Larry Sherman How Criminology Can Save the States from Bankruptcy

Less Prison + More Policing = Less CrimeHow Criminology Can Save the States from Bankruptcy

Lawrence W. Sherman
Jerry Lee Centers of Criminology
Universities of Cambridge
and Pennsylvania
April 21, 2010

Summary
If criminal justice policy were based only on current evidence of its cost-effectiveness, we would have
Less money spent on prison
More money spent on police
Fewer Serious Crimes, Less Total Harm
Fewer states threatened with bankruptcy

Cost-Effectiveness of Prison?
1. General Deterrence? Unknown
2. Specific Deterrence? Unknown
(Weak evidence of No Effect, or Net Increase)
3. Incapacitation: Wasted on Many.
Most people want “Willie Hortons” in prison
Relatively few people in prison are “Willie Hortons”
Many “Willie Hortons” get probation, parole
Only Virginia has adopted risk-based sentencing
Even Virginia fails to use seriousness as key factor

Cost-Effectiveness of Police?
General Deterrence:
Hot Spots Patrols (displacement debate)
Traffic and minor crime enforcement
Possibly total N of police
Incapacitation
Serious Repeat Offenders
Situational Crime Prevention: POP
Specific Deterrence: More diversion, less court

Less Crime?
Lock Up The Worst, Manage the Rest
Lock Up The Worst: Less Serious Crime
Manage the Rest: More Surveillance by Police with probation & parole
Criminal Events vs. People Who Commit Crime
1. Individuals  Events in Hot Spots
2. Police presence deters events
3. POP alters causal structure of events
Crime Victims Prefer Diversion, Also Reducing Crime

Criminologists at Work
Daniel NaginJoan Petersilia
Richard BerkDavid Weisburd
Frank CullenAnthony Braga
Kate BowersChris Koper

Outline
Premises
Key Concepts
--“Push-button” Policy Systems
-- Crime Harm Index (CHI)
-- Risk-Based Policies
--A General Theory of Crime, Prisons & Police
Evidence on Prisons
Evidence on Policing
Who Can Push the Buttons? How?

1. Premises: What Criminal Justice Needs
People Need Criminal Justice to
Protect them from loss of liberty to be secure
Hold offenders accountable for their crimes
3. Cost taxpayers as little as possible
This Requires a System of Criminal Justice that
Produces consequences for every decision that are
Predictable, based on good evidence, and
Chosen democratically, by managing the system

2. Key Concepts
A. “Push-Button” Policy Systems
B. Crime Harm Index: CHI
C. Risk-Based Policies
D. General Theory of Crime, Prisons & Police

2. a. “Push-Button” Policy Systems

Contrast
Before Keynes
Case Studies
Trends
Histories
Explanations
Micro-level studies
Little intervention
No “buttons” to push
Economy beyond control
After Keynes
Government has key buttons
Pushing can help a lot
Which ones to push?
When to push them?
What effect predicted?
How do buttons affect each other?

Push-Button Criminology
Case-by-case crime policy now “Laissez-Faire”
Interventionist policy: more control of trends
Key buttons to push: prisons, police, probation & parole
Pushing wrong buttons, case-by-case: research evidence shows
--Too much prison for too little benefit
--Not enough optimizing of police
Pushing right buttons requires system policy
Guided by a general theory

A General Theory
Macro-economics:
--societies as the unit of analysis
--not individuals
--not transactions
2. Rates across societies:
--Independent variables
(causes)
--Dependent variables
(effects)
Money  Employment

Neo-Keynesian Economics
Causes (Independent)
Money supply
Interest Rates
Tariffs
Taxation
Deficits
Effects (Dependent)
Employment
GDP
Gross National Happiness (Bhutan):
--crime
--disease
--mortality
--inequality

Macro-Criminology
Causes (Independent)
Prison
Police
Probation/Parole
Effects (Dependent)
Crime
Detection Rates
Crime Harm Index (CHI)

2.b. Crime Harm Index ( CHI )?
Not UCR Index—Challenge to BJS! (US Senate)
Like Consumer Price Index (CPI)
CHI Elements weighted according to formula
Sum of each (Crime X Cost = Cost per event)
Divided by Population (CHI per person)
Murder = $5 million, Burglary = $1,000
British Crime Survey uses some costs of crime
Could also be based on public opinion data
Limited to reliably counted categories

Beyond Neo-Classical Deterrence
Assumptions that
All crimes cause equal harm
All offenders commit crimes of equal harm
All prisons prevent equal harm per inmate
All police deter equal numbers of crimes
General, not specific, deterrence rules most
Punishment never escalates crime, just deters

BAD “Push-Button Criminology”

Total Incarceration Rate

Non-Police Data: Different Trend(BJS—NCVS)

