care and evacuation.The contingency plan for the medical component wasalmost complete when Katrina made landfall.25 Officialssaid although the plan was not yet fi nalized, it provedinvaluable to the response effort.26Further, in the aftermath of Katrinathe state had also agreed to learn and exercisea unified command through the incident commandsystem.39 Wells said the state did not do so, which led tomajor command and control problems during Katrina.
  • But it was in the post-Katrina review, that the government’s methods and capabilities for large scale response were called into question, and ws the cause for action for it to be substantially revamped in the largest revamp of the overall response system since the Stafford Act and the FWPCA and amendments that brought n the National Contingency Plan.Focus on Chapter Six – (abbreviated quotation from the report)‘After reviewing and analyzing the response toHurricane Katrina, we identified seventeen specificlessons the Federal government has learned. Theselessons, which flow from the critical challenges weencountered, are depicted in the accompanying text box.Fourteen of these criticalchallenges were highlighted inthe preceding Week of Crisis section and range fromhigh-level policy and planning issues (e.g., theIntegrated Useof Military Capabilities) to operationalmatters (e.g., Search and Rescue).‘Three otherchallenges – Training, Exercises, and Lessons Learned;Homeland Security Professional Development andEducation; and Citizen and Community Preparedness –are interconnected to the others but reflect measures and institutions that improve our preparedness more broadly.These three [are] discussed in the Report’s last chapter, Transforming National Preparedness.Some of these seventeen critical challenges affectedall aspects of the Federal response. Others had an impact on aspecific, discrete operational capability. Yet each, particularly when taken in aggregate, directly affected the overallefficiency and effectiveness of our efforts. This chapter summarizes the challenges that ultimately led to the lessonswe have learned. Over one hundred recommendations for corrective action flow from these lessons and are outlinedin detail in Appendix A of the Report.
  • A different authority governed DWH: The National Contingency Plan is not the same as the Stafford Act. Difference between a Disaster, and a “release of oil or hazardous materials into the environment…NRP proved insufficient – the National Response Framework (post 2005) helped bridge the gap….fundamental difference is that in a natural disaster there is no Responsible Party – ‘’God” has yet to file for corporate status….under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act – there is a responsible entity – someone who was deemed responsible for putting it there, and someone who is now responsible for getting it out (and paying for it)….
  • Boom Wars….Juliette Kayyam
  • Under NRP Agency Reps were delegated responsibility to make decisions on behalf of their agencies – proved in effective as the intense and extraordinary political engagement and complex issues required Cabinet level and White House leadership and capabilities to resolve. vEry unique for this to happen in an oil spill. NCP - adequate for most circumstances but not the truly complex large scale response
  • Ground Zero - familiar strong state role with Fed govt funding – a clear ‘enemy’ where anger could be redirected. CoscoBusan – the oil tanker that hit the San Francisco Bay Bridge - inability to quickly redirect the energy of a environmentally sensitive and proactive citizenry who wanted to help. Responders were stretched to cover it and gaps and delays further enraged a highly concerned population who was being held at ‘arms length’.– slow to adapt to need for flattened structure and dispersed decision-making; limited resources fueled fragmentation; lack of a COP a significant liability. National Contingency Plan responses with Responsible Party not well understood outside of response community; very different than Stafford Act responses – issues magnified by scale and complexity – role of federal, state govt, and a private industry “RP” not aligned with expectations of a general public more familiar with strong state role in stafford act responses. Scope of incident, technical novelty and complexity, no precedent, - spurred further evolution of the NRF and evolution of a strong NIC and direct WH/whole of government involvement
  • Large-Scale Responses are a chaos event - cha·os (ks) – according to the on-line Free Dictionary: n.1. A condition or place of great disorder or confusion.2. A disorderly mass; a jumble: The desk was a chaos of papers and unopened letters.3. often Chaos The disordered state of unformed matter and infinite space supposed in some cosmogonic views to have existed before the ordered universe.4. Mathematics A dynamical system that has a sensitive dependence on its initial conditions.5. Obsolete An abyss; a chasm.[Middle English, formless primordial space, from Latin, from Greek khaos.]cha·otic (-tk) adj.cha·oti·cal·ly adv.So here’s how I think of tackling chaos – and here’s how I will share with you information and opportunities as we all think about or prepare for the next set of unfortunate circumstances that result in a large-scale response which by its very nature, is ‘chaotic’…..(the adjective)Large –Scale responses have the same characteristics as ‘crisis emergencies’ – as distinguished from ‘routine emergencies’ – some of the best work being done in this area is by Howitt and Leonard and the people at NPLI/Harvard….I will talk about some of their notions, shameless suggest you read their work on it in ‘managing crises, responses to large-scale emergencies. That is because before we can talk about large-scale response, we have to break it down to it’s unique elements….once we do that, we can design for complex and layered decision-making, all of which relies heavily on generating meaningful information and requires understanding the stakeholders’ needs – the last area is where social media can be best used to accelerate the return to order or adapt to a new normal.Photo is from the 26th floor of the World Financial Center on 13 Sept looking down on GZ.
  • We talked about the foundational element of establishing an incident management structure.But to implement effective response we need to define, and continually redefine, what the information requirements are for each of the stakeholders,Collect and distribute that informatinThrough proactive engagement at all levels,Then revalidate and refresh – understand if they are no longer adequate, have changed, or soemthing else is needed – using deliberate mechansims….CDR Erich Telfer has done a thorough analysis of that in a year long study of DWH’s information requirements and methodology – the value of his work is that he looked at the problem set through the lenses of an alternative discipline, Intelligence Collection and Dissemination….this is a highly defined area with protocols, techniques, and technology – and absent some particular methods which can’t be discussed in open forums – the methodology and discipline of establishing the requirements and aligning them with tools is absolutely parallel to large-scale response.And I would add one other note from this graphic – information is not just collected to be effective, it must be distributed at various levels….engaging those impacted in a proactive communication cycle, that collects what they need for info, and includes them in appropriate levels of decision-making is significant. Admiral Allen, Captains Laferriere, Austin, and McPherson led that charge – they went out into the field, listened to the affected populations and their leadership, flattened the organization to allow them act more rapidly, collaborate as part of the response, and refine the information needs and response actions – they modified the organizational levels creating Branches in the Parishes, set up sepearate Incident Command Structures with FOSC authority elevated to National Level in the states and region and redelegated authority to locally based equally empowered Incident Commanders in Mobile and Florida…..for Florida/Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisianna – it provided a direct mechanism for Gov’s to engage, as well as counties, and local emergency response officials – in distributed and localized ways all fed back to the FOSC, Area Commander where the toughest decisions were brokering limited national asset resources. This became a bit more possible as the incident went along and some COP emerged. Lesson Learned: Make visible changes when info streams are failing. – distribute decision-making with strong Area Command functionality.How you handle information will depend on whether you are operating in ‘routine’ emergency characteristics or ‘Crisis emergency’ – these steps apply to both – how you do it defers between the two.And as we consider information, we are talking about the various ways one communicates….pictures, videos, one on one, community outreach, as part of response interactions, written materials, posted materials, analysis, write-ups, interviews, meetings….Everyone needs it _ in DWH all equities needed ‘eyes on’ the gulf to assess and operate (also media to communicate) – Adm Allen’s biggest concern – safety of airspace – numerous near-misses – (not to mention inefficiencies) – worked with WH and got national designation to control the airspace (TAO?....get name of this process) see Erich’s paper.
  • Common orientation – efficient sharing of infoConsistency – everyone is considering the same data, picture, status.Tightly manage resource locations, inventory, deployment, mobilization and eliminate waste, duplication, ineffienciesSpeed up assessment and facilitate decision-making – a lot of information can be conveyed and synthesized in unique and dynamic ways.The urge for everyone to ‘rush’ to the scene to ‘see’ what is happening is enormous, and human nature. In DWH, everyone responders, media, elected leaders, scientists all wanted to get into the air where they could get the broad view and “see it”….there were 8 near-miss midair collisions in DWH – it was Adm Allen’s top priority when he got there. He got presidential approval for a DOD Air Tasking Order and took control of the airspace. There was no COP or feed to help those people who needed it – developed near the end…but in the meantime, there was no question they needed it. They were just endangered getting it….had a better COP been in place from the beginning, one that was accurate and in which everyone has confidence, some of the air needs might have been reduced…we’ll also talk about a need to build information requirements management into the process in a bit…
  • Mirror the Intel Communities Priority Intel Requirement Process.HSIN is improving but it has limited accessibility.
  • Proposed by Buoy Tender Commanding Officers tasked with surface oil collection – post incident studyU.S. Coast Guard, John Kennedy, ed., Deepwater Horizon Response Surface Operations: A Case Study Prepared by Participating WLB Commanding Officers.” (Expanded after action report, Unpublished. December 2010, 43)…as summarized in Figure 16 of Telfer, Erich, Unlimited Impossibilities: Intelligence Support to the Deepwater Horizon Response, Figure 16, (Unpublished 13 Apr 2012).
  • Mark Cameron, et. al, in the paper Emergency Situation Awareness from Twitter for Crisis Management breaks down social media monitoring needs of emergency managers and first responders into 5 distinct areas.The need to: Detect unexpected or unusual incidents, possibly ahead of official communications; Condense and summarize messages about an incident maintaining awareness of aggregated content without having to read individual messages; Classify and review high-value messages during an incident (e.g. messages describing infrastructure damage or cries for help); and understand the impact of an incident on people and infrastructure; Identify, track, and manage issues within an incident as they arise, develop, and conclude; pro-actively identify and manage issues that may last for hours, days or weeks; Perform forensic analysis of incidents by analysing social media content from before, during, and after an incident.Their solution is the “Emergency Situation Awareness–Automated Web Text Mining” (ESA-AWTM) system.
  • Erich completed one of the most comprehensive reviews of information mgmt and subsequently information requirements and issues to resolve that I have seen from any response review. Information management is in virtually every after action report and every ‘hotwash’ – who didn’t know what when, why, the consequences of this lack of ubiquitous information mgmt and clarity of the situation, what we call situational awareness, the one think everyone needs in a response operation. We’ll here first his assessment and analysis which I believe lays out some very concrete actions that, if taken, could significantly improve information management in response operations.I’ll then touch briefly on information management in a broader context – challenges and opportunitiesBut I would like to spend the bulk of my time talking about decision-making in Large Scale Crises, what is different, how do we improve this – certain accurate information for all levels of decision making is essential – which is why you need to talk about one with the other – but I believe the area of decision-making warrants some solid awareness, discussion, and process improvements – and some good work is being done in that area. You can have access and availability of all kinds of information but it must feed a decision-making structure that is appropriately designed for the scale of the response – and, more importantly, the complexity of the response – complexity is as much a differentiator as ‘size’ or scope.