Police Count  Crime Count

Not Complex Enough for CHI
Prisoners vary highly in risk of “Willie Horton” crimes
Incapacitation effects on Crime Harm Index vary by risk level of people imprisoned
Imprisonment effects on CHI vary by age, first offense, etc.
Police impact on CHI varies highly by what they do
Especially vary in allocating time by risk level to
1. places
2. offenders
3. victims
Theories of CHI Must Focus on Risk of Serious Harm

2.c. Risk-Based Policies
Police
Prosecutors
Sentencing; Prisons
Parole and Probation

Peaks and Valleys of Crime
(Distribution of Violent Offenses in Tokyo)

A “Hockey Stick” CumulativeCurve:The “Power Few”

Normal Distribution

The Willie Horton Problem: Over-Prediction of High Risk
Extreme cases put low-risk people in prison
“Just in case”
No Prediction  More False Positives
----------------------------
Response Assumes Normal Curve
Increases dosage for all, not few
Rising Prison Rates
Not needed if responding to the “power few”

Risk-Based Policy:Foundation of Cost-Effectiveness
Pew Trust Report
RAND 1982 Report on Selective Incapacitation
Idea rejected by 1986 NAS Report on Error
False positives too high for values
But prison rate has tripled
False positives are embedded in sentencing
Actuarial Risk could get them out, not put them in

Since 1986: New Generation of Risk Forecasting
Based only on Prior Charges, Residence, Age, Sex—no PSR
Nothing qualitative
More like a short-term weather forecast
Based on huge samples
E.g., 30,000 in Philadelphia
Journal Royal Statistical Society, Series A, 2009
Richard Berk

Clinical vs. Statistical Forecasts
Since Meehl 1954 Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction
Statistical Prediction beats Clinical
Most contests before statistical learning
Cheap supercomputers
“Data mining” that assays every possible pattern of precursors
Identifies best prediction combinations

2-Dimensional Risk—or More?
Seriousness
Low High
Low 1 2
Frequency*
High 3 4
*Not probability (prevalence)

High Risk (2%)
Neither High nor Low Risk (38%)
Low Risk (60%)
Geoffrey Barnes (2007) 2-Year Berk Forecast Test, Philadelphia APPD Cases

High Risk 2% vs. Bottom 60%
Two Years From Forecast Date
Charges for Any Offence 8 X more
Charges Serious Offence 10 X more
Charges Murder or Attempt 75 X more

Group Average Number of Charges for ANY Offense Within Two Years of Probation Start
18.1
High
Neither
Low
7.75
2.25

Average Number of Charges for SERIOUS Crimes Within Two Years of Probation Start
3.13
High
Neither
Low
1.28
0.30

Average Charges for MURDER or Attempted Murder Within Two Years of Probation Start
.375
High
Neither
Low
.033
.005

Total Charges:High Risk 2% Over 2 Years
For every 100 Offenders:
--37 charges of murder or attempted murder
--318 charges of serious crime (murder, rape, robbery)
--1800 charges for all crimes

2.d. A General Theory of Crime, Prisons & Police
The higher the proportion of inmates who are high-frequency and high-harm, the more cost-effective prisons will be in lowering CHI.
The higher the proportion of police time spent on high-risk places, victims and offenders, the more cost-effective police will be in lowering CHI.
The more low-risk offenders police hold accountable for their crimes without using prison, the more cost-effective police at reducing CHI.

1. Prisons
The higher the proportion of inmates who are high-frequency and high-harm, the more cost-effective prisons will be in lowering CHI.
NB: Prisons would have to have many fewer inmates to become more cost-effective

2. Police Time
The higher the proportion of police time on high-risk places, victims and offenders, the more cost-effective police will be in lowering CHI.
NB: a. Just adding police is not predicted to cause less crime or harm
b. Reductions in crime harm could come with even fewer police, depending on their focus

3. Police Dispositions
The more low-risk offenders police hold accountable for their crimes without using prison, the more cost-effective police will be at lowering CHI.
NB: If police stop using arrest and prosecution where tested alternatives are available, they will be more cost-effective without spending more money.