  • When the Deepwater Horizon rig exploded and began gushing crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010, mapping divisions at the Interior Department, the Environmental Protection Agency and numerous other agencies all had a stake in providing timely, accurate information.Each division was building those maps inside its own servers, however, and there was no single place where they shared all their mapping data, EPA Geospatial Information Officer Jerry Johnston told Nextgov. Often geographic information systems leaders had to call or email each other to see if someone else already had built a map they could use, or to offer up a map they'd built.The Deepwater spill was a major impetus for Geoplatform.gov, a governmentwide GIS portal that will allow federal agencies to share maps in an easily searchable format across government and with the public.An early version of Geoplatform.gov is up now, housed inside a General Services Administration-owned computer cloud that hosts the government data set repository Data.gov. A final version should be available around October, said Johnston, who is a member of the executive steering committee of the Federal Geographic Data Committee and is leading a crossagency team that is developing the initial version of the geospatial platform.Johnston envisions the site as a "governmentwide one-stop shop for access to . . . trusted and nationally consistent geographic data and services."For agencies, the site will offer a full slate of searchable maps built with authoritative government data, including a trove of metadata describing the maps' origin and level of detail. That means GIS professionals in one agency could rely on another agency's maps rather than build their own. Other times they'll be able to tweak a map -- what Johnston describes as adding a data layer -- without duplicating underlying data.Agencies have a variety of sharing options for maps within the geoplatform system, including totally public, government only, within an agency or to a specific set of users.The site also will give private sector and nonprofit Web and mobile developers a single access point for government data sets. The investment community, for instance, often sifts through EPA data about toxins releases and enforcement to determine which companies present the most environmentally friendly investments, Johnston said."The data will be available instantly over Web services, so people can bring the content into their own GIS systems and build applications with it," Johnston said. "They'll be able to do a lot of things with the data instantly."The geoplatform essentially is run on a modified in-house version of ArcGIS Online, a cloud-based mapping system the GIS company Esri is in the process of launching to federal agencies, companies and the public.Many federal agencies have software licensing agreements with Esri so they already are using ArcGIS Online or ArcGIS, its server-based predecessor. Geoplatform.gov will allow agencies that use other mapping software to view and manipulate maps inside the platform and to pull them into their own in-house systems, Johnston said. The fact that the geoplatform is housed in a GSA cloud rather than the public Amazon cloud that houses ArcGIS Online makes it a better fit for agencies concerned about security. Cloud hosting is also a boon to mapmakers, Johnston said, because they don't have to worry about building capacity for especially popular maps. An annual EPA map detailing the agency's enforcement activities, for instance, tends to spark a huge amount of Web views when it's first released, he said, as scholars and environmentalists pore through the data and as media reports link to the map. Those views decline significantly after a few weeks, he said. In the past, Johnston had to build extra capacity into his servers to handle those first few weeks of traffic. Now, he can simply rely on the cloud to scale up and down as demand for the map changes.By Joseph MarksFebruary 29, 2012http://www.nextgov.com/cloud-computing/2012/02/government-geoplatform-to-launch-by-october
  • Decision-makers struggle to get timely accurate information – the need to know is immediate, and insatiable - President Lincoln was so ultimately frustrated by the lack of information from his Cabinet secretary during the Civil War, which would ultimately be called the First Modern War, especially as the course of the war lingered and concerns elevated, he stationed himself almost continuously at the war office telegraph room and directly communicated with his field commanders; management by “t-mail”. The Civil War of 1861-1865 required a new communication system for use by the government and the armed forces. In 1861, the Union Army established the U.S. Military Telegraph Corps, led by a young railroad man named Andrew Carnegie. The next year alone, the U.S.M.T.C. trained 1,200 operators, strung 4,000 miles of telegraph wire and sent more than a million messages to and from the battlefield.President Lincoln was already very much aware of the value of the telegraph, and would order that it be set up quickly. A system of wires would be run throughout the northern states to connect all areas. Some areas would be covered by quickly set-up poles and wires by use of wagons, horses and men. The telegraph equipment would be portable. The President would nearly take personal command of the battle fronts through use of the telegraph. The White House never had telegraph wiring, but the nearby War Department building would be the location. The President spent hours in the telegraph office waiting for and sending messages. Stretched for on the ground – ‘reached for anything – decision makers at dhs went so far as to direct ice agents to put cameras on themselves and walk around, access areas, so they could ‘see’ something about what was happening at the ground level.We’ll talk about decision-making the role of the elected and appointed leaders later but at the core of the issue, it was a picture and video they needed. Everyone needs to ‘see’ it….President Lincoln ran the Civil War through T-mail….the teletype, he camped out at the teletype room of the and after learning some hard lessons – took firm control of the national picture and directly engaged his field commander generals – ultimately bypassing his secretary of war and the bureaucracy he felt was preventing him from leading. Plus the delay in transmission…
  • The Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) is a national secure and trusted web-based portal for information sharing and collaboration between federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, private sector, and international partners engaged in the homeland security mission.HSIN is made up of a growing network of communities, called Communities of Interest (COI). COIs are organized by state organizations, federal organizations, or mission areas such as emergency management, law enforcement, critical sectors, and intelligence. Users can securely share within their communities or reach out to other communities as needed. HSIN provides secure, real-time collaboration tools, including a virtual meeting space, instant messaging and document sharing. HSIN allows partners to work together instantly, regardless of their location, to communicate, collaborate, and coordinate.
  • Find science or academic attribution to this….
  • Dow Corning's 2006 "human element" campaign, depicting a person as a symbol on a pseudo-element of a periodic table, the element symbol Hu and atomic number 7E+09 indicative of the 7-billion human population in the 2010s.
  • Approx
  • Data, data everywhere…Monitoring Social Media During a CrisisPosted on May 17, 2012 | 12 CommentsPost by: Kim StephensImage via: http://www.onlinerepmanagement.com/2011/08/social-media-monitoring.htmlWhen it comes to social media, monitoring these networks is the biggest concern of emergency management organizations, and for good reason: the stream of user-generated content becomes a torrent the second a crisis happens. I’ve blogged about this numerous times, but I’d like to mention a couple of resources and articles that have recently been brought to my attention.1. Social Media Monitoring Tools Wiki This wiki has an extensive list of over 100 free and for fee monitoring tools and services. Each item is hyperlinked, and you can sort each column, even by category. Although there isn’t an opportunity for users to rate the services or provide feedback, it is one of the few places I’ve seen such an exhaustive list. (As an aside, I’ve toyed with the idea of a user-rated website for all tools used by emergency managers. The consumer would be asked to rate their experience with the tool and discuss what they liked and didn’t like about it, similar to ratings for merchandise on Amazon.com or restaurants on Yelp.)Of note, most of the tools on the wiki are designed for business clients or individuals and are probably sufficient for performing sentiment analysis. However, these same tools have distinct limitations when they are used for the purposes of gaining situational awareness after a disaster. This brings me to#2 on my list.2. Mark Cameron, et. al, in the paper Emergency Situation Awareness from Twitter for Crisis Management break down social media monitoring needs of emergency managers and first responders into 5 distinct areas.The need to: Detect unexpected or unusual incidents, possibly ahead of official communications; Condense and summarise messages about an incident maintaining awareness of aggregated content without having to read individual messages; Classify and review high-value messages during an incident (e.g. messages describing infrastructure damage or cries for help); and understand the impact of an incident on people and infrastructure; Identify, track, and manage issues within an incident as they arise, develop, and conclude; pro-actively identify and manage issues that may last for hours, days or weeks; Perform forensic analysis of incidents by analysing social media content from before, during, and after an incident.Their solution is the “Emergency Situation Awareness–Automated Web Text Mining” (ESA-AWTM) system. The paper and this power point describes the system’s functionality as well as the trial deployment with the Media and Crisis Communication team within the Strategic Communication Branch (SCB) of the Australian Government. The ability to classify high value messages alone would be a significant improvement. Overall the system looks extremely promising, but unfortunately they do not indicate when it will be available for broader distribution.3. Computer aided analytics is one solution, another is crowdsourcing. This paper, “Towards Real-time Emergency Response, Using Crowd Supported Analysis of Social Media” was written by researchers at the University of Madeira in collaboration with the IBM T.J Watson Research Center. They propose an architecture for how crowdsourcing can be incorporated as part of an emergency response system in order to “analyze and structure social media content posted by micro-bloggers and service users, including emergency response coordinators and victims.” The key to crowdsourcing, they state, is ensuring that the crowd is given appropriate tasks to accomplish, and ultimately, that their analysis is fed back into the response community’s knowledge base in a structured way. This diagram illustrates their concept:This is just a short list, today, but there is a lot going on in this realm. If you know of other interesting studies please post them in the comments section and I’ll add them to the resource tab of the blog.Related articles Social Media Monitoring Assignment (emilybaal.wordpress.com) Social Media Monitoring (mimizhou217.wordpress.com) Anaheim CERT to Monitor Social Media During a Disaster (idisaster.wordpress.com) Handle Your Next Crisis with Social Media Monitoring (radian6.com) Learning the basics of social media monitoring (smartblogs.com) Social media monitoring tool video: Why should I monitor social media? (sazbean.com)Share this: ShareLike this:LikeBe the first to like this.This entry was posted in Social Media and Emergency Management and tagged Emergency management, social media, social media monitoring, Social network, Twitter, University of Madeira. Bookmark the permalink.12 Responses to Data, data everywhere…Monitoring Social Media During a Crisis Phil Spinelli | May 17, 2012 at 3:19 pm | Reply Just so you know, there already is a solution to manage the flood of incoming information (reports, questions, concerns, suggestions, etc.) from website forms, Twitter, Facebook, email and SMS during a crisis. It’s called PIER and I’d be happy to show you how it works if you like. As far as I know, PIER is the only Two-Way communication management platform that solves most of the issues being discussed on #SMEM. It even has the ability to publish crisis points and areas on Google maps with pop-up information. Just let me know. Thomas Ho (@DrThomasHo) | May 17, 2012 at 7:25 pm | Reply I am also bullish about generating a social graph to assess learning: http://blog.learnstream.co/post/10863713759/getting-all-as-in-school Could PIER also be used in this situation? Phil Spinelli | May 18, 2012 at 11:56 am | The quickest way to get your answer may be for me to show you how PIER collects, documents and processes Twitter/Facebook interaction and see if that is the right data form for your social graph. Just let me know. kim26stephens | May 17, 2012 at 5:06 pm | Reply Thanks so much for reminding me about PIER. It is a great system from what I understand. I actually might take you up on that demo offer! Phil Spinelli | May 18, 2012 at 11:47 am | Reply You’re welcome. The Social Media integration in PIER is still under most folks radar. Let me know when you have 30 minutes and I’ll show you how it works. Great job on all your communication. Pingback: The best list of social media monitoring tools I’ve ever seen | Crisisblogger Chris Syme (@cksyme) | May 18, 2012 at 8:03 am | Reply Awesome stuff here, Kim. Thanks for the excellent resources. Pingback: This Week’s Hot Topics: Technicalities Count in a Social Media Crisis kim26stephens | May 18, 2012 at 12:00 pm | Reply Thanks for commenting Chris! Pingback: Data, data everywhere…Monitoring Social Media During a Crisis | #UASI Shannon Caldwell | May 21, 2012 at 9:59 am | Reply Really like your idea about the web site for emergency managers and the ability to rate. Social media monitoring, tools and processes are very new topics for both emergency services and the community alike. Great resource. Thank you for bringing them together. Pingback: Data, data everywhere… Monitoring Social Media During a Crisis | VOST UK – IntranetLeave a Reply Email Subscription Enter your email address to subscribe to this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email. Join 2,030 other followers Subscribe: RSS RSS - Posts RSS - Comments Top Posts I Don't Have Time! Facebook "How-to" Resource Social Media and Irene, one NJ Police Chief's experience. 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  • Several of the majors can do this – they have placed equipment on satellites that will allow for ground to satellite communications bypassing the terrestrial infrastructure – this capability getting better all the time – not cheap but better all the time.
  • NIMS is necessary – but not sufficientTools and schoolsIts not the size the matters…. Complexity – what is different about a complex incident, and what is necessary, beyond NIMS structure to minimize loss, damage and impact. “minimize the consequences’… innovation – leaders work within a framework but are innovative in developing solutions in environment of complexity – Jim Schwartz Pentagon – adaptive; dwh – adapted to multi-state interest, emotions and impact (created a new organizational element – Incident Commands at each of the gulf states that reported to one FOSC (had to comply with the law) – even selection of ADM Allen as NIC was a no-brainer – besides his meta-leader qualities, trust generated from Katrina – he was the senior most operational individual in govt with authoritiy under the law to direct the actions associated with the consequences of a release of oil or hazardous materials into the environment.; NPFC in DWH had to develop an adaptive accounting and finance system to handle the unprecedented demand on the OSLTF – even had to craft legislation and move itthrough the congress in record time to authorize more than $100M of spending before the fund could be replenished because of the spend rate….also adapted with accepted but not common accounting practice of reimbursing against obligations versus receipts…the innovation and adaptations in the field where numerous – I had 500 personnel assigned most of whom were in boat crews or support for boat crews, several in NIMS roles manageing and coordinating - the boat crews were made up mostly of Maritime safety and security personnel – originally helping keep order of congested waterways – paired with a qual pollution investigator they could also now be first eyes on assessers to reports of new oil locations – mark the locations – and confirm or deny impacts – more rapidly feeding correcct information into the response and cleanup priorities.Transition and the Rise of the Super-NIC; - dhs transition, FEMA to whole of govt – through the painful lessons of Katrina….frantownsend report on Katrina…new NIC instruction – SONS exercise evolution (new madrid fault this year)Whole of Effort – global private sector players as experts in Scalewho understand large problems…and can opportunity to ScaleBrokering limited resources – preparation for
  • Highly vulnerable geography with the unimaginable predicted scenario.State and local leadership were themselves victims – weak state leadership response hampered support to gulf region; existing mechanisms were state based requests – with leadership compromised or unable to lead – fed remained too long on passive footing….over reliance on stafford act mechanisms (state request) – fed failed to recognize the novelty – serious discussion of fed taking over but only mechanism was Insurrection Act – laws rewritten, entirely new federal mechanisms instituted. Nascent “PFO” emerging NIC concept, and realization that state was not capable, resulted in assigning strong, collaborative experienced domestic response professional – ADM Allen had a bias for action, ability to collaborate and create unity of effort versus unity of command (collaboration), and a remarkable ability to communicate complex information to both public and leadership.
  • FEMA took a hit but almost half of FEMA positions were unfilled – an enormous vacancy rate following the standup of DHS and the move of FEMA from a direct report to the WH to one of 22 federal agencies moved into the new DHS – employees voted with their feet – in 2005 fema had 2500 employees – now it has ….xxxxx. Harvard case study describes it at the time as a ‘turbulent drama of bureaucratic displacement and discontentThe nrp adopted only 6 months earlier dec04 – adopted term incident of national significance – not clear how an NOS was declared – and once involked set in motion ‘complex array’ of incidnetmgmt activities – dhs homeland security ops center, femanrcresonsible for coordin incident info sharing op planning and deployment of fed resources…interagency incident mgmt group , senkiro fed dpt and agency officals expected to provide strategic incidnmgmtplannng and coord – a lot of demand for info – little commonality on impotant info – highly reactive vs proactive/could not get out ‘in front’ on info – JFO at field level was to coordinate fed assistance…add to this new and unfamiliar structure add the mysterious PFO that few understood and had never been actually invoked…..FEMA set up as a ‘assist by request’ via 15 esfsvs proactive partner – laborious process of linear progression to get to ‘fed assistance’ – intended to honor sovieringty of local and states who do not ‘report’ to the fed. No gov repots to the president – assumes a strong state leadership team – not so in Louisianna – the opposite…contrast that with Florida and gov bush who was a strong and disciplined leader in crisis and was directly engaged in the command post with his key em people…such as craigfugate who was his emergenmgr….Even without Pam, state federal and local officilas had other plans they turned to.Issue was contention between city and state, state and fed, and lack of leadership capable of managing crisis at the city and state level.Plans heavily depended on evacuation – with parishes taking responsibiilty for each of their areas for coordinating evacuation…Terry Ebbert, city’s director of hs “we always knew we did not have the means to evacuate the city”…the response plan depended on prevention…
  • Dependenceand vulnerability + haiti and new orleansSelf-reliance and resilence – joplin (others?), capitol hill – legislative branch (an island unto itself)
  • National Level Exercise NLE 2011 will be an operations-based exercise centered on the scenario of a catastrophic earthquake in the New Madrid Seismic Zone, encompassing four FEMA Regions (IV, V, VI and VII) and eight Central U.S. Earthquake States: Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Illinois, Indiana, Mississippi, Missouri and Tennessee. NLE 2011 will exercise initial incident response and recovery capabilities, to test and validate existing plans, policies and procedures to include the New Madrid Catastrophic Plan (currently under development). NLE 2011 will be conducted in May 2011.Update: The NLE 2011 will be conducted on May 16th - 20th, 2011.Scenario: On 16 May 2011, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) confirmed that a catastrophic earthquake with a magnitude of 7.7 occurred on the southwestern segment of the New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ), with an epicenter at Marked Tree, AR (to the northwest of Memphis, TN). A second large earthquake with magnitude of 6.0 occurred a short time later on the Wabash Valley Seismic Zone (WVSZ), with an epicenter near Mt. Carmel, IN.Arkansas Exercise Objectives: EOC Management - Demonstrate the State's and Counties ability as outlined in jurisdictional plans to effectively manage a catastrophic earthquake event through multi-agency coordination by activating and mobilizing Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), intrastate and interstate mutual aid agreements (MAAs), and Federal aid.Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution - Demonstrate the State's and Counties ability as outlined in jurisdictional plans to access and establish points of distribution (PODs), State Staging Areas (SSA), Incident Support Base (ISB), and reception centers to receive and distribute critical resource supplies, equipment, and personnel to affected areas throughout the State, including hazardous materials (HazMat) and search and rescue (SAR) resources.Emergency Public Information and Warning - Demonstrate the capability of the State's and Counties public information officer(s) to coordinate with Federal, State, local, private sector, and nongovernmental agencies for the formulation and dissemination of clear, accurate, and consistent information to the public and media and to establish a Joint Information Center (JIC) to monitor media contacts and conduct press briefings.Mass Care - Demonstrate the effectiveness of the State's and Counties written plans, policies, and procedures for providing mass care services: sheltering, staffing, feeding, and bulk distribution for the general and special needs population, service animals, and companion animals throughout the affected area in order to obtain access to medical care, physical assistance, shelter, and other essential services.Communications - Demonstrate the ability as outlined in jurisdictional plans to access, establish, and maintain a continuous flow of communications among multiple jurisdictions, agencies, governmental officials, and the private sector for the duration of the emergency while utilizing redundant interoperable voice and data communications systems needed to support mission critical lifesaving and sustaining operations.Citizens Evacuation and Shelter-In-Place - Demonstrate the State's and Counties ability as outlined in jurisdictional plans to ensure affected at-risk populations are safely sheltered-in-place and/or evacuated to safe areas in order to obtain access to medical care, physical assistance, shelter, and other essential needs and safely re-entered into the affected area.NLE 12 Cyber ExerciseMarch 2, 2012 by Bridget O'GradyThe Department of Homeland Security and FEMA are collaborating to host NLE 12. This year’s exercise will have a cyber focus and will be “played” in FEMA Regions 1, 2, 3, and 5 during the spring and summer of this year. Some impact or connection to the Water Sector is also expected. NLE 12 will consist of four main exercises:1. Information Exchange – a discussion-based event to evaluate information sharing within the Federal cyber community.2. Cyber Incident Management – addresses the National Cyber Incident Response Plan.3. NLE Capstone/Cyber Physical Effects – examines challenges related to managing a cyber event with physical consequences and national security implications.4. Continuity Exercise – evaluates the continuity, devolution, and reconstitution capabilities of Federal departments and agencies during a cyber security incident.If your state drinking water program or your water utility is interested in participating as either an active or virtual player, please contact Private.SectorNLE@dhs.gov for more information.The inability to provide adequate and timely response resources created challenges in almost every capability. While resources gaps are referenced throughout this report, the topic as a whole is discussed in Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution.• The Action Request Form/Mission Assignment (ARF/MA) process hindered tasks that fall into several capabilities. In this section, the process is discussed as part of Incident Management/EOC Management.• Information sharing and situational awareness challenges affected the achievement of all capabilities. In this section, it is discussed as part of Incident Management/EOC Management. Federal interaction with both the private sector and the international community were overarching leadership objectives and were linked to several objectives, including Medical Surge and Mass Care. The major observations of these interactions are discussed in Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution.• Observations about the implementation of plans are part of several capability discussions. First, several strategic-level planning issues can be found in Incident Management/EOC Management in a subsection on national, regional, and state plans. Second, issues related to the National Incident Support Manual (NISM) are discussed in the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) subsection of Incident Management/EOC Management. Finally, planning gaps that relate to the movement of assets are discussed in Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution.