My Title is Not Quite Right
Less prison, more police = less crime?
Not necessarily
Easier to say it that way
But risk-based policy is crucial
Theory of cost-effective CHI effects depends on it
Thus, conditional on optimizing risk-based allocations,
More prison could, with More Police = Less Crime
But More Prison would not Cost Effectiveness

Taking Cost Into Account
Prison rate hits diminishing returns quickly
Very few offenders per 100 seem worth locking up
Look at the evidence: prisons and police

3. Evidence on Prisons
If we use risk analysis,
Who Goes to Prison?
Who Doesn’t?
Preliminary analysis in Philadelphia suggests
half of all sentenced to prison are low-risk, yet
half of all high-risk offenders not given prison

Nagin and Cullen, 2009Crime and Justice Vol. 38
Daniel Nagin
Frank Cullen
“Special” Effects of Imprisonment on the Imprisoned:
5 Experimental studies of custody  more crime
11 Matching studies juvenile custody  more crime
Propensity Score Matching  mixed effects

4. Evidence on Police:Clear effects, More on Costs Needed
a. Places
1. Hot Spot Patrols
2. Problem-Oriented Policing
3. Displacement
b. Offenders
High-frequency, high-harm
Dispositions
Youth offenders
Domestic Violence
Restorative Justice

Campbell Collaboration
Systematic Reviews
Many with meta-analyses
Peer-Reviewed
NIJ support (UK, Holland, Canada, Sweden)
Chinese and English versions
Norwegian Government website:
www.campbellcollaboration.org

a. Policing Places
Anthony Braga review: Increasing police in high risk places reduces crime & disorder there
Koper & Mayo-Wilson: policing gun crime places  less gun crime
Weisburd, et al: Problem-Oriented Policing POP  less crime & disorder
Displacement: Weisburd, Bowers, others

b. Policing High-Risk Offenders
Two Randomized Controlled Trials:
Police Foundation (Washington)
RAND (Albuquerque, NM)

c. Detection, Dispositions, Accountability
Campbell Reviews:
Juvenile Prosecution: Petrosino et al 2010
Domestic Violence: NIJ experiments
Restorative Justice: UK, Australia, US
Shapland, et al 2008
Cost effectiveness on RJ in UK = 8 to 1 return

Grounded Theory of Crime, Police and Prisons
Police and prisons may cause crime as well as prevent it
Effects of police and prisons on crime depend on who is treated how
In general, prison does more harm than policing
In general, police do more good than prisons
Precise decisions needed to reduce harm, increase prevention.

5. Who Can Push the Buttons? How?
1. Governors and State Legislatures
--Sentencing Guidelines
--Parole Violations (less stick?)
--Bigger carrot: State funding more local police with prison savings
2. County Prosecutors & Judges
--Diversion from prosecution , Based on risk
--Incentives of more police in their county
3. Local Police Chiefs
--Hot spot patrols
--Problem-Oriented Policing (POP)
--Restorative solutions
4. Federal Leadership:
--showing the way
--funding more police, as incentives to states

Bankrupting States
NY Times: Schwarzenegger Seeks Shift From Prisons to Schools (by Jennifer Steinhauer Jan 6, 2010 )
State Constitutional Amendment
Referendum
No more money to prisons than to U of Calif.
But how to do it?
Privatization? Probably not.

HOW? Political Evidence
Reducing prison by early release may backfire
IF Money appears to be only motive
No analysis of public safety
No claim that less prison could  less crime

Front-End Beats Back-End
Arrest
Prosecution
Sentencing Guidelines
Risk Analysis at each step—before prison.
“These people were not sent to prison
on purpose!”
Why? Because it would have wasted your money. They weren’t dangerous enough.

UK Early Release
14 Days before sentence to end
2007-2010
Many crimes committed 2 weeks after release
But same would be true after full term
No evidence that net crime went up
But no randomized trial to test that theory
Result: Labour Prime Minister blamed

The Politics of Early Release

Emergency Release--US
NY Times: (Monica Davey, March 4, 2010)
“Safety Is Issue as Budget Cuts Free Prisoners”
Oregon suspends program—radio ads
Illinois program a “big mistake.”
Colorado—$14 million savings lost
Michigan—big drop, big challenges

Carrots and Sticks
Cost-saving is a stick, at front end or back
More police is a carrot
Cohen’s national data show people prefer to spend more money on police than prisons
Use some savings on prison budgets to hire more police

A Federal Carrot?
Plan A: Federal program could match local funds invested in policing out of less prison for low-risk offenders.
Plan B: Federal program could match local funds invested in policing high-harm targets
Plan C: Both A and B
Federal buttons to lower Crime Harm Index

Federal Leadership:Research and Development
1. More support for automated risk forecasting
2. More Randomized trials, COST-EFFECTIVENESS,
Risk-Based Policing
Risk-Based Charging
Risk-Based Sentencing
Risk-Based Parole Release
Risk-Based Parole Revocation

Beyond a Crisis
Bankruptcy is a bad reason to do this.
But it is a good opportunity.
If the result is less crime, cost issues may fade
The Obama administration has made history in health care
Can we now make history in criminal justice as well?
My answer: Yes we can.

THANK YOU

Lawrence W. Sherman
Jerry Lee Centers of Criminology
Universities of Cambridge
and Pennsylvania
April 21, 2010

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