  • Erich completed one of the most comprehensive reviews of information mgmt and subsequently information requirements and issues to resolve that I have seen from any response review. Information management is in virtually every after action report and every ‘hotwash’ – who didn’t know what when, why, the consequences of this lack of ubiquitous information mgmt and clarity of the situation, what we call situational awareness, the one think everyone needs in a response operation. We’ll here first his assessment and analysis which I believe lays out some very concrete actions that, if taken, could significantly improve information management in response operations.I’ll then touch briefly on information management in a broader context – challenges and opportunitiesBut I would like to spend the bulk of my time talking about decision-making in Large Scale Crises, what is different, how do we improve this – certain accurate information for all levels of decision making is essential – which is why you need to talk about one with the other – but I believe the area of decision-making warrants some solid awareness, discussion, and process improvements – and some good work is being done in that area. You can have access and availability of all kinds of information but it must feed a decision-making structure that is appropriately designed for the scale of the response – and, more importantly, the complexity of the response – complexity is as much a differentiator as ‘size’ or scope.
  • Responding to the ordinary chaos of routine emergencies is substantively different than responding to the extraordinary chaos of a crisis emergency, large-scale and with significant impacts.Howitt and Leonard of Harvard’s National Preparedness Leadership Initiative – talk about large-scale emergencies in perhaps the clearest terms – they differ from ‘routine emergencies’ in their novelty, which means they will not be familiar to even those with response experience – think Anthrax, think WTC, think DWH with the uncontrolled release at depths never experienced…complexity, where the variables are appearing in sequences or a manner that compounds the situation…and distributed consequences, where the effects of the incident are felt across numerous areas, domains, industries, and impacted communities…Sustainably staff it – DWH response impacted tremendously by slow recognition that this incident required massive influx’s of capable individuals for an extended period of time – initially, first few days, the never-fail blowout preventer – didn’t – but it did fail and it was underneath a burning/highly unstable damaged rig, that collapsed on day XXX, and at an unprecedented depth. Those in the New Orleans response new what was going on but getting national level and international level support (BP), and individuals with unique skills for this degree of novelty and complexity – was challenging. It was viewed as a ‘regional’ issue but ultimately required every piece of boom that could possibly be identified and shipped, often with Governor’s of other states objecting to being ‘stripped’ of their line of defense for potential crises. Ultimately, the President himself had to order the CG to triple the number of Coast Guard personnel responding – which forced ships to change schedules, units to operate below sustainable levels, and senior level decisions on risk tolerance with respect to the other safety missions around the country – the entire CG was stripped of people and equipment – ship schedules and cycles thrown off for years – we were on a wartime footing – one similar to WWII wrt the CG internal ops. Other smaller critical response agencies, such as NOAA who provide extraordinary technical expertise, were equally impacted. The National Incident Command structure was put in place, and national level interagency coordination and direct engagement by the Congress and the White House. Similarly, the responsible party, BP, had to recognize they couldn’t ‘delegate’ this to the local BP office – and had to engage with all the corporate tools (claims, legal, technical, operational, fiduciary) that could be brought to bear from throughout their international organization, and then some.Anthrax did not just hit capitol hill, it hit x locations in the united states via 5 letters that cross-contaminated unrelated mail throughout the mail system as well as postal sorting equipment from x to y - For WTC – the entire city, and every first responder who ever lived, wanted to be there to help – keeping people away (safe) was the challenge
  • The president was expecdted (via press q’s) to everyday know how much ice and water were distributed to new orleansOr in dwh, how much oil had leaked that day – info mgmt means accurante info on details has to move from reliable/validated sourceInfo: how much/how many.- will always be many answers unless all agree on ‘as of time and date’ and from ‘what geographic area’ – a ‘simple’ question but unless there is a common understandingof the parameters, answers will sound ‘uninformed’….get through this by establishing a set time for reporting/freeze the counts, communicate the agreement of parameters
  • Content of ‘pushed info’ is improving with increased academically informed messaging constructs and tools – initial warning, broad status updates – user choices who to ‘subscribe to’ – I subscribe to Arlington County alerts which is where I work – I get the ‘flood’ notices, the gas outages, and the hurricane and weather alert – and the rare, but actual, earthquake alerts.COP is the holy grail of a response – distributed decision-making based on leadership generated strategy – both ends of which (strategic – tactical) need their piece of the picture, real-time. As Erich points out – tools are out there in one form or another but they have struggled to be all things to all users – must be informed by the use/users, with specified requirements for ‘collection’, and relevant to multiple user populations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
  • Again we are talking about large-scale responses – and more and more we need to turn to structures, companies, and mechanisms that do large-scale on a routine basis and who can scale-up and adapt. US Chamber of Commerce, following While govt can have emergency first-in comms capability at the ready, and websites to communicate – consider what a game-changer Google is: During the Haiti Earthquake response, google took several silo’d sites, none able to take to the other, yet all set up to try to account for people, locate loved ones, identify victims, and stitched it into a world-wide accessible, searchable capability called ‘People Finder’ using an open source, open API standard PFIA person finder interchange format. FEMA, DOD, the National Guard, have mobile emergency response equipment but it is the large telecoms and satellite companies such as Hughes, that can set up , an only now, networks using satellite relays, and reestablish comms in a not large but reasonable area to allow responders and decision makers to communicate. This doesn’t even begin to touch on what the majors can bring to bear in terms of logistics such as Walmart or UPS – only recently being taped, post-katrina, and formally brought into the response structure. In Katrina, the entire communications infrastructure was wiped out – let me share with you the most powerful form of communications used then – and realize it was not designed for that purpose but became
  • NIMS is necessary – but not sufficientTools and schoolsIts not the size the matters…. Complexity – what is different about a complex incident, and what is necessary, beyond NIMS structure to minimize loss, damage and impact. “minimize the consequences’… innovation – leaders work within a framework but are innovative in developing solutions in environment of complexity – Jim Schwartz Pentagon – adaptive; dwh – adapted to multi-state interest, emotions and impact (created a new organizational element – Incident Commands at each of the gulf states that reported to one FOSC (had to comply with the law) – even selection of ADM Allen as NIC was a no-brainer – besides his meta-leader qualities, trust generated from Katrina – he was the senior most operational individual in govt with authoritiy under the law to direct the actions associated with the consequences of a release of oil or hazardous materials into the environment.; NPFC in DWH had to develop an adaptive accounting and finance system to handle the unprecedented demand on the OSLTF – even had to craft legislation and move itthrough the congress in record time to authorize more than $100M of spending before the fund could be replenished because of the spend rate….also adapted with accepted but not common accounting practice of reimbursing against obligations versus receipts…the innovation and adaptations in the field where numerous – I had 500 personnel assigned most of whom were in boat crews or support for boat crews, several in NIMS roles manageing and coordinating - the boat crews were made up mostly of Maritime safety and security personnel – originally helping keep order of congested waterways – paired with a qual pollution investigator they could also now be first eyes on assessers to reports of new oil locations – mark the locations – and confirm or deny impacts – more rapidly feeding correcct information into the response and cleanup priorities.Transition and the Rise of the Super-NIC; - dhs transition, FEMA to whole of govt – through the painful lessons of Katrina….frantownsend report on Katrina…new NIC instruction – SONS exercise evolution (new madrid fault this year)Whole of Effort – global private sector players as experts in Scalewho understand large problems…and can opportunity to ScaleBrokering limited resources – preparation for
  • The Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) is a national secure and trusted web-based portal for information sharing and collaboration between federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, private sector, and international partners engaged in the homeland security mission.HSIN is made up of a growing network of communities, called Communities of Interest (COI). COIs are organized by state organizations, federal organizations, or mission areas such as emergency management, law enforcement, critical sectors, and intelligence. Users can securely share within their communities or reach out to other communities as needed. HSIN provides secure, real-time collaboration tools, including a virtual meeting space, instant messaging and document sharing. HSIN allows partners to work together instantly, regardless of their location, to communicate, collaborate, and coordinate.
  • Transparency breeds self-correcting behavior…Uncomfortable to respondersNational Security ConcernsDecision-Making Ahead of Decision-MakersHave you seen extremely well intentioned data without context cause harm? Incite fear when there isn’t action or recommendations or context included? How do you ‘educate’ at the same time you are informing?Legal versus operational tensions….And the immediate demand signal – who is responsible for this bad thing? In the days before fairly accurate hurricane forecasting, even the forecasters were ‘held responsible’ for not getting it right, despite the mathematical limitations of models…..the hold someone accountable need/requirement is running through information channels and immediately impacting how info is collected, how it is disseminated, how it is incorporated into decision-making
  • Current fiscal climate hard choices are an example – long term congressional members say they have never seen anything like it – the hard part of governing….but ‘positions’ are more entrenched and rhetoric is high…Data and info…Who’s budget numbers are right? In incident mgmt the incident commander, and area command are themselves brokering limited resources and assets based on what information they have – winners and losers – who’s homes are saved and whose are destroyed? Tactical decisions made all the time on choices such as these, raise the effects and consequences of similar decisions and that is what elected leaders are asked to engage in….
  • With the info changing so fast, how can you ever be ‘right’ – time lag of flow in itself forces you to report something that is no longer the reality – TIME/DATE Imprint it – Match to normal cycles of information requirements – how to match to the timing of news cycles when the news is 24/7.In the Simultaneous picture – a common operating picture is continuously fed to an internet site or portal, …consider the power for decision-makers in the WH with the live stream of the Bin Laden raid. Downside is that there is no vetting -
  • Exception was Katrina – unusual, what are you doing for me culture particularly vis a vis fed govt – perpetual victims….hampered in ability to take charge of their own fate – live off of fed govt, and grants…
  • Dependenceand vulnerability + haiti and new orleansSelf-reliance and resilence – joplin (others?), capitol hill – legislative branch (an island unto itself)
  • In large-scale disasters, the impacted population and their leadership
  • PHASE CHANGE: All responses have phases and each should prompt a review of type, tempo, and tactics of information management.Need to be clear about movement from one ‘phase’ to another’ and the info expectatoins between different phases Create distinct phases that cause shift in tactics, and communicates the progress, adapts to the tempo and recognizes when the ‘crisis’ is over, ….the shift to remediation and/or recovery cap hill: emergnecy phase to recovery phase – driven by completion of assessment, corresponding site control, and defined tasks.dwh: no free floating oil/oil on beaches below threshold – shift to on-call response – callout versus on-site presence.katrina (2005): rescue phase to recovery – still in recovery phase; recent article 9 Jul 12 - $5.5M eligible FEMA funding awarded to Plaquemines Parish for a new government complex project as a result of storm damage to 11 facilities. 911: reopening of portions of lower manhattan – ‘asbestos in my apt’, is it safe, restoration of services, new boundaries
  • Only as far back as 2000, NIMS was known only to Wildland fire fighters and to a lesser extent some fire depts and small elements of the CG had embraced it (the “m” community) – only In the post-katrinaenviornment has FEMA adopted it and integrated it into a whole of response solution and a define drole in relationship to the JOC and ESFs which themselve s have been enhanced and improved.Now widely accepted, formally adopted by DHS (whole of governemnt sanctioned and subpported) – Are necessary but ‘insufficient’ in large-scale disasters – in addition to accepted and trained-to structures, LSDs must have systems for addressing contentious decisions that require ‘not insignificant’ trade-offsRole for elected and appointed leaders responsible to the citizenry.Facilitated by an agreed upon, ‘codified’ acknowledged process.Realistic acknowledgement of individual tactics , using information means and media, to influence others and position ones priorities above others - goal here is to gain as much common consensus with agreed upon best possible data/information, visible to each other.Current fiscal climate hard choices are an example – long term congressional members say they have never seen anything like it – the hard part of governing….but ‘positions’ are more entrenched and rhetoric is high…Data and info…Who’s budget numbers are right? In incident mgmt the incident commander, and area command are themselves brokering limited resources and assets based on what information they have – winners and losers – who’s homes are saved and whose are destroyed? Tactical decisions made all the time on choices such as these, raise the effects and consequences of similar decisions and that is what elected leaders are asked to engage in….
  • Single unit or national level engagement - scalable
  • Content of ‘pushed info’ is improving with increased academically informed messaging constructs and tools – initial warning, broad status updates – user choices who to ‘subscribe to’ – I subscribe to Arlington County alerts which is where I work – I get the ‘flood’ notices, the gas outages, and the hurricane and weather alert – and the rare, but actual, earthquake alerts.COP is the holy grail of a response – distributed decision-making based on leadership generated strategy – both ends of which (strategic – tactical) need their piece of the picture, real-time. As Erich points out – tools are out there in one form or another but they have struggled to be all things to all users – must be informed by the use/users, with specified requirements for ‘collection’, and relevant to multiple user populations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
  • Again we are talking about large-scale responses – and more and more we need to turn to structures, companies, and mechanisms that do large-scale on a routine basis and who can scale-up and adapt. US Chamber of Commerce, following While govt can have emergency first-in comms capability at the ready, and websites to communicate – consider what a game-changer Google is: During the Haiti Earthquake response, google took several silo’d sites, none able to take to the other, yet all set up to try to account for people, locate loved ones, identify victims, and stitched it into a world-wide accessible, searchable capability called ‘People Finder’ using an open source, open API standard PFIA person finder interchange format. FEMA, DOD, the National Guard, have mobile emergency response equipment but it is the large telecoms and satellite companies such as Hughes, that can set up , an only now, networks using satellite relays, and reestablish comms in a not large but reasonable area to allow responders and decision makers to communicate. This doesn’t even begin to touch on what the majors can bring to bear in terms of logistics such as Walmart or UPS – only recently being taped, post-katrina, and formally brought into the response structure. In Katrina, the entire communications infrastructure was wiped out – let me share with you the most powerful form of communications used then – and realize it was not designed for that purpose but became
  • Transparency breeds self-correcting behavior…Uncomfortable to respondersNational Security ConcernsDecision-Making Ahead of Decision-MakersHave you seen extremely well intentioned data without context cause harm? Incite fear when there isn’t action or recommendations or context included? How do you ‘educate’ at the same time you are informing?Legal versus operational tensions….And the immediate demand signal – who is responsible for this bad thing? In the days before fairly accurate hurricane forecasting, even the forecasters were ‘held responsible’ for not getting it right, despite the mathematical limitations of models…..the hold someone accountable need/requirement is running through information channels and immediately impacting how info is collected, how it is disseminated, how it is incorporated into decision-making

Bringing order to chaos   ahmp conf sept12 - rd Bringing order to chaos ahmp conf sept12 - rd Presentation Transcript

  • BRINGING ORDER TO CHAOS:HARNESSING AND DISTRIBUTING INFORMATIONAT ALL LEVELS OF LARGE-SCALE RESPONSES Emerging Best Practices and Decision-Making in Crisis Emergencies Gail Kulisch, CAPT, USCG (ret) EricTelfer, CDR, USCG Alliance of Hazardous Materials Professionals 13 September 2012
  • Bringing Order to Chaos Three Key Elements• Understand the Unique Characteristics of Large-Scale Response• Design for Complex and Layered Decision-Making• Generate Meaningful Information and Understand Stakeholder Needs
  • Bringing Order to Chaos Three Key Elements• Understand the Unique Characteristics of Large-Scale Response• Design for Complex and Layered Decision-Making• Generate Meaningful Information and Understand Stakeholder Needs
  • The Unique Characteristics Two Types of EmergenciesMode R : Routine Emergency Mode C : Crisis Emergency ─ Key Elements Known ─ Situation has Familiar Aspects ─ Significant Novelty ─ Methods Exist to Adapt ─ Relatively Low Understanding Response to Specific of the Situation Circumstance ─ Requires Creativity to ─ Necessary Skills Have Been Improvise New Approaches Trained to ─ Situation Goes Beyond ─ Authority Based C2 Structure Existing Plans Suited to Directing Execution ─ Cognitively Driven Routines ─ Implement Well-Developed and ─ Collaborative adaptive C2 Practiced Routines Style ─ Familiar Script or Elements ─ Limited Expertise in Key Areas Requiring Only Moderate of the Response Adjustments or Scaling ─ No Comprehensive Script ─ Hierarchical Structure with Well- ─ Variably Flattened Structure Defined General Routines(Ref: Howitt, Arnold and Herman B. Leonard; Managing Crises: Responses to Large-ScaleEmergencies, CQ Press, Washington, D.C., 2009.)
  • The Majority of Responses Routine Emergencies  All emergencies start as „operations‟  Most incidents resolved before ever leaving the stem and entering planning cycle chaos  For complex or extended response – Move to the Spiral: Get “Planning” ahead of “Operations”.  Responses can start as „routine‟ but become „crisis‟ emergencies.
  • Bringing Order to Chaos Three Key Elements• Understand the Unique Characteristics of Large-Scale Response• Design for Complex and Layered Decision-Making• Generate Meaningful Information and Understand Stakeholder Needs
  • Design for Layered, Complex Decision-Making Recognize Key Attributes of Large-Scale Response - Novelty, Complexity, Distributed Consequences, Insufficient Quantities of Specialized Equipment. Get A System in Place (GASP) – Quickly.  National Incident Management System (NIMS) – Necessary - But Not Sufficient…need:  Need additional structural elements to coordinate political entities.  Local engagement strategy.  Adaptive leader skilled in collaboration while developing solutions, hierarchical in execution.  Adjusted organizational structure: flattened for solution development, hierarchical for execution.  Implementing National Incident Commander framework - leadership and experience matter to more rapidly orient.  Flatten the Organization and Distribute Decision-Making.  Harness the Information.  Recognize corresponding complexity of information needs . Sustainably Staff and Equip.  Shift and Communicate National, International, and Corporate Level Allocation and Resources - Scale Up Rapidly, Plan for Long Duration.  Establish Priorities and Decision-Making for Allocation of Limited Critical Resources.
  • The Game-Changers Crisis Emergencies 11 SEPTEMBER 2001: Commercial Aircraft as Weapon to Destroy Iconic Infrastructure. ─ A „war‟ on US soil. ─ Entire US federal agency structure revisited through the lens of US „defense‟ and domestic security - DHS created. ANTHRAX ATTACKS: U.S. Mail System as a Delivery System for a Biological Weapon. ─ Distributed terror attack and unique vulnerability of every citizen to „new‟ weapons. ─ 15 Threats Vectors established with corresponding substantial investments in critical infrastructure protection, early warning systems. HURRICANE KATRINA: The Known But Unthinkable - Levee Failures (5 locations). ─ Hurricane “Pam” Laid Out the Unlikely Scenario. ─ National Response Framework established. ─ FEMA paradigm and culture substantively changed. DEEPWATER HORIZON: Uncontrolled Release of Oil at Virtually Inaccessible Depths. ─ Started as a „routine‟ emergency (platform fire). ─ Exceptionally complex decision-making in unique political environment (5 States, x „county equivalents‟). ─ National Contingency Plan‟s adequacy tested; response mechanisms adjusted and added ─ Private sector owned the financial capacity and technical means. ─ Exposed significant limitations of the National Contingency Plan.
  • Emergency Response Starts WithNIMS ICS Forms the Backbone of Routine and Crisis Response. ─ ICS developed by Firefighting Resources of Southern California Organized for Potential Emergencies (“Firescope”). ─ Chartered by Congress 1972; developed and Implemented in 1982. ─ Early adoption by some municipal fire departments and National Strike Force. ─ Post-Katrina FEMA adopted it and integrated it into a whole of response solution (tailored from FIRESCOPE ICS to NIMS ICS). ─ NIMS ICS and FEMA Joint Operations Center/Emergency Management Functions harmonization evolving. ─ Regardless of complexity, NIMS allows you to orient. Formally adopted by DHS ─ Whole of government sanctioned and supported. ─ Element of the National Response Framework.
  • Novelty: Anthrax Capitol Hill 2001 Distributed Attack ─ Entire US mail system potential source of increased contamination Unique Weapon ─ Weaponized biological agent Created Adjusted Structures ─ US Congress Oversees Response – Maintains Continuity of Government. ─ Executive Branch Supports. ─ Supreme Court Facilities Impacted.
  • Novelty: No Prior Anthrax Playbook When There Is No Playbook - Create One: ─ Build on What You Do Have/Know.  Tannery Field Decontamination Protocols.  Medical Community/USAMRID Microbiological Sampling Experience.  „Repurposed‟ Existing Methods for Decon (Chlorine Dioxide and Ethylene Oxide for Medical applications). ─ Apply Fundamentals of Hazmat Response.  Slow it down.  Isolate and Control Entry.  Deliberate Assessment.  Organizational Discipline (Rigor of the ICS Planning Cycle).  Life Safety Priorities. ─ Actively Manage The Differences  Legislative Branch Culture.  Continuity of Government Requirements.  Large Area Assessments of Commercial and Government Buildings. Standardization Provides a Baseline – Adaptation Makes It Work
  • Distributed Consequences: National Mail SystemAs An Attack Vector Extent and Location of Contamination Unknown - Emerged Over Time. ─ Established a system of reporting from Public Health System and First Responders. Postal Service Established a Unified Command. ─ Collaboration with Public Health agencies. ─ Tracked and engaged on every report. ─ Aggressively traced each report back to finite number of letters. ─ Localized decontamination efforts were situation dependent. ─ Ultimately „pieces of the puzzle‟ became known. ─ Applied and shared guidance and protocols evolved as incident evolved. EPA Retained National Federal On Scene Coordinator Role. ─ Legal authorities and fund access. ─ Created a body of adapted knowledge and techniques. ─ Developed and applied tailored techniques learned from one site to another. ─ Created technical and response protocol continuity. Every Hazmat Unit in the US a Potential Responder. ─ Required extensive distributed decision-making and professional collaboration. ─ Adapted existing and evolving response protocols while preserving a common framework; applied the basic principles of hazmat response. ─ Commercial sector adapted equipment to expedite detection.
  • Unprecedented Consequences:World Trade Center Ground Zero No Script. Requires Critical Leadership Adaptations. POTUS Channeled the Emotions:  Struck the right chord at the right moment  In two sentences framed a common purpose.  Harnessed the emotion and gave it a direction.  Visual display of solidarity across fed, state, and local elements. Mayor Guillianni harnessed the culture of New Yorkers.  Engaged leadership.  Resilient and independent.  Invincible culture despite the obstacles. Addressed emotional overlay of an entire nation.
  • Katrina: Insufficient Resources, InadequateResponse System Design The Known But Too Hard to Address Scenario – Levee Failures. Disproportionate Impact to the Poor and Infirmed. Extraordinary Property Damage. Complexity Exceeded Designed Roles and Capabilities of the Federal Disaster Response System. ─ FEMA Redesigned. ─ Creation of the NIC and Whole of Government Mechanisms. ─ Federal Role in Disasters Reevaluated. Decision-Makers Operated in an Information Vacuum.
  • Hurricane Pam: Too Hard to Even Plan 2004 SE Louisiana/Gulf Coast Catastrophic Hurricane Exercise. ─ 12 parishes represented, State Agencies and 15 federal agencies for an 8 day workshop. ─ Slow moving Cat 3 Hurricane (120 mph) with 20 inches of rain Resulted in the SE Louisiana catastrophic hurricane functional plan – with some highly detailed, some sketchy, and some TBD sections. Last "Hurricane Pam" training exercise was completed August 24, 2005, less than a week before Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast.
  • Katrina: What Went Right 6,000 Coast Guard personnel rescued 33,000 people along the Gulf Coast – largest helicopter rescue op in history. Private citizens heroic personal contributions. Military contributions to support and logistics. Private sector role including Wal-Mart‟s now reknown „empty the shelves‟ philosophy. States and individual federal agencies created unique solutions to tackle extraordinary issues.
  • Post-Katrina: Government and Organizational Insufficiencies Exposed and Addressed. Chapter Six Transforming Preparedness.  Define and Implement A Comprehensive National Preparedness System.  Foster a New, Robust Culture of Preparedness. • Align Federal Response Structures to NIMS with ICS as field command structure. • Create New Principal Federal Official Authorities. • Substantial Revisions to the National Response Plan. • Significant Review of All Federal Agency Support Rules in Response.
  • DWH: Novelty, Complexity, and UnprecedentedTechnical Challenges Largest National Contingency Plan Governed Response In History. Whole of Government Engagement – The NIC Role. Novelty Elements Delayed Critical Flattening of Organization. Critically Dependent on Common Operating Picture. Unique Legal, Fiduciary Obligations of Responsible Party (BP) Challenged Decision-Making. Capping at Depth; Limited National Boom Inventory.
  • DWH: Novelty, Complexity, and UnprecedentedTechnical Challenges The „Responsible Party‟ and the National Contingency Plan. NIC Communication Skills Essential. Extraordinary Legal Claims. New legislation required to allow funding for government costs in advance of reimbursements from BP. Limited Technical Solutions and Specialized Equipment.
  • DWH: NIC Role Proved Critical Identified Air Space Safety As Critical Need – Facilitated National Command Authority Action to Control the Air Space. Mobilized Senior Interagency Partners, Cabinet Level Officials - Mechanism for Higher Level Engagement and Decision-Making. Filled Critical Cross-Government Facilitation Role. Effective Communicator: Ability to Simplify Complex Information. Supported Flattened Organization and Broadened Engagement of the Locals in Decision-Making. Drove Development of a Common Operating Picture.
  • DEEPWATER HORIZON Single greatest challenge was lack of a common operating picture (adm allen) DWH Example: Authorities: Incident Command authority to prescribe the Persistent Demand for accurate, real time info RRI underfunded and unsupported for years- incomplete and inaccurate inventory of response equipment. Information requirements and authorities Air Tasking Order essential to manage all flights operating above and around the spill site Before ADM Allen implemented it, there were 8 near air-to-air
  • Flatten the Organization: Engaging theLocals Establish pre-existing relationships with community based organizations who can take leadership roles. Establish strong engagement with business community (large-scale capabilities, logistics mechanisms) Collaborative decision-making – Capture and incorporate info requirements of all stakeholders. Staff and sustain – surge versus dribble. Common Operating Picture – can they see what you see. The articulate communicator. Elevate quickly to NRF/NIC structure - can always back off.
  • Engaging the Locals: A Checkered History Ground Zero – Solidarity of Purpose (citizenry supported responders) Cosco Busan –Responders became „the enemy‟. Deepwater Horizon – Scale and complexity across 5 states exceeded routine collaborative methods. ─ Ultimately created additional and incident command elements with distributed authority and power, collaborative decision- making within discrete geographic areas. ─ Incident leadership distributed to personally engage locals.
  • Flatten the Organization: Engage thePrivate Sector„The Restorative Function of Business‟ Director Craig Fugate Federal Emergency Management Agency Role of Business in Disaster Response US Chamber of Commerce Report Pre-Crisis Alignment and Partnerships ─ Business Leaders Emergency Operations Center ─ Coca Cola partnership with the Red Cross ─ Target partnership with FEMA ─ Citi partnership with World Food Programme Bring Unique Expertise, Logistics, Innovation and Speed
  • Bringing Order to Chaos Three Key Elements• Understand the Unique Characteristics of Large-Scale Response• Design for Complex and Layered Decision-Making• Generate Meaningful Information and Understand Stakeholder Needs
  • Harness The Information Mature the Feedback Loops Proactively Adjust the Engage at All Response Levels Collect and Distribute Information Define Information RequirementsEstablishIncidentManagementStructure
  • Harnessing Information:Facilitated By Technical Tools Common Orientation. Consistency. Effective/Efficient Resource Allocation. Accelerate Assessment and Decision-Making. Safety. ─ People do not need to physically „be‟ in the danger zone to have information. ─ Operate moving resources in concentrated areas (air, marine, ground) without physical danger.
  • Harnessing Information:Managed As A SystemRequires: Authorities. - Air Space Management. - Collection Means Authorized. - Decision-Makers Engaged. Processes. ─ Requirements Identified and Validated. ─ Standard Requirements Developed in Plans. Tools. ─ Common Operating Picture. ─ Real-Time Video. ─ Accessible Network.
  • Harnessing Information:Structured By Defined Requirements. Learn From Other Disciplines: ─ The Intelligence Community.  Requirements Developed, Validated, Sourced.  Collected Information Distributed.  Intelligence Cycle Repeatable.  Plan, Collect, Analyze, Produce, Disseminate. ─ The Coast Guard‟s SDCIP Operational Planning Model.  Surveil.  Detect.  Classify.  Identify.  Prosecute.
  • SDCIP Tactics and Fusion Model
  • Harnessing Information: Collect andDistribute. Defined By: ─ Pre-scripted Priority Incident Requirements. ─ Event Specific Requirements. Collected by: ─ Real-Time Systems In A Repeatable Cycle. Displayed In: ─ A Common Operating Picture. Augmented By: ─ Push Tools Such as  Emergency Incident Alerts  Notifications  Updates
  • Harnessing Information:Strengthened By The Power of Social Media.Emergency Situation Awareness - Twitter for Crisis Management(Cameron et al) “Emergency Situation Awareness–Automated WebText Mining” (ESA-AWTM) system. . Detect unexpected or unusual incidents. Condense and summarize messages maintaining awareness of aggregated content. Classify and review high-value messages during an incident - understand the impact of an incident on people and infrastructure. Identify, track, manage issues within an incident. Pro-actively identify and manage issues that may last for hours, days or weeks. Perform forensic analysis of incidents by analyzing social media content from before, during, and after an incident.
  • The Common Operating Picture DWH - Initial lack of a GIS-based Common Operating Picture. ─ Hampered sharing and decision-making. ─ No tool to effectively manage airspace safety. Single biggest impediment to response decision making and communications: lack of common operating picture (ADM Thad Allen) The emergence of ERMA - Emergency Response Management Application. ─ GIS base/on-line mapping tool. ─ Integrates both static and real-time data  Maps  Environmental Sensitivity Index (ESI) maps  Ship Locations  Weather/Ocean Currents  Impacted Areas  Industrial Data
  • Deepwater Horizon ERMA
  • Arctic ERMA
  • Caribbean ERMA
  • ERMA Architecture
  • Real-Time Situational Awareness From the Civil War: ─ President Lincoln and “T-Mail” (Wheeler, Tom; Mr. Lincoln‟s T-Mails: How Abraham Lincoln Used the Telegraph to Win the Civil War; Harper Collins Publishers, NY, NY, 2006) ─ Personally Coordinated with Generals in the Field To the War on Terror: ─ The Raid on Bin Laden ─ Real-Time Camera feed from an Isolated Location in Pakistan.
  • Tactics and Tools At The Speed of Light New environment demands new tools to meet those needs. Data and information must be contextualized. ─ Rapid evolution of COP tools, incident notification tools, mapping tools; e.g.  HSIN: − Common Operational Picture (COP) provides situational awareness and analysis; − Integrated Common Analytical Viewer (iCAV) gives geographical visualization,; − 24/7 availability, document Libraries, instant-messaging tool, Web conferencing, incident reporting, Common Operational Picture (COP) provides situational awareness and analysis, announcements, discussion boards, task lists, requests for Information/or Your Information (RFIs/FYIs), calendars − Really Simple Syndication (RSS) Feeds − Online training materials − ERMA
  • Virtual On-line Sharing Tools (VOST) Reference: Bledsoe, Cheryl; VOST The Basics, Clark Regional Emergency Services, Twitter@CRESA@cherylble
  • Reference: Bledsoe, Cheryl; VOST The Basics, Clark RegionalEmergency Services, Twitter@CRESA@cherylble
  • Value of a Video ─ 911 - the repeated image of the towers falling created an enormous emotional impact. ─ Katrina - primary info in first 3 days was provided by CG Helicopter clips of rescues.
  • Katrina Clips
  • Repeated Video Impact Al Qaeda techniques: ─ IED explosion from multiple angles over mass comms medium – viewer perceives a single attack as multiple attacks. ─ Repeated viewing of same attack – exponential emotional impact. ─ Increases emotional impact of the terror.
  • Power of the Private Sector Resilient communities have:  A greater percentage of small businesses with disaster plans;  85% of business is small business (confrim) Yet:  71% of small businesses have no disaster plans  43% with no plan never reopen  If they do reopen, only 29% are still open two years laterThe Role of Business in Disaster Response, US Chamber of Commerce (Ref: The Role of Business in Disaster Response, US Chamber of Commerce, Business Civic Leadership Center, 2012
  • The Human ElementIn times of crisis, and on a daily basis, Allen said members of the public aregoing to base their perceptions of government on personal transactions, asthey did after oil spill. Alluding to the dissatisfaction among Gulf Coastresidents with contractors staffed in the region, the retired commandant said,"You cannot outsource core values -- empathy and compassion -- to a thirdparty." Admiral Thad Allen, National Incident Commander Hurricane Katrina and Deepwater Horizon
  •  The power of a picture…and the value of a video – Airsta Rescue – Katrina piece from
  • Commercial Tools Rapidly expanding Pre-incident warning
  • Backup Slides
  •  Deep Dive into Information Management: DEEPWATER HORIZON Case Study - CDR Erich Telfer, USCG Information Management – Broader Context
  • Social Media Explosion Data, data everywhere…Monitoring Social Media During a Crisis
  • Evolving Capabilities of the Private Sector People Finder (Google) Satellite Based emergency networks for responders ─ Private Sector capabilities rapidly expanding
  •  Its not the size that matters – complexity as a differentiator When there is no script – the unthinkable aand the new normal US Government Structural Transition and the Rise of the super-NIC NIMS is necessary – but not sufficient Situational Awareness on Steroids Tools and schools Brokering limited resources – Whole of Effort – global private sector players as experts in Scalewho understand large problems…and can opportunity to Scale
  •  In large-scale, a number of issues rise to this level….how best to maximize that „opportunity‟ ─ Invest in a solid NIMS process to bring as many issues into the NIMS/IC – Area Command process as possible; the better the workings and processes inside NIMS, the better the chance issues not „addressable‟ at AC level or IC level must ─ Courageous, knowledgable, articulate NIC  Meta-Leader  Knows what moves into the brokered sphere  Knows how to minimize the disconnects creating unnecessary engagement of senior leaders  Communications mastery – complex concepts made simple  Visible  No personal agenda/affiliation – „agnostic‟ – direct report to CIC…
  •  Information versus data How do you educate at the same time you inform? What parameters guide or determine how porous and rapid the data flow is versus information assessment by „experts‟ – does free flow of data (accurate or inaccurate) spur
  • Efforts to flow data and information… Can not themselves create more chaos - still need a system, still need some degree of site control, accounting for victims and responders, hazard assessment…. Pentagon 911 response, the DC fire dept and units from MD that they mobilized showed up and operated on the pentagon site without informing or integrating into the professionally well-known ICS structure - acted independently
  • A Number of Solutions on the Market
  •  Words matter – careful and deliberate selection of terms can ease tension, minimize misunderstanding…poorly selected terms can fuel rhetoric and misinform perception Cat spirit: Safe anchorage vs „harbor of refuge‟ (what is it hiding from) Returned to international svc (conveys acceptance of standards by a legitimate independent body) versus „allowed to enter port‟ (implies a personal decision of an individual cotp without context) Others?
  • KATRINAPhoto clip/Video
  •  The predicted crisis Hurricane Pam – 2004 full deliberate effort to plan and exercise reponse to a catastrophic hurricane in NOLA – all 12 parishes represented, state agenceis and 15 federal agencies for an 8 day workshop – slow moving cat 3 hurricane w20 inchses of rain……SE Loisiana catastrophic hurricane functional plan resulted – with some highly detailed, some sketchy and some TBD sections – assumed there were no levee breaches (yet believed it to be the worst case)…communicating the unthinkable…
  •  http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html? webmap=ecfd899b55e944a1977f00c06a111013&e xtent=-95.4268,29.5805,-94.747,29.8685 Wetlands map baseline
  •  Effective comms and info mgmt and decision making structures will depend on whether there is a culture of „self-relience‟ and „resilience‟ or a culture of „dependence „ and „vulnerability‟….in either case, the need for extraordinary external engagement and support is necessary, how that becomes interfaced, coordinated, and implemented depends on which circumstance the community is grounded in. Individuals can be either, this is a characterization of the collective behavior not individual behavior.
  •  Precrisis alignement and pre-existing relationships (w/business, govenrment entities, private sector groups, the broader response community) – increase resilience Precrisis macro culture (reliance or independence)
  • Resilient communities have Greater percentage of small businesses with disaster plans; - 85% of business is small business (confrim) 71% of small businesses have no disaster plans 43% with no plan never reopen If they do reopen, only 29% are still open two years later
  • RISK COMMUNICATION
  •  Incredible restorative function of business (Director Fugate) ROB rules in disaster resonse….
  • The Power of a Picture: Photos andVideos.
  • Study topics When is too much info „bad‟ How to optimize the theory “transparency breeds self- correcting behavior”
  • References The Role of Business in Disaster Response, US Chamber of Commerce/Business Civic Leadership Center, 2012
  • Nyc - resilience 911 Greatest example of resilience – canal street south completely shut down to vehicles – cement dust and debris coated every inch of buildings and streets – 16 acre „pile‟ – gutted center of the financial district
  • Wrap Large-scale have phases that go on for decades – still working Katrina issues , still individuals in „temp‟ housing; still an active series of recovery issues that are actively managed -
  • Info needs Need to add the context against the array of distributed info that spews from an incident Who adds the context, how, how to then distribute it, refresh it, stay relevant How to embrace the disparate nodes and corral them to a more powerful effect. Aggregation tools? – visual displays Data and info must be proactively contextualized – by credible source?, by an aggregate in a freely dispersed environment…
  • The Cycle
  •  Social media and extensive communications channels, including historically novel and significant expectations on
  • Expectations The president was expecdted (via press q‟s) to everyday know how much ice and water were distributed to new orleans Or in dwh, how much oil had leaked that day – info mgmt means accurante info on details has to move from reliable/validated source Info: how much/how many. Will always be many answers unless all agree on „as of time and date‟ and from „what geographic area‟ – a „simple‟ question but unless there is a common understandingof the parameters, answers will sound „uninformed‟….get through this by establishing a set time for reporting/freeze the counts, communicate the agreement of parameters
  •  The standup 8 hr (really every 6) change of shiftsL - LB FD reponse to 5000 gal baker tank 30% hydrogen peroxide self-venting….the 36 hour perspective watching 6 shift changes. Whiteboard on a pier – each brief, key pieces were dropped – perished. Not uncommon – continuity of people balanced against fatigue question
  • Info expectations All responses have phases Need to be clear about movement from one „phase‟ to another‟ and the info expectatIons between different phases Create distinct phases that cause shift in tactics, and communicates the progress ─ cap hill: emergency phase to recovery phase ─ dwh: katrina: rescue phase to recovery
  • References Howitt, Arnold and Herman Leonard, Managing Crises: Responses to Large-Scale Emergencies; CQ Press, Washington DC, 2009. Renaud, Cynthia Leonard, Herman and Arnold M. Howitt, Katrina as Prelude: Preparing for and Respnding to Future Katrina-Class Distrurbances in the United States; Testimony before the U.S. Senate Homealnd Security and Governmental Affairs Committee; 8 march 2006 Townsend, Francis, et al; The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina – Lessons Learned; February 2006. Kulisch, Gail P. et al; LNGC CATALUNYA SPIRIT Adrift Incident After Action Report; une 2008. Telfer, Erich; Unlimited Impossibilities: Intelligence Support to the Deepwater Horizon Response; Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, National Defense Intelligence University, DIA (Unpublished) Dec 2011. Rupert, Richard; Federal on-scene Coordinator‟s Report for the Capitol Hill Site, Washington, D.C.; USEPA Region 3; undated. US Coast Guard, On-Scene Coordinator Report Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Submitted to National Response Team, Sept 2011. Floriida Division of Emergency Management, Deepwater Horizon Response 30Apr2010 – 27AUg2010, After Action Report/Improvement Plan, 2March2011 Papp, Rober t, COMDT USCG, BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR), Final Report, Jan 2011
  • National Level ExercisesThe „Next Best Thing‟ to Actual Events NLE11 – New Madrid Fault Earthquake (May 2011) NLE12 – Cyber Focus (October 2012) ─ New Paradigm: Distributed Effects ─ Specifically Test:  Impacts to Infrastructure/Physical Effects  Information Exchange/Communications  National Cyber Incident Response Plan  Federal Government Continuity
  • ─ Deep Dive into Information Management: DEEPWATER HORIZON Case Study - CDR Erich Telfer, USCG─ Information Management – Broader Context─ Decision-Making in Large-Scale Crises
  • Bring Order to the Chaos Get A System in Place (GASP) – quickly  National Incident Management System (NIMS) − Necessary, But Not Necessarily Sufficient  National Response Framework − Whole of government effort Recognize the Key Attributes of a Large-Scale Response – Novelty, Complexity, Distributed Consequences, Insufficient Quantities of Specialized Equipment Sustainably Staff and Equip – National and Corporate Level Allocation and Designations
  • Tool Time Volunteer Tracking COP ICS Forms Management/Tracking Notifications and Alerts Interactive Mediums Hybrid Emergency Management Software
  • Volunteer2.com VolSoftwww.iamresponding.com
  • Katrina (2005) Worst case scenario – levees protecting major city breached Required full national engagement – „Beyond FEMA‟ Led to comprehensive review of National structure and established whole of government mechanisms NRF published 2008
  • Deep Water Horizon Complexity exceeded previous incidents. ─ Role of designated private commercial entity („responsible party‟) in a national level response ─ Uncontrolled release at unprecedented depth Sufficiency of the National Contingency Plan challenged.
  • Erich
  • Define InformationRequirements, Systems, andDissemination
  • Incident Communications and Structures:Before, During, and After Before – Minimize the Impact: Information „pushed‟ to potential victims – e.g. warning phase - Good Robo Calls : one of the first times „robo calls‟ used to scale was LA fires in 200x - warned individuals in remote area and communicated instructions e.g. „evacuate and go to the Staples Center‟ - Downside: Non-receipt and tracking of same – this past summer‟s Waldo Canyon fire in Colorado - more then 20,000 evacuation calls never delivered to residents in the path – two-thirds of the 32,000 impacted residents New tools to account, distribute, and engage all levels: ─ - People Finder (Haiti) ─ - Real-Time Logistics Tracking/Inventory and Distribution Technology (post-Katrina emphasis) ─ - Codified NIC structure and instituted multiple Incident Commanders concept creating mechanisms for direct engagement with impacted populations (Cosco Busan concerned citizen volunteers), impacted industries (fishermen in GOM), Congressional Members and staff (Cap Hill Anthrax), and accountable elected leaders (DWH). Command and control – distributed decision-making and engagement of the local elected leaders (DWH)
  • Information Management Proliferation of tools ─ Emergent and initial incident (warning phase) ─ Incident management (response phase) ─ Post-crisis (recovery phase) Define Information Requirements, Systems, and Dissemination
  •  Its not the size that matters – complexity as a differentiator When there is no script – the unthinkable and the new normal US Government Structural Transition and the Rise of the super-NIC NIMS is necessary – but not sufficient Situational Awareness on Steroids Tools and schools Brokering limited resources – Whole of Effort – global private sector players as experts in Scale who understand large problems…and can opportunity to Scale
  •  Harnessing the Private Sector - People Finder - Satellite Based emergency networks for responders
  • Tactics and tools at the speed of light New environment demands new tools to meet those needsdata and information must be contextualized ─ - rapid evolution of COP tools, incident notification tools, mapping tools; e.g.  HSIN: − Common Operational Picture (COP) provides situational awareness and analysis; − Integrated Common Analytical Viewer (iCAV) gives geographical visualization,; − 24/7 availability, document Libraries, instant-messaging tool, Web conferencing, incident reporting, Common Operational Picture (COP) provides situational awareness and analysis, announcements, discussion boards, task lists, requests for Information/or Your Information (RFIs/FYIs), calendars − Really Simple Syndication (RSS) Feeds − Online training materials − ERMA
  • Is too much information Bad?Is the info „accurate‟?Is it „current‟ with respect to the receive-act timeframe? If it wasaccurate 1 minute ago and you now receive it at time +3mindoes it cause more harm? Who determines „accurate‟?Is it this data or information? – experience accelerates thedetermination of „harm vs benefit‟ for info pieces and cycles –other ways to rapidly assess „harm vs benefit‟? Who decides –one persons harm is another‟s benefit….and, on top of that,what is the power and value of „transparency‟…do weunderestimate the power of“Transparency breeds self-correcting behavior” – ADM ThadAllen, USCG (ret)
  • Frameworks and Structures Evolve over the course of the incident Nims is necessary but „not sufficient‟ in large-scale disasters – in addition to accepted and trained-to structures, LSDs must have systems for addressing contentious decisions that require „not insignificant‟ trade-offs ─ Role for elected and appointed leaders responsible to the citizenry. ─ Facilitated by an agreed upon, „codified‟ acknowledged process. ─ Realistic acknowledgement of individual tactics , using information means and media, to influence others and position ones priorities above others - goal here is to gain as much common consensus with agreed upon best possible data/information, visible to each other.
  •  In large-scale, a number of issues rise to this level….how best to maximize that „opportunity‟ ─ Invest in a solid NIMS process to bring as many issues into the NIMS/IC – Area Command process as possible; the better the workings and processes inside NIMS, the better the chance issues not „addressable‟ at AC level or IC level must ─ Courageous, knowledgable, articulate NIC  Meta-Leader  Knows what moves into the brokered sphere  Knows how to minimize the disconnects creating unnecessary engagement of senior leaders  Communications mastery – complex concepts made simple  Visible  No personal agenda/affiliation – „agnostic‟ – direct report to CIC…
  •  Information versus data - How do you educate at the same time you inform?New language, no framework…. - what parameters guide or determine how porous andrapid the data flow is versus information assessment by„experts‟ – does free flow of data (accurate or inaccurate)spur
  • Efforts to flow data and information… Can not themselves create more chaos - still need a system, still need some degree of site control, accounting for victims and responders, hazard assessment…. How to share imperfect and evolving information – will you always be „wrong‟? ─ Create deliberate structures of reporting e.g. “as of” information ─ Match to normal cycles of information requirements ─ Simultaneous „picture‟ ─ The CG helicopter rescues during Katrina Pentagon 911 response, the DC fire dept and units from MD that they mobilized showed up and operated on the pentagon site without informing or integrating into the professionally well-known ICS structure - acted independently
  • The Meta Leader as Communicator Must earn the confidence of highly diverse set of both the engaged and enraged. Must see strategic picture. Be able to speak to detail of most elements. Communicate at multi-levels. Make people feel „safe‟ when they are „unsafe‟ and „unsure‟. Contextualizes data and information for common understanding. Lays out the areas for hard-choices ─ DWH not enough boom for everyone.
  • Info needs Need to add the context against the array of distributed info that spews from an incident Who adds the context, how, how to then distribute it, refresh it, stay relevant How to embrace the disparate nodes and corral them to a more powerful effect. Aggregation tools? – visual displays Data and info must be proactively contextualized – by credible source?, by an aggregate in a freely dispersed environment…
  •  Do the same principles apply if - event is predicted- Resources are prestaged- Vulnerabilities and impact area are known
  • The Averted Crisis – LNGC CATALYUNASPIRIT Disabled Adrift – April 2008 Words matter – Be Careful With Terms of Art ─ Careful and deliberate selection of terms can ease tension, minimize misunderstanding…poorly selected terms with specialized meaning can fuel rhetoric and misinform perception.  Safe Anchorage versus Harbor of Refuge (what is it hiding from)  Returned to International Service (conveys acceptance of standards by a legitimate independent body) versus „Allowed to Enter Port‟ which others might interpret as a personal decision of an individual without context.
  • Info mgmt within the zone - disaster and crisis phase – rely on preexisting natural nodes within the community – unique to each community – a church, civic group, or school system (joplin high school) – serve as comms and coordination nodes Citizens want to engage – economic incentives, environmental sensitivity incentives, desire to contribute, feeling of having control (COSCO Busan) The Role of Business
  •  - effective comms and info mgmt and decision making structures will depend on whether there is a culture of „self-relience‟ and „resilience‟ or a culture of „dependence „ and „vulnerability‟….in either case, the need for extraordinary external engagement and support is necessary, how that becomes interfaced, coordinated, and implemented depends on which circumstance the community is grounded in. Individuals can be either, this is a characterization of the collective behavior not individual behavior.
  • Influencers - precrisis alignement and pre-existing relationships (w/business, govenrment entities, private sector groups, the broader response community) – increase resilience precrisis macro culture (reliance or independence)
  • RISK COMMUNICATION
  • References The Role of Business in Disaster Response, US Chamber of Commerce/Business Civic Leadership Center, 2012
  • The meta leader as communicator Must see strategic picture Know every detail of every element Communicate at multi-levels Make people feel „safe‟ when they feel „unsafe‟ and „unsure‟ Contextualizes data and information for common understanding Lays out the areas for hard-choices ─ - DWH not enough boom for everyone
  •  The standup 8 hr (really every 6) change of shiftsL - LB FD reponse to 5000 gal baker tank 30% hydrogen peroxide self-venting….the 36 hou r perspective watching 6 shift changes. Whiteboard on a pier – each brief, key pieces were dropped – perished. Not uncommon – continuity of people balanced against fatigue question Risk was „local‟ if they dropped a key piece of info – so didn‟t illustrate critical need; but you operate for the big one the way you practice for the little ones.
  • Information Disrupters Phase Change Significant New Variable
  • References Howitt, Arnold and Herman Leonard, Managing Crises: Responses to Large-Scale Emergencies; CQ Press, Washington DC, 2009. Leonard, Herman and Arnold M. Howitt, Katrina as Prelude: Preparing for and Respnding to Future Katrina-Class Distrurbances in the United States; Testimony before the U.S. Senate Homealnd Security and Governmental Affairs Committee; 8 march 2006 Townsend, Francis, et al; The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina – Lessons Learned; February 2006. Kulisch, Gail P. et al; LNGC CATALUNYA SPIRIT Adrift Incident After Action Report; une 2008. Telfer, Erich; Unlimited Impossibilities: Intelligence Support to the Deepwater Horizon Response; Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, National Defense Intelligence University, DIA (Unpublished) Dec 2011. Rupert, Richard;; Federal on-scene Coordinator‟s Report for the Capitol Hill Site, Washington, D.C.; USEPA Region 3; undated. US Coast Guard, On-Scene Coordinator Report Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Submitted to National Response Team, Sept 2011. Floriida Division of Emergency Management, Deepwater Horizon Response 30Apr2010 – 27AUg2010, After Action Report/Improvement Plan, 2March2011 Papp, Rober t, COMDT USCG, BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR), Final Report, Jan 2011
  • Spare Slides
  •  http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html? webmap=84af65e379fb42dfbbb94e8bf0d78f5d&ex tent=-80.8474,36.1439,-69.9709,40.3104 Migratory bird map - baseline
  •  http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html? webmap=84af65e379fb42dfbbb94e8bf0d78f5d&ex tent=-80.8474,36.1439,-69.9709,40.3104 Migratory bird map - baseline
  • Wrap Large-scale have phases that go on for decades – still working Katrina issues , still individuals in „temp‟ housing; still an active series of recovery issues that are actively managed -
  •  Uncomfortable to responders National Security Concerns Decision-Making Ahead of Decision-Makers
  •  http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html? webmap=ecfd899b55e944a1977f00c06a111013&e xtent=-95.4268,29.5805,-94.747,29.8685 Wetlands map baseline
  • Frameworks and Structures Evolve over the course of the incident
  • HARNESSING THE INFORMATION Chaos phase Initial response NIMS ICS →→ NRF Build-out Mature Feedback Loops Proactively and Adjust Engage/Deliberat Response Define Information ely Distribute Requirements Collect and Distribute InformationEstablish Mode R: Refine StructureIncident and ProcessesManagement Mode C: Escalate - ShiftStructure Leadership and Structure
  • Incident Communications and Structures:Highly Engaged Communities and Opportunities Before – Minimize the Impact: Information „pushed‟ to potential victims – e.g. warning phase ─ Good Robo Calls : one of the first times „robo calls‟ used to scale was LA fires in 200x - warned individuals in remote area and communicated instructions e.g. „evacuate and go to the Staples Center‟ ─ Downside: Non-receipt and tracking of same – this past summer‟s Waldo Canyon fire in Colorado - more then 20,000 evacuation calls never delivered to residents in the path – two-thirds of the 32,000 impacted residents Now - New tools to account, distribute, and engage all levels: ─ People Finder (Haiti) ─ Real-Time Logistics Tracking/Inventory and Distribution Technology (post- Katrina emphasis) Command and control – distributed decision-making and engagement of the local elected leaders (DWH)
  • Information Management Proliferation of tools. ─ Emergent and initial incident (warning phase) ─ Incident management (response phase) ─ Post-crisis (recovery phase)
  • New Methods and Innovation Novelty Requires Technical and Organizational Improv and Adaptation. ─ Anthrax  Decontamination techniques. ─ DWH  Capping Technologies  Manually Controlling a Well at Unprecedented Depth The Power of the Private Sector.
  • Is too much information Bad?Is the info „accurate‟?Is it „current‟ with respect to the receive-act timeframe? If it wasaccurate 1 minute ago and you now receive it at time +3mindoes it cause more harm? Who determines „accurate‟?Is it this data or information? – experience accelerates thedetermination of „harm vs benefit‟ for info pieces and cycles –other ways to rapidly assess „harm vs benefit‟? Who decides –one persons harm is another‟s benefit….and, on top ofthat, what is the power and value of „transparency‟…do weunderestimate the power of“Transparency breeds self-correcting behavior” – ADM ThadAllen, USCG (ret)
  • Info mgmt within the zone - disaster and crisis phase – rely on preexisting natural nodes within the community – unique to each community – a church, civic group, or school system (joplin high school) – serve as comms and coordination nodes